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Ar 

LA 


DUE  PROCESS  qf  LAW 

and 
THE  EQUAL  PROTECTION 

qfthe  LAWS 

A  Treatise  Based,  in  the  Main,  on  the  Cases  in  Which 

the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  Has 

Granted  or  Denied  Relief  upon  the 

One   Ground   or  the   Other 


By  HANNIS  TAY|»OR 

Hon.  LL.  D.  of  the  Dnivenitiet  of  £Jihi>ur^lKLnd  Dublin  and  of  eight 

American  Dnivenitiet 


Author  of  The  JurisdictUn  and  Procedure  of  thi  Supremi  Court  of  the 
United  States**;  *' International  Public  Law**;  "The  Science  of 
Jurisprudence**  (Presented  to  the  Institute  of  France,  March  13, 
1909);  ''The  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  English  Constitution**;  ''The 
Origin  and  Growth  of  the  American  Constitution**;  "Cicero,  a 
Sketch  of  His  Life  and  Works.  'A  Commentary  on  the  Roman  Con-- 
stitution  and  Roman  Public  Life.**  Sometime  Minister  Plenipo- 
tentiary of  the  United  States  to  Spain. 


CHICAGO 

CALLAGHAN  AND  COMPANY 

191  7 


GOPTBIGHT  1917 
BT 

CALLAGHAN  &  COMPANY 


242';  66 


■  •^  •  • 


•  ^» 


"v 


tKitt  antfior  \tAitatti  tfittf  book 
to  W  slon 

HANNIS  JOSEPH  TAYLOR 

Tecentlj  admitted  to  the  bar,  and  through  him  to 
the  new  generation  of  American  lawyers  who  wiU 
be  called  upon  to  defend  the  ancient  constitutional 
guaranties  imbedded  in  ''the  law  of  the  land" 
against  the  persistent  effort  now  in  progress  to  sub- 
stitute for  them  a  bureaucratic  system  based  on  the 
deadly  assumption  that  this  is  no  longer  "a  thorough 
government  of  law  as  contradistinguished  to  a  gov- 
ernment of  functionaries." 


Qniunquam  te,  Marce  fill,  .  .  .  Cari  sunt  pa- 
rentes,  cari  liberi,  propinqui,  familiares,  sed  omnes 
omnium  caritates  patria  una  complexa  est,  pro  qua 
qnis  bonus  dubitet  mortem  oppetere,  si  ei  sit  pro- 
raturuaf     Cicero,  De  Offldis,  I,  i,  xvii. 


PREFACE 


The  principles  embodied  in  the  constitntional  formu- 
lafi — due  process  of  law  and  the  equal  protection  of  the 
\awa — are  the  ultimate  outcome  of  the  progressive  history 
of  the  English  and  American  peoples  considered  as  one 
unbroken  development.    The  basic  conception^  whether  it 
be  called  **due  process  of  law*'  or  *Hhe  law  of  the  land,'* 
is  purely  an  English  creation  which  has  no  prototype  in 
the  constitutional  history  of  any  other  country.     As 
lieber  has  expressed  it,  ''The  guaranty  of  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  law  [due  process]  leads  to  a  principle  which, 
so  far  as  I  know,  it  has  never  been  attempted  to  trans- 
plant from  the  soil  inhabited  by  Anglican  people,  and 
which,  nevertheless,  has  been,  in  our  system  of  liberty,  the 
natural  production  of  a  thorough  government  of  law  as 
contradistinguished  to  a  government  of  functionaries.'' 
CivU  Liberty  and  Self -Government,  91. 

As  thus  defined,  due  process  of  law  stands  as  the  anti- 
pole of  what  the  French  jurists  call  droit  administratif , 
which  rests  upon  the  assumption  that  in  France  the  gov- 
ermnent  and  each  of  its  servants  possess  a  body  of 
special  rights  and  privileges  as  against  private  citizens 
to  be  fixed  on  principles  different  from  those  defining  the 
legal  rights  and  duties  of  one  citizen  towards  another. 
Under  that  theory,  speaking  generally,  the  ordinary 
tribunals  have  no  concern  with  administrative  law  (droit 
administratif)  as  applied  by  administrative  courts  {tri- 
bunaux  administratif s)  ^  at  the  head  of  which  stands  the 
Council  of  State.  Dalloz,  Jurisprudence  Generale,  1883, 
ii,  p.  212;  iii,  p.  94;  1884,  i,  p.  220;  Aucoc,  Droit  Admin- 


vi  PEEPACE 

istratif ,  ss,  24,  269-272 ;  Vivien,  Etudes  Administratives, 
i,  pp.  129, 140 ;  M.  P.  BoBuf,  Droit  Administratif  (4~  ed.), 
p.  11 ;  Dicey,  The  Law  of  the  Constitution,  pp.  50, 252, 306- 
332;  Taylor,  The  Science  of  Jurisprudence,  pp.  88-9. 
For  example  if  a  body  of  policemen  in  France,  who  have 
broken  into  a  monastery,  seized  its  property  and  expelled 
its  inmates  under  an  administrative  order,  are  charged 
with  what  English  lawyers  would  call  trespass  and 
assault,  they  would  plead  as  an  exemption  the  govern- 
ment 's  mandate  in  the  execution  of  its  decrees  dissolving 
certain  religious  societies.  If  the  right  to  plead  that 
exemption  is  questioned  before  an  ordinary  civil  tribunal, 
a  ** conflict*'  arises  which  can  not  be  settled  by  an  ordi- 
nary judge  under  what  we  would  call  the  law  of  the  land. 
In  that  illustration  we  have  a  sharply  defined  distinction 
between  **a  thorough  government  of  law  as  contradis- 
tinguished to  a  government  of  functionaries.** 

Mr.  Dicey  has  said  that  **The  words  *  administrative 
law,  *  which  are  its  most  natural  rendering,  are  unknown 
to  English  judges  and  counsel,  and  are  in  themselves 
hardly  intelligible  without  further  explanation.  This 
absence  from  our  language  of  any  satisfactory  equiva- 
lent for  the  expression  droit  administrcUif  is  significant ; 
the  want  of  a  name  arises  at  bottom  from  our  non-recog- 
nition of  the  thing  itself.  In  England,  and  in  countries 
which,  like  the  United  States,  derive  their  civilization 
from  English  sources,  the  system  of  administrative  law 
and  the  very  principles  on  which  it  rests  are  in  truth 
unknown.  This  absence  from  the  institutions  of  the 
Union  of  anything  answering  to  droit  administratif 
arrested  the  observation  of  Tocqueville  from  the  first 
moment  when  he  began  his  investigations  into  the  char- 
acter of  American  democracy.  In  1831  he  writes  to  an 
experienced  judge  {magistrat)j  Monsieur  De  Blosseville, 
to  ask  both  for  an  explanation  of  the  contrast  in  this  mat- 
ter between  French  and  American  institutions,  and  also 
for  an  authoritative  explanation  of  the  general  ideas 
(notions  generates)  governing  the  droit  administratif  of 


PREFACE  vu 

his  country. ' '    The  Law  of  the  Constitntion,  p.  307,  citmg 
Tooqueville,  CEuvres  Completes,  vii,  p.  66. 

The  first  and  only  attempt  ever  made  to  induce  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  Utaited  States  to  recognize  the 
existence  in  this  country  of  a  droit  administratif  occurred 
in  the  famous  case  of  the  United  States  v.  Lee,  106  U.  S. 
196,  involving  the  title  to  the  Arlington  estate,  sold  dur- 
ing the  Civil  war  to  the  United  States  for  taxes,  the  cer- 
tificate of  sale  being  impeached  because  of  the  refusal  of 
the  commissioners  to  permit  the  owner  to  pay  the  tax, 
with  interest  and  costs,  before  the  day  of  sale,  by  an 
agent,  or  in  any  other  way  than  by  payment  in  person. 
After  the  case,  an  action  of  ejectment,  had  been  removed 
to  the  United  States  Circuit  Court,  the  Attorney  General 
challenged  its  jurisdiction,  and  denied  its  right  to  pro- 
ceed because  **the  property  in  controversy  in  this  suit 
has  been  for  more  than  ten  years  and  now  is  held,  occu- 
pied and  possessed  by  the  United  States,  through  its  offi- 
cers and  agents,  charged  in  behalf  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  with  the  control  of  the  property,  and 
who  are  in  the  actual  possession  thereof,  as  public  prop- 
erty of  the  United  States,  for  public  uses,  in  the  exercise 
of  their  sovereign  and  constitutional  powers  as  a  mili- 
tary station  and  as  a  national  cemetery  established  for 
the  burial  of  deceased  soldiers  and  sailors,  and  known 
and  designed  as  the  'Arlington  Cemetery.' ''  Against 
that  plea  of  droit  administratif  thus  set  up  by  the  agents 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  stood  the  conten- 
tion of  the  plaintiff  that  the  property  in  question  was  his 
private  property,  and  that  it  had  been  taken  from  him  in 
violation  of  the  constitutional  provisions  which  guaranty 
due  process  of  law,  and  that  private  property  can  not 
be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  The 
issue  so  made  up  between  the  droit  administratif  and 
'*the  law  of  the  land'*  was  thus  stated  by  the  court  itself: 
''The  counsel  for  plaintiffs  in  error  and  in  behalf  of  the 
United  States  assert  the  proposition,  that  though  it  has 
been  ascertained  by  the  verdict  of  the  jury,  in  which  no 


viu  PREFACE 

error  is  f ound|  that  the  plaintiff  has  the  title  to  the  land 
in  controversy,  and  that  what  is  set  up  in  behalf  of  the 
United  States  is  no  title  at  all,  the  court  can  render  no 
judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  defendants 
in  the  action,  because  the  latter  hold  the  property  as 
officers  and  agents  of  the  United  Staies  amd  it  is  appro- 
priated  to  lawful  public  uses/^  To  this,  perhaps  the 
piost  vital  question  ever  submitted  to  it,  the  Court 
answered,  in  the  majestic  words  of  Mr.  Justice  Miller, 
that  ''No  man  in  this  country  is  so  high  that  he  is  above 
the  law.  No  officer  of  the  law  may  set  that  law  at 
defiance,  with  impunity.  All  the  officers  of  the  Govern- 
ment, from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  are  creations  of 
the  law  and  are  bound  to  obey  it.  It  is  the  only  supreme 
power  in  our  system  of  government,  and  every  man  who, 
by  accepting  office,  participates  in  its  functions,  is  only 
the  more  strongly  bound  to  submit  to  that  supremacy, 
and  to  observe  the  limitations  which  it  imposes  upon 
the  exercise  of  the  authority  which  it  gives.  Courts  of 
justice  are  established  not  only  to  decide  upon  the  con- 
troverted rights  of  the  citizens  as  against  each  other, 
but  also  upon  rights  in  controversy  between  them  and 
the  Government,  and  the  docket  of  this  court  is  crowded 
with  controversies  of  the  latter  class.'*  No  more  notable 
triumph  was  ever  won  by  **the  law  of  the  land.*' 

The  germs  of  existing  English  and  American  ideas  of 
due  process  of  law  and  equal  protection  of  the  laws  first 
appeared  during  the  reign  of  Henry  II,  who  undertook 
not  only  to  establish  the  reign  of  law,  but  to  reduce  all 
orders  of  men  to  a  state  of  equality  before  the  same 
system  of  law.  The  most  formidable  obstacles  that  stood 
in  the  way  of  the  complete  execution  of  that  august 
design  were  the  baronage  on  the  one  hand,  with  their 
private  jurisdictions,  and  the  clergy  on  the  other,  with 
their  far-reaching  claims  of  exemption  from  ordinary 
process  of  the  temporal  tribunals.  As  Bishop  Stubbs 
has  expressed  it:  ''The  former  must  be  compelled  to 
agree  to  the  restriction  of  their  hereditary  jurisdictions 


PREFACE  is 

within  the  smallest  compass,  and  the  latter  to  allow 
themselves  to  be,  in  all  matters  not  purely  spiritual,  sub- 
ject to  the  ordinary  process  of  law  J*  Select  Charters, 
p.  21.  The  foundations  thus  laid  were  soon  widened  and 
strengthened  by  those  provisions  of  the  Great  Charter 
that  embody  a  series  of  practical  rules,  both  general  and 
special,  for  the  government  of  all  courts  in  the  admin- 
istration of  justice,  first  among  which  stand  chapters  39 
and  40,  providing:  ''and  we  will  not  set  forth  against 
him,  nor  send  against  him,  unless  by  the  lawful  judgment 
of  his  peers  and  by  the  law  of  the  land.  To  no  one  will 
we  sell,  to  no  one  will  we  refuse  or  delay,  right  or 
justice.'* 

During  the  period  that  intervened  between  the  Nor- 
man conquest  and  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century  the 
feudal  council  that  gathered  around  the  Norman  and 
Angevin  kings,  with  authority  too  vague  and  shadowy 
for  precise  definition,  was  gradually  transformed  into 
an  assembly  of  estates  that  won  not  only  the  right  to 
participate  in  taxation  and  legislation,  but  to  supervise 
and  control  the  entire  system  of  national  administration. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  period  all  of  the  great  powers 
of  government  are  centralized  in  the  person  of  the  king, 
acting  through  his  continual  council  composed  of  the 
officers  of  state  and  of  the  household,  from  which  ema- 
nated all  the  more  important  acts  of  government,  whether 
administrative,  legislative,  judicial,  fiscal,  or  political. 
At  the  end  of  the  period  we  find  the  sum  of  govern- 
mental power,  originally  vested  in  the  king  in  coimcil, 
vastly  reduced  by  a  process  of  subtraction  through  which 
the  greater  part  of  the  judicial  work  of  the  continual 
council,  which  soon  came  to  be  known  as  the  curia  regis, 
was  permanently  transferred  to  its  offspring,  the  courts 
of  king's  bench,  common  pleas,  and  exchequer,  each 
devoted  to  the  hearing  of  a  definite  class  of  causes.  And 
when  at  a  later  day  out  of  the  residuum  of  judicial  power 
retained  by  the  council  was  developed  the  equitable  juris- 
diction of  the  chancellor,  the  judicial  functions  of  the 


z  PREFACE 

crown  were  confined  within  a  still  narrower  circle.  Tay- 
lor, The  Origin  and  Growth  of  English  Constitntion, 
iiiy  pp.  248-250,  302.  By  the  transfer  thus  brought  about 
of  the  greater  part  of  the  judicial  business  originally 
despatched  by  the  king  in  council  to  the  great  courts  of 
law  and  equity,  the  central  administration,  in  its  judicial 
aspect,  was  transformed  into  a  government  of  law  as 
distinguished  from  a  government  of  functionaries.  In 
that  way  the  principle  became  settled  that  judicial  con- 
troversies should  no  longer  be  determined  by  the  mere 
force  of  royal  authority,  but  by  due  process  of  law, — 
that  is,  by  law  administered  in  fixed  tribunals  by  trained 
judges  governed  by  principles  and  precedent  drawn  from 
the  Old  English  code  of  customary  law  as  modified  by 
Norman  innovation. 

The  most  important  part  of  that  Norman  innovation 
was  represented  by  the  writ  process,  a  creation  of  royal 
law  that  brought  the  central  administration  of  justice 
into  close  contact  with  the  popular  or  customary  law  as 
administered  in  the  local  popular  assemblies  known  as 
the  courts  of  the  hundred  and  the  shire.  In  that  way 
the  Norman  system  of  central  or  royal  law  and  the  Old 
English  system  of  local  or  popular  law  (see  as  to  the 
distinction,  Budolph  Sohm,  North  American  Review  for 
July,  1874,  p.  222)  were  drawn  together  and  finally  amal- 
gamated in  one  composite  whole  that  retains  to  this  day 
the  strongest  elements  of  both.  The  visible  outcome  of 
the  imion  between  the  Norman  curia  and  the  Old  English 
shiremoot  is  the  typical  English  law  court  of  modem 
times,  in  which  witnesses  depose  to  facts,  upon  which 
the  jury  pass  under  the  guidance  and  direction  of  a  judge 
learned  in  the  law.  Under  the  infiuence  of  the  Norman 
writ  process  the  community-witnesses  of  the  Old  English 
customary  law  were  finally  relieved  altogether  of  their 
character  of  witnesses,  and  endowed  with  the  right  to 
act  as  judges  of  evidence  detailed  by  others.  From  the 
account  given  of  juries  by  Fprtescue  in  his  treatise  (De 
Laudibus  Legum  Angliae,  c.  xxvi,  89,  Clermont  ed.), 


PREFACE  zi 

written  between  1460  and  1470,  it  is  quite  clear  that  the 
final  stage  of  the  development  of  the  jury,  as  a  jury  of 
judgment  in  civil  cases,  was  not  reached  before  the  mid- 
dle of  the  fifteenth  century.  First  employed  in  suits  in 
which  rights  to  land  were  in  question,  the  jury  was  grad- 
ually  extended  by  the  judges  to  the  trial  of  other  civil 
cases  in  which  rights  to  land  were  not  involved.  The 
decree  of  the  Later  an  Council  which  led  to  the  abolition 
of  trial  by  ordeal  paved  the  way  for  the  introduction 
of  the  trial  jury  into  criminal  procedure.  After  ordeals 
were  abolished  in  England,  no  way  remained  of 
traversing  the  presumption  of  guilt  which  arose  out  of 
the  accusation  made  by  the  jury  of  presentment.  To 
remedy  that  evil  by  giving  the  accused  his  constitutional 
right  to  traverse  in  some  form  the  presumption  of  guilt 
raised  against  him,  trial  by  petit  jury  was  gradually 
introduced  in  criminal  cases.  Not  until  that  point  was 
reached,  not  until  trial  by  jury,  in  both  civil  and  crim- 
inal cases,  became  an  established  institution,  did  due 
process  of  law  become,  in  the  full  sense  of  the  term,  an 
integral  and  recognized  element  in  the  English  judicial 
system. 

As  the  trial  jury  did  not  exist  either  in  civil  or  criminal 
cases  at  the  time  of  the  winning  of  the  Great  Charter 
of  1215,  it  is  folly  to  contend  that  it  was  referred  to  as 
such  in  the  famous  chapter  39,  which  declares :  *  *  and  we 
will  not  set  forth  against  him,  nor  send  against  him, 
unless  by  the  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers  and  by  the 
law  of  the  land.''  It  was  settled  long  ago  that  the  guar- 
anty of  trial  by  jury  was  not  contained  in  the  phrase, 
**the  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers,"  and  that  **by  the 
law  of  the  land"  was  guarantied  at  most  judgment  by 
some  of  the  contemporary  methods  of  trial — the  duel, 
ordeal,  or  compurgation  in  criminal  cases ;  the  duel,  wit- 
nesses, charters,  or  recognition  in  property  cases.  Thus 
it  appears  that  the  chapter  in  question,  ^^a  sacred  text, 
the  nearest  approach  to  a  ^fundamental  statute'  that 
English  has  ever  had,"  contained  only  the  germs  out 


xii  PREFACE 

of  which  the  modem  conception  of  due  process  of  law  has 
been  slowly  evolved.  Pollock  and  Maitland,  Hist,  of 
Eng.  Law,  2d,  i,  173.  In  each  age  chapter  39  has  been 
interpreted  as  a  living  guaranty  of  fundamental  rights 
according  to  the  needs  of  that  age.  In  that  way,  after 
being  lost  for  a  long  time  in  the  midnight  of  the  Tudor 
despotism,  it  was  resurrected  and  given  a  broad  con- 
struction by  the  jurists  and  statesmen  of  the  seventeenth 
century  during  the  constitutional  struggle  with  the 
Stuarts;  and  that  broad  construction,  as  eventually 
defined  in  the  commentaries  of  Blackstone,  passed  into 
the  original  constitutions  of  the  thirteen  states  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  text  of  chapter  39,  which  was  repro- 
duced, in  substance,  in  all  of  them.  Thus  the  immortal 
part  of  the  Great  Charter,  embodied  in  its  judicial 
clauses,  out  of  which  has  grown  what  English  and  Ameri- 
can lawyers  call  due  process  of  law,  has  been  appealed 
to  by  each  succeeding  generation  as  a  living  guaranty 
of  the  rights  to  which  it  aspired.  It  has  been  interpreted 
in  each  succeeding  age  according  to  its  peculiar  needs 
and  aspirations.  A  famous  commentator  on  Goethe's 
P^'aust  (Dr.  Julius  Goebel,  p.  vi)  has  said:  **Like  all  the 
really  great  productions  of  literature,  this  world-poem 
possesses  the  magic  power  of  appealing  in  a  different 
way  to  every  new  generation;  and  like  the  fathomless 
crystal  lake  of  the  high  Sierras,  it  reflects  only  the  pic- 
ture of  the  beholder.*'  And  so  the  English  nation  has 
been  looking  from  age  to  age  into  the  judicial  clauses  of 
the  Great  Charter,  which  have  mirrored  for  each  genera- 
tion the  image  of  its  own  peculiar  conception  of  civil 
liberty  under  law. 

When  the  Fifth  Amendment  was  adopted,  the  essence 
of  chapter  39  of  the  Great  Charter  passed  into  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  as  a  limitation  on  the 
powers  of  the  Federal  Government,  in  this  form :  *  *  No 
person  shall  ...  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property,  without  due  process  of  law."  In  construing 
that  clause,  the  Supreme  Court  has  said:    **The  words 


J 


PREFACE  xui 

*dne  process  of  law'  were  undoubtedly  intended  to  convey 
the  same  meaniiig  as  the  words  'by  the  law  of  the  land' 
in  Magna  Carta.  Lord  Coke,  in  his  commentaries  on  these 
words  (2  Inst.  50),  says  they  mean  due  process  of  law. 
The  constitutions  which  have  been  adopted  in  the  several 
states  before  the  formation  of  the  Federal  Constitution, 
following  the  language  of  the  Great  Charter  more  closely, 
generally  contained  the  words,  *but  by  the  judgment  of 
Ma  peers,  or  the  law  of  the  land. ' '  *   Mr.  Justice  Curtis  in 
Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  &  Imp.  Co.,  18  How.  222.   There 
has  never  been  any  serious  dispute  as  to  the  general  scope 
and  meaning  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  which,  prior  to 
1878,  had  *  *  rarely  been  invoked  in  the  judicial  forum,  or 
the  more  enlarged  theater  of  public  discussion.*'     Mr. 
Justice  MiDer  in  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  IT.  S.  97. 
Senator  Howard,  in  introducing  in  the  Senate  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  in  behalf  of  the  Reconstruction  Com- 
mittee, of  which  he  was  a  member,  said:    **They  (the 
provisions  of  the  Fifth  Amendment)  do  not  operate  in 
the  slightest  degree  as  a  restraint  or  prohibition  upon 
state  legislation.    States  are  not  affected  by  them,  and 
it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  the  restriction  contained 
in  the  Constitution  against  the  taking  of  private  property 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation  is  not  a  restric- 
tion upon  state  legislation,  but  applies  only  to  the  legis- 
lation of  Congress.     There  is  no  power  given  in  the 
Constitution  to  enforce  and  to  carry  out  any  of  these 
guaranties. '^    Cong.  Globe,  39  Congress  1st  sess.,  part 
3,  pp.  2764,  65,  66. 

The  path-breaking  idea  that  distinguishes  the  second 
and  existing  Constitution  of  the  United  States  from  all 
preceding  federal  fabrics,  including  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation, is  embodied  in  the  principle  that  it  operates 
directly  on  the  citizen,  and  not  upon  the  states  as  cor- 
'    poratiouis.     If  that  principle  had  been  carried  at  the 
oxxioei  to  its  logical  conclusion,  it  would  have  been  th^n 
settled  that  the  individuals  upon  whom  the  new  govern- 
ment, partly  federal  and  partly  national,  was  to  act  were 


xiT  PBEFACE 

primarily  its  own  citizens.  Because  the  sense  of  nation- 
ality had  not  sufficiently  advanced  to  permit  the  expres- 
sion of  that  idea,  the  new  fabric  was  permitted  to  rest 
upon  the  solecism  that  while  it  was  the  first  federal  gov- 
ernment that  had  ever  operated  directly  on  citizens,  it 
had,  in  its  own  right,  no  citizens.  To  remove  that  sole- 
cism, to  fill  that  vacuum,  was  adopted  the  first  section 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  which,  without  making 
any  direct  reference  to  the  question  of  race  at  all,  con- 
tains the  first  positive  definition  ever  given  of  citizenship 
of  the  United  States  as  a  primary  and  substantive  thing, 
independent  of  state  citizenship.  It  provides  that,  ^^AU 
persons  bom  or  naturalized  in  the  United  States,  and 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  state  wherein  they  reside.  No 
state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  abridge 
the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States;  nor  shall  any  state  deprive  any  person  of  life, 
liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law;  nor 
deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws. ' '  Thus  was  reached  the  ultimate  and 
inevitable  conclusion  that  every  citizen  of  the  Union  is 
primarily  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  not  merely 
of  one  of  the  states  composing  them. 

In  commenting  upon  the  Act  of  Settlement,  Hallam 
(Const.  Hist,  iii,  196)  characterized  it  as  ^Hhe  seal  of 
our  constitutional  laws,  the  complement  of  the  Revolu- 
tion itself  and  the  Bill  of  Bights. '^  In  the  same  sense 
in  which  the  Act  of  Settlement  is  the  capstone  of  the 
English  Constitution,  the  first  section  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  is  the  capstone  of  the  American  Constitu- 
tion, completing  its  logical  symmetry  by  the  creation  of 
a  primary  and  independent  national  citizenship  whose 
privileges  and  immunities  were  wisely  limited  to  those 
only  **  which  owe  their  existence  to  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment, its  national  character,  its  constitution,  or  its  laws.^* 
Slaughter-House  Cases,  16  Wall.,  p.  79.  It  is  not  going 
too  far  to  say  that  a  revolution  was  wrought  by  the 


PBEPACB  XV 

creation  of  the  new  national  citizenship  which  ^^nation- 
alized the  whole  sphere  of  civil  liberty.  .  .  .  The 
rights  of  the  individual  to  life,  liberty,  and  property  had 
to  be  secured  by  the  Federal  Constitution  itself,  as, 
indeed,  they  should  have  been  when  it  waa  originally 
framed.  The  amendment,  therefore,  placed  the  essential 
rights  of  life,  liberty,  and  property  in  the  several  states 
of  the  Union  under  the  ultimate  protection  of  the  national 
Government  Guthrie,  The  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
p.  2,  citing  Hare 's  Am.  Const.  Law,  i,  747.  The  natural 
result  was  a  vast  and  sudden  increase  in  the  business 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  to  whose  guardianship  the  new 
citizenship  was  committed.  Speaking  upon  that  subject, 
as  early  as  1878,  the  Court  said:  ** While  it  (the  Four- 
teenth Amendment)  has  been  a  part  of  the  Constitution, 
as  a  restraint  upon  the  power  of  the  states,  only  a  few 
years,  the  docket  of  this  court  is  crowded  with  cases  in 
which  we  are  asked  to  hold  that  state  courts  and  state 
legislatures  have  deprived  their  own  citizens  of  life,  lib- 
erty, or  property  without  due  process  of  law.*'  David- 
son V.  New  Orleans,  96  IT.  S.  97.  During  the  thirty-eight 
years  that  have  passed  by  since  that  utterance  was  made, 
the  tide  has  steadily  risen  until  the  overshadowing  ques- 
tions presented  by  the  great  cases  that  now  engage  the 
attention  of  the  Supreme  Court  involve  either  due  proc- 
ess of  law,  or  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 

Just  as  due  process  of  law  is  a  purely  English  cre- 
ation, so  the  closely  related  principle  now  embodied  in 
the  formula,  *Hhe  equal  protection  of  the  laws,"  is  purely 
an  American  creation.  It  is  the  natural  and  inevitable 
expression  of  that  sense  of  equality  which  is  the  under- 
tone of  our  national  life.  In  the  words  of  Mr.  Justice 
Brewer :  "Equality  in  right,  in  protection  and  in  burden 
is  the  thought  which  has  run  through  the  life  of  this 
nation  and  its  constitutional  enactments  from  the  Decla- 
ration of  Independence  to  the  present  hour."  Gulf,  C.  & 
S.  F.  B.  Co.  V.  ElUs,  165  U.  S.  150.  That  equality  never 
adequately  secured  before,  either  by  constitutional  guar- 


xvi  PREFACE 

anties  or  by  the  common  law,  was  put  for  the  first  time 
upon  a  firm  foundation  by  the  addition  at  the  end  of 
Section  1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  clause 
declaring  that  no  state  shall  *  *  deny  to  any  person  within 
its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws/'  Such 
is  the  final  outcome  of  the  struggle  instituted  in  the  reign 
of  Henry  II,  who  undertook  not  only  to  establish  the 
reign  of  law  but  to  reduce  all  orders  of  men  to  a  state 
of  legal  equality  before  the  same  system  of  law.  That 
kind  of  legal  equality,  which  neither  the  constitutional 
nor  common  law  of  the  mother  country  was  ever  able  to 
establish,  has  appeared  for  the  first  time  upon  the  soil 
of  the  New  World,  As  it  is  here  enforceable  through 
the  judgments  and  decrees  of  federal  courts,  it  is  an 
entirely  different  thing  from  the  nebulous  egalite  of  the 
dreamers  of  the  French  Revolution,  who  never  compre- 
hended the  fact  that  all  guaranties  in  favor  either  of 
liberty  or  equality  are  worthless  unless  enforceable  by 
an  independent  judicial  power. 

How  to  ascertain  the  full  scope  and  meaning  of  the 
new  Magna  Carta  embraced  in  Section  1  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  which  has  wrought  a  revolution  by 
placing  the  essential  rights  of  life,  liberty,  or  property 
in  the  several  states  under  the  protection  of  the  Federal 
Government,  is  the  question  of  questions  now  absorbing 
the  American  lawyer.  When  we  go  to  the  final  arbiter 
for  a  definition,  we  are  given  instead  a  discreet  and 
fruitful  working  rule  best  described  in  its  own  language : 
*'But,  apart  from  the  imminent  risk  of  a  failure  to  give 
any  definition  which  would  be  at  once  perspicuous,  com- 
prehensive, and  satisfactory,  there  is  wisdom,  we  think, 
in  the  ascertaining  of  the  intent  and  application  of  such 
an  important  phrase  in  the  Federal  Constitution,  by  the 
gradual  process  of  judicial  inclusion  and  exclusion,  as 
the  cases  presented  for  decision  shall  require,  with  the 
reasoning  on  which  such  decisions  may  be  founded.'' 
Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97.  In  a  word,  the 
rule  is  that  when  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  as  such. 


PBEPACE  xvii 

oomplains  that  a  fundamental  right  guarantied  by  the 
clauses  in  question  has  been  taken  away,  the  court  will 
say  in  that  particular  case  whether  the  right  is  an  inci- 
dent of  national  citizenship  and,  as  such,  within  its  pro- 
tection, or  an  incident  of  state  citizenship  and,  as  such, 
within  the  protection  of  the  state.  In  that  way  a  swelling 
stream  of  decided  cases  is  rapidly  expanding  into  a 
vitally  important  body  of  judge-made  law,  which  must 
be  systematized  and  reduced  to  compendia,  because  the 
subjects  of  it  have  become  of  more  practical  importance 
than  all  others  to  the  American  bench  and  bar.  Any  one 
who  undertakes  to  perform  that  task  should  accept  the 
fact  that  the  subject  must  be  dealt  with  by  two  distinct 
methods — ^the  historical  and  the  analytical.  No  mind  can 
grasp  this  intricate  subject  as  a  whole  simply  by  the 
study  of  the  decided  cases  as  isolated  units.  By  the  aid 
of  the  historical  method,  a  review  must  first  be  made  of 
the  entire  evolution  through  which  Henry  II 's  effort  to 
establish  not  only  the  reign  of  law,  but  the  reduction  of 
all  orders  of  men  to  a  state  of  legal  equality  before  the 
same  system  of  law,  has  culminated,  after  seven  cen- 
turies of  struggle,  in  the  firm  establishment  upon  Ameri- 
can soil  not  only  of  due  process  of  law,  but  of  the  equal 
protectioji  of  the  laws.  In  the  light  of  many  years  of 
special  study  of  English  and  American  constitutional 
law,  the  author  has  attempted  to  outline  the  history  of 
that  evolution  in  the  Introduction,  entitled  The  Origin  and 
Growth  of  Due  Process.  He  has  then  applied  the  ana- 
lytical method  to  the  mass  of  decided  cases  upon  the  ' 
Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  in  such  a  way  as  to 
extract  from  them  the  working  rules  required  by  the 
practicing  lawyer  in  dealing  with  the  various  divisions 
and  subdivisions  of  the  subject.  That  difl5cult  task  has 
been  made  easier  by  his  effort  heretofore  made  to  define 
in  a  treatise  the  **  Jurisdiction  and  Procedure  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,'*  and  by  his  long 
experience  in  the  argument  of  cases  at  its  bar. 
In  the  preparation  of  Part  III,  entitled  **The  Equal 


zviii  PREFACE 

Protection  of  the  Laws  as  a  Limitation  on  State  Power/' 
the  author  has  been  assisted  by  Mr.  Frederick  C.  Bryan, 
an  able,  experienced  and  distinguished  member  of  the  bar 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

Washington,  D.  0.  Hakxhs  Tatlob. 

August,  1917. 


CONTENTS 


INTBODnCTZON 

TBS  OBIQIN  AND  CKOWTH  OF  DUX  FB0GI88 

Pact 

i  1.  Henry  II  and  the  reign  of  law 1 

i  2.  Bichard  I  and  John 2 

i  3.  The  Great  Charter  of  1215  a  treaty  between  the  crown  and  the 

estates   3 

i  4.  Chapter  39  of  the  Oreat  Charter 4 

i  5.  Later  versions  of  the  Great  Charter 6 

i   G.  Bebirth  of  the  Great  Charter  in  1628 7 

i  7.  Cohe  a  misleading  expounder  of  the  Great  Charter 8 

i   8.  The  Bevolntions  of  1640  and  1688 9 

f  9.  Blaekstone,  not  Coke,  the  true  guide 11 

i  10.  The  true  rule  reeognised  in  Hurtardo 12 

i  11.  Chapter  39  as  reproduced  in  our  first  state  constitutions 13 

f  12.  The  wider  scope  of  chapter  39  in  American  law 15 

f  13.  First  eight  articles  of  Amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution. ...  19 
f  14.  Due  process  of  law  as  embodied  in  the  Fifth  Amendment 21 

1 15.  Absence  of  national  citisenship  emphasised  by  the  Dred  Bcott  Case.  25 

116.  The  new  national  eitisenship  created  by  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 

ment   29 

f  17.  Our  new  Magna  Ctota  protects  only  the  national  citizenship 35 

1 18.  Due  process  of  law  as  embodied  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. ...  41 

1 19.  Equal  protection  of  the  laws  as  embodied  in  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 

ment   45 

1 20.  The  rule  of  inclusion  and  exclusion 49 


PART  I 

DUE  PROCESS  AS  A  LIMITATION  ON 

FEDERAL  POWER 

CHAPTEB  I 

FDTH  AMSNBKINT  AND  ITS  CONSTBtJOTION  (1790-1866) 

1 21.  The  text  of  the  Fifth  Amendment 55 

i  22.  Earlier  cases  eonstming  Fifth  Amendment 50 

zix 


CONTENTS 

Paob 

f  23.  Webster's  famous  definitioii  of  due  process  in  1819 58 

f  24.  Baron  y.  Baltimore,  1833,  Idmitationa  on  the  states 60 

i  25.  Fox  y.  Ohio — ^Involving  a  state  law  as  to  counterfeiting 61 

1 26.  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  Co. — ^Due  process  defined 62 

f  27.  Withers  v.  Buckley — Conflict  of  state  law  with  state  ccmstitution. .  64 

1 28.  Ex  parte  BCilligan  and  the  triumph  of  legality 65 

1 29.  Ex  parte  McCardle — ^Military  ccHnmission,  habeas  corpus 69 

CHAPTEB  n 

riVTH  AlCENDMENT  AND  ITS  CONSTRUCTION  (1866-1896) 

1 30.  The  legal  tender  cases 71 

1 31.  Miller  ▼.  U.  8.— Bight  of  confiscation 73 

1 32.  Pumpelly  v.  Canal  Co. — ^Bight  of  eminent  domain 74 

1 33.  Ex  parte  Wilson — ^Indictment  for  infamous  crime 76 

{  34.  Boyd  v.  U.  S.—Einship  of  Fourth  and  Fifth  Amendments 79 

{  35.  Spies  ▼.  Illinois — Jurisdiction  to  review  judgment  of  highest  court 

of  a  state  in  a  criminal  case 81 

{36.  Counselman  v.   Hitchcock — ^Broad  construction  of  Fifth  Amend- 
ment in  favor  of  refusal  to  testify 84 

I  37.  Simmons  v.  U.  8. — ^Bight  of  judge  to  discharge  jury  during  trial 

and  to  express  opinion  on  facts 85 

{  38.  Tesler  v.  Harbor  Line  Commissioners — ^Locating  harbor  lines. ...  86 
{  39.  Shoemaker  v.  U.  S. — ^Bight  of  eminent  domain  in  the  District  of 

Columbia    87 

f  40.  Thorington  v.  Montgomery — Fifth  Amendment  does  not  embrace 

questions  of  state  procedure 89 

{  41.  Monongahela  Nav.  Co.  v.  U.  S. — ^Eminent  domain  and  full  equiva- 
lent under  Fifth  Amendment 90 

{42.  Fong  Tue  Ting  v.  U.  S. — ^Bights  of  the  sovereign  to  deport  for- 
eigners already  domiciled 92 

f  43.  Johnson  v.  Sayre — ^Persons  subject  to  military  law 95 

{44.  Brown  v.  Walker — ^Immunity  for   witnesses  under   Act  of   1893 

applies  to  state  as  well  as  federal  courts 96 

{  45.  Case  of  Wong  Wing,  sequel  of  the  case  of  Fong  Tue  Ting 97 

{46.  Talton  v.  Mayes — ^Fifth  Amendment  has  no  application  to  courts 

of  Cherokee  Nation 99 

CHAPTEB  ni 

VlfTH  AMINDMXNT  AND  ITS  CONSTBTTCTION  (1896-1917) 

(   47.  Hovey  v.  Elliott — ^Fifth  Amendment  limits  the  judicial  as  well  as 

legislative  power  of  the  Federal  Government 101 

{  48.  Scranton  v.  Wheeler — ^Biparian  owner  deprived  of  access  to  navi- 
gable stream    103 

t^  49.  Wight  V.  Davidson — ^Meaning  of  due  process  in  the  District  of 

Columbia   104 

{   50.  Hanover  National  Bank  v.  Moyse»— Bankruptcy  Act  of  July  1, 

1898    107 


CONTENTS 

Paob 

51.  Breyer  ▼.  IDiiioifl — ^Former  jeopmrdy,  TJ.  8.  v.  Pem  reviewed. . .  .109 

52.  Lone  Wolf  ▼.  Hitehoock — ^Fifth  Amendment  does  not  limit  the 

power  of  GongreBB  when  ezereieing  eontroL  over  Indian  tribes.  .111 

53.  XJ.  S.  ▼•  Lynch — ^Liability  nnder  Fifth  Amendment  for  land  taken 

to  improve  navigation. 113 

54.  The  Japanese  Immigrant  Cue — ^Application  of  the  due  prooess 

daose  in  a  case  of  deportation  after  entry 114 

55.  Hawaii  v.  Mankiehi — ^How  colonists  must  win  right  to  partiei- 

pate  in  constitution  of  the  parent  state 116 

5d.  Bassmussen  v.  IT.  8.— Incorporation  of  Alaska  vrith  the  United 

8tates  and  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  of  twelve  men 123 

57.  A  group  of  eases  involving  the  extension  of  due  process  to  the 

Philippine  Islands    125 

58.  Bedford  v.  TJ.  8. — ^Distinguished  from  the  Lynch  Osse 127 

59.  Buttfield  v.  8tranahan — ^How  far  the  iK>wer  to  regulate  foreign 

commerce  is  limited  by  due  process 128 

60.  Adams  v.  New  York — Due  process  and  the  admissi<m  of  evidence 

illegally  obtained   131 

61.  Beavers  v.  Henkel — ^Indictment  as  evidence  of  probable  cause. . .  133 

62.  Public  Clearing  House  v.  Ck>yne — Due  process  as  a  limitation  on 

power  to  regulate  the  mails 134 

63.  U.  8.  ex  reL  Turner  v.  Williams — ^Due  process  as  a  limitation  on 

power  to  exclude  alien  anarchists 136 

64.  8hepard  ▼.  Barron — ^When  estoppel  to  contest  constitutionality 

may  be  set  up  against  promoters  of  public  improvement 138 

65.  Fayerweather  v.  Bich — ^Relation  of  due  process  to  res  judicata.  .139 

66.  McCray  v.  XT.  8. — ^Due  process  and  constitutionality  of  oleomar- 

garine tax   140 

67.  XT.  8.  y.  Ju  Toy — ^Due  process  of  law  in  Chinese  exclusion  cases — 

Conclusiveness  of  decision  of  executive  officer 142 

68.  South  Carolina  v.  17.  8. — ^Due  process  as  a  limitation  on  federal 

power  to  tax  dispensing  agents  of  a  state 143 

69.  Hale  v.  Henkel — ^Effect  of  statutory  immunity  upon  constitutional 

protection  against  self-incrimination 144 

70.  In  re  Moras — Claim  that  prisoner  wsS  convicted  without  indict- 

ment and  compelled  to  testify  against  himself 145 

71.  Union  Bridge  Co.  v.  TJ.  8.— Due  process  invoked  as  a  restraint  on 

power  of  Secretary  of  War  to  order  alterations  in  a  bridge  over 
a  waterway   147 

72.  TJ.  8.  V.  Heinszen — ^Due  process  and  the  rights  of  importers  under 

Philippine  Act  of  June  30,  1906 149 

73.  Adair  v.  U.  8. — ^Due  process  as  a  limitation  upon  power  of  Con- 

gress to  regulate  interstate  commerce — ^Belative  rights  of  em- 
ployer and  employee 150 

74.  Twining  v.  New  Jersey — ^Exemption  from  self-incrimination  not  a 

fundamental  right  of  national  citizenship 153 


CONTENTS 

Page 
f   75.  XT.  8.  ex  rel.  ▼.  Delaware  ft  H.  Go. — ^Due  prooess  and  the  eommo- 

dities  clause  of  the  Hepburn  Aet  of  June  29,  1906 155 

f  76.  Oceanic  Steam  Nav.  Go.  v.  Stranahan — ^Due  proeeee  and  the  Act 
of  March  3,  1903,  making  it  unlawful  to  bring  into  the  TJ.  S. 

any  aUen  affected  with  a  loathsome  or  contagious  disease 156 

f   77.  Brantley  v.  Georgia — ^Fifth  Amendment  inyoked  upon  plea  of 

former  jeopardy 158 

§    78.  Holt  V.  U.  8. — ^Protection  against  self-incriminati(A  invoked  in 

trial  for  a  crime  committed  within  a  military  reservation 159 

f    79.  Atlantic  G.  L.  B.  Go.  v.  Biverside  Mills — ^Due  process  not  denied 

by  Garmack  amendment  of  June  29,  1906 160 

I  80.  Briscoe  v.  Budolph — ^Due  process  as  involved  in  a  special  assess- 
ment for  benefits  in  Washington  Gity 161 

§  81.  Wilson  V.  U.  8. — ^Privilege  against  self-incrimination  when  in- 
voked by  an  officer  of  a  corporation 162 

§   82.  Breese  v.  U.  8. — ^Presentment  of  an  indictment  by  ^and  jury  in 

k  body  not  required  by  Fifth  Amendment 164 

f  83.  Ensign  v.  Pennsylvaniar— States  not  compelled  to  accord  the  pro- 
tection against  self-incrimination  guaranteed  by  Fifth  Amend- 
ment     165 

§    84.  Heike  v.  U.  8. — Self-incrimination  and  claim  of  immunity  based 

on  a  proviso  to  Act  of  February  25,  1903 166 

I    85.  Zakonaite  v.  Wolf — ^Due  process  invoked  by  an  alien  found  to  be 

practicing  prostitution  within  three  years  after  her  entry 167 

I  86.  Ochoa  v.  Hermandez — ^Due  process  denied  by  order  of  military 
governor  of  Porto  Bico  taking  property  from  lawful  owner 

without  notice  or  hearing 168 

I  87.  Delaware,  L.  and  W.  B.  Go.  v.  U.  8. — ^Prohibition  in  Hepburn 
Act  of  transportation  from  market  to  mine  does  not  deny  due 

process   170 

I  88.  Billings  v.  XT.  8. — ^Imposition  of  an  excise  tax  based  on  gross 
tonnage  upon  the  use  of  foreign-built  pleasure  yachts  does  not 

deny   due  process ; 171 

§  89.  Herbert  v.  Bicknell — ^Due  process  not  denied  when  judgment  by 
default  is  rendered  against  absent  defendant  on  summons  left 

at  last  and  usual  place  of  abode 173 

I  90.  U.  8.  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  8.  F.  B.  Go.— Act  of  February  4,  1887, 
I  4,  as  amended  by  Act  of  June  18,  1910,  f  8,  not  repugnant  to 

Fifth  Amendment 174 

§    91.  Pennsylvania  Go.  v.  XT.  8 176 

^    92.  Greenleaf  Lumber  Go.  v.  Garrison 177 

§   93.  Louisville  Sb  Nashville  B.  B.  v.  U.  8 179 

§    94.  Ghicago  &  Alton  B.  B.  v.  Tranbarger 180 

f   95.  Anderson  v.  Forty-two  Broadway  Go 180 

§    96.  Williams  v.   Johnson 181 

f   97.  Seven  Gases  v.  U.  8 181 

S   98.  Brushaber  v.  Union  Pacific  B.  B.  Go 181 

S   99.  Dodge  v.  Osbom 182 


CONTENTS  xxiii 

Paox 
1 99a.  Wilflon,  XT.  8.   Attorney  v.  New  and  Tenia,  Beceiyers— Eight- 

Houz-Law  Case    182 

i  100.  Beiview — ^Peraistent  and  harmful  infinence  of  Murray  v.  Hoboken 

Land  and  Improyement  Go 186 

CHAPTBB  rV 

VEDERAL  POWSB  OF  XUINXNT  DOMAIN  AND  DUS  PBOdSB 

1 101.  Power  of  eminent  domain  vested  in  all  states,  federal  as  well  as 

single    207 

1102.  The  eminent  domain  vested  in  Federal  Oovemment  paramount.  .208 

§  103.  Paramount  right  of  eminent  domain  limited  by  due  process 209 

§  104.  The  taking  must  be  for  a  public  use 211 

1 105.  Bight  of  legislature  to  determine  public  use 212 

§  106.  What  constitutes  a  taking 213 

§  107.  Neeesaitj  that  justifies  the  taking 215 

f  108.  Necessity  for  compensation 217 

f  109.  What  kind  of  property  may  be  taken 218 

§  110.  As  the  question  of  compensation  is  a  judicial  one,  a  competent 

tribunal  necessary    219 

S  111.  Bight  of  Congress  to  legislate  against  laches 221 

PART  II 

DUE  PROCESS  AS  A  LIMITATION   ON  STATE 

POWER 

CHAPTEB  V 

THX  NIW  NATIONAL  CITI2SNBHIP 

f  112.  Interstate  citizenship  created  by  Articles  of  Confederation 225 

f  113.  Developed  by  our  second  Federal  Constitution  of  1789 225 

i  114.  The  grand  inquest  in  the  Dred  Scott  Case 227 

1 115.  Section  1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  and  its  scope 228 

S 116.  The  new  citizenship  as  defined  in  the  Slaughter  House  Cases 228 

1 117.  Question  of  birth  as  settled  in  TJ.  S.  v.  Wong  Kim  Ark 231 

f  118.  Aliens,  resident  and  nonresident 233 

1 119.  Bight  to  due  process  in  unincorporated  territory 237 

§  120.  Bight  to  due  process  in  incorporated  territory 239 

1 121.  A  corporation  a  person  within  the  meaning  of  Section  1 240 

S  122.  Two  bulwarks  against  the  unlawful  or  unequal  exercise  of  state 

power   241 

1 123.  Due  process  clauses  of  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  should 

receive  identical  construction   243 

1 124.  Only  national  citizenship  as  such  protected  against  state  action  by 

the  due  process  clause  of  Section  1 244 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB  VI 

gxneeal  boopx  or  the  guabantt  ot  dus  pr00ks8 

Pagx 

1 125.  The  guaranty  in  English  law 249 

f  126.  The  guaranty  in  American  law 251 

1 127.  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  a  supervising  and  annul- 
ling tribunal 257 

§  128.  Congress  as  a  protecting  and  enforcing  body 266 

§  129.  Due  process  the  common  heritage  of  all  the  states 270 

f  130.  Notable  attempts  to  define  due  process 274 

1 131.  Difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  complete  and  authoritative  definitiQiL 

— The  rule  of  inclusion  and  exclusion 284 

f  132.  Fundamental  requisites  of  due  process — ^Notice 286 

1 133.  Fundamental  requisites  of  due  process — ^Hearing 292 

1 134.  Fundamental  requisites  of  due  process — Generality  and  equality 

of  laws   297 

S  135.  Fundamental  requisites  of  due  process — Jurisdiction 307 

CHAPTEB  VII 

DUS  PBOCBSS  AND  jxtbisdiohon 

f  136.  A  competent  tribunal  and  notice .312 

f  137.  Necessity  of  service  to  validity  of  judgment 314 

1 138.  Curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  by  appearance 316 

1 139.  Jurisdiction  over  nonresident  persons 318 

f  140.  Jurisdiction  over  nonresident  corporations 319 

1 141.  Proceedings  in  tem 321 

1 142.  Divorce  proceedings,  strictly  speaking,  neither   in  rem  nor  in 

personam    323 

f  143.  When  judgments  are  subject  to  collateral  attack 332 

CHAPTEB  Vm 

BTATX  POWER  OT  TAXATION  AND  DUB  PROCESS 

S  144.  Taxing  power  of  the  Imperial  Parliament 336 

f  145.  Extension  of  parliamentary  control  over  the  colonies 337 

f  146.  Colonies  transformed  into  sovereign  states 337 

1 147.  Constitutional  limitations  an  American  invention 338 

1 148.  Nature  and  extent  of  limitations  on  state  taxing  power — ^Exemp- 

tion of  governmental  agencies 339 

f  149.  Federal  power  to  regulate  interstate  commerce  not  to  be  hampered 

by  state  taxation 340 

f  150.  State  can  only  tax  property  within  its  jurisdiction 341 

1 151.  Taxation  of  corporate  property  situated  in  several  states 342 

S  151a.  Due  process  not  denied  by  state  statute  imposing  annual  fran- 
chise tax  on  a  consolidated  railway  corporation 343 

f  152.  Taxation  of  tangible  personal  property 344 

{ 153.  Taxation  of  intangible  personaJ  property 347 


CONTENTS 


Pact 

f  154.  ExemptioiiB  fr«an  taxation  fltrictlj  eonstnied 349 

1 155.  Taxation  must  be  for  a  public  use 352 

§156.  Legialatore  may  act  direetlj  or  delegate  functions  to  local  an- 

thoritieB    356 

S157.  Due  process  requires  compensation  to  owner  when  property  is 

taken,  by  state  for  public  use 358 

1 158.  Collection  of  taxes  by  summary  proceedings 361 

i  150.  Notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings 364 

f  160.  Besidunm  of  taxing  power  remaining  in  the  state 371 


CHAPTEB  IX 

STATE  POiWKB  OF  UONSNT  DOMAIN  AND  DUB  PROCXSS — ^TIDiaAL  EIGHT  OF 

SUPBBVIBION 

161.  Beview  heretofore  made  of  federal  power  of  eminent  domain. .  .377 

162.  Power  of  eminent  domain  inherent  in  states 378 

163.  Duty  of  state  to  guarantee  protection  to  life,  liberty  and  prop- 

erty through  due  process 379 

164.  l^ht  to  review  state  action  established  by  Fourteenth  Amend- 

ment     380 

165.  Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  ▼.  Chicago— Begard  must  be  had  to 

substance,  not  to  form 380 

166.  Fallbrook  Irrigation  District  ▼.  Bradley — ^Heed  to  be  given  to  de- 

cisions of  state  courts  construing  state  statutes  and  constitu- 
tions    382 

167.  Henderson  Bridge  Co.  ▼.  Henderson — ^It  must  clearly  appear  that 

state  taxation  is  really  spoliation 384 

168.  Hooker  ▼.  Los  Angeles — Case  must  be  clearly  stated  in  trial 

court    385 

169.  dark  ▼.  Kash — ^Bespect  to  be  given  to  state  definitions  of  a 

public  use  385 

170.  ICanigault  v.  Springs — ^When  flooding  does  not  constitute  a  tak- 

ing     386 

171.  Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  v.  Illinois— When  there  is  no  taking  of 

private  property  for  public  use 387 

172.  Noble  State  Bank  v.  Haskell — ^Use  really  public  when  judged  by 

the  ultimate  end  and  not  by  the  proximate  effect 389 

173.  Ettor   ▼.   Tacoma — ^When   a  vested  right   is   protected   against 

destruction  by  a  repeal  of  the  remedy 390 

174.  McGovem  v.  New  York — ^There  must  be  something  more  than  an 

honest  mistake  of  law 391 

175.  New  York  v.  Sage — ^The  rule  by  which  the  value  of  property 

should  be  measured 391 

176.  Union  Lime  Co.  v.  Chicago  ft  N.  W.  B.  Co.— rNo  unlawful  taking 

even  when  the  extension  of  a  spur  track  is  for  the  benefit  of  a 
single  industry    392 

177.  Brand  v.  Union  Elevated  B.  Co. — ^What  should  be  excluded  in  a 

proceeding  to  recover  for  a  decline  in  market  value 393 


xxvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB  X 

state  pougx  powxs  and  dus  pb0cx8s 

Paob 

f  178.  English  origin  of  state  poliee  power 395 

f  179.  The  typical  English  state  in  America 396 

f  180.  The  police  power  as  defined  by  American  jurists  and  text  writers. 397 
i  181.  Delegation  of  police  power  to  municipalities 400 

5 182.  Beasonableness  as  a  limitation  on  the  police  power 401 

5 183.  Vested  rights  as  a  limitation  on  police  poiwer 403 

S  184.  The  right  of  forfeiture 404 

i  185.  Limitations  on  the  enjoyment  of  property 405 

S 186.  Property  or  business  clothed  with  a  public  interest 407 

i  187.  Interstate  Commerce  Act  and  the  common  law 410 

i  188.  Beasonableness  of  rates  and  the  delegation  of  legislative  power.  .411 

1 189.  Elements  involved  in  the  reasonableness  of  rates 413 

S  190.  Becent  cases  on  the  subject  of  rates  and  due  process 416 

S  191.  Police  power  to  promote  publio  convenience 419 

S 192.  Police  power  and  the  exclusion  of  suicide  as  a  defense  on  policies 

of  insurance 420 

S  193.  Due  process  not  infringed  by  limitation  on  hours  of  labor  of 

women    421 

S 194.  Due  process  not  denied  by  the  prevention  of  the  diversion  of 

waters    421 

S  195.  Due  process  and  the  prohibition  of  exportation  of  Philippine  coin. 422 

$  196.  Forbidding  burial  within  city  limits 423 

S  197.  Due  process  not  denied  by  Michigan  Bales-in-Bulk  Act 424 

i  198.  Creation  of  depositors'  guaranty  fund  valid  exercise  of  police 

power  425 

i  199.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  prohibiting  the  use  of  ad- 
vertising trucks  or  vans 426 

S  200.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  prohibiting  billiard  or  pool 

rooms    427 

§  201.  Unconstitutional  exercise  of  police  power  in  establishing  a  build- 
ing line  427 

i  202.  Due  process  not  denied  by  prohibition  of  local  sales  of  malt 

liquors,  whether  intoxicants  or  not 428 

S  203.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  regulating  size  of  loaves  of 

bread    429 

§204.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  requiring  installation  of 

water-closets  under  certain  conditions 430 

§  205.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  concerning  milk  not  subjected 

to  tuberculin  j;est  431 

§  205a.  Due  process  not  denied  by  statutes  prohibiting  the  sale  as  "ice 
cream  "  of  a  product  containing  less  than  a  fixed  percental  of 
butter  fat 431 

S  206.  Due  process  not  denied  by  state  law  regulating  barrier  pillars 

between  adjoining  coal  properties 432 


CONTENTS 

Pact 
f  207.  CcHistitnUonal  ezerdfle  of  the  poliee  power  in  reference  to  deposi- 

tora '  guaranty  fund i33 

1 208.  Due  process  denied  by  Khtiwbw  Act  inflictung  paialtiee  on  employer 

for  impoeing  certain  conditione  on  employee 435 

1209.  Dae  proeeae  not  denied  by  the  so-called  Ohio  <<nm-of-mine''  or 

<< anti-screen''  law ; 436 

i  210.  Doe  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  prohibiting  brick  yards  in 

certain  portions  of  a  city 437 

S  211.  Due  process  not  denied  by  police  statute  requiring  hotel  keepers 

to  give  notice  to  guests  in  case  of  fire 437 

i211a.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  subjecting  business  of 

private  detectiTe  to  polio^  superyision 438 

1212.  Due  process  not  denied  by  legislation  declaring  the  emission  of 

dense  smoke  in  cities  a  nuisance 438 

S  213.  Due  process  not  denied  by  statute  requiring  full  switching  crews 

on  railroads  exceeding  one  hundred  miles  iu  length 439 

1 214.  Due  process  not  denied  by  statute  imposing  taxes  on  the  privilege 

of  using  profit  sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps 440 

i  215.  Due  process  not  denied  by  the  fixing  of  certain  absolute  liabilities. 440 

CHAPTEB  XI 

VWOFMBTY  U0BT8  AS  PBOVIOTKD  BY  DUX  FBOCISfl — 'YX8TID  BIGHTS  AKD  THUB 


1 216.  Chapter  39  of  Magna  Carta  and  its  amendments 443 

i  217.  Growth  in  England  of  the  idea  of  vested  rights 443 

1218.  Development  of  the  idea  of  "vested  rights"  advanced  by  con- 

stitutional limitations  on  legislative  power 445 

1 219.  Formula  in  Declaration  of  Independence 448 

S  220.  No  state  shall  make  any  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts. 449 

i  221.  Contract  clause  limited  to  vested  rights  that  arise  out  of  it 450 

1 222.  The  Fifth  Amendment 451 

S  223.  The  great  vacuum  to  be  filled 452 

S  224.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment 452 

S  225.  What  constitutes  a  vested  right 453 

i  226.  Bights  below  the  standard  of  vested  rights 456 

S  227.  Curative  legislation   457 

1 227a.  No  vested  right  in  any  genersl  rule  of  law  or  poli^  of  legisla- 
tion     458 

S  228.  Bight  of  a  state  to  regulate  its  procedure 458 

f  229.  An  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  the  scope  of  due  process. 459 

i  230.  Application  of  the  rule  of  inclusion  and  exclusion 461 

S  231.  Legitimate  modification  of  rights  of  abutting  owner 462 

S232.  How  the  outstanding  shares  of  an  owner  of  stock  may  be  con- 
demned without  denial  of  due  process 463 

{233.  Power  of  a  state  to  reorganize  a  co-operative  association  with- 
out consent  of  its  members 464 

{234.  Power  of  a  state  to  make  discriminating  property  classifications. 464 


"CONTENTS 

Pagx 

S  282.  Preedom  of  eontraet  not  infringed  hj  state  law  forbidding  the 

issue  of  irredeemable  orders  in  payment  of  labor 509 

{283.  Freedom  of  contract  not  limited  by  a  Missouri  statute  against 

combinations    510 

1284.  Freedom  of  contract  denied  by  application  of  nonforfeiture 
provisions  of  statute  of  one  state  so  as  to  invalidate  policy 
loan  agreement  made  in  another 511 

i  285.  Freedom  of  contract  denied  by  state  law  making  it  a  crime  for 

an  employer  to  impose  a  certain  condition  on  employee 512 

f  286.  Employment  at  the  will  of  the  parties  does  not  make  it  employ- 
ment at  the  will  of  others 514 

S287.  Freedom    of    contract    not    infringed    by    the    so-called    Ohio 

"run-of-mine"  or  '* anti-screen"  law 516 

S  288.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  certain  statutes  regulating 

the  employment  of  women 516 

§  289.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  Florida  statute  imposing 
special  license  taxes  on  merchants  using  profit  sharing  coupons 
and  trading  stamps 517 

CHAPTBE  XTTT 

PROPIRTT  aiOHTB  AS  PBOTEOTED  BY  DUE  PBOOXSS — ^LIMITATIONS  AND  BEMXDIX8 

I  290.  Statutes  of  limitation  regarded  as  rules  of  procedure 519 

i  291.  The  constitutional  limitation  of  reasonableness 520 

S  292.  When  statutes  of  limitation  may  be  retroactive 521 

I  293.  When  exemption  from  suit  by  the  ending  of  complete  statutory 

period  becomes  a  vested  right 523 

i  294.  Montoyo  v.  Gk)nzales  525 

i  295.  Bight  of  the  legislature  to  change  remedies 526 

S  296.  Qualifications  of  the  forgoing  rule 527 

CHAPTBB  XIV 

LIVB  AND  LIBXBTY   AS  PROTECTED  BY  DUE  PROCESS — ^PROCEDURE  IN   CRIMINAL 

CASES  IN  FEDERAL  C0X7RTS 

1 297.  No  change  in  proceedure,  either  under  federal  or  state  law,  must 

work  a  denial  of  fundamental  rights 532 

S  298.  Due    process    clause    of   Fifth   Amendment    as   re-enforced    by 

Amendments  Six  and  Seven 533 

i  299.  Federal  right  to  indictment  by  grand  jury  in  criminal  cases — 

Informations    534 

S  300.  Federal  right  to  trial  by  petit  jury 535 

f  301.  Bight  to  plead  guaranteed  by  Fifth  Amendment 536 

f  302.  A  person   accused   of  felony  necessarily  present   during  entire 

trial-— Privilege  can  not  be  waived 538 

S  302a.  Summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property  guaranteed  by  the 

Federal  Constitution    539 


CSONTBNTS 

GHAPTEB  XV 

urs  ain>  ubbrtt  as  pbotbotxd  by  dub  pb0cbs8 — proobbubb  in  obiminal 

gabbs  in  btatb  c0x7bts 

Pagb 
1 303.  How  far  the  statee  may  modifj  existing  flTstems  of  proeedore  in 

criminal  eases    541 

f  304.  The  straggle  to  leave  the  states  untrammeledy  as  far  as  possible, 

in  the  making  of  codes  of  criminal  procedure 543 

i  305.  Bight  of  a  state  to  abolish  grand  juries 544 

i  300.  ^ght  of  the  highest  court  of  a  state  to  dismiss  a  writ  of  error 

in  a  criminal  case   546 

i  307.  Bight  of  a  state  to  provide  for  a  trial  bj  a  struck  jury 547 

1 308.  Bight  of  a  state  to  authorize  a  trial  by  a  petit  jury  of  eight 548 

1309.  Exemption   from  compulsory  self-incrimination   in   state   courts 

not  a  violation  of  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 

Amendment 550 

i  310.  Befusal  to  set  aside  a  verdict,  after  the  rendition  of  which,  one  of 

the  jurors  became  insane  558 

§311.  Due  process  not  denied  because  no  arrangement  or  plea  was  had 

upon  a  second  information 554 

1 312.  Bight  of  the  accused  to  be  present  in  a  state  court  at  every  stage 

of  his  trial 556 

1 313.  Duty  of  an  accused  person  to  exhaust  all  of  his  remedies  in  the 

state  courts    562 

1 314.  When  habeas  corpus  is  the  proper  remedy  to  test  the  validity  of 

a  detention  under  state  law 564 

1 315.  The  notable  case  of  Prank  v.  Mangum 567 

i  316.  Dissenting  opinion  of  Justices  Holmes  and  Hughes 569 

1 317.  Are  there  at  present  any  enforceable  restraints  upon  the  powers 

of  a  state  to  regulate  its  procedure  in  criminal  cases 573 

GHAPTEB  XVI 

LIFB  AND  LIBBETT  AS  PEOTECTBD  BY  DUB  PB00B8S — ^PBOOBBDINGS  rOB 

CONTEMPT— DISBABUBNT   Or   ATTOBNBTS 

i  318.  Power  to  punish  for  contempt  inherent  in  all  courts 578 

1 319.  Proceeding  in  its  nature  criminal 579 

1320.  What  constitutes  a  direct  contempt  committed  in  the  presence 

of  court 580 

i  321.  As  the  power  to  punish  is  inherent,  trial  by  jury  is  not  required . 

by  due  process  of  law 580 

1 322.  What  constitutes  an  indirect  or  civil  contempt 582 

1 323.  Bight  to  notice  and  hearing  in  indirect  or  civil  contempts 585 

i  324.  Cronsequence  of  a  lack  of  jurisdiction 588 

1 325.  Power  to  disbar  attorneys  inherent  in  all  courts 589 

1326.  An  attorney  can  not  be  denied  due  process 590 


CONTENTS 


PART  III 

THE  EQUAL  PROTECTION  OF  THE  LAWS  AS  A 
LIMITATION  ON  STATE  POWER 

CHAPTEB  XVII 

first  intbprxtation  of  thb  olausb 

Pagb 
t327.  The   equal   protection   of   the   law   clause   a   purely   American 

invention  595 

S  328.  Denial  to  colored  persons  of  the  right  to  act  as  jurors 596 

i  329.  Equal  protection  of  laws  to  colored  race — ^Bight  to  mixed  juries.  .597 

f  330.  Exclusion  of  juror  on  account  of  color 600 

I  331.  Law  excluding  jurors  on  account  of  race  or  color 602 

i  332.  Punishment  of  offense 602 

1 333.  Setting  aside  panel  of  jurors — ^Discriminating  against  citizens  of 

African  descent 603 

§334.  State  statute  requiring  separate  acconmiodations  for  white  and 

colored  persons  in  railway  coaches 604 

f  335.  Discrimination  against  colored  children 605 

§  336.  Negroes  as  grand  jurors 606 

S  337.  Negroes  as  jurors 607 

I  338.  Bight  of  women  to  practise  law  in  state  courts 608 

I  339.  The  Civil  Bights   Cases 608 

CHAPTEB  XVIII 

POWER  OF  TAXATION 

S  340.  Constitutionality  of  state  tax  laws 611 

S  341.  Tax  on  corporate  securities 612 

§  342.  Tax  on  business  of  an  express  company 613 

f  343.  Legacy  and  inheritance  taxes 614 

f  344.  State  taxation  of  express  companies '  property 615 

1 345.  Penalty  for  nonpayment   of  taxes 617 

S  346.  State  tax  law  as  to  banks  constitutional 618 

I  347.  Taxation  of  mortgagee 's  interest  in  land 618 

S  348.  Forfeiting  lands  for  nonpayment  of  taxes 619 

1349.  Discrimination  in  taxes  as  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of 

the  laws    620 

1 350.  License  tax  on  emigrant  agents 622 

f  351.  Tax  on   corporations 623 

§  352.  Succession  taxes   624 

1 353.  Inheritance  tax   624 

S  354.  Income  tax  on  mining  companies 625 

I  355.  Tax  on  cigarette  selling 625 

§  356.  Taxation  of  corporate  franchise 626 

1 357.  Taxation  of  street  railways   627 

1 358.  Tax  on  special  franchises 628 


CONTENTS  xxxiii 

Pagb 

1 359.  Validity  of  state  inheritance  tax 629 

f  360.  State   taxation  of  meat-paddng  houaee ^ 630 

f  361.  Diacri  m  i  n  ation  in  taxing  Hqnor  seUera   632 

f  362.  State    inlieritanee  tax   632 

i  363.  Validity  of  stock  transfer  tax 633 

1 364.  Taxation,  of  spirits  in  bond 634 

i  365.  Inlieritanee  tax  635 

f  366.  Taxing   wholesale  dealers  in  oils   635 

1 367.  Ocenpation    tax    636 

1 368.  Forfeiture  for  nonpayment  of  taxes  637 

f  369.  Gla88ification«TaKes-Sales  for  future  deliverj  638 

1 370.  Bxeiae  tax  on  corporations 639 

i  371.  Tax  on  transfers  inter  vivos  .640 

S  372.  Discrimination  in  license  tax 641 

f  373.  Oradincf  municipal  license  fees  for  theaters  641 

f  374.  Taxation  of  deposits  in  national  banks  642 

i  375.  Taxation  of  mineral  rights  643 

S  376.  Taxation  of  savings  banks  644 

S377.  State  taxation  of  memberships  in  an  incorporated  chamber  of 

commerce    644 

S  378.  Discrimination  against  oleomargarine  in  license  tax 645 

§  379.  Excise  tax  imposed  on  gross  earnings  of  railway  companies. . .  .645 

1 380.  Discrimination  in  license  tax 646 

1 381.  Assessment  for  public  improvements  646 

§382.  Trading  stamps  and  pranium  coupons,  discriminations  against 

not  in  violation  of  equal  protection  clause 647 

1 382a.  State  taxation  of  consolidated  railway  company 648 

CHAPTEB  XIX 

CONTBOL  OF  BAILBOADS 

1 383.  Legislative  control  over  railroad  fare  and  rates 650 

1 384.  City  ordinance  as  to  railroad 651 

S  385.  Valuation  and  taxation  of  railroad  property 652 

1 386.  Liability  to  employee  for  negligence   of  fellow  servant  under 

Iowa  statute   653 

f  387.  Liabilities  of  railroad  companies  to  employees 654 

1 388.  Liability  of  railroad  company  for  omission  to  fence  its  road 655 

S  389.  Beasonableness  of  railroad  rates 656 

i  390.  Assessing  railroads  to  meet  expenses  of  state  railroad  commission. 657 

S  391.  Taxation  of  railroads — ^Law  of  Georgia 658 

S  392.  Requiring  railroad  companies  to  bear  entire  expense  of  abolishing 

grade  crossings  660 

S  393.  Remedy  for  property  injured  by  construction  of  a  railroad 661 

i  394.  Unjust  and  unreasonable  railroad  rates 662 

1 395.  Eimsas  law  as  to  liability  of  railroads  for  personal  injuries 663 

1 396.  Statuta  requiring  heating  of  railroad  cars  by  stoves 664 

f  397.  Damages  for  running  rulroad  across  street •  •  •  •665 


CONTENTS 

Pagx 

398.  State  law  establialiing  railroad  ratea — ^When  Toid 665 

399.  State  aet  as  to  railroad  eompanys'  paying  their  emplojees 667 

400.  Pirea  aet  bj  railroad  loeomotiyea  668 

401.  Statute    changing    fellow    servant    rule    in    eaae    of    railroad 
employees .669 

402.  Exceptions  to  ordinance  regulating  speed  of  trains  l^  city 670 

403.  Assessment  of  railroad  property  for  omitted  taxes 670 

404.  Charging  more  for  shorter  than  for  longer  haul 672 

405.  Validity  of  order  requiring  safety  appliances  at  grade  crossings. 673 

406.  Discriminating  against  railway  companies 674 

407.  Legislative  abrogation  of  fellow  servant  rule 675 

408.  Imposing  expense  on  railvraty  company  for  draining  private  lands. 676 

409.  Classifying  railway  mail  clerks  with  railway  employees 677 

410.  Excessive  penalties  for  violation  of  the  provisions  of  a  statute.  .678 

411.  Classification  of  railway  employees  680 

412.  Statute  creating  presumption  of  negligence 680 

413.  Requiring  full  train  crew 681 

414.  Requiring  full  switching  crew — ^Excessive  penalties 683 

415.  Classification  of  railway  employees — ^Railway  relief 683 

416.  Abolishing  fellow  servant  rule 684 

417.  Federal  employer's  liability  act 685 

418.  Comparative  negligence  in  injuries  to  railway  employees 686 

419.  Modifying  fellow  servant  rule 686 

420.  Classification  of  railroads  for  rate  regulation 687 

421.  Judicial  review  of  rate  regulation 688 

422.  Requiring  carrier  to  accept  reshipments  in  cars  of  other  carrier. 689 

423.  Requiring  electric  headlights  on  locomotives 689 

424.  Exessive  penalties 689 

425.  Taxation  of  foreign  railway  company 691 

426.  Requiring  railroads  to  provide  drainage  for  water  contrary  to 
common  law  rule 692 

427.  Discrimination  between  carrier  and  shipper  as  to  attorneys'  fees 
in  demurrage  cases  makes  law  invalid 693 

427a.  Requiring  railway  company  to  remove  noxious  weeds 694 

CHAPTER  XX 

CONTROL   OF   D0MX8TIG   AND   FCAKIGN    GOBPOBATIONB 

§  428.  State  control  of  corporations 696 

S  429.  Statute  applicable  to  fire  insurance  only 697 

§430.  Statute   as   to   effect   of  false   answers   by   applicant   for   life 

insurance 698 

1 431.  State  regulation  of  fordgn  corporations 698 

S  432.  State  anti-trust  laws  699 

f  433.  Discrimination   against   dealers  in   articles   manufactured   from 

produce  of  another  state  700 

S  434.  YaUdity  of  Texas  anti-trust  law  701 

§  435.  Appointing  state  auditor  to  accept  service  <m  corporation 702 


CONTENTS 

Pagb 

1436.  Unequal  wweiMiment  of  franehues  and  other  property  of  certain 

corporations    702 

1 437.  Bequlring  eorporatioiis  alone  to  produce  books  and  paper 703 

1 438.  State  regulation  of  telegraph  companies 704 

S439.  Local  aaBeeemente  on  state  tide  lands 704 

1 440.  Exempting  Farmers'  mutual  insuranee  companies  from  statute 

regulating  fire  iosurance  rates 705 

1441.  Forfeiture  of  charter  of  corporation  for  failure  to  file  afildavit 

of  innocence  not  required  of  individuals 706 

§  442.  License  tax  on  foreign  corporation 707 

S  443.  State  restrictions  on  foreign  corporations 708 

S  444.  Tax  on  capital  of  a  corporation ^ 708 

S  445.  Corporation,  when  not  within  jurisdiction  of  state 709 

§  446.  Bight  to  attach  nonresident's  property 711 

S447.  l>iscrimination  against  nonresident  creditors  of  foreign  corpo- 
rations  712 

S  448.  Taxation  of  nonresident  stockholders 713 

f  449.  Taxation  of  stock  of  foreign  railroads 714 

S  450.  State  taxation  of  local  managers  of  foreign  packing  houses. . .  .716 

S  451.  Excluding  foreign  corporation 716 

i  452.  Notice  to  nonresidents — ^Validity  of  tax  sales 717 

i  453.  Discrimination  between  residents  and  nonresidents  718 

1 454.  Taxing  shares  of  foreign  corporations 720 

i  455.  Excise  tax  on  foreign  corporations  720 

i  456.  Franchise  tax  on  foreign  corporation 721 

1 457.  Excluding  foreign  insurance  company .722 

GHAPTEB  XXI 

THB  PdVXa  OP  OLABSmCATION 

f  458.  Discrimination  between  agricultural  and  other  lands  in  statute 

of  annexation  to  city ^ 725 

1 459.  Begistration  law  discriminating  between  dtisens 726 

1 460.  Glaasification  of  elevators  and  warehouses 727 

S  461.  Classifieation  of  merchants   728 

S  462.  Discrimination  against  nonproducing  venders  of  milk 729 

1 463.  Bequiring  labels  on  mixed  paints  to  show  ingredients 730 

S  464.  Classification  of  coal  mines  by  number  of  men  employed 731 

S465.  Classification  between  corporations  and  individuals--<7ompulsory 

production  of  testimony 732 

1 466.  Discrimination  in  building  regulations 734 

1 467.  Begistration  of  physicians  735 

1 468.  Exempting  banks  and  trust  companies  and  bona  fide  mortgages 

from  state  usury  law  736 

1 469.  Creating  bank  depositors'  guaranty  fund 737 

1 470.  .Licensing  private  bankers  737 

1471.  Penalizing  insuranee  company  connected  with  tariff  association. 738 
S  472.  Prohibiting  waste  of  mineral  waters  739 


CONTENTS 

Pact 

§  473.  Advertismg  wagons  on  city  streets 740 

1 474.  Unelaimed  sayings  bank  deposits  741 

S  475.  Begolating  assignments  of  future  earnings 742 

S  476.  Municipal  liability  for  damage  by  mob 742 

§  477.  Begulating  canceUation  of  land  contracts 743 

i  478.  Discrimination  in  fee  for  auction  Ueense 744 

S  479.  Prohibiting  unfair  competition  744 

f  480.  Municipal  license  tax  based  on  classification 745 

§  481.  Municipal  waterworks  competition  746 

1 482.  Forbidding  sale  of  food  preservatives  containing  boric  acid.  ...747 

S  483.  Classification  of  telephone  companies  for  taxation 747 

S  484.  State  anti-trust  laws   748 

i  485.  Bedemption  of  store  orders  in  money 749 

f  486.  Abolishing  Greek  letter  fraternities  in  state  universities 750 

1 487.  Requiring  washhouses  for  coal  miners 751 

S488.  Discrimination  between  county  and  city  in  disposition  of  tax 

penalties 752 

f  489.  Discrimination  against  aliens   753 

1 490.  Discrimination  against  foreign  labor  on  public  works 755 

1 491.  Begulating  innkeeper's  duty  in  case  of  fire 756 

f  492.  Forbidding  brickmaking  in  designated  area 756 

1 493.  Workmen 's  compensation  act 757 

1 494.  Abating  smoke  nuisance  757 

i  495.  Begulating  net  weight  of  packages  of  lard 758 

1 496.  Classification    denying   equal   protection    of    the   laws,    because 

arbitrary  and  creating  presumption  of  guilt 758 

CHAPTER  XXII 

THS  POLIGX  POWIB 

1 497.  Police  power  of  state — ^Public  laundries  and  washhouses 760 

1 498.  City  ordinances  as  to  public  laundries,  when  valid 762 

S  499.  Drainage  law  of  New  Jersey  not  unconstitutional 763 

(  500.  Begulation  of  laundry  business 764 

§  501.  Oleomargarine  law   765 

f  502.  When  servitude  attaches  to  lands 766 

f  503.  Utah  statute  as  to  damages  by  cattle  767 

i  504.  Bequiring  five  towns  to  maintain  a  bridge  and  highway 768 

i  505.  Ordinance  as  to  license  for  sale  of  cigarettes 769 

1 506.  Validity  of  state   statute  restricting  sale  and  manufacture  of 

oleomargarine  770 

S  507.  Validity  of  mining  insi)ection  law 771 

§  508.  Live-stock  quarantine 772 

S  509.  Sale  of  stocks  on  margin  773 

§  510.  Eight-hour  law   774 

f  511.  Compulsory  vaccination   ^ . . .  775 

1512.  Municipal  ordinance  against  visiting  barricaded  gambling  rooms. 776 
i  513.  Municipal  regulation  of  milk  business , . .  .777 


CONTENTS 

Pack 

i  514.  Laws  to   prevent  dealing  in  fatures 777 

f  515.  Bestrietioiis  on  aheep  grssang  778 

1 516.  Begnlating  admiflaion  to  places  of  pnblie  amusement 779 

1 517.  State  proteetion  of  the  national  flag 780 

I51&.  Imposing  responsibility  on  mine  owners  for  defaults  of  certain 

employees    781^ 

1 519.  State  regulation  of  the  sale  of  patented  articles 782 

1 520.  Prohibiting  diverting  water  b^ond  state 784 

1 521.  Begolating  sales  in  bulk 785 

1 522.  Prohibiting  drumming  on  carriers'  premises   786 

i  523.  Begulating  sale  of  explosives 786 

i  524.  Prohibiting  billiard  or  pool  rooms 787 

S  525.  Begolation  of  junk  dealers  787 

1 526.  Beqniring  connection  vrith  sewer  system 788 

1 527.  Milk  ordinance  requiring  tuberculin  test  for  dairy  cattle 789 

S528.  Guarding  open  shafts  790 

f  529.  Begulating  entries  in  coal  mines 791 

f  530.  Municipal  water  supply 791 

1 531.  Employment  of  minors  in  hazardous  occupations 792 

i  532.  Prohibiting  possession  of  firearms  by  alien 792 

f  533.  Prohibiting  sales  by  itinerant  vendors  793 

i  534.  Prescription    794 

i  535.  Begulation  of  livery  stables  794 

f  536.  Workmen's  compensation  law  795 

f  537.  £ight-hour  law  for  women  employed  in  hotels 796 

i  538.  Classification  of  women  employees — Hours  of  labor 798 

i  539.  Control  of  liquor  traffic 799 

f  540.  Imposing  attorneys'  fees  and  penalties 803 

1541.  Certain  penalties  imposed  on  common  carriers   for   failure   to 

settle  claims  888 

1 542.  Attorneys'  fees  to  successful  plaintiff  in  mandamus  proceedings.  .809 

1 543.  Excessive  penalties  812 

f  544.  Statute  regulating  charges    812 

S  545.  Statute  limiting  charges  of  stockyards  companies 814 

§  546.  Municipal  regulation  of  telephone  rates 816 

1 546a.  Emulating  private  detectives 817 

f  546b.  Begulating  percentage  of  butter  fat  in  ice  cream 818 

1 546e.  State  regulation  of  motor  vehicles 819 

CHAPTEB  XXni 

PBOOXDUSX  IN  STATS  COUBTS 

1 547.  Different  courts  in  the  same  state 820 

i  548.  Tax  tities    821 

1 549,  Number  of  peremptory  challenges  in  criminal  cases 822 

1 550.  Laws  operating  on  all  alike 823 

S  551.  Error  in  charge  to  jury 824 

i  552.  Befnsal  to  amend  record  in  criminal  case 824 


xxxviii  CX)NTENTS 

Pagx 

I  553.  Power  of  state  to  make  elaasificatioiis  825 

f  554.  Sufficiencj  of  indictment 826 

S  555.  Severer  punishment  for  subsequent  offenses 826 

i  556.  Denial  of  right  of  review — ^Alien  juror 827 

S  557.  Adjudging  a  prosecutor  to  be  liable  for  costs 828 

§  558.  Payment  before  possession  in  condemnation  proceedings 828 

1 559.  When  equal  protection  of  the  laws  not  denied 829 

i  560.  Abridging  the  right  of  trial  by  jurj 829 

I  561.  Constitutionalitj  of  struck  jurj  law 830 

S  562.  Additional  punishment  on  third  conviction 831 

fi  563.  Criminal  law—Appeal  by  state 831 

§  564.  Difference  in  term  of  sentence  for  imprisonment 831 

f  565.  Presumption  of  guilt  from  possession  of  gambling  paraphernalia — 

Effect  of  exception  in  favor  of  public  oflcers 832 

I  566.  Change  of  venue  for  local  prejudice 832 

§  567.  Local  regulations  for  the  selection  of  jurors 833 

S  568.  Error  of  trial  court  in  discharging  a  juror 834 

S  569.  Indeterminate  sentence  act   834 

fi  570.  Discrimination  in  matter  of  grand  jury 835 

$  571.  Difference  of  procedure  against  corporations 836 

f  572.  Appeal  by  government  in  criminal  case 837 

I  573.  Classification  of  prisoners  committing  assaults 837 

§  574.  Quo  warranto 838 

§  575.  Punishing  habitual  criminals    839 

S  576.  Attachment  of  property  of  non-resident   840 

1 577.  Right  to  preliminary  examination  in  criminal  prosecutions  in 

Manila  840 

f  578.  Baising  federal  question  on  second  trial 841 


I .  'I 


•  - 


Dl]E  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


AND  THE 


EQUAL  PROTECTION  OF  THE  LAWS 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  OBIGIN  AND  OBOWTH  OF  DUE  FBOCESS 

§  1.  Henry  n  and  the  reign  of  law.  The  distinctive 
feature  of  the  Norman  period,  so  far  as  English  constitu- 
tional history  is  concerned,  is  the  development  of  the 
new  system  of  central  administration  with  the  source  of 
its  strength  in  the  royal  authority.  That  new  system  of 
central  administration  was  superimposed  as  a  Norman 
creation  upon  the  Old  English  system  of  local  self -gov- 
erning communities  represented  by  the  township,  the 
hundred  and  the  shire.  Out  of  the  fusion  between  the  two 
has  grovm  the  modem  constitution.  During  the  Norman 
period,  embracing  the  reigns  of  the  four  Norman  kings, 
the  great  mass  of  foreign  elements  and  influences  were 
infused  into  the  blood,  the  language,  the  laws,  the 
]>olitical  institutions  of  the  English  nation;  during  the 
Angevin  period,  embracing  the  reigns  of  Henry  II  and 
his  sons,  the  foreign  elements  were  worked  together  into 
a  new  combination  that  retained  the  strongest  elements 
of  both.  The  most  striking  single  fact  revealed  by  an 
analysis  of  the  result  is,  that  in  the  new  combination  the 
superstructure  is  ^orman,  the  substructure  Old  English. 
Under  the  pressure  of  common  calamities  and  through 
the  agency  of  frequent  intermarriage  the  work  of  fusion 

1 

Doe 


••• 


V...  •       DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §1 


•  •,    ••• 


•  •      • 


m 


adyatfoe'd  so  rapidly  that  by  the  time  of  Henry  II  it  was 
iijippssible,  without  a  careful  examination  of  pedigree, 
.  •JEpikscertain  who  was  Norman  and  who  was  English.  So 
•//jabon  as  that  condition  of  things  was  reached,  in  which  it 
was  difficult  to  distinguish  an  Englishman  from  a 
Norman,  all  legal  distinctions  of  one  race  as  against  the 
other  passed  out  of  view.  Thus  was  paved  the  way  for 
the  epoch-making  policy  that  contemplated  not  only  the 
establishment  of  the  reign  of  law,  but  the  reduction  of  all 
orders  of  men  to  a  state  of  legal  equality  before  the  same 
system  of  law,  inaugurated  by  Henry  II,  **  whose  states- 
manlike activity,  whose  power  of  combining  and  adapting 
that  which  was  useful  in  the  old  system  of  government 
with  that  which  was  desirable  and  necessary  under  the 
new,  gives  to  the  policy  which  he  initiated  in  England 
almost  the  character  of  a  new  creation. '  *  Stubbs,  Const. 
Hist.,  i,  336.  See  also  the  author's  Origin  and  Growth 
of  the  English  Constitution,  i,  284-333. 

§  2.  Richard  I  and  John— The  struggle  for  the  charters. 
Henry  II  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Richard  I,  a  spend- 
thrift knight  errant,  who  strained  to  the  utmost  the  new 
system  of  taxation  his  thrifty  father  had  devised  in  order 
to  provide  vast  sums  of  money  to  be  expended  in  crusades. 
By  the  steady  and  persistent  pressure  of  taxation  upon 
every  class  during  Eichard's  reign,  the  clergy,  the 
baronage,  and  the  commons  were  each  in  turn  aroused 
to  more  or  less  positive  resistance.  With  the  wanton  and 
irritating  pressure  of  the  royal  authority  upon  every 
class  in  the  reign  of  Richard  I,  the  struggle  for  the 
charters  really  begins.  That  struggle  was  intensified 
after  the  accession  of  John  by  the  shameless  pressure  of 
taxation,  by  acts  of  wanton  despotism  in  individual  cases, 
and  by  constant  demands  upon  the  baronage  for  military 
service  in  fruitless  expeditions  which  were  never  carried 
out.  The  royal  authority  reached  the  limit  of  its  growth 
when  both  Richard  and  John,  accepting  the  imperialist 
theories  of  Glanville,  held  that  the  will  of  the  prince  was 


53  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  3 

the  law  of  the  land.   The  reckless  attempts  made  by  John 
to  enforce  tliat  theory  finally  brought  about  the  armed 
conflict  belrween  the  king  and  the  nation,  divided  now 
into  clergy,  baronage  and  commons  as  a  part  of  a  general 
movement  known  as  the  estate  system  whose  growth 
constitutes  an  important  epoch  in  the!  constitutional  his- 
tory of  E^nrope.    The  nation  thus  marshaled  in  the  ranks 
of  the  three  estates  claimed  that  the  law  of  the  land  was 
not  the  will  of  the  prince,  but  the  immemorial  laws  of  the 
English  Kingdom,  with  such  modifications  and  amend- 
ments as  those  laws  had  suffered  through  the  results  of 
the  Norman  conquest.   It  is  therefore  plain  that  when  the 
barons  seized  upon  the  charter  of  Henry  I  as  the  basis 
of  national  action  and  demanded  of  the  king  that  he 
should  enter  into  a  treaty  with  the  nation  upon  the  lines 
it  defined,  it  simply  amounted  to  a  demand  upon  their 
part  that  the  legal  and  constitutional  relations  between 
the  king  and  the  nation  should  henceforth  be  regulated  by 
the  Old  English  code  of  customary  law,  subject  to  such 
changes  in  that  code  as  the  results  of  the  conquest  had 
brought  about.    The  effort  was  to  fix  the  limits  of  inno- 
vation, to  define  the  extent  to  which  the  centralizing  and 
feudaUzing  processes  to  which  the  conquest  gave  birth 
should  be  permitted  to  abridge  the  immemorial  freedom 
in  the  time  to  come.    In  that  vital  question  each  estate 
was  interested  as  a  corporate  entity,  and  the  nation  as 
a  whole  was  also  interested  as  a  corporate  entity. 

§3.  The  Great  Charter  of  1215  a  treaty  between  the 
crown  and  the  estates.  An  analysis  of  the  Great  Charter, 
when  made  in  the  light  of  the  circumstances  attending 
its  execution,  clearly  reveals  the  fact  that,  although 
issued  in  the  form  of  a  royal  grant,  it  was  in  substance 
a  treaty  or  compact  entered  into  between  the  royal 
authority  on  the  one  hand  and  the  nation  marshaled  in 
the  ranks  of  the  three  estates  on  the  other.  As  the  clergy, 
the  baronage,  and  the  general  commonalty  of  freemen 
all  participated  in  the  movement  that  brought  about  the 


4  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  8 

making  of  the  conventioiiy  and  as  all  three  orders  par- 
ticipated equally  in  its  fruits,  the  great  act  at  Bunnymede 
was  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  term  a  national  act,  and 
not  the  mere  act  of  the  baronage  in  behalf  of  their  own 
special  privileges.  The  winning  of  the  charter  was  in 
fact  the  final  consummation  of  the  work  of  union.  In  the 
words  of  a  master:  ^^It  is  the  first  great  act  of  the 
English  nation  after  the  descendants  of  Norman  con- 
querors and  Norman  settlers  had  fully  become  English- 
men,  after  all  thought  of  any  distinction  between  the 
king's  men,  French  and  English,  had  passed  away  from 
the  thoughts  of  men.*'  Freeman,  Norm.  Conq.,  Vol.  V., 
p.  475.  Each  estate  enters  into  a  covenant  with  the  kiag 
as  to  its  own  special  rights  and  privileges,  while  the 
nation  in  its  corporate  person  covenants  as  to  those  gen- 
eral rights  and  immunities  which  are  to  be  secured  to  the 
whole  body  of  freemen,  irrespective  of  their  division  into 
estates  or  orders. 

§4.  Chapter  39  of  the  Oreat  Oharten  Foremost  among 
the  guaranties  given  by  the  charter  to  the  nation  as  a 
whole  were  those  embracing  reforms  in  the  judicial  sys- 
tem. In  addition  to  the  provisions  touching  the  character 
and  appointment  of  judicial  officers,  the  f ramers  of  the 
charter  were  careful  to  announce  a  series  of  practical 
rules,  both  general  and  special,  for  the  government  of  all 
courts  in  the  administration  of  justice.  First  among 
those  general  rules  stands  the  famous  chapter  39,  which 
provides  that,  **No  freeman  shall  be  arrested,  or  detained 
in  prison,  or  deprived  of  his  freehold,  or  outlawed,  or 
banished,  or  in  any  way  molested;  and  we  will  not  set 
forth  against  him,  nor  send  against  him,  unless  by  the 
lawful  judgment  of  his  peers  and  by  the  law  of  the  land.*' 
A  recent  and  able  commentator,  in  speaking  of  the  ^^main 
object'*  of  that  chapter,  has  said:  ''It  has  been  usual  to 
read  it  as  containing  a  guaranty  of  trial  by  jury  to  all 
Englishmen ;  as  absolutely  prohibiting  arbitrary  commit- 
ment ;  and  as  xmdertaking  solemnly  to  dispense  to  all  and 


Si  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  5 

snndry  an  equal  justice,  fuU,  free,  and  speedy.    (See,  e.  g,, 
Coke,  Second  Institute,  55.)    The  traditional  interpreta- 
tion has  thus  made  it,  in  the  widest  terms,  a  promise  of 
law  and  liberty,  and  good  government  to  every  one. 
(Thus  Blackstone,  Commentaries,  iv,  424.)     A  careful 
analysis  of  the  words  of  the  clause,  read  in  connection 
with  its  historical  genesis,  suggests  the  need  for  modifi- 
cations  of  this  view.    It  was  in  accord  with  the  practical 
genius  of  this  great  document  that  it  should  direct  its 
energies,  not  to  the  enunciation  of  vague  platitudes  and 
well-sounding*  generalities,  but  to  the  reform  of  a  specific 
and  clearly  defined  group  of  abuses.    Its  main  object  was 
to  prohibit  John  from  resorting  to  what  is  sometimes 
whimsically  known  in  Scotland  as  *Jeddart  justice.'    It 
forbade  him  for  the  future  to  place  execution  before  judg- 
ment/^    McEIechnie,  Magna  Carta,  p.  439.    John  often 
proceeded,  or  threatened  to  proceed  (under  the  theory 
that  the  will  of  the  prince  is  the  law  of  the  land)  by  force 
of  arms  against  those  assumed  to  be  guilty,  without  wait- 
ing for  legal  procedure.    *  *  The  practice  of  granting  writs 
of  execution  ^^thout  trial  in  the  courts  appears  to  have 
been  common. '  *    Bigelow,  History  of  Procedure,  p.  155. 
The  primary  purpose  of  chapter  39  was  to  demand  not 
only  legal  procedure,  prior  to  execution,  but  an  ascertain- 
ment of  guilt  or  liability  **by  the  lawful  judgment  of  his 
peers  and  by  the  law  of  the  land.'*   Mr.  Webster  had  that 
basic  idea  clearly  in  mind  when,  in  defining  *  *  due  process 
of  law*'  and  **the  law  of  the  land,'*  in  the  Dartmouth  Col- 
lege Case,  he  said:    ''By  the  law  of  the  land  is  most 
clearly  intended  the  general  law,  a  law  which  hears  before 
it  condemns,  which  proceeds  upon  inquiry,  and  renders 
judgment  onlj/  after  trial.** 

Nothing  can  be  clearer,  in  the  light  of  our  present 
knowledge,  than  the  fact  that  *^nisi  per  legale  judicium 
parium  stMrutn  vel  per  legem  terrae**  meant  nothing 
more  than  the  right  to  make  ''proof  according  to  one 
of  the  then  existing  modes  of  legal  procedure.  In  the 
words  of  a  great  historical  jurist :   "The  expression  'per 


6  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  4 

legem  terrae*  simply  required  judicial  proceedings^ 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  case ;  the  duel,  ordeal,  or 
compurgation  in  criminal  cases,  the  duel,  witnesses,  char- 
ters, or  recognition  in  property  cases.**  Bigelow,  Pro- 
cedure, 155,  n.  That  trial  by  jury  was  not  in  contempla- 
tion is  absolutely  certain,  for  the  simple  and  conclusive 
reason  that  it  did  not  exist  in  1215 ;  the  jury  of  proof  was 
not  transformed  into  the  jury  of  judgment,  the  trial  jury 
of  our  day,  until  a  century  or  more  after  that  time.  The 
Great  Charter  did  not  guarantee  ** trial  by  jury*'  to  any 
one.  How  in  the  process  of  time  that  new  method  of 
trial — ^the  joint  product  of  the  Norman  writ  process  and 
the  community-witnesses  of  the  customary  law — ^gradu- 
ally absorbed  or  superseded  all  other  methods  of  trial 
that  had  prevailed  in  the  popular  courts  is  a  question  full 
of  interest,  but  one  that  belongs  to  the  history  of  legal 
procedure.  SuflSce  it  here  to  say  that  such  was  the  final 
result  of  the  development  of  the  jury  in  England,  where, 
rather  by  the  silent  force  of  its  own  intrinsic  excellence 
than  by  the  artificial  stimulus  of  legislation,  it  gradually 
overshadowed  and  exterminated  all  other  methods  of  trial 
ever  employed  for  the  settlement  of  issues  in  which  dis- 
puted facts  were  in  question.  By  the  force  of  the  law 
of  natural  selection  it  outlived  them  all — as  the  fittest  it 
survived. 

§  5.  Later  versions  of  the  Oreat  Charter.  The  charter 
was  reissued  in  1216,  and  again  in  1217,  and  that  text, 
though  often  republished  and  confirmed,  was  never  after- 
wards materially  altered.  The  later  versions,  beginning 
with  that  of  1217,  were  made  to  declare  that  *'No  free- 
man shall  be  arrested,  or  detained  in  prison,  or  deprived 
of  his  freehold,  free  tenements^  franchises^  and  free  cus- 
toms, or  outlawed,  or  banished, '^  etc,  by  the  addition  of 
the  words  ^'de  libera  tenemento  sua  vel  libertatibus,  vel 
liberis  consuetudinibus  suis/^  That  italicized  addition 
appears  in  the  reissues  of  1217  (2  Hen.  m,  1217)  and  of 
1225  (9  Hen.  lEI,  1225).     **(a)  Liberuni  tenementum. 


i  6  OBIGIN  AND  GROWTH  7 

'Free*  tenements  were  freeholds  as  opposed  to  the  holding 
of  villeins.  .  .  .  (b)  'Libertates'  covered  feudal  rights 
and  incidents  of  too  intangible  nature  to  be  appropriately 
described  as  'holdings.*  .  .  .  (c)  Consuetudines  had 
two  meanings,  a  broad  general  one  and  a  narrower  finan- 
cial one.  * '   McKechnie,  p.  445. 

§  6.  Rebirth  of  the  Great  Charter  in  1628.  During  the 
despotic  days  of  the  Tudor  monarchy,  whose  system  of 
government  by  councils  was  continued  by  the  Stuarts 
down  to  1640,  the  ancient  liberties  of  England  guar- 
anteed by  the  charters  were  obscured  as  a  wheat  field  is 
obscured  beneath  a  fertilizing  mantle  of  snow.  The  roots 
of  these  ancient  liberties  were  thus  strengthened  for  a 
sudden  and  vigorous  growth  in  the  time  to  come.  That 
larger  conception  of  civil  liberty,  bom  of  the  Renaissance 
and  the  Reformation,  which  culminated  in  the  Puritan 
Revolution  of  1640,  expressed  itself  in  no  uncertain  terms 
in  Charles  *  third  parliament  of  1628,  in  which  the  popu- 
lar cause  was  championed  by  Eliot,  Phelips  and  Sir 
Thomas  Wentworth.  The  Petition  of  Right,  then  adopted, 
drew  its  substance  from  Wentworth  and  its  form  from 
Coke.  After  referring  to  the  Great  Charter,  wherein 
it  was  declared  *'that  no  freeman  may  be  taken  or 
imprisoned  or  be  disseised  of  his  freehold  or  liberties, 
or  his  free  customes,  or  be  outlawed  or  exiled,  or  in  any 
manner  destroyed,  but  by  the  lawfuU  judgment  of  his 
peeres,  or  by  the  law  of  the  land ; '  *  to  the  statute  of  28 
Edw.  m,  c.  3,  wherein  it  was  declared  **that  no  man, 
of  what  state  or  condicion  that  he  be,  shall  be  put  out 
of  his  land  or  tenements,  nor  taken,  nor  imprisoned,  nor 
disinherited,  nor  put  to  death,  without  being  brought  to 
answere  by  due  process  of  lawe, '  *  and  then,  after  reciting 
the  fact  that  in  violation  of  such  statutes,  **and  other 
good  lawes  and  statutes  of  your  realme  to  that  end  pro- 
vided, divers  of  your  subjects  have  of  late  been  impris- 
oned without  any  cause  shewed;  and  when  for  their 
deliverance  they  were  brought  before  your  justices  by 


8  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  6 

your  Majestie's  writts  of  habeas  corpus,  there  to  under- 
goe  and  receive  as  the  court  should  order,  and  their 
keepers  commanded  to  certifie  the  causes  of  their  de- 
tayner,  no  cause  was  certified,  but  that  they  were  deteined 
by  your  Majestic 's  special  conmiand,  signified  by  the 
lords  of  your  Privie  Councell,  and  yet  were  returned 
backe  to  severall  prisons,  without  being  charged  with 
anything  to  which  they  might  make  answere  according 
to  the  lawe,**  the  petition  prayed  **that  no  freeman,  in 
any  such  manner  as  is  before  mencioned,  be  imprisoned 
or  detained.  ^  * 

§  7.  Coke  a  misleading  expounder  of  the  Great  Charter. 
Such  was  the  general  nature  of  the  document,  reviving 
the  immortal  part  of  the  Great  Charter,  which  drew  its 
form  from  Coke,  a  dogmatic  lawyer  whose  aspirations 
in  favor  of  liberty  were  deeply  colored  by  his  associa- 
tions with  a  despotic  past.  Cokeys  First  Institute,  begun 
in  1621,  was  completed  in  1628,  while  his  Second  Insti- 
tute— a  commentary  on  Magna  Carta  and  other  statutes, 
so  frequently  appealed  to  by  our  courts  as  the  best  expo- 
sition of  them — was  not  published  until  1632.  In  esti- 
mating the  value  of  Coke  as  an  expounder  of  the  Great 
Charter  it  is  impossible  to  ignore  the  fact  that,  after 
having  sat  in  the  Star  Chamber,  he  died  September  3, 
1634,  when  the  entire  code  of  Star  Chamber  law  and  High 
Commission  law  was  in  full  force.  It  is  not,  therefore, 
strange  that  we  are  unable  to  draw  from  his  commentary 
the  wider  meaning,  the  more  advanced  interpretation 
given  to  the  Great  Charter  by  the  leaders  of  the  revolu- 
tions of  1640  and  1688.  Another  difficulty  arises  from 
the  fact  that  * '  The  great  lawyer  reads  into  Magna  Carta 
the  entire  body  of  the  common  law  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  of  which  he  was  admittedly  a  master.  He  seems 
almost  unconscious  of  the  great  changes  accomplished  by 
the  experience  and  vicissitudes  of  the  four  eventful  cen- 
turies which  had  elapsed  since  the  charter  had  been  orig- 
inally granted.    The  various  clauses  of  Magna  Carta  are 


§  8  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  9 

thus  merely  occasions  for  exponnding  the  law  as  it  stood 
not  at  the  beginning  of  the  thirteenth  century,  but  in 
his  own  day.  In  the  skilful  hands  of  Sir  Edward,  the 
Great  Charter  is  made  to  attack  the  abuses  of  James  or 
Charles,  rather  than  those  of  John  or  Henry,  which  its 
framers  had  in  view.  .  .  .  Yet  Coke,  following  his 
vicious  method  of  assuming  the  existence,  in  some  part 
of  Magna  Carta,  of  a  warrant  for  every  legal  principle 
established  in  his  own  day,  has  utterly  misled  several 
generations  of  commentators. '  *  McKechnie,  p.  208,  447. 
It  is  all-important  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  Coke 's  com- 
mentary on  the  charter  is  neither  a  correct  description  of 
the  legal  conditions  existing  at  the  time  it  was  granted, 
nor  a  reliable  forec€ist  of  the  broad  meaning  put  upon  it 
during  the  half  century  or  more  that  followed  his  death. 
In  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  said:  **The  prohibition 
against  depriving  the  citizen  or  subject  of  his  life,  liberty, 
or  property,  without  due  process  of  law,  is  not  new  in  the 
constitutional  history  of  the  English  race.  It  is  not  new 
in  the  constitutional  history  of  this  country,  and  it  is  not 
new  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  when  it 
became  a  part  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  in  the  year 
1866.  The  equivalent  of  the  phrase  *due  process  of  law,' 
according  to  Lord  Coke,  is  found  in  the  words  'law  of  the 
land '  in  the  Great  Charter,  in  connection  with  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus,  the  trial  by  jury  and  other  guaranties 
of  the  rights  of  the  subject  against  the  oppression  of  the 
crown. ' '  In  that  case,  as  in  the  preceding  case  of  Murray 
V.  Hoboken  Land  and  Improvement  Co.,  18  How.  272, 
the  court  fell  into  a  manifest  historical  error  when  it 
assumed  that  the  due  process  of  law  clause,  as  it  appears 
in  the  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  amendments,  should  be  con- 
strued as  it  was  understood  in  England  in  1632,  when 
Coke's  Second  Institute  was  published. 

§  8.  The  revolutions  of  1640  and  1688.    During  the  one 
hundred  and  forty-two  years  that  intervened  between 


10  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  8 

Coke's  death  and  the  severance  of  the  English  colonies 
in  America  from  the  mother  country,  what  may  he  called 
the  ancient  Constitution  of  England,  first  clearly  defined 
in  Magna  Carta,  was  transformed  into  the  modem  con- 
stitution through  the  revolutions  of  1640  and  1688.  The 
reformed  and  invigorated  constitutional  system  that 
stands  out  after  those  revolutions  was  a  vastly  wider 
and  more  complete  fabric  of  liberty  under  law  than  that 
existing  in  Coke 's  time.  Those  revolutions  brought  into 
being  many  new  constitutional  principles  of  which  Coke 
never  heard,  most  of  which  passed  into  American  law. 
As  a  practical  illustration,  reference  may  be  made  to 
the  notable  discussion  that  occurred  in  Twining  v.  New 
Jersey,  211  U,  S.  78,  in  which  the  court  had  occasion  to 
consider  the  origin  of  the  constitutional  right  to  an 
exemption  from  compulsory  self-incrimination,  Down 
to  Coke 's  death  that  compulsory  principle  was  a  part  of 
the  Star  Chamber  code.  Not  until  after  the  revolution 
of  1688,  and  as  a  consequence  of  it,  was  that  Star  Cham- 
ber process  extinguished.  The  exemption  from  com- 
pulsory self-incrimination,  to  which  the  revolution  of 
1688  gave  birth,  had  become  so  clearly  defined  in  English 
constitutional  law  prior  to  the  separation  of  the  Ameri- 
can colonies  from  the  mother  country,  that  the  bills  of  . 
rights  of  our  first  state  constitutions  bristle  with  defini- 
tions of  it.  That  exemption  was  first  stated  in  a  dog- 
matic form  in  the  bills  of  rights  of  the  state  constitutions 
of  1776.  We  have  the  court's  word  for  it  that  **the 
exemption  from  testimonial  compulsion,  that  is,  from 
disclosure  as  a  witness  of  evidence  against  one's  self, 
forced  by  any  form  of  legal  process,  is  universal  in  Amer- 
ican law,  though  there  may  be  differences  as  to  its  scope 
and  limits."  That  exemption  only  became  ** universal  in 
American  law"  because  it  had  become  firmly  fixed  in 
English  law  between  1688  and  1776.  The  new  constitu- 
tional principle,  forbidding  compulsory  self-incrimina- 
tion, that  passed  into  all  or  nearly  all  of  our  original 
state  constitutions,  is  highly  typical  of  the  fact  that  the 


i  9  OBIGIN  AND  GROWTH  11 

bills  of  rig^hts  of  those  first  state  constitutions  are  but 
epitomes^  and  the  very  besi  epitomes,  of  the  English  con- 
stitutional system  as  it  stood  forth  after  the  revolutions 
of  1640  and  1688.  The  draftsmen  of  those  constitutions 
would  have  recoiled  with  horror  at  the  thought  that  they 
were  founding  American  constitutional  law  upon  the 
ancient  Snglish  Constitution  as  it  existed  in  1632 — ^with 
the  Star  Chamber  and  High  Commission  intact — and  not 
upon  the  reformed  English  Constitution  as  it  stood  after 
the  glorious  revolutions  of  1640  and  1688. 

§9.  Blackstone,  not  Coke,  the  true  guide.    Blackstone's 
famous  *  *  Commentaries  *  *  were  put  in  their  present  form 
in  1758;  and  Burke,  in  his  conciliation  speech  made  in 
the  House  of  Commons  in  1775,  said :    *  *  I  hear  that  they 
(English  booksellers)  have  sold  nearly  as  many  of  Black- 
stone's  Commentaries  in  America  as  in  England.    Gen- 
eral Ga^e  marks  out  this  disposition  very  particularly 
m  a  letter  on  your  table.  * '   Those  *  *  Commentaries  * '  were 
taught  at  TVilliam  and  Mary  College,  before  the  revolu- 
tion of  1776,  by  Chancellor  Wythe,  who  numbered  Mar- 
shall, Jefferson^  and  Monroe  among  his  students.    Amer- 
ican lawyers  of  that  day,  as  of  this,  knew  Coke  through 
Blackstone,  ^th  his  doctrines  amended  and  expanded 
by  the  changes  the  revolutions  of  1640  and  1668  had 
wrought  in  the  ancient  constitution  of  1632.    Thus  trained 
and  influenced,  the  founders  of  this  republic  epitomized 
m  our  first  state  constitutions  the  modem  English  Con- 
stitution as  Blackstone  had  defined  it.    If  anything  in 
the  history  of  this  country  is  certain,  it  is  the  fact  that 
the  essence    of  the  English  constitutional  system  as 
reformed  hy  the  revolutions  of  1640  and  1688,  and  as 
defined  by  Blackstone  in  1758,  passed  into  our  first  state 
oonfltitutions,  which  were  the  fitter  beds  through  which 
the  essence  of  the  reformed  English  system  passed  into 
the  existing  Constitution  of  the  United  States.    There- 
fore, in  construing  the  due  process  of  law  clause,  as  it 
appears  in  the  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  amendments,  noth- 


12  DDE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  9 

ing  but  confusion  and  inaccuracy  can  result  from  the 
acceptance  of  the  false  standard  contained  in  a  mislead- 
ing andchronisuL  We  should  have  nothing  to  do  with 
Coke's  sketch  of  the  ancient  English  Constitution  as  it 
existed  in  1632 — ^we  should  turn  instead  to  the  true  foun- 
tain opened  for  us  by  Blackstone  in  1758. 


§  10.  The  true  rule  recognized  in  Hurtado  v. 
In  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U,  S.  516,  Mr.  Justice 
Matthews  was  the  first  to  perceive  that  the  rule  of  con- 
struction,  based  on  English  constitutional  theory  as  it 
existed  in  Coke's  time,  is  at  once  unsound  and  imprac- 
tical. In  rejecting  that  idea,  accepted  without  due  consid- 
eration by  Justices  Curtis  and  Miller  in  cases  heretofore 
referred  to,  he  said:  **It  would  be 'to  stamp  upon  our 
jurisprudence  the  unchangeableness  attributed  to  the 
laws  of  the  Modes  and  Persians.  This  would  be  all  the 
more  singular  and  surprising,  in  this  quick  and  active 
age,  when  we  consider  that,  owing  to  the  progressive 
development  of  legal  ideas  and  institutions  in  England, 
the  words  of  Magna  Carta  stood  for  very  different  things 
at  the  time  of  the  separation  of  the  American  colonies 
from  what  they  represented  originally.  ...  In  this 
country  written  constitutions  were  deemed  essential  to 
protect  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people  against  the 
encroachments  of  power  delegated  to  their  governments, 
and  the  provisions  of  Magna  Carta  were  incorporated 
into  bills  of  rights ;''  that  is,  into  bills  of  rights  of  the 
first  state  constitutions,  because  there  were  no  other  bills 
of  rights.  In  these  golden  sentences,  Mr.  Justice 
Matthews  solved  the  problem  by  announcing  that  the 
court,  when  construing  the  due  process  of  law  clause  as 
it  appears  in  the  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  amendments, 
should  take  that  formula  with  the  meaning  annexed  to 
it  in  English  constitutional  law,  ''af  the  time  of  the  sep- 
aration of  the  America/n  colonies/'  as  contra-distin- 
guished from  the  meaning  annexed  to  it  in  1632,  when 
Coke  ^s  Second  Institute  was  published.    That  conclusion 


§11  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  13 

was  greatly    strengthened  by  the  statement  that  **the 
provisioiiB  of  Magna  Carta  were  incorporated  into  bills 
of  rights,  *  *  that  is,  into  the  bills  of  rights  of  our  first 
state  Gonstltxitions.    Thus  a  new  and  unassailable  his- 
torical test  v^BB  laid  down  as  a  guide  whenever  a  particu- 
lar law  or  procedure  is  drawn  in  question  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  i^iranting  in  due  process  of  law,  and  that  new 
test  received   emphatic  confirmation  when  the  court, 
8X)eaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Gray  in  Lowe  v.  Kansas, 
163  U.  S.  81,  said:    ** Whether  the  mode  of  proceeding 
prescribed  by  this  statute,  and  followed  in  this  case,  was 
due  process  of  law  depends  upon  the  question  whether 
it  w(is  in  substantial  accord  with  the  law  and  usage  of 
England  before  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  in 
this  country  since  it  became  a  nation,  in  similar  cases. ' ' 
That  emphatic  refusal  to  recognize  as  a  correct  historical 
test  the  condition  of  English  constitutional  law  as  it 
existed  in  1632  was  repeated  in  no  uncertain  terms  in 
Twining  v.  New  Jersey,  211  U.  S.  78,  when  the  court, 
speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Moody,  said:    ^^ Second. 
It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  a  procedure  settled  in 
English  law  at  the  time  of  the  emigration,  and  brought 
to  this  country  by  our  ancestors,  is  an  essential  element 
in  due  process  of  law.    //  that  were  so,  the  procedure  of 
the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  would  be  fastened 
upon  American  jurisprudence  like  a  straight-jacket,  only 
to  be  loosed  by  constitutional  amendment/^ 

§  11.  Oliapter  39  as  reproduced  in  our  first  state  consti- 
tutions. An  attempt  has  now  been  made  to  state  within 
narrow  limits  the  history  of  the  famous  formula  that 
underlies  the  English  conception  of  due  process  of  law, 
from  its  advent  in  the  Great  Charter  of  1215  down  to 
its  embodiment  in  the  American  state  constitutions 
adopted  in  1776  or  shortly  thereafter.  Emphasis  has 
been  given,  first,  to  the  fact  that  during  the  five  hundred 
and  sixty-one  years  intervening  between  those  dates  the 
meaning  of  the  formula  varied  from  age  to  age,  each 


14  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  11 

generation  perceiving  in  it  its  own  peculiar  conception 
of  civil  liberty  and  law;  second,  to  the  fact  that  our 
American  states  adopted  it  with  the  meaning  attached 
to  it  in  England  in  1776.  Chapter  39  appears  in  the  fol- 
lowing forms  in  the  state  constitutions  of  1776.  In  the 
act  of  that  year,  continuing  the  charter  of  Coimecticut 
of  1662  as  the  organic  law  of  the  state,  it  is  provided 
'  ^  that  no  man 's  life  shall  be  taken  away :  no  man 's  honor 
or  good  name  shall  be  stained :  no  man 's  person  shall  be 
arrested,  restrained,  banished,  dismembered,  nor  any 
ways  punished :  no  man  shall  be  deprived  of  his  wife  or 
children:  no  man's  goods  or  estate  shall  be  t£Cken  away 
from  him,  nor  any  ways  indamaged  under  the  color  of 
law,  or  countenance  of  authority:  unless  clearly  war- 
ranted by  the  laws  of  the  state. '  *  In  Maryland  *s  consti- 
tution of  the  same  year  it  is  provided  *Hhat  every  free- 
man, for  any  injury  done  him  in  his  person  or  property, 
ought  to  have  remedy  by  the  course  of  the  law  of  the 
land,  and  ought  to  have  justice  and  right  freely  without 
sale,  freely  without  denial,  and  speedily  without  delay, 
according  to  the  law  of  the  land."  In  North  Carolina's 
constitution  of  the  same  year  it  is  provided  **that  no 
freeman  ought  to  be  taken,  imprisoned,  or  disseized  of 
his  freehold,  liberties,  or  privileges,  or  outlawed,  or 
exiled,  or  in  any  manner  destroyed,  or  deprived  of  his  life, 
liberty,  or  property,  but  by  the  law  of  the  land.'*  In 
Pennsylvania's  constitution  of  the  same  year  it  is  pro- 
vided, *'nor  can  any  man  be  justly  deprived  of  his  liberty 
except  by  the  laws  of  the  land,  or  the  judgment  of  his 
peers.''  In  Virginia's  constitution  of  the  same  year  it 
is  provided  *Hhat  no  man  be  deprived  of  his  liberty, 
except  by  the  law  of  the  land  or  by  the  judgment  of  his 
peers."  In  Vermont's  constitution,  drafted  in  1777  and 
affirmed  in  1779,  it  is  provided,  **nor  can  any  man  be 
justly  deprived  of  his  liberty,  except  by  the  laws  of  the 
land  or  the  judgment  of  his  peers."  Li  South  Carolina's 
constitution  of  1778  it  is  provided  **that  no  freeman  of 
this  State  be  taken  or  imprisoned,  or  disseized  of  his 


§  12  OBIGIN  AND  GROWTH  15 

freehold,  liberties,  or  privileges,  or  outlawed,  exiled,  or 
in  any  manner  disseized  or  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty, 
or  property,  but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers  or  by  the 
law  of  the  land. ' '   In  Massachusetts '  constitution  of  1780 
it  is  provided  that  **no  subject  shall  be  arrested,  impris- 
oned, despoiled,  or  deprived  of  his  property,  inmiunitieSy 
or  privileges,  put  out  of  the  protection  of  the  law,  exiled, 
or  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty,  or  estate,  but  by  the  judg- 
ment of  his  peers,  or  the  law  of  the  land. ' '    In  the  New 
Hampshire  constitution  of  1784  the  same  provision  is 
rex)eated,  word  for  word.    The  student  of  American  con- 
stitutional law  should  never  for  a  moment  forget  that 
the  best  epitomes  of  the  reformed  English  Constitution 
ever  written  are  to  be  found  in  the  bills  of  rights  of  our 
first  state  constitutions,  drafted  by  men  who  knew  per* 
fectly  what  rights  were  fundamental  in  English  law  at 
that  time.     Those  bills  of  rights  were  the  filter  beds 
through  which  the  due  process  principle  passed  prior  to 
its  incorporation  into  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States. 

§  12.  The  wider  scope  of  chapter  39  in  American  law. 
In  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  the  Court  said : 
**It  is  easy  to  see  that  when  the  great  barons  of  England 
wrung  from  King  John,  at  the  point  of  the  sword,  the 
concessions  that  neither  their  property  should  be  dis- 
posed  of  by  the  crown,  except  as  provided  by  the  law  of 
the  land,  they  meant  by  *  law  of  the  land '  the  ancient  and 
customary  laws  of  the  English  people,  or  laws  enacted 
by  the  parliament  of  which  those  barons  were  a  con- 
trolling element.  It  was  not  in  their  minds,  therefore, 
to  protect  themselves  against  the  enactment  of  laws  by 
the  Parliament  of  England.^'  In  Hurtado  v.  California, 
110  TJ.  S.  516,  that  statement  was  amplified  by  the  dec- 
laration that  **The  concessions  of  Magna  Carta  were 
wrung  from  the  king  as  guaranties  against  the  oppres- 
sions and  usurpations  of  his  prerogative.  It  did  not 
enter  into  the  minds  of  the  barons  to  provide  security 


16  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  12 

against  their  own  body  or  in  favor  of  the  commons  by 
limiting  the  power  of  parliament :  so  that  bills  of  attain- 
der, ex  post  facto  laws,  laws  declaring  forfeitures  of 
estates,  and  other  arbitrary  acts  of  legislation,  which 
occur  so  frequently  in  English  history,  were  never 
regarded  as  inconsistent  with  the  law  of  the  land,  for 
notwithstanding  what  was  attributed  to  Lord  Coke  in 
Bonham's  Case  (8  Coke  114),  the  omnipotence  of  parlia- 
ment over  the  common  law  was  absolute,  even  against 
common  right  and  reason.  The  actual  and  practical 
security  for  English  liberty  against  legislative  tyranny 
was  the  power  of  a  free  public  opinion  represented  by 
the  commons/'  In  Bonham's  Case,  Coke's  words  are 
these :  *  *  And  it  appears  in  our  books,  that  in  many  cases, 
the  common  law  will  control  acts  of  Parliament  and  some- 
times adjudge  them  to  be  utterly  void ;  for  when  an  act 
of  Parliament  is  against  common  right  and  reason,  or 
repugnant  or  impossible  to  be  performed,  the  common 
law  will  control  it  and  adjudge  such  act  to  be  void." 
8  Coke  118a.  And  yet,  when  properly  understood,  what 
Coke  said  was  only  inteujded  as  an  announcement  of  a  rule 
of  construction  whereby  acts  of  parliament  were  to  be 
interpreted  according  to  common  law  and  natural  right, 
even,  when  necessary,  to  the  extent  of  giving  a  forced  con- 
struction. As  Mr.  Dicey  has  expressed  it:  ** English 
judges  do  not  claim  or  exercise  any  power  to  repeal  a 
statute,  whilst  acts  of  Parliament  may  override  and  con- 
stantly do  override  the  law  of  the  judges.  Judicial  legis- 
lation is,  in  short,  subordinate  legislation,  carried  on  with 
the  assent  and  subject  to  the  supervision  of  Parliament. ' ' 
Law  of  the  Const.,  p.  58.  See  also  Thayer,  1  Cas.  Const. 
Law,  48,  note. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  English  guarantee  of  private 
rights  embodied  in  the  formula  *'by  lawful  judgment 
of  his  peers  and  by  the  law  of  the  land"  was  intended 
as  a  limitation  upon  the  crown,  or  upon  those  exercising 
authority  by  it«  direction,  as  by  letters  patent.  In  Lon- 
don's case,  8  Coke  125a,  in  which  Henry  VI  granted  to  the 


§  12  OMGIN  AND  GROWTH  17 

oorpbration  of  dyers  in  London  power  to  search,  and  if 
fliey  found    any  doth  dyed  with  logwood,  such  cloth 
should  be  forfeited,  it  was  adjudged  that  this  charter  con- 
cerning the  forfeiture  was  against  the  law  of  the  land, 
because  no  forfeiture  can  grow  by  letters  patent.    Upon 
the  same  principle  it  was  held  that  the  law  of  the  land 
afforded  protection  against  unjust  and  arbitrary  conduct 
upon  the  part  of  municipal  corporations,  because,  in  the 
words  of  Coke,  they  **  derive  their  authority  from  the 
king."    Upon  that  basis  it  was  held  in  Bagg's  case,  11 
Coke  99a,  that  no  freeman  of  a  borough  or  city  can  be 
disfranchised  from  the  corporation  provided  it  has  no 
authority  so  to  act  either  by  the  express  terms  of  the  char- 
ter or  prescription.    In  the  absence  of  such  authority  the 
freeman  should,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Great  Char- 
ter, be  convicted  by  due  process  of  law  before  removal. 
In  the  same  way,  a  custom  in  a  city  was  adjudged  void 
because  ^^ against  the  law  of  the  land."    2  Inst.  46  Cf. 
McGehee,  p.  24,  sq.    In  the  English  system  the  guarantee 
in  question  was  intended  to  restrain  executive  action  flow- 
ing directly  or  indirectly  from  the  crown;  it  was  not 
intended  to  restrain  legislative  action  upon  the  part  of 
the  omnipotent  parliament. 

It  has  ever  been  an  elementary  principle  of  American 
constitutional  law  that  every  state  legislature  is  endowed 
by  its  very  nature  with  the  omnipotence  of  the  English 
parliament,  save  so  far  as  that  omnipotence  is  restrained 
by  the  express  terms  of  constitutional  limitations — an 
American  invention  that  rests  on  the  doctrine  of  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  people  as  distinguished  from  the  sover- 
eignty of  parliament.  Such  limitations,  of  which  the 
European  world  knew  nothing,  grew  naturally  out  of  the 
process  through  which  American  legislatures  came  into 
existence.  From  the  very  beginning  the  powers  of  the 
colonial  assemblies  were  more  or  less  limited  through  the 
terms  of  the  charters  by  which  such  assemblies  were  either 
created  or  recognized.  In  colonial  times,  if  statutes  were 
passed  in  excess  of  the  powers  conferred  by  the  charter, 

Due 


18  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  12 

the  question  was  tested,  in  the  first  instance,  in  the  colo- 
nial courts,  or,  if  the  matter  was  taken  to  England,  by  the 
privy  council.  After  the  severance  from  the  mother 
country,  that  power  to  annul  an  unconstitutional  law  was 
simply  assumed,  without  any  express  grant  from  the 
people,  by  the  state  courts.  Paper  constitutions,  defining 
in  a  dogmatic  form  the  circle  of  individual  rights  sur- 
rounding the  citizen  into  which  state  power  must  not 
intrude,  was  a  French  invention ;  the  right  of  the  judicial 
power  to  strike  down  as  void  any  such  unlawful  intru- 
sion was  an  American  invention,  the  first  and  only  real 
one  to  which  our  state  system  has  so  far  given  birth. 
And  here  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  very  first  cases 
in  which  the  right  of  an  American  court  to  declare  an 
act  of  a  state  legislature  unconstitutional  and  void  was 
asserted  arose  out  of  attempts  upon  the  part  of  such 
legislatures  to  destroy  or  impair  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury  as  a  part  of  the  law  of  the  land.  In  Trevett  v. 
Weeden,  decided  in  Rhode  Island  in  1786,  an  act  was 
declared  void  because  it  impaired  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury  guaranteed  by  the  colonial  charter  granted  in  1660, 
which  Rhode  Island  continued  as  her  organic  law  until 
1842 ;  in  Bayard  v.  Singleton,  1  N.  C.  42,  decided  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  North  Carolina  in  1787,  an  act  passed 
in  1785,  authorizing  summary  proceedings  in  suits  con- 
cerning confiscated  property,  was  declared  void  because 
destructive  of  the  right  of  trial  by  jury.  Those  who 
claim  the  honor  of  the  first  case  on  the  subject  for  New 
Jersey  contend  that  at  some  uncertain  date,  prior  to 
1785,  Chief  Justice  Brearley,  in  Holmes  v.  Walton,  held 
an  act  void  which  provided  for  trials  by  jury  consisting 
of  six  men.  Those  who  claim  the  honor  for  Virginia  rely 
upon  the  case  of  Com.  v.  Caton,  4  Call  5,  which  came 
before  the  court  of  appeals  of  that  state  in  November, 
1782.  In  Bowman  v.  Middleton,  1  Bay  252,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  South  Carolina  held  in  1792  that  an  act  passed 
by  the  colonial  legislature  of  1712  was  ipso  facto  void 
because  in  contravention   of  Magna  Carta.     See  the 


S 13  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  19 

antlior's  Jurisdiction  and  Procedure  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  pp.  2-5. 

So  it  appears  that  just  as  the  guaranty  contained  in 
chapter  39  of  Magna  Carta  existed  in  England  as  a 
limitation  upon  executive  power,  as  embodied  in  the 
crown  and  its  agents,  so  in  America  it  existed  as  a 
limitation  upon  legislative  power,  as  embodied  in  the 
state  legislatures.  From  that  starting  point  the  circle 
has  widened  until  in  our  system  it  has  been  made  to 
embrace  all  state  power,  executive,  legislative  and  judi- 
ciaL  In  the  words  of  the  Supreme  Court:  **In  this 
country  written  constitutions  were  deemed  essential  to 
protect  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people  against  the 
encroachments  of  power  delegated  to  their  governments, 
and  the  provisions  of  Magna  Carta  were  incorporated 
into  bDls  of  rights.  They  were  limitations  upon  all  the 
powers  of  government,  legislative  as  well  as  executive 
and  judicial.  It  necessarily  happened,  therefore,  that 
as  these  broad  and  general  maxims  of  liberty  and  justice 
held  in  our  system  a  different  place  and  perform  a  dif- 
ferent function  from  their  position  and  office  in  English 
constitutional  history  and  law,  they  would  receive  and 
justify  a  corresponding  and  more  comprehensive  inter- 
pretation. Applied  in  England  only  as  guards  against 
executive  usurpation  and  tyranny,  here  they  have  become 
bulwarks  also  against  arbitrary  legislation. ' '  Hurtado  v. 
California,  110  U.  S.  516.  See  also  Davidson  v.  New 
Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97. 

§  13.  First  eight  articles  of  Amendment  to  the  Federal 
Constitation.  The  position  of  those  who  opposed  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution  of  1787  because  it  was  not 
prefaced  by  a  bill  of  rights  was  neither  factious  nor 
unreasonable.  When  the  new  state  constitutions  came 
into  existence,  the  tendency  was  general  to  preface  them 
with  bills  of  rights  epitomizing,  as  explained  already,  all 
of  the  seminal  principles  of  the  English  Constitution 
for  the  protection  of  the  citizen  against  the  crown,  as 


20  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  13 

those  principles  had  been  redefined  in  the  revolutions  of 
1640  and  1688.  At  the  base  of  that  body  of  protective 
constitutional  law  was  that  part  of  Magna  Carta  (chap- 
ter 39)  out  of  which  grew  the  modem  conception  of  due 
process  of  law.  With  the  broad  construction  put  upon 
that  chapter  by  the  statesman  and  lawyers  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  as  restated  by  Blackstone,  it  became  at 
the  close  of  the  American  Revolution  the  cornerstone  of 
American  constitutional  law.  Upon  chapter  39  as  a  base 
were  superimposed  the  more  modem  principles  defined 
during  the  revolutions  of  1640  and  1688,  as  embodied  in 
the  acts  of  the  Long  Parliament  (1640-41),  the  Petition  of 
Right  (1628),  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act  (1679),  the  Bill  of 
Rights  (1689),  and  the  Act  of  Settlement  (1700-1701), 
which  Hallam  has  characterized  as  ' '  the  seal  of  our  con- 
stitutional laws,  the  complement  of  the  Revolution  itself 
and  the  Bill  of  Rights,  and  the  last  great  statute  which 
restrains  the  power  of  the  crown.  ^'  Out  of  those  funda- 
mental statutes  were  fabricated  the  bills  of  rights  by 
which  the  first  state  constitutions  were  prefaced,  and  out 
of  those  bills  of  rights  were  coined  the  first  eight  amend- 
ments to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  After  the 
Federal  Convention  of  1787  had  refused  to  limit  its  unique 
creation  by  a  bill  of  rights,  and  after  Congress  had  acted 
adversely  on  Lee's  suggestion  in  the  same  direction,  the 
question  passed  to  the  conventions  of  the  states  which 
followed  the  lead  of  Massachusetts,  whose  convention 
agreed  unconditionally,  in  the  words  of  Hancock,  *  *  to  the 
Constitution,  in  full  confidence  that  the  amendments  pro- 
posed will  soon  become  a  part  of  the  system.'*  In  order 
to  carry  out  that  understanding  Madison,  the  leader  of 
the  House  in  the  first  Congress,  offered  on  June  8,  1789, 
the  desired  guarantees  in  the  form  of  twelve  amendments, 
ten  of  which,  after  long  discussion,  were  ratified  by  the 
states.  In  the  words  of  Rives,  **The  amendments  pro- 
posed by  Mr.  Madison  were,  therefore,  mainly  in  the 
nature  .of  a  Declaration  of  Rights,  placing  the  freedom 
of  speech,  the  freedom  of  the  press,  freedom  of  religion, 


§  14  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  21 

the  security  of  property,  personal  liberty,  trial  by  jury, 
and  in  general  every  right  and  power  of  the  people  not 
delegated  or  surrendered,  under  the  aegis  of  the  Con- 
stitution, and  by  express  interdiction,  beyond  the  reach 
of  the  Government  Life  and  Times  of  James  Madison, 
ii,  38-46.  The  terms  of  the  first  eight  out  of  the  ten 
amendments  thus  adopted  demonstrate,  as  nothing  else 
can,  the  oneness  of  English  and  American  constitutional 
law.  And  yet  the  demonstration  is  not  complete  if 
we  exclude  the  notable  declaration  made  by  Chief 
Justice  Marshall  in  Burr*s  Case,  4  Cranch  App'x  470, 
when  he  was  called  upon  to  define  the  term  '^levying  war** 
as  it  appears  in  Art.  HE,  §  3,  which  provided  that 
"treason  against  the  United  States  shall  consist  only  in 
levying  war  against  them,  or  in  adhering  to  their  enemies, 
giving  them  aid  and  comfort.  *  *  In  giving  the  definition 
the  great  path-breaker  said:  **But  the  term  is  not  for 
the  first  time  applied  to  treason  by  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  It  is  a  technical  term.  It  is  used  in  a 
very  old  statute  of  that  country  whose  language  is  our 
language,  and  whose  laws  form  ihe  substratum  of  our 
laws.  It  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  the  term  was  not 
employed  by  the  f ramers  of  our  Constitution  in  the  sense 
which  had  been  affixed  to  it  by  those  from  whom  we  bor- 
rowed it  So  far  as  the  meaning  of  any  terms  particu- 
larly terms  of  art,  is  completely  ascertained,  those  by 
whom  they  are  employed  must  be  considered  as  employ- 
ing them  in  that  ascertained  meaning,  unless  the  con- 
trary be  proved  by  the  context.  It  is  therefore  reaspn- 
able  to  suppose,  unless  it  be  incompatible  with  other 
expressions  in  the  Constitution,  that  the  term  'levying 
war'  is  used  in  that  instrument  in  the  same  sense  in  which 
it  was  understood  in  England,  and  in  this  country  to  have 
been  used  in  the  statute  of  twenty-fifth  of  Edward  III, 
from  which  it  was  borrowed.'' 

§14.  Due  process  of  law  as  embodied  in  the  TUth 
Amendment.     It  is  impossible  to  grasp  the  full  meaning 


22  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  14 

of  the  Fifth  Amendment  when  considered  in  isolation, 
interwoven  as  it  is  with  the  entire  fabric  contained  in  the 
first  eight  articles  of  amendment  which,  when  taken  as 
a  whole,  embody  the  essence  of  the  new  scheme  of  civil 
liberty  in  England  as  it  emerged  from  the  revolutions  of 
1640  and  1688.  It  was  that  entire  and  connected  scheme 
that  the  first  eight  articles  of  amendment  imposed  as 
limitations  upon  the  powers  of  the  Federal  Government 
of  the  United  States.  The  amendment  in  question  pro- 
vides that:  **No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a 
capital,  or  otherwise  infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  pre- 
sentment or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  in  cases 
arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia,  when 
in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger,  nor 
shall  any  person  be  subject  for  the  same  offense  to  be 
twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb ;  nor  shall  be  com- 
pelled in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against  him- 
self, nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without 
due  process  of  law;  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken 
for  public  use,  without  just  compensation. ' '  Into  Arti- 
cles V,  VI,  and  VII  are  condensed  the  guarantees  of  due 
process  of  law,  springing  from  chapter  39  of  the  Great 
Charter  and  from  the  English  jury  system,  grand  and 
petit,  as  that  system  existed  at  the  time  of  the  severance 
of  the  colonies  from  the  mother  country.  Nothing  more 
can  be  attempted  than  a  statement  of  the  essence  of  the 
judicial  literature  that  has  grown  up  around  each  article 
since  its  adoption.  The  purpose  of  the  first  clause  of 
Article  V  was  to  perpetuate  the  grand  jury  as  an  instru- 
ment for  the  prosecution  of  serious  crimes  in  the  courts 
of  the  United  States.  It  has  been  held  that  it  was  not  the 
purpose  of  the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  Article  XIV 
to  perpetuate  that  institution  in  the  states.  In  Hurtado 
V.  California,  110  U.  S.  516,  it  was  said:  **We  are  to 
construe  this  phrase  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  by 
the  usus  loquendi  of  the  Constitution  itself.  The  same 
words  are  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment.  That 
article  makes  specific  and  express  provision  for  perpetu- 


§  14  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  23 

ating  the  institution  of  the  grand  jury  so  far  as  it  relates 
to  prosecutions  for  the  more  aggravated  crimes,  under 
the  laws  of  the  United  States.  According  to  a  recog- 
nized canon  of  interpretation,  especially  applicable  to 
formal  and  solemn  instruments  of  constitutional  law,  we 
are  forbidden  to  assume,  without  clear  reason  to  the  con- 
trary,  that  any  part  of  this  most  important  amendment  is 
superfluous.  The  natural  and  obvious  inference  is,  that 
in  the  sense  of  the  Constitution  *due  process  of  law'  was 
not  meant  or  intended  to  include,  ex  vi  termini,  the  insti- 
tution and  procedure  of  a  grand  jury  in  any  case.  The 
conclusion  is  equally  irresistible  that  when  the  same 
phrase  was  employed  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to 
restrain  the  action  of  the  states,  it  was  in  the  same  sense 
and  with  no  greater  extent ;  and  that  if  in  the  adoption 
of  that  amendment  it  had  been  part  of  its  purpose  to  per- 
petuate the  institution  of  the  grand  jury  in  the  states,  it 
would  have  embodied  as  did  the  Fifth,  express  declara- 
tions to  that  effect.*'  For  a  reexamination  of  the  ques- 
tion at  a  later  day,  see  Maxwell  v.  Dow,  176  U.  S.  581. 
Thus  it  appears  that  the  Fifth  Article  is  a  limitation 
upon  the  powers  of  the  National  Government,  while  the 
Fourteenth  is  a  limitation  upon  the  powers  of  the  states. 
Under  the  Fifth  it  is  necessary  that  the  accused  plead, 
or  be  ordered  to  plead,  or,  in  a  proper  case,  that  a  plea 
of  not  guilty  be  filed  for  him,  before  his  trial  can  right- 
fully proceed;  and  the  record  of  his  conviction  should 
show  distinctly,  and  not  by  inference  merely  that  every 
step  involved  in  due  process  of  law,  an  essential  to  a 
valid  trial,  was  taken  in  the  trial  court;  otherwise  the 
judgment  will  be  erroneous.  It  is  also  the  right  of  the 
accused  to  be  present  during  the  whole  trial,  a  right  of 
which  he  can  not  be  deprived  even  with  his  consent.  The 
clause  that  provides  that  "no  person  shall  be  compelled 
to  be  a  witness  against  himself*'  has  been  recently  con- 
sidered in  Twining  v.  New  Jersey,  211  U.  S.  78,  in  which 
it  was  held  that  exemption  from  self  incrimination, 
though  secured  as  against  federal  action  by  Article  V  is 


24  DUE  PEOCESS  OF  LAW  §  14 

not  one  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  national  citizenship, 
so  as  to  be  included  among  the  privileges  and  immnnities 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States  which  the  slates  are  for- 
bidden by  Article  XIV  to  abridge.  Not  until  after  the 
Revolution  of  1688,  and  as  a  consequence  of  it,  was  the 
principle  of  compulsory  self-incrimination  abolished.  As 
Stephen  has  expressed  it:  **Soon  after  the  Revolution 
of  1688,  the  practice  of  questioning  the  prisoner  died 
out,'*  it  was  not  abolished  by  statute  or  ordinance.  See 
History  of  the  Criminal  Law,  vol.  i,  p.  440.  And  so  it 
came  to  pass  that  the  exemption  from  that  cruel  provision 
of  the  Star  Chamber  code  was  first  defined  as  a  principle 
of  constitutional  law  in  the  American  bills  of  rights  of 
1776. 

The  all  important  clause  that  **no  person  shall  be  .  .  . 
deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process 
of  law'*  was  first  expounded  in  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land 
and  Improvement  Co.,  in  18  How.  272,  in  which  the  Court, 
speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Curtis,  said :  *  *  The  words 
*due  process  of  law'  were  undoubtedly  intended  to  con- 
vey the  same  meaning  as  the  words  *by  the  law  of  the 
land, '  in  Magna  Carta.  Lord  Coke  in  his  commentary  on 
those  words  (2  Inst.  50)  says  they  mean  due  process 
of  law.'*  Following  in  the  path  thus  marked  out, 
Mr.  Justice  Miller,  in  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S. 
&7,  said :  *  *  The  equivalent  of  the  phrase  *  due  process  of 
law,'  according  to  Lord  Coke,  is  found  in  the  words  the 
*law  of  the  land'  in  the  Great  Charter,  in  connection  with 
the  writ'  of  habeas  corpus,  the  trial  by  jury,  and  other 
guaranties  of  the  rights  of  the  subject  against  the  oppres- 
sion of  the  Crown."  An  effort  has  been  made  therefore 
to  demonstrate  that  these  eminent  justices  fell  into  a 
grave  historical  mistake  when  they  assumed  that  the 
meaning  of  **due  process  of  law"  should  be  accepted  by 
American  courts  in  the  limited  sense  in  which  it  was 
understood  by  Coke  in  1632,  prior  to  the  Eevolutions  of 
1640  and  1688  by  which  it  was  given  a  vastly  wider  sig- 
nificance.  It  was  then  said  that  the  draftsmen  of  our  first 


§  15  OEIGIN  AND  GROWTH  25 

conartitntions  ^wonld  have  recoiled  with  horror  at  the 
thought  that  they  were  founding  American  constitutional 
law  upon  the  ancient  English  Constitution  as  it  existed 
in  1632 — ^with  the  Star  Chamber. and  High  Commissions 
mtact — ^and  not  upon  the  reformed  English  Constitution, 
as  Blackstone  described  it  in  the  first  book  of  his  *  *  Com- 
mentaries,' '  arranged  in  their  present  form  in  1758.  The 
matter  was  first  put  upon  a  proper  foundation  by 
Mr.  Justice  Matthews  in  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  XJ.  S. 
516,  as  heretofore  stated. 

After  declaring  in  Barron  v.  Baltimore,  7  Pet.  243,  that 
the  final  clause,  *  *  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for 
public   nse,    without  just   compensation,^*   is   intended 
"solely  as  a  limitation  on  the  exercise  of  power  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  *  *  Marshall,  C.  J.,  said : 
"But  it  is  universally  understood,  it  is  the  history  of  the 
day,  that  the  great  revolution  which  established  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  was  not  effected  without 
immense    opposition.     Serious  fears  were  extensively 
entertained  that  those  powers  which  the  patriot  states- 
men who  then  watched  over  the  interests  of  our  country 
deemed  essential  to  union,  and  to  the  attainment  of  those 
invaluable  objects  for  which  union  was  sought,  might  be 
exercised  in  a  manner  dangerous  to  liberty.    In  almost 
every  convention  by  which  the  Constitution  was  adopted, 
amendments  to  guard  against  the  abuse  of  power  were 
recommended.     These  amendments  demanded  security 
against   the   apprehended  encroachments   of  the  Gen- 
eral   Government — ^not    against    those    of    the    local 
governments.'' 


§  15.  Absence  of  national  citizenship  emphasized  by 
the  Dred  Scott  Case.  With  the  ratification  of  the  Twelfth 
Amendment  on  September  the  25,  1804,  the  constructive 
work  of  the  **  patriot  statemen'*  who  founded  the  Eepub- 
lic  drew  to  a  close.  By  that  time  Washington,  Pelatiah 
Webster,  Franklin,  Hamilton,  John  Rutledge,  James 
Wilson,  George  Mason,  Roger  Sherman,  John  Blair,  and 


26  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  15 

Robert  Yates  had  passed  away;  while  Jefferson,  John 
Adams,  Madison,  Marshall,  Charles  Pinckney,  Oliver 
Ellsworth,  Elbridge  Gerry,  Eufus  King,  Edmund  Ran- 
dolph, Robert  Morris,  Qonverneur  Morris,  John  Lang- 
don,  George  Wythe,  and  Richard  Dobbs  Spaight  still 
remained.  Not  one  of  that  number,  however,  survived 
the  sixty-one  years  destined  to  pass  by  before  the  adop- 
tion of  the  new  or  civil  war  series  of  articles  headed  by 
the  Thirteenth  Amendment,  ratified  on  December  18, 
1865.  During  that  interval  the  Union  was  for  a  time  dis- 
solved by  civil  war,  the  product  of  the  deadly  original  sin 
of  this  Republic,  African  slavery,  which  had  crept  into 
the  colonies  prior  to  the  Revolution.  Finally  in  1789  the 
North  and  the  South  covenanted  together  in  what  are 
known  as  the  **  compromises  of  the  constitution ' '  to  per- 
petuate it  by  law  forever.  After  that  fateful  compact  had 
been  signed  a  great  moral  revolt  took  place  in  the  con- 
science of  the  world  that  ultimately  destroyed  the  insti- 
tution in  this  country  at  the  end  of  a  civil  war  which,  for 
a  time,  disrupted  the  Union,  in  fact  if  not  in  law.  The 
driving  force  of  that  great  moral  revolt  manifested  itself 
in  no  uncertain  terms  in  England  when  Lord  Mansfield, 
in  Somersett*s  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  79,  held  that  a 
person  forcibly  detained  in  England  as  a  slave,  is  enti- 
tled to  be  discharged  on  habeas  corpus.  The  failure,  in 
the  celebrated  case  of  Dred  Scott,  19  How.  393, — ^wherein 
a  person,  having  the  status  of  a  slave  in  a  state  where 
slavery  was  legal,  was  taken  by  his  master  into  a  free 
state  of  the  Union  in  which  slavery  was  prohibited  by 
law, — of  the  attempt  in  this  country  to  enforce  the  prin- 
ciple thus  announced  by  Lord  Mansfield,  precipitated  the 
Civil  war.  The  vital  facts  of  the  case,  decided  by  the 
Supreme  Court,  March  6,  1857,  were  these:  In  1834, 
Doctor  Emerson  took  his  negro  slave,  Dred  Scott,  from 
Missouri  first  to  Illinois,  where  slavery  was  prohibited 
by  statute,  then  to  Wisconsin,  a  part  of  the  Louisiana 
purchase,  where  slavery  was  prohibited  by  the  Missouri 
Compromise.   In  1838,  Doctor  Emerson  returned  with  his 


§  15  OBIGIN  AND  GROWTH  27 

slave  to  Missouri.  Then  it  was  that  Scott,  or  some  one 
for  him,  conceived  the  idea  that  hy  touching  the  free  soils 
of  Illinois  and  Wisconsin  during  his  absence  he  had  been 
set  free.  In  other  words,  the  direct  purpose  of  the  case 
was  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  the  doctrine  laid  down 
by  Lord  Mansfield  in  Somersett^s  case — ^wherein  it  was 
held  that  a  slave,  taken  to  England  from  one  of  the  Amer- 
ican colonies  where  slavery  was  legal,  was  set  free  by 
touching  the  soil  of  England,  where  slavery  was  not 
recognized  by  positive  law,— could  be  applied  under  our 
Constitution,  whose  compromises  expressly  recognized 
the  existence  of  slavery  as  a  matter  of  positive  and 
supreme  law.  On  the  theory  that  he  was  a  free  man  after 
his  return  to  Missouri,  Dred  Scott  contended  that  a  whip- 
ping there  given  him  by  his  master  in  1848,  was  an  assault 
and  battery  for  which  he  brought  suit  in  a  state  court  at 
St.  Louis  and  obtained  judgment.  While  that  case  was 
pending  in  the  State  Supreme  Court,  Doctor  Emerson 
sold  his  slave  to  one  Sandford  of  the  city  of  New  York. 
Upon  the  theory  that  Scott  and  Sandford  thus  became 
'^citizens  of  different  states/'  the  former  brought  suit 
against  IJie  latter  for  assault  in  the  Federal  Circuit  Court 
for  Missouri,  where  Sandford  pleaded  that  the  plaintiff 
was  not  as  alleged  a  citizen  of  Missouri  but  "a  negro  of 
African  descent,  his  ancestors  were  of  pure  African 
blood,  and  were  brought  into  this  country  and  sold  as 
negro  slaves/'  Scott  in  demurring  to  that  plea  claimed 
that  he  was  a  citizen  on  defendants*  own  showing,  and 
his  demurrer  was  sustained,  Sandford  then  pleaded  to 
the  merits  that  plaintiff  was  his  negro  slave  and  that  as 
such  he  had  ** gently  laid  hands  on  him*'  as  he  was  author- 
ized by  law  to  do.  After  the  court  had  declared  the  law 
to  be  with  the  defendant,  plaintiff  presented  exceptions 
upon  which  the  case  passed  to  the  Supreme  Court,  where 
the  primary  question,  was  one  of  jurisdiction.  Was 
Scott  a  ** citizen  of  Missouri**  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Constitution?  If  he  was  not,  the  Federal  Circuit  Court 
had  no  jurisdiction  of  his  case ;  and  he  certainly  was  not 


28  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  15 

a  citizen  but  a  slave,  unless  his  residence  in  Illinois^ 
where  slavery  was  prohibited  by  statute,  and  in  Wiscon- 
sin where  slavery  was  prohibited  by  the  Missouri  Com- 
promise had  set  him  free.  The  constitutionality  of  the 
Compromise  was  thus  the  essence  of  the  issue,  because 
upon  its  validity  depended  the  fact  whether  Scott  *s  status 
as  a  slave  was  affected  by  his  presence  on  the  soil  of 
Wisconsin.  It  is  not  likely  that  any  jurist  familiar  with 
the  practice  of  the  Supreme  Court  would  have  seriously 
contended,  in  times  free  from  political  excitement,  that 
the  constitutionality  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  involv- 
ing the  entire  status  of  slavery  in  the  territories,  was  not 
squarely  before  that  court  on  the  pleadings  in  the  Dred 
Scott  Case,  19  How.  393.  However  that  may  be,  the 
court  so  held,  and  that  decision  was  conclusive  upon  all 
persons  bound  to  respect  its  authority.  One  of  the  harsh- 
est critics  of  the  judgment  in  question  frankly  admits  that 
**the  action  had  been  brought  by  Scott  in  the  Circuit 
Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  District  of  Missouri 
to  establish  the  freedom  of  himself,  his  wife,  and  their 
two  children/^  Carson,  History  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
p.  367.  With  that  question  squarely  before  it  the  court 
held  that  under  the  Constitution  as  it  then  stood,'  no  state 
had  the  right  to  raise  a  man  of  African  descent  to  the 
rank  of  a  citizen  so  as  to  make  him  a  citizen  of  a  state  or 
of  the  United  States.  After  the  end  of  the  Civil  war  that 
judgment  was  affirmed  by  the  nation  as  a  whole  when  it 
resolved  that  Scott's  appeal  could  only  be  granted 
through  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  itself. 

The  vital  importance  of  the  case  in  question  to  the 
subject  before  us  is  emphasized  by  the  fact  that  a  grand 
inquest  was  then  held,  upon  the  eve  of  the  Civil  war,  with 
all  the  machinery  of  learning,  and  with  all  the  accessories 
of  prolonged  and  exhaustive  argument,  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain whether  or  not  such  a  thing  existed  as  a  citizenship 
of  the  United  States,  defined  as  such  by  its  Constitution 
and  laws,  independently  of  state  citizenship.  The  most 
earnest  seeker  for  such  a  citizenship  was  Mr.  Justice 


S 16  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  29 

Cartas,  who  was  in  the  highest  degree  qualified  to  ascer- 
tain it,  if  it  existed  at  all.  His  return  was  non  est  inven- 
tus. He  ascertained  that  there  was  no  such  thing  at  that 
time,  as  a  citizenship  of  the  United  States,  as  a  sub- 
stantiye  thing  independent  state  citizenship.  He  said: 
**I  can  find  nothing  in  the  Constitution,  which,  propria 
vigore,  deprives  of  their  citizenship  any  class  of  persons 
who  were  citizens  of  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  its 
adoption,  or  who  should  be  native  born  citizens  of  any 
state  after  its  adoption;  nor  any  power  enabling  Con- 
gress to  disfranchise  persons  bom  on  the  soil  of  any 
state,  and  entitled  to  citizenship  of  such  state  by  its  con- 
stitution and  laws.  And  my  opinion  is  that,  under  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  every  free  person  bom 
on  the  soil  of  a  state,  who  is  a  citizen  of  that  state 
by  force  of  its  constitution  or  laws,  is  also  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  That  the  Constitution  itself 
h(i$  defined  citizenship  of  the  United  States  by  declaring 
what  persons f  horn  within  the  several  states,  shall  or  not 
he  citizens  of  the  United  States,  wUl  not  he  pretended.  It 
contains  no  such  declaration/^  Dissenting  opinion  in 
Dred  Scott  Case,  18  How.  393.  When  we  place  in  juxta- 
position with  those  weighty  words  the  language  of  Sec- 
tion 1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment — **  All  persons  bom 
or  naturalized  in  the  United  States,  and  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of  the  United  States '  ^ — 
whereby  the  new  national  citizen  was  created,  we  perceive 
at  once  how  prophetic  they  were  of  the  definition  soon  to 
come. 

§  16.  The  new  national  dtiMnship  created  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  persuaded  him- 
self that  Sandford's  plea  to  the  jurisdiction  was  bad,  and 
that  Scott  had  the  right  to  sue  because  *  *  every  such  citi- 
zen, residing  in  any  state^  has  the  right  to  sue,  and  is 
liable  to  be  sued  in  the  federal  courts,  as  a  citizen  of  that 
state  in  which  he  resides.*'  Even  if  we  concede  all  the 
Justice  claimed,  it  appears  that  such  citizenship  of  the 


30  DUB  PEOCESS  OF  LAW  §  16 

United  States  as  Scott  was  supposed  to  possess  was  noth- 
ing more  than  a  secondary  and  dependent  relation  result- 
ing from  his  state  citizenship.  Such  was  the  solecism 
imbedded  in  the  Constitution  at  the  time  of  its  adoption. 
While  it  created  the  first  Federal  Government  that  ever 
operated  directly  on  citizens,  the  fact  remained  that  it 
had  no  citizens  in  its  own  right.  The  solenm  judidal 
ascertainment  in  the  Dred  Scott  Case,  19  How.  393,  that 
such  a  vacuum  existed  in  the  Constitution  did  more  than 
any  one  thing  to  precipitate  the  Civil  war ;  and  after  its 
close  the  vacuum  was  filled  by  Section  1  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  which,  without  making  any  direct  reference 
to  the  question  of  race  at  all,  contains  the  first  positive 
definition  ever  given  of  citizenship  of  the  United  States 
as  a  primary  and  substantive  thing,  independent  of  state 
citizenship.  It  changed  both  its  origin  and  character  by 
providing  that  **A11  persons  bom  or  naturalized  in  the 
United  States,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof, 
are  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state  wherein 
they  reside.  No  state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law 
which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States ;  nor  shall  any  state  deprive  any 
person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process 
of  law ;  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  ^  * 

It  is  hard  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  a  constitu- 
tional revolution  which,  through  the  creation  of  this  new 
national  citizenship,  shifted  the  center  of  gravity  of  the 
composite  structure  from  the  states  to  the  nation,  thus 
nationalizing  the  entire  sphere  of  civil  liberty.  It  is  not 
therefore  strange  that  we  should  desire  to  know  some- 
thing of  the  authorship  of  a  document  which  has  been 
called  not  inaptly,  a  new  Magna  Carta.  Unfortunately, 
and  strangely  enough,  the  inner  history  of  the  personal 
authorship  of  the  various  parts  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  is  shrouded  in  almost  as  much  mystery  as 
that  which  surrounds  the  personal  authorship  of  the  old 
Magna  Carta  from  which  its  vital  part  was  drawn.    We 


!  16  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  31 

know  little  beyond  the  fact  that,  taken  as  a  whole,  it  was 
drafted  by  tbe  Joint  Reconstruction  Committee,  consist- 
ing of  nine  members  from  the  House  and  six  from  the 
Senate,  the  majority  of  whom  joined  in  a  report  made  on 
June  8,  1866,  which  burns  not  unnaturally  with  the  pas- 
sions of  the  Civil  wax.  **Your  committee  does  not  deem 
it  either  necessary  or  proper  to  discuss  the  question 
whether  the  late  Confederate  States  are  still  States  of 
this  Union,  or  can  ever  be  otherwise.  Granting  this 
profitless  abstraction,  about  which  so  many  words  have 
been  wasted,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  people  of 
those  States  may  not  place  themselves  in  a  condition  to 
abrogate  the  powers  and  privileges  incident  to  a  State  of 
Union,  and  deprive  themselves  of  all  pretense  of  right 
to  exercise  those  powers  and  enjoy  those  privileges.  A 
State  within  the  Union  has  obligations  to  discharge  as 
a  member  of  the  Union.  It  must  submit  to  federal  laws 
and  uphold  federal  authority.  It  must  have  a  govern- 
ment republican  in  form,  under  and  by  which  it  is  con- 
nected with  the  General  Government,  and  through  which 
it  can  discharge  its  obligations.  It  is  more  than  idle,  it 
is  a  xnockery,  to  contend  that  a  people  who  have  thrown 
off  their  allegiance,  destroyed  the  local  government  which 
bound  their  States  to  the  Union  as  members  thereof, 
defined  its  authority,  refused  to  execute  its  laws,  and 
abrogated  every  provision  which  gave  them  political 
rights  within  the  Union,  still  retain,  through  all,  the 
perfect  and  entire  right  to  resume,  at  their  own  will  and 
pleasure,  all  their  privileges  within  the  Union,  and  espe- 
cially to  participate  in  its  government,  and  to  control  the 
conduct  of  its  affairs.''  Eesolution  proposing  amend- 
ment was  dated  June  16,  1866.  With  the  report  of  the 
Joint  Beconstruction  Committee,  reviewing  the  condi- 
tions that  controlled  it  in  the  drafting  of  the  amendment 
in  question  before  him,  Mr.  Justice  Miller  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  say  in  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36, 
decided  in  1872,  that  **The  first  observation  we  have  to 
make  on  this  clause  is  that  it  puts  at  rest  both  the  ques- 


32  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  16 

tions  which  we  stated  to  have  been  the  subject  of  differ- 
ences of  opinion.  It  declares  that  persons  may  be  citizens 
of  the  United  States  without  regard  to  their  citizenship 
of  a  particular  state,  and  it  overturns  the  Dred  Scott 
decision  by  making  all  persons  bom  within  the  United 
States  and  subject  to  its  jurisdiction  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  That  its  main  purpose  was  to  establish 
the  citizenship  of  the  negro  can  admit  of  no  doubt. 
.  .  .  We  doubt  very  much  whether  any  action  of  a 
state  not  directed  by  way  of  discrimination  against  the 
negroes  as  a  class,  or  on  account  of  their  race,  will  ever 
be  held  to  come  within  the  purview  of  this  provision.  It 
is  so  clearly  a  provision  for  that  race  and  that  emergency, 
that  a  strong  case  would  be  necessary  for  its  application 
to  any  other. ' ' 

Ten  years  later,  when  the  jurists  and  statesmen  of  the 
country  had  perceived  the  necessity  for  widening  the  new 
citizenship  beyond  the  drcumstances  out  of  which  it  grew, 
Mr.  Boscoe  Conkling,  a  leading  member  of  the  Recon- 
struction Committee  that  framed  the  amendment,  during 
the  argument  of  the  San  Mateo  County  Case  in  the 
Supreme  Court,  December  19,  1882,  116  U.  S.  138,  pro- 
duced for  the  first  time  the  journal  of  the  committee,  never 
before  published.  In  his  argument,  after  explaining  how 
the  various  provisions  came  to  be  inserted,  he  affirmed 
that  the  committee  did  not  intend  to  confine  their  opera- 
tion to  the  African  race.  He  said :  **  At  the  time  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  was  ratified,  as  the  records  of  the  two 
Houses  will  show,  individuals  and  joint  stock  companies 
were  appealing  for  congressional  and  administrative 
protection  against  invidious  and  discriminating  state  and 
local  taxes.  One  instance  was  that  of  an  express  com- 
pany, whose  stock  was  owned  largely  by  citizens  of  the 
State  of  New  York,  who  came  with  petitions  and  bills 
seeking  acts  of  Congress  to  aid  in  resisting  what  they 
deemed  oppressive  taxation  in  two  states,  and  oppres- 
sive and  ruinous  rules  of  damages  applied  under  state 


§  16  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  33 

laws.    That  complaints  of  oppression  in  respect  of  prop- 
erty and  other  rights,  made  by  citizens  of  Northern 
States  who  took  up  residence  in  the  South,  were  rife,  in 
and  out  of  Congress,  none  of  us  can  forget;  that  com- 
plaints of  oppression  in  various  forms,  of  white  men  in 
the  South, — of  'Union  men' — ^were  heard  on  every  side, 
I  need  not  remind  the  court.    The  war  and  its  results, 
the  condition  of  the  f reedmen,  and  the  manifest  duty  owed 
to  them,  no  douht  brought  on  the  occasion  for  constitu- 
tional amendment,  but  when  the  occasion  came,  and  men 
set  themselves  to  the  task,  the  accumulated  evils  falling 
within  the  purview  of  the  work  were  the  surrounding  cir- 
cumstances, in  the  light  of  which  they  strove  to  increase 
and  strengthen  the  safeguards  of  the  Constitution  and 
the  laws."    Fortunately  the  negro  was  not  mentioned  by 
name  in  the  amendment  even  if  he  was  the  primary  cause 
of  it.    Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  his  dissenting  opinion  in 
the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  said:    **It  is 
futile  to  argue  that  none  but  persons  of  the  African  race 
are  intended  to  be  benefited  by  this  amendment    They 
may  have  been  the  primary  cause  of  the  amendment,  but 
its  language  is  general  embracing  all  citizens,  and  I  think 
it  was  purposely  so  expressed.  ^ '    Mr.  Justice  Swayne  in 
his  dissenting  opinion  in  the  same  case  said :    ^ '  The  lan- 
guage employed  is  unqualified  in  its  scope.    There  is  no 
exception  in  its  terms,  and  there  can  be  properly  none  in 
their  application.   By  the  language  *  citizens  of  the  United 
States'  was  meant  all  such  citizens;  and  by  *any  person' 
was  meant  all  persons  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State. 
No  distinction  is  intimated  on  account  of  race  or  color. 
This  court  has  no  authority  to  interpolate  a  limitation 
that  is  neither  expressed  nor  implied.**    By  that  broad 
view  thus  expressed  by  Justices  Bradley  and  Swayne, 
and  concurred  in  by  Chief  Justice  Chase  and  Justice 
Field,  the  amendment  in  question  was  severed  from  its 
history  and  made  to  rest  alone  upon  a  construction  of  the 
terms  that  appeared  upon  the  face  of  it.    In  order  to  give 

Due  Process — 3 


34  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  16 

support  to  that  idea  Mr.  Justice  Gray  said,  in  United 
States  V.  Wong  Kim  Ark,  169  U.  S,  649:  *' doubtless  the 
intention  of  the  Congress  which  framed  and  of  the  states 
which  adopted  this  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  must 
be  sought  in  the  words  of  the  amendment ;  and  the  debates 
in  Congress  are  not  admissible  as  evidence  to  control  the 
meaning  of  those  words/'  To  that  eminently  wise  and 
patriotic  method  of  construction  Mr.  Conkling  gave 
strong  support  by  his  presentation  of  the  unpublished 
journal  of  the  Committee  in  the  San  Mateo  County  Case. 
And  so  it  has  been  settled  for  the  good  of  the  whole  nation 
that  the  new  national  citizenship  was  not  created  for  the 
exclusive  benefit  of  the  colored  race,  nor  limited  to  their 
protection;  it  was  made  a  part  of  the  fundamental  law 
for  the  benefit  of  ''AH  persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the 
United  States,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof. '* 
All  such  are  declared  to  be  ''citizens  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  State  wherein  they  reside. '  ^  Py  the  force  of 
those  provisions  the  primary  citizenship  in  this  country 
is  in  the  United  States ;  and  the  secondary  is  in  the  state 
of  the  citizen 's  residence.  The  two  citizenships  are  sepa- 
rate and  distinct  from  each  other.  In  the  words  of  the 
Supreme  Court :  "  It  is  quite  clear,  then,  that  there  is  a 
citizenship  of  the  United  States  and  a  citizenship  of  the 
state,  which  are  distinct  from  each  other  and  which 
depend  upon  different  characteristics  or  circumstances 
in  the  individual.^'  Only  the  privileges  and  immunities 
that  belong  to  a  citizen  of  the  U^ted  States  as  such  are 
placed  by  the  amendment  under  the  protection  of  the 
Constitution;  "those  belonging  to  the  citizen  of  the  state 
as  such  .  •  .  must  rest  for  their  security  and  protec- 
tion where  they  have  heretofore  rested ;  for  they  are  not 
embraced  by  this  paragraph  of  the  amendment."  The 
privileges  and  immunities  of  the  new  and  primary  na- 
tional citizenship  were  thus  wisely  limited  to  those  only 
"which  owe  their  existence  to  the  Federal  government,  its 
national  character,  its  constitution  or  its  laws.  ^  ^  Slaugh- 
ter House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36. 


§  17  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  35 

§  17.  Our  new  Magna  Oarta  protects  only  the  national 
dtizenship.     Section  1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
embraces  two  separate  and  distinct  subject  matters.    The 
first  creates  the  new  national  citizenship  by  the  declara- 
tion that  *  *  All  persons  bom  or  naturalized  in  the  United 
States  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  and  of  the  State  wherein  they 
reside;**  the  second  protects  the  new  citizenship  thus 
created  by  the  declaration  that  *  *  No  State  shall  make  or 
enforce  any  law  which  shaU  abridge  the  privileges  or 
immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States;  nor  shall 
any  State  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property, 
without  due  process  of  law;  nor  deny  to  any  person 
within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. ' ' 
Only  to  the  protective  portion  of  Section  1,  devised  to 
shield  the  individual  from  the   arbitrary  exercise   of 
power  by  state  authority,  executive,  legislative,  or  judi- 
cial, can  the  phrase,  **new  Magna  Carta,''  be  applied. 
And  that  protective  portion  divides  itself  into  two  dis- 
tinct parts:   first,  the  provision,  **nor  shall  any  State 
deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without 
due  process  of  law/'  a  reproduction  of  the  ancient 
formula  derived  from  the  English  Constitution ;  second, 
the  provision, '  *  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  juris- 
diction the  equal  protection  of  the  laws, ' '  a  purely  Amer- 
ican invention  which  has  no  connection  whatever  with 
English  law. 

To  protect  the  new  national  citizenship  against  the 
encroachments  of  state  power  was  the  primary  purpose, 
of  its  creators.  Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  amendment 
the  citizens  of  a  state  could  rely  for  due  process  of  law 
on  the  institutions  of  the  state  alone ;  and  when  such  pro- 
tection was  denied  the  Federal  government  had  no  right 
whatever  to  interfere.  Li  the  words  of  the  Supreme 
Court  the  amendment  **legitimality  operates  to  extend 
to  citizens  and  residents  ( [Hibben  v.  Smith]  191  U.  S. 
310,  326)  of  the  states  the  same  protection  against  arbi- 
trary state  legislation  affecting  life,  liberty  and  property 


36  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  17 

as  if  offered  by  the  Fifth  Amendment  against  similar 
legislation  by  Congress/'  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  if 
the  state  fails  to  guarantee  due  process  of  law  and  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  as  such,  the  Federal  judiciary  can  supervise  the 
performance  of  that  duty  in  such  a  way  as  to  vest  the 
ultimate  decision  of  every  question,  involving  due  process 
of  law  and  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  in  the  Federal 
courts.  But  in  the  particular  case  the  Federal  court  can 
only  determine  whether  the  state  has  failed  in  that  duty ; 
and,  in  that  event,  it  can  only  declare  the  proceedings 
void.  The  vital  question  therefore  in  every  case  is  this : 
Has  the  individual  complaining  been  deprived  by  official 
state  action  of  some  right  or  immunity  guaranteed  to  him 
by  virtue  of  his  national  citizenship,  considered  as  a  thing 
separate  and  apart  from  his  state  citizenship,  because  it 
was  settled  at  the  outset  '*that  there  is  a  citizenship  of 
the  United  States  and  a  citizenship  of  the  state,  which 
are  distinct  from  each  other  and  which  depend  upon  dif- 
ferent characteristics  or  circumstances  in  the  individ- 
ual. ' '  Only  the  privileges  and  immunities  that  belong  to 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States  as  such  are  placed  by  the 
amendment  under  the  protection  of  the  Constitution; 
those  belonging  to  the  citizens  of  the  state  as  such  '^must 
rest  for  their  security  and  protection  where  they  have 
heretofore  rested;  for  they  are  not  embraced  by  this 
paragraph  of  the  amendment. ' '  A  definition  of  the  privi- 
leges and  immunities  of  state  citizenship  was  drawn  in 
the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  from  the  opin- 
ion of  Mr.  Justice  Washington  in  Corfield  v.  Coryell, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  3230,  in  the  following  form :  *'the  inquiry,'' 
he  says,  *'is,  what  are  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  several  States?  We  feel  no  hesitation  in 
confining  these  expressions  to  those  privileges  and 
immunities  which  are  fundamental;  which  belong  of 
right  to  the  citizens  of  all  free  governments,  and  which 
have  at  all  times  been  employed  by  citizens  of  the  several 
States  which  compose  this  Union,  from  the  time  of  their 


17  OEIGIN  AND  GROWTH  37 

becoming  free,  independent,  and  sovereign.    What  these 
fundamental  principles  are,  it  would  be  more  tedious  than 
difficult  to  enumerate.    They  may  all,  however,  be  com- 
prehended nnder  the  following  general  heads :  protection 
by  the  government,  with  the  right  to  acquire  and  possess 
property  of  every  kind,  and  to  pursue  and  obtain  hap- 
piness and  safety,  subject,  nevertheless,  to  such  restraints 
as  the  government  may  prescribe  for  the  general  good  of 
the  whole.*'     Mr.  Justice  Field,  who  dissented  in  the 
Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  with  the  concur- 
rence of  the  Chief  Justice,  and  Justices  Bradley  and 
Swayne,  contended  that  the  fundamental  rights  of  citi- 
zenship, which,  by  the  opinion  of  the  court,  were  held  to 
be  rights  of  state  citizenship,  protected  only  by  the  state 
government,  became,  as  the  result  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  rights  of  national  citizenship,  protected  by 
the  Federal   Constitution.     That  view  was   based  on 
the  contention  that  the  safeguards  of  personal  rights 
enumerated  in  the  first  eight  articles  of  Amendment  to 
the  Federal  Constitution,  sometimes  called  the  Federal 
Bill  of  Bights,  though  they  were  by  those  amendments 
originally   secured   only   against   national   action,   are 
among  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  which  Section  1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment protects  against  state  action.    The  majority  of  the 
court  took,  however,  a  much  narrower  view  of  the  scope 
of  the  amendment  by  declaring  that  the  states  might  still 
abridge  some  of  the  personal  rights  enumerated  in  the 
first  eight  amendments,  whenever  it  appeared  that  such 
X)ersonal  rights  were  not  within  the  meaning  of  the  clause 
"privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States. '*     With  the  way  thus  cleared  it  was  held  in 
Walker  v.  Sauvinet,  92  U.  S.  90,  that  the  right  to  trial  by 
jury  in  civil  cases,  guaranteed  by  the  Seventh  Amend- 
ment ;  in  Presser  v.  Illinois,  116  U.  S.  252,  that  the  right 
to  bear  arms,  guaranteed  by  the  Second  Amendment ;  in 
Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516,  that  the  security 
against  prosecution,  except  by  indictment  of  a  grand 


38  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  17 

jury,  guaranteed  by  the  Fifth  Amendment;  in  West  v. 
Louisiana,  194  U,  S.  258,  the  right  to  be  confronted  by 
witnesses,  guaranteed  by  the  Sixth  Amendment  were  not 
privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  as  such,  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment. Then  came  the  notable  case  of  Twining  v.  New 
Jersey,  211 TJ.  S.  78,  which  may  be  said  to  have  closed  the 
controversy  on  this  subject  by  the  declaration,  after  a 
careful  review  of  all  the  preceding  cases,  that  the  exemp- 
tion from  self-incrimination  secured,  as  against  the  action 
of  the  Federal  government  by  the  Fifth  Amendment,  is  not 
one  of  the  fundamental  rights  of  national  citizenship 
included  among  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens 
of  the  United  States  which  the  states  are  forbidden  to 
abridge  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  After  describ- 
ing, in  general  terms,  the  character  of  state  citizenship 
the  court,  in  the  case  in  question,  thus  states  the  essence 
of  its  conclusion:  ** Privileges  and  immunities  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  are  only 
such  as  arise  out  of  the  nature  and  essential  character  of 
the  national  government,  or  are  specifically  granted  or 
secured  to  all  citizens  or  persons  by  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  Slaughter  House  Oases,  supra,  p.  79 ; 
Be  Kemmler,  136  U.  S.  436,  448 ;  Duncan  v.  Missouri,  152 
U.  S.  377.  Thus  among  the  rights  and  privileges  of 
national  citizenship  recognized  by  this  court  are  the  right 
to  pass  from  state  to  state  (Crandall  v.  Nevada,  6  Wall. 
35) ;  the  right  to  petition  Congress  for  a  redress  of  griev- 
ances (United  States  v.  Cruikshank,  supra) ;  the  right  to 
vote  for  national  officers  (Ex-parte  Yarbrought,  110  U.  S. 
651 ;  Wily  v.  Sinkler,  179  U.  S.  58) ;  the  right  to  enter  the 
public  lands  (United  States  v.  Waddell,  112  U.  S.  76) ;  the 
right  to  be  protected  against  violence  while  in  the  lawful 
custody  of  a  United  States  marshal  (Logan  v.  United 
States,  144  U.  S.  263) ;  and  the  right  ^o  inform  the  United 
States  authorities  of  violation  of  its  laws  (Re  Quarles, 
158U.  S.532)..'' 
The  majority  of  the  court  who  determined  in  the 


§  17  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  39 

Slaughter  House  Gases,  16  Wall.  36,  to  confine  the  opera- 
tion of  the  amendment  within  the  narrowest  possible 
limits  were  largely  controlled  no  doubt  by  a  practical 
consideration  which  has  prevailed  down  to  the  present 
time.  It  was  considered  wise  so  to  limit  the  constitn- 
tional  revolution  wrought  by  the  amendment  as  to  pre- 
vent a  radical  diange  of  the  whole  theory  of  the  relations 
of  the  state  and  federal  governments  to  each  other,  and 
of  both  governments  to  Ihe  people.  It  was  thereof  said 
in  the  United  States  v.  Cruikshank,  92  U.  S.  542,  that 
"The  Fourteenth  Amendment  prohibits  a  state  from 
depriving  any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law ;  but  this  adds  nothing  to  the  rights  of 
one  citizen  as  against  another.  It  simply  furnishes  an 
additional  guaranty  against  any  encroachment  by  the 
states  upon  the  fundamental  rights  which  belong  to 
every  citizen  as  a  member  of  society ; ' '  and  In  Be  Kemm- 
ler,  supra,  that  **The  Fourteenth  Amendment  did  not 
radically  change  the  whole  theory  of  the  relations  of  the 
state  and  federal  governments  to  each  other,  and  of  both 
governments  to  the  people.  The  same  person  may  be  at 
the  same  time  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  and  a  citizen 
of  the  state.  Protection  to  life,  liberty  and  property 
rests,  primarily,  with  the  States,  and  the  amendment 
furnishes  an  additional  guaranty  against  any  encroach- 
ment upon  those  fundamental  rights  which  belong  to  citi- 
zenship, and  which  the  state  governments  were  created 
to  secure.  Undoubtedly  the  amendment  forbids  any  arbi- 
trary deprivation  of  life,  liberty  or  property,  and  secures 
equal  protection  to  all  under  Uke  circumstances  in  the 
enjoyment  of  their  rights ;  and,  in  the  administration  of 
criminal  justice,  requires  that  no  different  or  higher  pun- 
ishment shall  be  imposed  upon  one  than  is  imposed  upon 
all  for  like  offenses.  But  it  was  not  designed  to  interfere 
with  the  power  of  the  State  to  protect  the  lives,  liberties 
and  property  of  its  citizens,  and  to  promote  their  health, 
peace,  morals,  education  and  good  order.  Barbier  v.  Con- 
noUy,  113  U.  S.  27,  31. ''    Thus  it  was  considered  all 


40  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  17 

important  to  leave  the  internal  sovereignty  of  the  states 
so  unimpaired  that  they  could  still  exercise  the  sovereign 
rights  of  taxation,  eminent  domain,  the  police  power,  the 
administration  of  justice,  in  civil  and  criminal  cases,  with 
no  restraint  whatever  so  long  as  the  guarantees  in  favor 
of  the  new  national  citizenship  were  not  violated.  In  the 
second  place,  it  was  considered  necessary  so  to  limit  the 
scope  of  the  amendment  as  to  prevent,  the  Federal  courts 
from  being  submerged  under  a  mass  of  new  Ktigation 
involving  practically  a  review  of  every  transaction 
between  the  state  and  its  citizens.  Its  framers  had  no 
idea  of  converting  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  into  a  general  court  of  appeal  with  jurisdiction 
so  wide  and  plenary  as  to  enable  it  to  review  all  cases 
involving  the  taking  away  of  life,  liberty  and  property 
when  only  questions  of  equitable  consideration  or  broad 
ideas  of  justice  are  involved.  That  tribunal  remains  as 
before  a  court  not  of  general  but  special  appeal  with 
power  to  supervise  under  the  amendment  in  question  only 
when  the  official  action  of  the  state  has  violated  either  its 
provisions  or  those  of  some  act  of  Congress  passed  in 
pursuance  of  it.  The  denial  of  due  process  becomes  a 
question  when  the  decision  of  the  highest  court  of  a  state 
is  against  the  vaUdity  of  a  right  set  up  under  the  Federal 
Constitution  of  its  laws. 

Here  the  fact  should  be  emphasized  that  the  prohibi- 
tions of  the  amendment  have  reference  to  state  action 
exclusively,  and  not  to  any  action  of  private  individuals. 
Such  actions  constitute  merely  private  wrongs,  or  crimes 
of  the  individual.  There  can  be  no  remedy  under  the 
amendment  unless  the  denial  of  the  constitutional  right 
in  question  rests  for  its  justification  upon  state  law  or 
authority.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion guarantees  a  republican  form  of  government  the  ulti- 
mate power  to  determine  all  questions  of  local  govern- 
ment and  policy  still  resides,  and  must  ever  reside  in  the 
states,  so  long  as  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  individual 
as   guaranteed   by  the   Federal   Constitution   are  not 


§  18  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  41 

abridged  or  denied.  The  Federal  courts  have  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  the  expediency  or  policy  of  state 
laws,  nor  is  the  hardship  or  injustice  of  such  laws  neces- 
sarily an  objection  against  their  constitutional  validity. 
**The  rule,  briefly  stated,  is  that  whenever  an  act  of  the 
legislature  is  challenged  in  court  the  inquiry  is  limited 
to  the  question  of  power,  and  does  not  extend  to  the  mat- 
ter of  expediency,  the  motives  of  the  legislators,  or  the 
reasons  which  were  spread  before  them  to  induce  the  pas- 
sage of  the  act.''  Angle  v.  Chicago,  St.  Paul,  etc.,  Eail- 
way,  151  U.  S.  1.  The  amendment  does  not  attempt  to 
deprive  the  states  of  their  police  powers  nor  does  it  '*  pro- 
fess to  secure  to  all  persons  in  the  United  States  the 
benefit  of  the  same  laws  and  the  same  remedies.  Great 
diversities  in  these  respects  may  exist  in  two  states  sepa- 
rated only  by  an  imaginary  line.  On  one  side  of  this  line 
there  may  be  a  right  of  trial  by  jury,  and  on  the  other 
side  no  such  right.  Each  state  prescribes  its  own  modes 
of  judicial  proceeding. ' '  Bowman  v.  Lewis,  101  U.  S.  22. 
In  speaking  of  due  process  as  applied  to  legal  proceedings 
the  Supreme  Court  has  said  that  it  means  **a  course  of 
legal  proceedings  according  to  those  rules  and  principles 
which  have  been  established  in  our  system  of  jurispru- 
dence for  the  protection  and  enforcement  of  private 
rights.  To  give  such  proceedings  any  validity,  there  must 
be  a  tribunal  competent  by  its  Constitution — ^that  is  by 
the  law  of  its  creation — ^to  pass  upon  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  the  suit,  and,  if  that  involves  merely  a  determina- 
tion of  the  personal  liability  of  the  defendant,  he  must  be 
brought  within  its  jurisdiction  by  service  of  process 
within  the  State,  or  his  voluntary  appearance. ' '  Pen- 
noyer  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714,  quoted  in  Scott  v.  McNeal, 
154  U.  S.  46. 

§  18.  Dae  process  of  law  as  embodied  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The  leading  case  just  quoted  emphasizes 
with  a  clearness  and  force  that  can  not  be  surpassed,  the 
all  important  fact  that  what  the  amendment  does  guar- 


42  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  18 

antee,  primarily  and  in  terms  that  can  not  be  misunder- 
stood, is  that  kind  of  legal  proceedings  contemplated  by- 
chapter  39  of  the  Great  Charter,  as  the  same  was  under- 
stood in  England  at  the  time  of  the  separation  from  the 
mother  country.  Unfortunately  in  applying  that  seminal 
principle  of  the  English  Constitution  as  a  limitation  upon 
the  powers  of  the  states  the  Supreme  Court,  speaking 
through  a  great  judge,  fell  into  the  error,  as  heretofore 
explained,  of  appealing  to  Coke 's  commentary  on  Magna 
Carta,  published  in  1632,  as  the  true  key  to  its  meaning 
instead  of  the  ** Commentaries^'  of  Blackstone,  put  in 
their  present  form  in  1758,  after  the  meaning  of  due  proc- 
ess had  been  vastly  widened  by  the  results  of  the  Revolu- 
tions of  1640  and  1688.  In  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans, 
96  U.  S.  97  (1877),  the  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Miller,  said:  **The  equivalent  of  the  phrase  *due 
process  of  law, '  according  to  Lord  Coke,  is  found  in  the 
words  *  law  of  the  land, '  in  the  Great  Charter,  in  connec- 
tion with  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  the  trial  by  jury,  and 
other  guaranties  of  the  rights  of  the  subject  against  the 
oppression  of  the  Crown.  In  the  series  of  amendments 
to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  proposed  imme- 
diately after  the  organization  of  the  Government,  which 
were  dictated  by  the  jealousy  of  the  states  as  further 
limitations  upon  the  power  of  the  Federal  Government, 
it  is  found  in  the  Fifth,  in  connection  with  other  guaranties 
of  personal  rights  of  the  same  character.  Among  those 
are  protection  against  prosecutions  for  crimes  unless  sanc- 
tioned by  a  grand  jury ;  against  being  twice  tried  for  the 
same  offense ;  against  the  accused  being  compelled  in  a 
criminal  case,  to  testify  against  himself;  and  against 
taking  private  property  for  public  use  without  just  com- 
pensation .  .  .  when,  in  the  year  of  grace  1868,  there 
is  placed  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  a  decla- 
ration that  *No  State  shall  deprive  any  person  of  life,  lib- 
erty, or  property  without  due  process  of  law,  ^  can  a  State 
make  anything  due  process  of  law  which,  by  its  own  legis- 
lation, it  chooses  to  declare  such?     To  affirm  this  is 


§  18  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  43 

to  hold  that  the  prohibition  to  the  States  is  of  no  avail, 
or  has  no  application  where  the  invasion  of  private  rights 
is  affected  nnder  the  forms  of  state  legislation.''  The 
Court  added  that  **A  most  exhaustive  judicial  inquiry 
into  the  meaning  of  the  words  Mue  process  of  law,'  as 
found  in  the  Fifth  Amendment,  resulted  in  the  unani- 
mous decision  of  this  court,  that  they  do  not  necessarily 
imply  a  regular  proceeding  in  a  court  of  justice,  or  after 
the  manner  of  such  courts.  Murray  v,  Hoboken  Land 
Co.,  18  How.  272  (1855)."  In  that  case  the  Court,  falling 
into  the  same  historical  error,  said:  **The  words  *due 
process  of  law, '  were  undoubtedly  intended  to  convey  the 
same  meaning  as  the  words  'by  the  law  of  the  land,'  in 
Magna  Carta.  Lord  Coke,  in  his  commentary  on  those 
words  (2  Inst.,  50),  says,  they  mean  due  process  of  law. 
The  Constitution  which  had  been  adopted  by  the  several 
States  before  the  formation  of  the  Federal  Constitution, 
following  the  language  of  the  Great  Charter  more  closely, 
generally  contained  the  words  *but  by  the  judgment  of 
his  peers,  or  the  law  of  the  land.'  " 

As  time  went  on  the  Court  perceived  that  the  draft- 
men  of  the  State  Constitutions,  to  which  Mr.  Justice 
Curtis  referred  in  the  case  last  cited,  never  dreamed  of 
founding  American  constitutional  law  upon  the  ancient 
English  constitution  as  it  existed  in  1632 — ^with  the  Star 
Chamber  and  High  Commission  intact — and  not  upon  the 
reformed  English  constitution,  as  Blackstone  described 
it  in  the  first  book  of  his  famous  ** Commentaries,"  put 
in  their  present  form  in  1758.  The  departure  from  the 
old  and  mischievous  misconception  dates  from  1884  when 
in  Hutardo  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516,  Mr.  Justice 
Matthews  was  the  first  to  perceive  that  the  old  rule  of 
construction,  based  on  English  Constitutional  theory  as 
it  existed  in  Coke's  time,  was  at  once  unsound  and  imprac- 
ticaL  In  rejecting  the  old  rule,  he  said :  * '  It  would  be  to 
stamp  upon  our  jurisprudence  the  unchangeableness 
attributed  to  the  laws  of  the  Medes  and  Persians.  This 
would  be  all  the  more  singular  and  surprising,  in  this 


44  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  18 

quick  and  ax^tive  age,  when  we  consider  that^  owing  to  the 
progressive  development  of  legal  ideas  and  institutions 
in  England,  the  words  of  Magna  Carta  stood  for  very 
different  things  at  the  time  of  the  separation  of  the  Amer- 
ican colonies  from  what  they  represented  originaUy/^ 
The  good  work  thus  begun  was  materially  advanced  in 
1896  when  in  Lowe  v.  Kansas,  163  U.  S.  81,  Mr.  Justice 
Gray  said :  **  Whether  the  mode  of  proceeding  prescribed 
by  this  statute,  and  followed  in  this  case  was  due  process 
of  law,  depends  upon  the  question  whether  it  was  in  sub- 
stantial accord  with  the  law  and  usage  of  England  before 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  in  this  country 
since  it  became  a  nation,  in  similar  cases. ' '  But  the  end 
was  not  reached  until  1908  when  in  Twining  v.  New  Jer- 
sey, 211  U.  S.  78,  Mr.  Justice  Moody,  a  jurist  of  rare 
promise,  said:  **It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  a  pro- 
cedure settled  in  English  law  at  the  time  of  the  emigra- 
tion, and  brought  to  this  country  and  practiced  by  our 
ancestors,  is  an  essential  element  of  due  process  of  law. 
//  that  were  so,  the  procedure  of  the  first  half  of  the 
seventeenth  century  would  be  fastened  upon  American 
jurisprudence  like  a  straight  jacket  only  to  be  loosed  by 
constitutional  amendment/^ 

The  foregoing  definitions  of  the  due  process  of  law 
guaranteed  by  the  amendment  in  question,  as  formulated 
by  Justices  Matthews,  Gray  and  Moody,  are  happy 
expressions  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  Histori- 
cal School  of  Jurisprudence  which  has  established  the 
momentous  conclusion  that  law,  in  its  final  analysis,  is 
neither  the  command  of  an  outside  sovereign,  nor  a  collec- 
tion of  abstract  principles  in  force  by  the  nature  of 
things  for  all  ages.  Law  is  a  living  and  growing  organ- 
ism which  changes  as  the  relations  of  society  change. 
As  Mr.  Justice  Holmes  has  expressed  it:  **The  law  is 
always  approaching,  and  never  reaching  consistency.  It 
is  forever  adopting  new  principles  from  life  at  one  end, 
and  it  always  retains  old  ones  from  history  at  the  other, 
which  have  not  been  absorbed  or  sloughed  off.    It  will 


§  19  OBIQIN  AND  GROWTH  45 

become  entirely  consistent  only  when  it  ceaaes  to  grow. ' ' 
The  Common  Law,  p.  36,  Only  so  long  as  a  constitution 
continues  to  be  a  living  and  growing  organism,  which 
changes  as  the  relations  of  society  change,  can  it  continue 
to  adapt  itself  to  the  ever  increasing  wants  of  a  progres- 
sive society.  Mr,  Justice  Moody  grasped  the  fact  that  the 
problem  of  problems  for  those  who  create  judge  made  law 
is  to  find  a  way  through  which  the  '*  straight- jacket  ^^  put 
on  a  progressive  state,  in  the  form  of  a  written  constitu- 
tion or  code,  can  be  made  sufBciently  elastic  to  adapt  itself 
to  all  the  changing  conditions  of  the  aftergrowth.  That 
problem  has  been  engaging  EngUsh  jurists  ever  since 
chapter  39  of  the  Great  Charter  was  formulated  in  121 5. 
They  have  interpreted  the  due  process  principle  it  em- 
bodies  in  each  succeeding  age  according  to  its  needs  and 
aspirations ;  and  in  that  way  it  has  been  made  to  mirror 
for  each  age  its  own  peculiar  conception  of  civil  liberty. 
After  it  had  been  broadened  and  adapted  to  modem  condi- 
tions  by  the  Revolutions  of  1640  and  1688  it  passed  into 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  as  a  limitation  on 
the  powers  of  the  Federal  Government  after  the  adoption 
of  the  Fifth  Amendment  in  1790 ;  and  as  a  limitation  on  the 
powers  of  the  state  government  after  the  adoption  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  in  1868. 

§  19.  Equal  protection  of  the  laws  as  embodied  in  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  The  draftsmen  of  the  amend- 
ment in  question  were  prompted  to  add  the  final  clause 
of  Section  1 — ^'^nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  juris- 
diction the  equal  protection  of  the  laws'' — ^by  the  peculiar 
political  conditions  by  which  they  were  surrounded.  Mil- 
lions of  slaves  of  African  descent  had  been  suddenly 
lifted  to  the  condition  of  f reedmen,  and  there  was  a  grave 
apprehension  expressed  upon  the  part  of  their  liberators 
that  the  legislatures  of  the  Southern  States,  if  not 
restrained  by  a  constitutional  limitation,  would  enact  dis- 
criminating statutes  designed  to  remand  these  freedmen 
to  a  condition  of  virtual  slavery.    It  was  said,  and  right- 


46  DUE  PEOCESS  OP  LAW  §  19 

fully,  that  against  such  statutes  the  due  process  clause 
would  afford  no  protection  because  the  principle  of  *  *  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws '  ^  had  no  place  in  it, — such  a 
principle  had  never  been  recognized  in  the  EngUsh  con- 
stitutional system.  It  was  also  realized  that  Section  4  of 
Article  IV  of  the  Constitution  which  declares  that  *  *  The 
United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  State  of  this 
Union  a  republican  form  of  government^'  was  too  vague 
and  indefinite  to  give  adequate  protection.  Prompted  by 
such  conditions  American  jurists  made  an  invention,  cre- 
ating equality  before  the  law  and  securing  equal  laws,  a 
guarantee  that  never  existed  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  In  that  way  the  due  process 
clause  was  supplemented  by  a  new  creation  of  a  broader 
scope  and  deeper  significance.  Referring  to  provisions 
of  the  Constitution  existing  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the 
new  amendments,  and  particularly  to  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, Senator  Howard,  who  introduced  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  in  the  Senate  on  behalf  of  the  Beconstrue- 
tion  Committee,  said:  ''Section  one  is  a  restriction  upon 
the  States,  and  does  not,  of  itself,  confer  any  power,  upon 
Congress.  I  look  upon  the  first  section,  taken  in  connec- 
tion with  the  fifth,  as  very  important.  It  will,  if  adopted 
by  the  States,  forever  disable  everyone  of  them  from 
passing  laws  trenching  upon  those  fundamental  rights 
and  privileges  which  pertain  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  to  all  persons  who  may  happen  to  be  within 
their  jurisdiction.  It  establishes  equality  before  the  law, 
and  it  gives  to  the  humblest,  the  poorest,  the  most 
despised  of  the  race  the  same  rights  and  the  same  pro- 
tection before  the  law  as  it  gives  to  the  most  powerful, 
the  most  wealthy,  or  the  most  haughty.'*  In  explaining 
the  provision  for  equal  protection  of  the  laws  Senator 
Poland  said  of  equality:  ''It  is  the  very  spirit  and 
inspiration  of  our  system  of  government,  the  absolute 
foundation  upon  which  it  was  established.  It  is  essen- 
tially declared  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and 
in  all  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution.    Notwithstand- 


§  19  ORIGIN  AND  GEOWTH  47 

ing  this,  we  know  that  state  laws  exist,  and  some  of  them 
of  very  recent  enactment,  in  direct  violation  of  these  prin- 
ciples. It  certainly  seems  desirable  that  no  doubt  should 
be  left  existing  as  to  the  power  of  Congress  to  enforce 
principles  lying  at  the  very  foundation  of  all  republican 
government  if  they  be  denied  or  violated  by  the  States, 
and  I  can  not  doubt  but  that  every  senator  will  rejoice  in 
idding  to  remove  all  doubt  upon  this  power  of  Congress. ' ' 
The  moment  the  amendment  passed  from  the  political 
arena  to  the  Supreme  Court  the  manifest  historical  fact 
was  promptly  recognized  that  the  protection  of  the 
negro  race  was  the  primary  and  immediate  cause  of  its 
adoption.  In  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36, 
Mr.  Justice  Miller  said :  *  *  *  Nor  shall  any  State  deny  to 
any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws.'  In  the  light  of  the  history  of  these  amend- 
ments, and  the  prevailing  purpose  of  them,  which  we  have 
already  discussed,  it  is  not  difficult  to  give  a  meaning  to 
this  clause.  The  existence  of  the  laws  of  the  States 
where  the  newly  emancipated  negroes  resided,  which  dis- 
criminated with  gross  injustice  and  hardship  against 
them  as  a  class,  was  the  evil  to  be  remedied  by  this  clause, 
and  by  it  such  laws  are  forbidden.*'  Mr.  Justice  Field, 
in  his  dissenting  opinion,  said:  *' After  referring  to  sev- 
eral statutes  passed  in  some  of  the  Southern  States,  dis- 
criminating between  the  f  reedmen  and  white  citizens,  and 
after  citing  the  definition  of  civil  liberty  given  by  Black- 
stone  the  Senator  (Trumbull)  said:  *I  take  it  that  any 
statute  which  is  not  equal  to  all,  and  which  deprives  any 
citizen  of  civil  rights,  which  are  secured  to  other  citizens, 
is  an  unjust  encroachment  upon  liberty ;  and  it  is  in  fact 
a  badge  of  servitude  which  by  the  Constitution  is  pro- 
hibited: Cong.  Globe,  1st  Sess.,  39  Cong.,  part  I,  p.  474.** 
Nevertheless  the  wise  and  patriotic  jurists,  who  thus 
frankly  stated  the  true  facts  as  to  the  history  of  the 
amendment,  at  once  resolved  to  sever  it  from  its  history, 
in  order  to  give  it  a  broad  national  significance  according 
to  i(^  terms  which,  fortunately,  did  not  refer  to  the  exist- 


48  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  19 

ence  of  race  distinctions  in  any  form  whatsoever.  In  the 
weighty  words  of  Mr.  Justice  Bradley:  '*It  is  futile  to 
argue  that  none  but  persons  of  the  African  race  are 
intended  to  be  benefited  by  this  amendment.  They  may 
have  been  the  primary  cause  of  the  amendment,  but  its 
language  is  general,  embracing  all  citizens,  and  I  think  it 
was  purposely  so  expressed.  The  mischief  to  be  reme- 
died was  not  merely  slavery  and  its  incidents  and  conse- 
quences. The  amendment  was  an  attempt  to  give  voice 
to  the  strong  national  yearning  for  that  time  and  condi- 
tion of  things,  in  which  American  citizenship  should  be  a 
sure  guaranty  of  safety,  and  in  which  every  citizen  of 
the  United  States  might  stand  erect  in  every  portion  of 
its  soil,  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  every  right  and  privilege 
belonging  to  a  freeman  without  fear  of  violence  or  moles- 
tation.''  And  in  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356, 
Mr.  Justice  Matthews  said:  ** These  provisions  (of  Sec- 
tion 1)  are  universal  in  their  application,  to  all  persons 
within  the  territorial  jurisdiction,  without  regard  to  any 
differences  of  race,  of  color,  or  of  nationality;  and  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  a  pledge  of  the  protection 
of  equal  laws. '  ^  The  ripe  fruit  of  that  wise  rule  of  con- 
struction was  embodied  in  the  Railroad  Tax  Cases 
8  Sawy.  238,  by  Mr.  Justice  Field  who  said :  '  *  Oppres- 
sion of  the  person  and  spoliation  of  property  by  any  state 
were  thus  forbidden,  and  equality  before  the  law  was 
secured  to  all.  With  the  adoption  of  the  amendment 
the  power  of  the  states  to  oppress  any  one  under  any 
pretense  or  in  any  form  was  forever  ended ;  and  thence- 
forth all  persons  within  their  jurisdiction  could  claim 
equal  protection  under  the  laws.  No  state — ^such  is  the 
sovereign  command  of  the  whole  people  of  the  United 
States — ^no  state  shall  touch  the  life,  the  liberty,  or  the 
property  of  any  person,  however  humble  his  lot  or 
exalted  his  station,  without  due  process  of  law;  and  no 
state,  even  with  due  process  of  law,  shall  deny  to  any  one 
within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.** 


§  20  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  49 

§  20.  The  rule  of  inclusion  and  exdnsion.  Despite  the 
fact  that  the  meaning  of  the  two  formulas  contained  in 
Section  1  of  the  amendment,  as  limitations  upon  the 
powers  of  the  states,  has  been  definitely  ascertained,  it  is 
gravely  difficult  in  a  particular  case  to  determine  when 
the  act  of  a  state,  executive,  legislative,  or  judicial,  takes 
away  from  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  as  such,  a  right 
so  fundamental  that  its  loss  may  be  said  to  *  *  deprive  any 
person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process 
of  law,'*  or  **deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  * '  Foreseeing  that  diffi- 
culty at  the  outset  the  Supreme  Court  determined  to  meet 
it  in  each  case  by  a  discreet  and  cautious  working  rule 
best  described  in  its  own  language:  **But,  apart  from 
the  imminent  risk  of  a  failure  to  give  any  definition 
which  would  be  at  once  perspicuous,  comprehensive,  and 
satisfactory,  there  is  wisdom,  we  think,  in  the  ascertain- 
ing of  the  intent  and  application  of  such  an  important 
phrase  in  the  Federal  Constitution,  by  the  gradual  process 
of  judicial  inclusion  and  exclusion,  as  the  cases  presented 
for  decision  shall  require  with  the  reasoning  on  which 
such  decisions  may  be  founded.*'  Davidson  v.  New 
Orleans,  96  IT.  S.  97.  In  a  word,  the  rule  is  that  when 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  as  such,  complains 
that  a  fundamental  right  guaranteed  by  the  clauses  in 
question  has  been  taken  away,  the  court  will  ascertain 
in  that  particular  case  whether  the  right  is  an  incident  of 
national  citizenship,  and  as  such  within  its  protection,  or 
an  incident  of  state  citizenship,  whose  protection  belongs 
to  the  state  alone.  If  it  appears  that  the  right  claimed  is 
an  incident  of  national  citizenship,  then  the  ultimate 
question  arising  is,  whether  or  no  that  right  as  protected 
by  the  amendment  has  been  actually  taken  away  by  state 
action,  executive,  legislative  or  judicial.  The  natural  and 
inevitable  tendency  always  impelling  the  court  to  narrow 
rather  than  extend  its  jurisdiction  arises  out  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  self-preservation.  After  stating  that  so  long  as 
the  due  process  of  law  clause  was  only  a  part  of  the  Fifth 

Doe 


50  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  20 

Amendment  it  **has  rarely  been  invoked  in  the  judicial 
fornm,  or  the  more  enlarged  theatre  of  public  discus- 
sion,"  attention  was  called  to  the  fact^  as  early  as  1878, 
that  ^' while  it  has  been  a  part  of  the  Constitution,  as  a 
restraint  upon  the  power  of  the  staies,  only  a  few  years, 
the  docket  of  this  court  is  crowded  with  cases  in  which 
we  are  asked  to  hold  that  state  courts  and  state  legis- 
latures have  deprived  their  citizens  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property,  without  due  process  of  law.^*  Davidson  v. 
New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97.  For  the  last  thirty-six 
years  the  court  has  been  applying  its  rule  of  inclusion 
and  exclusion  to  the  ever  rising  tide  of  cases  before 
it,  and  the  result  is  a  body  of  unique  and  pro- 
foundly important  judicial  literature  which  the  author  is 
now  striving  to  condense  and  arrange  in  a  more  complete 
and  systematic  form  than  it  has  ever  assumed  before. 
This  body  of  literature  is  unique  because  it  embodies  the 
result  of  an  effort  upon  the  part  of  the  only  court  in  the 
world's  li^story  ever  endowed  with  such  a  power  to  annul 
national  and  state  laws  whenever  they  attempt  to  violate 
the  rights  of  the  national  citizen  as  guaranteed  by  the 
national  constitution.  When  the  framers  of  the  French 
Constitution  of  1795  defined  legal  equality  by  declaring : 
**L'egalite  consiste  en  ce  que  la  loi  est  la  meme  pour 
tons,  soit  qu'elle  protege,  soit  qu'elle  punisse,'''  they  did 
not  conceive  of  a  supreme  tribunal  armed  with  the  power 
to  enforce  such  equality  in  every  case  in  which  it  might  be 
denied.  The  judicial  power  as  the  ultimate  supreme 
power  in  the  state  is  purely  an  American  creation.  Here 
it  is  supposed  to  express  the  last  word  of  the  people 
when  their  political  agents  have  transcended  the  bounds 
set  by  their  written  constitutions.  Thus  we  have 
realized,  in  our  own  way,  the  dream  of  Savigny,  who  gave 
expression  to  a  path-breaking  idea,  unfamiliar  before  his 
time,  when  in  his  Beruf  unserer  Zeit,  which  appeared  in 
1814,  he  said  that  law  is  a  part  and  parcel  of  the  life  of 
a  nation,  *  *  not  a  garment  merely  which  has  been  made  to 
please  the  fancy  and  can  be  taken  off  at  pleasure  and 


J  20  OMGIN  AND  GROWTH  61 

exclianged  for  another.'^   Instead  of  considering  law  as 

the  creation  of  the  will  of  individuals,  he  regarded  it  as 

the  natural  outcome  of  the  consciousness  of  the  people, 

hke  their  social  habits  or  their  language.    To  use  his 

own  words :     Das  Gesetz  ist  das  Organ  de$  Volksrechts 

(the  people   is   always  the  true  legislator).     In  nearly 

all  of  the  -weighty  judgihents  rendered  by  the  Supreme 

Court  of  the    United  States  in  the  leading  cases  that 

have  arisen   under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  it  has 

strengthened  its  hold  upon  the  confidence  of  the  nation 

by  giving  faithful  and  accurate  expression  to  the  national 

consciousness      as     embodied    in    contemporary    public 

opinion. 


PART  I 

DUE  PROCESS  AS  A  LIMITATION  ON 

FEDERAL  POWER 


PART  I 

DUE  PROCESS  AS  A  LIMITATION  ON 

FEDERAL  POWER 


56  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  21 

Criminal  Law,  i,  p.  416.  The  Star  Chamber  system  of 
trials  exercised  a  strong  influence  over  trial  by  jury, 
and  its  effect  may  be  traced  in  all  the  criminal  proceed- 
ings that  took  place  under  the  Tudors,  James  I  and 
Charies  L  And  despite  the  fact  that  the  civil  wars 
broke  down  that"  system  and  gave  to  trial  by  jury  an 
undoubted  supremacy,  the  fact  remains  that  during  the 
reigns  of  Charies  n  and  James  II  juries  were  so  manipu- 
lated that  they  proved  in  practice  quite  as  unjust  and 
tyrannical  as  the  Star  Chamber.  All  the  safeguards  pro- 
vided against  that  condition  of  things  passed  into  the 
first  state  constitutions,  and  then  into  the  foregoing 
clauses  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.  The  second  provision, 
declaring  that  no  person  shall  be  **  deprived  of  life,  lib- 
erty, or  property,  without  due  process  of  law,''  simply 
embodies  the  essence  of  chapter  39  of  the  Great  Charter 
as  it  was  understood  in  England  in  Blackstone's  time, 
while  the  third  and  last,  *'nor  shall  private  property  be 
taken  for  public  use,  without  just  compensation,"  is  an 
assertion,  in  its  American  form,  of  the  restraint  imposed 
upon  a  right  inseparable  from  sovereignty,  unless  denied 
to  the  state  by  its  fundamental  law,  and  known  since  the 
time  of  Grotius  as  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  De  Jure 
Belli  et  Pacis,  lib.  iii,  c.  20,  §  7 ;  Thayer  Cas.  Const.  Law, 
945,  947 ;  Gardner  v.  Newburg,  2  Johns.  Ch.  162. 

§22.  Earlier  cases  construing  Fifth  Amendment.  Dur- 
ing the  seventy-six  years  that  intervened  between  the  rati- 
fication of  the  amendment  in  question,  in  1790,  and  the 
case  of  Ex  parte  Milligan,  4  Wall.  2,  decided  in  1866, 
only  ten  cases  involving  its  construction  were  passed 
upon  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  IPnited 
States  V.  Perez,  9  Wheat.  579  (1824) ;  Barron  v.  Balti- 
more, 7  Pet.  243  (1833) ;  Fox  v.  Ohio,  5  How.  410  (1847) ; 
West  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6  How.  507  (1848); 
Mitchell  V.  Harmony,  13  How.  115  (1851) ;  Moore  v. 
Illinois,  14  How.  13  (1852) ;  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land 
and  Im.  Co.,  18  How.  272  (1855) ;  Dynes  v.  Hoover,  20 


§22  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1790-1866)     57 

How.  65  (1857) ;  Withers  v.  Buckley,  20  How.  84  (1857) ; 
Ex  parte  Milligan,  4  Wall.  2  (1866).    In  the  first  case, 
of  United  States  v.  Perez,  the  court,  speaking  through 
Justice  Story,  simply  declared  in  a  few  words  that  the 
discharge  of  the  jury  from  giving  a  verdict  in  a  capital 
case,  without  the  consent  of  the  prisoner,  the  jury  being 
unable  to  agree,  is  not  a  bar  to  a  subsequent  trial  for  the 
same  offense.    With  that  case  of  double  jeopardy  may 
be  classed  Moore  v.  Hlinois.     In  West  Kiver  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Dix,  the  court  refused  to  disturb  the  judgment  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Vermont  upholding  the  right  of 
eminent  domain  asserted  by  that  state  in  the  extinguish- 
ment of   a  franchise,  Justice   McLean  saying:    **The 
power  of  appropriation  by  a  state  has  never  been  held 
by  any  judicial  tribunal  as  impairing  the  obligation  of 
a  contract  in  the  sense  of  the  Constitution.    And  this 
power  has  been  frequently  exercised  by  all  the  states 
since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.     In  the  fifth 
article   of  the   amendments  to   the   Constitution  it  is 
declared :    *  Nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for  pub- 
lic use,  without  juSt  compensation. ' '  *    The  first  case  in 
which  relief  was  ever  granted  under  the  amendment  in 
question  is  that  of  Mitchell  v.  Harmony,  in  which  the 
court,  after  admitting  that  private  property  may  be  taken 
by  a  military  commander  to  prevent  it  from  falling  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  or  for  the  purpose  of  converting 
it  to  the  use  of  the  public  when  the  danger  is  immediate 
and  impending,  or  the  necessity  urgent  for  the  public 
service,  such  as  will  not  admit  of  delay,  denied  that  in 
that  particular  case  there  was  any  such  urgent  necessity 
or  impending  danger.    A  few  years  later  it  was  held,  in 
Dynes  v.  Hoover,  that  the  provisions  of  the  amendment 
in  question  limits  in  no  way  the  power  of  Congress  '  *  to 
provide  for  the  trial  and  punishment  of  military  and 
naval  offenses  in  the  manner  then  and  now  practiced  by 
civilized  nations.  ^ '    The  more  notable  cases  that  remain 
will  be  considered  separately. 


58  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  23 

§23.  Webster's  famous  definition  of  due  process  in 
1819.  It  is  important  to  note  that  five  years  before  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  was  called  upon  to 
consider  the  first  case  involving  the  construction  of  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  Daniel  Webster  had  presented  to  that 
court  his  famous  definition  of  due  process,  or  *'the  law 
of  the  land,*'  in  the  Dartmouth  College  Case,  4  Wheat.  518, 
in  which  he  emphasized  the  fact  that  the  acts  of  the  New 
Hampshire  legislature,  taking  away  the  rights  and  fran- 
chises of  the  college  acquired  under  prior  charter,  were  in 
conflict  with  that  provision  of  that  state's  constitution, 
which  declared  that  no  one  shall  be  deprived  of  *  *  property, 
privileges  or  immunities  but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers 
or  the  law  of  the  land. ' '  He  said :  * '  It  is  not  too  much 
to  assert  that  the  legislature  of  New  Hampshire  would 
not  have  been  competent  to  pass  the  acts  in  question, 
and  make  them  binding  on  the  plaintiffs  without  their 
assent,  even  if  there  had  been,  in  the  constitution  of 
New  Hampshire,  or  of  the  United  States,  no  special 
restriction  on  their  power,  because  these  acts  are  not 
the  exercise  of  a  power  properly  legislative.  Their  object 
and  effect  is  to  take  away  from  one  rights,  property  and 
franchises,  and  to  grant  them  to  another.  This  is  not 
the  exercise  of  a  legislative  power.  To  justify  the  taking 
away  of  vested  rights  there  must  be  a  forfeiture;  to 
adjudge  upon  and  declare  which  is  the  proper  province 
of  the  judiciary.  Attainder  and  confiscation  are  acts  of 
sovereign  power,  not  acts  of  legislation.  .  .  .  By  these 
acts,  the  legislature  assumes  to  exercise  a  judicial  power. 
It  declares  a  forfeiture  and  resumes  franchises,  once 
granted,  without  trial  or  hearing.  If  the  constitution  be 
not  altogether  waste  paper,  it  has  restrained  the  power  of 
the  legislature  in  these  particulars.  .  •  •  Lord  Coke  is 
equally  decisive  and  emphatic.  Citing  and  commenting 
on  the  celebrated  39  chap,  of  Magna  Carta^  he  says :  *  No 
man  shall  be  disseized,  etc.,  unless  it  be  by  the  lawful 
judgment,  that  is,  verdict  of  equals,  or  by  the  law  of  the 
land,  that  is  (to  speak  it  once  for  all),  by  the  due  course 


§23   FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1790-1866)     59 

and  process  of  law. '  Have  the  plaintiffs  lost  their  fran- 
chises by  *dne  course  and  process  of  law'!  On  the  con- 
trary, are  not  these  acts  ^particular  acts  of  the  legisla- 
ture, which  have  no  relation  to  the  community  in  general, 
and  which  are  rather  sentences  than  laws*!  By  the  law 
of  the  land  is  most  clearly  intended  the  general  law;  a 
law  which  hears  before  it  condenms ;  which  proceeds  upon 
inquiry,  and  renders  judgmentorily  after  trial.  The 
meaning  is  that  every  citizen  shall  hold  his  life,  lib- 
erty, property  and  inmaunities,  under  the  protection  of 
the  general  rules  which  govern  society.  Everything 
which  may  pass  under  the  form  of  an  enactment  is  not, 
therefore,  to  be  considered  the  law  of  the  land.  If  this 
were  so,  acts  of  attainder,  bills  of  pains  and  penalties, 
acts  of  confiscation,  acts  reversing  judgments,  and  acts 
directly  transferring  one  man's  estate  to  another,  legis- 
lative judgments,  decrees  and  forfeitures,  in  all  possible 
forms,  would  be  the  law  of  the  land.  Such  a  strange 
construction  would  render  constitutional  provisions  of 
the  highest  importance  completely  inoperative  and  void. 
It  would  tend  directly  to  establish  the  union  of  all  powers 
in  the  legislature.  There  would  be  no  general  perma- 
nent law  for  courts  to  administer,  or  for  men  to  live 
under.  *'  The  fact  that  this  epoch-making  case  was 
decided  upon  the  ground  that  the  charter  granted  to 
the  trustees  of  the  college  by  the  crown  in  1769  was  a 
contract  within  the  meaning  of  that  clause  of  the  Con- 
stitution (art.  I,  §  10)  which  declares  that  no  state 
shall  make  any  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts, 
and  that  the  charter  of  the  college,  as  a  private  corpora- 
tion, was  not  dissolved  by  the  Revolution,  does  not  dimin- 
ish in  any  way  the  inestimable  value  of  Webster  *s 
demonstration  *Hhat  the  legislature  of  New  Hampshire 
would  not  have  been  competent  to  pass  the  acts  in  ques- 
tion, and  to  make  them  binding  on  the  plaintiffs  without 
their  assent,  even  if  there  had  been,  in  the  constitution 
of  New  Hampshire,  or  of  the  United  States,  no  special 
restriction  on  their  power;  because  these  acts  are  not 


60  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW.  §  23 

the  exercise  of  a  power  properly  legifllative. '  *  By  that 
demonstration,  Webster  blazed  the  way  for  those  who, 
in  the  time  to  come,  were  to  impose  constitutional  limi- 
tations upon  state  power  through  Section  1  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment. 

§  24.  Barron  v.  Baltimore,  7  Pet.  243  (U.  8.)  8  L.  Ed.  672, 
1833 — ^Limitationa  on  the  states.  Not  until  fourteen  years 
after  the  decision  of  the  Dartmouth  College  Case  did  the 
court,  speaking  again  through  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  un- 
dertake to  declare  that  the  first  eight  articles  of  amend- 
ment were  intended  solely  as  limitations  on  the  exercise  of 
power  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  not  as 
limitations  upon  the  powers  of  the  states.  In  the  case  in 
question  the  Court  said :  ' '  The  Constitution  was  ordained 
and  established  by  the  people  of  the  United  States  for 
themselves,  for  their  own  government,  and  not  for  the 
government  of  the  individual  states.  Each  state  estab- 
lished a  constitution  for  itself,  and  in  that  constitution  pro- 
vided such  limitations  and  restrictions  on  the  powers  of 
its  particular  government  as  its  judgment  dictated.  The 
people  of  the  United  States  framed  such  a  government 
for  the  United  States  as  they  supposed  best  adapted  to 
their  situation,  and  best  calculated  to  promote  their  inter- 
ests. The  powers  they  conferred  on  this  government 
were  to  be  exercised  by  itself;  and  the  limitations  on 
power,  if  expressed  in  general  terms,  are  naturally,  and, 
we  think,  necessarily,  applicable  to  the  government  cre- 
ated by  the  instrument.  They  are  limitations  of  power 
granted  in  the  instrument  itself;  not  of  distinct  govern- 
ments framed  by  different  persons  and  for  different 
purposes.  If  these  propositions  be  correct,  the  Fifth 
Amendment  must  be  understood  as  restraining  the  power 
of  the  general  Government,  and  not  as  applicable  to 
states.  These  amendments  demanded  security  against 
the  apprehended  encroachments  of  the  general  Govern- 
ment, not  against  those  of  the  local  governments.  In  com- 
pliance with  a  sentiment  thus  generally  expressed,  to 


§25   FIFTH  AMENDMENT— (X)NTINUED  (1790-1866)     61 

quiet  fears  thus  extensively  entertained,  amendments 
were  proposed  by  the  required  majority  in  Congress,  and 
adopted  by  the  states.  These  amendments  contain  no 
expression  indicating  an  intention  to  apply  them  to  the 
state  governments.  This  court  can  not  so  apply  them. ' ' 
7  Pet.  243.  See  also  Smith  v.  Maryland,  18  How.  76 ; 
Pervear  v.  Mass.,  5  Wall.  480;  Twitchell  v.  Penn,  7  Wall. 
325;  Edwards  v.  EUiott,  21  Wall.  557;  U.  S.  v.  Cruik- 
shank,  92  U.  S.  552 ;  Spies  v.  Dlinois,  123  U.  S.  166 ;  O  'Neil 
V.  Vermont,  144  U.  S.  360;  Brown  v.  Walker,  161  U.  S. 
606 ;  Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175  U.  S.  174 ;  Twining  v.  New 
Jersey,  211  U.  S.  78. 

§  25.  Fox  y.  Ohio— Involving  a  state  law  as  to  counter- 
feiting. In  the  case  in  question  it  was  held  that  a  state 
law  punishing  the  offense  of  passing  counterfeit  coin  was 
not  unconstitutional,  because  of  the  difference  between 
the  offense  of  counterfeiting  the  coin,  a  crime  directly 
against  the  Federal  Government,  and  the  offense  of  pass- 
ing counterfeit  money,  a  private,  wrong,  by  which  that 
Government  may  be  injured  only  indirectly,  if  at  all. 
The  Court  said:  **We  think  it  manifest  that  the  lan- 
guage of  the  Constitution,  by  its  proper  signification,  is 
limited  to  the  facts,  or  to  the  faculty  in  Congress  of 
coining  and  of  stamping  the  standard  of  value  upon  what 
the  Government  creates  or  shall  adopt,  and  of  punishing 
the  offense  of  producing  a  false  representation  of  what 
may  have  been  so  created  or  adopted.  The  imposture 
of  passing  a  false  coin  creates,  produces,  or  alters  noth- 
ing; it  leaves  the  legal  coin  as  it  was — affects  its  intrinsic 
value  in  nowise  whatever.  The  particular  offense 
described  in  the  statute  of  Ohio,  and  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment against  the  plaintiff  in  error,  is  deemed  by  this 
court  to  be  clearly  within  the  rightful  power  and  juris- 
diction of  the  state.  So  far,  then,  neither  the  statute  in 
question,  nor  the  conviction  and  sentence  founded  upon 
it,  can  be  held  as  violating  either  the  Constitution  or  any 
law  of  the  United  States  made  in  pursuance  thereof. '  * 


62  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  25 

5  How.  410.  See  also  U.  S.  v.  Marigold,  9  How.  560; 
Smith  V.  Maryland,  18  How.  76;  Ex  parte  Wilson,  114 
U.  S.  423.  Justice  McLean  dissented,  however,  npon  the 
ground  *  Hhat  the  power  to  punish  for  passing  counterfeit 
coin  is  clearly  in  the  Federal  Government.  Can  this  same 
power  be  exercised  by  a  state !  I  think  it  can  not.  ^  ^  He 
therefore  concluded  that  a  person  might  be  put  twice  in 
jeopardy  for  the  same  offense,  despite  the  amendment  in 
question,  because  **the  punishment  under  the  state  law 
would  be  no  bar  to  a  prosecution  under  the  law  of 
Congress. '» 

§26.  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  Oo. — ^Due  process  de- 
fined. Not  until  1855  did  the  due  process  clause  of  the 
amendment  come  before  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case 
in  question,  in  which  it  was  held  that  a  distress  warrant, 
issued  under  the  act  of  May  15,  1820,  by  the  solicitor  of 
the  treasury,  against  a  delinquent  collector  of  customs 
for  a  balance  found  to  be  due  his  accounts,  was  **due 
process  of  law. ' '  In  the  words  of  the  Court :  *  *  It  must 
be  admitted  that,  if  the  auditing  of  this  account,  and  the 
ascertaining  of  its  balance,  and  the  issuing  of  this  proc- 
ess, was  an  exercise  of  the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
States,  the  proceeding  was  void ;  for  the  officers  who  per- 
formed these  acts  could  exercise  no  part  of  that  judicial 
power.  They  neither  constituted  a  court  of  the  United 
States,  nor  were  they,  or  either  of  them,  so  connected 
with  any  such  court  as  to  perform  even  any  of  the  min- 
isterial duties  which  arise  out  of  judicial  proceedings. 
The  question  whether  these  acts  were  an  exercise  of  the 
judicial  power  of  the  United  States  can  best  be  consid- 
ered under  another  inquiry,  raised  by  the  further  objec- 
tion of  the  plaintiff,  that  the  effect  of  the  proceedings 
authorized  by  the  act  in  question  is  to  deprive  the  party 
against  whom  the  warrant  issues  of  his  liberty  and  prop- 
erty *  without  due  process  of  law,'  and  therefore  is  in 
conflict  with  the  fifth  article  of  the  amendment  of  the 
Constitution.    To  what  principles,  then,  are  we  to  resort 


§26  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1790-1866)     63 

to  ascertain  whether  this  process,  enacted  by  Congress, 
is  due  process  t     To  this  the  answer  must  be  twofold. 
We  must  examine  the  constitution  itself,  to  see  whether 
this  process  can  be  in  conflict  with  any  of  its  provisions. 
If  not  found  to  be  so,  we  must  look  to  those  settled  usages 
and  modes  of  proceeding  existing  in  the  common  and 
statute  law  of  England  before  the  emigration  of  our 
ancestors,  and  which  are  shown  to  have  been  imsuited 
to  their  civil  and  political  condition,  by  having  been  acted 
on  by  them  after  the  settlement  of  this  country.    We 
apprehended  there  has  been  no  period  since  the  establish- 
ment of  the  English  monarchy  when  there  has  not  been, 
by  the  law  of  the  land,  a  summary  method  for  the  recov- 
ery of  debts  due  to  the  crown,  and  especially  those  due 
from  receivers  of  the  revenues.     It  is  diflScult  at  this 
day  to  trace  with  precision  all  the  proceedings  had  for 
these  purposes  in  the  earliest  ages  of  the  common  law. 
That  they  were  summary  and  severe,  and  had  been  used 
for  purposes  of  oppression,  is  inferable  from  the  fact 
that  one  chapter  of  Magna  Carta  treats  of  their  restraint. 
It  is  certain  that  this  diversity  in  the  law  of  the  land 
between  pubUc  defaulters   and  ordinary  debtors  was 
understood  in  this  country  and  entered  into  the  legisla- 
tion of  the  colonies  and  provinces,  and  more  especially 
of  the  states,  after  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and 
before  the  formation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.    Tested  by  the  conunon  and  statute  law  of  Eng- 
land prior  to  the  emigration  of  our  ancestors,  and  by 
the  laws  of  many  of  the  states  at  the  time  of  the  adop- 
tion of  this  amendment,  the  proceedings  authorized  by 
the  act  of  1820  can  not  be  denied  to  be  due  process  of 
law,  when  applied  to  the  ascertainment  and  recovery  of 
balances  due  to  the  Government  from  a  Collector  of  Cus- 
toms, unless  there  exists  in  the  Constitution  some  other 
provision  which  restrains  Congress  from  authorizing 
such  proceedings.    For,  though  *  due  process  of  law '  gen- 
erally implies  and  includes  actor,  reus,  judex,  regular 
allegations,  opportunity  to  answer,  and  a  trial  according 


84  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  26 

to  some  settled  course  of  jndicial  proceedings  (2  Inst. 
47,  50;  Hoke  v.  Henderson,  4  Dev.  N.  C.  15;  Taylor  v. 
Porter,  4  Hill  146 ;  Van  Zandt  v.  Waddel,  2  Yerg.  260, 
599;  State  Bank  v.  Cooper,  Ibid.  599;  Jones'  Heirs  v. 
Perry,  10  Yerg.  59;  Green  v.  Briggs,  1  Curtis),  yet,  this 
is  not  universally  true.  There  may  be,  and  we  have  seen 
that  there  are,  cases  under  the  law  of  England  after 
Magna  Carta,  and  as  it  was  brought  to  this  country  and 
acted  on  here,  in  which  process,  in  its  nature  final,  issues 
against  the  body,  lands  and  goods  of  certain  public 
debtors  without  any  such  trial.'' 

Such  was  the  process  of  reasoning  by  which  the  court 
convinced  itself  that  the  case  of  Swartwout,  who  was 
found  to  be  indebted  to  the  Government  in  the  sum  of 
$1,374,119.65,  by  mere  administrative  officers  armed  with 
no  kind  of  judicial  power,  was  an  exception  to  the  gen- 
eral rule  of  due  process,  including  ^^actqr,  reus,  judex, 
regular  allegations,  opportunity  to  answer,  and  a  trial 
according  to  some  settled  course  of  judicial  proceed- 
ings," because  of  a  ** diversity  in  *the  law  of  the  land' 
between  public  defaulters  and  ordinary  debtors."  18 
How.  272.  In  other  words,  when  mere  auditing  officers 
ascertain  the  fact  that  a  collector  of  the  public  revenue  is 
a  defaulter,  and  issue  final  process  for  the  collection  of  the 
balance  so  ascertained  against  him,  he  is  ipso  facto  de- 
prived of  the  due  process  which  the  law  of  the  land  would 
otherwise  guarantee  him  in  any  other  case.  An  exhaustive 
examination  of  that  entirely  unfounded  assumption  will 
be  made  hereafter. 

§  27.  Withers  v.  Buckley— Conflict  of  state  law  with 
state  constitution.  In  this  case  the  court  held  that  it  had 
no  jurisdiction  either  to  declare  a  state  law  void,  as  in 
conflict  with  the  state  constitution;  nor  to  review  the 
judgments  or  decrees  of  state  courts  as  to  the  construc- 
tion of  state  laws, — the  state  legislation  involved  not 
being  repugnant  to  the  provisions  of  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, which  is  not  applicable  to  or  restrictive  of  state 


5  28  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1790-1866)     65 

laws.  The  Court  said  that  it  ^' never  has  and  does  not 
assume  the  right  to  pronounce  authoritatively  npon  the 
wisdom  or  justice  of  the  legislation  of  the  states,  when 
operating  upon  their  own  citizens  and  upon  subjects 
of  property  clearly  within  their  own  territory  and  appro- 
priate cognizance,  except  so  far  as  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  expressly  or  by  inevitable  implication, 
may  have  made  it  the  duty  of  tiiiis  court  to  control  the 
action  of  the  state  governments.  Nor  has  it  been  deemed 
the  province  of  this  court  to  abrogate  or  overrule  the 
interpretation  put  upon  their  own  respective  statutes  by 
the  courts  of  the  several  states,  whether  such  interpreta- 
tion had  reference  to  the  ordinary  rights  of  person  or 
property,  or  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  legislative 
powers  vested  by  the  constitutions  of  the  several  states, 
and  their  coincidence  with  acts  of  legislation  performed 
imder  the  delegation  of  those  powers.  These  are  the 
fmictions  wisely  and  necessarily  left  by  this  court 
tmtouched  in  the  state  tribunals,  the  assumption  of  which 
by  the  federal  judiciary,  as  it  would  embrace  every  mat- 
ter npon  which  the  government  of  the  states  could  operate, 
would,  in  effect,  amount  to  the  annihilation  of  those  gov- 
ermnents. ' '  20  How,  84.  It  was  also  held  that  as  the  state 
of  Mississippi  possessed  as  a  sovereign  the  inherent  right 
to  improve  her  navigable  rivers,  her  act  designed  for 
that  purpose  was  not  in  conflict  with  the  act  of  Congress, 
admitting  the  state  into  the  Union,  which  guaranteed  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  river. 

§28.  Ex-parte  MUligan  and  the  triumph  of  legality. 
What  may  be  called  the  first  epoch  in  the  history  of  the 
Fifth  Amendment  ended  in  1866,  with  a  notable  triumph 
for  "the  law  of  the  land''  in  Ex-parte  Milligan,  4  Wall.  2, 
a  case  in  which  the  material  facts,  as  stated  by  the  Court, 
were  as  follows:  *'0n  the  10th  day  of  May,  1865,  Lamb- 
din  P.  Milligan  presented  a  petition  to  the  Circuit  Court 
of  the  United  States  for  the  District  of  Indiana,  to  be 
discharged  from  an  alleged  unlawful  imprisonment.    The 

Due 


66  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  28 

case  made  by  the  petition  is  this :  Milligan  is  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States ;  has  lived  for  twenty  years  in  Indi- 
ana ;  and  at  the  time  of  the  grievances  complained  of  was 
not,  and  never  had  been,  in  the  military  service  of  the 
United  States.  On  the  5th  day  of  October,  1864,  while 
at  home,  he  was  arrested  by  order  of  General  Alvin  P. 
Hovey,  commanding  the  military  district  of  Indiana ;  and 
has  ever  since  been  kept  in  close  confinement.  On  the 
21st  day  of  October,  1864,  he  was  brought  before  a 
military  commission,  convened  in  Indianapolis,  by  order 
of  General  Hovey,  tried  on  certain  charges  and  specifi- 
cations; found  guilty,  and  sentenced  to  be  hanged,  and 
the  sentence  ordered  to  be  executed  on  Friday,  the  19th 
day  of  May,  1865.  On  the  2d  day  of  January,  1865,  after 
the  proceedings  of  the  military  commission  were  at  an 
end,  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  Indiana 
met  at  Indianapolis  and  impaneled  a  grand  jury,  who 
were  charged  to  inquire  whether  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  had  been  violated;  and  if  so,  to  make  present- 
ments. The  court  adjourned  on  the  27th  day  of  January, 
having,  prior  thereto,  discharged  from  further  service 
the  grand  jury,  who  did  not  find  any  bill  of  indictment 
or  make  any  presentment  against  Milligan  for  any  offense 
whatever;  and,  in  fact,  since  his  imprisonment,  no  bill 
of  indictment  has  been  found  or  presentment  made 
against  him  by  any  grand  jury  of  the  United  States. 
Milligan  insists  that  such  military  conunission  had  no 
jurisdiction  to  try  him  upon  the  charges  preferred,  or 
upon  any  charge  whatever;  because  he  was  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  and  of  the  state  of  Indiana,  and  had 
not  been,  since  the  commencement  of  the  late  Eebellion, 
a  resident  of  any  of  the  states  whose  citizens  were  arrayed 
against  the  Government,  and  that  the  right  to  trial  by 
jury  was  guaranteed  to  him  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  The  prayer  of  the  petition  was,  that  under 
the  act  of  Congress  approved  March  3d,  1863  (12  Stat. 
755),  entitled  *An  Act  Relating  to  Habeas  Corpus,  and 
Regulating  Judicial  Proceedings  in  Certain  Cases,'  he 


§  28    FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1790-1866)     67 

may  be  brought  before  the  court,  and  either  turned  over 
to  the  proper  civil  tribunal  to  be  proceeded  against 
according  to  the  law  of  the  land,  or  discharged  from  cus- 
tody altogether. ' ' 

Upon  that  state  of  facts  the  Supreme  Court  held  that 
the  act  of  Congress  approved  March  3, 1863,  **  relating  to 
habeas  corptis/^  conferred  jurisdiction  on  the  Circuit 
Court  of  Indiana  to  hear  such  a  case ;  that  a  proceeding 
by  habeas  corpus  is  a  cause,  as  that  term  is  used  in  sec- 
tion 25  of  the  Judiciary  act ;  that  the  said  Circuit  Court 
had  authority  to  certify  questions  in  a  proceeding  for  a 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  inquire  into  a  sentence  of  a  mili- 
tary commission;  and  that  it  had  jurisdiction  to  hear 
and  determine  thenoL 

Thus  in  possession  of  the  merits  of  the  case,  upon 
questions  properly  certified,  the  Supreme  Court  said: 
'  *  No  graver  question  was  every  considered  by  this  court, 
nor  one  which  more  nearly  concerns  the  rights  of  the 
whole  people,  for  it  is  the  birthright  of  every  American 
citizen,  when  charged  with  crime,  to  be  tried  and  pun- 
ished according  to  law.  These  precedents  inform  us  of 
the  extent  of  the  struggle  to  preserve  liberty  and  to 
relieve  those  in  civil  life  from  military  trials.  The  found- 
ers of  our  Government  were  familiar  with  the  history  of 
that  struggle;  and  secured  in  a  written  constitution 
every  right  which  the  people  had  wrested  from  power 
daring  the  contest  of  ages.  By  that  Constitution  and  the 
laws  authorized  by  it,  this  question  must  be  determined. 
The  provisions  of  that  instnmient  on  the  administration 
of  criminal  justice  are  too  plain  and  direct  to  leave  room 
for  misconstruction  or  doubt  of  their  true  meaning. 
Those  applicable  to  this  case  are  found  in  that  clause 
of  the  original  Constitution  which  says,  *That  the  trial 
of  all  crimes,  except  in  case  of  impeachment,  shall  be 
by  jury :  *  and  in  the  fourth,  fifth  and  sixth  articles  of  the 
amendments.  The  fourth  proclaims  the  right  to  be  secure 
in  person  and  effects  against  unreasonable  search  and 
seizure;  and  directs  that  a  judicial  warrant  shall  not 


68  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  28 

issue  ^without  proof  of  probable  canse  supported  by  oath 
or  affirmation.'  The  fifth  declares  Hhat  no  person  shall 
be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital  or  otherwise  infamous 
crime  unless  on  presentment  by  a  grand  jury,  except  in 
cases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia 
when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger, 
nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due 
process  of  law/  And  the  sixth  guarantees  the  right  of 
trial  by  jury,  in  such  manner  and  with  such  regulations 
that  with  upright  judges,  impartial  juries,  and  an  able 
bar,  the  innocent  will  be  saved  and  the  guilty  punished. 
It  is  in  these  words:  ^In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the 
accused  shall  enjby  the  right  to  a  speedy  and  public  trial 
by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  state  and  district  wherein  the 
crime  shall  have  been  committed,  which  district  shall 
have  been  previously  ascertained  by  law,  and  to  be 
informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation,  to  be 
confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him,  to  have  com- 
pulsory process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  favor,  and 
to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  defense. '  These 
securities  for  personal  liberty  thus  embodied,  were  such 
as  wisdom  and  experience  had  demonstrated  to  be  neces- 
sary for  the  protection  of  those  accused  of  crime.  And 
so  strong  was  the  sense  of  the  country  of  their  impor- 
tance, and  so  jealous  were  the  people,  that  these  rights, 
highly  prized,  might  be  denied  them  by  implication,  that 
when  the  original  Constitution  was  proposed  for  adop- 
tion it  encountered  severe  opposition;  but  for  the  belief 
that  it  would  be  so  amended  as  to  embrace  them,  it  would 
never  have  been  ratified. ' '  In  order  to  enforce  those  con- 
stitutional guarantees  in  Milligan's  favor,  the  court  held 
that  Congress  could  not  grant  the  power,  and  no  usage 
of  war  could  sanction  a  military  trial  for  any  offense 
whatever,  of  a  citizen  in  civil  life,  in  nowise  connected 
with  the  military  service,  in  a  state  where  federal  author- 
ity was  always  unopposed,  and  its  courts  always  open  to 
hear  criminal  accusations  and  redress  grievances;  that 
to  every  one  accused  of  crime,  who  is  not  attached  to  the 


§  29   FIFTH  AMENDiMENT— CONTINUED  (1790-1866)     69 

anny,  or  navy,  or  militia  in  actnal  service,  the  right  of 
trial  by  jury  is  preserved ;  that  martial  law  can  not  arise 
from  a  threatened  invasion;  that  the  necessity  must  be 
actual,  the  invasion  real,  such  as  actually  closes  the  courts 
and  overthrows  the  civil  administration ;  that  martial  law 
can  never  exist  where  the  courts  are  open  and  in  the 
unobstracted  exercise  of  their  jurisdiction;  that  a  mili- 
tary commission  has  no  jurisdiction  to  try  and  sentence 
one  not  a  resident  of  one  of  the  states  in  rebellion,  nor 
a  prisoner  of  war ;  that  Milligan  could  not  be  treated  as 
a  prisoner  of  war,  when,  at  the  time  of  his  arrest,  he  had 
been  living  in  Indiana  for  twenty  years,  he  never  hav- 
ing been  in  the  military  or  naval  service,  but  living  at  his 
home  when  arrested  by  the  military  power  of  the  United 
States,  imprisoned,  and  on  certain  criminal  charges  pre-' 
ferred  against  him,  tried,  convicted,  and  sentenced  to 
be  hanged  by  a  military  commission  organized  under  the 
military  conunander  of  the  military  district  of  Indiana; 
that  if  such  military  trial  of  Milligan  was  contrary  to 
law,  he  was  entitled,  on  the  facts  presented  by  this  peti- 
tion, to  be  discharged  from  custody  under  the  terms  of 
the  act  of  Congress  of  March  3, 1863,  and  it  was  so  certi- 
fied to  the  said  Circuit  Court.  Thus  the  right  to  trial 
by  jury  was  preserved  to  every  one  accused  of  crime,  who 
is  not  attached  to  the  army,  navy,  or  militia  in  actual 
service.  Martial  law  can  not  arise  from  a  threatened 
invasion ;  the  necessity  must  be  actual  and  present ;  the 
invasion  real,  such  as  effectually  closes  the  courts  and 
deposes  the  civil  administration. 

§29.  Ex-parte  McCardle— Military  commission,  habeas 
corpus.  Reference  should  here  be  made  to  the  closely 
related  case  of  McCardle,  who  was  arrested  and  held  in 
custody  in  the  state  of  Mississippi  by  a  military  com- 
mission organized  under  the  Reconstruction  acts,  upon 
charges  of  disturbing  the  public  peace,  and  inciting  to 
insurrection.  As  the  case  involved  the  validity  of  the 
Reconstruction  acts,  it  excited  universal  interest  and  was 


70  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  29 

argued  by  counsel  of  the  greatest  distinction.  In  Ex- 
parte  McCardle,  6  Wall.  318,  it  was  held  that  an  appeal 
lies  to  the  Supreme  Court,  from  the  judgment  of  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  in  cases  of  habeas  corpus;  and  that  every 
question  of  substance  which  the  Circuit  Court  could 
decide  upon  the  return  of  the  habeas  corpus,  including 
the  question  of  its  own  jurisdiction,  may  be  reviewed  on 
appeal  from  its  final  judgment.  From  the  statement 
of  the  case  it  appears  that*  *4n  obedience  to  the  writ, 
Major  General  Gillem,  on  the  21st  day  of  November, 
made  a  return  to  the  cause  of  imprisonment,  from  which 
it  appeared  that  McCardle  had  been  arrested  and  held 
in  custody  for  trial  by  a  military  commission  under  the 
alleged  authority  of  the  Reconstruction  acts.*'  In  Ex- 
parte  McCardle,  7  Wall.  506,  it  was  held  that,  as  the  act 
of  March,  1868,  took  away  the  jurisdiction  defined  by  the 
act  of  February,  1867,  of  the  Supreme  Court,  in  habeas 
corpus  cases,  no  judgment  could  be  rendered  in  a  suit, 
after  the  repeal  of  the  act  under  which  it  was  brought  and 
prosecuted.  In  the  opinion  in  which  the  validity  of  the 
repealing  act  was  sustained,  the  court,  speaking  through 
Chief  Justice  Chase,  said:  **It  is  quite  clear  that  this 
court  can  not  pronounce  judgment  in  this  case,  as  it  has 
no  longer  jurisdiction  of  the  appeal,  and  judicial  duty  is 
not  less  fitly  performed  by  declining  jurisdiction  than  in 
exercising  formally  that  which  the  Constitution  and  laws 
confer/' 


CHAPTER  n 

FIPTH  AMENDMENT  AND  ITS  CONSTBUCTION  (1866-1896) 

§30.  The  legal  tender  cases.    When  we  cross  the 
threshold  of  what  may  be  called  the  second  epoch  in  the 
historjr  of  the  construction  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  we 
enconnter  the  cases  in  question  in  which  the  guaranties 
given  by  that  amendment  entered  into  the  controversy 
as  a  vital  element    By  acts  of  Congress  of  February  25 
and  July  11,  1862,  and  March  3,  1863,  it  was  declared 
that  notes  issued  thereunder  should  be  **  lawful  money 
and  a  legal  tender  in  payment  of  all  debts,  public  and 
private,  vnthin  the  United  States,  except  duties  on  im- 
ports,** etc.    The  question  whether  Congress  really  pos- 
sessed the  power  to  make  anything  but  gold  or  silver  coin 
a  legal  tender  was  first  raised  in  Bronson  v.  Bodes,  7  Wall. 
229  (1868),  in  which  it  appeared  that  the  contract  sued 
on  stipulated  for  the  payment  of  gold  and  silver  coin, 
lawful  money  of  the  United  States,  with  interest  also  in 
com.    Upon  that  record  the  conclusion  was  reached  that 
express  contracts  to  pay  coin  dollars  could  only  be  sat- 
isfied by  payment  of  the  same ;  that  such  contracts  were 
not  such  *' debts  as  could  be  satisfied  by  the  tender  of 
United  States  notes.  ^*    Not  until  the  later  case  of  Hep- 
bum  V.  Griswold,  8  Wall.  603  (1869),  involving  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  provision  as  to  legal  tenders  applied  to 
debts  contracted  before,  as  well  as  after,  the  enactment, 
was  the  constitutionality  of  the  acts  in  question  presented 
for  consideration.    In  stating  the  constitutional  objec- 
tions, the  Court  said:    ** Another  provision  found  in  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  must  be  considered  in  this  connection. 
We  refer  to  that  which  ordains  that  private  property 
shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use  without  compensation. 

71 


72  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  30 

This  provision  is  kindred  in  spirit  to  that  which  forbids 
legislation  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts;  but, 
unlike  that,  it  is  addressed  directly  and  solely  to  the 
National  Government.  It  does  not,  in  terms,  prohibit 
legislation  which  appropriates  the  private  property  of 
one  class  of  citizens  to  the  use  of  another  class;  but  if 
such  property  can  not  be  taken  for  the  benefit  of  all, 
without  compensation,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how 
it  can  be  taken  for  the  benefit  of  a  part  without  violating 
the  spirit  of  the  prohibition.  But  there  is  another  pro- 
vision in  the  same  amendment,  which,  in  our  judgment, 
can  not  have  its  full  and  intended  effect  unless  construed 
as  a  direct  prohibition  of  the  legislation  which  we  have 
been  considering.  It  is  that  which  declares  that  ^no 
person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property, 
without  due  process  of  law/  It  is  not  doubted  that  all 
the  provisions  of  this  amendment  operate  directly  in 
limitation  and  restraint  of  the  legislative  powers  con- 
ferred by  the  Constitution.  The  only  question  is,  whether 
an  act  which  compels  all  those  who  hold  contracts  for 
the  payment  of  gold  and  silver  money  to  accept  in  pay- 
ment a  currency  of  inferior  value  deprives  such  persons 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law.  *  ^  After  affirm- 
ing the  doctrine  announced  in  Bronson  v.  Bodes,  7  Wall. 
229,  the  legal  tender  acts  were  held  to  be  unconstitutional 
so  far  as  they  applied  to  debts  contracted  before  their 
passage,  in  an  opinion  in  which  the  Court  said :  '  ^  It  has 
not  been  maintained  in  argument,  nor,  indeed,  would  any 
one,  however  slightly  conversant  with  constitutional  law, 
think  of  maintaining,  that  there  is  in  the  Constitution 
any  express  grant  of  legislative  power  to  make  any 
description  of  credit  currency  a  legal  tender  in  payment 
of  debts.  We  must  inquire,  then,  whether  this  can  be 
done  in  the  exercise  of  an  implied  power. '*  The  result 
of  a  searching  inquiry  in  that  direction  was  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  recognition  of  the  existence  of  such  an 
implied  power  would  carry  that  doctrine  beyond  any 
limits  heretofore  given  to  it. 


§31  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     73 

After  the  court  had  been  reorganized,  the  entire  legal 
tender  question  was  reopened  and  exhaustively  reargued 
in  Legal  Tender  Cases,  12  Wall.  457  (1870).  The  result 
was  a  judgment  which,  in  overruling  Hepburn  v.  Gris- 
wold,  8  WalL  603,  held  that  the  legal  tender  acts  were 
valid,  as  to  contracts  made  before  as  well  as  to  those 
made  since  their  passage.  In  the  opinion  delivered  by 
Justice  Story  the  comment  was  made  that  Hepburn  v. 
Griswold  **was  decided  by  a  divided  court,  and  by  a 
court  having  a  less  number  of  judges  than  the  law  then 
in  existence  provided  this  court  shall  have.  These  cases 
have  been  heard  before  a  full  court,  and  they  have 
received  our  most  careful  consideration.'* 

§  31.  Miller  v.  XT.  S.^— Right  of  confiscation.  The  real 
questioi^  at  issue  was  the  constitutionality  of  the  Confis- 
cation Act  of  July  17, 1862,  which  **made  it  the  duty  of 
the  President  to  cause  the  seizure  of  all  the  estates, 
property,  money,  stocks,  credits  and  effects  of  the  per- 
sons described,  and  in  order  to  secure  the  condemnation 
and  sale  of  such  property,  after  its  seizure,  directed 
judicial  proceedings,  in  rem^  to  be  instituted.  It  con- 
templated that  every  kind  of  property  mentioned  should 
be  seized  effectually  in  some  mode.  It  had  in  view  not 
only  tangible  property,  but  that  which  is  in  action.  It 
named  stock  and  credits;  but  it  gave  no  directions 
respecting  the  mode  of  seizure.  It  is,  therefore,  a  fair 
conclusion  that  the  mode  was  intended  to  be  such  as  is 
adapted  to  the  nature  of  the  property  directed  to  be 
seized,  and  in  use  in  courts  of  revenue  and  admiralty. 
.  .  .  As  described,  it  was  *An  Act  to  Suppress  Insur- 
rection, to  Punish  Treason  and  Eebellion,  to  Seize  and 
Confiscate  the  Property  of  the  Rebels,  and  for  Other 
Purposes.'  '*  Those  who  assailed  the  constitutionality 
of  the  act  relied  upon  those  parts  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
amendments  as  restrictions  upon  legislative  power  which 
provide  that  no  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  cap- 

1—11  Wall  208. 


74  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  31 

ital  or  otherwise  infamous  offense,  save  on  indictment  or 
presentment  by  a  grand  jury ;  that  no  person  shall  be  de- 
prived of  his  property,  without  due  process  of  law ;  that  in 
all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  be  entitled  to  a 
speedy  and  public  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  in  the  state 
or  district  in  which  the  offense  was  committed.  The 
court  held  that  in  confiscation  cases,  as  in  revenue  and 
admiralty  cases,  a  default  may  be  entered  establishing 
facts  averred  in  the  libel  or  information,  warranting  a 
decree  of  condemnation,  when  such  libel  or  information 
contains  the  necessary  averment;  that  after  default 
entered,  under  such  circumstances,  a  trial  by  jury  is 
unnecessary;  that  the  Confiscation  Act  in  question  was 
constitutional,  because  a  legitimate  exercise  of  the  war 
power ;  that  the  right  to  confiscate  enemy  property  exists 
in  full,  no  matter  whether  the  war  is  domestic  or  civil ; 
that  if  the  war  be  civil,  all  are  to  be  treated  as  enemies, 
who,  though  citizens  of  the  lawful  government,  are  resi- 
dents of  the  territory  under  the  dominion  of  the  power 
resisting  that  government. 

§  32.  Pumpelly  v.  Canal  Co.— Right  of  eminent  domain. 

In  such  a  case  the  primary  inquiry  always  is  whether 
the  use  is  public  or  not.  If  it  is  public,  private  property 
can  not  be  taken,  no  matter  how  large  the  professed 
compensation  may  be.  A  state  statute  was  held  to  be 
unconstitutional  which,  as  construed  by  the  highest  court 
of  the  state,  compelled  a  railroad  company  to  permit  a 
private  party  to  erect  an  elevator  upon  its  right  of  way, 
the  result  being  the  taking  of  private  property  for  a 
private  use.  In  the  Pumpelly  Case,  13  Wall.  166, 
the  court  determined  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
property  should  be  absolutely  taken,  in  the  narrowest 
sense  of  the  word,  in  order  to  bring  the  case  within  the 
protection  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.  In  its  opinion  the 
Court  says:  **But  there  are  numerous  authorities  to 
sustain  the  doctrine  that  a  serious  interruption  to  the 
common  and  necessary  use  of  property  may  be,  in  the 


§32   FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     75 

langaage  of  Mr.  Angell^  in  his  work  on  water-courses, 
equivalent  to  the  taking  of  it,  and  that  under  the  consti- 
tutional provisions  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  land 
should  be  absolutely  taken.  Ang.  Wat.,  §  465,  2 ;  Hooker 
V.  N.  Haven  and  Northampton  Co.,  14  Conn.  146 ;  Rowe  v. 
Granite  Bridge  Co.,  21  Pick.  344;  Canal  Appraisers  v. 
People,  17  Wend.  604;  Lackland  v.  North  Mo.  R.  R.  Co., 
31  Mo.  180 ;  Stevens  v.  Prop,  of  Middlesex  Can.,  12  Mass. 
466.  And  perhaps  no  state  court  has  given  more  fre- 
quent utterance  to  the  doctrine  that  overflowing  land  by 
backing  water  on  it  from  dams  built  below  is  within  the 
constitutional  provision,  than  Wisconsin.  In  numerous 
cases  of  this  kind  under  the  Mill  and  Mill-dam  Act  of 
that  State  this  question  has  arisen,  and  the  right  of  the 
mill-owner  to  flow  hack  the  water  has  been  repeatedly 
placed  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  taking  of  private 
property  for  public  use. ' ' 

Private  property  may  be  appropriated  to  the  uses  of 
government.  Federal  or  State;  or  to  the  uses  of  such 
local  governments  as  counties  or  municipalities.  Under 
that  general  authority  condemnations  are  made  for  navy 
yards,  forts,  armories,  light  houses,  custom  houses,  court 
houses,  post-offices,  public  schools,  alms-houses,  and  the 
like.  In  Kohl  v.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  367,  the  Court 
said:  '^But,  if  the  right  of  eminent  domain  exists  in 
the  Federal  Government,  it  is  a  right  which  may  be 
exercised  within  the  States,  so  far  as  is  necessary  to 
the  enjoyment  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  it  by  the 
Constitution.  In  Ableman  v.  Booth,  21  How.  523,  Chief 
Justice  Taney  described  in  plain  langaage  the  complex 
nature  of  our  government,  and  the  existence  of  two  dis- 
tinct and  separate  sovereignties  within  the  same  terri- 
torial space,  each  of  them  restricted  in  its  powers,  and 
each,  within  its  sphere  of  action  prescribed  by  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  independent  of  the  other. 
Neither  is  under  the  necessity  of  applying  to  the  other 
for  permission  to  exercise  its  lawful  powers.  Within 
its  own  sphere  it  may  employ  all  the  agencies  for  exert- 


76  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  32 

ing  them  which  are  appropriate  or  necessary  and  which 
are  not  forbidden  by  the  law  of  its  being.  When  the 
power  to  establish  post-offices  are  to  create  courts  within 
the  States  was  conferred  npon  the  Federal  Government, 
included  in  it  was  authority  to  obtain  sites  for  such 
offices  and  for  court-houses,  and  to  obtain  them  by  such 
means  as  were  known  and  appropriate.  The  right  of 
eminent  domain  was  one  of  those  means  well  known  when 
the  constitution  was  adopted,  and  employed  to  obtain 
land  for  public  uses.  Its  existence,  therefore,  in  the 
grantee  of  that  power,  ought  not  to  be  questioned.  The 
Constitution  itself  contains  an  implied  recognition  of  it 
beyond  what  may  justly  be  implied  from  the  express 
grant.  The  Fifth  Amendment  contains  a  provision  that 
private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use  without 
just  compensation.  What  is  that  but  an  implied  assertion 
that,  on  making  just  compensation,  it  may  be  taken  f ' '  In 
the  case  in  question,  involving  the  condemnation  of  land 
for  a  custom  house,  it  was  held  that  the  circuit  court 
had  jurisdiction  of  the  proceeding,  under  the  general 
grant  of  jurisdiction  made  by  the  Act  of  1789,  and  that 
such  court  was  not  required  to  allow  a  separate  trial 
to  each  owner  of  an  estate  or  interest  in  each  parcel. 

§  33.  Ex-parte  Wilson— Indictment  for  infamous  crime. 
In  the  case  in  question  it  was  held  that  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Fifth  Amendment  a  person  sentenced  to 
imprisonment  for  an  infamous  crime,  without  having 
been  presented  by  a  grand  jury,  is  entitled  to  be  dis- 
charged on  habeas  corpus.  In  the  course  of  its  opinion 
the  Court  says:  **The  leading  word  *  capital'  describing 
the  crime  by  its  punishment,  only  the  associated  words 
*or  other  infamous  crime'  must,  by  an  elementary  rule 
of  construction,  include  crimes  subject  to  any  infamous 
punishment,  even  if  they  should  be  held  to  include  also 
crimes  infamous  in  their  nature  independently  of  the 
punishment  affixed  to  them.  A  reference  to  the  history 
of  the  proposal  and  adoption  of  this  provision  of  the 


§33  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     77 

Constitution  confirms  this  conclusion.  It  had  its  origin 
in  one  of  the  Amendments  in  the  nature  of  a  Bill  of 
Bights,  recommended  by  the  Convention,  by  which  the 
State  of  Massachusetts  in  1788  ratified  the  original  Con- 
stitution, and  as  so  recommended  was  in  this  form :  ^  No 
person  shall  be  tried  for  any  crime,  by  which  he  may 
incur  an  infamous  punishment,  or  loss  of  life,  until  he 
be  first  indicted  by  a  grand  jury,  except  in  such  cases 
as  may  arise  in  the  government  and  regulation  of  the 
land  and  naval  forces. '  Journal  Massachusetts  Conven- 
tion, 1788  (ed.  1856)  80,  84,  87;  2  Elliott's  Debates,  177. 
As  introduced  by  Mr.  Madison  in  1789  at  the  first  ses- 
sion of  the  House  of  Bepresentatives  of  the  United 
States,  it  stood  thus :  ^  In  all  crimes  punishable  with  loss 
of  life  or  member,  presentment  or  indictment  by  a  grand 
jury  shall  be  an  essential  preliminary.'  Being  referred 
to  a  committee,  of  which  Mr.  Madison  was  a  member,  it 
was  reported  back  in  substantially  the  same  form,  in 
which  it  was  afterwards  approved  by  Congress  and  rati- 
fied by  the  States.  Annals  of  Congress,  435,  760.  Mr. 
Dane,  one  of  the  most  learned  lawyers  of  his  time,  and 
who  as  a  member  of  the  Continental  Congress  took  a 
principal  part  in  framing  the  Ordinance  of  1787  for  the 
government  of  the  Northwest  Territory,  assumes  it  as 
unquestionable  that  by  virtue  of  the  Amendment  of  the 
Constitution,  informations  'can  not  be  used  where  either 
capital  or  infamous  punishment  is  inflicted.'  7  Dane 
Abr.  280.  Judge  Cooley  has  expressed  a  similar  opinion. 
Cooley  Constitutional  Law,  291.  Within  the  last  fifteen 
years,  prosecutions  by  information  have  greatly  in- 
creased, and  the  general  current  of  opinion  in  the  Circuit 
and  District  Courts  has  been  towards  sustaining  them 
for  any  crime  a  conviction  of  which  would  not  at  common 
law  have  disqualified  the  convict  to  be  a  witness.  U.  S. 
V.  Shepard,  1  Abb.  U.  S.  431 ;  U.  S.  v.  Maxwell,  3  Dill. 
275;  U.  S.  V.  Block,  4  Sawy.  211 ;  U.  S.  v.  Miller,  3  Hughes 
553;  U.  S.  V.  Baugh,  4  Hughes  501;  U.  S.  v.  Yates,  6  Fed. 
Sep.  861;  U.  S.  v.  Field,  21  Blatchf.  330;  Ee  Wilson,  18 


78  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  33 

Fed.  33.  But,  for  the  reasons  above  stated^  having 
regard  to  the  object  and  the  terms  of  the  first  provision 
of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  as  well  as  to  the  history  of 
its  proposal  and  adoption,  and  to  the  early  understand- 
ing and  practice  under  it,  this  court  is  of  opinion  that 
the  competency  of  the  defendant,  if  convicted,  to  be  a 
witness  in  another  case,  is  not  the  true  test;  and  that 
no  person  can  be  held  to  answer,  without  presentment 
or  indictment  by  a  grand  jury,  for  any  crime  for  which 
an  infamous  punishment  may  be  imposed  by  the  court. 
This  case  was  distinguished  in  Bannon  v.  United 
States,  156  U.  S.  464,  in  which  the  court  held  that  the 
affixing  of  an  infamous  punishment  did  not  raise  the 
crime  to  the  grade  of  a  felony.  **  Neither  does  it  neces- 
sarily follow  that,  because  the  punishment  affixed  to  an 
offense  is  infamous,  the  offense  is  thereby  raised  to  the 
grade  of  felony.  The  word  *  felony'  was  used  at  com- 
mon law  to  denote  offenses  which  occasioned  a  forfeiture 
of  the  lands  or  goods  of  the  offender  to  which  capital 
or  other  punishment  might  be  superadded  according  to 
the  degree  of  guilt.  4  Black.  Com.  94,  95;  1  Eussell, 
Crimes,  42.  Certainly  there  is  no  intimation  to  the  con- 
trary in  Mackin's  Case  [117  U.  S.  348],  which  was  put 
wholly  upon  the  ground  that,  at  the  present  day,  impris- 
onment in  a  state  prison  or  penitentiary,  with  or  without 
hard  labor,  is  considered  an  infamous  punishment.  If 
such  imprisonment  were  made  the  sole  test  of  felonies, 
it  would  necessarily  follow  that  a  great  many  offenses 
of  minor  importance,  such  as  selling  distilled  liquors 
without  payment  of  the  special  tax,  and  other  analogous 
offenses  under  the  internal  and  customs  revenue  laws, 
would  be  treated  as  felonies,  and  the  persons  guilty  of 
such  offenses  stigmatized  as  felons.  The  cases  of  Ex- 
parte  Wilson,  114  U.  S.  417,  and  Mackin  v.  United  States, 
117  XT.  S.  348,  prescribe  no  new  definition  of  the  word 
felony,  but  secured  persons  accused  of  offenses  pun- 
ishable by  imprisonment  in  the   penitentiary  against 


§  34    FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     79 

prosecution  by  information,  and  without  a  preliminary 
investigation  of  their  cases  by  a  grand  jury. ' ' 

§34.  Boyd  v.  U.  S.''— Kinship  of  Fourth  and  Fifth 
amendments.  In  the  case  in,  question  the  court,  after 
declaring  that  it  does  not  require  actual  entry  upon  the 
premises  and  search  for  and  seizure  of  papers  to  consti- 
tute an  unreasonable  search  and  seizure  as  defined  by 
the  Fourth  Amendment,  held  that  a  proceeding  to  for- 
feit a  man 's  goods  for  an  offense  against  the  laws,  though 
civil  in  form,  no  matter  whether  in  rem  or  in  personam^ 
is  a  criminal  case  within  the  scope  of  that  part  of  the 
Fifth  Amendment  declaring  that  no  person  **  shall  be 
compeUed,  in  any  criminal  case,  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself/'  In  speaking  of  the  Fourth  Amendment,  the 
Court  said:  **The  case,  however,  which  will  always  be 
celebrated  as  being  the  occasion  of  Lord  Camden's  mem- 
orable discussion  of  the  subject,  was  that  on  Entick  v. 
Carrington,  reported  at  length  in  19  How.  St.  Tr.  1029. 
The  action  was  trespass  for  entering  the  plaintiff's 
dwelling  house  in  November,  1762,  and  breaking  open 
his  desks,  boxes,  etc.,  and  searching  and  examining  his 
papers.  The  jury  rendered  a  special  verdict,  and  the 
case  was  twice  solemnly  argued  at  the  bar.  Lord  Cam- 
den pronounced  the  judgment  of  the  Court  in  Michael- 
mas Term,  1765,  and  the  law  as  expounded  by  him  has 
been  regarded  as  settled  from  that  time  to  this,  and  his 
great  judgment  on  that  occasion  is  considered  as  one  of 
the  landmarks  of  English  liberty.  It  was  welcomed  and 
applauded  by  the  lovers  of  liberty  in  the  Colonies  as 
well  as  in  the  mother  country.  It  is  regarded  as  one 
of  the  permanent  monuments  of  the  British  Constitution, 
and  is  quoted  as  such  by  the  English  authorities  on  that 
subject  down  to  the  present  time.  As  every  American 
statesman,  during  our  revolutionary  and  formative 
period  as  a  nation,  was  undoubtedly  familiar  with  this 
monument  of  English  freedom,  and  considered  it  as  the 

2-116  V,  8.  616. 


80  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  S  3* 

true  and  intimate  expression  of  constitutional  law,  it 
may  be  confidently  asserted  that  its  propositions  were 
in  the  mind  of  those  who  framed  the  Fourth  Amendment 
to  the  Constitution,  and  were  considered  as  sufficiently 
explanatory  of  what  was  meant  by  unreasonable  searches 
and  seizures.  .  .  .  We  have  already  noticed  the  intimate 
relation  between  the  two  Amendments.  They  throw 
great  light  on  each  other.  For  the  *  unreasonable  searches 
and  seizures'  condemned  in  the  Fourth  Amendment  are 
almost  always  made  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  a 
man  to  give  evidence  against  himself,  which  in  criminal 
cases  is  condemned  in  the  Fifth  Amendment;  and  com- 
pelling a  man  'in  a  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself,'  which  is  condemned  in  the  Fifth  Amendment, 
throws  light  on  the  question  as  to  what  is  an  ^unrea- 
sonable search  and  seizure'  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Fourth  Amendment.  And  we  have  been  unable  to  per- 
ceive that  the  seizure  of  a  man's  private  books  and 
papers  to  be  used  in  evidence  against  him  is  substan- 
tially different  from  compelling  him  to  be  a  witness 
against  himself.  We  think  it  is  within  the  clear  intent 
and  meaning  of  those  terms.  We  are  also  clearly  of  the 
opinion  that  proceedings  instituted  for  the  purpose  of 
declaring  the  forfeiture  of  a  man's  property  by  reason 
of  offenses  committed  by  him,  though  they  may  be  civil 
in  form,  are  in  their  nature  criminal.  .  .  .  Though  the 
proceeding  in  question  is  divested  of  many  of  the  aggra- 
vating incidents  of  actual  search  and  seizure,  yet,  as 
before  said,  it  contains  their  substance  and  essence,  and 
effects  their  substantial  purpose.  It  may  be  that  it  is 
the  obnoxious  thing  in  its  mildest  and  least  repulsive 
form ;  but  illegitimate  and  unconstitutional  practices  get 
their  first  footing  in  that  way,  namely:  by  silent  ap- 
proaches and  slight  deviations  from  legal  modes  of  pro- 
cedure. This  can  only  be  obviated  by  adhering  to  the 
rule  that  constitutional  provisions  for  the  security  of  the 
person  and  property  should  be  liberally  construed." 
The  foregoing  case  was  cited  and  relied  upon  by  the 


S35  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     81 

dissenting  Justices  in  Brown  v.  Walker,  161  U.  S.  591, 
in  which  the  majority  held  that  immunity  granted  to  a 
witness  before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
deprives  him  of  the  right  to  refuse  to  answer.  The  bare 
possibility  that  by  a  disclosure  such  a  witness  may  be 
subjected  to  the  criminal  laws  of  some  other  sovereignty, 
and  that  he  may  be  subjected  to  the  expense  and  annoy- 
ance of  pleading  his  immunity  by  way  of  confession  and 
avoidance,  notwithstanding  the  law  has  given  him  immu- 
nity from  prosecution  therefor,  is  not  sufficient  to  justify 
his  refusal  to  answer  after  immunity  has  been  granted 
hint 

• 

§  35.  Spies  V.  IllmoiB  ^ — Jurisdiction  to  review  judg- 
ment of  highest  court  of  a  state  in  a  criminal  case.  Peti- 
tion for  writ  of  error  in  this  case,  after  citing  section 
709  of  Eevised  Statutes,  averred  that  the  following  fed- 
eral questions  were  involved  and  presented  by  it: 
"First,  Petitioners  challenged  the  validity  of  the  statute 
of  Illinois,  under  and  pursuant  to  which  the  trial  jury 
was  selected  and  impaneled,  on  the  ground  of  repug- 
nancy to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
state  court  sustained  the  validity  of  the  statute.  Second, 
Petitioners  asserted  and  claimed,  under  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States,  the  right,  privilege  and  inmiu- 
nity  of  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  and  the  decision  of 
the  state  court  was  against  the  right,  privilege  and 
immunity  so  asserted  and  claimed.  Third.  The  State  of 
Illinois  made,  and  the  state  court  enforced  against  peti- 
tioners, a  law  (the  aforesaid  statute)  whereby  the  priv- 
ileges and  immunities  of  petitioners  as  citizens  of  the 
United  States  were  abridged,  contrary  to  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  Fourth.  Upon 
their  trial  for  a  capital  offense,  petitioners  were  com- 
pelled by  the  state  court  to  be  witnesses  against  them- 
selves, contrary  to  the  provisions  of  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States,  which  declare  that  'No  person  shall 

a— 123  V.  8.  131. 
BneProeeBS — 6 


82  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  35 

be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself,'  and  that  'no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life 
or  liberty  without  due  process  of  law.'  Fifth.  That  by 
the  action  of  the  state  court  in  said  trial,  petitioners 
were  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  contrary 
to  the  guaranty  of  the  said  Fourteenth  Amendment  of 
the  Federal  Constitution."  In  dismissing  the  petition 
the  court  held  that  the  first  ten  amendments  were  intended 
solely  as  limitations  upon  the  Federal  government  and 
not  upon  those  of  the  states;  that  ''when,  as  in  this  case, 
application  is  made  to  us  on  the  suggestion  of  one  of 
our  number,  to  whom  a  similar  application  had  been 
previously  addressed,  for  the  allowance  of  a  writ  of  error 
to  the  highest  court  of  a  state  under  Section  709  of  the 
Eevised  Statutes,  it  is  our  duty  to  ascertain  not  only 
whether  any  question  reviewable  here  was  made  and 
decided  in  the  proper  court  below,  but  whether  it  is  of 
a  character  to  justify  us  in  bringing  the  judgment  here 
for  re-examination.  In  our  opinion,  the  writ  ought  not 
to  be  allowed  by  the  court,  if  it  appears  upon  the  face 
of  the  record  that  the  decision  of  the  federal  question 
which  is  complained  of  was  so  plainly  right  as  not  to 
require  argument,  and  especially  if  it  is  in  accordance 
with  our  well  considered  judgments  in  similar  cases;" 
that  when  the  application  is  based  on  the  ground 
that  a  statute  of  a  state  as  construed  by  the  state  court 
deprived  petitioners  of  a  trial  by  an  impartial  jury,  this 
court  will  consider  only  the  rulings  on  the  challenges  to 
the  jurors  who  actually  sat  at  the  trial;  disallowance 
of  challenge  does  not  prejudice  defendants  who  have  per- 
emptory challenges  remaining;  a  right  to  challenge  is 
right  to  reject,  not  to  select  jurors ;  that  where  the  chal- 
lenge is  on  the  ground  that  the  juror  had  formed  an 
opinion,  it  must  appear  clearly  that  upon  the  evidence, 
the  trial  court  should  have  found  that  he  had  formed 
such  an  opinion  that  he  could  not  be  considered  in  law 
impartial ;  that  a  statute  is  constitutional  which  provides 
that  a  juror  shall  not  be  disqualified  simply  by  reading 


§35   FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     83 

newspaper  articles ;  that  it  could  not  be  said  that  the  state 
had  unlawfully  denied  a  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  to 
one  accused  of  crime,  when  it  appeared  upon  the  trial 
that  a  part  of  the  jurors  had  formed .  opinions  based 
npon  newspaper  articles  concerning  the  truth  of  which 
they  had  expressed  no  opinion  after  they  had  stated  on 
oath  that  they  could  try  the  case  upon  the  evidence  pre- 
sented, regardless  of  such  opinion;  that  the  plea  that 
the  defendants,  who  were  foreign  bom,  were  denied  by 
the  trial  court  rights  guaranteed  by  treaty  can  not  be 
heard  for  the  first  time  in  this  court;  that  the  extent 
and  character  of  the  cross  examination  to  which  the 
accused  subjects  himself  when  he  appears  as  a  witness 
m  his  own  behalf,  is  purely  a  question  of  state  law ;  that 
the  objection  that  the  defendants  were  not  actually  pres- 
ent in  the  state  court  when  sentence  was  pronounced  can 
not  be  made  for  the  first  time  in  this  court,  when  the 
record  attests  the  fact  that  they  were  present;  that  an 
objection,  not  made  in  the  court  below,  to  the  use  in 
evidence  of  a  letter  on  the  ground  that  it  was  obtained 
by  an  unlawful  search  and  seizure,  can  not  be  heard  for 
the  first  time  in  this  court,  that  to  give  this  court  juris- 
diction by  reason  of  the  denial  by  a  state  court  of  any 
right  or  immunity  set  up  under  the  Federal  Constitution, 
it  must  appear  from  the  record  that  such  pght  or 
inmmnity  was  set  up  in  such  court,  at  the  time  and  in  the 
manner  which  the  law  directs. 

In  this  case  the  contention  was  made  that  the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  embrace 
the  rights  protected  by  the  first  eight  amendments. 
While  the  court  did  not  deem  it  necessary  to  pass  upon 
that  contention  it  referred  to  in  this  way:  **It  was  con- 
tended, however,  in  argument  that '  though  originally  the 
first  ten  amendments  were  adopted  as  limitations  on  fed- 
eral power,  yet  in  so  far  as  they  secure  and  recognize 
fnndamental  rights — common-law  rights — of  the  man, 
they  make  them  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  man  as 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  can  not  now  be 


84  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  35 

abridged  by  a  state  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
In  other  words,  while  the  ten  amendments  as  limitations 
on  power  only  apply  to  the  Federal  Government,  and  not 
to  the  States,  yet  in  so  far  as  they  declare  or  recognize 
rights  of  persons,  these  rights  are  theirs,  as  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  to  such 
rights  limits  state  power,  as  the  ten  amendments  had  lim- 
ited federal  power.'  It  is  also  contended  that  the  pro- 
vision of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  which  declares  that 
no  State  shall  deprive  *any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property  without  due  process  of  law, '  implies  that  every 
person  charged  with  crime  in  a  State  shall  be  entitled  to 
a  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  and  shall  not  be  compelled  to 
testify  against  himself. '* 

§36.  Counselman  v.  Hitchcock  ^— Broad  coiiBtruction 
of  Fifth  Amendment  in  favor  of  refusal  to  testify.  In 
the  case  in  question  it  was  held  that  the  privilege  of  the 
Fifth  Amendment  extends  to  any  criminal  proceeding 
before  a  grand  jury,  that  the  privilege  given  to  every  one 
by  the  Constitution,  that  he  shall  not  be  compelled  to  be 
a  witness  against  himself  in  any  criminal  case,  is  not 
taken  away  by  section  860  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  which 
provides  that  the  evidence  of  a  person  shall  not  be  used 
against  him  in  any  proceeding  for  a  crime,  or  penalty, 
or  forfeiture.  The  court  said:  **It  is  broadly  con- 
tended on  the  part  of  the  appellee  that  a  witness  is  not 
entitled  to  plead  the  privilege  of  silence,  except  in  a 
criminal  case  against  himself;  but  such  is  not  the  lan- 
guage of  the  Constitution.  Its  provision  is  that  no  per- 
son shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness 
against  himself.  This  provision  must  have  a  broad  con- 
struction in  favor  of  the  right  which  it  was  intended  to 
secure.  The  matter  under  investigation  by  the  grand 
jury  in  this  case  was  a  criminal  matter,  to  inquire  whether 
there  had  been  a  criminal  violation  of  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act.   If  Counselman  had  been  guilty  of  the  matters 

4—142  U.  S.  647. 


§37  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)      85 

inquired  of  in  the  questions  which  he  refused  to  answer, 
he  himself  was  liable  to  criminal  prosecution  under  the 
Act  The  case  before  the  grand  jury  was,  therefore,  a 
criminal  case.  The  reason  given  by  Counselman  for  his 
refusal  to  answer  the  questions  was  that  his  answer  might 
tend  to  criminate  him,  and  showed  that  his  apprehension 
was  that,  if  he  answered  the  questions  truly  and  fully  (as 
he  was  bound  to  do  if  he  should  answer  them  at  all),  the 
answers  might  show  that  he  had  committed  a  crime 
agaiQst  the  Literstate  Commerce  Act,  for  which  he  might 
be  prosecuted.  His  answers,  therefore,  would  be  testi- 
mony against  himself,  and  he  would  be  compelled  to  give 
them  in  a  criminal  case.  It  is  impossible  that  the  mean- 
ings of  the  constitutional  provision  can  only  be,  that  a 
person  shall  not  be  compelled  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself  in  a  criminal  prosecution  against  himself.  It 
would  doubtless  cover  such  cases;  but  it  is  not  limited 

•  

to  them.  The  object  was  to  insure  that  a  person  should 
not  be  compelled,  when  acting  as  a  witness  in  any  investi- 
gation, to  give  testimony  which  might  tend  to  show  that 
he  himself  had  committed  a  crime.  The  privilege  is  lim- 
ited to  criminal  matters,  but  it  is  as  broad  as  the  mischief 
against  which  it  seeks  to  guard. ' ' 

§  37.  Simmons  v.  U.  S.' — ^Right  of  judge  to  discharge 
jtny  during  trial  and  to  express  opinion  on  facts.  In  the 
case  in  question  it  was  held  that  the  court  may  discharge 
the  jury  during  trial  when  it  appears  that  by  reason  of 
facts,  existing  when  the  jurors  were  sworn  but  not  then 
known  to  the  court,  or  by  reason  of  influences  to  which  the 
jurors  were  subjected  during  the  trial,  they  or  any  of  them 
were  imbued  with  such  prejudices  as  to  render  them  in- 
capable of  impartiality  between  the  government  and  the 
acensed ;  that  when  a  jury  in  a  criminal  case  is  discharged 
under  such  circumstances,  the  defendant  may  be  put  on 
trial  before  another  jury,  without  being  subject  to  the 
double  jeopardy  forbidden  by  the  Fifth  Amendment.    In 

5-142  U.  8.  148. 


86  DUB  PBOCESS  OP  LAW  R  S7 

the  words  of  the  court :  * '  The  only  other  exception  argue*  i 
is  to  the  statement  made  by  the  judge  to  the  second  jury, 
in  denying  their  request  to  be  discharged  without  having 
agreed  upon  a  verdict,  that  he  regarded  the  testimony  as 
convincing.  But  at  the  outset  of  his  charge  he  had  told 
them,  in  so  many  words,  that  the  facts  were  to  be  decided 
by  the  jury,  and  not  by  the  court.  And  it  is  so  well 
settled,  by  a  long  series  of  decisions  of  this  court,  that 
the  judge  presiding  at  a  trial,  civil  or  criminal,  in  any 
court  of  the  United  States,  is  authorized,  whenever  he 
thinks  it  will  assist  the  jury  in  arriving  at  a  just  conclu- 
sion, to  express  to  them  his  opinion  upon  the  questions 
of  fact  which  he  submits  to  their  determination,  that  it  is 
only  necessary  to  refer  to  two  or  three  recent  cases  in 
which  the  judge  *s  opinion  on  matters  of  fact  was  quite 
as  plainly  and  strongly  expressed  to  the  jury  as  in  the 
case  at  bar.  Vickburg  and  M.  B.  Co.  v.  Putnam,  118 
U.  S.  545 ;  United  States  v.  Philadelphia  and  E.  E.  Co., 
123  U.  S.  113;  Lovejoy  v.  United  States,  128  U.  S.  171/' 


§  38.  Tesler  v.  Harbor  Line  Oommissionen  ^ — ^Locating 
harbor  lines.  The  basic  question  involved  the  taking  of 
private  property  for  public  use  without  just  compensa- 
tion, forbidden  by  the  Fifth  Amendment,  was  blended,  and 
perhaps  confused  with  the  claim  of  a  denial  of  the  due 
process  provided  by  the  Fourteenth.  The  court  said: 
**By  the  16th  section  of  article  I  of  the  constitution  of 
Washington  no  private  property  can  be  taken  or  damaged 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  The  similar 
Umitation  upon  the  power  of  the  general  government, 
expressed  in  the  Fifth  Amendment,  is  to  be  read  with 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  prohibiting  the  states  from 
depriving  any  person  of  property  without  due  process 
of  law,  and  from  denying  to  any  person  within  their  juris- 
diction the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  amendment 
undoubtedly  forbids  any  arbitrary  deprivation  of  life, 
liberty,  or  property,  and  secures  equal  protection  to  all 

e— 146  U.  8.  646. 


§39  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     87 

under  like  circumstances  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  rights. 
Assuming  onr  jurisdiction  to  revise  the  judgment  of  a 
state  tribunal  upholding  a  law  authorizing  the  taking  of 
private  property  without  compensation  to  be  unques- 
tionable (Kaukauna  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Green  Bay  and 
M.  Canal  Co.,  142  U.  S.  254, 269),  we  can  not  accede  to  the 
position  that  the  action  of  the  Harbor  Line  Commission- 
ers,  in  locating  the  harbor  line  and  filing  the  plat,  would 
take  any  of  relator 's  property,  or  so  injuriously  affect  it 
as  to  come  within  the  constitutional  inhibition.  The  filing 
of  maps  of  definite  location  in  the  exercise  of  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  furnishes  no  analogy.  The  design  of 
the  state  law  is  to  prohibit  the  encroachment  by  private 
individuals  and  cooperations  on  navigable  waters,  and  to 
secure  a  uniform  water  front;  and  it  does  not  appear 
from  relator's  application  that  the  defendants  have 
threatened  in  any  manner  to  disturb  him  in  his  posses- 
sion, nor  that  which  is  proposed  to  be  done  tends  to  pro- 
duce that  effect.  The  consequences  which  he  deprecates 
were  too  remote  to  form  the  basis  of  decision.*' 

§  39.  Shoemaker  v.  U.  S. — ^Right  of  eminent  domain  in 
the  District  of  Columbia.  In  this  case,  147  IT.  S.  282,  as  in 
all  others  arising  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  the  constitu- 
tional aspects  of  the  question  of  eminent  domain  are  gov- 
erned by  the  Fifth  Amendment.  Under  such  conditions  it 
was  held  that  the  courts  must  determine  the  question  of 
the  public  use,  the  legislature  the  amount  of  the  property 
to  be  taken.  * '  We  are  not  called  apon, ' '  say  the  court,  * '  by 
the  duties  of  this  investigation,  to  consider  whether  the 
alleged  restriction  on  the  power  of  eminent  domain  in  the 
general  government,  when  exercised  within  the  territory 
of  a  state,  does  really  exist,  or  the  extent  of  such  restric- 
tion, for  we  are  here  dealing  with  an  exercise  of  the 
power  within  the  District  of  Columbia  over  whose  terri- 
tory the  United  States  possess,  not  merely  the  political 
authority  that  belongs  to  them  as  respects  the  states  of 
the  Union,  but  likewise  the  power  Ho  exercise  exclusive 


88  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  39 

legislation  m  ail  cases  whatsoever  over  such  district/ 
U.  S.  Const.  Art.  I,  58.  d.  17.*^  In  the  later  case  of 
Bauman  v.  Eoss,  167  U.  S.  548,  it  was  said:  "By  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  the  estimate  of  the  just 
compensation  for  property  taken  for  the  pnblic  nse, 
under  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  is  not  required  to 
be  made  by  a  jury ;  but  may  be  intrusted  by  Congress  to 
commissioners  appointed  by  a  court  or  by  the  executive, 
or  to  an  inquest  consisting  of  more  or  fewer  men  than  an 
ordinary  jury.  Curtiss  v.  Georgetown  and  A.  Tump.  P. 
Co.,  6  Cranch,  233 ;  Secombe  v.  Milwaukee  &  S.  P.  B.  Co., 
23  Wall.  108, 117, 118 ;  United  States  v.  Jones,  109  U.  S. 
513,  519 ;  Shoemaker  v.  United  States,  147  U.  S.  282,  300, 
301;  Long  Island  Water  Supply  Co.  v.  Brooklyn,  166 
U.  S.  685.'^  And  in  Parsons  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
170  U.  S.  45,  it  was  held  *'that  it  was  competent  for  Con- 
gress to  create  a  general  system  to  store  water  and  fur- 
nish it  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  District  and  to  prescribe 
the  amount  of  the  assessment  and  the  method  of  its  col- 
lection ;  and  that  the  plaintiff  in  error  can  hot  be  heard 
to  complain  that  he  was  not  notified  of  the  creation  of 
such  a  system  or  consulted  as  to  the  probable  cost  thereof. 
He  is  presumed  to  have  notice  of  these  general  laws 
regulating  such  matters. ' '  Thus  the  Supreme  Court  has 
settled  the  fact  that  when  Congress  acts  directly,  it  may 
determine  the  district  benefited  by  a  public  improvement, 
and  apportion  absolutely  the  expense  among  the  parcels 
of  land  included  in  it.  As  such  an  act  concluded  both  the 
question  of  the  necessity  of  the  work,  and  the  benefits  aw 
against  the  abutting  property,  such  questions  are  not 
open  to  review  by  the  Courts  upon  the  petition  of  any 
property  holder.  In  Wilson  v.  Lambert,  168  U.  S.  611, 
**  while  the  general  power  to  legislate  exclusively  for  the 
District  of  Columbia  is  not  disputed,  nor  the  competency 
of  Congress,  in  the  exercise  of  that  power,  to  establish  a 
public  park,  it  is  contended  that  under  the  limitation  upon 
that  power  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment,  protecting 
the  citizen  from  being  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  prop- 


140  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     89 

erty  without  due  process  of  law,  Congress,  when  erecting 
a  work  which  is  expressly  declared  to  be  perpetually 
dedicated  to  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  should  defray  the  cost  thereof  out  of  the 
funds  of  the  entire  nation.  It  is  further  contended  in  the 
brief  of  the  appellees  that  a  tax  for  raising  a  fund  for 
snch  a  purpose  to  be  valid  ought  to  be  levied  and  appor- 
tioned as  a  direct  tax  among  the  several  states,  according 
to  their  respective  numbers. ' '  It  was  held  however,  in  the 
face  of  that  contention,  that  special  assessments  for  a 
public  park  in  the  District  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  people 
of  the  United  States  are  not  unconstitutional  as  a  depri- 
vation of  property  under  the  Amendment  in  question, 
upon  the  theory  that  the  cost  should  be  defrayed  *  *  out  of 
the  funds  of  the  entire  nation. ' ' 

It  was  held  in  Stoutenburgh  v.  Hennick,  129  U.  S.  141, 
that  while  Congress  has  express  power  to  exercise  exclu- 
sive legislation  over  the  District  of  Columbia,  it  can  not, 
in  creating  such  District  a  body  corporate  for  municipal 
purposes,  delegate  its  exclusive  power  to  legislate  for 
sneh  District.  It  can  authorize  such  subordinate  body  to 
exercise  municipal  powers  only. 

§40.  Thorington  v.  Montgomery— Fifth  Amendment 
does  not  embrace  questions  of  state  procedure.  After 
saying  in  this  case,  147  U.  S.  490:  *'We  can  not  find  that 
any  Federal  question  was  raised  in  the  proceedings  in  the 
chancery  court.  The  only  error  assigned  in  the  Supreme 
court  was  that  'the  court  below  erred  in  rendering  the  final 
decree  made  by  it  dismissing  appellant's  bill  and  in  over- 
rulmg  objections  to  testimony. '  It  is  stated  in  the  writ  of 
error  that  in  the  cause  *  between  Sallie  G.  Thorington,  ap- 
pellant, and  the  city  council  of  Montgomery,  appellee, 
wherein  was  drawn  in  question  appellants  right  under 
Article  V  of  the  amended  constitution  of  the  United 
States  to  have  the  testimony  of  her,  the  said  Sallie  G., 
which  had  been  taken  under  a  duly  issued  commission  in 
that  behalf,  read  in  her  behalf  on  the  trial  of  the  said 


90  DUE,  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  40 

cause,  and  the  decision  was  against  her  right  and  claim 
to  be  so  heard,  a  manifest  error  hath  happened,  etcf — 
the  Court  held  that  a  decision  by  the  state  court  upon  a 
matter  of  state  practice  did  not  draw  in  question  any 
right  plaintiff  had  under  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  that  no  Federal  ques- 
tion was  raised  by  the  refusal  of  the  State  court  to  set 
aside  the  submission  of  a  suit  in  equity  in  order  to  give 
plaintiff  time  to  get  the  deposition  of  witnesses,  where 
there  had  been  ample  time  to  have  done  so  before  the 
submission.  In  Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175  U.  S.  172,  it 
was  said:  *'The  state  has  full  control  over  the  pro- 
cedure of  its  courts,  both  in  civil  and  criminal  cases,  sub- 
ject only  to  the  qualification  that  such  procedure  must 
not  work  a  denial  of  fundamental  rights,  or  conflict  with 
specific  and  applicable  provisions  of  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution. Ex  parte  Eeggel,  114  U.  S.  642 ;  Iowa  C.  E.  Co.  v. 
Iowa,  160  U.  S.  389;  Chicago,  B.  and  Q.  E.  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
166U.  S.  226." 

§  41.  Monongahela  Nav.  Co.  v.  U.  S.^ — ^Eminent  domain 
and  full  equivalent  under  Fifth  Amendment.  In  this 
case  it  was  held  that  apart  from  the  benefit  derived  in 
common  with  the  public,  the  Amendment  in  question 
guarantees  to  the  owner  a  full  and  perfect  equivalent  for 
the  property  taken ;  that  as  the  measure  of  compensation 
is  a  judicial  question  the  court  may  disregard  a  direction 
of  Congress  as  to  the  method  by  which  such  compensation 
shall  be  ascertained;  that  the  right  of  the  Federal  gov- 
ernment, under  the  power  to  regulate  commerce,  to  con- 
demn and  appropriate  a  lock  on  the  Monongahela  river,  is 
subject  to  the  provision  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  which 
provides  that  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for 
public  use  without  just  compensation ;  that  such  compen- 
sation includes  not  only  the  value  of  the  tangible  prop- 
erty, but  also  the  value  of  the  franchise  to  take  tolls.  The 
Court  said:    *'The  language  used  in  the  Fifth  Amend- 

7—148  u.  a  312. 


§41   FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     91 

ment  in  respect  to  this  matter  is  happily  chosen.  The 
entire  Amendment  is  a  series  of  negations,  denials  of 
right  or  power  in  the  government,  the  last,  the  one  in 
point  here,  being  *Nor  shall  private  property  be  taken 
for  public  nse  without  just  compensation.'  The  noun 
'compensation,'  standing  by  itself,  carries  the  idea  of 
an  equivalent.  Thus  we  speak  of  damages  by  way  of 
compensation,  or  compensatory  damages,  as  distin- 
guished from  punitative  damages,  the  former,  being  the 
equivalent  of  the  injury  done,  and  the  latter  imposed  by 
way  of  punishment.  So  that  if  the  adjective  *just'  had 
been  omitted,  and  the  provision  was  simply  that  prop- 
erty should  not  be  taken  without  compensation,  the  natu- 
ral import  of  the  language  would  be  that  the  compensa- 
tion should  be  the  equivalent  of  the  property.  And  this 
is  made  emphatic  by  the  adjective  *just.'  There  can,  in 
view  of  the  combination  of  those  two  words,  be  no  doubt 
that  the  compensation  must  be  a  full  and  perfect  equiva- 
lent for  the  property  taken.  And  this  just  compensation, 
it  will  be  noticed  is  for  the  property  and  not  to  the  owner. 
Every  other  clause  in  this  Fifth  Amendment  is  personal. 
'No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital,  or  other- 
wise infamous  crime,'  etc.  Instead  of  continuing  that 
form  of  statement,  and  saying  that  no  person  shall  be 
deprived  of  his  property  without  *  just  compensation,'  the 
personal  element  is  left  out,  and  the  *  just  compensation,' 
is  to  be  a  full  equivalent  for  the  property  taken.  This 
excludes  the  taking  into  account  as  an  element  in  the  com- 
pensation any  supposed  benefit  that  the  owner  may 
receive  in  common  with  all  from  the  public  uses  to  which 
his  private  property  is  appropriated,  and  leaves  it  to 
stand  as  a  declaration  that  no  private  property  shall  be 
appropriated  to  public  uses  unless  a  full  and  exact  equiva- 
lent for  it  be  returned  to  the  owner.  We  do  not  in  this 
refer  to  the  case  where  only  a  portion  of  a  tract  is  taken, 
or  express  any  opinion  on  the  vexed  question  as  to  the 
extent  to  which  the  benefit  or  injuries  to  the  portion  taken 
may  be  brought  into  consideration.  *' 


92  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  42 

§  42.  Fong  Tne  Ting  v.  U.  S.^— Right  of  the  sovereign 
to  deport  foreigners  already  domiciled.  Justice  Brewer 
in  his  dissenting  opinion  said:  *'I  rest  my  dissent  on 
three  propositions :  Firsts  that  the  persons  against  whom 
the  penalties  of  Section  6  of  the  Act  of  1892  are  directed 
are  persons  lawfully  residing  within  the  United  States; 
secondly,  that  as  such  they  are  within  the  protection  of 
the  Constitution,  and  secured  its  guaranties  against 
oppression  and  wrong;  and  third,  that  section  6  deprives 
them  of  liberty  and  imposes  punishment  without  due 
process  of  law,  and  in  disregard  of  constitutional  guar- 
anties, especially  those  found  in  the  4th,  5th,  6th,  and  8th 
articles  of  the  Amendments, ' '  Justice  Field,  in  his  dis- 
senting opinion,  said :  '  *  The  citation  from  the  opinion  in 
the  recent  case  of  Ekiu  v.  United  States  (the  Japanese 
case)  142  U.  S.  651 ;  the  citation  from  the  opinion  in  Chae 
Chan  Ping  v.  United  States  (the  Chinese  exclusion  case) 
130  U.  S.  603,  604,  606;  the  citation  in  the  case  before 
the  judiciary  committee  of  the  Privy  Council — all  have 
reference  to  the  exclusion  of  Foreigners  from  entering  the 
country.  They  do  not  touch  upon  the  question  of  deport- 
ing them  from  the  country  after  they  have  been  domi- 
ciled vnthin  it  by  the  consent  of  its  government,  which 
is  the  real  question  in  this  case.**  Chief  Justice  Fuller, 
in  his  dissenting  opinion,  said:  '^I  entertain  no  doubt 
that  the  provisions  of  5th  and  14th  amendments,  which 
forbid  that  any  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty, 
or  property  without  due  process  of  law,  are  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Mr.  Justice  Matthews  already  quoted  by  my 
brother  Brewer,  *  universal  in  their  application  to  all  per- 
sons within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  without  regard  to 
any  differences  of  race,  of  color,  or  of  nationality, '  and 
although  in  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  366,  only  the 
validity  of  a  municipal  ordinance  was  involved  the  rule 
laid  down  as  much  applies  to  Congress  under  the  Fifth 
Amendment  as  to  the  States  under  the  Fourteenth.  * '  The 
precise  question  at  issue,  therefore,  was  this:  Had  the 

8—149  U.  S.  698. 


1 42  FIFTH  AMEND>IENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     93 

Congress  of  the  United  States,  tinder  the  limitation  of 
due  process  imposed  upon  it  by  the  Fifth  Amendment, 
the  constitutional  right  to  authorize  the  exclusion  of  for- 
eigners already  domiciled  here  under  the  provisions  of 
section  6  of  the  Act  of  May  5, 1892.  Justice  Brewer,  in 
his  dissenting  opinion,  supported  the  negative  in  this 
way;  "Section  6  deprives  of  *life,  liberty,  and  property 
witiiout  due  process  of  law.'  It  imposes  punishment 
without  trial,  and  punishment  cruel  and  severe.  It  places 
the  liberty  of  one  individual  subject  to  the  unrestrained 
control  of  another.  Notice  its  provisions :  It  first  com- 
mands all  to  register.  He  who  does  not  register  violates 
that  law,  and  may  be  punished ;  and  so  the  section  goes 
on  to  say  that  one  who  has  not  complied  with  its  require- 
ments, and  has  no  certificate  of  residence,  ^  shall  be 
deemed  and  adjudged  to  be.  unlawfully  within  the  United 
States,'  and  then  it  imposes  as  a  penalty  his  deportation 
from  the  country.  Deportation  is  punishment.  It 
involves  first  an  arrest,  a  deprival  of  liberty ;  and,  second 
a  removal  from  home,  from  family,  from  business,  from 
property.  In  Bapalje  and  Lawrence's  Law  Dictionary, 
p.  109,  ^Banishment'  is  thus  defined:  ^A  punishment  by 
forced  exile,  either  for  years  or  for  life ;  inflicted  princi- 
pally upon  political  offenders,  *  transportation'  being  the 
word  used  to  express  a  similar  punishment  of  ordinary 
criminals. '  In  4  Blackstone,  377,  it  is  said.  ^  Some  pun- 
ishments consist  in  exile  or  banishment  of  the  realm,  or 
transportation*'  In  Vattel  we  find  that  'banishment  is 
only  applied  to  condenmation  in  due  course  of  law. '  Vat- 
tel's  Law  of  Nations,  288,  note." 

Despite  such  objections  the  majority  of  the  Court, 
speaking  through  Justice  Gray  held  that  the  United 
States  as  an  independent  sovereign  is  vested  by  interna- 
tional law  with  full  power  to  exclude  or  expel  aliens; 
that  such  power  is  vested  in  the  political  department  of 
the  government,  subject  to  regulation  by  act  of  Congress 
or  by  treaty ;  that  such  power  is  to  be  carried  into  effect 
by  the  executive,  subject  to  the  right  of  the  judiciary  to 


94  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  42 

intervene  when  required  to  do  so  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Constitution,  a  statute  or  treaty ;  that  such  a  power  when 
asserted  through  a  constitutional  Act  of  Congress  must 
be  made  to  override  an  earlier  treaty;  that  Chinese 
laborers  resident  in  this  country  continue  to  be  aliens, 
and  as  such  remain  subject  to  the  authority  of  Congress 
to  expel  them  or  to  order  them  to  be  deported,  whenever 
in  its  judgment  such  removal  is  expedient  or  necessary 
for  the  public  interest  As  to  the  right  of  Congress  to 
prescribe  the  evidence  admissible  upon  this  subject  in  the 
Federal  courts,  and  to  determine  the  effect  of  that  evi- 
dence, the  Court  said :  *  *  The  effect  of  the  provisions  of 
section  6  of  the  Act  of  1892  is  that,  if,  a  Chinese  laborer, 
after  the  opportunity  afforded  him  to  obtain  a  certificate 
of  residence  within  a  year,  at  a  convenient  place,  and 
without  cost,  is  found  without  such  a  certificate,  he  shall 
be  so  far  presumed  to  be  not  entitled  to  remain  within 
the  United  States  that  an  officer  of  the  customs,  or  a  col- 
lector of  internal  revenue,  or  a  marshal,  or  a  deputy  of 
either,  may  arrest  him,  not  with  a  view  to  imprisonment, 
or  punishment,  or  to  his  inamediate  deportation  without 
further  inquiry  but  in  order  to  take  him  before  a  judge. 
The  provision  which  puts  the  burden  of  proof  upon  him 
of  rebutting  the  presumption  arising  from  his  having  no 
certificate,  as  well  as  the  requirement  of  proof,  *by  at 
least  one  credible  white  witness,  that  he  was  a  resident 
of  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  this 
Act,'  is  within  the  acknowledged  power  of  every  legis- 
lature to  prescribe  the  evidence  which  shall  be  received, 
and  the  effect  of  that  evidence,  in  the  courts  of  its  own 
government.  Ogden  v.  Saunders,  12  Wheat.  213,  262, 
349 ;  Pellow  v.  Roberts,  13  How.  472,  476 ;  125  Baskets  of 
Champagne  v.  United  States,  3  Wall.  114,  143 ;  Ex  parte 
Fiske,  113  U.  S.  713,  721 ;  Holmes  v.  Hunt,  122  Mass  505, 
516-519.  The  competency  of  all  witnesses,  without  regard 
to  their  color,  to  testify  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States, 
rests  on  acts  of  Congress,  which  Congress  may  at  its  dis- 
cretion modify  or  repeal.*' 


§43   FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     95 

§  43.  Jobnson  v.  Sayre  ^—Persons  subject  to  military 
law.  This  was  an  appeal  from  an  order  of  a  United 
States  Circuit  Court  discharging,  upon  habeas  corpus,  a 
paymaster's  clerk  in  the  Navy,  from  custody  under  a 
sentence  of  a  Naval  Court  Martial,  upon  a  plea  by  Sayre 
that  he  *  *  was  unlawfully  restrained  of  his  liberty,  because 
detained  under  a  sentence  to  an  infamous  punishment, 
not  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger,  without  indictment 
or  trial  by  jury,  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States/'  In  holding  that  all  persons  in  the  naval 
or  military  service  are  subject  to  the  military  law,  and 
that  the  words  '  *  when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or 
public  danger, ' '  apply  to  the  militia  only,  the  Court  said : 
"By  the  Fifth  Article  of  Amendment  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  *no  person  shall  be  held  to  answer 
for  a  capital  or  otherwise  infamous  crime,  unless  on  a 
presentment  or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  in 
eases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia, 
when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger. ' 
The  decision  below  is  based  upon  the  construction  that 
the  words  'when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or  public 
danger'  refer,  not  merely  to  the  last  antecedent,  *or  in 
the  militia,'  but  also  to  the  pervious  clause,  4n  the  land 
or  naval  forces.'  That  construction  is  grammatically 
possible.  But  it  is  opposed  to  the  evident  meaning  of 
the  provision,  taken  by  itself,  and  still  more  so,  when  it  is 
considered  together  with  the  other  provisions  of  the  Con- 
stitution. The  whole  purpose  of  the  provision  in  ques- 
tion is  to  prevent  persons,  not  subject  to  the  military 
law,  from  being  held  to  answer  for  a  capital  or  otherwise 
infamous  crime  without  presentment  or  indictment  by  a 
grand  jury.  All  persons  in  the  military  or  naval  service 
of  the  United  States  are  subject  to  the  military  law ;  the 
members  of  the  regular  army  and  navy  at  all  times ;  the 
militia,  so  long  as  they  are  in  actual  service. ' ' 

•-158  U.  a  109. 


96  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  44 

§44.  Brown  v.  Walker  ^^ — Iinrnnnlty  for  witnesses 
under  act  of  1893  applies  to  state  as  well  as  federal 
courts.  In  this  case,  after  declaring  that  the  English 
rule  of  evidence — Nemo  tenetur  seipsum  Mcusare — 
'  *  became  clothed  in  this  conntry  with  the  impregnability 
of  a  constitutional  enactment/'  the  Court  held  that  the 
constitutional  guarantee  of  protection  to  every  person 
against  being  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  wit- 
ness against  himself  is  not  infringed  by  the  Act  of  Con- 
gress of  Feb.  11, 1893,  exempting  a  witness  from  prosecu- 
tion on  account  of  any  transaction  to  which  he  may  testify 
before  the  Interstsate  Commerce  Commission;  that  such 
exemption  extends  not  only  to  Federal  courts,  but  to  state 
courts  as  well ;  that  the  power  of  Congress  to  pass  such 
acts  of  general  amnesty  as  that  of  Feb.  11,  1893,  is  not 
taken  away  by  the  constitutional  power  of  the  President 
to  grant  pardons.  The  Court  said:  **This  case  involved 
an  alleged  incompatibility  between  the  clause  of  the  Fifth 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution  which  declares  that  no 
person  'shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a 
witness  against  himself,*  and  the  act  of  Congress  of 
February  11, 1893  (27  Stat,  at  L.  443),  which  enacts  that 
'no  person  shall  be  excused  from  attending  and  testifying 
or  from  producing  books,  papers,  tariffs,  contracts,  agree- 
ments, and  documents  before  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Conmiission,  or  in  obedience  to  the  subpoena  of  the  Com- 
mission. •  .  .  The  act  is  supposed  to  have  been  passed 
in  view  of  the  opinion  of  this  court  in  Counselman  v. 
Hitchcock,  142  U.  S.  547, 3  Inters.  Cent  Eep.  816,  to  the  ef- 
fect that  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat  860,  providing  that  no  evidence 
given  by  a  witness  shall  be  used  against  him,  his  prop- 
erty or  estate,  in  any  manner,  in  any  court  of  the  United 
States,  in  any  criminal  proceeding  did  not  afford  that 
complete  protection  to  the  witness  which  the  Amendment 
was  intended  to  guarantee.  .  .  .  The  act  of  Congress  in 
•question,  securing  to  witnesses  immunity  from  prosecu- 
tion, is  virtually  an  act  of  general  amnesty,  and  belongs  to 

10—161  U.  S.  591. 


§45  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     97 

a  dass  of  legislation  which  is  not  uncommon  either  in 
England  (2  Taylor,  Ev.  1455),  where  a  large  number  of 
similar  acts  are  collated,  or  in  this  country.  Although 
the  Constitution  vests  in  the  President  *  power  to  grant 
reprieves  and  pardons  for  offenses  against  the  United 
States,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment,'  this  power  has 
never  been  held  to  take  away  from  Congress  the  power 
to  pass  acts  of  general  amnesty,  and  is  ordinarily  exer- 
cised only  in  cases  of  individuals  after  conviction,  as  was 
said  by  this  court  in  Ex  parte  Garland,  4  Wall.  333,  380, 
*it  extends  to  every  offense  known  to  the  law,  and  may  be 
exercised  at  any  time  after  its  commission,  either  before 
legal  proceedings,  or  during  their  pendency  or  after  con- 
viction and  judgment. '  .  .  .  If,  as  was  justly  observed 
in  the  opinion  of  the  court  below,  witnesses  standing  in 
Brown's  position  were  at  liberty  to  set  up  an  immunity 
from  testifying,  the  enforcement  of  the  interstate  com- 
merce law  or  other  analogous  acts  wherein  it  is  for  the 
interest  of  both  parties  to  conceal  misdoings,  would  be- 
come impossible,  since  it  is  only  from  the  mouths  of  those 
having  knowledge  of  the  inhibited  contracts  that  the  facts 
can  be  ascertained.  While  the  constitutional  provision  in 
question  is  justly  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  valuable 
prerogatives  of  the  citizen,  its  object  is  fully  accom- 
plished by  the  statutory  immunity. ' ' 

§  45.  Case  of  Wong  Wing,  sequel  of  the  case  of  Fong 
Yue  Ting.  In  the  case  of  Wong  Wing,  163  U.  S.  228,.  it 
was  held  that  the  provisions  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
Amendments,  relating  to  criminal  procedure,  protect  all 
aliens  in  the  territory  of  the  United  States ;  and  that  a 
pretended  judgment  rendered  by  a  Commissioner  of  a 
Circuit  Court  commanding  **that  they  be  imprisoned  at 
hard  labor  at  and  in  the  Detroit  House  of  Correction  for 
a  period  of  sixty  days  from  and  including  the  day  of 
commitment,  and  that  at  the  expiration  of  said  time  they 
be  removed  from  the  United  States  to  China,"  without 
presentment  or  indictment,  and  without  trial  by  jury,  is 

Dae 


98  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  45 

a  denial  of  due  process  of  law.  The  court  said:  **It  is, 
indeed,  obvious,  from  some  expressions  used  by  the  court 
in  a  previous  opinion  under  the  exclusion  acts,  that  it  was 
perceived  that  the  question  now  presented  mi^ht  arise; 
but  care  was  taken  to  reserve  any  expression  of  opinion 
upon  it.  .  •  •  Our  views  upon  the  question  thus 
specifically  pressed  upon  our  attention  may  be  briefly 
expressed  thus :  We  regard  it  as  settled  by  our  previous 
decisions  that  the  United  States  can,  as  a  matter  of  public 
policy,  by  Congressional  enactment  forbids  aliens  or 
classes  of  aliens  from  coming  within  their  borders,  and 
expel  aUens  or  classes  of  aliens  from  their  territory,  in 
order  to  mate  effectual  such  decree  of  exclusion  or  expul- 
sion, devolve  the  power  and  duty  of  identifying  and 
arresting  the  persons  included  in  such  decree,  and  causing 
their  deportation,  upon  executive  or  subordinate  oflScials. 
But  when  Congress  sees  fit  to  further  promote  such 
a  policy  by  subjecting  the  persons  of  such  aliens  to 
infamous  punishment  at  hard  labor,  or  by  confiscating 
their  property,  we  think  such  legislation,  to  be  valid,  must 
provide  for  a  judicial  trial  to  establish  the  guilt  of  the 
accused.  No  limits  can  be  put  by  the  courts  upon  the 
power  of  Congress  to  protect,  by  summary  methods,  the 
country  from  the  advent  of  aliens  whose  race  or  habits 
render  them  undesirable  as  citizens,  or  to  expel  such  if 
they  have  already  found  their  way  into  our  land  and 
unlawfully  remain  here.  But  to  declare  unlawful  resi- 
dence within  the  country  to  be  an  infamous  crime,  pun- 
ishable by  deprivation  of  liberty  and  property,  would  be  to 
pass  out  of  the  sphere  of  constitutional  legislation,  unless 
provision  were  made  that  the  fact  of  guilt  should  be  first 
established  by  a  judicial  trial.  .  .  .  Applying  this  rea- 
soning to  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Amendments,  it  must  be 
concluded  that  all  persons  within  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  are  entitled  to  the  protection  guaranteed 
by  those  amendments,  and  that  even  aliens  shall  not  be 
held  to  answer  for  a  capital  or  other  infamous  crime, 
unless  on  a  presentment,  or  indictment  of  grand  jury, 


§46  FIFTH  AMENDMENT-CONTINUED  (1866-1896)     99 

nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law. ' ' 

§46.  Talton  v.  Mayes  ^^— Fifth  Amendment  has  no 
application  to  courts  of  Cherokee  Nation.  In  that  case 
it  was  held  that  as  the  Cherokee  Nation  enjoyed  local 
self-government  before  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  was  adopted,  the  crime  of  murder  committed  by 
a  Cherokee  Indian  upon  the  person  of  another,  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  that  Nation,  is  an  offense  against  its  local 
laws  and  not  against  the  United  States;  that  for  that 
reason,  the  provision  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  as  to  a 
presentment  or  indictment  by  a  grand  jury  has  no  appli- 
cation to  criminal  procedure  in  the  courts  of  the  Chero- 
kee Nation,  where  the  number  composing  a  grand  jury 
is  regulated  entirely  by  the  local  law.  The  court  said : 
**The  question  therefore  is.  Does  the  Fifth  Amendment 
of  the  Constitution  apply  to  the  local  legislation  of  the 
Cherokee  Nation  so  as  to  require  all  prosecutions  for 
offenses  committed  against  the  laws  of  that  nation  to  be 
initiated  by  a  grand  jury  organized  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  that  amendment  ?  The  solution  of  this 
question  involves  an  inquiry  as  to  the  nature  and  origin 
of  the  power  of  local  government  exercised  by  the  Chero- 
kee Nation  and  recognized  to  exist  in  it  by  the  treaties 
and  statutes  above  referred  to.  Sini3e  the  case  of  Barron 
v.  Baltimore,  7  Pet.  243,  it  has  been  settled  that  the  Fifth 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is  a 
limitation  only  upon  the  power  of  the  general  govern- 
ment, that  is,  that  the  amendment  operates  solely  on  the 
Constitution  itself  by  qualifying  the  powers  of  the 
national  government  which  the  Constitution  called  into 
being.  .  .  .  The  case  in  this  regard  therefore  depends 
npon  whether  the  powers  of  local  government  exercised 
by  the  Cherokee  Nation  are  Federal  powers  created  by 
and  springing  from  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
and  hence  controlled  by  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  Con- 

11—163  U.  a  376. 


100  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  46 

stitution,  or  whether  they  are  local  powers  not  created  by 
the  Constitutioiiy  although  subject  to  its  general  pro- 
visions and  the  paramount  authority  of  Congress.  The 
repeated  adjudications  of  this  court  have  long  since 
answered  the  former  question  in  the  negative/' 


*  J 


>  ^ 


CHAPTER  m 

FIFTH  AMENDMENT  AND  ITS  CONSTBUCTION   (1896-1917) 

§  47.  Hovey  v.  Elliott  ^— Fifth  Amendment  limits  the 
judicial  as  well  as  legislative  power  of  the  Federal  Grov- 
enment.    On  February  12,  1878,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  District  of  Columbia  at  general  term  made  the  fol- 
lowing decree :    '  *  The  answer  of  defendants  having  been 
removed  from  the  files  for  their  contempt  in  refusing  to 
obey  the  order  of  the  court  and  deposit  in  registry  the 
sum  of  $49,279.50,  it  is  now  ordered,  adjudged  and  decreed 
that  the  bill  be  taken  pro  confesso  against  them.    On 
April  17, 1878,  that  order  was  made  absolute  by  another 
order  or  decree,  which,  after  reciting  material  allegations 
in  the  complainants '  bill  as  ^  standing  without  denial  on 
the  part  of  defendants,  *  ordered  and  adjudged  *  that  the 
complainants  have  a  lien  upon  the  claim  of  Augustine  B. 
McDonald  against  the  United  States   .   •   .   of  $197,190, 
and  upon  any  draft,  money,  evidence  of  indebtedness,  or 
proceeds  thereof. ' '   The  court  held  that  a  decree  pro  con- 
fesso  entered,  after  removing  defendants'  answer  from 
the  files  as  a  punishment  for  their  contempt  in  refusing 
to  obey  an  order  of  the  court,  was  a  denial  of  due  process, 
because  the  power  to  withhold  a  favor  or  privilege  from 
one  in  contempt  does  not  include  the  power  to  refuse  to 
such  a  one  the  right  to  defend  on  the  merits  in  the  princi- 
pal  case.    Counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error  contended  that 
"The  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  provided  that  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  his 
'property  without  due  process  of  law.*     This  means 
process  adapted  to  the  character  of  the  case.    It  does  not 
mean  that  the  practice  in  common  law  cases  shall  be  the 

1—167  u.  S.  409. 

101 


•. 


•  • 


•  •• 

•  •  •    • 

•  •     • 


102       ..••%/•       DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §47 


•  •  • 


•  •  •    • 


cphk^utional  right  of  a  defendant  who  is  sued  in  a  conrt 
\  of •  admiralty  or  equity.  Defendants  had  ten  months' 
.•••/•.  .•time  to  comply  with  the  order  of  the  court  for  the  deposit 
of  the  money,  and  over  three  months  to  apply  to  have  the 
answer  reinstated.  This  was  due  process  of  law.  Since 
the  English  court  of  chancery  began  to  exercise  its  powers 
there  never  was  a  time  when  a  defendant  in  such  circum- 
stances had  the  right  to  be  heard  upon  the  merits  of  his 
alleged  defense.  *'  In  passing  adversely  upon  that  con- 
tention the  court  said :  .  *  *  Story,  in  his  treatise  on  the 
Constitution  (vol.  2,  1789),  speaking  of  the  clause  in  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  where  it  is  declared  that  no  person 
*  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  ^  says :  *  The  other  part  of  the  clause 
is  but  an  enlargement  of  the  language  of  Magna  Carta, 
*Nec  super  eum  ibimus,  nee  super  eum  mittimus,  nise  per 
legale  judicium  parium  su4)rum,  vel  per  legem  terrae* 
(neither  will  we  pass  upon  him,  or  condemn  him,  but  by 
the  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers,  or  by  the  law  of  the 
land).  Lord  Coke  says  that  these  latter  words,  per 
legem  terrae  (by  the  law  of  the  land),  mean  by  due 
process  of  law,  that  is,  without  due  presentment  or 
indictment,  and  being  brought  in  to  answer  thereto  by 
due  process  of  the  common  law.  So  that  this  clause  in 
effect  aflSrms  the  right  of  trial  according  to  the  process 
and  proceedings  of  the  common  law. '  Can  it  be  doubted 
that  due  process  of  law  signifies'  a  right  to  be  heard  in 
one 's  defense  1  If  the  legislative  department  of  the  gov- 
ernment were  to  enact  a  statute  conferring  the  right  to 
condemn  the  citizen  without  any  opportunity  of  being 
heard,  would  it  be  pretended  that  such  an  enactment 
would  not  be  violative  of  the  Constitution?  //  this  be 
true,  as  it  undoubtedly  is,  how  can  it  be  said  that  the  judi- 
cial department,  the  source  and  fountain  of  justice  itself ^ 
has  yet  the  authority  to  render  lawful  that  which  if  done 
under  express  legislative  sanction  would  be  violative  of 
the  Constitution.  If  such  power  obtains,  then  the  judi- 
cial department  of  the  government  sitting  to  uphold  and 


§48  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896.1917)  103 

eiiforce  the  Constitution  is  the  only  one  possessiag  a 
power  to  disregard  it.    If  such  authority  exists  then  in 
consequence  of  their  establishment,  to  compel  obedience 
to  law  and  to  enforce  justice,  courts  possess  the  right  to 
inflict  the  very  wrongs  which  they  were  created  to  pre- 
vent.  .    .    .    The  necessary  effect  of  the  judgment  of  the 
supreme  court  of  the  District  of  Columbia  was  to  decree 
a  portion  of  the  award  made  in  favor  of  the  defendant, 
in  other  words  his  property  belonged  to  the  complainants 
in  the  cause.    The  decree  therefore  awarded  the  prop- 
erty of  the  defendant  to  the  complainant  upon  the 
hypothesis  of  fact  that  by  contract  the  defendant  had 
transferred  the  right  to  this  property  to  the  complainant. 
If  the  court  had  power  to  do  this,  by  denying  the  right  to 
be  heard  to  the  defendant,  what  plainer  illustration  could 
there  be  of  taking  property  of  one  and  giving  it  to  another 
without  hearing  or  without  process  1    The  power  to  vio- 
late   fundamental    constitutional    safeguards    securing 
property  exists,  and  if  they  may  be  with  impunity  set 
aside  by  courts  on  the  theory  that  they  do  not  apply  to 
proceedings  in  contempt,  why  will  they  not  also  apply  to 
proceedings  against  the  liberty  of  the  subject!     Why 
should  not  a  court  in  a  criminal  proceeding  deny  to  the 
accused  all  right  to  be  heard  on  the  theory  that  he  is  in 
contempt,  and  sentence  him  to  the  full  penalty  of  the  law  ? 
No  distinction  between  the  two  cases  can  be  pointed  out.  * ' 

§  48.  Scranton  v.  Wheeler  ^ — ^Riparian  owner  deprived 
of  access  to  navigable  stream.  In  this  case  it  was  held 
that  a  riparian  owner  is  not  entitled  to  any  compensa- 
tion under  the  guarantee  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  declar- 
ing that  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public 
use,  without  just  compensation,  despite  the  fact  that  he 
is  permanently  denied  access  to  a  navigable  stream  by  a 
pier,  erected  by  the  Federal  government  merely  for  the 
improvement  of  navigation,  on  land  submerged  under 
navigable  water,  the  title  to  which  is  vested  in  such  ripa- 

2-179  u.  S.  141. 


104  DUB  PEOCESS  OP  LAW  §  48 

rian  owner,  for  the  reason  that  no  matter  whether  the 
title  to  the  land  is  vested  in  the  riparian  owner  or  the 
state,  it  was  so  vested  subject  to  the  public  right  of  navi- 
gation in  such  stream.  The  court  said :  *  *  Undoubtedly 
compensation  must  be  made  or  secured  to  the  owner  when 
that  which  is  done  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  taking  of  private 
property  for  public  use  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fifth 
Amendment  of  the  Constitution;  and  of  course  in  its 
exercise  of  the  power  to  regulate  commerce  Congress  may 
not  override  the  provision  that  just  compensation  must  be 
made  when  private  property  is  taken  for  public  use.  .  .  . 
Is  the  broad  power  with  which  Congress  is  invested  bur- 
dened with  the  condition  that  a  riparian  owner  whose 
land  borders  upon  a  navigable  water  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  compensated  for  his  right  of  access  to  naviga- 
bility whenever  such  right  ceases  to  be  of  value  solely  in 
consequence  of  the  improvement  of  navigation  by  means 
of  piers  resting  upon  submerged  lands  away  from  the 
shore  line!  We  think  not.  The  question  before  us  does 
not  depend  upon  the  inquiry  whether  the  title  to  the  sub- 
merged lands  on  which  the  new  south  pier  rests  is  in  the 
state  or  in  the  riparian  owner.  It  is  the  settled  rule  in 
Michigan  that  *  the  title  of  the  riparian  owner  extends  to 
the  middle  line  of  the  lake  or  stream  of  the  inland  waters. ' 
Webber  v.  Pere  Marquette  Boom  Co.,  2  Mich.  636,  and 
authorities  there  cited.  But  it  is  equally  well  settled  in 
that  state  that  the  rights  of  the  riparian  owner  are  sub- 
ject to  the  public  easement  or  servitude  of  navigation. 
Lorman  v.  Benson,  8  Mich.  18 ;  Ryan  v.  Brown,  18  Mich. 
195,  207.  So  that,  whether  the  title  to  the  submerged 
lands  of  navigable  waters  is  in  the  state  or  in  the  ripa- 
rian owners,  it  was  acquired  subject  to  the  rights  which 
the  public  have  in  the  navigation  of  such  waters. ' ' 

§  49.  Wight  V.  Davidson  ^ — ^Meaning  of  due  process  in 
the  District  of  Columbia.  In  this  case  was  involved  the 
constitutionality  of  the  act  of  March  3,  1899,  entitled 

3—181  u.  S.  371. 


§49  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    105 

**  An  Act  to  Extend  S  Street  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
and  for  Other  Purposes,**  under  which  was  made  an 
assessment  upon  lands  of  the  appellees  for  alleged  bene- 
fits accruing  from  the  opening  of  certain  streets  Adjoin- 
ing such  lands.  The  act  was  held  to  be  valid  upon  the 
ground  that  Congress  has  the  power  to  legislate  for 
the  District  of  Columbia  in  such  a  way  as  to  provide  for 
the  assessment,  on  abutting  lands  and  lands  benefited,  of 
one  half  or  more  of  the  damages  resulting  from  such  con- 
demnation. The  Court  said:  ^^In  the  present  case  is 
involved  the  constitutionality  of  an  act  of  Congress  regu- 
lating assessments  on  property  in  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia, and  in  respect  to  which  the  jurisdiction  of  Congress, 
in  matters  municipal  as  well  as  political,  is  exclusive,  and 
not  controlled  by  the  provisions  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  No  doubt,  in  the  exercise  of  such  legislative 
powers,  Congress  is  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Fifth 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
which  provide,  among  other  things,  that  no  person  shall 
be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for 
public  use  without  just  compensation.  But  it  by  no 
means  necessarily  follows  that  a  long  and  consistent  con- 
struction put  upon  the  Fifth  Amendment,  and  maintain- 
ing the  validity  of  the  acts  of  Congress  relating  to  public 
improvements  within  the  District  of  Columbia,  is  to  be 
deemed  overruled  by  a  decision  concerning  the  operation 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  controlling  state  legis- 
lation. However,  we  need  not  pursue  this  suggestion, 
because  we  think  the  court  of  appeals,  in  regarding  the 
decision  in  Norwood  v.  Baker,  [172  U.  S.  269],  as  over- 
ruling our  previous  decisions  in  respect  of  congressional 
legislation  in  respect  to  public  local  improvements  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  misconceived  the  meaning  and 
effect  of  that  decision.  There  the  question  was  as  to  the 
validity  of  a  village  ordinance  which  imposed  the  entire 
cost  and  expenses  of  opening  a  street,  irrespective  of  the 
question  whether  the  property  was  benefited  by  the  open- 


106  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  49 

ing  of  the  street.  The  legislature  of  the  state  had  not 
defined  or  designed  the  abutting  property  as  benefited  by 
the  improvement,  nor  had  the  village  authority  made  any 
inquiry  into  the  question  of  benefits.  There  having  been 
no  legislative  determination  as  to  what  lands  were  bene- 
fited, no  inquiry  instituted  by  the  village  councils,  and  no 
opportunity  afforded  to  the  abutting  owner  to  be  heard 
on  that  subject,  this  court  held  that  the  exaction  from  the 
owner  of  private  property  of  the  cost  of  a  public  improve- 
ment in  substantial  excess  of  the  special  benefits  accru- 
ing to  him  is,  to  the  extent  of  such  excess^  a  taking  under 
the  guise  of  taxation,  of  private  property  for  pubUc  use, 
without  compensation,  and  accordingly  affirmed  the 
decree  of  the  circuit  court  of  the  United  States,  which, 
while  preventing  the  enforcement  of  the  particular  assess- 
ment in  question  upon  the  plaintiff  ^s  abutting  property 
for  so  much  of  the  expense  of  opening  the  street  as  would 
be  found  upon  due  and  proper  inquiry  to  be  equal  to  the 
special  benefits  accruing  to  the  property.  That  it  was 
not  intended  by  this  decision  to  overrule  Bauman  v.  Boss, 
[167  U.  S.  548],  and  Parsons  v.  District  of  Columbia 
[170  U.  S.  45],  is  seen  in  the  opinion  where  both  those 
cases  are  cited,  and  declared  not  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  conclusion  reached.  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172  U.  S. 
269,294.'^ 

The  precise  issue  of  constitutional  law  involved  in  this 
important  case  can  be  best  defined  in  the  words  of 
Mr.  Justice  Harlan  who  in  his  dissenting  opinion,  said : 
*'The  court  in  the  present  case  says  that  Congress  has 
exclusive  jurisdiction,  municipal  and  political,  in  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  and  is  not  controlled  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  although  it  is  controlled  by  the  Fifth 
Amendment  providing,  among  other  things,  that  no  per- 
son shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  *But,'  the 
court  proceeds,  *it  by  no  means  necessarily  follows  that 
a  long  and  consistent  construction  put  upon  the  Fifth 


§50  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    107 

Amendment  and  maintaining  the  validity  of  the  acts  of 
Congress  relating  to  public  improvements  within  the 
District  of  Columbia,  is  to  be  deemed  overruled  by  a 
decision  concerning  the  operation  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  as  controlling  legislation.*  These  observa- 
tions were  made  to  sustain  the  proposition  that  the  prin- 
ciples announced  in  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172  U.  S.  269,  in 
reference  to  the  validity  of  state  enactments  relating  to 
local  public  improvements,  have  no  necessary  application 
to  a  case  of  a  like  kind  arising  under  a  similar  act  of 
Congress  relating  to  local  public  improvements  in  the 
District  of  Columbia.  As  the  court  does  not  pursue  this 
subject,  nor  express  any  final  view  upon  the  question 
referred  toy  I  refer  this  part  of  its  opinion  only  for  the 
purpose  of  recording  my  dissent  from  the  intimation 
that  what  a  state  might  not  do  in  respect  of  the  depriva- 
tion of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  Congress 
under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  could,  per- 
haps, do  in  respect  of  property  in  this  District.  The 
Fifth  Amendment  declares  that  no  person  shall  be 
deprived  of  property  'without  due  process  of  law/  The 
Fourteenth  Amendment  declares  that  no  state  shall 
deprive  any  person  of  property  'without  due  process  of 
law. '  It  is  inconceivable  to  me  that  the  question  whether 
a  person  has  been  deprived  of  his  property  without  due 
process  of  law  can  be  determined  upon  principles  applica- 
ble under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  but  not  applicable 
under  the  Fifth  Amendment,  or  upon  principles  appliCd- 
ble  under  the  Fifth  and  not  applicable  under  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  words  'due 
process  of  law^  mean  the  same  in  both  Amendments. 
The  intimation  to  the  contrary  in  the  opinion  of  the  court 
is,  I  take  leave  to  say,  without  any  foundation  upon  which 
to  rest,  and  is  most  mischievous  in  its  tendency. ' ' 

§  50.  Hanover  National  Bank  v.  Moyses  ^—Bankruptcy 
act  of  July  1, 1898,  did  not  deny  due  process.    The  Court 

4—186  U.  a  181. 


108  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  50 

said:  '*But  it  is  contended  that  as  to  voluntary  pro- 
ceedings the  act  is  in  violation  of  the  Fifth  Amendment 
in  that  it  deprives  creditors  of  their  property  without 
due  process  of  law  in  failing  to  provide  for  notice.  Thfe 
act  provides  that  *any  person  who  owes  debts,  except  a 
corporation,  shall  be  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  this  act  as 
a  voluntary  bankrupt/  (4a),  aud  that  *upon  the  filing 
of  a  voluntary  petition  the  judge  shall  hear  the  petition 
and  make  the  adjudication  or  dismiss  the  petition.  *  18g. 
With  the  petition  he  must  file  schedules  of  his  property 
and  *  of  his  creditors,  showing  their  residences,  if  known, 
if  unknown,  that  fact  to  be  stated.'  7,  subd.  8.  The 
schedules  must  be  verified  and  the  petition  must  state 
that  *  petitioner  owe©  debts  which  he  is  unable  to  pay  in 
full,'  and  *that  he  is  willing  to  surrender  all  his  prop- 
erty for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  except  such  as  is 
exempt  by  law.'  This  establishes  those  facts  so  far  as 
a  decree  of  bankruptcy  is  concerned,  and  he  has  com- 
mitted an  act  of  bankruptcy  in  filing  the  petition.  These 
are  not  issuable  facts,  and  notice  is  unnecessary,  unless 
dismissal  is  sought,  when  notice  is  requested.  §  59g. 
.  .  .  It  is  also  provided  by  §  15  that  a  discharge  may 
be  revoked,  on  the  application  within  a  year,  if  pro- 
cured by  fraud  and  not  warranted  by  the  facts.  Not- 
withstanding these  provisions,  it  is  insisted  that  the 
want  of  notice  of  filing  the  petition  is  fatal  because  the 
adjudication  per  se  entitles  the  bankrupt  to  a  discharge, 
and  that  the  proceedings  in  respect  of  discharge  are  in 
personam,  and  require  personal  service  of  notice.  The 
adjudication  does  not  itself  have  that  effect,  and  the  first 
of  these  objections  really  rests  on  the  ground  that  the 
notice  provided  for  is  unreasonably  short,  and  the  right 
to  oppose  discharge  unreasonably  restricted.  Consid- 
ering the  plenary  power  of  Congress,  the  subject  matter 
of  the  suit  and  the  common  rights  and  interests  of  the 
creditors,  we  regard  the  contention  as  untenable.  Con- 
gress may  prescribe  any  regulations  concerning  discharge 
in  bankruptcy  that  are  not  so  grossly  unreasonable  as 


§51  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    109 

to  be  incompatible  with  fundamental  law,  and  we  can 
not  find  anything  in  this  act  on  that  subject  which  would 
justify  us  in  overthrowing  its  action/' 

§61.  Dreyer  v.  Illinois  ^—Foimer  jeopardy,  XT.  S.  v. 
Perez  reviewed.  The  Court  said:  ^'The  contention  is 
that,  notwithtsanding  the  recital  in  the  record  that  the 
jury  were  discharged  by  the  court  because  they  were 
unable  to  agree  upon  a  verdict,  such  discharge  was  with- 
out moral  or  physical  necessity,  and  operated  as  an 
acquittal  of  the  defendant.''  When  called  upon  under 
such  a  contention  to  pass  upon  the  prohibition  of  double 
jeopardy  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment,  the  court 
answered  that  the  plea  was  untenable.  That  conclusion 
is  notable  because  it  was  reached  after  a  careful  review 
of  United  States  v.  Perez,  9  Wheat.  579,  decided  in  1824, 
the  first  case  in  which  the  Amendment  in  question  was 
ever  construed.  In  the  course  of  that  review  the  Court 
said:  **Upon  the  face  of  the  question  under  examina- 
tion the  inquiry  might  arise  whether  the  due  process  of 
law  required  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  protects  one 
accused  of  crime  from  being  put  twice  in  jeopardy  of 
life  or  limb.  In  other  words,  is  the  right  not  to  be  put 
twice  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb  forbidden  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment ;  or,  so  far  as  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  is  concerned,  is  it  forbidden  only  by  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  which,  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  had  been  held  as  restricting  only 
the  powers  of  the  national  government  and  its  agencies  f 
We  pass  this  important  question  without  any  considera- 
tion of  it  upon  its  merits,  and  content  ourselves  with 
referring  to  the  decision  of  this  court  in  United  States 
V.  Perez,  9  Wheat.  579.  That  was  a  capital  case,  in 
which,  without  the  consent  of  the  prisoner  or  of  the 
attorney  of  the  United  States,  the  jury  being  unable  to 
agree,  were  discharged  by  the  court  from  giving  any 
verdict    This  court,  speaking  by  Mr.  Justice  Story,  said : 

5—187  u.  s.  71. 


110  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  51 

*We  are  of  opinion  that  the  facts  constitute  no  legal 
bar  to  a  future  trial.  The  prisoner  has  not  been  con- 
victed or  acquitted,  and  may  again  be  put  upon  his 
defense.  We  think  that  in  all  cases  of  this  nature  the 
law  has  invested  courts  of  justice  with  the  authority 
to  discharge  a  jury  from  giving  any  verdict,  whenever, 
in  their  opinion,  taking  all  the  circumstances  into  con- 
sideration, there  is  a  manifest  necessity  for  the  act,  or 
the  ends  of  public  justice  would  otherwise  be  defeated. 
They  are  to  exercise  a  sound  discretion  on  the  subject; 
and  it  is  impossible  to  define  all  the  circumstances  which 
would  render  it  proper  to  interfere.  To  be  sure,  the 
power  ought  to  be  used  with  the  greatest  caution,  under 
urgent  circumstances,  and  for  very  plain  and  obvious 
causes;  and,  in  capital  cases  especially,  courts  should 
be  extremely  careful  how  they  interfere  with  any  of  the 
chances  in  favor  of  the  prisoner.  But,  after  all,  they 
have  the  right  to  order  the  discharge;  and  the  security 
which  the  public  have  for  the  faithful,  sound,  and  con- 
scientious exercise  of  this  discretion  rests  in  this,  as  in 
other  cases,  upon  the  responsibility  of  the  judges,  under 
their  oaths  of  office.  We  are  aware  that  there  is  some 
diversity  of  opinion  and  practice  on  this  subject  in  the 
American  courts,  but,  after  weighing  the  question  with 
due  deUberation,  we  are  of  opinion  that  such  a  discharge 
constitutes  no  bar  to  further  proceedings,  and  gives  no 
right  of  exemption  to  the  prisoner  from  being  again  put 
upon  trial.'  If  the  due  process  of  law  required  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  embraces  the  guaranty  that  no 
person  shall  be  put  twice  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb, — 
upon  which  question  we  need  not  now  express  an 
opinion, — ^what  was  said  in  United  States  v.  Perez  [9 
Wheat.  579]  is  applicable  to  this  case  upon  the  present 
writ  of  error,  and  is  adverse  to  the  contention  of  the 
accused  that  he  was  twice  put  in  jeopardy. 

**The  principles  settled  in  United  States  v.  Perez,  we 
may  remark,  were  reaffirmed  in  Ex  parte  Lange,  18  Wall. 
175 ;  Summons  v.  United  States,  142  U.  S.  148 ;  Logan  v. 


852  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    111 

United  States,  144  U.  S.  263 ;  Thompson  v.  United  States, 
155P.  S.  274/' 

§52.  Lone  Wolf  v.  Hitchcock  <^— Fifth  Amendment 
does  not  limit  the  power  of  Congress  when  exercising 
control  over  lodian  tribes.  A  treaty  was  concluded  in 
1867  with  the  Eiowa  and  Comanche  tribes  of  Indians, 
and  snch  other  friendly  tribes  as  might  be  united  with 
them^  setting  apart  a  reservation  for  the  use  of  such 
Indians.  The  Apache  tribe  of  Indians  was  incorporated 
with  those  two  tribes  by  a  separate  treaty,  and  thus 
became  entitled  to  share  in  the  benefits  of  the  reserva- 
tion. By  the  sixth  article  of  the  first  treaty  it  was  pro- 
vided that  heads  of  families  might  select  a  tract  of  land 
within  the  reservation,  not  exceeding  320  acres  in  extent, 
which  should  thereafter  cease  to  be  held  in  common, 
and  should  be  for  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  Indian 
making  the  selection,  so  long  as  he  or  his  family  might 
continue  to  cultivate  the  land.  The  twelfth  article  of 
the  treaty  was  as  follows:  ** Article  12.  No  treaty  for 
the  cession  of  any  portion  or  part  of  the  reservation 
herein  described,  which  may  be  held  in  common,  shall 
be  of  any  validity  or  force  as  against  the  said  Indians, 
unless  executed  and  signed  by  at  least  three-fourths  of 
all  the  adult  male  Indians  occupying  the  same,  and  no 
cession  by  the  tribe  shall  be  understood  or  construed  in 
such  manner  as  to  deprive,  without  his  consent,  any  indi- 
vidual member  of  the  tribe  of  his  rights  to  any  tract  of 
land  selected  by  him  as  provided  in  article  3  (6)  of  this 
treaty. ' '  Thereafter  was  passed  the  Act  of  June  6, 1900, 
at  a  time  when  the  tribal  relations  between  the  confed- 
erated tribes  of  Kiowas,  Comanches,  and  Apaches  still 
existed,  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  with  the  tribal  prop- 
erty in  a  manner  other  than  that  prescribed  by  the  treaty. 
Lone  Wolf,  suing  for  himself  as  well  as  for  all  others 
of  the  confederated  tribes,  filed  a  bill  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia  to  enjoin  the  carrying 

6—187  u.  s.  56?. 


112  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  52 

into  effect  of  the  Act  of  Congress  of  Jnne  6,  1900  (31 
Stat,  at  L.  677,  a  813),  dealing  with  the  tribal  prop- 
erty in  question.  In  stating  the  precise  issue  involved, 
the  Court  said:  ^^The  appellants  base  their  right  to 
relief  on  the  proposition  that  by  the  effect  of  the  article 
just  quoted  the  confederated  tribes  of  Kiowas,  Co- 
manches,  and  Apaches  were  vested  with  an  interest 
in  the  lands  held  in  common  within  the  reservation, 
which  interest  could  not  be  divested  by  Congress  in  any 
other  mode  than  that  specified  in  the  said  twelfth  article, 
and  that  as  a  result  of  the  said  stipulation  the  interest 
of  the  Indians  in  the  common  lands  fell  within  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  and  such  interest,  indirectly  at  least, 
came  under  the  control  of  the  judicial  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment. We  are  unable  to  yield  our  assent  to  this  view. 
.  .  .  Plenary  authority  over  the  tribal  relations  of  the 
Indians  has  been  exercised  by  Congress  from  the  begin- 
ning, and  the  power  has  always  been  deemed  a  political 
one,  not  subject  to  be  controlled  by  the  judicial  depart- 
ment of  the  government.  Until  the  year  1871  the  policy 
was  pursued  of  dealing  with  Indian  tribes  by  means  of 
treaties,  and,  of  course,  a  moral  obligation  rested  upon 
Congress  to  act  in  good  faith  in  performing  the  stipu- 
lations entered  into  on  its  behalf.  But,  as  with  treaties 
made  with  foreign  nations  (Chinese  Exclusion  Case,  130 
U.  S.  581,  600),  the  legislative  power  might  pass  laws 
in  conflict  with  treaties  made  with  the  Indians.  •  .  . 
When,  therefore,  treaties  were  entered  into  between  the 
United  States  and  a  tribe  of  Indians,  it  was  never  doubted 
that  the  power  to  abrogate  existed  in  Congress,  and  that 
in  a  contingency  such  power  might  ber  availed  of  from 
considerations  of  governmental  policy,  particularly  if 
consistent  with  perfect  good  faith  towards  the  Indians.  * ' 
Upon  that  ground  the  court  refused  to  extend  its  judicial 
control  over  the  treaty  or  contract  in  question  under  the 
due  process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment. 


§53  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)   113 

§  53.  IT.  S.  v.  Lynah  7— Liability  under  Fifth  Amend- 
ment for  land  taken  to  improve  navigation.  In  this  case 
it  was  held  that  the  United  States  was  liable  for  the 
taking  of  land  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment  when,  as  the  necessary  result  of  an  improvement 
in  navigation  executed  under  the  authority  of  Congress, 
a  valuable  rice  plantation  was  converted  into  a  valueless 
and  irreclaimable  bog.  The  Court  said:  **It  is  clear 
from  these  authorities  that  where  the  government  by  the 
construction  of  a  dam  or  other  public  works  so  floods 
lands  belonging  to  an  individual  as  to  substantially 
destroy  their  value,  there  is  a  taking  within  the  scope 
of  the  Fifth  Amendment.  While  the  government  does 
not  directly  proceed  to  appropriate  the  title,  yet  it  takes 
away  the  use  and  value ;  when  that  is  done  it  is  of  little 
consequence  in  whom  the  fee  may  be  vested.  Of  course, 
it  results  from  this  that  the  proceeding  must  be  regarded 
as  an  actual  appropriation  of  the  land,  including  the 
possession,  the  right  of  possession,  and  the  fee;  and 
when  the  amount  awarded  as  compensation  is  paid,  the 
title,  the  fee,  with  whatever  rights  may  attach  thereto — 
in  this  case  those  at  least  which  belong  to  the  riparian 
proprietor — ^pass  to  the  government  and  it  becomes 
henceforth  the  full  owner.  Passing  to  the  third  question, 
it  is  contended  that  what  was  done  by  the  government 
was  done  in  improving  the  navigability  of  a  navigable 
river,  that  it  is  given  by  the  Constitution  full  control 
over  such  improvements,  and  that  if  in  doing  any  work 
therefor,  injury  results  to  riparian  proprietors  or  others, 
it  is  an  injury  which  is  purely  consequential,  and  for 
which  the  government  is  not  liable.  But  if  any  one 
proposition  can  be  considered  as  settled  by  the  decisions 
of  this  court,  it  is  that,  although  in  the  discharge  of  its 
duties  the  government  may  appropriate  property,  it  can 
not  do  so  without  being  liable  to  the  obligation  cast  by 
the  Fifth  Ajnendment  of  paying  just  compensation. '  *  In 
distinguishing  this  case  from  that  of  Scranton  v.  Wheeler, 

7—188  XJ.  S.  446. 
Doe 


114  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  53 

179  V.  S.  141,  the  Court  said :  *  *  It  is  true  that  a  majority 
of  the  court  held,  in  that  case,  that  the  destruction  of 
access  to  land  abutting  on  a  navigable  river  by  the  con- 
struction by  Congress  of  a  pier  on  the  submerged  lands 
in  front  of  the  upland  was  not  a  taking  of  private  prop- 
erty for  public  use,  but  only  an  instance  of  consequential 
injury  to  the  property  of  the  riparian  owner.  But  the 
right  of  compensation  in  case  of  a  taking  was  conceded. ' ' 
In  the  Scranton  Case  the  Court  said  that  **  Undoubtedly 
compensation  must  be  made  or  secured  to  the  owner 
when  that  which  is  done  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  taking 
of  private  property  for  public  use  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Fifth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  and,  of 
course,  in  its  exercise  of  the  power  to  regulate  commerce. 
Congress  may  not  override  the  provision  that  just  com- 
pensation must  be  made  when  private  property  is  taken 
for  public  use.** 

§  54.  The  Japanese  Immigrant  Case  ®— ^Application  of 
the  due  process  clause  in  a  case  of  deportation  after 
entry.  Proceeding  under  the  act  of  Congress  of  March 
3,  1891,  relating  to  the  exclusion  of  certain  classes  of 
alien  immigrants,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  issued 
a  warrant,  July  23,  1901,  addressed  to  the  immigrant 
inspector  at  Seattle,  reciting  that  the  appellant  had  come 
to  the  United  States  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  the 
above  act  of  1891,  and  ordering  that  she  be  taken  into 
custody  and  returned  to  Japan  at  the  expense  of  the 
vessel  importing  her.  The  Court  said :  *  *  It  is  contended, 
however,  in  respect  of  an  alien  who  has  already  landed 
it  is  consistent  with  the  acts  of  Congress  that  he  may 
be  deported  without  previous  notice  of  any  purpose  to 
deport  him,  and  without  any  opportunity  on  his  part 
to  show  by  competent  evidence  before  the  executive 
officers  charged  with  the  execution  of  the  acts  of  Con- 
gress, that  he  is  not  here  in  violation  of  law;  that  the 
deportation  of  an  alien  without  provision  for  such  a 

8—189  U.  S.  86. 


§  54  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896.1917)    115 

notice  and  for  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  was  incon- 
sistent with  the  due  process  of  law  required  by  the  Fifth 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution.  Leaving  on  one  side 
the  question  whether  an  alien  can  rightfully  invoke  the 
due  process  clause  of  the  Constitution  who  has  entered 
the  country  clandestinely,  and  who  has  been  here  too 
brief  a  period  to  have  become,  in  any  real  sense,  a  part 
of  our  population,  before  his  right  to  remain  is  disputed, 
we  have  to  say  that  the  rigid  construction  of  the  Acts 
of  Congress  suggested  by  the  appellant  are  not  justified. 
Those  acts  do  not  necessarily  exclude  opportunity  to  the 
immigrant  to  be  heard,  when  such  opportunity  is  of 
right.  It  was  held  in  Den  ex  dem.  Murray  v.  Hoboken 
Land  and  Improv.  Co.,  18  How.  272,  280,  281,  283,  that 
•though  due  process  of  law  generally  implies  and  includes 
actor,  reus,  judex,  regular  allegations,  opportunity  to 
answer,  and  a  trial  according  to  some  settled  course  of 
judicial  proceedings,  .  .  .  yet  this  is  not  universally 
true,'  and  *that  though  generally  both  public  and  private 
wrongs  are  redressed  through  judicial  action,  there  are 
more  summary  extra-judicial  remedies  for  both. '  Hence, 
it  was  decided  in  that  case  to  be  consistent  with  due 
process  of  law  for  Congress  to  provide  summary  means 
to  compel  revenue  officers — and,  in  case  of  default,  their 
sureties — ^to  pay  such  balances  of  the  public  money  as 
might  be  in  their  hands.  Now,  it  has  been  settled  that 
the  power  to  exclude  or  expel  aliens  belonged  to  the 
political  department  of  the  government,  and  that  the 
order  of  an  executive  officer  invested  with  the  power  to 
determine  finally  the  facts  upon  which  an  alien's  right 
to  enter  this  country,  or  remain  in  it,  depended,  was 
^due  process  of  law,  and  no  other  tribunal,  unless  ex- 
pressly authorized  to  do  so,  was  at  liberty  to  re-examine 
the  evidence  on  which  he  acted,  or  to  controvert  its  suffi- 
ciency.' Nishimura  Ekiu  v.  United  States,  142  U.  S. 
651,  659;  Fong  Yue  Ting  v.  United  State,  149  U.  S.  698, 
713;  Lem  Moon  Sing  v.  United  States,  158  U.  S.  538,  547. 
But  this  court  has  never  held,  nor  must  we  now  be 


116  DUE  PEOCBSS  OP  LAW  §  54 

understood  as  holding,  that  administrative  officers,  when 
executing  the  provisions  of  a  statute  involving  the  lib- 
erty of  persons,  may  disregard  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples that  inhere  in  'due  process  of  law'  as  understood 
at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.  One 
of  these  principles  is  that  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of 
his  liberty  without  opportunity,  at  some  time,  to  We 
heard,  before  such  officers,  in  respect  of  the  matters  upon 
which  that  liberty  depends — ^not  necessarily  an  opportu- 
nity upon  a  regular,  set  occasion,  and  according  to  the 
forms  of  judicial  procedure,  but  one  that  will  secure  the 
prompt,  vigorous  action  contemplated  by  Congress,  and 
at  the  same  time  be  appropriate  to  the  nature  of  the 
case  upon  which  such  officers  are  required  to  act.  There- 
fore, it  is  not  competent  for  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury or  any  executive  officer,  at  any  time  within  the  year 
limited  by  statute,  arbitrarily  to  cause  an  alien  who  has 
entered  the  country,  and  has  become  subject  in  all 
respects  to  its  jurisdiction,  and  a  part  of  its  population, 
although  alleged  to  be  illegally  here,  to  be  taken  into 
custody  and  deported  without  giving  him  all  opportunity 
to  be  heard  upon  the  questions  involving  his  right  to  be 
and  remain  in  the  United  States.  No  such  arbitrarv 
power  can  exist  where  the  principles  involved  in  due 
process  of  law  are  recognized.'* 

§55.  Hawaii  v.  Mankichi — ^How  colonists  must  win 
right  to  participate  in  constitution  of  the  parent  state. 
In  the  ancient  Mediterranean  world,  where  the  state  was 
the  city-commonwealth,  those  who  went  out  of  the  city 
went  out  of  the  state.  Therefore,  according  to  Greek 
ideas,  the  eflfect  of  an  emigration  for  the  foundation  of 
a  new  settlement  was  an  absolute  political  severance 
from  the  mother  state,  which  retained  no  more  substan- 
tial hold  upon  its  colonies  than  the  sentimental  tie  aris- 
ing out  of  the  community  of  blood  and  speech  and  com- 
mon religious  rights.  When  a  conquering  city  extended 
its  dominions  by  reducing  other  self-governing  cities  to 


§  55  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    117 

the  condition  of  dependent  allies,  such  allies  were  often 
permitted  to  enjoy  local  autonomy  under  their  own  con- 
stitutions, without  the  right  to  participate  in  any  way 
in  the  political  affairs  of  the  ruling  state.  The  most 
favored  member  of  the  Athenian  Alliance  or  Empire, 
even  Chios  or  Mitylene,  could  not  have  a  voice  in  the 
general  direction  of  the  confederacy,  for  the  simple  rea- 
son that  Greek  exclusiveness  rejected  to  the  last  the 
idea  of  a  fusion  of  any  large  number  of  cities  into  a 
single  body  with  equal  rights  common  to  all. 

Not  until  after  the  Teutonic  nations  had  settled  upon 
the  wreck  of  the  Boman  Empire  did  the  ancient  concep- 
tion of  the  state  as  the  city-conmaonwealth  give  way  to 
the  modem  conception  of  the  state  as  the  nation, — ^an 
aggregation  of  people  occupying  a  definite  portion  of 
the  earth's  surface  with  fixed  geographical  boundaries, 
the  state  as  known  to  modem  international  law.  When 
the  time  came  for  states  of  the  new  type  to  send  out 
bands  of  emigrants  to  found  colonies  in  distant  lands, 
an  entirely  new  conception  of  the  relation  that  should 
bind  such  colonies  to  the  mother  state  came  into  exist- 
ence. Instead  of  the  emigrants  leaving  the  mother  state 
behind  them,  they  were  supposed  to  take  it  upon  their 
backs.  "The  notion  was,  where  Englishmen  are,  there 
IS  England,  where  Frenchmen  are,  there  is  France;  and 
so  the  possessions  of  France  in  North  America  were 
called  New  France,  and  one  group  at  least  of  the  Eng- 
lish possessions  New  England.*'  Seeley,  The  Expan- 
sion of  England,  p.  49.  On  that  principle  all  the  western 
hemisphere  passed  under  the  control  of  a  colonial 
system  of  complete  monopoly  by  mother  countries, 
and,  as  a  general  rule,  was  excluded  from  direct 
communication  with  Europe,  outside  of  the  respective 
parent  states.  According  to  the  theory  of  the*  English 
Constitution,  the  title  to  all  newly  discovered  lands 
accrued  to  the  King  in  his  public  and  regal  character, 
and  the  exclusive  right  to  grant  them  resided  in  him 
as  a  part  of  the  royal  prerogative ;  upon  these  principles 


118  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW .  §  55 

rest  the  various  charters  and  grants  of  territory  made 
on  this  continent.  The  title-deed  nnder  which  the  English 
took  possession  of  the  greater  part  of  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  is  represented  by  the  charter  granted  by  James 
I,  April  10,  1606,  creating  two  distinct  corporations  as 
colonizing  agents.  In  that  charter  it  was  declared  *  *  that 
all  and  every  the  persons  within  the  said  colony  and 
plantation,  and  every  their  children  and  posterity,  which 
shall  happen  to  be  bom  within  any  of  the  limits  thereof, 
shall  have  and  enjoy  all  Uberties,  franchises,  and  immu- 
nities  of  free  denizens  and  natural  subjects  within  our 
dominations,  to  all  intents  and  purposes  as  if  they  had 
been  abiding  and  bom  within  this  our  realm  of  England 
or  in  any  other  of  our  dominions. '  *  It  is  not,  therefore, 
strange  that,  under  the  principles  of  the  English  Con- 
stitution, a  country  subdued  by  an  army  of  the  Empire 
should  become  immediately  a  part  of  the  King's  domin- 
ions in  right  of  his  crown,  and  its  inhabitants,  so  soon  as 
they  pass  under  the  King's  protection,  cease  to  be  enemies 
or  aliens  and  become  subjects.  In  a  word,  foreign  ter- 
ritory becomes  a  part  of  the  British  Empire  and  its 
inhabitants  British  subjects,  both  as  to  the  conquering 
state  and  foreign  nations  ipso  facto,  by  the  conquest 
itself,  without  any  enabling  or  confirming  legislation 
upon  the  part  of  the  Imperial  Parliament.  As  Lord 
Coke  declared  in  Calvin's  Case,  7  Co.  Rep.  1,  **they  that 
were  bom  in  those  parts  of  France  that  were  under  actual 
allegiance  and  obedience  were  no  aliens,  but  capable  of, 
and  heritable  to,  lands  in  England."  And  yet  the  lib- 
erality with  which  the  English  constitution  thus  bestows 
citizenship  and  legal  rights  upon  those  under  its  dominion 
in  foreign  lands  has  ever  been  offset  by  the  exclusive 
spirit,  sanctioned  by  all  the  precedents  of  the  past,  that 
denies  to  all  colonists  the  right  to  representation  in  the 
sovereign  assembly  at  home  which  directs  the  affairs  of 
the  Empire  as  a  whole.  That  assembly,  while  denying 
to  all  colonists,  as  every  other  home  assembly  had  denied, 
the  boon  of  being  heard  through  their  representatives. 


§55  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    119 

has  ever  claimed  the  right  to  invade  the  jurisdiction  of 
all  colonial  assemblies  in  order  to  legislate  directly  upon 
internal  colonial  concerns.  See  the  author's  The  Origin 
and  Growth  of  the  American  Constitution^  pp.  91-92, 
380  sq. 

When  the  founders  of  our  colonial  system  defined  its 
principles  in  the  famous  Ordinance  of  July  13,  1787, 
entitled  **An  Ordinance  for  the  government  of  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  United  States  northwest  of  the  river  Ohio,'* 
they,  in  obedience  to  a  principle,  universal  in  the  ancient 
and  modem  world,  excluded  the  colonists  from  all  right 
to  participate  in  the  constitution  of  the  mother  state, 
save  so  far  as  particular  provisions  of  it  might  be 
extended  to  them  as  a  matter  of  grace  and  not  as  a 
matter  of  right.  Really  the  only  connection  between  the 
colonial  government  of  the  Northwest  and  the  legislature 
of  the  parent  state  was  through  *  *  a  delegate  to  Congress, 
who  shall  have  a  seat  in  Congress  with  the  right  of 
debating,  but  not  of  voting.'*  The  rank  heresy  of  a  later 
time,  that  **the  Constitution  follows  the  flag,'*  finds 
nothing  but  refutation  in  the  terms  of  the  acts  through 
which  our  early  colonial  systems  were  organized.  The 
fundamental  principle  upon  which  all  of  them  rests  is 
that  the  Constitution  is  the  exclusive  possession  of  the 
fully  organized  states.  That  fact  was  emphasized  with 
peculiar  force  in  the  case  of  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canter, 
1  Pet.  511,  in  which  it  was  held  that  a  territorial  court 
whose  judges  hold  their  offices  for  four  years  can  not 
be  a  court  of  the  United  States  within  the  meaning  of 
the  Constitution,  because  that  provides  that  the  judges 
shall  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior.  As  Mar- 
shall, C.  J.,  has  expressed  it:  **We  have  only  to  pursue 
this  subject  one  step  further,  to  perceive  that  this  provi- 
sion of  the  Constitution  does  not  apply  to  it.  The  next 
sentence  declares  that  *the  judges  both  of  the  supreme 
and  inferior  courts  shall  hold  their  offices  during  good 
behavior. '  The  judges  of  the  superior  courts  of  Florida 
hold  their  offices  for  four  years.    The  courts,  then,  are 


120  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  55 

not  constitutional  courts,  in  which  the  judicial  power 
conferred  by  the  Constitution  on  the  General  Govern- 
ment can  be  deposited.  They  are  incapable  of  receiving 
it.  They  are  legislative  courts,  created  by  virtue  of  the 
general  right  of  sovereignty  which  exists  in  the  Govern- 
ment, or  in  virtue  of  that  clause  which  enables  Congress 
to  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting  the 
territory  belonging  to  the  United  States.*'  It  was  thus 
settled  at  an  early  day  that  the  colonies  or  territories 
of  the  United  States  are  governed,  as  all  other  colonies 
in  the  world 's  history  have  been  governed,  by  the  parent 
state,  without  the  right  to  participate  in  its  Constitution. 
With  all  the  fundamentals  thus  clearly  defined  in  har- 
mony with  the  past  history  of  the  world  as  to  the  relation 
of  colonies  to  the  constitution  of  the  parent  state,  there 
was  really  no  occasion  for  the  great  forensic  contest  and 
subsequent  conflict  among  the  judges  which  assumed 
such  large  proportions  in  what  are  known  as  the  Insular 
Tariff  Cases,  the  most  important  of  which  are  De  Lima 
V.  Bidwell,  182  U.  S.  1,  and  Downes  v.  Bidwell,  182  U.  S. 
244.  In  the  first,  the  question  was  this :  Was  the  island 
of  Porto  Rico,  after  the  treaty  with  Spain  for  the  trans- 
fer of  sovereignty  had  been  ratified  and  proclaimed,  and 
prior  to  any  action  by  Congress  in  regard  to  the  island, 
a  part  of  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  and  subject 
to  that  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  declares  that 
*  *  all  duties,  imports  and  excises  shall  be  uniform  through- 
out the  United  States '*!  It  was  held  that,  at  the  time 
the  duties  in  question  were  levied,  *' Porto  Rico  was  not 
a  foreign  country,  within  the  meaning  of  the  tariff  laws, 
but  a  territory  of  the  United  States ;  that  the  duties  were 
illegally  exacted,  and  the  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to  recover 
them  back.'*  In  the  second,  the  same  question  arose, 
after  the  passage,  on  April  12, 1900,  of  the  Foraker  Act, 
which  provided  for  a  territorial  government  in  Porto 
Rico  and  levied  a  duty  upon  such  products  of  the  island 
AS  migh{  be  brought  into  the  United  States.  When  the 
questioi)  of  the  validity  of  the  duty  so  imposed  arose, 


§55  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896  1917)   121 

it  was  held  to  be  valid,  regardless  of  the  riniformity 
clause  of  the  Constitution,  because,  in  the  opinion  of 
Mr.  Justice  Brown,  who  delivered  the  judgment,  the 
Constitution  does  not,  by  its  own  force,  extend  to  the 
possessions  of  the  United  States,  whether  created  into 
territories  with  a  regular  form  of  government,  or  exist- 
ing as  unorganized  possessions.  As  a  qualification  of 
that  statement,  that  ever  sane  and  luminous  judge  said : 
"To  sustain  the  judgment  in  the  case  under  considera- 
tion, it  by  no  means  becomes  necessary  to  show  that  none 
of  the  articles  of  the  Constitution  apply  to  the  island 
of  Porto  Rico.  There  .is  a  clear  distinction  between  such 
prohibitions  as  go  to  the  very  root  of  the  power  of  Con- 
gress to  act  at  all,  irrespective  of  time  or  place,  and 
such  as  are  operative  only  *  throughout  the  United  States' 
or  among  the  several  states.  Thus  when  the  Constitution 
declares  that  *no  bill  of  attainder  or  ex  post  facto  law 
shall  be  passed,'  and  that  *no  title  of  nobility  shall  be 
granted  by  the  United  States, '  it  goes  to  the  competency 
of  Congress  to  pass  a  bill  of  that  description.  Upon 
the  other  hand,  when  the  Constitution  declares  that  all 
duties  shall  be  uniform  *  throughout  the  United  States,' 
it  becomes  necessary  to  inquire  whether  there  be  any 
tei«ritory  over  which  Congress  has  jurisdiction  which  is 
not  a  part  of  the  *  United  States,'  by  which  term  we 
understand  the  States  whose  people  united  to  form  the 
Constitution,and  such  as  have  since  been  admitted  to 
the  Union  upon  an  equality  with  them."  Thus  it  was 
expressly  decided  that  incorporation  into  the  United 
States  territory  acquired  by  treaty  or  cession  in  which 
there  are  conditions  against  the  incorporation  of  the 
territory  until  Congress  provides  therefor,  will  not  take 
place  until  in  the  wisdom  of  Congress  it  is  deemed  that 
the  acquired  territory  has  reached  that  state  where  it 
is  proper  that  it  should  enter  into  and  form  a  part  of 
the  American  family.  Until  the  fiat  is  given  by  Con- 
gress, no  territory  can  pass  from  a  colonial  or  territorial 


122  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  55 

condition  into  that  full  statehood  which  alone  confers 
the  right  to  participate  in  the  national  Constitution. 

With  the  foregoing  preface  clearly  in  view,  it  will  be 
easy  to  explain  the  principles  of  that  class  of  cases  to 
which  Hawaii  v.  Mankichi,  190  U.  S.  197,  belongs.  Upon 
a  petition  for  habeas  corpus,  the  District  Court  of  the 
United  States  for  the  Territory  of  Havaii  discharged 
Mankichi,  who  had  been  convicted  of  manslaughter  upon 
an  indictment  not  found  by  a  grand  jury  and  upon  a 
verdict  rendered  upon  the  agreement  of  nine  jurors. 
Following  the  usual  course  of  procedure  in  Hawaii,  prior 
to  its  incorporation  as  a  territory  of  the  United  States, 
the  prisoner  was  tried  upon  an  indictment  by  the  attor- 
ney general,  resembling  an  information  at  common  law, 
and  indorsed  **a  true  bill  found  this  4th  day  of  May, 
A.  D.  1899.  A.  Perry,  first  judge  of  the  circuit  court,'* 
etc.  From  the  order  discharging  the  prisoner  the  attor- 
ney general  of  the  territory  appealed  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  where  it  was  contended  for 
the  prisoner  that  **It  is  contrary  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  that  any  person  should  be  held  to 
answer  for  a  capital  crime  unless  on  a  presentment  or 
indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  and  that  in  a  criminal  prose- 
cution a  conviction  should  be  had  by  verdict  of  nine 
members  of  the  jury.*'  In  disallowing  that  contention, 
the  court  held  that  the  then  existing  criminal  procedure 
of  the  Hawaiian  islands  was  not  superseded  by  the 
criminal  proceedings  by  grand  and  petit  juries,  as  pre- 
scribed by  Amendments  Five  and  Six  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  by  the  annexation  of  said  islands 
as  a  part  of  the  territory  of  the  United  States  and  sub- 
ject to  the  sovereign  dominion  thereof,  under  the  New- 
lands  resolution  of  July  7,  1898,  accepting  the  cession 
thereof  made  by  the  Republic  of  Hawaii,  and  continuing 
the  municipal  legislation  of  such  islands  not  inconsistent 
with  such  resolutions,  **nor  contrary  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,*'  until  Congress  should  otherwise 
determine.    In  concluding  its  judgment  the  Court  said: 


§56  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    123 

**  Inasmuch  as  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  status  of  the 
islands  and  the  powers  of  their  provisional  government 
were  measured  by  the  Newlands  Resolution,  and  the  case 
has  been  argued  upon  that  theory,  we  have  not  deemed 
it  necessary  to  consider  what  would  have  been  its  posi- 
tion had  the  important  words  *nor  contrary  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States'  been  omitted,  or  to 
reconsider  the  questions  which  arose  in  the  Insular  Tariff 
Cases  regarding  the  power  of  Congress  to  annex  terri- 
tory without,  at  the  same  time,  extending  the  constitution 
over  if 

§  56.  Rassmussen  v.  XT.  S.® — ^Incorporation  of  Alaska 
with  the  United  States  and  the  right  of  trial  by  a  jury  of 
twelve  men.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  Sixth  instead  of 
the  Fifth  Amendment  was  directly  involved  in  this  case, 
it  should  be  considered  here  because  it  illustrates  in 
such  a  vivid  way  the  constitutional  results  of  an  actual 
incorporation  of  a  colony  or  territory  with  the  parent 
state.  The  plaintiff  in  error  was  convicted  of  a  misde- 
meanor by  a  jury  of  six  men,  in  accordance  with  section 
171  of  the  Code  of  Alaska  adopted  by  Congress,  wherein 
it  was  provided  ^*That  hereafter  in  trials  for  misde- 
meanor six  persons  shall  constitute  a  legal  jury.**  At 
the  trial  a  common-law  jury  of  twelve  was  demanded 
and  refused,  and  upon  an  exception  to  that  ruling  the 
case  was  determined  on  appeal.  The  Court  said:  **At 
the  threshold  of  the  case  lies  the  constitutional  question 
whether  Congress  had  power  to  deprive  one  accused  in 
Alaska  of  a  misdemeanor  of  trial  by  a  common-law  jury ; 
that  is  to  say,  whether  the  provision  of  the  act  of  Con- 
gress in  question  was  repugnant  to  the  Sixth  Amendment 
to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  The  va- 
lidity of  the  provision  in  question  is,  therefore,  sought  to 
be  sustained  upon  the  proposition  that  the  Sixth  Amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  did  not  apply  to  Congress  in 
legislating  for  Alaska.    And  this  rests  upon  two  conten- 

»— 197  u.  8.  516. 


124  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  56 

• 

tions,  which  we  proceed  separately  to  consider.  1st. 
Alaska  was  not  incorporated  into  the  United  States,  and 
therefore  the  Sixth  Amendment  did  not  control  Congress 
in  legislating  for  Alaska.  .  .  .  2d.  That  even  if  Alaska 
was  incorporated  into  the  United  States,  as  it  was  not  an 
organized  territory,  therefore  the  provisions  of  the  Sixth 
Amendment  were  not  controlling  on  Congress  when  leg- 
islating for  Alaska.^'  In  rejecting  those  contentions,  and 
in  reaching  the  conclusion  that  by  the  treaty  nnder  which 
it  was  acquired,  and  by  the  subsequent  congressional 
legislation  imposing  internal  revenue  taxation,  and  ex- 
tending the  laws  of  the  United  States  as  to  customs, 
commerce  and  navigation  over  Alaska,  and  establishing 
a  collection  district  therein,  Alaska  was  so  incorporated 
into  the  United  States  as  to  render  the  article  of  the  Code 
in  question  (31  Stat,  at  L.  358,  c.  786)  repugnant  to  the 
Sixth  Amendment,  the  Court  said :  *  *  Without  attempting 
to  examine  in  detail  the  opinions  in  the  various  cases,  in 
our  judgment  it  clearly  results  from  them  that  they  sub- 
stantially rested  upon  the  proposition  that  where  territory 
was  a  part  of  the  United  States,  the  inhabitants  thereof 
were  entitled  to  the  guaranties  of  the  Fifth,  Sixth  and 
Seventh  Amendments,  and  that  the  act  of  Congress  pur- 
porting to  extend  the  Constitution  were  considered  as  de- 
claring merely  of  a  result  which  existed  independently  by 
the  inherent  operation  of  the  Constitution.  It  is  true  that, 
in  some  of  the  opinions,  both  the  application  of  the  Con- 
stitution and  the  statutory  provisions  declaring  such 
application  were  referred  to,  but  in  others  no  reference 
to  such  statutes  was  made,  and  the  cases  proceeded  upon 
a  line  of  reasoning  leaving  room  for  no  other  view  than 
that  the  conclusion  of  the  court  was  rested  upon  the  self- 
operative  application  of  the  Constitution.  Springville  v. 
Thomas,  166  U.  S.  707;  Thompson  v.  Utah,  170  U.  S.  343; 
Capital  Traction  Co.  v.  Hof ,  174  U.  S.  1 ;  Black  v.  Jack- 
son, 177  U.  S.  349.  ...  As  it  conclusively  results  from 
the  foregoing  considerations  that  the  Sixth  Amendment 
to  the  Constitution  was  applicable  to  Alaska,  and  as,  of 


5  57  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    125 

course,  being  applicable,  it  was  controlling  upon  Con- 
gress in  legislating  for  Alaska,  it  follows  that  the  provi- 
sion of  the  act  of  Congress  under  consideration,  depriving 
persons  accused  of  a  misdemeanor  in  Alaska  of  a  right 
to  trial  by  a  conunon-law  jury,  was  repugnant  to  the  Con- 
stitution and  void.'* 

§  57.  A  group  of  cases  involving  the  extension  of  due 
process  to  the  Philippine  Islands.  Consideration  should 
be  given  here  to  a  group  of  cases  involving  the  extension 
of  due  process  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine 
Islands,  residing  on  territory  not  incorporated  into  the 
United  States.  In  the  case  of  Dorr  v.  United  States, 
195  U.  S.  138,  the  court,  in  reaching  the  conclusion  that 
the  Constitution,  of  its  own  force,  and  without  legisla- 
tion, did  not  extend  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  to  the 
Philippine  Islands,  ceded  by  Spain  to  the  United  States, 
and  not  incorporated  by  congressional  action,  said :  **  As 
we  have  had  occasion  to  see  in  the  case  of  Kepner  v. 
United  States,  195  U.  S.  100,  the  President,  in  his  instruc- 
tions to  the  Philippine  Commission,  while  impressing  the 
necessity  of  carrying  into  the  government  the  guaranties 
of  the  Bill  of  Bights  securing  those  safeguards  to  life 
and  liberty  which  are  deemed  essential  to  our  govern- 
ment, was  careful  to  reserve  the  right  to  trial  by  jury, 
which  was  doubtless  due  to  the  fact  that  the  civilized 
portion  of  the  island  had  a  system  of  jurisprudence 
founded  upon  the  civil  law,  and  the  uncivilized  parts  of 
the  archipelago  were  wholly  unfitted  to  exercise  the  right 
of  trial  by  jury.  The  Spanish  system,  in  force  in  the 
Philippines,  gave  the  right  to  the  accused  to  be  tried 
before  judges,  who  acted,  in  effect,  as  a  court  of  inquiry, 
and  whose  judgments  were  not  final  until  passed  in 
review  before  the  audiencia,  or  superior  court,  with  right 
of  final  review,  and  power  to  grant  a  new  trial  for  errors 
of  law,  in  the  supreme  court  at  Madrid.  To  this  system 
the  Philippine  Commission,  in  executing  the  power  con- 
ferred by  the  orders  of  the  President,  and  sanctioned  by 


126  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  57 

act  of  Congress  (act  of  July  1,  1902,  32  Stai  at  L.  691, 
0. 1369),  has  added  a  guaranty  of  the  right  of  the  accused 
to  be  heard  by  himself  and  counsel,  to  demand  the  nature 
and  cause  of  the  accusation  against  him,  to  have  a  speech 
and  public  trial,  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face 
to  face,  and  to  have  compulsory  process  to  compel  the 
attendance  of  witnesses  in  his  behalf.  And,  further,  that 
no  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  criminal  offense 
without  due  process  of  law,  nor  to  be  put  twice  in 
jeopardy  of  punishment  for  the  same  offense,  nor  to  be 
compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself.  As  appears  in  the  Kepner  Case,  195  U.  S.  100, 
the  accused  is  given  the  right  of  appeal  from  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court  of  first  instance  to  the  supreme  court, 
and,  in  capital  cases,  the  case  goes  to  the  latter  court 
without  appeal. '*  It  was  therefore  held  in  Trono  v. 
United  States,  199  U.  S.  521,  that  while  the  act  of  Con- 
gress of  July  1,  1902,  provided  (Sec.  5)  that  **no  per- 
son for  the  same  offense  shall  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy 
of  punishment,**  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Philippine 
Islands  did  not  err  in  reversing  the  judgment  of  the 
court  of  first  instance,  and  convicting  the  accused  of 
the  crime  of  homicide  (substantially  murder  in  the  sec- 
ond degree),  included  in,  and  a  lower  degree  of  the  crime 
charged  in  the  complaint,  and  yet  a  higher  degree  of 
crime  than  that  of  which  the  accused  was  convicted 
(assault)  in  the  primary  court  The  Court  said:  **We 
may  regard  the  question  as  thus  presented  as  the  same 
as  if  it  arose  in  one  of  the  Federal  courts  in  this  coun- 
try.'* In  Grafton  v.  United  States,  206  U.  S.  333,  in 
which  an  acquittal  of  homicide,  as  defined  by  the  Philip- 
pine criminal  code,  was  pleaded  as  a  bar  to  a  subsequent 
trial  for  the  same  offense  in  a  civil  court,  the  accused 
based  his  plea  in  part  upon  the  Fifth  Amendment  and  in 
part  upon  that  section  of  the  Philippine  act  which  declares 
that  **no  person,  for  the  same  offense,  shall  be  twice 
put  in  jeopardy  of  punishment.**  The  plea  was  sus- 
tained and  the  conviction  in  civil  court  reversed.    See 


S  58  PIPTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)   127 

Gavieres  v.  United  States,  220  U.  S.  338,  and  Dowdell  v. 
United  States,  221  U.  S.  325,  in  which  it  was  said:  **As 
to  the  objection  that  no  indictment  was  f onnd  by  a  grand 
jury,  as  required  by  article  5  of  the  Amendment  of  the 
Constitution,  there  is  no  such  requirement  in  the  Philip- 
pine act  of  July  1, 1902.  It  is  therein  provided  that  *no 
law  shall  be  enacted  which  shall  deprive  any  person  of 
life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law/ 
This  court  has  held  that  due  process  of  law  does  not 
require  presentment  of  an  indictment  found  by  a  grand 
jury.  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516/*  See  also, 
Tiaco  V.  Forbes,  228  U.  S.  549 ;  MacLeod  v.  United  States, 
229  U.  S.  416;  Ocampo  v.  United  States,  234  U.  S.  91. 

§58.  Bedford  v.  U.  8.^  <>  — Distinguished  from  the 
Lynah  Case.  Appellant  claimed  that  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment had  been  violated  by  the  taking  of  private  property 
for  public  use  by  the  United  States  through  the  con- 
struction of  certain  revetments  on  the  Mississippi  river, 
which  caused  injury  to  his  lands  as  a  riparian  property, 
through  overflow  and  erosion  as  the  result  of  the  action 
of  that  river  through  a  series  of  years.  The  government 
contended  that  as  the  revetments  were  not  on  appellant 's 
lands,  the  damage  was  too  remote  to  constitute  a  taking, 
because  of  its  right  to  claim,  in  protecting  the  property 
intrusted  to  its  care,  the  benefit  of  the  principle  which 
authorizes  a  riparian  owner  to  preserve  existing  condi- 
tions, although  he  may  not  erect  constructions  which  will 
change  those  conditions.  Subject  to  that  limitation,  he 
may  preserve  his  property  irrespective  of  the  conse- 
quences to  his  neighbors.  Jn  sustaining  that  contention 
the  Court  said :  *  *  The  constitution  provided  that  private 
property  shall  not  be  taken  without  just  compensation, 
but  a  distinction  has  been  made  between  damage  and 
taking,  and  that  distinction  must  be  observed  in  applying 
the  constitutional  provision.  An  excellent  illustration  is 
found  in  Gibson  v.  United  States,  166  U.  S.  269.    The 

10—192  TJ.  S.  217. 


128  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  58 

distinction  is  there  instructively  explained,  and  other 
cases  need  not  be  cited.  It  is,  however,  necessary  to 
refer  to  United  States  v.  Lynah,  188  U.  S.  445,  as  it  is 
especially  relied  upon  by  appellants.  .  .  .  The  question 
was  asked :  *Does  this  amount  to  a  taking! '  To  which  it 
was  replied:  *The  case  of  Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  and 
M.  Canal  Co.,  13  Wall.  166,  answers  this  question  in  the 
aflSrmative.'  And  further:  *The  Green  Bay  Company, 
as  authorized  by  statute,  constructed  a  dam  across  Fox 
river,  by  means  of  which  the  land  of  Pumpelly  was  over- 
flowed and  rendered  practically  useless  to  him.  There, 
as  here,  no  proceeding  had  been  taken  to  formally  con- 
demn the  land.'  In  both  cases,  therefore,  it  was  said 
that  there  was  an  actual  invasion  and  appropriation  of 
land  as  distinguished  from  consequential  damage.  In 
the  case  at  bar  the  damage  was  strictly  consequentiaL 
It  was  the  result  of  the  action  of  the  river  through  a 
course  of  years.  The  case  at  bar,  therefore,  is  distin- 
guishable from  the  Lynah  Case  in  the  cause  and  manner 
of  the  injury.  In  the  Lynah  Case  the  works  were  con- 
structed in  the  tide  of  the  river,  obstructed  the  natural 
flow  of  its  waters,  and  were  held  to  have  caused,  as  a 
direct  consequence,  the  overflow  of  Lynah 's  plantation. 
In  the  case  at  bar  the  works  were  constructed  along  the 
banks  of  the  river,  and  their  effect  was  to  resist  erosion 
of  the  banks  by  the  water  of  the  river.  There  was  no 
other  interference  with  natural  conditions.  Therefore, 
the  damage  to  appellant's  land,  if  it  can  be  assigned  to 
the  work  at  all,  was  but  an  incidental  consequence  of 
theuL"  i 

§59.  Bnttfleld  v.  Stranahan  ^^— How  far  the  power 
to  regulate  foreign  commerce  is  limited  by  due  process. 

The  constitutionality  of  the  Act  of  March  2,  1897,  which 
had  for  its  purpose  the  exclusion  from  the  country  of 
the  lowest  grades  of  tea,  was  assailed  under  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  upon  the  fol- 

11—192  U.  S.  470. 


859  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CX)NTINTJBD  (1896-1917)    129 

lowing  grounds:  **lst,  that  the  act  of  March  2,  1897, 
confers  authority  to  establish  standards,  and  that  such 
power  is  legislative  and  can  not  constitutionally  be  dele- 
gated by  Congress  to  administrative  ofBcers;  2d,  that 
the  plaintiff  in  error  had  a  vested  right  to  engage  as  a 
trader  in  foreign  commerce  and  as  such  to  import  teas 
into  the  United  States,  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  were 
pure,  wholesome,  and  free  from  adulteration,  fraud,  and 
deception,  and  which  were  fit  for  consumption ;  3d,  that 
the  establishment  and  enforcement  of  standards  of  qual- 
ity of  teas,  which  operated  to  deprive  the  alleged  vested 
right,  constituted  a  deprivation  without  due  process  of 
law ;  4th,  that  the  act  is  unconstitutional,  because  it  does 
not  provide  that  notice  and  opportunity  to  be  heard 
afforded  an  importer  before  the  rejection  of  his  tea  by 
the  tea  examiner,  or  the  tea  board  of  general  appraisers ; 
and,  5th,  that,  in  any  event,  the  authority  conferred  by  the 
statute  to  destroy  goods  upon  the  expiration  of  the  time 
limit  for  their  removal  for  export,  and  the  destruction 
of  such  property  without  a  judicial  proceeding,  was  con- 
demnation of  property  without  hearing  and  the  taking 
thereof  without  due  process  of  law.'*  These  several 
grounds  rested  upon  the  fundamental  contention  that 
the  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  commerce  with  foreign 
nations  and  between  the  states  is  subject  to  such  limita- 
tipns  as  are  prescribed  by  the  Constitution  and  its  amend- 
ments; that  if  in  the  exercise  of  such  power  Congress 
deems  it  necessary  to  take  private  property  for  a  public 
use,  then  it  must  proceed  subject  to  the  limitations  im- 
posed by  the  Fifth  Amendment,  and  can  do  so  only  on 
payment  of  just  compensation.  In  holding  that  no  one 
has  such  a  vested  right  to  trade  with  foreign  nations  as 
prevents  Congress,  in  the  exercise  of  its  plenary  power 
to  regulate  foreign  commerce,  from  prohibiting  by  the 
inspection  Act  of  March  2,  1897,  the  importation  of 
teas  below  the  government  standards,  when  it  considers 
it  wise  policy  to  do  so,  the  Court  said:  **The  claim 
that  the  statute  conunits  to  the  arbitrary  discretion  of 

Due  Process — 9 


130  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  59 

the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  the  determination  of  what 
teas  may  be  imported,  and  therefore  in  eflfect  vests  that 
oflScial  with  legislative  power,  is  without  merit.  We  are 
of  opinion  that  the  statute,  when  properly  construed,  as 
said  by  the  circuit  court  of  appeals,  but  expresses  the 
purpose  to  exclude  the  lowest  grades  of  tea,  whether  de- 
monstrably of  inferior  purity,  or  unfit  for  consumption, 
or  presumably  so  because  of  their  inferior  quality.  This, 
in  effect,  was  the  fixing  of  a  primary  standard,  and 
devolved  upon  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  the  mere 
executive  duty  to  effectuate  the  legislative  policy  declared 
in  the  statute.  The  case  is  within  the  principle  of 
Marshall  Field  &  Co.  v.  Clark,  143  U.  S.  643,  where  it  was 
decided  that  the  3rd  section  of  the  tariff  act  of  October  1, 
1890,  was  not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  as  conferring 
legislative  and  treaty-making  power  on  the  President, 
because  it  authorized  him  to  suspend  the  provisions  of 
the  act  relating  to  the  free  introduction  of  sugar,  molas- 
ses, coffee,  tea,  and  hides.  We  may  say  of  the  legislation 
in  this  case,  as  was  said  of  the  legislation  considered  in 
Marshall  Field  &  Co.  v.  Clark,  that  it  does  not  in  any 
real  sense,  invest  administrative  officials  with  the  power 
of  legislation.  Congress  legislated  on  the  subject  as  far 
as  was  reasonably  practicable,  and  from  the  necessities 
of  the  case  was  compelled  to  leave  to  executive  officials 
the  duty  to  bring  about  the  result  pointed  out  by  the  stat- 
ute. To  deny  the  power  of  Congress  to  delegate  such  a 
duty  would  in  effect,  amount  but  to  declaring  that  the 
plenary  power  vested  in  Congress  to  regulate  foreign 
commerce  could  not  be  efficaciously  exerted.  ...  It  is 
urged  that  there  was  denial  of  due  process  of  law  in  fail- 
ing to  accord  plaintiff  in  error  a  hearing  before  the  board 
of  tea  inspectors  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in 
establishing  the  standard  in  question,  and  before  the  gen- 
eral appraisers  upon  the  reexamination  of  the  tea.  Waiv- 
ing the  point  that  the  plaintiff  in  error  does  not  appear 
to  have  asked  for  a  hearing,  and  assuming  that  the  statute 
did  not  confer  such  a  right,  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  stat- 


§  60  FIFTH  AMtBNDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)   131 

Bte  was  not  objectionable  for  that  reason.  ...  It  re- 
mains only  to  consider  the  contention  that  the  provision  of 
the  statute  conunanding^  the  destruction  of  teas  not  ex- 
ported within  six  months  after  their  final  rejection  was 
unconstitutional.  .  .  .  The  duty  to  take  such  action  "viras 
enjoined  upon  him  (the  importer),  and,  if  he  failed  to  ex- 
ercise it,  the  collector  was  under  the  obligation,  after  the 
expiration  of  the  time  limit,  to  destroy  the  goods.  That 
plaintiff  in  error  had  knowledge  of  the  various  steps  taken 
with  respect  to  the  tea,  including  the  final  rejection  by 
the  board  of  general  appraisers,  is  conceded.  We  think 
the  provision  of  the  statute  complained  of  was  not  want- 
ing in  due  process  of  law/' 

§  60.  Adams  v.  New  York  ^^ — ^Dne  process  and  the  ad- 
mission of  evidence  illegally  obtained.  Adams  was  con- 
victed of  the  crime  of  having  in  his  possession,  knowingly, 
certain  gambling  paraphernalia  used  in  the  game  com- 
monly known  as  policy,  in  violation  of  §  344a  of  the  Penal 
Code  of  the  State  of  New  York.  The  principal  assign- 
ment of  error  was  *  *  that  the  court  erred  in  holding  that 
by  the  reception  in  evidence  of  the  defendant's  private 
papers  seized  in  the  raid  of  his  premises,  against  his  pro- 
test and  without  his  consent,  which  had  no  relation  what- 
soever to  the  game  policy,  for  the  possession  of  papers 
used  in  connection  with  which  said  game  he  was  con- 
victed, his  constitutional  right  to  be  secure  in  his  person, 
papers  and  effects  against  unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures  was  not  violated,  and  that  he  was  also  thereby 
not  compelled  to  be  a  witness  against  himself,  in  contra- 
vention of  the  4th,  and  5th,  and  14th  Articles  of  Amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.''  The 
essence  of  that  contention,  was  that  a  trial  and  convic- 
tion in  an  unconstitutional  way  is  as  violative  of  a  def  end- 
ant 's  constitutional  rights  as  a  trial  and  conviction  under 
an  unconstitutional  law.  Ee  Nielsen,  131  U.  S.  176.  In 
overruling  that  contention  the  Court  said:    **So  far  as 

12—192  n.  S.  585. 


134  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  61 

ment  to  summarily  arrest  him  wherever  he  may  be  found, 
transport  him,  perhaps,  far  away  from  his  home,  and  sub- 
ject him,  among  strangers,  to  the  diflSculties  and  expense 
of  making  his  defense.  It  is  unnecessary  to  definitely  de- 
termine this  question.  It  is  sufiicient  for  this  case  to 
decide,  as  we  do,  that  the  indictment  is  prima  facie  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  probable  cause.  This  is  not  in 
conflict  with  the  views  expressed  by  this  court  in  Greene 
V.  Henkel,  183  U.  S.  249.  .  .  .  With  reference  to  other 
questions  we  remark  that,  so  far  as  respects  technical 
objections,  the  sufficiency  of  the  indictment  is  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  court  in  which  it  was  found,  and  is  not  a 
matter  of  inquiry  in  removal  proceedings  (Greene  v. 
Henkel,  183  U.  S.  249) ;  that  the  defendant  has  there  no 
right  to  an  investigation  of  the  proceedings  before  the 
grand  jury,  or  an  inquiry  concerning  what  testimony  was 
presented  to,  or  what  witnesses  were  heard  by,  that  body. 
In  other  words,  he  may  not  impeach  an  indictment  by 
evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  grand  jury  did  not  have 
testimony  before  it  sufficient  to  justify  its  action. '  * ' 

§  62.  Public  Clearing  House  v.  Coyne  ^* — ^Due  process 
as  a  limitation  on  power  to  regulate  the  mails.  Appel- 
lant filed  a  bill  in  equity  to  enjoin  the  postmaster  at 
Chicago  from  seizing  and  detaining  his  mail,  stamping  it 
' 'fraudulent,"  and  returning  it  to  the  senders,  and  from 
denying  to  him  the  use  of  the  registered-letter  and  money 
order  systems,  upon  the  ground  that  the  statutes  author- 
izing such  conduct  were  unconstitutional,  under  the  due 
process  of  law  clause  of  the  Federal  constitution,  because 
they  direct  *  *  the  Postmaster  General,  upon  evidence  sat- 
isfactory to  him,  and  which  do  not  provide  for  any  trial, 
hearing,  or  inquiry  of  any  kind,  arbitrarily  to  seize  the 
honest  mail  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  as  alleged 
in  the  bill,  and  to  interdict  and  prohibit  its  receiving 
any  mail,  to  destroy  its  business  and  its  property  and 
property  rights,  and  to  subject  its  papers  and  sealed 

14—194  U.  S.  497. 


§  62  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    135 

packets  to  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures."  In 
upholding  the  constitutionality  of  such  statutes  the 
Supreme  Court  said:  **It  is  too  late  to  argue  that  due 
process  of  law  is  denied  whenever  the  disposition  of 
property  is  affected  by  the  order  of  an  executive  depart- 
ment. .  .  .  That  due  process  of  law  does  not  necessarily 
require  the  interference  of  the  judicial  power  is  laid  down 
in  many  cases  and  by  many  eminent  writers  upon  the  sub- 
ject to  constitutional  limitations.  Den  ex  dem.  Murray 
V.  Hoboken  Land  &  Improv.  Co.,  18  How.  272 ;  Bushnell  v. 
Leland,  164  TJ.  S.  684,  ...  If  the  ordinary  daily  trans- 
actions of  the  departments,  which  involve  an  interference 
with  private  rights,  were  required  to  be  submitted  to  the 
courts  before  action  was  finally  taken,  the  result  would 
entail  practically  a  suspension  of  some  of  the  most  impor- 
tant functions  of  the  government.  Even  in  the  recent  case 
of  the  American  School  of  Magnetic  Healing  v.  McAn- 
nulty,  187  U.  S.  94,  the  constitutionality  of  the  law 
authorizing  seizures  of  this  kind  by  the  Postmaster  Gen- 
eral was  assumed,  if  not  actually  decided,  the  only  reser- 
vation being  that  the  person  injured  may  apply  to  the 
courts  for  redress  in  case  the  Postmaster  General  has 
exceeded  his  authority,  or  his  action  is  palpably  wrong. 
So,  too,  in  the  recent  case  of  Bates  &  G.  Co.  v.  Payne, 
194  TJ.  S.  106,  ante,  p.  894,  the  law  was  also  assumed  to 
be  constitutional,  the  only  doubtful  question  being 
whether  this  court  should  accept  the  findings  of  the  Post- 
master General  as  to  the  classification  of  the  mail  matter 
as  final  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Inasmuch 
as  the  action  of  the  Postmaster  in  seizing  letters  and 
returning  them  to  the  writers  is  subject  to  revision  by 
the  judicial  department  of  the  government  in  cases  where 
the  postmaster  has  exceeded  his  authority  under  the 
statute  (American  School  of  Magnetic  Healing  v.  McAn- 
nuMy,  187  TJ.  S.  94),  we  think  it  within  the  power  of 
Congress  to  intrust  him  with  the  power  of  seizing  and 
detaining  letters  upon  evidence  satisfactory  to  himself, 
and  that  his  action  will  not  be  reviewed  by  the  court  in 


136  DUE  PBOCESS  OP  LAW  §  62 

doubtful  cases/*  Thus  it  was  settled  that  because  the 
action  of  the  Postmaster  General  *4s  subject  to  revision 
by  the  judicial  department  of  the  government  in  cases 
where  the  postmaster  has  exceeded  his  authority  under 
the  statute,  *'  the  absence  of  any  provision  for  a  judicial 
hearing  on  the  question  of  legality  does  not  render  such 
statute  or  statutes  repugnant  to  the  due  process  of  law 
clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 

§  63.  U.  S.  ex  rel.  Turner  v.  Williams  ^^ — ^Dne  process 
as  a  limitation  on  power  to  exdnde  alien  anarchists.  In 
his  petition  for  habeas  corpus  Turner  alleged :  **  Second. 
Your  relator  is  so  imprisoned  by  virtue  of  a  warrant 
sworn  out  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce and. Labor,  which  warrant  charges  your  relator 
with  being  an  anarchist,  and  being  unlawfully  within  the 
United  States,  in  violation  of  2  and  20  of  the  immigration 
laws  of  the  United  States,  as  amended  by  act  of  March 
3,  1903  (32  Stat,  at  L.  1213,  chap.  1012).  Third.  Upon 
information  and  belief,  that  a  special  board  of  inquiry, 
consisting  of  Charles  Dempsey,  Captain  Weldon,  super- 
vising inspector,  and  L.  C.  Stewart,  all  of  whom  are 
executive  officers  of  the  United  States,  has  inquired  into 
your  relator 's  case,  and  decided  that  your  relator  is  an 
anarchist,  and  is  in  the  United  States  in  violation  of 
law,  within  the  meaning  of  the  act  of  March  3,  1903.'* 
Petitioner  claimed  that  said  act  is  unconstitutional  be- 
cause in  contravention  of  the  1st,  5th  and  6th  articles 
of  amendment  of  the  constitution,  and  of  §  1  of  article  3 
of  that  instrument;  and  because  no  power  *4s  delegated 
by  the  Constitution  to  the  general  government  over 
alien  friends  with  reference  to  their  admission  into  the 
United  States  or  otherwise,  or  over  the  beliefs  of  citi- 
zens, denizens,  sojourners,  or  aliens,  or  over  freedom  of 
speech  or  the  press.**  In  overruling  that  contention 
the  Court  said :  *  *  Bepeated  decisions  of  this  court  have 
determined  that   Congress  has  the  power  to   exclude 

16—194  U.  S.  279. 


§  63  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    137 

aliens  from  the  United  States;  to  prescribe  the  terms 
and  conditions  on  which  they  may  come  in;  to  estab- 
lish regulations  for  sending  out  of  the  country  such 
aliens  as  have  entered  in  violation  of  law,  and  to  com- 
mit the  enforcement  of  such  conditions  and  regula- 
tions to  executive  officers;  that  the  deportation  of  an 
alien  who  is  found  to  be  here  in  violation  of  law  not  a 
deprivation  of  liberty  without  due  process  of  law,  and 
that  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  securing  the  right 
to  trial  by  jury  have  no  application.  Chae  Chan  Ping  v. 
United  States,  130  U.  S.  581 ;  Nishimura  Ekiu  v.  United 
States,  142  U.  S.  651;  Fong  Yue  Ting  v.  United  States, 
149  U.  S.  698 ;  Lem  Moon  Sing  v.  United  States,  158  U.  S. 
538;  Wong  Wing  v.  United  States,  163  U.  S.  228;  Fok 
Yung  Yo  V.  United  States,  185  U.  S.  296;  Japanese 
Immigrants  Case,  189  U.  S.  86 ;  Chin  Bak  Kan  v.  United 
States,  186  U.  S.  193 ;  United  States  v.  Sing  Tuck,  194 
U.  S.  161.  ...  In  the  present  case  alienage  was  con- 
ceded, and  was  not  in  dispute,  and  it  was  the  question  of 
fact  thereupon  arising  that  was  passed  on  by  the  board, 
and  by  the  Secretary  on  appeal.  Whether  rested  on  the 
accepted  principle  of  international  law,  that  every  sov- 
ereign nation  has  the  power,  as  inherent  in  sovereignty 
and  essential  to  self-preservation,  to  forbid  the  entrance 
of  foreigners  within  its  dominions,  or  to  admit  them  only 
in  such  cases  and  upon  such  conditions  as  it  may  see  fit 
to  prescribe ;  or  on  the  power  to  regulate  commerce  with 
foreign  nations,  which  includes  the  entrance  of  ships,  the 
importation  of  goods,  and  the  bringing  of  persons  into 
the  ports  of  the  United  States,  the  act  before  us  is  not 
open  to  constitutional  objection.  And  while  we  held  in 
Wong  Wing  v.  United  States,  163  U.  S.  228,  a  certain 
provision  of  an  immigration  law  invalid  on  that  ground, 
this  act  does  not  come  within  the  ruling.  .  .  .  We  do 
not  feel  called  upon  to  reconsider  these  decisions,  and  they 
dispose  of  the  specific  contentions  as  to  the  application 
of  the  5th  and  6th  Amendments,  and  §  1  of  article  3, 


138  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  63 

and  the  denial  of  the  delegation  to  the  general  govern- 
ment of  the  power  to  enact  this  law. '  ^ 

§  64.  Shepard  v.  Barron  ^<^— When  estoppel  to  contest 
constitutionality  may  be  set  up  against  promoters  of 
public  improvement.  The  plaintiffs  in  this  case  filed  a 
bill  in  a  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  attacking  the 
validity  of  an  act  of  the  legislature  of  Ohio  on  the  ground 
that  the  frontage  rule  of  assessment  fixed  by  the  Statute 
under  which  the  improvement  was  made  operated  as  a 
denial  of  due  process  of  law.  In  the  words  o(f  the 
Supreme  Court:  **But  the  plaintiffs  also  insist  that  the 
act  is  void  as  a  violation  of  the  5th  and  14th  Amendments 
to  the  Federal  Constitution.  The  assessment  per  front 
foot,  it  is  contended,  leads  in  this  case  to  a  confiscation 
of  the  property  of  the  plaintiffs,  and  is  not  based  upon 
the  fact  of  benefits  received,  and  it  results  in  a  taking  of 
the  property  of  plaintiffs  without  due  process  of  law.** 
When  that  contention  was  met  by  the  plea  that  the  abut- 
ting owners  who  petitioned  for  the  improvement  were 
estopped  by  their  recognition  of  the  justice  of  the  assess- 
ment, and  by  their  active  participation  in  carrying  on 
the  work,  the  Court  sustained  it,  saying:  ** Where,  as  in 
this  case,  the  work  is  done  and  the  assessment  made 
at  the  instance  and  request  of  plaintiffs  and  the  other 
owners,  and  pursuant  to  an  act  (in  form  at  least)  of 
the  legislature  of  the  state,  and  in  strict  compliance  with 
its  provisions  and  with  the  petition  of  the  landowners, 
there  is  an  implied  contract  arising  from  such  facts  that 
the  party  at  whose  request  and  for  whose  benefit  the  work 
has  been  done  will  pay  for  it  in  the  manner  provided  for 
by  the  act  under  which  the  work  was  done.  ...  On 
principles  of  general  law,  we  are  satisfied  that  the  plain- 
tiffs are  not  in  a  position  to  assert  the  unconstitution- 
ality of  the  act  under  which  they  petitioned  that  pro- 
ceedings should  be  taken.  ...  In  Wight  v.  Davidson, 
181  U.  S.  371,  this  court,  while  not  positively  deciding 

16—194  IT.  S.  553. 


§65  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    139 

the  proposition,  yet  strongly  intimated,  that  by  reason 
of  the  acts  of  appellees  they  were  not  in  a  position  to 
question  the  validity  of  the  statute  there  under  consid- 
eration. *  * 

§  65.  Fayerweather  v.  Ritch  ^^ — ^Relation  of  due  proc- 
ess to  res  judicata.    In  this  case  it  was  held  that  where 
a  Federal  court  gives  effect  to  the  judgment  of  a  state 
court,  as  res  judicata,  in  the  face  of  a  claim  that  such 
judgment  deprived  the  parties  of  their  property  under 
forms  of  law,  while  failing  to  provide  a  judicial  finding 
of  the  essential  facts  that  alone  could  have  justified 
such  deprivation,  the  application  of  the  due  process  of 
law  clause  of  the  Federal  Amendment  is  so  involved  as 
to  justify  a  direct  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court.    After 
stating  the  facts,  that  Court  said:    **The  contention  is 
that,  by  article  5  of  the  Amendments  to  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution, no  person  can  *be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property,  without  due  process  of  law;'  that  these  plain- 
tiffs were  entitled  to  large  shares  of  the  estate  of  Daniel 
B.  Fayerweather;  that  they  were  deprived  of  this  prop- 
erty by  the  judgment  of  the  circuit  court,  which  gave 
unwarranted  effect  to  a  judgment  of  the  state  courts; 
that  this  action  of  the  circuit  court  is  not  to  be  considered 
a  mere  error  in  the  progress  of  a  trial,  but  a  deprivation 
of  property  under  the  forms  of  legal  procedure.    In  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  B.  Co.  V.  Chicago,  166  U.  S.  226,  we  held 
that  a  judgment  of  a  state  court  might  be  here  reviewed 
if  it  operated  to  deprive  a  party  of  his  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  and  that  the  fact  that  the  parties 
were  properly  brought  into  court  and  admitted  to  make 
defense  was  not  absolutely  conclusive  upon  the  question 
of  due  process.    ...    If  a  judgment  of  a  state  court 
can  be  reviewed  by  this  court  on  error  upon  the  ground 
that,  although  the  forms  of  law  were  observed,  it  neces- 
sarily operated  to  wrongfully  deprive  a  party  of  his  prop- 
erty (as  indicated  by  the  decision  just  referred  to),  a 

17-i-195  U.  S.  276. 


140  DXJE  PRCK3ESS  OF  LAW  §  65 

judgment  of  the  circuit  court  of  the  United  States,  claimed 
to  give  such  unwarranted  effect  to  a  decision  of  a  state 
court  as  to  accomplish  the  same  result,  may  also  be  con- 
sidered as  presenting  the  question  how  far  it  can  be  sus- 
tained in  the  view  of  the  prohibitory  language  of  the  5th 
Amendment,  and  thus  involve  the  application  of  the  Con- 
stitution. *  * 

§66.  McOray  v.  U.  S.^^— Due  process  and  constitn- 
tionality  of  oleomargarine  tax.  The  essence  of  plaintiff 
in  error ^s  contention  was  thus  stated:  **The  district 
court  erred  in  refusing  to  hold  that  the  act  of  Congress 
approved  August  2, 1886,  as  amended  by  the  act  of  Con- 
gress approved  May  9,  1902,  is  in  contravention  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  of 
the  Amendments  thereto,  and  is  illegal  and  void,  for  the 
reasons:  (a)  The  act  deprives  the  defendant  of  his  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law.  (b)  The  act  is  an 
unwarranted  encroachment  upon,  and  an  interference 
with  the  police  powers  reserved  to  the  several  states 
and  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  (c)  The  act  so 
arbitrarily  discriminates  against  oleomargarine  in  favor 
of  butter  as  to  destroy  the  oleomargarine  industry  for 
the  benefit  of  the  butter  industry  of  the  United  States, 
and  is  thus  repugnant  to  those  fundamental  principles 
which  are  inherent  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  The  district  court  erred  in  holding,  if  said  act 
be  not  in  contravention  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  that  oleomargarine,  which  contains  no  artificial 
coloration  than  that  imparted  to  it  by  the  use  of  butter 
which  itself  contains  coloring  matter,  and  which  there- 
fore causes  said  oleomargarine  to  look  like  butter  of  a 
shade  of  yellow,  is  subject  to  a  tax  of  10  cents  per  pound 
instead  of  a  tax  of  one-fourth  of  1  cent  per  pound.**  In 
reaching  the  conclusion  *Hhat  the  manufacture  of  arti- 
ficially colored  oleomargarine  may  be  prohibited  by  a 
free  government  without  a  violation  of  fundamental 

18— 195  U.  S.  27. 


§  66  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)   141 

rights/'  the  Court  said:  *^The  errors  relied  upon  em- 
brace not  only  the  contention  that  the  act  of  Congress 
imposing  the  tax  is  repugnant  to  the  Constitution,  but 
also  that  the  penalty  was  wrongfully  enforced,  because 
the  one-quarter  of  a  cent  per  pound  which  had  been  paid 
on  the  oleomargarine  was  the  only  tax  to  which  it  was 
liable  under  the  act  of  Congress  when  rightly  construed. 
•  .  .  it  is  insisted  that  the  acts  in  question  are  void, 
because  the  burdens  which  they  impose  are  repugnant 
to  both  the  5th  and  10th  Amendments.  To  the  5th  Amend- 
ment, because  the  amount  of  the  tax  is  so  out  of  propor- 
tion to  the  value  of  the  property  taxed  as  to  destroy  that 
property,  and  thus  amount  to  a  taking  thereof  without 
due  process  of  law.''  In  holding  that  the  motives  of 
Congress  in  imposing  the  tax  in  question  on  artificially 
colored  oleomargarine  are  not  to  be  inquired  into  by 
the  judiciary,  the  Court  added :  *  *  The  right  of  Congress 
to  tax  within  its  delegated  power  being  unrestrained, 
except  as  limited  by  the  Constitution,  it  was  within  the 
authority  conferred  on  Congress  to  select  the  objects 
upon  which  an  excise  should  be  laid.  It  therefore  follows 
that,  in  exerting  its  power,  no  want  of  due  process  of 
law  could  possibly  result,  because  that  body  chose  to 
impose  an  excise  on  artificially  colored  oleomargarine, 
and  not  upon  natural  butter  artificially  colored.  The 
judicial  power  may  not  usurp  the  functions  of  the  legisla- 
tive in  order  to  control  that  branch  of  the  government 
in  the  performance  of  its  lawful  duties.  This  was  aptly 
pointed  out  in  the  extract  heretofore  made  from  the  opin- 
ion in  Treat  v.  White,  181  U.  S.  264.  ...  It  hence  re- 
sults that,  even  although  it  be  true  that  the  effect  of  the  tax 
in  question  is  to  repress  the  manufacture  of  artificially 
colored  oleomargarine,  it  can  not  be  said  that  such  repres- 
sion destroys  rights  which  no  free  government  could 
destroy,  and  therefore,  no  ground  exists  to  sustain  the 
proposition  that  the  judiciary  may  invoke  an  implied  pro- 
hibition upon  the  theory  that  to  do  so  is  essential  to  save 
such  rights  from  destruction.    And  the  same  considera- 


142  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  66 

tions  dispose  of  the  contention  based  upon  the  due  proc- 
ess clause  of  the  5th  Amendment. ' ' 

§  67.  U.  S.  V.  Ju  Toy  ^^— Due  process  of  law  in  Chinese 
exclusion  cases — Conclusiveness  of  decision  of  ezecutiye 
officer.  In  this  case  it  was  held  that  the  provision  of  the 
act  of  August  18, 1894,  making  the  decision  of  the  proper 
department  on  the  right  of  a  person  of  Chinese  descent 
to  enter  the  United  States  conclusive  on  the  Federal 
Courts  in  habeas  corpus  proceedings,  when  there  has 
been  no  abuse  of  authority,  even  when  the  right  of  entry 
is  based  of  citizenship,  does  not  violate  the  guarantee  of 
due  process  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment.  In  the 
words  of  the  Court:  **If  for  the  purpose  of  argument, 
we  assume  that  the  5th  Amendment  applies  to  him  (the 
petitioner),  and  that  to  deny  entrance  to  a  citizen  is  to 
deprive  him  of  liberty,  we  nevertheless  are  of  opinion 
that  with  regard  to  him  due  process  of  law  does  not 
require  judicial  trial.  That  is  the  result  of  the  cases 
we  have  cited,  and  the  almost  necessary  result  of  the 
power  of  Congress  to  pass  exclusion  laws.  That  the  deci- 
sion may  be  intrusted  to  an  executive  officer,  and  that 
his  decision  ig  due  process  of  law,  was  affirmed  and 
explained  in  Nishimura  Ekiu  v.  United  States,  142  U.  S. 
651,  660,  and  in  Fong  Yue  Ting  v.  United  States,  149 
U.  S.  698,  713,  before  the  authorities  to  which  we  have 
already  referred. '^  At  an  earlier  stage  of  its  opinion 
the  Court  had  said:  **The  broad  question  is  presented 
whether  or  not  the  decision  of  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce and  Labor  is  conclusive.  It  was  held  in  United 
States  V.  Sing  Tuck,  194  U.  S.  161,  167,  that  the  act  of 
August  18,  1894,  purported  to  make  it  so,  but  whether 
the  statute  could  have  that  effect  constitutionally  was  left 
untouched  by  a  reference  to  cases  where  an  opinion 
already  had  been  expressed.  ...  It  is  established,  as 
we  have  said,  that  the  act  purports  to  make  the  decision  of 
the  Department  final,  whatever  the  ground  on  which  the 

19—198  U.  S.  253. 


§68  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)   J43 

right  to  enter  the  country  is  claimed, — ^as  well  when  it 
is  citizenship  as  when  it  is  domicile,  and  the  belonging 
to  a  class  excepted  from  the  exclusion  acts.  United  States 
V.  Sing  Tuck,  194  U.  S.  161, 167 ;  Lem  Moon  Sing  v.  United 
States,  158  U.  S.  538,  546,  547.  It  also  is  established  by 
the  former  case  and  others  which  it  cites  that  the  relevant 
portion  of  the  act  of  August  18,  1894,  is  not  void  as  a 
whole.  The  statute  has  been  upheld  and  enforced.  But 
the  relevant  portion  being  a  single  section,  accomplishing 
all  its  results  by  the  same  general  words,  must  be  valid 
as  to  all  that  it  embraces,  or  altogether  void.  It  neces- 
sarily follows  that  when  such  words  are  sustained,  they 
are  sustained  to  their  full  extent.*' 


§  68.  South  Carolina  v.  U.  S.^^— Due  process  as  a  limi- 
tation on  federal  power  to  tax  dispensing  agents  of  a 
state.  In  stating  the  case  the  Court  said  that  the  impor- 
tant question  *4s  whether  persons  who  are  selling  liquor 
are  relieved  from  liability  for  the  internal  revenue  tax 
by  the  fact  that  they  have  no  interest  in  the  profits  of 
the  business,  and  are  simply  the  agents  of  a  state  which, 
in  the  exercise  of  the  sovereign  power,  has  taken  charge 
of  the  business  of  selling  intoxicating  liquors. '^  In 
answering  that  question,  the  Court,  after  stating  that 
*'By  the  1st  clause  of  §  8  of  article  1  of  the  Constitution, 
Congress  is  given  the  *  power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes, 
duties,  imposts,  and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts  and  provide 
for  the  common  defense  and  general  welfare  of  the  United 
States ;  but  all  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  shall  be  uni- 
form throughout  the  United  States,'  '' — admitted  that 
such  grant  of  power  was  limited  by  several  enumerated 
provisions  of  the  Constitution,  the  last  of  which,  "Article 
5  of  the  amendment  provides  that  no  one  shall  be  deprived 
of  'life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process  of  law.  *  *' 
Notwithstanding  that,  and  all  the  other  enumerated  limi- 
tations upon  the  taxing  power  in  question,  the  court  held 
that  "whenever  a  state  engages  in  a  business  which  is  | 

20—199  U.  S.  437.  | 


144  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  68 

of  a  private  nature,  that  business  is  not  withdrawn  from 
the  taxing  power  of  the  nation.  For  these  reasons  we 
think  that  the  license  taxes  charged  by  the  Federal  gov- 
ernment upon  persons  selling  liquor  are  not  invalidated 
by  the  fact  that  they  are  the  agents  of  the  state,  which 
has  itself  engaged  in  the  business. ' ' 

§  69.  Hale  v.  Henkel  ^i— Effect  of  statutory  inunmiity 
upon  constitutional  protection  against  self-incrimination. 

The  Court  said:  ** Appellant  also  invokes  the  protec- 
tion of  the  5th  Amendment  to  the  Constitution,  which 
declares  that  no  person  '  shall  be  compelled  in  any  crim- 
inal case  to  be  witness  against  himself,*  and  in  reply  to 
various  questions  put  to  him  he  declined  to  answer,  on 
the  ground  that  he  would  thereby  incriminate  himself. 
The  answer  to  this  is  found  in  a  proviso  to  the  general 
appropriation  act  of  February  25,  1903,  that  *no  person 
shall  be  prosecuted  or  be  subjected  to  any  penalty  or 
forfeiture  for  or  on  account  of  any  transaction,  matter, 
or  thing  concerning  which  he  may  testify  or  produce 
evidence,  documentary  or  otherwise,  in  any  proceeding, 
suit,  or  prosecution  under  said  acts,'  of  which  the  anti- 
trust law  is  one,  providing,  however,  that  *no  person  so 
testifying  shall  be  exempt  from  prosecution  or  punish- 
ment for  perjury  committed  in  so  testifying.'  While 
there  may  be  some  doubt  whether  the  examination  of 
witnesses  before  a  grand  jury  is  a  suit  or  prosecution, 
we  have  no  doubt  that  it  is  a  'proceeding'  within  the 
meaning  of  the  proviso.  The  word  should  receive  as  wide 
a  construction  as  is  necessary  to  protect  the  witness  in 
his  disclosures,  .whenever  such  disclosures  are  made  in 
pursuance  of  a  judicial  inquiry,  whether  such  inquiry  be 
instituted  by  a  grand  jury,  or  upon  the  trial  of  an  indict- 
ment found  by  them.  The  word  'proceeding'  is  not  a 
technical  one,  and  is  aptly  used  by  the  courts  to  designate 
an  inquiry  before  a  grand  jury.  .  .  .  The  interdiction  of 
the  5th  Amendment  operates  only  where  a  witness  is  asked 

21—201  u.  S.  43. 


§70  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    145 

to  incriminate  himself, — ^in  other  words,  to  give  testi- 
mony which  may  possibly  expose  him  to  a  criminal  charge. 
But  if  the  criminality  has  already  been  taken  away,  the 
amendment  ceases  to  apply. ' '  After  citing  with  approval 
the  cases  of  Counselman  v.  Hitchcock,  142  U.  S.  547 ;  and 
Brown  v.  Walker,  161  U.  S.  591,  the  Court  proceeded  to 
say:  **But  it  is  further  insisted  that,  while  the  immunity 
statute  may  protect  individual  witnesses,  it  would  not 
protect  the  corporation  of  which  appellant  was  the  agent 
and  representative.  This  is  true,  but  the  answer  is  that 
it  was  not  designed  to  do  so.  The  right  of  a  person 
under  the  5th  Amendment  to  refuse  to  incriminate  him- 
self is  purely  a  personal  privilege  of  the  witness. '* 

Despite  the  fact  that  the  case  of  McAllister  v.  Henkel, 
201  U.  S.  90,  differed  from  the  foregoing  *'in  two  impor- 
tant particulars:  First,  in  the  fact  that  there  was  a 
complaint  and  charge  made  on  behalf  of  the  United  States 
against  the  Aimerican  Tobacco  Company  and  the  Imperial 
Tobacco  Company  under  the  so-called  Sherman  act,  and 
second,  that  the  subpoena  pointed  out  the  particular  writ- 
ings sought  for  (three  agreements),  giving  in  each  case 
the  date,  the  names  of  the  parties,  and  in  one  instance,  a 
suggestion  of  the  contents,  *  V  the  court  concluded  **that 
the  inmiunity  provided  by  the  5th  Amendment  against 
self-incrimination  is  personal  to  the  witness  himself,  and 
that  he  can  not  set  up  the  privilege  of  another  person 
or  of  a  corporation  as  an  excuse  for  a  refusal  to  answer ; 
in  other  words,  the  privilege  is  that  of  the  witness  him- 
self, and  not  that  of  the  party  on  trial.*'  And  in  the 
case  of  Nelson  v.  United  States,  201  U.  S.  92,  the  same 
doctrine  was  so  extended  as  to  compel  a  witness  to  testify 
under  the  immunity  statutes,  even  though  they  may  fail 
to  afford  immunity  from  prosecution  in  the  state  courts 
for  the  offense  disclosed. 

§70.  &i  re  Horan  ^^— Claim  that  prisoner  was  con- 
Ticted  without  indictment  and  compelled  to  testify 
against  himself.    This  was  a  petition  for  habeas  corpus 

22—203  n.  8.  96. 
Dae  Proeess — ^10 


146  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  70 

and  certiorari  presented  by  one  imprisoned  on  a  convic- 
tion for  murder,  alleging  that  the  judgment  under  which 
he  was  held  was  void.  The  first  constitutional  contention 
was  that  the  guaranty  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  was  vio- 
lated because  the  pretended  indictment  upon  which  the 
prisoner  was  convicted  was  no  indictment  at  all,  that  it 
was  wholly  insufficient  to  give  the  trial  court  jurisdiction 
over  the  person  of  the  defendant.  The  Court  answered : 
**The  next  ground  argued  is  that  the  laws  of  the  terri- 
tory were  not  followed  in  the  selection  of  the  grand  jury, 
because  the  persons  selected  were  not  electors  of  the  ter- 
ritory,  and  some  of  them  were  nonresidents,  with  other 
subordinate  matters.  The  order  for  the  summons  stated 
the  reason,  which  was  that  there  had  been  no  election 
held  in  the  county,  and  there  were  no  names  of  jurors 
in  the  jury  box;  whereupon  the  presiding  judge  ordered 
the  sheriff  to  summon  twenty  persons  from  the  body  of 
the  county.  We  have  heard  no  answer  to  the  material 
portion  of  the  reasoning  of  the  circuit  court  of  appeals 
upon  this  point.  If  the  legislature  of  Oklahoma  had 
prescribed  the  method  of  selection  followed,  that  method 
would  not  have  violated  tiie  Constitution  or  any  law  or 
treaty  of  the  United  States.  If  it  did  prescribe  a  differ- 
ent one,  a  departure  from  that  was  a  violation  of  the 
territorial  enactment  alone.  The  acts  of  the  legislature 
of  Oklahoma  are  not  laws  of  the  United  States  within 
the  meaning  of  Eev.  Stat.  753  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat  1901, 
p.  592.  If  any  laws  have  been  violated,  it  is  the  latter 
one.  Therefore  the  petitioner  is  not  entitled  to  release 
on  this  ground  under  Rev.  Stat.  753.  The  5th  Amend- 
ment, requiring  the  presentment  of  a  grand  jury,  does 
not  take  up  into  itself  the  local  law  as  to  how  the  grand 
jury  should  be  made  up,  and  raise  the  latter  to  a  consti- 
tutional requirement.  See  Rawlins  v.  Georgia,  201  U.  S. 
638.*'  In  disposing  of  the  second  constitutional  objec- 
tion the  Court  said:  ** Finally,  it  is  contended  that  the 
petitioner  was  compelled  to  be  a  witness  against  himself, 
contrary  to  the  5th  Amendment,  because  he  was  com- 


§71  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    147 

pelled  to  stand  up  and  walk  before  the  jury,  and  because 
during  a  recess  the  jury  was  stationed  so  as  to  observe 
his  size  and  walk.  If  this  was  an  error,  as  to  which  we 
express  no  opinion,  it  did  not  go  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court    Felts  v.  Murphy,  201  U.  S.  123/^ 

-  §  71.  Union  Bridge  Co.  v.  U.  S.^^— Due  process  invoked 
as  a  restraint  on  power  of  Secretary  of  War  to  order 
alterations  in  a  bridge  over  a  waterway.  After  stating 
that  *^the  Secretary  of  War  found  the  bridge  to  be  an 
unreasonable  obstruction  to  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Allegheny  river,  and  required  the  Bridge  Company  to 
make  certain  changes  or  alterations  in  order  that  navi- 
gation be  rendered  free,  easy,  and  unobstructed ;  ^ '  which 
alterations,  it  was  charged,  the  company  wilfully  failed 
and  refused  to  make,  the  Court  said:  **The  next  prin- 
cipal contention  of  the  Bridge  Company  is  that  the  act 
of  1899  is  unconstitutional,  in  that  it  makes  no  provision, 
and  the  United  States  has  not  offered  to  compensate  it 
for  the  sum  that  will  necessarily  be  expended  in  order 
to  make  the  alterations  or  changes  required  by  the  order 
of  the  Secretary  of  War.  In  other  words,  the  defendant 
insists  that  what  the  United  States  requires  to  be  done 
in  respect  of  defendant's  bridge  is  a  taking  of  private 
property  for  public  use,  which  the  government  is  for- 
bidden by  the  Constitution  to  do  without  making  just 
compensation  to,  or  without  making  provision  to  justly 
compensate,  the  owner.*'  The  Government,  after  deny- 
ing that  there  had  been  a  taking  of  private  property  for 
public  use  as  contemplated  by  the  Constitution,  contended 
**that  the  cost  of  such  alterations  or  changes  is  to  be 
deemed  incidental  only  to  the  exercise  of  an  undoubted 
function  of  the  United  States,  when  exerting,  through 
Congress,  its  power  to  regulate  commerce  among  the 
states,  and  therefore  navigation  upon  the  waterways  on 
and  over  which  such  commerce  is  conducted.'*  After 
reviewing  the  leading  cases  of  Gibson  v.  United  States, 

23—204  IT.  S.  364. 


148  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  71 

166  U.  S.  269,  271 ;  South  Carolina  v.  Georgia,  93  U.  S. 
4 ;  Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1 ;  Eldridge  v.  Trezevant, 
160  U.  S.  452 ;  Northern  Transp.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  99  U.  S, 
635;  Scranton  v.  Wheeler,  179  U.  S.  141,  153,  162;  New 
Orleans  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Drainage  Commission,  197  U.  S. 
453, 461;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  200  U.  S.  561, 
582,  593;  West  Chicago  Street  B.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  201 
U.  S.  506,  524,  the  Court  said:  **Do  the  principles  an- 
nounced in  the  above  cases  require  us  to  hold,  in  the 
present  case,  that  the  making  of  the  alterations  of  its 
bridge  specified  in  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  will 
be  a  taking  of  the  property  of  the  Bridge  Company  for 
public  use?  We  think  not.  Unless  there  be  a  taking, within 
the  meaning  of  the  Constitution,  no  obligation  arises 
upon  the  United  States  to  make  compensation  for  the 
cost  to  be  incurred  in  making  such  alterations.  The  dam- 
age that  will  accrue  to  the  Bridge  Company,  as  the  result 
of  compliance  with  the  Secretary's  order,  must,  in  such 
case,  be  deemed  incidental  to  the  exercise  by  the  govern- 
ment of  its  power  to  regulate  commerce  among  the  states, 
which  includes,  as  we  have  seen,  the  power  to  secure 
free  navigation  upon  the  waterways  of  the  United  States 
against  unreasonable  obstructions.  There  are  no  circum- 
stances connected  with  the  original  construction  of  the 
bridge,  or  with  its  maintenance  since,  which  so  tie  the 
hands  of  the  government  that  it  can  not  exert  its  power 
to  protect  the  freedom  of  navigation  against  obstruction. 
Although  the  bridge,  when  erected  under  the  authority 
of  a  Pennsylvania  charter,  may  have  been  a  lawful  struc- 
ture, and  although  it  may  not  have  been  an  unreasonable 
obstruction  to  commerce  and  navigation  as  then  carried 
on,  it  must  be  taken,  under  the  cases  cited,  ai^d  upon  prin- 
ciple, not  only  that  the  company,  when  exerting  the  power 
conferred  upon  it  by  the  state,  did  so  knowing  of  the 
paramount  authority  of  Congress  to  regulate  commerce 
among  the  states,  but  that  it  erected  the  bridge  subject 
to  the  possibility  that  Congress  might,  at  some  future 
time,  when  the  public  interest  demanded,  exert  its  power 


§72  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    149 

by  appropriate  legislation  to  protect  navigation  against 
anreasonable  obstructions.  ...  It  is  for  Congress  to 
determine  when  it  will  exert  its  power  to  regulate  inter- 
state commerce.  Its  mere  silence  or  inaction  when  indi- 
viduals or  corporations,  under  the  authority  of  a  state, 
place  unreasonable  obstructions  in  the  waterways  of  the 
United  States,  can  not  have  the  eflfeot  to  cast  upon  the 
government  an  obligation  not  to  exert  its  constitutional 
power  to  regulate  interstate  commerce  except  subject  to 
the  condition  that  compensation  be  made  or  secured  to  the 
individual  or  corporation  who  may  be  incidentally 
affected  by  the  exercise  of  such  power." 

§  72.  U.  S.  V.  Heinszen  ^^— Due  process  and  the  rights 
of  importers  imder  Philippine  act  of  June  30,  1906.  In 
this  case  it  was  held  that  importers  were  not  deprived 
of  their  property  without  due  process  of  law,  even  though 
they  had  commenced  suits  to  recover  the  amount  of  duties 
collected  before  the  passage  of  the  act  of  June  30,  1906, 
ratifying  the  illegal  collection  of  duties  on  imports  to 
the  Philippine  Islands,  levied  under  the  President's  order 
of  June  12,  1898,  between  the  dates  of  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain  and  the  approval  of 
the  act  of  July  1,  1902,  providing  a  tariff  of  duties  for 
those  islands.  On  the  main  question  the  Court  said :  '  *  It 
is  urged  that  the  ratifying  statute  can  not  be  given  effect 
without  violating  the  5th  Amendment  to  the  Constitution, 
SLQce  to  give  eflScacy  to  the  act  would  deprive  the  claim- 
ants of  their  property  without  due  process  of  law,  or 
would  appropriate  the  same  for  public  use  without  just 
compensation.  This  rests  upon  these  two  contentions: 
It  is  said  that  the  money  paid  to  discharge  the  illegally 
exacted  duties  after  payment,  as  before,  *  justly  and 
equitably  belonged*  to  the  claimants,  and  that  the  title 
thereto  continued  in  them  as  a  vested  right  of  property. 
It  is  consequently  insisted  that  the  right  to  recover  the 
money  could  not  be  taken  away  without  violating  the  5th 

24—206  U.  S.  370. 


150  DXJE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  72 

Amendment,  as  stated.  But  here,  again,  the  argument 
disregards  the  fact  that  when  the  duties  were  illegally 
exacted  in  the  name  of  the  United  States,  Congress  pos- 
sessed the  power  to  have  authorized  their  importation  in 
the  mode  in  which  they  were  enforced,  and  hence,  from 
the  very  moment  of  collection,  a  right  in  Congress  to 
ratify  the  transaction,  if  it  saw  fit  to  do  so,  was  engen- 
dered. In  other  words,  as  a  necessary  result  of  the  power 
to  ratify,  it  followed  that  the  right  to  recover  the  duties 
in  question  was  subject  to  the  exercise  by  Congress  of 
its  undoubted  power  to  ratify.  To  hold  to  the  contrary 
would  be  to  say  that  whilst  the  unauthorized  act  of  an 
oflBcer  done  on  behalf  of  the  United  States  was  subject 
to  ratification  by  the  United  States,  yet,  if  the  officer 
acted  without  authority  the  act,  when  performed,  annihi- 
lated the  power  to  ratify ;  that  is,  that  the  very  condition 
which  engendered  the  power  destroyed  it.  .  .  .  Nor 
does  the  mere  fact  that,  at  the  time  the  ratifying  statute 
was  enacted,  this  action  was  pending  for  the  recovery  of 
the  sums  paid,  cause  the  statute  to  be  repugnant  to  the 
Constitution.  The  mere  commencement  of  the  suit  did 
not  change  the  nature  of  the  right.  Hence,  again,  if  it  be 
conceded  that  the  capacity  to  prosecute  the  pending  suit 
to  judgment  was,  in  a  sense,  a  vested  right,  certainly 
also  the  power  of  the  United  States  to  ratify  was,  to  say 
the  least,  a  right  of  as  high  a  character.  To  arrogate 
to  themselves  the  authority  to  divest  the  right  of  the 
United  States  to  ratify,  is  then,  in  reason,  the  assumption 
upon  which  the  asserted  right  of  the  claimants  to  recover 
must  resf 

§  73.  Adair  v.  U.  S.^^— Due  process  as  a  limitation  upon 
power  of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  commerce — 
Relative  rights  of  employer  and  employee.  In  this  very 
important  case  it  was  held  "that  the  provision  of  the 
statute  under  which  the  defendant  was  convicted  must 
be  held  to  be  repugnant  to  the  Fifth  Amendment,  and 

2&— 208  u.  S.  161« 


1 73  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    151 

as  not  embraced  by  nor  within  the  power  of  Congress 
to  regulate  interstate  commerce,  but,  under  the  guise  of 
regulating  interstate  commerce  and  as  applied  to  this 
case  it  arbitrarily  sanctions  an  illegal  invasion  of  the 
personal  liberty  as  well  as  the  right  of  property  of  the 
defendant  Adair,  ^ '  who  was  indicted  for  violating  the  Act 
of  Congress  of  June  1,  1898  (30  Stat.  424,  c  370),  con- 
cerning carriers  engaged  in  interstate  commerce.  Sec- 
tion 10  of  the  act  in  question  is  in  these  words :  ' '  That 
any  employer  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  act  and 
any  officer,  agent  or  receiver  of  such  employer,  who  shall 
require  any  employee,  or  any  person  seeking  employ- 
ment, as  a  condition  of  such  employment,  to  enter  into 
an  agreement,  either  written  or  verbal,  not  to  become  or 
remain  a  member  of  any  labor  corporation,  association, 
or  organization;  or  shall  threaten  any  employee  with  loss 
of  employment,  or  shall  unjustly  discriminate  against 
any  employee  because  of  his  membership  in  such  a  labor 
corporation,  association,  or  organization;  or  who  shall 
require  any  employee  or  any  person  seeking  employment, 
as  a  condition  of  such  employment,  to  enter  into  a  con- 
tract whereby  such  employee  or  applicant  for  employ- 
ment shall  agree  to  contribute  to  any  fund  for  charitable, 
social,  or  beneficial  purposes;  to  release  such  employer 
from  legal  liability  for  any  personal  injury  by  reason  of 
any  benefit  received  from  iauch  fund  beyond  the  propor- 
tion of  the  benefit  arising  from  the  employer's  contri- 
bution to  such  fund ;  or  who  shall,  after  having  discharged 
an  employee,  attempt  or  conspire  to  prevent  such  em- 
ployee from  obtaining  employment,  or  who  shall,  after 
the  quitting  of  an  employee,  attempt  or  conspire  to  pre- 
vent such  employee  from  obtaining  employment,  is  hereby 
declared  to  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and  upon  con- 
viction thereof  in  any  court  of  the  United  States  of 
competent  jurisdiction  in  the  district  in  which  such 
offense  was  committed,  shall  be  punished  for  each  offense 
by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  one  hundred  dollars  and  not 
more  than  one  thousand  dollars/*    The  specific  charge 


152  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  73 

in  the  first  count  of  the  indictment  was  ''that  William 
Adair,  agent  and  employee  of  said  common  carrier  and 
employer,  as  aforesaid,  in  the  district  aforesaid,  on  and 
before  the  15th  day  of  October,  1906,  did  unlawfully  dis- 
criminate against  0.  B.  Coppage,  employee  as  aforesaid, 
by  then  and  there  discharging  said  0.  B.  Coppage  from 
such  employment  of  said  common  carrier  and  employer, 
because  of  his  membership  in  said  labor  organization, 
and  thereby  did  unjustly  discriminate  against  an  em- 
ployee of  a  common  carrier  and  employer  engaged  in 
interstate  commerce  because  of  his  membership  in  a  labor 
organization,  contrary  to  the  forms  of  the  statute  in  such 
cases  made  and  provided.  *  * 

In  the  course  of  its  opinion  the  Court  said :  * '  The  first 
inquiry  is  whether  the  part  of  the  10th  section  of  the 
Act  of  1898  upon  which  the  first  count  of  the  indictment 
is  based  is  repugnant  to  the  Fifth  Amendment  of  the 
Constitution  declaring  that  no  person  shall  be  deprived 
of  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law.  In 
our  opinion,  that  section,  in  the  particular  mentioned,  is 
an  invasion  of  the  personal  liberty,  as  well  as  the  right 
of  property,  guaranteed  by  that  Amendment.  Such  lib- 
erty and  right  embraces  the  right  to  make  contracts  for 
the  purchase  of  the  labor  of  others  and  equally  the  right 
to  make  contracts  for  the  sale  of  one^s  own  labor;  each 
right,  however,  being  subject  to  the  fundamental  condi- 
tion that  no  contract,  whatever  its  subject  matter,  can 
be  sustained  which  the  law,  upon  reasonable  grounds, 
forbids  as  inconsistent  with  the  public  interests  or  as 
hurtful  to  the  public  order  or  a' detrimental  to  the  com- 
mon good.  This  court  has  said  that  *in  every  well  ordered 
society,  charged  with  the  duty  of  conserving  the  safety 
of  its  members,  the  right  of  the  individual  in  respect  of 
his  liberty  may  at  times,  under  the  pressure  of  great 
dangers,  be  subjected  to  such  restraint,  to  be  enforced  by 
reasonable  regulations,  as  the  safety  of  the  general  pub- 
lic may  demand.'    Jacobson  v.  Massachusetts,  197  XJ.  S. 


§74  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    153 

1129,  and  authorities  there  cited.  •  .  .  It  was  the  right 
of  the  defendant  to  prescribe  the  terms  upon  which  the 
services  of  Coppage  would  be  accepted,  and  it  was  the 
right  of  Coppage  to  become  or  not,  as  he  chose,  an  em- 
ployee of  the  railroad  company  upon  the  terms  offered 
him.  •  •  •  The  right  of  a  person  to  sell  his  labor  upon 
such  terms  as  he  deems  proper  is,  in  its  essence,  the  same 
as  the  right  of  the  purchaser  of  labor  to  prescribe  the  con- 
ditions upon  which  he  will  accept  such  labor  from  the 
person  offering  to  sell  it.  So  the  right  of  the  employee 
to  quit  the  service  of  the  employer,  for  whatever  reason, 
is  the  same  as  the  right  of  the  employer,  for  whatever 
reason,  to  dispense  with  the  services  of  such  employee. 
...  In  all  such  particulars  the  employer  and  the  em- 
ployee have  equality  of  right,  and  any  legislation  that  dis- 
turbs that  equality  is  an  arbitrary  interference  with  the 
hberty  of  contract  which  no  government  can  legally 
justify  in  a  free  land.  These  views  find  support  in 
adjudged  cases,  some  of  which  are  cited  in  the  margin. '  * 

§  74.  Twininjf  v.  New  Jersey  ^^ — ^Exemption  from  self- 
incrimination  not  a  fundamental  right  of  national  citizen- 
ship. It  is  only  necessary  to  refer  to  that  part  of  the 
opinion  in  this  notable  case  which  settles  the  fact  that 
the  Fifth  Amendment  had  no  application  to  the  question 
at  issue,  for  the  reajson  that  while  exemption  from  self- 
incrimination  is  secured  by  that  Amendment,  as  against 
Federal  action,  it  is  not  one  of  the  *  *  privileges  and  immu- 
nities of  citizens  of  the  United  States*'  which,  as  a 
fundamental  right  of  national  citizenship,  is  protected 
against  state  action  by  the  Fourteenth.  On  that  subject 
the  Court  said:  **The  defendants  contend,  in  the  first 
place,  that  the  exemption  from  self-incrimination  is  one  of 
the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States  which  the  14th  Amendment  forbids  the  states  to 
abridge.    It  is  not  argued  that  the  defendants  are  pro- 

28—211  IT.  S.  78. 


154  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  74 

tected  by  that  part  of  the  5th  Amendment  which  provides 
that  *no  person  .  .  .  shall  be  compelled  in  any  crim- 
inal case  to  be  a  witness  against  himself/  for  it  is  recog- 
nized by  counsel  that  by  a  long  line  of  decisions,  the  first 
ten  Amendments  are  not  operative  on  the  state.  Barron 
V.  Baltimore,  7  Pet.  243;  Spies  v.  Illinois,  123  U.  S.  131; 
Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175  U.  S.  172 ;  Barrington  v.  Mis- 
souri, 205  U.  S.  483.  But  it  is  argued  that  this  privilege 
is  one  of  the  fundamental  rights,  of  national  citizenship, 
placed  under  national  protection  by  the  14th  Amend- 
ment, and  it  is  specifically  argued  that  the  *  privileges 
and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,'  pro- 
tected against  state  action  by  that  Amendment,  include 
those  fundamental  personal  rights  which  were  protected 
against  national  action  by  the  first  eight  Amendments; 
that  this  was  the  intention  of  the  framers  of  the  14th 
Amendment,  and  that  this  part  of  it  would  otherwise 
have  little  or  no  meaning  and  effect.*'  In  rejecting  that 
contention  the  Court  said :  *  *  Even  if  the  historical  mean- 
ing of  due  process  of  law  and  the  decisions  of  this  court 
did  not  exclude  the  privilege  from  it,  it  would  be  going 
far  to  rate  it  as  an  immutable  principle  of  justice  which 
is  the  inalienable  possession  of  every  citizen  of  a  free 
government.  Salutary  as  the  principle  may  seem  to  a 
great  majority,  it  can  not  be  ranked  with  the  right  to 
hearing  before  condemnation,  the  immunity  from  arbi- 
trary power  not  acting  by  general  laws,  and  the  inviola- 
bility of  private  property.  The  wisdom  of  the  exemption 
has  never  been  universally  assented  to  since  the  days 
of  Bentham,  many  doubt  it  today  and  it  is  best  defended 
not  as  an  unchangeable  principle  of  universal  justice,  but 
as  a  law  proved  by  experience  to  be  expedient.  See  Wig- 
more,  Ex.  2251.  It  has  no  place  in  the  jurisprudence  of 
civilized  and  free  countries  outside  the  domain  of  the 
common  law,  and  it  is  nowhere  observed  among  our  own 
people  in  the  search  for  truth  outside  the  administration 
of  the  law.'' 


§  75  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    155 

§  75.  U.  S.  ex  reL  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Co.^^— Due  process 
and  the  commodities  clause  of  the  Hepburn  act  of  June 
29|  1906.  The  text  of  the  commodities  clause  upon  which 
these  cases  depended  is  as  follows:  *'From  and  after 
May  first,  nineteen  hundred  and  eight,  it  shall  be  imlaw- 
ful  for  any  railroad  company  to  transport  from  any 
state,  territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  to  any  other 
state,  territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  or  to  any 
foreign  country,  any  article  or  commodity,  other  than 
lumber  and  the  manufactured  products  thereof,  manu- 
factured, mined,  or  produced  by  it,  or  under  its  authority, 
or  which  it  may  own  in  whole  or  in  which  it  may  have 
any  interest,  direct  or  indirect,  except  such  articles  or 
commodities  as  may  be  necessary  and  intended  for  its 
use  in  the  conduct  of  its  business  as  a  common  carrier. ' ' 
In  the  words  of  the  Court:  *' Except  as  we  have  said, 
in  the  particular  that  one  of  the  corporations  claimed 
that  it  was  not  a  railroad  company  within  the  meaning 
of  the  commodities  clause,  they  all  defended  substan- 
tially upon  the  ground  that,  when  correctly  interpreted, 
the  commodities  clause  did  not  forbid  the  interstate  com- 
merce traffic  in  coal  by  them  carried  on.  If  it  did,  the 
clause  was  assailed  as  inherently  repugnant  to  the  Con- 
stitution, because  the  right  to  enact  was  not  embraced 
within  the  authority  conferred  upon  Congress  to  regu- 
late commerce.  In  addition  it  was  contended  that  even 
if,  abstractly  considered,  the  clause  might  be  embraced 
within  the  grant  of  power  to  regulate  commerce,  never- 
theless its  provisions  were  in  conflict  with  the  due  proc- 
ess clause  of  the  5th  Amendment  to  the  Constitution, 
because  of  the  destructive  effect  which  the  enforcement 
of  its  provisions  would  produce  on  the  rights  of  prop- 
erty which  the  corporations  possessed  and  had  long 
enjoyed  under  the  sanction  of  valid  state  laws.'*  After 
holding  that  when  properly  construed,  **the  statute  was 
inherently  within  the  power  of  Congress  to  enact  as  a  reg- 
ulation of  commerce/'  the  Court  said:  "We  think  it  un- 

27—213  IT.  S.  366. 


156  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  75 

necessary  to  consider  at  length  the  contentions  based  upon 
the  dne  pgrocess  clanse  of  the  5th  Amendment.  In  form  of 
statement  those  contentions  apparently  rest  npon  the 
ruinons  consequences  which  it  is  assumed  would  be  op6r. 
ated  ni)on  the  property  rights  of  the  carriers  by  the  en- 
forcement of  the  clause,  interpreted  as  the  government 
construed  it.  For  the  purpose  of  our  consideration  of  the 
subject  it  may  be  conceded,  as  insisted  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States,  that  these  contentions  proceed  upon 
the  mistaken  and  baleful  conception  that  inconvenience, 
not  power,  is  the  criterion  by  which  to  test  the  constitu- 
tionality  of  legislation.  When,  however,  mere  forms  of 
statement  are  put  aside  and  the  real  scope  of  the  argument 
at  bar  is  grasped,  we  think  it  becomes  clear  that,  in  sub- 
stance and  effect,  the  argument  really  asserts  that  the 
clause  as  construed  by  the  government,  is  not  a  regulation 
of  commerce,  since  it  transcends  the  limits  of  regulation 
and  embraces  absolute  prohibitions,  which,  it  is  insisted, 
could  not  be  exerted  in  virtue  of  the  authority  to  regulate. 
The  whole  support  upon  which  the  propositions  and  the 
arguments  rest  hence  disappears  as  a  result  of  the  con- 
struction which  we  have  given  the  statute.  Through 
abundance  of  caution,  we  repeat  that  our  ruling  here 
made  is  confined  to  the  question  before  us.  Because, 
therefore,  in  pointing  out  and  applying  to  the  statute  the 
true  ride  of  construction,  we  have  indicated  the  grave 
constitutional  questions  which  would  be  presented  if  we 
departed  from  that  rule,  and  we  must  not  be  considered 
as  having  decided  those  questions.  We  have  not  entered 
into  their  consideration,  as  it  was  unnecessary  for  us  to 
doso.^^ 

§76.  Oceanic  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Stranahan^^ — ^Due 
process  and  the  act  of  March  3, 1903,  making  it  unlawful 
to  bring  into  the  U.  S.  any  alien  afflicted  with  a  loath- 
some or  contagious  disease.  In  this  case  it  was  held  that 
the  statute  in  question  is  not  repugnant  to  the  due  proc- 

28—214  TJ.  S.  320. 


§  76  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    157 

• 

ess  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  because  it  makes 
the  ofScial  medical  examination  at  the  port  of  arrival 
conclusive  for  the  purpose  of  imposing  the  penalty, 
enforceable  by  refusing  clearance  papers  until  paid,  as 
authorized  by  such  statute,  when  its  provisions  are  vio- 
lated by  the  bringing  into  the  country  of  an  alien  afSicted 
with  a  loathsome  or  contagious  disease  from  which  he 
was  suffering  at  the  time  of  embarkation,  the  presence 
of  which  might  have  been  detected  through  a  competent 
medical  examination  then  and  there  made.  Before  reach- 
ing that  conclusion  the  Court  said:  ''It  is  urged  that 
the  fines  which  constituted  the  exactions  were  repugnant 
to  the  5th  Amendment,  because  amounting  to  a  taking 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  since,  as  asserted, 
the  fines  were  imposed,  in  some  cases,  without  any  pre- 
vious notice,  and  in  all  cases  without  any  adequate  notice 
or  opportunity  to  defend.  Stated  in  the  briefest  form, 
the  findings  below  show  that  on  the  arrival  of  a  vessel, 
if  the  examining  medical  ofScers  discover  that  an  immi- 
grant was  afflicted  with  one  of  the  prohibited  diseases, 
the  owner  of  the  vessel  was  notified  of  the  fact,  and, 
indeed,  that  the  steamship  company  had  at  the  place 
where  the  examination  was  made  what  is  known  as  a 
landing  agent,  whose  business  it  was  to  keep  informed 
as  to  the  result  of  medical  examinations,  and  to  know 
when  an  immigrant  was  detained  by  the  medical  officers 
because  afflicted  by  a  prohibited  disease.  The  findings 
also  established  that,  where  a  fine  was  imposed  under 
§  9  by  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  it  was  only 
done  after  the  transmission  to  that  official  of  the  certifi- 
cate of  the  examining  medical  officer  that  a  particular 
alien  immigrant  had  been  found  to  be  afflicted  with  one 
of  the  prohibited  diseases,  and  that  the  state  of  the  dis- 
ease established  in  the  opinion  of  the  medical  officer  that 
it  existed  at  the  time  of  embarkation,  and  could  then 
have  been  detected  by  a  competent  medical  examination.  *  ^ 
In  holding  that  due  process  was  not  denied  by  such  pro- 
ceedings, the  Court  said:    **In  effect,  all  the  contentions 


158  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  76 

pressed  in  argument  concerning  the  repugnancy  of  the 
statute  to  the  due  process  clause  really  disregarded  the 
complete  and  absolute  power  of  Congress  over  the  sub- 
ject with  which  the  statute  deals.  They  mistakenly 
assume  that  mere  form,  and  not  substance,  may  be  made 
by  the  courts  the  conclusive  test  as  to  the  constitutional 
power  of  Congress  to  enact  a  statute.  These  conclusions 
are  apparent,  we  think,  since  the  plenary  power  of  Con- 
gress as  to  the  admission  of  aliens  leaves  no  room  for 
doubt  as  to  its  authority  to  impose  the  penalty,  and  its 
complete  administrative  control  over  the  granting  or 
refusal  of  a  clearance  also  leaves  no  doubt  of  the  right 
to  endow  administrative  officers  with  discretion  to  refuse 
to  perform  the  administrative  act  of  granting  a  clearance, 
as  a  means  of  enforcing  the  penalty  which  there  was  law- 
ful  authority  to  impose.'^ 

§77.  Brantley  v.  Georgia  ^^— Fifth  Amendment  in- 
yoked  upon  plea  of  former  jeopardy.  A  writ  of  error  to 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  to  review  a  judgment 
affirming  a  conviction  for  murder,  after  a  reversal  in  the 
Court  of  Appeals  of  that  state  upon  an  appeal  from  a 
conviction  of  voluntary  manslaughter.  At  the  second 
trial  Brantley  pleaded  former  jeopardy,  claiming  that 
be  had  been  tried  for  murder,  and  having  been  found 
guilty  of  a  lesser  grade  of  homicide,  that  operated  to 
acquit  him  of  the  charge  of  murder,  and  to  try  him  again 
for  murder  under  the  same  indictment  would  be  to  try  him 
twice  for  an  offense  of  which  he  had  been  previously 
acquitted.  His  contention  was  that  he  could  only  be  tried 
again  for  voluntary  manslaughter.  In  disposing  of  that 
plea  the  court  said:  **The  Constitution  of  the  state  of 
Georgia  provides  that  *  no  person  shall  be  put  in  jeopardy 
of  life  or  liberty  more  than  once  for  the  same  offense, 
save  on  his  or  her  own  motion  for  anew  trial,  after  con- 
viction, or  in  case  of  mistrial.*  This  writ  of  error  was 
sued  out,  and  plaintiff  in  error  contended  that  the  judg- 

20—217  IT.  S.  284. 


1 78  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    159 

ment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  was  in  violation 
of  the  5th  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  that  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
state  of  Georgia  were  null  and  void  as  construed  by  the 
state  supreme  court.  The  contention  is  absolutely  with- 
out merit.  It  was  not  a  case  of  twice  in  jeopardy  under 
any  view  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. ' ' 

§78.  Holt  v.  U.  S.^^ — ^Protection  against  self-incrimi- 
nation invoked  in  trial  for  a  crime  committed  within  a 
military  reservation.  Holt  was  convicted  in  a  circuit 
court  of  the  United  States  of  a  murder,  alleged  to  have 
been  committed  **  within  the  Fort  Worden  Military 
Beservation,  a  place  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of 
the  United  States.  ^ '  During  the  trial  a  question  arose  as 
to  the  ownership  of  a  blouse  which  a  witness  testified 
fitted  the  prisoner  after  he  had  put  it  on.  In  disposing 
of  the  claim  that  the  prisoner  was  thus  subjected  to  the 
self-incrimination  which  the  Amendment  in  question  for- 
bids, the  Court  said:  ** Another  objection  is  based  upon 
an  Qxtravagant  extension  of  the  5th  Amendment.  A 
question  arose  as  to  whether  a  blouse  belonged  to  the 
prisoner.  A  witness  testified  that  the  prisoner  put  it  on 
and  it  fitted  him.  It  is  objected  that  he  did  this  under 
the  same  duress  that  made  his  statement  nnadmissible, 
and  that  it  should  be  excluded  for  the  same  reason.  But 
the  prohibition  of  compelling  a  man  in  a  criminal  court 
to  be  a  witness  against  himself  is  a  prohibition  of  the  use 
of  physical  or  moral  compulsion  to  extort  communica- 
tions from  him,  not  an  exclusion  of  his  body  as  evidence 
when  it  may  be  material.  The  objection  in  principle 
would  forbid  a  jury  to  look  at  a  prisoner  and  compare 
his  features  with  a  photograph  in  proof.  Moreover,  we 
need  not  consider  how  far  a  court  would  go  in  compelling 
a  man  to  exhibit  himself.  For  when  he  is  exhibited, 
whether  voluntarily  or  by  order,  and  even  if  the  order 

30—218  IT.  S.  245. 


160  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  78 


goes  too  far,  the  evidence,  if  material,  is  competent. 
Adams  v.  New  York,  192  U.  S.  585.'' 

§79.  Atlantic  0.  L.  B.  Oo.  v.  Riverside  Mills— Due 
process  not  denied  by  Oarmack  amendment  of  June  29, 
1906.  In  this  ease,  219  U.  S.  186,  it  was  contended  that  the 
statute  in  question  (the  Carmack  amendment  of  June  29, 
1906,  to  the  act  of  February  4,  1887,  20),  by  providing 
that  the  initial  carrier  shall  issue  a  bill  of  lading,  and  shall 
be  liable  to  its  holder  for  any  damage  caused  by  any  con- 
necting carrier,  renders  the  initial  carrier  liable  for  the 
debts  of  the  connecting  carrier,  in  violation  of  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.  In  overruling 
that  contention  the  Court  said :  *  *  It  is  obvious,  from  the 
many  decisions  of  this  court,  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  absolute  freedom  of  contract.  Contracts  which  con- 
travene public  policy  can  not  be  lawfully  made  at  all ;  and 
the  power  to  make  contracts  may  in  all  cases  be  regulated 
as  to  form,  evidence,  and  validity  as  to  third  persons. 
The  power  of  government  extends  to  the  denial  of  liberty 
of  contract  to  the  extent  of  forbidding  or  regulating  ^very 
contract  which  is  reasonably  calculated  to  injuriously 
affect  the  public  interests.  Undoubtedly  the  United 
States  is  a  government  of  limited  and  delegated  powers, 
but  in  respect  of  those  powers  which  have  been  expressly 
delegated,  the  power  to  regulate  commerce  between  the 
states  being  one  of  them,  the  power  is  absolute,  except 
as  limited  by  other  provisions  of  the  Constitution  itself. 
...  it  is  said  that  the  act  violates  the  5th  Amendment 
by  taking  the  property  of  the  initial  carrier  to  pay  the 
debt  of  an  independent  connecting  carrier  whose  negli- 
gence may  have  been  the  sole  cause  of  the  loss.  But  this 
contention  results  from  a  surface  reading  of  the  act,  and 
misses  the  true  basis  upon  which  it  rests.  The  liability 
of  the  receiving  carrier  which  results  in  such  a  case  is 
that  of  a  principle  for  the  negligence  of  his  own  agents/' 
When,  in  the  later  case  of  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dixie 
Tobacco  Co.,  228  U.  S.  593,  the  question  of  constitution- 


§  80  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    161 

ality  was  again  presented,  the  Court  said :  *  *  The  supreme 
court  of  appeals  followed  the  ruling  in  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  R.  Co.  v.  Riverside  Mills,  219  U.  S,  186  (to  which 
may  be  added  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Wallace, 
223  U.  S.  481),  as  conclusive.  The  plaintiff  in  error  con- 
tends that  these  cases  may  be  distinguished  on  the  ground 
that  in  both  of  them  it  was  to  be  presumed  that  the  car- 
rier was  a  voluntary  party  to  a  through  route  and  rate, 
whereas  here  the  stipulation  against  liability  beyond  its 
line,  and  the  fact  that  it  had  no  through  route  with  the 
steamship  company,  exclude  that  presumption.  It  argues 
that  it  was  bound  to  accept  goods  destined  beyond  its  line 
for  delivery  to  the  next  carrier,  and  was  required  by  the 
statute  to  give  a  through  bill  of  lading,  if,  on  such  com- 
pulsory acceptance,  it  is  made  answerable  for  damages 
done  by  others,  its  property  is  taken  without  due  process 
of  law.  But  in  the  former  case  there  was  the  same  stipu- 
lation in  the  bill  of  lading,  and  the  supposed  through 
routes  were  only  presumed.  In  the  second  case  the  car- 
rier is  spoken  of  as  voluntarily  accepting  goods  for  a 
point  beyond  its  line ;  but  there,  too,  there  was  the  same 
attempt  to  limit  liability,  and  in  the  present  case  the 
acceptance  was  voluntary  in  the  same  degree  as  in  that. 
There  is  no  substantial  distinction  between  the  earlier 
decisions  and  this." 

§80.  Briscoe  v.  Rudolph  ^^ — ^Due  process  as  involved 
in  a  special  assessment  for  benefits  in  Washington  City. 
In  that  case  it  was  held  that  where  there  is  nothing  to 
show  that  the  actual  assessments  were  in  substantial 
excess  of  the  benefits,  there  was  no  denial  of  the  due 
process  guaranteed  by  the  Fifth  Amendment  in  pro- 
ceedings under  the  act  of  February  10,  1899,  providing 
that  one-half  of  the  amount  awarded  as  damages  in  the 
extension  of  an  avenue  in  the  City  of  Washington  was  to 
be  assessed  against  lands  within  a  designated  area  as 
benefits,  when  there  was  a  taking  into  account  the  bene- 

31—221  U.  8.  547. 
Due  Proceae — 11 


162  DUB  PEOCBSS  OP  LAW  S  80 

fits  received  by  each  lot  within  such  area.  The  Conrt  said : 
**The  objection  to  the  constitutionality  of  the  act  of  Feb- 
ruary 10,  1899,  as  stated  in  appellant's  brief,  is  'that  it 
authorizes  an  assessment  of  appellant's  property  to  meet 
the  cost  of  public  improvements,  in  substantial  excess  of 
the  special  benefits  conferred  by  the  improvements,  and 
to  the  extent  of  such  excess  confiscates  appellants' 
property  to  public  use  without  compensation.'  .  .  . 
That  Congress,  under  its  wide  legislative  power  over  the 
District  of  Columbia,  may  create  a  special  improvement 
district,  and  charge  a  part  or  all  the  cost  upon  the  prop- 
erty in  that  improvement  district,  can  hardly  be  doubted. 
It  would  be  but  an  exercise  of  the  power  taxation  for  a 
public  purpose  in  an  area  carved  out  for  the  purpose. 
In  Webster  v.  Fargo,  181  U.  S.  394,  it  was  held  that  a 
state  might  create  such  special  taxing  districts,  and 
charge  the  whole  or  part  of  the  cost  of  a  local  improve- 
ment upon  the  property  in  the  district,  either  according 
to  valuation,  superficial  area,  or  frontage.  That  it  is 
within  the  power  of  Congress  to  create  such  a  special 
improvement  district,  and  charge  the  cost  of  improve- 
ment therein  according  to  the  benefits  received  by  the 
property  within  such  district,  has  been  more  than  once 
aflSrmed.  Bauman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548,  Wight  v.  David- 
son, 181  U.  S.  371 ;  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia^  205 
U.  S.  135;  Columbia  Heights  Realty  Co.  v.  Rudolph,  217 
U.  S.  547." 


§  81.  Wilson  v.  XT.  S. — ^Privilege  against  self-incrimina- 
tion when  invoked  by  an  officer  of  a  corporation.    In 

these  cases,  221  IT.  S.  361,  appeals  were  taken  from  a 
United  States  circuit  court  to  review  a  judgment  commit- 
ting an  officer  of  a  corporation  for  contempt  in  refusing  to 
produce  the  corporate  books  before  the  grand  jury.  The 
books  belonged  to  a  corporation  of  which  he  was  president, 
and  were  required  to  be  produced  by  a  subpoena  duces 
tecum,  he  claiming  the  privilege  against  self-incrimination 
guaranteed  by  the  Fifth  Amendment.    In  reaching  the 


§  81  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    163 

conclusion  that  ^^None  of  his  personal  papers  are  subject 
to  inspection  under  the  writ,  and  his  action  in  refusiag  to 
permit  the  examination  of  the  corporate  books  demanded 
fully  warranted  his  commitment  for  contempt/'  the  Court 
said:  **We  come,  then,  to  the  broader  contention  of  the 
appellant, — thus  stated  in  the  argument  of  his  counsel: 
'  *  An  officer  of  a  corporation  who  actually  holds  the  physi- 
cal possession,  custody  and  control  of  books  or  papers  of 
the  corporation,  which  he  is  required  by  a  subpoena  duces 
tecum  to  produce,  is  entitled  to  the  same  protection 
against  exposing  Ihe  contents  thereof  which  would  tend 
to  incriminate  him,  as  if  the  books  and  papers  were  abso- 
lutely his  own.'  That  is,  the  power  of  the  courts  to 
require  production  depends  not  upon  their  character  as 
corporate  books  and  the  duty  of  the  corporation  to  submit 
them  to  examination,  but  upon  the  particular  custody  in 
which  they  may  be  found.  .  .  .  But  the  physical  cus- 
tody of  incriminating  documents  does  not  of  itself  protect 
the  custodian  against  their  compulsory  production.  The 
question  still  remains  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  the 
documents  and  the  capacity  in  which  they  are  held.  .  .  . 
The  fundamental  ground  of  decision  in  this  class  of  cases 
is  that  where,  by  virtue  of  their  character  and  the  rules  of 
law  applicable  to  them,  the  books  and  papers  are  held 
subject  to  examination  by  the  demanding  authority,  the 
custodian  has  no  privilege  to  refuse  production  although 
their  contents  tended  to  criminate  him.  In  assuming  their 
custody  he  has  accepted  the  incident  obligation  to  permit 
their  inspection. ' '  In  Wheeler  v.  United  States,  226  U.  S. 
478,  it  was  said :  *^  We  are  of  opinion  that  this  case  is  vir- 
tuaUy  ruled  by  Wilson  v.  United  States  [221  U.  S.  361], 
.  .  .  and  that  there  was  no  self-incrimination  of  such 
officer,  because  he  was  not  compelled  to  produce  his  pri- 
vate books,  but  the  books  of  the  corporation,  which  were 
not  within  the  protection  given  to  the  private  books  and 
papers  of  an  individual.  We  are  unable  to  see  that  this 
case  differs  in  principle  from  that  one."  In  Grant  v. 
United  States,  227  U.  S.  74,  it  was  held  that  despite  the 


164  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  81 

fact  that  the  legal  title  to  the  books  and  papers  of  a  de- 
funct corporation  may  not  be  in  him,  a  stockholder  of  such 
corporation,  having  the  same  in  his  possession,  can  not 
plead  the  constitutional  privilege  against  self-incrimina- 
tion as  a  justification  of  his  refusal  to  produce  them  be- 
fore the  grand  jury  under  a  subpoena  duces  tecum ;  that  no 
question  of  professional  privilege  is  involved  when  an  ' 
attorney  refuses  to  obey  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  requiring 
the  production  of  his  clients '  books  and  papers  before  a 
grand  jury  when  they  may  tend  to  incriminate  such 
clients ;  in  such  a  case  the  sole  question  involved  is  the 
client's  personal  privilege  against  self-incrimination. 
The  Court  rested  its  conclusion  in  this  case  upon  Wilson 
V.  United  States,  221 U.  S.  361 ;  Wheeler  v.  United  States. 
226  U.  S.  478. 

§82.  Breese  v.  U.  S.— Presentment  of  an  indictment 
by  grand  jury  in  a  body  not  required  by  Fifth  Amend- 
ment.  The  Court,  226  U,  S.  1,  said:  **We  do  not  think  it 
necessary  to  discuss  the  contention  that  the  5th  Amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  requires  the  indictment  to  be 
presented  by  the  grand  jury  in  a  body  or  that  their  fail- 
ure so  to  present  it  goes  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court. 
See  Keizo  v.  Henry,  211  U.  S.  146 ;  Harlan  v.  McGourin, 
218  U.  S.  442;  United  States  v.  McKee,  4  Dill  1,  9,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  15,687.  The  reasons  for  the  requirement,  if 
they  ever  were  very  strong,  h'as  disappeared,  at  least 
in  part,  and  we  have  no  doubt  that  Congress,  like  the 
state  of  North  Carolina,  could  have  done  away  with  it,  if 
it  had  seen  fit  to  do  so  instead  of  remaining  silent.  See 
Danforth  v.  Georgia,  75  Ga.  614,  620,  58  Am.  Rep.  480; 
United  States  v.  Butler,  1  Hughes  457,  461,  Fed  Cas.  No. 
14,700;  Frisbie  v.  United  States,  157  U.  S.  160, 163.'^  In 
this  connection  it  may  be  well  to  reproduce  the  following : 
**To  the  intimation  in  Breese  v.  United  States  that  the 
reasons  for  requiring  an  indictment  to  be  presented  by 
the  grand  jury  in  a  body  were  no  longer  persuasive,  may 
be  opposed  several  decisions  holding  that  the  return  of 


1 83  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    165 

the  indictment  must  be  made  in  the  presence  of  the  grand 
jury.  Bobinson  v.  State,  33  Ark.  180;  People  v.  Black- 
weU,  27  CaL  65;  State  v.  Gaines,  86  N.  C.  632;  State  v. 
Bordeaux,  93  N.  C.  560.  And  in  Cachute  v.  State,  50  Miss. 
169,  the  rule  in  Mississippi  is  said  to  be  that  the  indict- 
ment must  be  brought  into  court  by  the  grand  jury  as 
a  body,  or  through  the  foreman  accompanied  by  the  other 
jurors.  And  this  view  is  strongly  upheld  in  Renegar  v. 
United  States,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  683,  97  C.  C.  A.  172, 
172  Fed.  646,  19  Ann.  Cas.  1117,  where  the  foreman  of 
the  grand  jury  had  handed  a  paper  indorsed  *A  True 
Bill,'  to  the  clerk  of  the  court,  when  the  court  was  not  in 
session,  and  when  none  of  the  grand  jurors,  except  the 
foreman,  were  present.  The  court  held  that  this  was  not 
sufficient  to  place  the  accused  on  trial  for  an  infamous 
crime  under  the  provision  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
that  no  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  such  a  crime 
unless  by  an  indictment  of  the  grand  jury,  and  that  to 
constitute  a  valid  indictment,  the  paper  must  be  brought 
publicly  into  court  by  the  grand  jury  as  a  body.*'  Co-op. 
ed.  of  Supreme  Court  Reports,  57  Law  ed.  note  to  this 
case,  p.  97. 

§  83.  Ensign  v.  Pennsylvania  ^^ — States  not  oompelled 
to  accord  the  protection  against  self-incrimination  gnar- 
anteed  by  Fifth  Amendment.  The  Court  said :  ^  ^  Article 
5  of  Amendments  to  the  Federal  Constitution  is  invoked, 
which  provides  (inter  alia) — *No  person  .  .  .  shall  be 
compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself.  *  But,  as  has  been  often  reiterated,  this  amend- 
ment is  not  obligatory  upon  the  governments  of  the  sev- 
eral states,  or  their  judicial  establishments,  and  regulates 
the  procedure  of  the  federal  courts  only.  Barron  v. 
Baltimore,  7  Pet.  243 ;  Spies  v.  Illinois,  123  U.  S.  131 ; 
Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175  XJ.  S.  172 ;  Barrington  v.  Mis- 
souri, 205  TJ.  S.  493 ;  Twining  v.  New  Jersey,  211  TJ.  S. 
78,  93.    We  are  referred  to  a  similar  proposition  in  art.  1, 

as— 227  U.  S.  592. 


166  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  83 

9,  of  the  Constitution  of  Pennsylvania;  Uat,  even  if  the 
trial  of  the  plaintiffs  in  error  proceeded  in  disregard  of 
this  provision,  no  Federal  right  was  thereby  infringed. ' ' 

§  84.  Heike  v.  U.  S.^^— Self-incrimination  and  daim  of 
immunity  based  on  a  proviso  ta  act  of  February  26|  1903. 

In  this  case  it  was  held  that  petitioner,  an  officer  of  a 
sugar  refining  company  who  had  testified  before  a 
United  States  grand  jury  investigating  alleged  viola- 
tions by  such  company  of  the  anti-trust  act  of  July  2, 
1890,  presenting  in  the  main,  documentary  evidence  fur- 
nished by  the  books  and  papers  of  the  company,  produced 
in  response  to  a  subpoena  directed  to  him,  could  not 
escape  a  prosecution  for  a  conspiracy  to  conunit  a  crime 
against  the  Federal  Government  by  making  entries  of 
raw  sugar  at  less  than  their  true  weights,  under  a  claim 
of  immunity  based  on  the  proviso  to  the  act  of  February 
25,  1903.  The  Court  said:  **The  petitioner  contended 
that,  as  soon  as  he  had  testified  upon  a  matter  under  the 
Sherman  act,  he  had  an  amnesty  by  the  statute  from 
liability  for  any  and  every  offense  that  was  connected 
with  that  matter  in  any  degree ;  or,  at  least,  every  offense 
towards  the  discovery  of  which  his  testimony  led  up,  even 
if  it  had  no  actual  effect  in  bringing  the  discovery  about. 
.  .  .  Of  course  there  is  a  clear  distinction  between  an 
amnesty  and  the  constitutional  protection  of  a  party  from 
being  compelled  in  a  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself.  Amendment  5.  But  the  obvious  purpose  of  the 
statute  is  to  make  evidence  available  and  compulsory  that 
otherwise  could  not  be  got.  We  see  no  reason  for  suppos- 
ing that  the  act  offered  a  gratuity  to  crime.  It  should  be 
construed,  so  far  as  its  words  fairly  allow  the  construc- 
tion, as  coterminous  with  what  otherwise  would  have 
been  the  privilege  of  the  person  concerned.  We  believe 
its  policy  to  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  earlier  act  of 
February  11, 1893,  chap,  83,  27  Stat,  at  L.  443,  U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901,  p.  3173,  which  read:    *No  person  shall  be 

33—227  U.  S.  131. 


§85  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1517)    167 

excused  from  attending  and  testifying, '  etc.  *But  no  per- 
son shall  be  prosecuted/  etc.,  as  now,  thus  showing  the 
correlation  between  constitutional  right  and  inununity  by 
the  form.  That  statute  was  passed  because  an  earlier 
one,  in  the  language  of  a  late  case,  'was  not  coextensive 
with  the  constitutional  privilege.'  American  Litho- 
graphic Co.  V.  Werckmeister,  221  U.  S.  603,  611.  .  .  • 
Taking  all  these  considerations  together  we  think  it  plain 
that  the  petitioner  could  take  nothing  by  his  plea. ' ' 

§  85.  Zakonaite  v.  Wolf  ^^ — ^Due  process  invoked  by  an 
alien  found  to  be  practicing  prostitution  within  three 
yean  after  her  entry.  This  was  an  appeal  from  an  order 
dismissing  a  petition  for  discharge  upon  habeas  corpus 
filed  by  appellant,  who  had  been  arrested  and  held  in 
custody  under  warrants  of  arrest  and  deportation  issued 
by  the  Acting  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor  under 
the  immigration  act  of  February  20, 1907,  it  having  been 
ascertained  that  she  was  subject  to  deportation  in  that 
she  was  a  prostitute,  and  had  been  found  practicing 
prostitution  three  years  after  her  entry  into  the 
United  States.  The  Court  said:  **In  her  behalf  it 
was  contended  in  the  court  below,  and  is  here  con- 
tended, first,  that  there  was  no  evidence  before  the  Secre- 
tary of  Commerce  and  Labor  sufiBcient  to  warrant  the 
findings  of  fact  upon  which  the  order  of  deportation  was 
based ;  and,  secondly,  that  §  3  of  the  act  of  February  20, 
1907,  which  provides  that  *  any  alien  woman  or  girl  who 
shall  be  found  an  inmate  of  a  house  of  prostitution  or 
practicing  prostitution,  at  any  time  within  three  years 
after  she  shall  have  entered  the  United  States,  shall  be 
deemed  to  be  unlawfully  within  the  United  States,  and 
shall  be  deported  as  provided  by  sections  twenty  and 
twenty-one  of  this  act, — ^is  unconstitutional  because  vio- 
lative of  the  guaranties  that  no  person  shall  be  deprived 
of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process  of  law, 
and  that  in  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall 

34^226  IT.  S.  272. 


168  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  85 

enjoy  the  right  to  a  speedy  and  public  trial  by  an  impar- 
tial jury  of  the  state  and  district  wherein  the  crime  shall 
have  been  committed,  as  contained  in  the  5th  and  6th 
Amendments.  As  to  the  first  point,  an  examination  of 
the  evidence  upon  which  the  order  of  deportation  was 
based  convinces  us  that  it  was  adequate  to  support  the 
Secretary's  conclusion  of  fact.  That  being  so,  and  the 
appellant  having  had  a  fair  hearing,  the  findings  are  not 
subject  to  review  by  this  court.  With  respect  to  the 
second  point  little  more  need  be  said.  It  is  entirely  settled 
that  the  authority  of  Congress  to  prohibit  aliens  from 
coming  within  the  United  States,  and  to  regulate  their 
coming,  includes  authority  to  impose  conditions  upon  the 
performance  of  which  the  continued  liberty  of  the  alien 
to  reside  within  the  bounds  of  this  country  may  be  made 
to  depend ;  that  a  proceeding  to  enforce  such  regulations 
is  not  a  criminal  prosecution  within  the  meaning  of  the 
5th  and  6th  Amendments ;  .  .  .  that  such  an  inquiry 
may  be  properly  devolved  upon  an  executive  department 
or  subordinate  oflBcials  thereof,  and  that  the  findings  of 
fact  reached  by  such  oflScials,  after  a  fair  though  summary 
hearing,  may  constitutionally  be  made  conclusive  as  they 
are  made  by  the  provisions  of  the  act  in  question.  Fong 
Tue  Ting  v.  United  States,  149  U.  S.  698,  730;  United 
States  V.  Zucker,  161  U.  S.  481 ;  Wong  Wing  v.  United 
States,  163  U,  S.  228;  United  States  ex  rel.  Turner  v. 
Williams,  194  U.  S.  279,  289;  Chin  Tow  v.  United  States, 
208  U.  S.  8,  11;  Tang  Tun  v.  Edsell,  223  U.  S.  673,  675; 
Low  Wah  Suey  v.  Backus,  225  U.  S.  460,  468.  *' 

• 

§86.  Ochoa  v.  Hernandez  ^^ — ^Due  process  denied  by 
order  of  military  governor  of  Porto  Rico  taking  property 
from  lawful  owner  without  notice  or  hearing.  In  this 
case  it  was  claimed  that  due  process  was  denied  by  a 
judicial  order,  dated  April  4,  1899,  by  Major  General 
Henry  U.  S.  Volunteers,  at  that  time  military  governor 
of  Porto  Rico,  which  by  its  terms  reduced  from  twenty 

35—230  U.  S.  139. 


§86  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    169 

years  to  six  years  the  period  during  which  real  estate 
must  be  held  in  order  to  permit  the  conversion  in  the 
registry  of  a  possessory  title  to  a  dominio  title.  The  trial 
court  held  that  such  order  was  void  because  it  denied 
*  *  due  process  of  law  ^ '  as  guaranteed  by  the  Fifth  Amend- 
menty  **so  far  as  it  operated  retrospectively  upon  the 
rights  of  the  complainants,  who  were  minors  at  the  time 
and  for  some  time  thereafter,  and  who  owned  the  land 
during  the  entire  period  of  nine  years  that  elapsed 
between  the  fraudulent  entry  of  possessory  title  in  the 
name  of  their  maternal  grandfather.  Morales,  and  the 
promulgation  of  General  Henry's  order.''  In  sustaining 
that  eminently  just  judgment  the  Court  said :  *  *  Without 
the  guaranty  of  *due  process'  the  right  of  private  prop- 
erty can  not  be  said  to  exist,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is 
known  to  our  laws.  The  principle,  known  to  the  common 
law  before  Magna  Carta,  was  embodied  in  that  Charter 
(2  Coke,  Inst.  45,  50),  and  has  been  recognized  since  the 
Bevolution  as  among  the  safest  foundation  of  our  insti- 
tutions. Whatever  else  may  be  uncertain  about  the  defini- 
tion of  the  term  'due  process  of  law,'  all  authorities 
agree  that  it  inhibits  the  taking  of  one  man's  property 
and  giving  it  to  another,  contrary  to  settled  usages  and 
modes  of  procedure,  and  without  notice  or  an  oppor- 
tunity for  a  hearing.  Now,  the  effect  and  operation  of 
the  retroactive  clause  in  the  judicial  order  of  April,  1899, 
as  applied  to  the  facts  of  the  concrete  case,  were  such 
that,  although  Morales  had  until  then  no  right,  title,  or 
interest  in  the  land  in  question,  and  had  merely  estab- 
lished through  fraudulent  means  and  without  notice  to 
the  i)ersons  concerned  a  footing  of  possession,  as  a  result 
of  which,  if  they  should  permit  his  claims  to  remain 
unchallenged,  and  he  should  in  fact  maintain  continuous 
possession  for  nearly  twelve  years  longer,  he  would 
thereby  be  enabled  to  procure,  by  ex  parte  proceedings, 
an  apparent  title  in  himself  as  against  them,  yet  the  order 
permitted  him  at  once,  and  without  notice  to  the  owners, 
to  procure  such  record  of  ownership  in  his  name,  although 


170  DXJB  PEOCBSS  OP  LAW  §  86 

they  were  then  infants,  and,  so  far  as  appears,  not  cog- 
nizant of  his  possession  of  the  land  or  of  any  of  his  pro- 
ceedings ;  and  then,  by  virtue  of  other  provisions  of  the 
mortgage  law,  he  could  completely  deprive  them  of  their 
property  if  he  could  make  sale  of  it  to  a  bonafide  pur- 
chaser without  notice  of  the  infirmity  of  his  apparent  title. 
.  .  .  Since  the  proceeding  for  converting  the  entry  of 
possession  into  a  dominio  title,  as  well  as  the  proceeding 
for  an  entry  of  possession  itself,  was  taken  without  notice 
to  the  owners,  the  effect  of  the  judicial  order  was  pre- 
cisely the  same  as  if  the  military  governor  had  declared 
that  the  property  in  question  should  be  taken  from  the 
lawful  owner  and  given  to  the  fraudulent  occupant. ' ' 


§  87.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  B.  Co.  v.  XT.  S.^^*— ] 
in  Hepburn  act  of  transport  from  market  to  mine  does 
not  deny  due  process.  The  railroad  in  question  was 
indicted  for  hauling  over  its  lines  twenty  car  loads  of  hay 
belonging  to  the  company,  but  not  necessary  for  its  use 
as  a  common  carrier.  Such  hay  had  been  purchased  for 
the  use  of  animals  employed  in  and  about  certain  mines, 
all  the  coal  taken  from  them  being  sold  for  use  by  the 
public,  except  the  steam  coal  used  as  fuel  for  the  com- 
pany's locomotives.  It  appeared  on  the  trial  that  the 
defendant  was  not  only  chartered  as  a  railroad,  but  had 
been  authorized  to  operate  coal  mines;  and  it  claimed 
that  the  commodities  clause  of  the  Hepburn  act  of  June 
29, 1906,  "violated  the  5th  Amendment,  deprived  the  com- 
pany of  a  right  to  contract,  and  prevented  it  from  carry- 
ing its  own  property  needed  in  a  legitimate  intrastate 
business,  conducted  under  authority  of  a  charter  granted 
by  the  state  of  Pennsylvania,  many  years  before  the 
adoption  of  the  Hepburn  bill.'*  In  rejecting  that  con- 
tention the  Court  said :  *  *  This  contention  must  be  over- 
ruled on  the  authority  of  United  States  ex  rel.  Atty.  Gen. 
V.  Delaware  &  H.  Co.  213  U.  S.  366,  416.  It  is  true  that 
the  decision  in  that  case  related  to  shipments  of  coal 

36—23111.8.363.  * 


§  88  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    171 

from  mine  to  market,  while  here  the  merchandise  was 
transported  from  market  to  mine.  But  the  statute  relates 
to  *aU  conunoditieSy  except  lumber,  owned  by  the  com- 
pany/ and  includes  inbound  as  well  as  outbound  ship- 
ments. Both  classes  of  transportation  are  within  the 
purview  of  the  evil  to  be  corrected,  and  therefore  subject 
to  the  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  commerce. 
The  exercise  of  that  power  is,  of  course,  limited  by  the 
provisions  of  the  5th  Amendment  (Monongahela  Nav.  Co. 
V.  United  States,  148  U.  S.  336 ;  McCray  v.  United  States, 
195  U.  S.  27 ;  Union  Bridge  Co.  v.  United  States,  204  U.  S. 
364),  but  the  commodity  clause  does  not  take  property, 
nor  does  it  arbitrarily  deprive  the  company  of  a  right  of 
property.  The  statute  deals  with  railroad  companies 
as  public  carriers,  and  the  fact  that  they  may  also  be 
engaged  in  a  private  business  does  not  compel  Congress 
to  legislate  concerning  them  as  carriers  so  as  not  to  inter- 
fere with  them  as  miners  or  merchants. ' ' 


§  88.  Billings  v.  TT.  S.^^— Imposition  of  an  excise  tax 
based  on  gross  tonnage  upon  the  use  of  foreign  built 
pleasure  yachts  does  not  deny  due  process.  The  consti- 
tutional contention  of  plaintiff  in  error  was  that  the 
classification  in  37  of  the  tariff  act  of  August  5, 1909,  vio- 
lated the  Fifth  Amendment;  that  such  violation  resulted 
from  the  imposition  of  an  excise  tax  based  upon  gross 
tonnage  upon  the  use  of  foreign  built  pleasure  yachts 
owned  by  American  citizens  in  the  absence  of  a  like 
imposition  upon  the  use  of  domestic  yachts  under  like 
conditions.  In  rejecting  that  contention  the  Court  said : 
"It  has  been  conclusively  determined  that  the  require- 
ment of  uniformity  which  the  Constitution  imposes  upon 
Congress  in  the  levy  of  excise  taxes  is  not  an  intrinsic 
uniformity  but  merely  a  geographical  one.  Flint  v. 
Stone,  Tracy  Co.,  220  U.  S.  107;  McCray  v.  United  States, 
195  U.  S.  27 ;  Knowlton  v.  Moore,  178  U.  S.  41.  It  is  also 
settled  beyond  dispute  that  the  Constitution  is  not  self- 

37—232  IT.  S.  2ftL. 


172  DUB  PEOCESS  OP  LAW  §  88 

destructive.  In  other  words,  that  the  powers  which  it 
confers  on  the  one  hand  it  does  not  immediately  take 
away  on  the  other;  that  is  to  say,  that  the  authority  to 
tax  which  is  given  in  express  terms  is  not  limited  or  re- 
stricted by  the  subsequent  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
or  the  Amendments  thereto,  especially  by  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  5th  Amendment.  McCray  v.  United  States, 
195  U.  S.  27,  and  authorities  there  cited.  Nor  is  there  any- 
thing in  Carroll  v.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.,  199  U.  S.  401,  or 
Twining  v.  New  Jersey,  211  U.  S.  78,  which  in  the  remot- 
est degree  nullifies  or  restricts  the  principle  thus  stated. 
Indeed  it  is  apparent,  if  the  suggestion  as  to  the  meaning 
of  those  cases  were  assented  to,  it  would  result  in  render- 
ing the  Constitution  unconstitutional.  This  certainly  was 
the  view  entertained  by  the  pleader  when  the  answer  in 
the  case  was  prepared,  shice  the  sole  attack  on  the  consti- 
tutionality of  the  statute  was  based  upon  the  assertion 
that  it  was  repugnant  to  the  due  process  clause  of  the 
5th  Amendment.  And  such  also  is  the  line  of  the  argu- 
ment at  bar  where  the  fundamental  rights  secured  by 
the  5th  Amendment  are  constantly  referred  to  as  the 
basis  upon  which  the  unconstitutionality  of  the  statute 
is  urged.  Is  there  foundation  for  this  claim  under  the 
5th  Amendment,  is  then  the  issue,  and  that,  of  course, 
requires  a  statement  of  the  grievances  which  it  is  as- 
serted resulted  from  the  upholding  the  tax.  They  all 
come  to  this, — ^that  to  impose  a  burden  in  the  shape  of 
a  tax  upon  the  use  of  a  foreign  built  yacht  when  a  like 
tax  is  not  imposed  on  the  use  of  a  domestic  yacht  under 
similar  circumstances  is  so  beyond  the  power  of  classifi- 
cation, so  abhorrent  to  the  sense  of  justice,  and  so  repug- 
nant to  the  conception  of  free  government  as  to  be  void 
even  in  the  absence  of  express  constitutional  limitation. 
•  •  .  we  are  of  opinion  the  conclusion  can  not  be 
escaped  that  the  propositions,  each  and  all  of  them,  what- 
ever may  be  their  form  of  expression,  are  in  substance 
and  effect  but  an  assertion  that  the  tax  which  the  statute 
imposes  is  void  because  of  a  want  of  intrinsic  uniformity ; 


§89  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    173 

and  therefore  all  the  contentions  are  adversely  disposed 
of  by  the  previons  decisions  of  this  court  on  that  subject.'^ 
See  to  the  same  effect.  United  States  v.  Bennett,  232  U.  S. 
299;  Bainey  v.  United  States,  232  U.  S.  310. 

§89.  Herbert  v.  Bicknell  ^^— Due  process  not  denied 
when  judgment  by  default  is  rendered  against  absent 
defendant  on  summons  left  at  last  and  usual  place  of 
abode.  This  action  was  begun  in  the  District  Court  of 
Honolulu  against  the  defendant  at  a  time  when  it  is 
admitted  he  was  absent  from  the  territory.  The  sum- 
mons was  left  at  a  place  which,  according  to  the  return, 
Was  the  defendant's  last  and  usual  place  of  abode.  He 
claimed  however  that  he  had  changed  his  domicile  to  Aus- 
tralia before  the  beginning  of  the  suit ;  that  his  last  and 
usual  place  of  abode,  before  his  change  of  domicile,  was 
at  WaikiM ;  and  that  the  place  at  which  the  summons  was 
left  was  a  lodging  house  at  which  he  was  temporarily 
stopping,  and  was  not  therefore  his  last  and  usual  place 
of  abode  within  the  meaning  of  2114  of  the  Revised  Laws 
of  Hawaii.  Upon  that  state  of  facts  the  defendant 
claimed  that  the  provision  for  substituted  service  by  leav- 
ing the  notice  **at  his  last  and  usual  place  of  abode'' 
referred  either  to  one  who  was  inhabitant,  or  a  resident 
at  the  time  of  the  service.  Therefore,  as  the  defendant 
was  in  neither  category,  that  the  attempted  constructive 
or  substituted  service  gave  the  court  no  jurisdiction.  In 
rejecting  that  contention  the  Court  said:  **The  argu- 
ment for  the  plaintiff  in  error  assumes  a  wider  range 
than  is  open  upon  this  motion.  The  supreme  court  says 
that  the  question  whether  the  evidence  was  suflScient  to 
support  the  judgment  can  not  be  raised  in  this  way,  and 
we  would  follow  the  decision  below  even  if  it  seemed  less 
obviously  reasonable  than  it  does.  Montoya  v.  Gonzales, 
232  U.  S.  375.  Moreover,  the  only  errors  assigned  here 
are  in  holding  that  the  service  prescribed  by  2114  of  the 
Bevised  Laws  of  Hawaii,  as  construed  by  the  court,  and 

38—233  V.  S.  70. 


174  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  89 

that  leaving  a  copy  of  the  summons  as  above  stated  after 
garnishment  of  a  debt  due  to  the  defendant,  were  suffi- 
cient to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  5th  Amendment 
(the  court  having  assumed  that  the  defendant  referred 
to  the  5th  when  he  mentioned  the  14th  in  his  motion 
below).  The  Supreme  Court  was  of  opinion  that,  if  the 
question  was  open,  leaving  copy  of  the  summons  at  the 
place  where  the  defendant  last  had  stopped  was  leaving 
it  at  his  last  and  usual  place  of  abode  within  2114.  On 
that  point  we  see  no  sufficient  reason  for  disturbing  the 
judgment.  Phoenix  E,  Co.  v.  Landis,  231  U.  S.  578,  579/' 
See  the  instructive  note  to  this  case,  entitled  **  Service 
of  process  on  resident  in  action  in  personam  by  leaving 
copy  at  residence  as  due  process  of  law'*  in  Co-op.  ed.  of 
S.  C.  Reports,  58  Law  ed.  p.  854,  where  it  is  said  that 
''the  doctrine  that  a  personal  judgment  upon  constmc- 
tive  or  substituted  service  upon  a  nonresident  who  does 
not  appear  is  contrary  to  due  process  is  not  generally 
regarded  as  applicable  to  a  judgment  in  personam  ren- 
dered upon  constructive  or  substituted  service  upon  a 
resident  of  the  state,  even  though  he  may  have  been 
absent  from  the  state  at  the  time.  *  *  Citing  notes  to  Pinney 
V.  Providence  Loan  &  Invest.  Co.,  50  L.  B,  A.  585,  and 
Raher  v.  Raher,  35  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  292. 

§  90.  n.  S.  V.  Atchison,  T.  and  S.  F.  K.  Oo.»»— Act  of 
February  4, 1887,  §  4,  as  amended  by  act  of  June  18, 1910, 
§  8,  not  repugnant  to  Fifth  Amendment.  These  appeals 
were  taken  to  review  an  interlocutory  order  and  final 
decree  of  the  Conamerce  Court,  enjoying  the  enforce- 
ment of  an  order  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Comnds- 
sion  based  upon  the  long  and  short  haul  clause  of  the  act 
to  regulate  conunerce.  In  holding  that  the  statute  as 
amended  is  not  made  repugnant  to  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, as  denying  due  process  of  law,  by  the  imperative 
enforcement  of  its  provisions  prohibiting  common  car- 
riers to  charge  a  lesser  rate  for  a  longer  than  for  a 

39—234  IT.  S.  476. 


§91  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    175 

shorter  haul,  which  results  when  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  has  performed  the  duty  imposed  upon  it  by 
the  statute  to  refuse  in  a  proper  case  an  application  by  a 
carrier  for  relief  from  such  long  and  short  haul  clause,  the 
Court  said :  ''It  is  said  in  the  argument  on  behalf  of  one 
of  the  carriers  that  as  in  substance  and  effect  the  duty  is 
imposed  upon  the  Commission  in  a  proper  case  to  refuse 
an  application^  therefore  the  law  is  void  because  in  such 
a  contingency  the  statute  would  amount  to  an  imperative 
enforcement  of  the  long  and  short  haul  and  would  be 
repugnant  to  the  Constitution.  It  is  conceded  in  the  argu- 
ment that  it  has  been  directly  decided  by  this  court  that 
a  general  enforcement  of  the  long  and  short  clause  would 
not  be  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  (Louisville  &  N.  B. 
Co.  V.  Kentucky,  183  U,  S,  503),  but  we  are  asked  to 
reconsider  and  overrule  the  case,  and  thus  correct  the 
error  which  was  manifest  in  deciding  it.  But  we  are  not 
in  the  remotest  degree  inclined  to  enter  into  this  inquiry, 
not  only  because  of  the  reasons  which  were  stated  in  the 
case  itself,  but  also  because  of  those  already  expounded 
in  this  opinion,  and  for  an  additional  reason,  which  is, 
that  the  contention  by  necessary  implication  assails 
numerous  cases  which,  from  the  enactment  of  the  act 
to  regulate  commerce  down  to  the  present  time,  have 
involved  the  adequacy  of  the  conditions  advanced  by 
carriers  for  justifying  their  departure  from  the  long  and 
short  haul  clause.  We  say  this  because  the  controversies 
which  the  many  cases  referred  to  considered  and  decided 
by  a  necessary  postulate  involved  an  assertion  of  the 
validity  of  the  legislative  power  to  apply  and  enforce  the 
long  and  short  haul  clause.'' 

§  91.  Pennsylvania  Oo.  v.  TT.  S.  In  this  case  (236  U.  S. 
351),  the  Court  held:  first,  that  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  has  jurisdiction  to  compel  an  interstate  car- 
rier to  receive  and  transport  over  its  terminals  carload 
interstate  freight  from  one  carrier  having  a  physical 
connection  with  its  lines  on  the  same  terms  on  which  it 


176  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  91 

performs  such  service  for  other  connecting  carrier  in  a 
like  situation ;  second,  that  such  an  order  is  not  an  appro- 
priation of  terminal  property  of  the  carrier  in  violation 
of  the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment 
but  a  regulation  of  its  terminal  facilities  within  the 
authority  delegated  to  Congress  (Grand  Trunk  By,  v. 
Michigan  Railroad  Commission,  231  U.  S.  457 ;  followed ; 
Louis,  and  N.  R.  R.  v.  Stock  Yards  Co,,  212  U-  S.  132,  dis- 
tinguished) ;  third,  that  Congress  may  so  control  the  ter- 
minal facilities  of  a  carrier,  and  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  may  make  such  orders,  as  will  prevent  the 
creation  of  monopolies  within  the  limitations  and  prohibi- 
tions of  the  Anti-trust  Act.  United  States  v,  St.  Louis 
Terminal,  224  U.  S.  383.  Li  passing  upon  the  constitu- 
tional question  the  Court  said :  **The  third  and  last  objec- 
tion is  that  the  effect  of  the  order  of  the  Conunission  is 
to  appropriate  the  property  of  the  Pennsylvania  Com- 
pany without  compensation  to  the  use  of  the  Rochester 
Company,  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  Certainly  the  railroad  can  not  maintain,  in  view 
of  the  provisions  of  the  statute  to  which  we  have  referred, 
that  these  terminal  facilities  are  exempt  from  public 
regulation  and  under  all  circumstances  subject  to  its  con- 
trol, to  be  dealt  with  in  such  manner  as  it  may  see  fit. 
This  court  recognized,  in  the  cases  of  United  States  v. 
Terminal  R.  R.  Ass'n,  224  U.  S.  383,  that  teiminal  facili- 
ties might  be  so  used  as  to  create  monopolies,  which  it  was 
within  the  power  of  Congress  to  control,  a  power  which 
it  might  ..exercise  within  the  prohibitions  and  limitations 
of  the  Sherman  Act.  So  in  the  present  case,  all  that  the 
order  requires  the  Pennsylvania  Company  to  do  is  to 
receive  and  transport  over  its  terminals  by  its  own  motive 
power,  for  the  Rochester  Company,  as  it  does  for  other 
companies,  similarly  situated,  carload  freight  in  the 
course  of  interstate  transportation.  To  support  the  con- 
stitutional argument  in  this  connection,  reliance  is  had 
upon  the  decision  of  this  court  in  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  v. 
Stock  Yards,  212  U.  S.  132.    That  case  was  also  relied 


§  92  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    177 

upon  to  support  a  like  argmnent  in  the  Grand  Trunk 
Case,  supra,  and  in  the  opinion  of  the  court  was  analyzed 
and  its  application  to  the  situation  then  presented  denied. 
An  examination  of  the  LouisviUe  Case  shows  that  it  was 
unlike  the  one  now  presented.  *  *  *  So  here  there  is 
no  attempt  to  appropriate  the  terminals  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Company  to  the  use  of  the  Rochester  Company. 
What  is  here  accomplished  is  only  that  the  same  trans- 
portation facilities  which  are  afforded  to  the  shipments 
brought  to  the  point  of  connection  over  the  tracks  used 
in  common  by  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio,  Railroad  and  the 
Rochester  Company  shall  be  rendered  to  the  Rochester 
Company  as  are  given  to  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Com- 
pany under  precisely  the  same  circumstances  of  connec- 
tion for  the  transportation  of  interstate  traffic*' 

§  92.  Oreenleaf  Lumber  Oo.  v.  Oarrison.  In  this  case 
(237  U.  S.  251),  it  was  held:  first  that  as  the  power  of  a 
state  over  navigable  waters  is  subordinate  to  the  control 
of  Congress,  the  state  can  grant  no  right  to  the  soil  of 
the  bed  of  navigable  waters  which  is  not  subject  to  Fed- 
eral regulation  (Philadelphia  Co.  v.  Stimson,  223  U.  S. 
605 ;  United  States  v.  Chandler-Dunbar  Co.,  229  U.  S.  53)  ; 
second,  that  as  the  sovereign  power  of  a  state  or  nation 
is  perpetual  it  can  not  be  exhausted  by  one  exercise.  All 
privileges  granted  in  public  waters  are  subject  to  that 
state  power  whose'  exercise  is  not  the  taking  of  private 
property  for  public  use  but  a  lawful  exercise  of  govern- 
mental authority  for  the  common  welfare;  tWrd,  that 
when  any  one  acting  under  authority  erects  a  structure  of 
any  kind  in  navigable  waters,  he  does  so  with  full  knowl- 
edge of  the  perpetual  paramount  authority  of  Congress  to 
regulate  commerce  among  the  states;  fourth,  that  the 
power  of  Congress  extends  to  the  entire  expanse  of  a 
navigable  stream,  regardless  of  the  depth  or  shallowness 
of  the  water,  and  as  the  power  of  a  state  over  navigable 
waters  is  subordinate  to  that  of  Congress,  the  state  can 
grant  no  right  to  the  soil  of  the  bed  of  navigable  waters 

Due  Process — 12 


178  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  92 

which  is  not  subject  to  Federal  control.  (Philadelphia  Co, 
V.  Stimson,  223  U.  S.  605 ;  United  States  v.  Chandler-Dun- 
bar  Co.y  229  U.  S.  53) ;  fifth,  that  although  a  wharf  was 
originally  erected  within  the  harbor  lines  tlien  duly  estab- 
lished by  both  the  state  and  Federal  authority,  the  United 
States  is  not  liable  under  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  com- 
pensate the  owner  of  a  wharf  erected  in  navigable 
waters  for  the  removal  of  that  part  of  the  structure  out- 
side of  the  new  property  established  by  Federal  author- 
ity. In  reaching  those  conclusions  the  Court  said:  ^'It 
is,  however,  contended  that  the  jurisdiction  to  establish 
harbor  lines  is  given  by  statute  only  *  where  it  is  made 
manifest  to  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the  establishment 
of  harbor  lines  is  essential  to  the  preservation  and  pro- 
tection of  harbors;'  and  that  it  is  shown  by  the  agreed 
statement  of  facts  and  the  correspondence  attached 
thereto  that  the  Secretary  of  War  acted  at  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  Navy  Department  for  the  improvement  of  the 
river  opposite  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  and  in  pursuance 
of  the  act  making  appropriations  for  the  naval  service 
for  the  year  ending  June  30,  1912,  §  239,  36  Stat  1265, 
1275 ;  and  that  this  was  the  ^  sole  purpose  of  tiie  change 
in  the  harbor  lines  and  the  required  removal  of  the  com- 
pany's (complainant's)  property  is  shown  by  the  addi- 
tional fact  that  it  appears  that  the  United  States  moors 
abreast  its  war  vessels,  colliers  and  other  vessels  in  front 
of  its  Navy  Yard,  so  that  they  may  project  out  in  the 
channel  which  it  so  uses  for  the  storage  of  its  vessels/ 
We  may  grant  that  such  was  the  inducement  and  such 
the  occasional  use,  but  neither  militates  against  the  valid- 
ity of  the  power  exercised.  The  mooring  of  vessels  is  as 
necessary  as  their  movement,  and  the  navigability  of  a 
river  can  be  maintained  or  increased  as  legally  for  the 
accommodation  of  war  vessels  as  for  trading  vessels, 
those  of  public  ownership  as  well  as  those  of  private 
ownership,  and  we  can  not  enter  into  a  consideration  of 
what  may  be  necessary  for  either  purpose. 
It  was   said  in  United   States  v.   Chandler-Dunbar 


§  93  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— (X)NTINUED  (1896-1917)   179 

Water  Co.,  229  U,  S.  at  page  64:  So  unfettered  is  the 
^control  of  Congress  over  the  navigable  streams  of  the 
country,  that  its  judgment  as  to  whether  a  construction 
in  or  over  such  a  river  is  or  is  not  an  obstacle  and  a  hin- 
drance to  navigation,  is  conclusive.  Such  judgment  and 
determination  is  the  exercise  of  legislative  power  in 
respect  of  a  subject  wholly  within  its  control.*  And  in 
Scranton  v.  Wheeler,  179  U.  S.  141, 162 :  *  Whether  navi- 
gation upon  waters  over  which  Congress  may  exert  its 
authority  requires  improvement  at  aU,  or  improvement 
in  a  particular  way,  are  matters  wholly  within  its  discre- 
tion. '  This  power  has  been  exercised  by  the  act  of  March 
3, 1899,  delegating  to  the  Secretary  of  War  the  power  to 
establish  harbor  lines  and,  necessarily,  to  require  the 
removal  of  structures  which  project  beyond  them.  Union 
Bridge  Company  v.  United  States,  204  U.  S.  364/' 

§  93.  Louisville  and  Naahville  R.  K.  v.  U.  S.  In  this 
case  (238  U.  S.  1),  it  was  held  that  neither  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  nor  the  provision  in  §  15 
of  the  Commerce  Act  that  a  carrier  shall  not  be  required 
to  give  the  use  of  its  tracks  or  terminals  to  another  car- 
rier engaged  in  like  business,  were  violated  by  an  order 
requiring  the  carrier  to  extend  to  connecting  carriers,  as 
to  competitive  business,  the  same  facilities  that  it  extends 
to  some  of  the  other  carriers,  in  regard  to  the  same  class 
of  business.  After  making  this  quotation  from  the  Dis- 
trict Court, — *  *  There  is  furthermore  no  evidence  that  the 
switching  practices  prescribed  will  violate  the  constitu- 
tional provision  against  taking  property  without  due  pro- 
cess of  law.  See  Grand  Trunk  Ry,  v.  Michigan  Commis- 
sion, 231  U.  S.  468.  And  it  may  well  be  assumed  that  the 
petitioners  will  not  themselves  establish  a  switching 
charge,  so  low  as  to  be  confiscatory,'* — ^the  Court  said: 
**The  question,  as  to  power  of  the  Commission  to  make 
this  part  of  the  order,  is  settled  by  the  decision  in  Pennsyl- 
vania Company  v.  United  States,  236  U.  S.  318,  recently 
decided.    The  appellants,  however,  insist  that  that  case 


180  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  93 

did  not  involve  switching  but  transportation;  and  further 
they  claim  that  the  Pennsylvania  road  was  there  ordered 
to  discontinue  discrimination — ^while  here  the  appellants 
are  required  by  an  affirmative  order  to  devote  their  prop- 
erty to  the  use  of  a  parallel  and  competing  carrier.  But 
the  alleged  differences  do  not  serve  to  take  the  present 
case  out  of  the  principle  announced  in  that  just  cited. 
For  in  this  order  the  prohibition  against  the  existing 
practice  and  requirement  to  furnish  equal  facilities  come 
to  the  same  thing.** 

§  94.  Chicago  and  Alton  R.  R.  v.  Tranbarger.  In  this 
case  (238  U.  S.  67),  it  was  held  that  a  statute  compelling 
owners  of  a  railroad  to  provide  means  for  passing  water 
under  embankments  amounts  rather  to  an  application  of 
the  maxim,  sic  utere  tuo  ut  alienum  non  laedas;  and,  as  a 
legitimate  exercise  of  the  police  power,  is  not  a  taking  of 
property  without  compensation  within  the  meaning  of 
the  Federal  constitution.  The  Court  said:  **We  deem 
it  very  clear  that  the  act  under  consideration  is  a  legiti- 
mate exercise  of  the  police  power,  and  not  in  any  proper 
sense  a  taking  of  the  property  of  plaintiff  in  error.  The 
ease  is  not  at  all  analogous  to  those  which  have  held  that 
the  taking  of  a  right  of  way  across  one  *s  land  for  a  drain- 
age ditch,  where  no  water-course  exists,  is  a  taking  of 
property  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution.  The 
present  regulation  is  for  the  prevention  of  drainage 
attributable  to  the  railroad  embankment  itself,  and 
amounts  merely  to  an  application  of  the  ma,xim  sic  utere 
ttio  ut  alienum  non  laedas/* 

§95.  Anderson  v.  Forty-two  Broadway  Co.  In  that 
case  (239  U.  S.  69),  it  was  held  that  the  provision  in  Cor- 
poration Tax  Act  of  1909,  36  Stat.  112  limiting  interest 
deductions  to  an  amount  of  the  indebtedness  not  exceed- 
ing capital  is  not  an  arbitrary  classification  denying  due 
process  of  law  under  the  5th  Amendment,  as  Congress 
has  power  to  adopt  a  baais  of  distinction  between  cor- 


§  98  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)    181 

porations  carrying  current  indebtedness  exceeding  capi- 
tal and  those  that  do  not 

§  96.  Williams  v.  Johnson.  In  that  case  (239  U.  S. 
414),  it  was  held  (1)  That  as  Indians  are  wards  of  the 
Nation,  Congress  has  plenary  power  over  tribal  property 
and  relations,  that  power  continuing  after  the  Indians 
are  made  citizens  and  may  be  exercised  as  to  restrictions 
on  alienation  of  allotments  (Tiger  v.  Western  Investment 
Co.,  221  U.  S.  286 ;  Choate  v.  Trapp,  224  U.  S.  665  dis- 
tinguished) ;  (2)  That  the  provision  in  the  Act  of  April 
21, 1904,  c-  33,  Stat.  204,  removing  certain  restrictions  on 
alienation  of  allotments  to  Choctaw  Indians  imposed  by 
the  Act  of  July  1, 1902,  was  within  the  authority  of  Con- 
gress, and  was  not,  under  the  due  process  clause  of  the 
5th  Amendment,  an  unconstitutional  deprivation  of  prop- 
erty of  Indians  to  whom  allotments  had  been  made. 

§97.  Seven  Cases  v.  U.  S.  In  that  case  (239  U.  S. 
510),  it  was  held  (1)  That  the  power  of  Congress  to 
regulate  interstate  and  foreign  commerce  authorized  the 
enactment  of  the  Sherley  Amendment  of  August  23, 1912, 
to  the  Food  and  Drugs  Act  under  which  misbranding 
includes  false  and  fraudulent  statements  regarding  cura- 
tive effects  of  drugs ;  (2)  That  such  Amendment  does  not 
by  reason  of  uncertainty  operate  as  a  deprivation  of 
property  without  due  process  of  law  as  guaranteed  by 
the  5th  Amendment. 


§  98.  Broshaber  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Oo.  In  that 
case  (240  U.  S.  1),  it  was  held  that  the  5th  Amendment  is 
not  a  limitation  upon  the  taxing  power  conferred  upon 
Congress  by  the  Constitution ;  that  the  income  provisions 
of  the  Tariff  Act  of  1913  are  not  unconstitutional  by  rea- 
son of  retroactive  operation,  the  period  covered  not 
extending  prior  to  the  time  when  the  Amendment  was 
operative;  nor  are  those  provisions  unconstitutional 
under  the  due  process  clause  of  the  5th  Amendment ;  nor 


182  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  98 

do  they  deny  due  process  of  law,  nor  equal  protection  of 
the  law  by  reason  of  the  classifications  therein  of  things 
or  persons  subject  to  the  tax. 

§99.  Dodge  v,  Osbom.  In  that  case  (240  U.  S,  118), 
it  was  held  that  the  due  process  clause  of  the  5th  Amend- 
ment was  not  violated  by  the  provisions  of  Rev,  Stat, 
§§  3220,  3226,  and  3227,  requiring  an  appeal  to  the  Com- 
missioner of  Internal  Revenue  after  payment  of  taxes 
and  only  giving  a  right  to  sue  after  his  refusal  to  refund. 
The  Court  said:  **And  this  doctrine  has  been  repeat- 
edly applied  until  it  is  no  longer  open  to  question  that  a 
suit  may  not  be  brought  to  enjoin  the  assessment 
or  collection  of  a  tax  because  of  the  alleged  unconstitu- 
tionality of  the  statute  imposing  it.  Shelton  v.  Piatt, 
139  U.  S.  591 ;  Pittsburgh  &  C.  Ry.  v.  Board  of  Public 
Works,  172  U.  S.  32;  Pacific  Whaling  Co.  v.  Smith  & 
Stutes,  187  U.  S.  447, 451, 452. ' '  See  also  Dodge  v.  Brady, 
240  U.  S.  122. 

§99a.  Wilson,  U.  S.  Attorney  v.  New  and  Ferris, 
Receivers.  Eight-Hour-Law  Case.  This  case,  known  as 
the  Eight-Hour-Law  Case,  decided  March  19,  1917,  and 
not  yet  reported,  involved  the  constitutionality  of  the  Act 
of  Congress  of  September  3,  5,  1916,  39  Stat.  721,  c.  436, 
entitled  ^^An  act  to  establish  a/n  eight-hour  day  for  em- 
ployees of  carriers  engaged  in  interstate  and  foreign 
commerce,  and  for  other  purposes.' '  In  the  majority 
opinion,  announced  by  Mr.  Chief  Justice  White,  after  a 
review  of  the  circumstances  out  of  which  the  legislation  in 
question  arose,  the  following  statement  of  the  issues  was 
made :  ' '  The  court  below,  briefly  announcing  that  it  was  of 
opinion  that  Congress  had  no  constitutional  power  to 
enact  the  statute,  enjoined  its  enforcement  and  as  the  re- 
sult of  the  direct  appeal  which  followed  we  come,  after 
elaborate  oral  and  printed  arguments,  to  dispose  of  the 
controversy.  All  the  propositions  relied  upon  and  argu- 
ments advanced  ultimately  come  to  two  questions:  first, 


899a  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  183 

the  entire  want  of  constitutional  power  to  deal  with  the 
subjects  embraced  by  the  statute,  and  second,  such  abuse 
of  the  power  if  possessed  as  rendered  its  exercise  uncon- 
stitutional.'* After  a  separate  consideration  of  each 
objection  the  court  held,  first,  that  the  subjects  embraced 
by  the  statute  were  within  the  Commerce  clause  of  the 
Constitution,  when  the  special  circumstances  are  con- 
sidered under  which  the  legislative  power  in  question  was 
exercised ;  second,  that  by  the  exercise  of  such  legislative 
power  by  Congress  under  such  special  circumstances,  no 
other  limitations  imposed  by  the  Constitution  on  the 
power  to  regulate  conunerce  were  violated.  In  conclusion 
the  court  said :  ^  ^  Being  of  the  opinion  that  Congress  had 
the  power  to  adopt  the  act  in  question,  whether  it  be 
viewed  as  a  direct  fixing  of  wages  to  meet  the  absence 
of  a  standard  on  that  subject  resulting  from  the  dispute 
between  the  parties  or  as  the  exertion  by  Congress  of 
the  power  which  it  undoubtedly  possessed  to  provide  by 
appropriate  legislation  for  compulsory  arbitration — a 
power  which  inevitably  resulted  from  its  authority  to 
protect  interstate  commerce  in  dealing  with  a  situation 
like  that  which  was  before  it — ^we  conclude  that  the  court 
below  erred  in  holding  the  statute  was  not  within  the 
power  of  Congress  to  enact  and  in  restraining  its  enforce- 
ment and  its  decree  therefore  must  be  and  is  reversed 
and  the  cause  remanded  with  directions  to  dismiss  the 
bill.*'  In  his  concurring  opinion  Mr.  Justice  McKenua 
said :  *  *  It  is  the  contention  of  the  Government  that  the 
Act  is  an  hours-of-service  law,  the  intent  of  Congress 
being  by  its  enactment,  Ho  proclaim  a  substantial  eight- 
hour  day. '  The  opposing  contention  is  that  *  the  language 
of  the  Act  shows  that  it  deals  solely  with  the  construction 
of  contracts  and  with  the  standard  and  amount  of  com- 
pensation, and  not  with  any  limitation  upon  the  hours  of 
labor.'  Upon  these  opposing  contentions  the  parties 
respectively  assert  and  deny  the  power  of  Congress  to 
enact  the  law."  From  the  conclusion  reached  by  the 
majority  four  of  the  Justices  dissented. 


184  DUB  PEOCESS  OP  LAW  §  99a 

Mr.  Justice  Day  in  his  dissenting  opinion,  after  saying 
that  he  was  *'not  prepared  to  deny  to  Congress,  in  view 
of  its  constitutional  authority  to  regulate  commerce 
among  the  states,  the  right  to  fix  by  lawful  enactment 
the  wages  to  be  paid  to  those  engaged  in  such  commerce 
in  the  operation  of  trains  carrying  passengers  and 
freight,'^  asserted  that  *4t  is  equally  true  that  this  regu- 
latory power  is  subject  to  any  applicable  constitutional 
limitations.  This  power,  cannot  any  more  than  others 
conferred  by  the  Constitution,  be  the  subject  of  lawful 
exercise  when  such  exertion  of  authority  violates  funda- 
mental rights  secured  by  the  Constitution.  Gibbons  v. 
Ogden,  9  Wheat.  1,  196 ;  Monongahela  Navigation  Co.  v. 
United  States,  148  U.  S.  312,  336 ;  United  States  v.  Joint 
Traffic  Assn.,  171  U.  S.  505,  571 ;  Lottery  Case,  188  U.  S. 
321,  353.  The  power  to  legislate,  as  well  as  other  powers 
conferred  by  the  Constitution  upon  the  coordinate  branches 
of  the  Government,  is  limited  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Fifth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  preventing  depriva- 
tion of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law. 
.  .  .  It  results  from  the  principles  which  have  been 
enforced  in  this  court,  and  recognized  by  writers  of 
authority,  that  due  process  of  law,  when  applied  to  the 
legislative  branch  of  the  Government,  will  not  permit 
Congress  to  make  anything  due  process  of  law  which  it 
sees  fit  to  declare  such  by  the  mere  enactment  of  the 
statute ;  if  this  were  true,  life,  liberty,  or  property  might 
be  taken  by  the  terms  of  the  legislative  act,  depending 
for  its  authority  upon  the  will  or  caprice  of  the  legislature, 
and  constitutional  provisions  would  thus  become  a  mere 
nullity.  .  .  .  Applying  these  principles,  in  my  opinion, 
this  Act  cannot  successfully  withstand  the  attack  that  is 
made  upon  it  as  an  arbitrary  and  unlawful  exertion  of 
supposed  legislative  power.  It  is  not  an  act  limiting  the 
hours  of  service.  Nor  is  it,  in  my  judgment,  a  legitimate 
enactment  fixing  the  wages  of  employees  engaged  in  such 
service.  ...  Such  legislation,  it  seems  to  me,  amounts  to 
the  taking  of  the  property  of  one  and  givingit  to  another 


§  99a  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  185 

in  violation  of  the  spirit  of  fair  play  and  equal  right 
which  the  Constitution  intended  to  secure  in  the  Due 
Process  Clause  to  all  coming  within  its  protection,  and  is 
a  striking  illustration  of  that  method  which  has  always 
been  deemed  to  be  the  plainest  illustration  of  arbitrary 
action,  the  taking  of  the  property  of  A  and  giving  it  to 
B  by  legislative  fiat.  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S. 
97, 104/'  Justices  Pitney  and  Van  Devanter  concurred 
in  all  that  Justice  Day  had  said  as  to  the  invalidity  of 
the  Act  in  question  by  reason  of  its  repugnancy  to  the 
Fifth  Amendment.  Speaking  for  both  on  that  subject, 
Justice  Pitney  said :  *  *  The  right  to  immunity  from  con- 
fiscation is  not  the  only  right  of  property  safeguarded 
by  the  Fifth  Amendment.  Rights  of  property  include 
something  more  than  mere  ownership  and  the  privilege 
of  receiving  a  limited  return  from  its  use.  The  right  to 
control,  to  manage,  and  to  dispose  of  it,  the  right  to  put 
it  at  risk  in  business,  and  by  legitimate  skill  and  enter- 
prise to  make  gains  beyond  the  fixed  rates  of  interest, 
the  right  to  hire  employees,  to  bargain  freely  with  them 
about  the  rate  of  wages,  and  from  their  labors  to  make 
lawful  gains — ^these  are  among  the  essential  rights  of 
property,  that  pertain  to  owners  of  railroads  as  to  others. 
The  devotion  of  their  property  to  the  public  use  does  not 
give  to  the  public  an  interest  in  the  property,  but  only 
in  its  use.  This  Act,  in  my  judgment,  usurps  the  right 
of  the  owners  of  the  railroads  to  manage  their  own  prop- 
erties, and  is  an  attempt  to  control  and  manage  the 
properties  rather  than  to  regulate  their  use,  in  commerce. 
In  particular^  it  deprives  the  carriers  of  their  right  to 
agree  with  their  employees  as  to  the  terms  of  employment. 
Without  amplifying  the  point,  I  need  only  refer  again  to 
Adair  v.  United  States,  208  U.  S.  161, 174, 178.'^ 

With  equal  emphasis  Justices  Pitney  and  Van  Devanter 
denied  the  power  of  Congress  to  legislate  at  all  upon 
the  subject  matter  by  virtue  of  the  Commerce  clause. 
Speaking  for  both  on  that  subject  the  former  said :  *  *  I 
am  convinced,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  Act  cannot  be 


186  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  99a 

sustained  as  a  regalation  of  cominercey  because  it  has  no 
such  object,  operation,  or  effect,  •  •  •  The  simple 
eflfect  of  section  3  is  to  increase,  during  the  period  of 
its  operation,  the  rate  of  wages  of  railroad  trainmen 
employed  in  interstate  commerce*  It  comes  to  this, — ^that 
whereas  the  owners  of  the  railroads  have  devoted  their 
property  to  the  movement  of  interstate  as  well  as  intra- 
state commerce,  and  whereas  the  trainmen  have  accepted 
employment  in  such  commerce,  and  thus  employers  and 
employees  are  engaged  together  in  a  qiuisi  public  service, 
the  Act  steps  in  and  prescribes  how  the  money  earned  in 
the  public  service  shall  be  divided  between  the  owners  of 
the  railroads  and  these  particular  employees.  This,  in 
my  view,  is  a  regulation  not  of  commerce  but  of  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  the  commerce  carriers, — ^precisely  as  if 
an  act  were  to  provide  that  the  rate  of  interest  payable 
to  the  bondholders  must  be  increased  and  the  dividend 
payments  to  the  stockholders  correspondingly  decreased 
— and  is  not  only  without  support  in  the  Commerce  clause 
of  tiie  Constitution,  but,  as  I  shall  endeavor  to  show,  trans- 
gresses the  limitations  of  the  Fifth  Amendment/*  Mr. 
Justice  McReynolds,  in  his  dissenting  opinion,  agreed, 
in  no  uncertain  terms,  with  Justices  Pitney  and  Van 
Devanter  in  the  conclusion  that  the  Act  could  not  be  sus- 
tained as  a  regulation  of  commerce.  He  said :  *  *  I  have 
not  heretofore  supposed  that  such  action  was  a  regula- 
tion of  commerce  within  the  fair  intendment  of  those 
words  as  used  in  the  Constitution;  and  the  argument 
advanced  in  support  of  the  contrary  view  is  unsatisfac- 
tory to  my  mind.  I  cannot,  therefore,  concur  in  the  con- 
clusion that  it  was  within  the  power  of  Congress  to  enact 
the  statute.*' 


§100.  Review— Persistent  and  harmful  influence  of 
Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  and  Lnprovement  Go.    The 

author  feels  that  he  can  not  conclude  this  prolonged 
review  of  the  weighty  expositions  made  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  of  the  due  process  of  law 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  187 

clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  without  reproducing 
the  substance  of  a  criticism  in  which  he  has  heretofore 
attempted  to  demonstrate  that  the  entire  stream  of  expo- 
sition was  poised  at  its  source  by  the  first  judgment  pro- 
nounced on  the  subject  in  1856, — radically  unsound,  as  the 
author  believes,  both  from  the  historical  and  logical  point 
of  view. 

The  English  idea  of  due  process  waa  first  embodied  in 
chapter  39  of  Magna  Carta  which  provides  that  **No 
freeman  shall  be  arrested  or  detained  in  prison,  or 
deprived  of  his  freehold,  or  outlawed,  or  banished,  or  in 
any  way  molested :  and  we  will  not  set  forth  against  him, 
nor  send  against  him*,  unless  by  the  lawful  judgment  of 
his  peers  and  by  the  law  of  the  land/*  After  being 
reproduced  in  all  the  original  state  constitutions  chapter 
39  passed  into  the  Federal  Constitution  *®  in  this  form : 
**No  person  shall  be  .  •  .  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property,  without  due  process  of  law/'  Not  until  1856 
was  that  vital  provision  construed  in  the  famous  case  of 
Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  &  Improvement  Company.** 
In  that  case,  the  Court  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice 
Curtis,  undertook  to  define,  for  the  first  time,  the  term 
"due  process  of  law**  as  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, and  to  adjudge  that  such  due  process  had  not  been 
denied  Samuel  Swartwout  in  a  case  in  which  his  land 
had  been  sold  under  a  warrant  issued  by  the  solicitor  of 
the  Treasury  under  an  act  of  Congress  of  May  15,  1820, 
authorizing  the  issuance  of  such  a  wjirrant.  The  account 
of  Swartwout,  as  collector  of  the  customs  for  the  Port  of 
New  York,  **was  audited  by  the  first  auditor,  and  certi- 
fied by  the  comptroller  of  the  Treasury ;  and  for  the  bal- 
ance thus  found,  amounting  to  the  sum  of  $1,374,119.65, 
the  warrant  in  question  was  issued  by  the  solicitor  of  the 
Treasury.**  It  was  admitted  by  the  court  that  all  the 
proceedings  fixing  that  vast  sum  as  a  lien  on  the  land  of 
Swartwout  were  purely  ex  parte;  that  he  had  no  notice 

40 — Fifth  Amendment. 
41^18  How.  272. 


188  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  100 

from  or  hearing  before  the  purely  ministerial  officers  by 
whom  that  so-called  judgment  for  more  than  a  miUion  and 
a  quarter  of  dollars  was  rendered  against  him.  It  was 
careful  to  declare  in  express  terms  that  the  Treasury 
oflScials  who  thus  rendered  judgment  against  Swartwout 
were  purely  ministerial  officers  armed  with  no  judicial 
power  whatever.  *  *  It  must  be  admitted,  * '  said  the  Court, 
*Hhat,  if  the  auditing  of  this  account  and  the  ascertain- 
ment of  its  balance,  and  the  issuing  of  this  process,  was 
an  exercise  of  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States,  the 
proceeding  was  void ;  for  the  officers  who  performed  these 
acts  could  exercise  no  part  of  that  judicial  power.  They 
neither  constituted  a  court  of  the  United  States,  nor  were 
they,  or  either  of  them,  so  connected  with  any  such  court 
as  to  perform  even  any  of  the  ministerial  duties  which 
arise  out  of  judicial  proceedings.'^  The  sole  question  at 
issue  was  this :  Did  a  warrant  or  execution  so  issued,  in 
conformity  with  the  terms  of  an  act  of  Congress  direct- 
ing its  issue,  after  ministerial  officers,  armed  with  no 
judicial  authority  whatever,  had,  in  a  purely  ex  parte 
proceeding',  without  notice  or  hearing  of  any  kind, 
entered  up  a  judgment  as  a  lien  on  Swartwout  *s  land, 
constitute  **due  process  of  law*'  as  defined  by  the  Fifth 
Amendment?  It  is  impossible  for  an  American  lawyer 
to  understand  how  su^ch  an  ex  parte  proceeding,  without 
notice  or  hearing,  could  have  constituted  due  process  of 
law,  if  he  is  unable  to  accept  the  startling  contention  set 
up  by  the  court  in  a  vain  effort  to  defend  it. 

That  contention  was  this :  (1)  that  by  virtue  of  certain 
statutes  *^  passed  in  the  most  despotic  days  of  the  Tudor 
monarchy,  a  special  rule  or  practice  had  grown  up  in  the 
Court  of  Exchequer  that  authorized  the  collection  of  debts 
due  to  the  crown  from  receivers  of  the  revenue  by  a  sum- 
mary process  which  only  required  that  auditors  should, 
in  an  ex  parte  proceeding,  without  any  notice  whatever 
to  the  alleged  debtor,  ascertain  the  amount  supposed  to 
be  due,  for  the  collection  of  which  an  execution  against 

42—33  Hen.  VIII.,  c.  39;  13  Eliz.,  c.  4. 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  189 

the  debtor  could  be  forthwith  delivered  by  the  Pipe  Office 
to  the  sherifiEs;  (2)  that  such  rule  or  practice  had  been 
established  in  England  as  an  exception  to  the  general 
role  known  as  the  law  of  the  land  or  due  process  ordained 
by  Magna  Carta,  by  reason  of  a  certain  supposed  neces- 
sity which  the  court  described  in  these  terms :  *  *  It  may 
be  added,  that  probably  there  are  few  governments  which 
do  or  can  permit  their  claims  for  public  taxes,  either  on 
the  citizen  or  the  officer  employed  for  their  collection  or 
disbursement,  to  become  subjects  of  judicial  controversy 
according  to  the  course  of  the  law  of  the  land.  Impera- 
tive necessity  has  forced  a  distinction  between  such  claims 
and  all  others,  which  has  sometimes  been  carried  out  by 
summary  methods  of  proceeding,  and  sometimes  by  sys- 
tems of  fines  and  penalties;  but  always  in  some  way 
observed  and  yielded  to;*'  (3)  that  such  special  rule  or 
practice,  supposed  to  have  been  built  up  in  the  Tudor 
time  in  defiance  of  and  as  an  exception  to  the  general 
rule  embodied  in  the  law  of  the  land  or  due  process  as 
ordained  by  Magna  Carta,  was  brought  over  by  our  ances- 
tors and  so  firmly  established  in  our  colonial  system  that 
it  lived  on  in  defiance  of  the  Petition  of  Eight  and  the 
Bill  of  Bights,  until  it  was  finally  embedded,  by  implica- 
tion, in  the  Fifth  Amendment. 

Mr.  Justice  Curtis  frankly  admits  that  the  special  rule 
or  practice  in  question,  as  a  means  of  collecting  debts 
due  to  the  Crown,  was  one  of  the  abuses  that  had  existed 
prior  to  the  granting  of  Magna  Carta,  Chapter  9  of  which 
was  specially  designed  for  its  removal.  He  says,  **It  is 
difficult,  at  this  day,  to  trace  with  precision  all  the  pro- 
ceedings had  for  these  purposes  (sunmaary  methods  for 
the  collection  of  debts  due  to  the  Crown)  in  the  earliest 
ages  of  the  common  law.  That  they  were  summary  and 
severe  and  had  been  used  for  purposes  of  oppression,  is 
inferable  from  the  fact  that  one  chapter  (9)  of  Magna 
Carta  treats  of  their  restraint.  * '  That  vitally  important 
part  of  the  matter  should  be  made  more  clear  by  the  aid 
of  historical  knowledge   not   available   in   1856.     Due 


190  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  100 

process  as  now  understood  throughout  the  English-speak- 
ing world  had  its  origin  in  Chapter  39  of  the  Great 
Charter  of  Liberties  of  1215,  which  provided  that  **No 
freeman  shall  be  arrested,  or  detained  in  prison,  or 
deprived  of  his  freehold,  or  outlawed,  or  banished,  or  in 
any  way  molested ;  and  we  will  not  set  forth  against  him, 
nor  send  against  him,  unless  by  the  lawful  judgment  of 
his  peers  and  by  the  law  of  the  land.**  What  was  the 
meaning,  at  the  time  they  were  used,  of  those  italicized 
words  f  In  explaining  them  the  foremost  commentator 
on  Magna  Carta  has  said:  ''Its  main  object  (Chap.  39) 
was  to  prohibit  John  from  resorting  to  what  is  sometimes 
whimsically  known  in  Scotland  as  'Jeddart  justice.*  It 
forbade  Mm  for  the  future  to  place  execution  before 
judgment.  Three  aspects  of  this  prohibition  may  be 
emphasized.  (1)  Judgment  must  precede  execution.  In 
some  isolated  cases,  happily  not  numerous,  John  pro- 
ceeded, or  threatened  to  proceed,  by  force  of  arms  against 
recalcitrants  as  though  assured  of  their  guilt,  without 
waiting  for  legal  procedure.'*  And  then,  after  stating 
that ' '  Complaint  was  made  of  arrests  and  imprisonments 
suffered  'without  judgment,'  *'  the  same  authority  adds: 
"Mr.  Bigelow  considers  that  such  cases  were  numerous. 
See  Procedure,  155:  'The  practice  of  granting  writs  of 
execution  without  trial  in  the  courts  appears  to  have 
been  common.  ^ » '  *»  Thus  we  know  for  certain  what  was 
the  real  moving  cause  that  prompted  the  baronage  to 
demand  that  the  Crown  should  bind  itself,  by  the  terms 
used  in  Chapter  39  of  Magna  Carta,  not  to  render  judg- 
ment first,  without  a  hearing  or  legal  procedure  of  any 
kind,  as  in  the  case  of  Swartwout ;  and  then  to  send  out 
a  writ  of  execution,  without  a  trial  in  the  courts.  The 
phrase  "we  will  not  set  forth  against  him,  nor  send 
against  him,  unless  by  the  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers 
and  by  the  law  of  the  land,'*  which  has  such  a  strange 
and  incoherent  sound  in  modem  ears,  was  perfectly  un- 
derstood early  in  the  thirteenth  century  when  John  was 

43— McEeclinie,  Magna  Carta,  437-38. 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  191 

in  the  habit  of  setting  forth  against  a  man,  or  sending 
an  armed  retinae  against  him  to  collect  some  debt  due 
to  the  Crown  upon  which  no  proceeding  had  been  had 
in  any  couri  Again,  to  quote  Professor  McKechnie :  ^ 
**The  idea  of  open  violence,  thus  clearly  indicated,  is 
expressed  in  contemporary  documents  by  the  fuller 
phrase,  per  vim  et  arma/^ 

Is  it  natural,  is  it  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  debtors 
of  the  Crown,  most  numerous  among  the  baronage  who 
led  the  fight  for  Magna  Carta  primarily  for  their  own 
benefit,  deliberately  excluded  themselves  from  the  protec- 
tion against  execution  before  judgment  given  by  Chapter 
39  f  It  is  impossible  for  such  an  assumption  to  arise 
because  it  is  answered  in  advance  by  Chapter  9,  specially 
designed  to  prevent  any  doubt  on  that  subject :  *  *  Neither 
we  nor  our  bailiffs  shall  seize  any  land  or  rent  for  any 
debt,  so  long  as  the  chattels  of  the  debtor  are  sufficient 
to  repay  the  debt;  nor  shall  the  sureties  of  the  <^ebtor 
be  distrained,  so  long  as  the  principal  debtor  is  able  to 
satisfy  the  debt;  and  if  the  principal  debtor  shall  fail 
to  pay  the  debt,  having  nothing  wherewith  to  pay  it,  then 
the  sureties  shall  answer  for  the  debt ;  and  let  them  have 
the  lands  and  rents  of  the  debtor,  if  they  desire  them, 
until  they  are  indemnified  for  the  debt  which  they  have 
paid  for  him,  unless  the  principal  debtor  can  show  proof 
that  he  is  discharged  thereof  as  against  the  said  sure- 
ties." In  explaining  the  history  and  meaning  of  that 
chapter.  Professor  McKechnie  says:*'  **The  Charter 
now  passes  to  another  group  of  grievances.  Chapters  9 
to  11  treat  of  the  kindred  topics  of  debts,  usury  and  the 
Jews,  and  should  be  read  in  connection  with  each  other, 
and  with  Chapter  26,  which  regulates  the  procedure  for 
attaching  the  personal  estate  of  deceased  Crown  tenants 
who  were  also  Crown  debtors.  The  present  chapter, 
although  quite  general  in  its  terms,  had  special  reference 
to  cases  where  the  Grown  was  the  creditor;  while  the 

44— p.  436,  note  2. 
46— P.  262. 


192  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  100 

two  following  chapters  treated  more  particularly  of  debts 
contracted  to  Jews  or  other  money  lenders.  The  fact 
that  John 's  subjects  owed  debts  to  his  exchequer  did  not, 
of  course,  imply  that  they  had  borrowed  money  from 
the  King.  The  sums  entered  as  due"  in  the  Rolls  of  th^ 
Exchequer  represented  obligations  which  had  been  in- 
curred in  many  different  ways.  What  with  feudal  inci- 
dents and  scutages  and  indiscriminate  fines,  ^o  heavy  in 
amount  that  they  could  only  be  paid  by  installments,  a 
large  proportion  of  Englishmen  must  have  been  perma- 
nently indebted  to  the  Crown.  At  John 's  accession  most 
of  the  northern  barons  still  owed  the  scutages  demanded 
by  Eichard.  John  remitted  none  of  the  arrears,  while 
imposing  new  burdens  of  his  own.  The  attempts  made 
to  collect  these  debts  intensified  the  friction  between  John 
and  his  barons.  It  was,  further,  the  Crown  *s  practice 
wherever  possible  to  make  its  debtors  find  sureties  for 
their  debts,  thus  widening  the  circle  of  those  liable  to 
distraint,  while  the  officers  who  enforced  payment  were 
guilty  of  irregularities,  which  became  the  cloaks  of  grave 
abuses.'^  The  legal  historians  have  thus  fixed  the  fact 
that  the  great  motive  cause  that  prompted  the  baronage 
to  demand  the  insertion  in  the  Great  Charter  of  Chapter 
39,  guaranteeing  due  process  of  law,  pr  the  law  of  the 
land,  was  John's  oppressive  practice  of  collecting  debts 
due  to  the  Crown  from  its  debtors  by  force  of  arms,  *'per 
vim  et  arma/^  thus  carrying  into  effect  ^^ writs  of  execvr 
tion  without  trial  in  the  courts** — ^words  that  exactly 
describe  the  writ  issued  and  executed  by  ministerial  offi- 
cers of  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  Swartwout.  In 
order  to  render  impossible  the  issuance  of  such  writs  for 
all  time  were  inserted  in  Magna  Carta,  first.  Chapter  39, 
as  a  general  prohibition,  and  second.  Chapter  9,  as  a 
special  prohibition  against  the  collection  of  Crown  debts 
by  execution  prior  to  judgment.  **The  attempts  made 
to  collect  these  debts  intensified  the  friction  between  John 
and  his  barons.'* 
After  admitting  that  the  special  rule  or  practice  in 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  193 

question,  the  sole  and  only  basis  of  the  judgment  in  Mur- 
ray V.  Hoboken  Land  &  Improvement  Company,  had  been 
stigmatized  by  Chapters  9  and  39  of  Magna  Carta  as 
contrary  to  due  process  of  law,  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  under- 
took the  dreary  task  of  demonstra&ng  by  the  aid  of  a 
few  authorities,  sharply  hostile  to  his  contention,  that 
suoh  special  rule  or  practice  prevailed  in  the  Court  of  Ex- 
chequer by  virtue  of  two  statutes,  33  Hen,  VII,  c.  39, 
and  13  Eliz.,  a  4.  The  leading  authority  he  cites  is  Coke, 
whose  ** Second  Institute,'*  a  commentary  on  Magna 
Carta,  was  published  in  1632,  Its  author,  who  as  Privy 
Councillor  sat  in  the  Star  Chamber,  died  September  3, 
1634,  while  the  entire  code  of  Star  Chamber  law  and 
High  Commission  law  was  in  full  force.  It  is  not  there- 
fore strange  that  Mr.  McKechnie*®  should  say  what 
everybody  now  knows,  that  *  *  Coke,  following  the  vicious 
method  of  assuming  the  existence,  in  some  part  of  Magna 
Carta,  of  a  warrant  for  every  legal  principle  in  his  own 
day,  has  utterly  mislead  several  generations  of  commen- 
tators.*' And  yet  even  with  Coke's  aid  the  learned  jus- 
tice was  unable  to  prove  that  the  special  rule  or  practice 
upon  which  he  relied  ever  cut  off,  even  in  the  darkest 
days  of  the  Tudor  despotism,  the  right  of  a  Crown  debtor 
to  have  the  amount  of  his  debt  ascertained  by  the  verdict 
of  a  jury  in  a  court  of  justice  prior  to  the  issue  of  an 
execution  for  its  collection.  The  nemesis  of  his  argu- 
ment is  to  be  found  in  the  phrase  **writ  of  extent,*'  to 
which  he  constantly  refers  and  whose  real  nature  he 
entirely  misunderstood.  He  says :  ^'To  authorize  a  writ 
of  extent,  however,  the  debt  must  be  matter  of  record  in 
the  King's  exchequer.  The  33  Henry  VIII,  ch.  39,  sec.  50, 
made  all  specialty  debts  due  to  the  King  of  the  same 
force  and  effect  as  debts  by  statute  staple,  thus  giving 
to  such  debts  the  effect  of  debts  of  record.  In  regard  to 
debts  due  upon  simple  contract,  other  than  those  due 
from  collectors  of  the  revenue  and  other  accountants  of 
the  Crown,  the  practice,  from  very  ancient  times,  has 

46— P,  447. 
Due  Process— 13 


194  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  100 

been  to  issue  a  commission  to  inquire  as  to  the  existence 
of  the  debt.  This  commission  being  returned,  the  debt 
f oxmd  was  thereby  evidenced  by  a  record,  and  an  extent 
could  issue  thereon.  No  notice  was  required  to  be  given 
to  the  alleged  debtor  of  the  execution  of  this  commission 
(2  Tidd's  Practice,  1047),  though  it  seems  that,  in  some 
cases,  an  order  for  notice  might  be  obtained.  1  Ves.  269. 
Formerly,  no  witnesses  were  examined  by  the  commis- 
sion (Chitty's  Prerogative,  267;  West,  22),  the  affidavit 
prepared  to  obtain  an  order  for  an  immediate  extent 
being  the  only  evidence  introduced.  But  this  practice 
has  been  recently  changed.  11  Price,  29. ' '  Let  us  pause 
here  and  examine  the  authority  last  cited,*^  a  case  ex- 
plaining the  nature  of  a  ^^writ  of  extent/'  and  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  it  might  be  issued.  From  the 
head  note  we  learn  that  **the  inquisition  upon  which 
the  Fiat  was  obtained  and  the  Extent  sued  out,  was  made 
without  viva  voce  testimony  having  been  given  to  the 
jury  of  the  existence  of  the  debt,  and  that  they  found 
the  debt  to  be  due,  solely  on  the  usual  affidavit  on  which 
the  Judge 's  Fiat  is  Obtained,  made  for  that  purpose,  by 
or  on  the  part  of  the  prosecutors  of  the  Extent/'  In  his 
opinion,  delivered  in  this  case.  Baron  Wood  said:** 
**  There  are  two  things  necessary  to  be  done  before  an 
extent  can  be  properly  issued,  without  which  it  can  not 
be  supported.  First,  an  affidavit  must  be  made  to  pro- 
duce before  the  Judge,  and  then,  an  inquisition  must  be 
taken  before  a  jury.  Now,  all  inquisitions  so  taken  before 
a  jury  can  only  by  course  of  law  be  taken  on  viva  voce 
testimony  produced  before  them.'* 

In  the  later  case  of  Begina  v.  Eyle,*®  in  which  the 
Crown  had  sued  out  an  immediate  extent,  in  order  to 
collect  2,492£.  7s.  7d.  from  a  defaulting  Crown  officer,  we 
have  a  complete  and  luminous  exposition  of  the  entire 

47— Bex  ▼.  Hornblower,  Vol.  XI,  p.  29,  Price's,  ''Reports  of  CaMs 
Argued  and  Determined  in  the  Ck>urt  of  Exchequer." 
48— P.  39. 
49—9  M.  ft  W.  227. 


§100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  1S5 

subject.  In  that  case  the  Court  reviewed  Rex  v.  Hom- 
blower  and  modified  the  requirement  as  to  viva  voce 
testimony  before  the  jury  in  the  inquisition  taken  prior 
to  the  issuance  of  the  writ  of  extent.  It  held  that  an 
affidavit  was  sufficient,  because,  as  the  Solicitor  General 
contended :  *  *  The  debt  is  not  conclusively  found  by  the 
inquiry  before  the  jury  but  the  party  (the  Crown  debtor) 
is  at  liberty  to  traverse  the  debt  in  the  proceedings  which 
subsequently  take  place.' ^  In  confirming  that  contention, 
the  Court  said :  *  *  That  there  can  be  no  debt  of  the  Crown 
upon  which  process  can  issue,  except  it  be  a  debt  on  rec- 
ord. Upon  what  is  that  founded  t  Upon  nothing  but 
usage.  One  does  not  see  any  principle  why  the  Crown 
should  not  be  able  to  proceed  for  the  recovery  of  a  debt 
in  the  same  way  as  a  subject,  but  a  usage  has  grown  up 
which  we  do  not  disturb,  that  the  debts  of  the  Crown 
must  be  found  by  record,  must  be  on  the  records  of  the 
court,  before  the  process  can  issue  to  enforce  them.  For- 
merly that  process  called  upon  the  party  to  appear,  and 
to  contest  his  debt  in  the  suit  The  statute  of  the  33 
Henry  Vlll  was  passed  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the 
Crown  a  more  rapid  procedure,  and  for  the  very  purpose 
of  securing  the  debt  before  the  party  should  have  time 
to  abscond  or  make  way  with  his  goods.  The  process  by 
scire  factor  would  give  him  that  opportunity.  The  legis- 
lature, therefore,  in  the  time  of  Henry  VIII,  passed  this 
act  for  the  purpose  of  authorizing  the  Court  of  Ex- 
chequer, or  any  other  court  in  which  the  King's  debt  is 
entered  on  record,  to  issue  an  immediate  process  for  exe- 
cution, a  capias,  extendi  facias,  or  a  subpoena.  But  that 
statute  has  provided  a  remedy  for  all  possible  incon- 
venience that  might  result ;  for  it  enacts,  by  the.  79th 
section,  *that  if  any  person  or  persons  of  whom  any  such 
debt  or  duty  is  or  at  any  time  hereafter  shall  be  demanded 
or  required,  allege,  plead  or  declare,  or  show,  in  any  of 
the  said  courts,  good,  perfect  and  sufficient  cause  and 
matter  in  law,  reason,  or  good  conscience,  in  bar  of  the 
said  debt  or  duty,  etc.,  the  said  courts,  and  every  one 


196  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  100 

of  them,  shall  have  full  power  and  authority  to  aocept, 
adjudge,  and  allow  the  same  proof,  and  wholly  and  clearly 
to  acquit  and  discharge  all  and  every  person  and  per- 
sons that  shall  be  so  impleaded,  sued,  vexed,  or  troubled 
for  the  same.'  That  clause  allows  the  party  to  plead 
to  the  extent,  or  to  apply  by  summary  motion,  which  is 
often  done,  to  the  court,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  good 
grounds  to  discharge  him  from  that  process,  and  the 
court  often  acted  upon  it,  and  hence,  as  well  in  law  as 
in  equity  and  good  conscience,  the  court  has  an  equitable 
jurisdiction,  in  all  cases  of  process  of  this  sort,  to  enter 
upon  the  whole  merits  of  the  case,  and  to  discharge  the 
party,  if,  in  equity  and  good  conscience,  he  ought  to  be 
discharged."  After  holding  that  an  afiBidavit  was  suffi- 
cient proof  before  the  jury  in  the  preliminary  inquisition, 
the  Court  concluded  by  saying:  **!  think  it  was  such 
evidence  as  the  jury  might  take  and  find  the  debt  upon. 
The  party  is  not  prejudiced  by  not  being  summoned  to 
attend  before  them,  because  the  appeal  is  open  to  him 
afterwards  when  the  process  is  issued,  and  the  very 
object  of  the  statute  of  Henry  VIII  was  to  enable  the 
court  to  issue  a  more  immediate  process,  leaving  it  open 
to  the  party  to  plead  before  execution  as  he  might  have 
done  previously .' '  Here  we  have  the  whole  matter  in  a 
nut  shell.  (1)  The  Crown  was  so  hampered  by  an  old 
usage  that  it  could  not  proceed  at  all  against  a  Crown 
debtor  until  its  debt  was  **on  the  records  of  the  Court" 
For  that  reason,  it  was  necessary  to  call  in  the  auditors 
of  the  exchequer  when  a  collector  of  the  revenue  made 
default,  so  that  their  finding  {ex  parte  because  it  did 
not  bind  the  debtor)  might  put  the  claim  of  the  Crown 
*  *  on  the  records  of  the  court, ' '  to  the  end  that  an  extent  in 
chief  might  be  applied  for.  (2)  Before  such  a  writ  could 
issue  a  jury  had  to  be  called  and  proof  taken,  at  one  time 
viva  voce,  at  another  by  affidavit,  convincing  the  first 
jury  of  the  existence  of  the  debt.  (3)  Not  until  that  pro- 
ceeding had  been  completed  could  the  writ  of  extent  issue 
under  the  statute  of  Henry  VIH,  which  carefully  pro- 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  197 

vided  that  after  the  Crown  debtor's  lands  and  goods 
had  been  seized,  **for  the  very  pnrpose  of  securing  the 
debt,"  such  debtor  could  come  into  court,  dispute  the 
debt  by  any  defense  that  he  might  see  fit  to  set  up,  thus 
giving  to  the  court  jurisdiction  ^'to  enter  upon  the  whole 
merits  of  the  cctse/^  What  fixes  the  fact  that  the  writ 
of  extent  was,  as  we  would  say  here,  simply  on  dttach- 
ment  to  secure  a  debt,  aud  not  an  execution,  is  the  author- 
ity which  declares  that  the  sheriff  is  not  entitled  to  sell 
the  goods  and  chattels  he  has  seized  under  the  extent 
without  the  issue  of  a  writ  of  venditioni  exponas.^  Thus 
it  appears  that  two  jury  trials  were  necessarily  provided 
in  every  proceeding  against  Crown  debtors  by  writ  of 
extent.  The  first  ascertained  whether  there  was  prob- 
able cause  justifying  its  issuance,  including  of  course  a 
preUminary  examination  as  to  the  amount  of  the  debt. 
The  second  gave  the  Crown  debtor  his  day  in  court,  cou- 
pled with  the  right  to  make  every  defense,  and  **to  enter 
upon  the  whole  merits  of  the  case,"  before  there  could 
be  a  sale  of  the  goods  under  a  venditioni  exponas,  which 
could  not  be  issued  until  the  second  and  real  trial  was 
over.  (4)  But  in  the  event  that  third  persons  came  in 
and  claimed  that  the  goods  seized  as  the  Crown  debtor's 
were  really  their  own,  then  a  third  jury  trial  was  ordered 
for  their  benefit.*^^  In  the  last  case  cited,  illustrating 
the  Crown's  priority  in  a  colony,  it  was  *'held,  that  the 
rights  of  the  Crown  to  be  paid,  in  preference  to  other 
creditors,  out  of  the  estate  of  a  defaulting  treasurer  (at 
Trinidad),  was  confined  to  his  default  in  respect  of 
moneys  in  his  hands  as  treasurer,  and  as  a  part  of  the 
revenue  of  the  colony/' 

Here  the  fact  should  be  emphasized  that  the  writ  of 
extent  is  not  one  of  the  prerogative  writs,  and  that  the 
right  to  its  issuance  did  not  accrue  to  the  King  by  virtue 

60— Bex  ▼.  Hopper,  (1816)  3  Price  40;  18  B.  B.  641. 

51..See  Bex  v.  Gollingridge,  3  Price  280;  Bex  v.  Bandell,  5  Price  376; 
Bex  y.  Lambton,  5  Price  421;  Wildes  v.  Atty.  Gen.  for  Trinidad,  3  Moore, 
P.  C.  200. 


198  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  100 

of  the  common  law,  but  solely  by  sections  50  and  53  of 
the  statute  33  Henry  VTII,  c.  39.  So  says  West,  the 
great  authority  on  the  subject.*^*  The  writ  is  in  full  force 
in  England  today,  and  a  complete  account  of  it  may  be 
found  in  the  Earl  of  Halsbury^s  great  work,  **The  Laws 
of  England/* »»  It  is  there  thus  defined: "  *'The  writ 
of  extent  is  the  process  by  which  the  Crown  can  seize 
the  body,  lands,  goods,  and  debts  or  other  choses  in  action 
of  its  debtor  by  summary  process  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  satisfaction  of  debts  due  it.'*  The  old  pro- 
ceeding, as  heretofore  described,  has  not  been  changed 
in  any  material  particular ;  trial  by  jury  is  still  guaran- 
teed at  every  stage  of  it.  And  now,  as  always,  careful 
provision  is  made  by  the  laws  of  England  for  court  pro- 
cedure and  trial  by  jury  in  all  cases  in  which  the  Crown 
is  compelled  to  enforce  the  collection  of  its  revenue. 
From  the  same  authority  we  learn  ^*  that  *' Proceedings 
for  the  recovery  of  penalties  under  the  Customs  Acts 
in  the  High  Court  of  Justice  may  be  commenced  either 
by  writ  of  subpcena,  or  by  writ  of  capias.  .  .  .  The 
writ  of  capias  is  issued  by  direction  of  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral and  on  the  fiat  of  a  judge.  .  .  .  The  suit  is  set 
down  for  hearing  by  the  Crown.  Notice  of  trial,  which 
must  be  given  by  the  Crown,  is  ten  days  in  all  cases, 
and  countermand  of  notice  of  trial  must  be  given  four 
days  before  the  time  mentioned  in  tl^e  notice  of  trial, 
unless  short  notice  of  trial  has  been  given,  when  two 
days  are  suflScient.  The  trial  is  usually  before  a  judge 
and  special  jury,  and  the  associate  in  all  cases  at  nisi 
prius  is  to  take  the  verdict.^'  It  thus  appears  that  Mr. 
Justice  Curtis  was  in  the  gravest  possible  error,  so  far 
OrS  the  law  of  England  is  concerned,  when  he  said  **that 
probably  there  are  few  governments  which  do  or  can 

52 — Treatise  of  the  Law  and  Practice  of  Extents,  c.  1. 
53 — ^Vol.  Xf  under  the  title,  '^Proceedings  on  the  Bevenue  Bide  of  the 
King's  Bench  Division."   e 
54— P.  14. 
55— P.  8. 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  199 

permit  their  claims  for  public  taxes,  either  on  the  citizen 
or  the  officer  employed  for  their  collection  or  disburse- 
ment, to  become  subjects  of  judicial  controversy,  accord- 
ing to  the  course  of  the  law  of  the  land.'*  Upon  the  con- 
trary in  England,  ever  since  Chapters  9  and  39  of  Magna 
Carta  went  into  effect,  most  careful  provision  has  been 
made  for  court  procedure,  including  trial  by  jury  **  ac- 
cording to  the  course  of  the  law  of  the  land,  *  *  whenever 
the  Crown  asserts  **  claims  for  public  taxes,  either  on 
the  citizen  or  the  officer  employed  for  their  collection  or 
disbursement/^  Mr.  Dicey,  in  expounding  the  doctrine 
of  due  process  as  it  is  understood  in  the  English  consti- 
tutional system,  has  said :  **  *  *  In  England  the  idea  of 
legal  equality,  or  of  the  universal  subjection  of  all  classes, 
to  the  law  administered  by  the  ordinary  courts,  has  been 
pushed  to  its  utmost  limit.  With  us  every  official,  from 
the  Prime  Minister  down  to  a  constable  or  collector  of 
taxes,  is  under  the  same  responsibility  for  every  act  done 
without  legal  justification  as  any  other  citizen/*  The 
idea  that  a  special  class  of  persons,  for  example  Crown 
debtors,  could  be  exempt  from  the  protection  of  a  sys- 
tem whose  main  feature  is  its  universal  application  to 
all  classes,  is  an  unthinkable  solecism  which  no  English 
judge  could  possibly  embody  in  a  judgment  or  decree. 
That  solecism  becomes  still  more  pronounced  when  we 
remember  that  the  protection  of  Crown  debtors  against 
execution  before  judgment  was  the  leading  motive  that 
compelled  the  insertion  of  Chapter  39  of  the  Great  Char- 
ter upon  which  due  process  is  founded.  In  attempting 
to  prove  the  existence  of  the  special  Exchequer  rule  or 
practice  upon  which  alone  he  based  the  judgment  of  the 
court  in  the  case  in  question,  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  not  only 
ignored  the  general  principle  of  due  process  in  England, 
so  luminously  stated  by  Mr.  Dicey,  but,  stranger  still, 
he  fell  into  hopeless  confusion  by  mistaking  a  writ  of 
extent  for  a  writ  of  execution.  It  is  undoubtedly  true, 
as  he  says,  that  there  was  a  time  when,  in  the  event  of 

56 — ^Tbe  Law  of  tlie  Constitution,  183. 


200  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  100 

defaults  by  collectors  of  the  revenue,  the  balances  against 
them  were  made  up  by  auditors  of  the  Exchequer.  To 
use  his  own  words,  *' these  balances  were  found  by  audi- 
tors, the  particular  oflScers  acting  thereon  have  been, 
from  time  to  time,  varied  by  legislation  and  usage/' 
What  was  the  effect  of  their  findings  t  He  gives  us  the 
answer.  '^By  the  statute  13  Eliz.,  ch.  4,  balances  due  from 
receivers  of  the  revenue  and  all  other  accountants  of 
the  Crown  were  placed  on  the  same  footing  as  debts 
acknowledged  to  be  due  by  statute  staple. ''  That  is  to 
say,  a  debt  due  upon  open  account  was  by  the  action  of 
the  auditors  converted  into  a  debt  of  record,  upon  which 
the  writ  of  extent  could  be  sued  out.  It  could  not  be 
sued  out  at  all  until  the  debt  was  first  made  a  matter 
of  record.  In  the  words  of  the  learned  Justice:  **To 
authorize  a  writ  of  extent,  however,  the  debt  must  be  a 
matter  of  record  in  the  King's  exchequer.  The  33  Henry 
Vin,  c.  39  sec.  50,  made  all  specialty  debts  due  to  the 
King  of  the  same  force  and  effect  as  debts  by  statute 
staple,  thus  giving  to  such  debts  the  effect  of  debts  of 
record.''  The  fact  is  thus  fixed  that  after  the  auditors 
of  the  Exchequer  had  converted  the  balance  due  on  open 
account  from  a  collector  into  a  debt  of  record,  a  writ  of 
extent  could  be  issued  for  its  collection;  and  a  writ  of 
extent  was  simply  what  American  lawyers  call  an  attach- 
ment, because  its  sole  purpose  was  to  give  the  Crown  a 
preference  lien  upon  the  lands  and  goods  of  the  debtor 
as  against  bona  fide  purchasers.  Blackstoiie  makes  it 
all  very  plain  when,  in  describing  the  writ  of  extent,  he 
says  x^"^  *  *  The  lands  and  goods  may  be  taken  by  the  proc- 
ess, usually  called  an  extent,  or  extendi  facias,  because 
the  sheriff  is  to  cause  the  lands,  etc.,  to  be  appraised  to 
their  full  extended  value,  before  he  delivers  them  to  the 
plaintiff,  that  it  may  be  certainly  known  how  soon 
the  debt  will  be  paid ;  ...  so  that,  if  such  oflScer  of  the 
Crown  aliens  for  a  value  consideration,  the  land  shall 
be  liable  to  the  sovereign's  debt  even  in  the  hands  of  a 

57—3  Bl.  Com.  424-5. 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  201 

bona  fide  purchaser,  though  the  debt  to  the  Crown  was 
contracted  by  the  vendor  many  years  after  the  aliena- 
tion. ' '  Thus  we  know  for  certain  that  the  writ  of  extent 
that  went  into  the  hands  of  the  sheriffs,  at  the  suit  of  the 
Crown,  to  collect  its  debt  of  record,  was  not  an  execution, 
as  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  erroneously  supposed,  ending  a 
litigation,  hut  an  attachment  beginning  one.  Before  the 
writ  could  be  issued  the  Crown  had  first  to  satisfy  the 
jury  on  the  first  inquisition  that  the  circumstances  jus- 
tified its  issue.  Then  followed  the  trial  on  the  merits 
upon  every  defense  the  Crown  debtor  saw  fit  to  impose, 
as  explained  heretofore  by  the  opinion  of  the  Exchequer 
judges  in  Eex  v.  Homblower,  and  in  Begina  v.  Byle. 

No  trained  lawyer  who  will  read  the  perfectly  clear 
history  of  the  processes  provided  by  English  law  for  the 
collection  of  debts  due  to  the  Crown  since  the  violent 
methods  of  John,  based  on  the  **grantings  of  writs  of 
execution  without  trial  in  the  courts,  *  *  were  abolished  by 
Chapters  9  and  39  of  the  Great  Charter,  can  doubt  for 
a  moment  that  the  single  ground  upon  which  the  judg- 
ment in  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  &  Improvement  Com- 
pany was  based  is  absolutely  foundationless.  The  entire 
history,  illuminated  as  it  is  by  the  Exchequer  reports, 
West 's  Treatise,  and  the  recent  restatement  of  the  whole 
matter  by  the  Earl  of  Halsbury  in  **The  Laws  of  Eng- 
land, ' '  annihilates  the  assumption  that,  even  in  the  dark- 
est days  of  the  Tudor  despotism,  auditors  of  the  Ex- 
chequer, without  notice  or  hearing,  could  enter  up  a 
balance  against  a  collector  of  the  revenue  as  a  final  judg- 
ment upon  which  execution  could  issue.  As  no  such  rule 
or  practice  ever  existed  in  England  at  any  time,  the  Act 
of  Congress  of  May  15,  1820,  authorizing  ministerial 
officers  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  armed  with 
no  judicial  powers  whatever,  to  do  such  a  thing  here  was 
of  course  grossly  unconstitutional  because  forbidden  by 
the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  which 
denies,  when  properly  interpreted,  that  claims  against 
collectors  of  the  revenue  can  ever  cease  to  be  **  subjects 


202  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  100 

of  judicial  controversy  according  to  the  course  of  the  law 
of  the  land.'' 

It  is  equally  impossible  to  defend  the  judgment  of  the 
court  in  the  case  in  question,  even  if  we  admit  for 
the  sake  of  the  argument,  the  existence  in  England  of 
the  special  rule  or  practice  which  is  its  sole  and  only 
basis,  for  the  simple  and  conclusive  reason  that  the  entire 
fabric  of  despotic  law,  generally  known  as  Star  Chamber 
law,  built  up  during  the  Tudor  period,  was  swept  away 
by  the  Revolutions  of  1640  and  1688.  The  English  con- 
stitutional  law  that  passed  into  our  first  state  consti- 
tutions, and  thence  into  the  first  eight  amendments  to  the 
Federal  Constitution,  was  drawn  from  the  reformed  Eng- 
lish system  as  Blackstone  defined  it  in  1758,  and  not 
from  the  unref ormed  system  as  Coke  described  it  in  1632, 
with  the  Star  Chamber  and  High  Commission  intact. 
That  vital  historical  fact  was  first  accepted  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  in  Hurtado  v.  Califor- 
nia *®  when,  in  openly  repudiating  the  definition  of  due 
process  contained  in  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  &  Im- 
provement Company,  it  said :  **It  is  urged  upon  us,  how- 
ever, in  argument,  that  the  claim  made  in  behalf  of  the 
plaintiff  in  error  is  supported  by  the  decision  of  this 
court  in  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  &  Improvement  Com- 
pany, 18  How.  272.  .  .  .  The  point  in  tlte  case  cited 
arose  in  reference  to  a  summary  proceeding,  questioned 
on  that  account,  as  not  due  process  of  law.  The  answer 
was :  however  exceptional  it  may  be,  as  tested  by  defini- 
tions and  principles  of  ordinary  procedure,  nevertheless, 
this,  in  substance,  has  been  immemorially  the  actual  law 
of  the  land  and,  therefore,  is  due  process  of  law.  But 
to  hold  that  such  a  characteristic  is  essential  to  due  proc- 
ess of  law,  would  be  to  deny  every  quality  of  the  law  but 
its  age,  and  to  render  it  incapable  of  progress  or  improve- 
ment. It  would  be  to  stamp  upon  our  jurisprudence  the 
unchangeableness  attributed  to  the  laws  of  the  Medes  and 
Persians.    This  would  be  all  the  more  singular  and  sur- 

58—110  U.  S.  528. 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (1896-1917)  203 

prising  in  this  qnick  and  active  age,  when  we  consider 
that,  owing  to  the  progressive  development  of  legal  ideas 
and  institutions,  the  words  of  Magna  Carta  stood  for 
very  different  things  at  the  time  of  the  separation  of  the 
American  colonies  from  what  they  represented  orig- 
inally/* The  good  work  thus  begun  by  Mr.  Justice 
Matthews  was  continued  in  Twining  v.  New  Jersey*^® 
when  the  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Moody,  in 
repudiating  the  definition  of  due  process  in  question  for 
a  second  time,  said:  *'What  is  due  process  of  law  may 
be  ascertained  by  an  examination  of  those  settled  usages 
and  modes  of  proceedings  existing  in  the  common  and 
statute  law  of  England  before  the  emigration  of  our 
ancestors,  and  shown  not  to  have  been  unsuited  to  their 
civil  and  political  condition  by  having  been  acted  on  by 
them  after  the  settlement  of  this  country.  This  test  was 
adopted  b^the  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Cur- 
tis, in  Den  ex  dem.  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  &  Improve- 
ment Company,  18  How.  272.  ...  Of  course,  the  part 
of  the  constitution  then  before  the  court  was  the  Fifth 
Amendment."  After  approving  Mr.  Justice  Matthew's 
repudiation  in  Hurtado  v.  California,  Mr.  Justice  Moody 
added :  *  *  It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  a  procedure 
settled  in  English  law  at  the  time  of  the  emigration  and 
brought  to  this  country  and  practiced  by  our  ancestors, 
is  an  essential  element  of  due  process  of  law.  //  that 
were  so,  the  procedure  of  the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century  would  he  fastened  upon  American  jurisprudence 
like  a  straight  jacket,  only  to  be  u/nloosed  by  a  constitu- 
tional amendment  J* 

And  yet,  despite  these  emphatic  repudiations  of  the 
unhistorical  and  misleading  definition  of  due  process 
cofntained  in  the  cade  in  question,  its  tap-root  remains 
unbroken.  The  tap-root  consists  of  the  entirely  un- 
founded assumption  that  there  were  in  England  a  certain 
class  of  Crown  or  government  cases,  which  were  imme- 
Mortally  excluded  by  a  special  rule  or  practice  of  the 

5^—211  V.  8.  78. 


204  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  100 

Court  of  Exchequer  from  the  protection  of  due  process 
or  the  law  of  the  land,  because,  as  Mr.  Justice  Curtis 
expressed  it,  no  government  can  allow  certain  matters 
**to  become  subjects  of  judicial  controversy  according 
to  the  course  of  the  law  of  the  land. '  *  The  earnest  pur- 
pose of  the  author  is  to  demonstrate,  first  that  no  such 
principle  ever  existed  or  could  exist  in  the  English  con- 
stitutional system;  second,  that  no  such  special  rule  or 
practice  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer  as  Mr.  Justice  Curtis 
put  forward,  ever  did  or  does  exist  in  England;  third, 
that  the  deadly  doctrine  drawn  from  that  indefensible 
assumption  is  eating  like  a  canker  sore  into  the  vitals 
of  American  constitutional  law.  As  a  striking  illustra- 
tion, reference  may  be  made  to  the  case  of  United  States 
V.  Ju  Toy,®*  in  which  it  is  said:  **It  is  unnecessary  to 
repeat  the  often-quoted  remarks  of  Mr.  Justice  Curtis, 
speaking  for  the  whole  court  in  Den  ex  dem.  Murray  v. 
Hoboken  Land  &  Improvement  Company,  18  How.  272, 
280,  to  show  that  the  requirement  of  a  judicial  trial  does 
not  prevail  in  every  case.  Lem  Moon  Sing  v.  United 
States,  158  U.  S.  538,  546,  547 ;  Japanese  Immigrant  Case 
(Yamataya  v.  Fisher),  189  U.  S.  100;  Public  Clearing 
House  V.  Coyne,  194  U.  S.  497,  508,  509. '*  In  the  second 
case  cited,  the  court,  after  referring  to  Murray  v.  Hobo- 
ken Land  &  Improvement  Company  by  name  and  saying 
that  ^4t  was  decided  in  that  case  [upon  the  false  assump- 
tion that  has  been  herein  exi)osed]  to  be  consistent  with 
due  process  of  law  for  Congress  to  provide  summary 
means  to  compel  revenue  officers  and,  in  case  of  default, 
their  sureties  to  pay  such  balances  of  the  public  money 
as  might  be  in  their  hands,'*  added:  **Now,  it  has  been 
settled  that  the  power  to  exclude  or  expel  aliens  belonged 
to  the  political  department  of  the  government,  and  that 
the  order  of  an  executive  officer  invested  with  the  power 
to  determine  finally  the  facts  upon  which  an  alien's  right 
to  enter  this  country,  or  remain  in  it,  depended,  was 
*due  process  of  law,'  and  no  other  tribunal,  unless  ex- 

60—198  U.  8.  253. 


§  100  FIFTH  AMENDMENT— CONTINUED  (18961917)  205 

pressly  authorized  to  do  so,  was  at  liberty  to  re-examine 
the  evidence  on  which  he  acted,  or  to  controvert  its  suffi- 
dency/'**  But  unfortunately  that  deadly  and  entirely 
unsupported  doctrine  has  by  no  means  been  limited  to 
cases  involving  the  expulsion  of  aliens.  The  last  case 
cited,  Public  Clearing  House  v,  Coyne,  involved  the  regu- 
lation of  the  mails,  and  even  as  to  that  sacred  subject 
the  court  said:  ^^It  is  too  late  to  argue  that  due  process 
of  law  is  denied  whenever  the  disposition  of  property  is 
affected  by  the  order  of  an  executive  department.  •  .  . 
The  action  of  the  department  is  accepted  as  final  by  the 
courts,  and  even  when  involving  questions  of  law  this 
action  is  attended  by  a  strong  presumption  of  its  correct- 
ness. Bates  &  G.  Company  v.  Payne,  194  U.  S.  106,  ante 
894.  That  due  process  of  law  does  not  necessarily  require 
the  interference  of  the  judicial  power  is  laid  down  in 
many  cases  and  by  many  eminent  writers  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  constitutional  limitations.  Den  ex  dem.  Murray 
v.  Hoboken  Laad  &  Improvement  Company,  18  How.  272, 
280.'*  The  regulation  of  the  mails,  including  the  free- 
dom of  the  press,  has  thiis  passed  under  the  autocratic 
control  of  an  administrative  system  whose  authority  rests 
now  upon  the  judicial  finding  by  our  highest  court  that 
under  the  American  constitution  there  is  a  widening  cir- 
cle of  governmental  cases  not  protected  hy  the  law  of  the 
land,  because  certain  matters  can  not  be  suffered  by  gov- 
ernment *Ho  become  subjects  of  judicial  controversy 
according  to  the  course  of  the  law  of  the  land.''  No  sudi 
rule  of  law  ever  existed  in  England  in  the  past  or  present. 
It  finds  its  only  parallel  in  the  administrative  law  (droit 
administratif)  of  France,  a  term  for  which  there  is  no 
equivalent  in  English  legal  phraseology  for  the  reason 
that  among  Anglican  peoples  the  thing  itself  does  not 
exist.  It  has  been  defined  to  be  **that  portion  of  French 
law  which  determines  (i)  the  position  and  liabilities  of 
all  state  officials,  and  (ii)  the  civil  rights  and  liabilities 
of  private  individuals  in  their  dealings  as  representa- 

61— Ekiu  ▼.  United  States,  142  U.  8.  651,  and  other  eases  cited. 


206  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  100 

tives  of  the  state,  and  (iii)  the  procedure  by  which  these 
rights  and  liabilities  are  enforced, ' '  Droit  administratif 
has  no  right  to  exist  in  a  country  in  which  there  is  due 
process  of  law  or  the  law  of  the  land,  because  it  assumes 
that  the  ordinary  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  to  admin- 
ister it.  Such  law  is  administered  by  administrative 
courts  (tribunaux  administratif s),  at  the  head  of  which 
stands  in  France  the  Council  of  State.  Under  the  fatal 
exception  to  the  law  of  the  land,  bom  of  a  lamentable 
misapprehension  in  Murray  v.  Hoboken  L^nd  &  Improve- 
ment Company,  we  are  rapidly  building  up  a  droit  admin- 
istratif in  the  United  States,  despite  the  noble  effort 
made  in  the  historic  case  of  United  States  v.  Lee,  106 
U.  S.  196,  to  make  such  a  result  impossible. 


CHAPTER  IV 

FEDEBAL  POWEB  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN  AND  DUE  PBOCESS 

§  101.  Power  of  eminent  domain  vested  in  all  states^ 
federal  as  well  as  single.  The  term  seems  to  have  orig- 
inated with  Grotius.  De  Jure  BeUi  et  Pads,  i,  3,  6,  ii, 
14,  7.  See  Bynkershoek  QtuBstiones  I,  p.  ii,  15.  As  it  is 
employed  by  Vattel,  it  was  probably  imported  into  the 
English  langaage  through  the  Translation  of  1760.  See 
Holland,  Jurisprudence,  p.  377,  note  1.  In  Gardner  v. 
Newburg,  2  Johns,  j  a  162,  Chancellor  Kent  says :  *  *  Gro- 
tius,  Pnffendorf  and  Bynkershoek,  when  speaking  of 
the  eminent  domain  of  the  sovereign,  admit  that  private 
property  may  be  taken  for  public  uses,  when  public  neces- 
sity or  utility  require  it. '  *  See  also  Thayer  Cos.  Const 
Law,  945,  947.  In  Kohl  v.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  367, 
the  Court  said :  *  *  The  powers  vested  by  the  Constitution 
in  the  General  Government  demand  for  their  exercise  the 
acquisition  of  lands  in  all  the  states.  These  are  needed 
for  forts,  armories  and  arsenals,  for  navy  yards  and 
light-houses,  for  custom  houses,  postoffices,  and  court 
houses,  and  for  other  public  uses.  The  right  is  the  off- 
spring of  political  necessity;  and  it  is  inseparable  from 
sovereignty,  unless  denied  to  it  by  its  fundamental  law. 
Vatt.  eh.  20,  34 ;  Bynk.,  lib.  2,  ch.  15 ;  Kent,  Com.  338-340 ; 
Cooley,  Const.  Lim.,  584,  et  seq.  But  it  is  no  more  neces- 
sary for  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  a  state  government 
than  it  is  for  the  exercise  of  the  conceded  powers  of  the 
Federal  Government.  That  Government  is  a  sovereign 
within  its  sphere  as  the  states  are  within  theirs.  True, 
its  sphere  is  limited.  Certain  subjects  only  are  com- 
mitted to  it ;  but  its  power  over  those  subjects  is  as  full 
and  complete  as  is  the  power  of  the  states  over  the  sub- 

207 


208  DUE  PBOCBSS  OF  LAW  { 101 

jects  to  which  their  sovereignty  extends.  The  power  is 
not  changed  by  its  transfer  to  another  holder."  In 
Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6  Cranch  87,  Mr.  Justice  Johnson,  in 
defining  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  said:  '^A  right 
which  a  magnanimous  and  just  government  will  never 
exercise  without  amply  indemnifying  the  individuals,  and 
which  perhaps  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  the  power 
to  oblige  him  to  sell  and  convey,  when  the  public  neces- 
sities require  if  In  the  United  States  v.  Jones,  109 
U.  S.  513,  it  was  held  that  as  the  right  is  an  incident  of 
sovereignty,  it  requires  no  constitutional  recognition. 
See  also,  Calder  v.  Bull,  3  Dall.  386 ;  Charles  River  Bridge 
V.  Warren  Bridge,  11  Pet.  420. 

§  102.  The  eminent  domain  vested  in  Federal  Govern- 
ment paramount.  In  Cherokee  Nation  v.  Southern  Kan- 
sas B.  Co.,  135  U.  S.  661,  the  Court  said:  ^'As  was  said 
by  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Stockton  v.  Baltimore  &  N. 
Y.  R.  Co.,  32  Fed.  Rep.  9, 19 :  *  The  argument  based  upon 
the  doctrine  that  the  states  have  the  eminent  domain  or 
highest  dominion  in  the  lands  comprised  within  their 
limits,  and  that  the  United  States  have  no  dominion  in 
such  lands,  can  not  avail  to  frustrate  the  supremacy  given 
by  the  Constitution  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States  in  all  matters  within  the  scope  of  its  sovereignty. 
This  is  not  a  matter  of  words,  but  of  things.  If  it  is 
necessary  that  the  United  States  government  should  have 
an  eminent  domain  still  higher  than  the  states,  in  order 
that  it  may  fully  carry  out  the  objects  and  purposes  of 
the  Constitution,  then  it  has  it.  Whatever  may  be  the 
necessities  or  conclusions  of  theoretical  law  as  to  eminent 
domain  or  anything  else,  it  must  be  received  as  a  postu- 
late of  the  Constitution  that  the  government  of  the 
United  States  is  invested  with  full  and  complete  power 
to  execute  and  carry  out  its  purposes. '  It  would  be  very 
strange  if  the  national  government,  in  the  execution  of 
its  rightful  authority,  could  exercise  the  power  of  emi- 
nent' domain  in  the  several  states,  and  could  not  exercise 


§  103    FEDERAL  POWER  OP  EMINBNT'DOMAIN       209 

the  same  power  in  a  territory  occupied  by  an  Indian  tribe 
or  nation,'^  The  paramount  right  of  eminent  domain 
vested  in  the  Federal  Government,  so  far  as  it  effects 
public  waters,  was  reasserted  with  great  emphasis  in  the 
recent  case  of  Greenleaf  Lumber  Go.  v.  Garrison,  237 
U,  S.  251,  in  which  the  Court,  after  a  careful  review  of 
the  authorities,  said:  ^^We  have  recognized  that  the 
states  have  a  certain  control  and  management  over  the 
navigable  streams  within  their  territory,  but  subject  to 
be  superseded  by  the  interference  of  Congress.  Gilman 
V.  Philadelphia,  supra;  Pound  v.  Turck,  95  IT.  S.  459; 
Escanaba  Co.  v.  Chicago,  107  U.  S.  678.  When  Congress 
acts,  necessarily  its  power  extends  to  the  whole  expanse 
of  the  stream,  and  it  is  not  dependent  upon  the  depth 
or  shallowness  of  the  water.  To  recognize  such  distinc- 
tion would  be  to  limit  the  power  when  and  where  its 
exercise  might  be  most  needed.  In  Scranton  v.  Wheeler, 
179  U.  S.  141,  the  water  was  very  shallow  between  the 
high  land  and  the  pier  erected  in  the  river  by  the  author- 
ity of  Congress  and  which  it  was  contended  cut  off  access 
to  navigability/*  n 


§  103.  Paramoimt  right  of  eminent  domain  limited  by 
due  process.  Over  and  above  the  paramount  right  of 
eminent  domain  vested  in  the  Federal  Government  sits 
the  restraining  power  of  the  due  process  clause  of  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  which  provides  that  **No  person  shall 
be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due 
process  of  law ;  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for 
public  use,  without  just  compensation.''  If  the  last  em- 
phasizing clause  had  been  omitted,  the  right  to  compen- 
sation for  the  taking  of  private  property  for  a  public 
use  would  have  been  complete  under  the  due  process 
clause  alone.  In  construing  the  North  Carolina  consti- 
tution, which  contained  no  specific  provision  for  compen-. 
sation,  the  Court,  in  Baleigh,  etc.  B.  Co.  v.  Davis,  2  Dev. 
&  B.  L.  451,  after  referring  to  the  guaranty  of  *  *  the  law 
of  the  land,"  said :    ** Under  the  guaranty  of  this  article. 

Doe  ProcoM— 14 


210  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  103 

it  has  been  held,  and  in  our  opinion  properly  held,  that 
private  property  is  protected  from  the  arbitrary  power 
of  transfer  by  one  person  to  another  We  doubt  not 
that  it  is  also  protected  from  the  power  of  despotic 
resumption,  upon  a  legislative  declaration  of  forfeiture, 
or  merely  to  deprive  the  owner  of  it,  or  to  enrich  the 
treasury,  unless  as  a  pecuniary  contribution  by  way  of 
tax.  Though  not  so  obvious,  it  may  also  be  true  that  the 
clause  under  consideration  is  restrictive  of  the  right  of 
the  public  to  the  use  of  private  property,  and  impliedly 
forbids  it,  without  compensation. '  *  In  Monongahela  Nav- 
igation Co.  V.  United  States,  148  IT.  S.  12,  a  higher  court 
said:  ^^In  the  case  of  Sinnickson  v.  Johnson,  17  N.  J. 
L.  129, 145,  cited  in  the  case  of  Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  & 
M.  Canal  Co.,  13  Wall.  166,  178,  it  was  said  that  Hhis 
power  to  take  private  property  reaches  back  of  all  con- 
stitutional provisions ;  and  it  seems  to  have  been  consid- 
ered a  settled  principle  of  universal  law  that  the  right  to 
compensation  is  an  incident  to  the  exercise  of  that  power ; 
that  the  one  is  so  inseparably  connected  with  the  other 
that  they  may  be  said  to  exist  not  as  separate  and  dis- 
tinct principles,  but  as  parts  of  one  and  the  same  prin- 
ciple.'* And  in  Gardner  v.  Newburg,  2  Johns.,  ch.  162, 
Chancellor  Kent  afSrmed  substantially  the  same  doctrine. 
In  Bauman  v.  Boss,  167  IT.  S.  574,  the  Court  said:  **In 
the  5th  article  of  the  earliest  Amendments  to  the  con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  of 
rights,  the  inherent  and  necessary  power  of  the  govern- 
ment to  appropriate  property  to  the  public  use  is  recog- 
nized, and  the  rights  of  private  owners  are  secured  by 
the  declaration,  *nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for 
public  use  without  just  compensation.  *  The  right  of  emi- 
nent domain,  as  was  said  by  this  court,  speaking  through 
the  Chief  Justice,  in  a  recent  case,  *is  the  offspring  of 
political  necessity,  and  is  inseparable  f r<Hn  sovereignty 
unless  denied  to  it  by  the  fundamental  law.  It  can  not 
be  exercised,  except  upon  condition  that  just  compensa- 
tion shall  be  made  to  the  owner;  and  it  is  the  duty  of 


§  104    PBDERAL  POWER  OP  EMINENT  DOMAIN       211 

the  state,  in  the  conduct  of  the  inquest  by  which  the  com- 
pensation is  ascertained,  to  see  that  it  is  just,  not  merely 
to  the  individual  whose  property  is  taken,  but  to  the 
public  which  is  to  pay  for  it/  Searl  v.  Lake  County 
School  Dist.  No.  2, 133  U.  S.  553,  562.  The  just  compen- 
sation  required  by  the  constitution  to  be  made  to  the 
owner  is  to  be  measured  by  the  loss  caused  to  him  by 
the  appropriation.  He  is  entitled  to  receive  the  value 
of  what  he  has  been  deprived  of,  and  no  more.  To  award 
him  less  would  be  unjust  to  him;  to  award  him  more 
would  be  unjust  to  the  public. '  *  See  Wilson  v.  Lambert, 
168  U.  S.  611 ;  Greenleaf  Lumber  Co.  v.  Garrison,  237 
U.  S.  251. 

§  104.  The  taking  must  be  for  a  pnUic  use.  In  Wil- 
kinson V.  Leland,  2  Pet.  627,  it  was  held  that  under  the 
right  of  eminent  domain  private  property  can  only  be 
taken  for  a  public  use,  upon  the  payment  of  just  com- 
pensation ;  the  right  can  not  be  asserted  for  the  purpose 
of  taking  private  property  for  private  purposes.  West 
Biver  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6  How.  507 ;  Cole  v.  La  Grange, 
113  U.  S.  1,  The  taking  must  be  for  some  of  the  recog- 
nized necessities  of  government,  such  as  the  construction 
of  arsenals,  forts,  armories,  navy  yards,  light-houses, 
custom  houses,  postoffices,  court  houses,  highways,  rail- 
ways, canals,  bridges,  wharves,  parks  for  public  use  and 
recreation  and  the  like.  See  Kohl  v.  United  States,  91 
IT.  S.  367;  Ft.  Leavenworth  R.  Co.  v.  Lowe,  114  U.  S. 
525;  Shoemaker  v.  United  States,  147  U.  S.  282;  Chap- 
pell  V.  United  States,  160  U.  S.  499;  Wilson  v.  Lambert, 
168  U.  S.  611.  In  United  States  v.  Gettysburg  Electric 
B.  Co.,  160  U.  S.  668,  the  Court,  in  giving  perhaps  the 
widest  possible  extension  to  the  right  of  eminent  domain, 
said :  *  *  The  really  important  question  to  be  determined 
in  these  proceedings  is  whether  the  use  to  which  the 
petitioner  desires  to  put  the  land  described  in  the  peti- 
tions is  that  kind  of  public  use  for  which  the  government 
of  the  United  States  is  authorized  to  condemn  land.    It 


212  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  104 

has  authority  to  do  so  whenever  it  is  necessary  or  appro- 
priate to  use  the  land  in  the  execution  of  any  of  the 
powers  granted  to  it  by  the  Constitution.  Kohl  v.  United 
States,  91  U.  S.  367 ;  Cherokee  Nation  v.  Southern  Kan- 
sas B.  Co.,  135  U.  S.  641-656;  Chappell  v.  United  States, 
160  U.  S.  499.  Is  the  proposed  use  to  which  this  land 
is  to  be  put  a  public  use  within  the  limitation  t  The 
purpose  of  the  use  is  stated  in  the  first  act  of  Congress. 
The  appropriation  act  of  August  18, 1894,  also  contained 
the  following:  *For  continuing  the  work  of  surveying, 
locating,  and  preserving  the  lines  of  battle  at  Gettysburg, 
Pa.,  and  for  purchasing,  opening,  constructing,  and  im- 
proving avenues  along  the  portions  occupied  by  the 
various  commands  of  the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and 
Northern  Virginia  on  that  field,  .  .  .  Any  act  of  Con- 
gress which  plainly  and  directly  tends  to  enhance  the 
respect  and  love  of  the  citizen  for  the  institutions  of  his 
country  and  to  quicken  and  strengthen  his  motives  to 
defend  them,  and  which  is  germane  to  and  intimately 
connected  with  and  appropriate  to  the  exercise  of  some 
one  or  all  of  the  powers  granted  by  Congress  must  be 
valid.  This  proposed  use  comes  within  such  description. 
The  provision  comes  within  the  rule  laid  down  by  Chief 
Justice  Marshall  in  McCuUoch  v.  Maryland,  4  Wheat. 
421,  in  these  words:  *Let  the  end  be  legitimate,  let  it 
be  within  the  scope  of  the  constitution,  and  all  means 
which  are  appropriate,  which  are  plainly  adequate  to 
that  end,  which  are  not  prohibited,  but  consistent  with 
the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  constitution,  are  constitu- 
tional.^ '' 


§105.  Right  of  legislature  to  determine  what  is  a 
public  use.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  right  to  deter- 
mine whether  or  no  an  appropriation  of  private  property 
to  a  particular  use,  because  of  its  public  character,  is 
justifiable,  is  vested  primarily  in  the  legislature.  It  is 
equally  clear  that  after  it  has  acted,  stating  its  reasons 
thereof,  the  power  of  review  is  vested  in  the  judiciary, — 


§  106    FEDBEAL  POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN        213 

to  that  department  belongs  the  ultimate  right  to  deter- 
mine whether  or  no  the  use  in  question  is  in  contempla- 
tion of  laW;  a  public  use.  A  vivid  illustration  of  the 
relations  actually  existing  between  the  two  departments 
is  to  be  found  in  the  foregoing  case  of  United  States  v. 
Gettysburg  Electric  R.  Co.,  160  U.  S.  668,  in  which  the 
Court  said:  ^^In  examining  an  act  of  Congress  it  has 
been  frequently  said  that  every  intendment  is  in  favor 
of  its  constitutionality.  Such  act  is  presumed  to  be 
valid  unless  its  invalidity  is  plain  and  apparent;  no  pre- 
sumption  of  invalidity  can  be  indulged  in;  it  must  be 
shown  clearly  and  unmistakably.''  That  is  to  say  that 
in  reviewing  the  legislative  declaration  of  a  public  use, 
the  courts  will  permit  it  to  prevail  unless  it  is  manifestly 
erroneous  when  measured  by  legal  standards.  *  *  The  judi- 
cial function  is  merely  that  of  fixing  the  outside  border 
of  reasonable  legislative  action,  the  boundary  beyond 
which  the  taxing  power,  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 
police  power,  and  legislative  power  in  general  can  not 
go  without  violating  the  prohibitions  of  the  constitution, 
or  crossing  the  line  of  its  grants. ' '  Prof.  J.  B.  Thayer, 
7  Harvard  Law  Rev.  148.  In  Shoemaker  v.  United  States, 
147  U.  S.  282,  it  was  held  that  land  in  a  city,  appropriated 
by  law  for  public  parks  and  squares,  is  taken  for  a  public 
use,  no  matter  whether  advantageous  to  the  public,  for 
recreation,  health  or  business. 

§  106.  What  constitutes  a  taking.  That  a  physical 
invasion  and  actual  ouster  of  possession  is  necessary,  at 
least  such  a  serious  interruption  to  the  necessary  and 
common  use  as  will  be  equivalent  to  a  taking,  is  explained 
in  Pumpelly  v.  Canal  Co.,  13  Wall.  166,  in  which  the 
Court  said:  **But  there  are  numerous  authorities  to 
sustain  the  doctrine  that  a  serious  interruption  to  the 
common  and  necessary  use  of  property  may  be,  in  the 
language  of  Mr.  Angell,  in  his  work  on  water  courses, 
equivalent  to  the  taking  of  it,  and  that  under  the  constitu- 
tional provisions  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  land  should 


214  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  106 

be  absolutely  taken.  Ang.  Wat.  Sec  465,  a ;  Hooker  v.  N. 
Haven  and  Northampton  Co.,  14  Conn.  146;  Eowe  v. 
Granite  Bridge  Co.,  21  Pick.  344;  Canal  Appraisers  v. 
People,  17  Wend.  604 ;  Lackland  v.  North  Mo.  R.  E.  Co., 
31  Mo.  180;  Stevens  v.  Prop,  of  Middlesex  Canal,  12 
Mass.  466.  And  perhaps  no  state  court  has  given  more 
frequent  utterance  to  the  doctrine  that  overflowing  land 
by  backing  water  on  it  for  dams  built  below  is  within 
the  constitutional  provision,  than  that  of  Wisconsin.** 
See  Head  v.  Amoskeag  M.  Co.,  113  U.  S.  26;  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  V.  MiUer,  132  U.  S.  83 ;  United  States  v. 
Alexander,  148  U.  S.  187.  In  United  States  v.  Lynah, 
188  U.  S.  445,  in  which  it  was  held  that  there  was  a  tak- 
ing of  land  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fifth  Amendment, — 
by  the  turning  of  a  valuable  rice  plantation  into  an  irre- 
claimable bog  as  the  necessary  result  of  an  improvement 
in  navigation  by  the  Federal  Government, — ^the  Court 
said:  **But  if  any  one  provision  can  be  considered  as 
settled  by  the  decisions  of  this  court,  it  is  that,  although 
in  the  discharge  of  its  duties  the  government  may  appro- 
priate property,  it  can  not  do  so  without  being  liable  to 
the  obligation  cast  by  the  5th  Amendment  of  paying  just 
compensation.*'  And  yet  where  acts  are  done  in  the 
proper  exercise  of  governmental  power,  not  directly  en- 
croaching upon  private  property,  although  their  conse- 
quences may  injure  its  use,  they  do  not  entitle  the  owner 
to  compensation.  Northern  Transp.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  99 
U.  S.  635.  See  also,  Montana  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Min.,  etc., 
Co.,  152  U.  S.  160.  In  Gibson  v.  United  States,  166  U.  S. 
269,  where  the  riparian  owner  was  deprived  during  a 
greater  part  of  the  season  of  access  to  his  landing  by  the 
construction  of  a  dike  by  the  Federal  Government  in  the 
improvement  of  a  navigable  stream, — ^the  Court  said: 
**The  5th  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  provides  that  private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation.  Here,  how- 
ever, the  damage  of  which  Mrs.  Gibson  complained  was 
not  the  result  of  the  taking  of  any  part  of  her  property, 


§  107     FEDERAL  POWER  OP  EMINENT  DOMAIN        215 

whether  upland  or  sabmerged,  or  a  direct  invasion 
thereof,  but  the  incidental  consequence  of  the  lawful  and 
proper  exercise  of  a  governmental  power. ' '  In  Scranton 
V.  Wheeler,  179  TJ.  S,  141,  it  was  held  that  there  was  no 
violation  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  although  a  pier 
erected  by  the  Federal  Government  on  land  submerged 
under  navigable  waters  permanently  destroyed  access  to 
such  waters  upon  the  part  of  a  riparian  proprietor  own- 
ing the  title,  when  the  act  complained  of  was  merely  for 
the  improvement  of  navigation.  It  was  said  that  no  mat- 
ter whether  the  title  to  the  land  was  owned  by  a  riparian 
proprietor  or  the  state,  it  was  acquired  subject  to  the 
rights  which  the  public  have  in  the  navigation  of  such 
waters.  In  Bedford  v.  United  States,  192  U.  S.  217, 
compensation  was  denied  where  damage  to  land  was  the 
consequence  of  flooding  resulting  from  the  construction 
of  revetments  by  the  United  States.  The  Court  said: 
''In  the  case  at  bar  the  damage  was  strictly  consequen- 
tial. It  was  the  result  of  the  action  of  the  river  through 
a  course  of  years.  The  case  at  bar,  therefore,  is  distin- 
guishable from  the  Lynah  Case  [188  U.  S.  445]  in  the 
cause  and  manner  of  the  injury.  In  the  Lynah  Case  the 
works  were  constructed  in  the  bed  of  the  river,  obstructed 
the  natural  flow  of  its  water,  and  were  held  to  have 
caused,  as  a  direct  consequence,  the  overflow  of  Lynah  *s 
plantation.  In  the  case  at  bar  the  works  were  constructed 
along  the  banks  of  the  river,  and  their  effect  was  to  resist 
erosion  of  the  banks  by  the  waters  of  the  river.  There 
was  no  other  interference  with  natural  conditions.*'  See 
also  Manigault  v.  Springs,  199  U.  S.  473 ;  Union  Bridge 
Co.  V.  United  States,  204  U.  S.  364 ;  Monongahela  Bridge 
Co.  V.  United  States,  216  U.  S.  177;  Jackson  v.  United 
States,  230  U.  S.  1 ;  Peabody  v.  United  States,  231  U.  S. 
530;  Richards  v.  Washington  Terminal  Co.,  233  U.  S. 
546 ;  Greenleaf  Lumber  Co.  v.  Garrison,  237  U.  S.  267. 

§  107.  Necessity  that  justifies  the  taking.    In  Missis- 
sippi &  Rum  River  Boom  Co.  v.  Patterson,  98  U.  S.  403, 


216  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  107 

the  Court  said :  ^  ^  The  right  of  eminent  domain,  that  is 
the  right  to  take  private  property  for  public  uses,  apper- 
tains to  every  independent  government.  It  requires  no 
constitutional  recognition;  it  is  an  attribute  of  sov- 
ereignty. The  clause  found  in  the  constitutions  of  the 
several  states  providing  for  just  compensation  for  prop- 
erty taken  is  a  mere  limitation  upon  the  exercise  of  the 
right  When  the  use  is  public,  the  necessity  or  expe- 
diency of  appropriating  any  particular  property  is  not 
a  subject  of  judicial  cognizance,'^  In  Shoemaker  v. 
United  States,  147  U.  S.  282,  the  Court  said:  *'The 
adjudicated  cases  likewise  establish  the  proposition  that 
while  the  courts  have  power  to  determine  the  use  for 
which  private  property  is  authorized  by  the  legislature 
to  be  taken  is  in  fact  a  public  use,  yet,  if  this  question 
is  decided  in  the  affirmative,  the  judicial  function  is 
exhausted;  that  the  extent  to  which  such  property  shall 
be  taken  for  such  use  rests  wholly  in  the  legislative  dis- 
cretion, subject  only  to  the  restraint  that  just  compensa- 
tion must  be  made.''  See  also,  Fallbrook  Irrigation 
District  v.  Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112,  159,  160.  In  Backus 
V.  Fort  Street  Union  Depot  Co.,  169  U.  S.  568,  the  Court 
said:  ** Neither  can  it  be  said  that  there  is  any  funda- 
mental right  secured  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  to  have  the  questions  of  compensation  and  neces- 
sity both  passed  upon  by  one  and  the  same  jury.  In 
many  states  the  question  of  necessity  is  never  submitted 
to  the  jury  which  passes  upon  the  question  of  compensa- 
tion. It  is  either  settled  affirmatively  by  the  legislature, 
or  left  to  the  judgment  of  the  corporation  invested  with 
the  right  to  take  property  by  condemnation.  The  ques- 
tion of  necessity  is  not  one  of  a  judicial  character,  but 
rather  one  for  determination  by  the  lawmaking  branch 
of  the  government.  Mississippi  &  Rum  River  Boom  Co. 
v.  Patterson,  98  U.  S.  402,  406 ;  United  States  v.  Jones, 
109  U.  S.  513 ;  Cherokee  Nation  v.  Southern  Kansas  Rail- 
way, supra. ' '  In  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  171 
U.  S.  270,  the  Court  said:    **By  granting  a  right  of  way 


§  108    PEDBEAL  POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN        217 

400  feet  in  width,  Congress  must  be  understood  to  have 
conclusively  determined  that  a  strip  of  that  width  was 
necessary  for  a  public  work  of  such  importance,  and  it 
was  not  competent  for  a  court  at  the  suit  of  a  private 
party,  to  adjudge  that  only  25  feet  thereof  were  occupied 
for  railroad  purposes.'^  See  also  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co. 
V.  Townsend,  190  U,  S.  267,  272.  In  the  light  of  the  fore- 
going cases  it  is  hard  to  challenge  the  fact  that  ^'The 
general  principle  is  now  well  settled  that  when  the  uses 
are  in  fact  public,  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  taking 
private  property  for  such  uses  by  the  exercise  of  the 
power  of  eminent  domain,  the  instrumentaUties  to  be 
used  and  the  extent  to  which  such  right  shall  be  delegated 
are  questions  appertaining  to  the  political  and  legislative 
branches  of  the  government.  ^ '  Matter  of  Niagara  Falls, 
etc.,  B.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  375,  383. 

§  108.  Necessity  for  compensation.  If  the  legislative 
power  is  the  judge  of  the  necessity  which  authorizes  the 
taking  of  private  property,  it  is  under  a  double  necessity 
to  provide  for  the  payment  of  just  compensation.  As 
heretofore  pointed  out,  the  guaranty  of  due  process  of 
law  alone  obliges  a  sovereign  to  compensate  the  owner 
whose  property  is  taken  by  its  authority.  The  express 
constitutional  guaranties,  state  and  Federal,  simply 
restate  and  intensify  that  primary  obligation.  When 
Grotius  defined  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  he  coupled 
with  it  the  right  of  the  party  deprived  of  his  property 
to  receive  its  value  from  the  public  treasury.  That 
right  to  compensation,  founded  on  a  **  clear  principle  of 
natural  equity''  (Monongahela  Nav.  Co.  v.  United  States, 
148  U.  S.  312)  has  been  reaffirmed  id  express  terms  in 
most  of  the  state  constitutions,  and  in  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States.  Such  provisions  are  limitations 
upon  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  the  conditions  upon 
which  it  must  be  exercised.  United  States  v.  Jones,  109 
U.  S.  613 ;  Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  &  M.  Canal  Co.,  13 


218  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  108 

Wall.   166;  Hot   Springs  B.   Co.  v.   Williamson,   136 
U.  S.  121. 

Only  upon  condition  that  just  compensation  shall  be 
made  to  the  owner — compensation  just  not  only  to  the 
individual  whose  property  is  taken,  but  to  the  public 
charged  with  its  payment — can  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main be  exercised.  Searl  v.  School  Dist.  No.  2,  133  U.  S. 
553.  The  statute  granting  the  right  of  eminent  domain 
must  provide  for  reasonable  compensation  to  the  owner 
as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  exercise  of  the  right. 
Sweet  V.  Eechel,  159  U.  S.  380.  Even  when  the  Federal 
Government,  in  the  exercise  of  its  supreme  control  over 
the  regulation  of  commerce,  can  take  private  property, 
it  can  do  so  only  on  payment  of  just  compensation. 
Monongahela  Nav.  Co.  v.  United  States,  148  U.  S.  312. 
Whenever  private  property  is  thus  taken  for  public  pur- 
poses it  must  be  after  full  compensation  to  the  owner- 
United  States  V.  Russell,  13  Wall.  623.  There  is  no 
authority  to  enter  upon  the  property  of  an  individual 
or  of  a  state  and  appropriate  it  without  just  compensa- 
tion, under  a  Federal  franchise  to  a  corporation,  state 
or  national,  to  establish  interstate  communication.  Rich- 
mond V.  Southern  Bell  Teleph.  &  Teleg.  Co.,  174  U.  S. 
761.  In  the  absence  of  an  express  provision  requiring 
it,  it  is  not  necessary  that  compensation  be  made  in 
advance  of  the  taking.  The  constitutional  guaranty  that 
private  property  can  not  be  taken  for  public  use  without 
just  compensation  is  satisfied,  provided  provision  is  made 
for  compensation  at  once  certain  and  adequate.  Chero- 
kee Nation  v.  Southern  Kansas  R.  Co.,  135  U.  S.  641; 
Sweet  v.  Rechel,  159  U.  S.  380.  In  condemnation  cases 
the  sovereign  may  authorize  the  taking  of  possession 
prior  to  the  final  adjudication  of  the  amount  of  compen- 
sation and  the  payment  of  the  same.  Backus  v.  Fort 
Street  Union  Depot  Co.,  169  U.  S.  557. 

§109.  What  kind  of  property  may  be  taken.  The 
power  of  eminent  domain  extends  to  all  kinds  of  prop- 


§  110     FEDERAL  POWER  OP  EMINENT  DOMAIN        219 

erty,  real  and  personal,  including  f ranchises,  easements 
and  incorporeal  hereditaments.  Richmond,  F.  &  P.  B. 
Co.  V.  Louisa  R.  Co.,  13  How.  71.  In  West  River  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Dix,  6  How.  507,  it  was  held  that  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  extends  over  all  private  rights  vested 
under  the  government,  including  tiioee  held  by  charter 
or  other  contracts.  In  New  Orleans  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Lou- 
isiana Light  &  Heat  Prod,  and  Mfg.  Co.,  115  U.  S.  650, 
it  was  held  that  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 
and  upon  the  payment  of  just  compensation,  rights  and 
privileges  which  had  become  vested  upon  the  faith  of 
contracts  made  by  the  state  could  be  taken  away.  See 
Stone  V.  Southern  Illinois  &  M.  Bridge  Co.,  206  U.  S. 
267.  A  bridge  possessed  by  an  incorporated  company 
chartered  by  a  state  may  be  condemned  and  taken  as  a 
part  of  a  public  road,  under  the  laws  of  such  state.  West 
River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  6  How.  507.  A  water  supply 
system  may  be  condemned  under  the  power  of  eminent 
domain.  Long  Island  Water  Supply  Co.  v.  Brooklyn, 
166  U.  S.  685.  The  absence  of  a  non-resident  owner  of 
real  estate  from  the  state  in  which  the  property  is  situ- 
ated, can  not,  in  that  way,  prevent  the  exercise  over  it 
of  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  Huling  v.  Kaw  Valley 
R.  and  Improv.  Co.,  130  U.  S.  559.  In  Western  U.  Teleg. 
Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  195  U.*  S  570-574,  the  Court  said : 
"A  railroad's  right  of  way  has,  therefore,  the  substan- 
tiality of  the  fee,  and  it  is  private  property,  even  to  the 
public,  in  all  else  but  an  interest  and  benefit  in  its  use. 
It  can  not  be  invaded  without  the  guilt  of  trespass.  .  .  . 
It  follows  from  these  views  that  the  act  of  1866  does  not 
grant  the  right  to  telegraph  companies  to  enter  upon  and 
occupy  the  rights  of  way  of  railroad  companies,  except 
with  the  consent  of  the  latter,  or  grant  the  power  of 
eminent  domain. ' '  See  also  Spokane  Falls  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Zeigler,  167  U.  S.  65. 

§110.  As  the  question  of  compensation  is  a  judicial 
one,  a  competent  tribunal  necessary.    As  the  question 


220  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  110 

of  compensation  is  a  judicial  one,  it  must  be  determined 
by  some  kind  of  a  tribunal  capable  of  making  a  decision 
after  notice  and  hearing.  In  United  States  v.  Jones^  109 
U.  S.  513,  the  Court  said :  *  *  The  proceeding  for  the  ascer- 
tainment of  the  value  of  the  property  and  consequent 
compensation  to  be  made,  is  merely  an  inquisition  to 
establish  a  particular  fact  as  a  preliminary  to  the  actual 
taking;  and  it  may  be  prosecuted  before  conunissioners 
or  special  boards  or  the  courts,  with  or  without  the  inter- 
vention of  a  jury,  as  the  legislative  power  may  designate. 
All  that  is  required  is  that  it  shall  be  conducted  in  some 
fair  and  just  manner,  with  opportunity  to  the  owners  of 
the  property  to  present  evidence  as  to  its  value,  and  to 
be  heard  thereon.  Whether  the  tribunal  shall  be  created 
directly  by  an  Act  of  Congress,  or  one  already  established 
by  the  states  shall  be  adopted  for  the  occasion,  is  a  mere 
matter  of  legislative  discretion.  ^  ^  In  Bauman  v.  Boss, 
167  U.  S.  593,  the  Court  said:  **By  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States,  the  estimate  of  the  just  compensation 
for  property  taken  for  the  public  use,  under  the  right 
of  eminent  domain,  is  not  required  to  be  made  by  a  jury ; 
but  may  be  intrusted  by  Congress  to  commissioners 
appointed  by  a  court  or  by  the  executive,  or  to  an  inquest 
consisting  of  more  or  fewer  men  than  an  ordinary  jury. 
Curtiss  V.  Georgetown  &  A.  ^ump.  P.  Co.,  6  Cranch  233 ; 
Secombe  v.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  E.  Co.,  23  Wall.  108, 117, 
118;  United  States  v.  Jones,  109  U.  S.  513,  519;  Shoe- 
maker V.  United  States,  147  U.  S.  282,  300,  301;  Long 
Island  Water  Supply  Co.  v.  Brooklyn,  166  U.  S.  685." 
While  the  proceeding  for  the  condemnation  of  land  is  a 
judicial  proceeding,  it  does  not  include  the  right  to  trial 
by  jury  as  a  constitutional  right.  Kohl  v.  United  States, 
91  U.  S.  367.  See  Chappell  v.  United  States,  160  U.  S. 
499.  In  Backus  v.  Fort  Street  Union  Depot  Co.,  169  U. 
S.  568-569,  the  Court  said:  ** Neither  can  it  be  said  that 
there  is  any  fundamental  right  secured  by  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  to  have  the  questions  of  com- 
pensation and  necessity  passed  upon  by  one  and  the  same 


§  HI    FEDERAL  POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN        221 

jury.  In  many  states  the  question  of  necessity  is  never 
submitted  to  the  jury  which  passes  on  the  question  of  com- 
pensation. It  is  either  settled  affirmatively  by  the  legis- 
lature,  or  left  to  the  judgment  of  the  corporation  invested 
with  the  right  to  take  property  by  condemnation.  The 
question  of  necessity. is  not  one  of  a  judicial  character, 
but  rather  one  for  determination  by  the  lawmaking 
branch  of  the  government.  Mississippi  Biver  Boom  Co. 
v.  Patterson,  98  U.  S.  402,  404 ;  United  States  v.  Jones, 
109  U.  S.  513 ;  Cherokee  Nation  v.  Southern  Kansas  Bail- 
way  Company,  supra.  All  that  is  essential  is  that  in  some 
appropriate  way,  before  some  properly  constituted  tri- 
bunal^ inquiry  shall  be  made  as  to  the  amount  of  com- 
pensation, and  when  this  has  been  provided  there  is  that 
due  process  of  law  which  is  required  by  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution. Bauman  v.  Boss,  167  U.  S.  548,  593."  See 
Crozier  v.  Fried.  Krupp  Aktiengesellschaft,  224  U.  S. 
290 ;  District  of  Columbia  v.  Lynchburg  Invest.  Corpora- 
tion, 236  U.  S.  692. 

§  111.  Right  of  Congress  to  legislate  against  laches.  In 
Kankauna  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Green  Bay  &  Miss.  Canal 
Co.,  142  U.  S.  254,  the  Court  said :  *  *  Congress  was  not 
obliged  to  keep  th0  act  of  1875  (admitting  the  liability  of 
the  TTnited  States  to  pay  for  property  taken  for  a  public 
use)  in  operation  forever,  and  reasonable  opportunity 
having  been  afforded  to  the  plaintiffs  in  error  to  obtain 
compensation  for  the  damages  sustained  by  the  con- 
struction of  the  improvement,  we  think  they  must  be 
deemed  to  have  waived  their  right  to  them.  Where  a 
statute  for  the  condemnation  of  lands  provides  a  definite 
and  complete  remedy  for  obtaining  compensation,  this 
remedy  is  exclusive;  the  common  law  remedy  or  pro- 
ceeding is  superseded  by  the  statute,  and  the  owner  must 
pursue  the  course  pointed  out  by  it.  Mills,  Eminent 
Domain,  87,  88.  It  is  true  that  if  the  statutory  remedy 
be  incomplete  or  imperfect,  the  owner  is  not  thereby 
debarred  from  his  common  law  remedy  and  may  recover 


222  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  HI 

his  damages  in  an  action  of  trespass  or  ejectment.  But 
it  does  not  follow  even  from  this  that  he  has  a  right, 
especially  after  acquiescing  in  the  appropriation  of  his 
land  for  a  number  of  years,  to  take  the  law  into  his  own 
hands,  and,  manu  forti,  repossess  himself  of  his  own/* 


PART  II 

DUE  PROCESS  AS  A  LIMITATION 

ON  STATE  POWER 


CHAPTEE  V 

THE   NEW   NATIONAL   CITIZENSHIP 

§  112.  Interstate  citizenship  created  by  Articles  of  Con- 
federation. The  one  particular  in  which  our  first  Federal 
Constitution  rose  above  the  older  Teutonic  leagues,  after 
which  it  wks  patterned,  was  embodied  in  the  new  princi- 
ple of  interstate  citizenship  it  originated.  That  principle 
infused  itself  neither  into  the  constitution  of  the  old  Ger- 
man Empire,  nor  of  Switzerland,  nor  of  Holland.  Sec- 
tion 1  of  Article  IV  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation 
provided  that  **the  better  to  secure  and  perpetuate 
mutual  friendship  and  intercourse  among  the  people  of 
different  states  in  this  Union,  the  free  inhabitants  of 
each  of  these  states,  paupers,  vagabonds,  and  fugitives 
from  justice  excepted,  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges 
and  immunities  of  free  citizens  of  the  several  states.'' 
Apart  from  that  invention  of  an  interstate  citizenship 
American  statesmen  in  their  first  effort  exhibited  no  f elr- 
tility  of  resource  whatever  in  the  making  of  Federal 
constitutions.  The  Articles  of  Confederation  simply  em- 
bodied the  old  story  of  a  federal  league,  with  the  federal 
power  vested  in  a  single  assembly,  without  an  executive 
head  and  without  a  judiciary,  operating  only  on  the  states 
as  corporations. 

§  113.  Developed  by  our  second  Federal  Constitution 
of  1789.  In  the  words  of  Tocqueville,  our  second  Federal 
constitution  of  1789  is  based  *  *  upon  a  wholly  novel  theory 
which  may  be  considered  a  great  discovery  in  modem 
political  science.'^  That  **novel  theory**  embodies  (1)  a 
federal  government  with  the  independent  power  of  taxa- 
tion; (2)  the  division  of  the  federal  head  into  three 

225 

Dae  Proeesfl — ^15 


226  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  113 

departments,  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial;  (3)  the 
division  of  the  federal  legislature  into  two  chambers; 
(4)  a  federal  government  with  delegated  powers,  the 
residuum  of  power  remaining  in  the  states;  (5)  a  federal 
government  operating  not  upon  states  in  their  corporate 
capacity,  but  directly  on  individuals  as  such.  If  the  basic 
principle  last  stated  had  been  carried  at  the  outset, 
to  its  logical  conclusion,  it  would  have  been  settled 
from  the  beginning  that  the  individuals  upon  whom 
the  new  and  unique  creation  acts  are  primarily  its 
own  citizenB.  But  at  the  time  of  the  drafting  of 
our  existing  constitution  the  sense  of  nationality  had 
not  sufficiently  advanced  to  permit  the  statement 
of  the  ultimate  and  inevitable  conclusion,  that  every 
citizen  of  the  Union  is  primarily  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  and  not  merely  of  one  of  the  states  which  com- 
pose  them.  The  thought  of  the  Federal  Convention  of 
1787  upon  this  vitally  important  subject  was  embodied 
in  Section  2  of  Article  IV,  which  provides  that  *  *  the  citi- 
zens of  each  state  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and 
immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  states."  Beyond 
that  point  the  f ramers  of  the  more  perfect  union  were 
not  prepared  to  go.  They  did  not  attempt  to  do  more 
than  establish  an  interstate  citizenship  to  which  they 
imparted  the  qualities  of  uniformity  and  equality  by 
denying  to  every  state  the  right  to  discriminate  in  favor 
of  its  own  citizens  as  against  those  of  any  other  state. 
In  the  absence  of  any  positive  assertion  by  federal 
authority  of  any  such  thing  as  &  primary  citizenship  of 
the  United  States  as  such,  thore  was  really  no  substan- 
tial basis  upon  which  to  maintain  its  existence.  The 
better  view  is  that  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  14th 
Amendment  a  man  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
only  by  virtue  of  his  citizenship  in  one  of  the  states  com- 
posing the  Union.  If  any  such  thing  as  a  federal  or 
national  citizenship  then  existed  at  all,  it  was  nothing 
more  than  a  secondary  and  dependent  relation » 


§  114  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSHIP  227 

§  114.  The  grand  inquest  in  the  Dred  Soott  Case.    An 

account  has  been  given  already  of  the  grand  inquest  held 
in  the  Dred  Scott  Case,  19  How.  393,  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain whether  or  no  such  a  thing  existed  as  a  citizenship 
of  the  United  States,  defined  as  such  by  its  Constitution 
and  laws,  independent  of  state  citizenship.  The  most 
earnest  seeker  for  such  a  citizenship  was  Mr.  Justice 
Curtis,  who  was  in  the  highest  degree  qualified  to  ascer- 
tain it,  if  it  existed  at  all.  His  conclusion  was  that  there 
was  no  such  thing,  at  that  time,  as  a  citizenship  of  the 
United  States,  as  a  substantive  thing  independent  of 
state  citizenship.  He  said:  ''I  can  find  nothing  in  the 
Constitution,  which,  propria  vigore,  deprives  of  their  cit- 
izenship any  class  of  persons  who  were  citizens  of  the 
United  States  at  the  time  of  its  adoption,  or  who  should 
be  native  born  citizens  of  any  state  after  its  adoption; 
nor  any  power  enabling  Congress  to  disfranchise  persons 
bom  on  the  soil  of  any  state,  and  entitled  to  citizenship 
of  such  state  by  its  constitution  and  laws.  And  my 
opinions  that,  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  every  free  person  bom  on  the  soil  of  a  state,  who 
is  a  citizen  of  that  state  by  force  of  its  constitution  or 
laws,  is  also  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  That 
the  Constitution  itself  has  defined  citizenship  of  the 
United  States  by  declaring  what  persons,  bom  within  the 
several  states,  shall  or  shall  not  be  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  will  not  be  pretended.  It  contains  no  such  dec- 
laration.^^ Even  if  the  learned  Justice  was  right  in  his 
assumption  that  Sandf  ord  's  plea  to  the  jurisdiction  was 
baseless,  and  that  Scott  had  the  right  to  sue  because 
*  *  every  such  citizen,  reisiding  in  any  state,  has  the  right  to 
sue,  and  is  liable  to  be  sued  in  the  federal  courts,  as  a  citi- 
zen of  that  state  in  which  he  resides, '^  it  appears  that 
such  citizenship  of  the  United  States  as  Scott  was  thus 
supposed  to  possess  was  nothing  more  than  a  secondary 
and  dependent  relation  resulting  from  his  state  citizen- 
ship. 


228  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  115 

§  115.  Section  1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  and  its 
scope.  To  fill  the  vacuum  disclosed  by  the  grand  inquest 
held  in  the  Dred  Scott  Case,  19  How.  393,  was  adopted 
the  first  section  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  which, 
without  making  any  direct  reference  to  the  question  of 
race  at  all,  contains  the  first  positive  definition  ever  given 
of  citizenship  of  the  United  States  as  a  primary  and  sub- 
stantive thing,  independent  of  state  citizenship.  It  pro- 
vides that  **A41  persons  bom  or  naturalized  in  the  United 
States,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state  wherein  they 
reside.  No  state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which 
shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  nor  shall  any  state  deprive  any  per- 
son of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of 
law;  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.*^  An  account  has  hereto- 
fore been  given  of  the  historical  side  of  the  constitutional 
revolution  through  which  the  creation  of  the  new  citizen- 
ship shifted  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  composite  struc- 
ture, partly  national  and  partly  federal,  from  the  states 
to  the  nation,  thus  nationalizing  for  the  first  time  the 
entire  sphere  of  civil  liberty.  It  was  then  ascertained 
that  as  the  Amendment  made  no  direct  reference  to 
the  question  of  race,  it  was  severed  from  its  history  and 
given  a  construction  as  broad  as  the  unqualified  terms 
that  appear  upon  its  face,  thus  settling  the  fact  that  the 
new  national  citizenship  was  not  created  for  the  exclusive 
benefit  of  the  colored  race,  not  limited  to  their  protection. 

§  116.  The  new  citizenship  as  defined  in  the  Slaughter 
House  Cases.  The  sequel  of  the  Dred  Scott  Case,  19 
How.  393,  is  to  be  found  in  the  Slaughter  House  Cases 
(1872),  16  Wall.  36,  in  which  another  grand  inquest  was 
held  in  order  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  new  citizen- 
ship brought  into  existence  by  Section  1  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The  case  for  the  plaintiffs  in  error  was 
presented  in  a  far-reaching  argument  by  the  Hon.  John 


§  116  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSHIP  229 

A.  Campbell,  who  had  sat  as  one  of  the  Justices  in  the 
Dred  Scott  Case.  The  Court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Miller,  declared :  ( 1 )  *  *  The  first  section  of  the  Four- 
teenth Article,  to  which  our  attention  is  more  specially 
invited,  opens  with  a  definition  of  citizenship — ^not  only 
citizenship  of  the  United  States,  but  citizenship  of  the 
states.  No  such  definition  was  previously  found  in  the 
Constitution,  nor  had  any  attempt  been  made  to  define 
it  by  Act  of  Congress.  It  had  been  the  occasion  of 
much  discussion  in  the  courts,  by  the  executive  depart- 
ments and  in  the  public  journals.  It  had  been  said  by 
eminent  judges  that  no  man  was  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  except  as  he  was  a  citizen  of  one  of  the  states 
composing  the  Union.  Those,  therefore,  who  had  been 
bom  and  resided  always  in  the  District  of  Columbia 
or  in  the  territories,  though  within  the  United  States, 
were  not  citizens.  Whether  this  proposition  was  sound 
or  not,  had  never  been  judicially  decided.  But  it  had 
been  held  by  this  Court,  in  the  celebrated  Dred  Scott 
Case,  only  a  few  y^ars  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil 
War,  that  a  man  of  African  descent,  whether  a  slave  or 
not,  was  not  and  could  not  be  a  citizen  of  a  state  or  of  the 
United  States.  This  decision,  while  it  met  with  the  con- 
demnation of  some  of  the  ablest  statesmen  and  consti- 
tutional lawyers  of  the  country,  had  never  been  over- 
ruled; and  if  it  was  to  be  accepted  as  a  constitutional 
limitation  of  the  right  of  citizenship,  then  all  the  negro 
race  who  had  recently  been  made  freemen  were  still,  not 
only  not  citizens,  but  were  incapable  of  becoming  so  by 
anything  short  of  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution;'' 
(2)  '*it  (Section  1  of  Article  XIV)  declares  that  persons 
may  be  citizens  of  the  United  States  without  regard  to 
their  citizenship  in  a  particular  state,  and  it  overturns 
the  Dred  Scott  decision  by  making  all  persons  born  within 
the  United  States  and  subject  to  its  jurisdiction  citizens 
of  the  United  States.  That  its  main  purpose  was  to 
establish  the  citizenship  of  the  negro  can  admit  of  no 
doubt;''  (3)  **the  distinction  between  citizenship  of  the 


230  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  116 

United  States  and  citizenship  of  a  state  is  clearly  rec- 
ognized and  established.  Not  only  may  a  man  be  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  without  being  a  citizen  of  a  state, 
but  an  important  element  is  necessary  to  convert  the 
former  into  the  latter.  He  must  reside  within  the  state 
to  make  him  a  citizen  of  it,  but  it  is  only  necessary  that 
he  should  be  bom  or  naturalized  in  the  United  States 
to  be  a  citizen  of  the  Union ;*^  (4)  ** there  is  a  citizenship 
of  the  United  States  and  a  citizenship  of  a  state,  which 
are  distinct  from  each  other,  and  which  depend  upon 
different  characteristics  or  circumstances  in  the  indi- 
vidual;^' (5)  ** privileges  and  inmiunities  of  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  are  placed  by  this  clause  under  the 
protection  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  and  that  tiie  lat- 
ter, whatever  they  may  be,  are  not  intended  to  have  any 
additional  protection  by  this  paragraph  of  the  Amend- 
ment. If  then  there  is  a  difference  between  the  privileges 
and  immunities  belong  to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
as  such,  the  latter  must  rest  for  their  security  and  pro- 
tection where  they  have  heretofore  rested,  for  they  are 
not  embraced  in  this  paragraph  of  the  Amendment;'* 
(6)  ** having  shown  that  the  privileges  and  immunities 
relied  on  in  the  argument  are  those  which  belong  to  citi- 
zens of  the  states  as  such,  and  that  they  are  left  to  the 
state  governments  for  security  and  protection,  and  not 
by  this  article  placed  under  the  special  care  of  the  Fed- 
eral Government,  we  may  hold  ourselves  excused  from 
defining  the  privileges  and  inmiunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  which  no  state  can  abridge,  until  some 
case  involving  these  privileges  make  it  necessary  to  do 
so.  But  lest  it  should  be  said  that  no  such  privileges 
and  immunities  are  to  be  found  if  those  we  have  been 
considering  are  excluded,  we  venture  to  suggest  some 
which  owe  their  existence  to  the  Federal  Government, 
its  national  character,  its  Constitution,  or  its  laws.  One 
of  these  is  well  described  in  the  case  of  Crandall  v.  Ne- 
vada, 6  Wall.  36.  It  is  said  to  be  the  right  of  tiie  citizen 
of  this  great  country,  protected  by  implied  guaranties 


§  117  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSfflP  231 

of  its  Constitution,  Ho  come  to  the  seat  of  government 
to  assert  any  claim  he  may  have  upon  that  government,  to 
transact  any  business  he  may  have  with  it,  to  seek  its  pro- 
tection, to  share  its  offices,  to  engage  in  administering 
its  functions.  He  has  the  right  to  free  access  to  its  sea- 
ports, through  which  all  operations  of  foreign  commerce 
are  conducted,  to  the  sub-treasuries,  land  offices,  and 
courts  of  justice  in  the  several  states.'  .  .  .  Another 
privilege  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  is  to  demand  the 
care  and  protection  of  the  Federal  Government  over  his 
life,  liberty,  and  property  when  on  the  high  seas  or  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  foreign  government.  Of  this  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  nor  that  the  right  depends  upon  his  char- 
acter as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  The  right  to 
peaceably  assemble  and  petition  for  redress  of  griev- 
ances, the  privileges  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  are 
rights  of  the  citizen  guaranteed  by  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution. The  right  to  use  the  navigable  waters  of  the 
United  States,  however  they  may  penetrate  the  territory 
of  the  several  states,  and  all  rights  secured  to  our  citizens 
by  treaties  with  foreign  nations,  are  dependent  upon  citi- 
zenship of  the  United  States,  and  not  citizenship  of  the 
state/' 

§  117.  Question  of  birth  as  settled  in  U.  S.  v.  Wong 
Kim  Ark.  Twenty-six  years  passed  by  before  the  orig- 
inal definition  of  the  new  citizenship  given  in  the  Slaugh- 
ter House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36  (1872),  was  rounded  out 
in  United  States  v.  Wong  Kim  Ark,  169  U.  S.  649  (1898) 
by  an  exposition  of  the  phrase,  **A11  persons  bom  or 
naturalized  in  the  United  States,  and  subject  to  the  juris- 
diction thereof.^'  Where  the  parents  of  a  child  bom  in 
the  United  States  were  citizens,  there  could  be  no  diffi- 
culty as  to  its  nationality ;  but  the  status  of  a  child  bom 
in  the  United  States  of  Indian,  or  of  Chinese,  or  other 
alien  parentage  was  quite  another  matter.  In  the  case 
of  Elk  V.  Wilkins,  112  U.  S.  94,  98,  it  was  held  that  an 
Indian  bom  a  member  of  one  of  the  Indian  tribes  still 


232  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  117 

recognized  as  snch — although  he  had  voluntarily  sepa- 
rated himself  from  his  tribe  and  taken  up  his  residence 
among  the  white  people,  but  without  being  naturalized 
or  taxed — ^was  born  ** subject  to  the  jurisdiction^*  of  his 
tribe.  Therefore  he  was  not  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  because  not  bom  ''subject  to  the  jurisdiction'* 
thereof.  Such  was  the  prelude  to  the  great  case  in  which 
was  settled  the  legal  status  of  all  persons  bom  in  the 
United  States  of  alien  parentage.  In  the  case  of  Wong 
Kim  Ark  it  was  held  that  a  child  bom  in  the  United 
States  of  parents  of  Chinese  descent — ^who  at  the  time  of 
his  birth  are  subjects  of  the  Emperor  of  China,  but  have 
a  permanent  domicile  and  residence  in  this  country,  and 
are  carrying  on  business  here,  and  not  employed  in  any 
diplomatic  or  official  capacity  under  the  Emperor  of 
China — becomes  at  the  time  of  his  birth  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  by  virtue  of  the  first  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  Here  the  rule  of  the  civil  law  as  to 
the  allegiance  of  the  parents  was  set  aside  in  favor  of 
the  common  law  rule  of  locality  of  birth,  under  which  it 
has  been  long  held  that  every  child  bom  in  England  of 
alien  parents  is  a  natural  bom  subject,  unless  the  child 
of  a  diplomatic  representative  of  a  foreign  state,  or  of 
an  alien  enemy  in  hostile  occupation  of  the  place  where 
the  child  was  born.  In  tracing  that  principle,  with  its 
qualifications,  back  to  the  leading  case  known  as  Calvin 's 
Case,  7  Co.  Rep.  1,  or  the  case  of  the  Postnati,  decided 
in  1608,  the  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Gray, 
said  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  must  be 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  common  law.  The  inter- 
pretation of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is 
necessarily  influenced  by  the  fact  that  its  provisions  are 
framed  in  the  language  of  the  English  common  law,  and 
are  to  be  read  in  the  light  of  its  history.  124  U.  S.  478. 
**The  fundamental  principle  of  the  common  law  with 
regard  to  English  nationality  was  birtii  within  the  alle- 
giance, also  called  Migealty,*  *  obedience,'  *  faith,*  or 
*  power*  of  the  King.    The  principle  embraced  all  persons 


§  118  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSHIP  233 

bom  within  the  King's  allegiance  and  subject  to  his  pro- 
tection.^' See  Keck  v.  United  States,  172  U.  S.  446, 
where  it  is  said:  ''These  conclusions  arising  from  a 
consideration  of  the  text  of  the  statute  are  rendered  yet 
clearer  by  taking  into  view  the  definite  legal  meaning 
of  the  word  smuggling.  That  term  had  a  well  understood 
import  at  common  law,  and,  in  the  absence  of  a  particu- 
larized definition  of  its  significance  in  the  statute  creating 
it,  resort  may  be  had  to  the  common  law  for  the  purpose 
of  arriving  at  the  meaning  of  the  word.  Sweringen  v. 
United  States,  161 U.  S.  446;  United  States  v.  Wong  Kim 
Ark,  169  U.S.  649.'' 

§  118.  Aliens,  resident  and  nonresident.  While  aliens 
are  undoubtedly  entitled  to  due  process,  the  distinction 
must  be  clearly  drawn  between  such  as  are  resident  and 
such  as  are  nonresident.  Every  sovereign  state  has  an 
inherent  right  to  forbid  the  entrance  of  foreigners  within 
its  limits,  or  to  admit  them  only  upon  such  conditions 
as  its  sovereign  will  may  impose.  As  the  exercise  of 
that  power  belongs  to  the  political  department  of  the 
government.  Congress  may  so  legislate  as^to  provide  for 
the  exclusion  of  aliens,  fixing  the  conditions  on  which 
they  may  be  admitted,  and  the  regulations  under  which 
they  may  be  deported  in  the  event  they  have  entered 
contrary  to  law.  It  may  also  entrust  the  enforcement 
of  such  regulations  to  executive  oflScers.  In  United  States 
ex  rel.  Turner  v.  Williams,  194  U.  S.  279,  the  Court  said : 
*  *  It  is  contended  that  the  act  of  Maroh  3, 1903,  is  uncon- 
stitutional because  in  contravention  of  the  1st,  5th  and 
6th  articles  of  amendment  of  the  Constitution,  and  of 
1  of  article  3  of  that  instrument;  and  because  no  power 
'is  delegated  by  the  Constitution  to  the  general  govern- 
ment over  alien  friends  with  reference  to  their  admission 
into  the  United  States  or  otherwise,  or  over  the  beliefs 
of  citizens,  denizens,  sojourners,  or  aliens,  or  over  the 
freedom  of  speech  or  of  the  press. '  Bepeated  decisions 
of  this  court  have  determined  that  Congress  has  the 


234  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  118 

power  to  exclude  aliens  from  the  United  States ;  to  pre- 
scribe the  terms  and  conditions  on  which  they  may  come 
in ;  to  establish  regulations  for  sending  out  of  the  country 
such  aliens  as  have  entered  in  violation  of  law,  and  to 
commit  the  enforcement  of  such  conditions  and  regula- 
tions to  executive  officers;  that  the  deportation  of  an 
alien  who  is  found  to  be  here  in  violation  of  law  is  not 
a  deprivation  of  liberty  without  due  process  of  law,  and 
that  the  provisions  of  the  constitution  securing  the  right 
of  trial  by  jury  have  no  application.  Chae  Chan  Ping 
v.  United  States,  130  U,  S.  581 ;  Nishimura  EMu  v.  United 
States,  142  U.  S.  651 ;  Fong  Yue  Ting  v.  United  States, 
149  U.  S.  698;  Lem  Moon  Sing  v.  United  States,  158 
U.  S.  538;  Wong  Wing  v.  United  States,  163  U.  S.  228; 
Fok  Yung  Yo  v.  United  States,  185  U.  S,  296 ;  Japanese 
Immigration  Case,  189  U.  S.  86 ;  Chin  Bak  Kan  v.  United 
States,  186  U.  S.  193 ;  United  States  v.  Sing  Tuck,  194 
U.  S.  161/*  Thus  it  seems  to  be  settled  that  the  order 
of  an  executive  officer  excluding  aliens,  if  made  in  accord- 
ance with  statutory  authority,  is  necessarily  due  process. 
In  the  cases  of  Nishimura  Ekiu  v.  United  States,  and 
Fong  Yue  Ting  v.  United  States,  just  cited,  it  was  held 
that  though  Congress  may,  if  it  pleases,  authorize  the 
courts  to  investigate  and  ascertain  the  facts  upon  which 
the  right  of  an  alien  to  land  is  made  by  the  statutes  to 
depend,  still  it  may  conunit  the  final  determination  of 
such  facts  to  an  administrative  officer.  In  that  event 
his  order  or  determination  is  due  process,  and  no  other 
tribunal,  not  expressly  authorized  by  law  to  do  so,  has 
the  jurisdiction  to  examine  the  evidence  upon  which  he 
acted  or  to  question  its  sufficiency.  It  was  said,  how- 
ever, in  a  later  case  that  **This  court  has  never  held, 
nor  must  we  now  be  understood  as  holding,  that  admin- 
istrative officers,  when  executing  the  provisions  of  a  stat- 
ute involving  the  liberty  of  persons,  may  disregard  the 
fundamental  principles  that  inhere  in  *due  process  of 
law'  as  understood  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the 
constitution.    One  of  these  principles  is  that  no  x>er8on 


§  118  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSHIP  235 

shall  be  deprived  of  his  Uberty  without  opportunity  at 
some  time  to  be  heard  before  such  oflScers  in.  respect  of 
the  matters  upon  which  that  liberty  depends — ^not  neces- 
sarily an  opportunity  upon  a  regular,  set  occasion,  and 
according  to  the  forms  of  judicial  procedure,  but  one 
that  will  secure  the  prompt,  vigorous  action  contem- 
plated by  Congress,  and  as  tiie  same  time  be  appropriate 
to  the  nature  of  the  case  upon  which  officers  are  required 
to  act.*'  Japanese  Immigrant  Case,- 189  U.  S.  86.  See 
also  TJ.  S.  V.  Sing  Tuck,  194  U.  S.  161 ;  and  U.  S.  v.  Ju 
Toy,  198  U.  S.  253,  specially  dissenting  opinions  in  that 
case  of  Justices  Brewer  and  Peckham, 

An  yet,  no  matter  how  absolute  or  arbitrary  the  right 
of  exclusion  may  be,  after  an  alien  has  once  been  admit- 
ted according  to  law,  he  becomes  entitled  at  once  to  the 
protection  due  to  a  native  or  naturalized  citizen  of  the 
country,  to  whom  belongs  all  the  guaranties  of  life,  lib- 
erty and  property  secured  by  the  constitution  to  all  per- 
sons within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States.  He 
is  entitled  to  the  regular  course  of  judicial  proceedings 
accorded  to  all  other  citizens  when  his  life  and  liberty 
are  involved;  he  can  not  be  deprived  of  either  upon  a 
mere  executive  hearing.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the 
exclusion  laws  can  not  be  applied  either  to  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  nor  to  any  other  person  who  is  not 
in  strictness  an  alien,  although  he  may  not  be  a  full  citi- 
zen. Such  equality  of  right  is  not  to  be  acquired,  how- 
ever, by  a  clandestine  entry  and  residence  for  a  period 
too  brief  to  make  the  alien  a  part  of  the  population.  The 
act  of  Congress  fixing  the  period  of  one  year  after  the 
landing  of  such  an  alien,  as  the  time  within  which  he 
may  be  deported  on  the  order  of  the  appropriate  execu- 
tive oflBcer,  is  constitutional.  While  temporary  confine- 
ment or  detention  may  be  prescribed  as  a  means  of  giving 
effect  to  the  exclusion  acts,  an  infamous  punishment  can 
not  be  inflicted  without  a  judicial  trial  to  fix  the  guilt 
of  the  accused.  Congress  can  not  declare  that  the  offense 
of  unlawful  residence  by  an  alien  is  an  infamous  crime 


236  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  118 

punishable  by  imprisonment  or  at  hard  labor  or  by  con- 
fiscation of  property  upon  a  summary  hearing.  As  to 
the  right  to  determine  the  status  of  a  person  entering 
the  country,  it  was  held  in  1895,  in  the  case  of  an  admitted 
alien,  that,  under  the  act  of  Congress  of  August  18, 1894, 
the  holding  of  the  immigration  conmiissioner  was  conclu- 
sive of  the  alien  *s  right  to  enter  **by  virtue  of  some  law 
or  treaty."  Three  years  later  the  decision  of  an  admin- 
istrative officer  excluding  an  alien  was  reversed  on  habeas 
corpus  when  the  facts  appeared  by  the  government's 
admission  that  the  excluded  person  was  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States.  When  as  a  consequence  of  that  decision 
many  claims  of  citizenship  were  set  up  by  excluded  aliens 
in  order  to  oust  the  jurisdiction  of  the  immigration 
officer,  the  Supreme  Court  in  1902  held  (189  U.  S.  86)  that 
the  mere  claim  of  citizenship  did  not  affect  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  immigration  officer ;  that  *  *  the  facts  on  which 
such  claim  is  rested  must  be  made  to  appear.*'  The 
equality  acquired  by  a  resident  alien,  except  as  to  his 
property  remaining  here,  is  lost  by  a  departure  from  the 
country  even  for  a  temporary  purpose.  When  he  at- 
tempts to  return,  after  such  an  absence,  he  is  subject  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  administrative  official  to  the  same 
extent  as  upon  his  original  entry.  *  *  He  can  not  by  reason 
merely  of  his  domicil  in  the  United  States  for  purposes  of 
business  demand  that  his  claim  to  re-enter  this  country  by 
virtue  of  some  statute  or  treaty  shall  be  determined  ulti- 
mately, if  not  in  the  first  instance,  by  the  courts  of  the 
United  States,  rather  than  exclusively  and  finally,  in 
every  instance,  by  executive  officers  charged  by  an  act  of 
Congress  with  the  duty  of  executing  the  will  of  the  i>oliti- 
cal  department  of  the  government  in  respect  of  a  matter 
wholly  political  in  its  character.'*  Lem  Moon  Sing  v. 
U.  S.,  158  U.  S.  538,  548.  In  a  case  of  Chin  Bak  Kan 
v.  United  States,  186  U.  S.  193,  just  cited,  the  court 
said:  *'It  is  impossible  for  us  to  hold  that  it  is  not  compe- 
tent for  Congress  to  empower  a  United  States  commis- 
sioner to  determine  the  various  facts  on  which  citizenship 


§  119  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSHIP  237 

depends;*'  and  two  years  later  it  was  held  that  when  a 
claim  to  citizenship  is  decided  adversity  by  an  immigra- 
tion inspector  there  is  no  immediate  right  of  recourse  to 
the  courts;  that  an  appeal,  according  to  the  procedure 
defined  by  the  statute,  must  first  be  taken  to  the  secretary 
of  the  treasury,  as  an  indispensable  prerequisite  of  an 
appeal  to  the  courts  by  habeas  corpus.  (U.  S.  v.  Sing 
Tuck,  194  U.  S.  161.)  When  in  1905  a  person  claim- 
ing citizenship  was  denied  the  right  of  entry  by  the 
collector  of  the  port  of  San  Francisco,  and  an  appeal 
was  taken  to  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  by 
whom  the  ruling  was  confirmed,  an  application  was  made 
for  a  habeas  corpus  to  the  District  Court  which  held, 
** seemingly  on  new  evidence,*'  that  the  applicant  was  a 
native  bom  citizen  of  the  United  States.  That  decision 
was  reversed  by  the  Supreme  Court  upon  the  ground 
that  the  District  Court  should  have  disposed  of  the  ques- 
tion presented  by  the  writ  without  the  hearing  of  new 
evidence  as  to  citizenship,  as  there  was  no  proof  tend- 
ing to  show  an  abuse  of  discretion  on  the  part  of  the 
administrative  officer,  in  the  absence  of  which  the  decision 
of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor  was  conclusive, 
even  upon  the  question  of  citizenship.  The  Court  speak- 
ing through  Mr.  Justice  Holmes  said:  **If,  for  the 
purpose  of  argument,  we  assume  that  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment applies  to  him,  and  that  to  deny  entrance  to  a 
citizen  is  to  deprive  him  of  liberty,  we  nevertheless  are 
of  opinion  that  with  regard  to  him,  due  process  of  law 
does  not  require  judicial  trial.  That  is  the  result  of  the 
cases  which  we  have  cited,  and  the  almost  necessary 
result  of  the  power  of  Congress  to  pass  exclusion  laws. '  * 
U.  S-  V.  Ju  Toy,  198  U.  S.  253. 

§  119.  Right  to  due  process  in  unincorporated  territory. 

After  commenting  in  another  work,  upon  the  case  of 
Fleming  v.  Page,  9  How.  603,  the  author  said:  "By  that 
time  (1850)  the  following  propositions  had  become  firmly 
settled  in  the  constitutional  law  of  this  country:  (1)  That 


238  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  119 

when  territory  is  subdued  by  the  axmies  of  the  United 
States,  it  passes  under  the  despotic  power  of  the  Presi- 
dent, as  commander-in-chief,  who,  in  the  exercise  of  that 
power,  is  unrestrained  by  the  Constitution  and  laws  of 
the  United  States;  (2)  that  when  territory  is  thus 
acquired  by  conquest,  its  holding  is  a  mere  military  occu- 
pation until,  by  a  treaty  of  peace,  the  acquisition  is 
confirmed;  (3)  that  when  the  new  acquisition  passes  into 
a  territorial  condition,  the  despotic  war  power  vested  in 
the  President,  as  conunander-in-chief,  is  superseded  by 
the  power  of  Congress,  which  is  equally  unlimited,  except 
as  to  such  constitutional  *  provisions  as  go  to  the  very 
root  of  the  power  of  Congress  to  act  at  all,  irrespective 
of  time  or  place;'  (4)  that  until  the  ceded  territory  is 
admitted  as  a  state,  it  is  not  drawn  within  the  circle  of 
constitutional  guarantees  which  apply  in  their  entirety  to 
states  alone/'  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Am,  Const.,  p. 
387,  Prior  to  incorporation  by  act  of  Congress,  ''the 
territory  is  to  be  governed  under  the  power  existing  in 
Congress  to  make  laws  for  such  territories,  and  subject 
to  such  constitutional  restrictions  upon  the  powers  of 
that  body  as  are  applicable  to  the  situation.''  So  long 
as  held  in  that  way  such  territory  is  subject  to  the  will 
of  Congress  as  the  supreme  law  subject  only  to  certain 
''fundamental  limitations  in  favor  of  personal  rights," 
imbedded  rather  in  the  spirit  than  the  letter  of  the  Con- 
stitution. While  bills  of  attainder  and  ex  post  facto  laws 
could  not  be  applied  by  Congress  to  such  territory  it 
has  been  held  that  the  right  to  a  jury  trial,  and  the  right 
to  indictment  by  a  grand  jury,  as  provided  for  in  the 
Fifth  and  Sixth  Articles  of  Amendment,  are  not  included 
among  the  rights  to  which  the  inhabitants  of  unincorpo- 
rated territory  are  entitled.  Downes  v.  Bidwell,  182  U.  S. 
244.  Are  the  inhabitants  of  such  unincorporated  territory 
entitled,  as  a  fundamental  right,  to  due  process  of  lawf 
That  question  was  answered  in  the  affirmative  in  Ochoa  v. 
Hernandez,  230  U.  S.  139,  where  the  Court,  speaking 
through  Mr.  Justice  Pitney,  said:  "The  court  below  held 


§  120  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSHIP  239 

(5  Porto  Bico  Fed.  Bep.  463)  that,  assuming  General 
Henry  possessed  all  the  legislative  power  that  is  pos- 
sessed by  Congress  under  the  Constitution,  he  was  still 
necessarily  subject  (as  Congress  would  be)  to  the  due 
process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.  And  since 
his  judicial  order,  because  of  its  retroactive  clause,  by  its 
terms  covered  the  present  case,  where  the  real  owners  of 
the  land  were  infants  and  unable  to  protect  themselves, 
and  where  they  still  had,  under  the  mortgage  law  as  it 
stood,  nearly  twelve  years  in  which  to  attain  maturity  and 
contest  the  possession  and  right  of  Morales,  and  since 
the  order  shortened  the  period  of  limitation  to  six  years, 
which  period  in  their  case  had  already  elapsed,  the  order 
at  the  same  time  contained  no  provision  for  saving  exist- 
ing rights  or  giving  to  them  or  to  others  in  like  situation 
any  opportunity  to  assert  their  rights, — ^it  was  the  same 
in  effect  as  taking  their  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  Under  all  the  circumstances  we  deem  it  clear 
that  the  governor  was  without  authority  from  the  Presi- 
dent to  make  any  order,  judicial  in  its  nature,  that  would 
have  the  effect  of  depriving  any  person  of  his  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  .  .  .  Without,  the  guaranty 
of  *due  process'  the  right  of  private  property  can  not  be 
said  to  exist,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  known  to  our 
laws.  The  principle,  known  to  the  common  law  before 
Magna  Carta,  was  embodied  in  that  Charter  (2  Coke, 
Inst.  45,  50),  and  has  been  recognized  since  the  Bevolu- 
tion  as  among  the  safest  foundations  of  our  institutions. 
Whatever  else  may  be  uncertain  about  the  definition  of 
the  term  *due  process  of  law,'  all  authorities  agree  that 
it  inhibits  the  taking  of  one  man's  property  and  giving 
it  to  another,  contrary  to  settled  usages  and  modes  of 
procedure,  and  without  notice  or  an  opportunity  for  a 
hearing. ' ' 

§  120.  Right  to  due  process  in  incorporated  territory. 

After  territory  has  been  **  incorporated  into  the  United 
States,"  it  is  subject  to  its  Constitution,  and  its  inhabi- 


240  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  120 

tants  are  then  entitled  to  all  the  guaranties  of  life,  liberty, 
and  property  contained  in  the  national  bill  of  rights 
embodied  in  the  first  eight  articles  of  Amendment.  Such 
incorporation  may  result  from  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
of  session  through  which  the  United  States  acquires  it 
from  the  sovereign  ceding  it,  and  from  the  legislation 
of  Congress  enacted  after  its  acquisition.  Subject  to 
the  rights  thus  acquired  Congress  must  legislate  for  all 
the  territories,  including  Alaska  and  Hawaii  Like 
restrictions  rest  upon  Congress  when  legislating  for  all 
places  acquired  by  the  United  States  within  the  several 
states  for  forts,  arsenals,  and  the  like,  and  for  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia.  In  Callan  v.  Wilson,  127  U.  S.  540,  the 
Court  said :  * '  There  is  nothing  in  the  history  of  the  Con- 
stitution or  of  the  original  amendments,  to  justify  the 
assertion  that  the  people  of  this  District  (of  Columbia) 
may  be  lawfully  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  any  of  the 
constitutional  guaranties  of  life,  liberty,  and  property — 
especially  of  the  privilege  of  trial  by  jury  in  criminal 
cases. ' '  It  was  held  however  in  Capital  Traction  Co.  v. 
Hof,  174  U.  S.  1,  that  a  trial  by  a  jury  of  twelve  men 
before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  having  been  unknown  in 
England  or  America  before  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, is  not  a  trial  by  jury  within  the  Seventh  Article 
of  Amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

§  121.  A  corporation  a  person  within  the  meaning  of 
Section  1.  The  Fifth  as  well  as  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment uses  the  word  ** person'*  to  describe  those  who  are 
entitled  to  the  protection  of  due  process  of  law,  that  term 
embracing  all  within  the  territory  of  the  United  States, 
regardless  of  differences  of  nationality,  race  or  color. 
Wong  Wing  v.  U.  S.,  163  U.  S.  236;  Tick  Wo  v.  Hopkins, 
118  U.  S.  369.  Not  until  the  case  of  Santa  Clara  Co.  v. 
Southern  Pacific  Railroad,  118  U.  S.  394  (1886)  was  it 
definitely  held  for  the  first  time  that  a  corporation  is  a 
person  within  the  meaning  of  the  section  in  question. 
Then  followed  the  cases  of  Minn.  By.  Co.  v.  Beckwith,  129 


§  122  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSHIP  241 

U.  S.  26 ;  Covington  &  L,  Tump.  Boad  Co.  v.  Sandf  ord, 
164  U.  S.  578 ;  and  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S.  466,  in  which 
''it  is  now  settled  that  corporations  are  persons  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  provisions  forbidding 
the  deprivation  of  property  without  due  process  of  law 
as  well  as  the  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. '  * 
Thus  it  was  settled  that  corporations  are  ''persons"  but 
not  citizens  entitled  to  the  "privileges  or  immunities 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States."  As  the  Santa  Clara 
case  involved  a  domestic  corporation  it  was  afterwards 
held  in  Philadelphia  Fire  Ass^n.  v.  New  York,  119  U.  S. 
110,  that  a  state  could  prescribe  whatever  condition  it 
saw  fit  for  permitting  a  foreign  insurance  company  to 
transact  business  within  its  limits  even  to  the  extent  of 
total  exclusion  although  it  could  not  exclude  an  indi- 
vidual.  Such  power  of  exclusion  can  not  be  applied, 
however,  to  corporations  engaged  in  interstate  com- 
merce, or  to  agencies  of  the  General  Government  ' '  The 
only  limitation  upon  this  power  of  the  state  to  exclude 
a  foreign  corporation  from  doing  business  within  its 
limits,  or  hiring  officers  for  that  purpose,  or  to  exact  con- 
ditions for  allowing  the  corporation  to  do  business  or 
hire  officers  there,  arises  where  the  corporation  is  in  the 
employ  of  the  Federal  Government,  or  where  its  business 
is  strictly  commerce,  interstate  or  foreign.  The  control 
of  such  commerce,  being  in  the  Federal  Government,  is 
not  to  be  restricted  by  state  authority.  * ' 

§  122.  Two  bulwarks  against  the  unlawful  or  unequal 
exercise  of  state  power.  Due  consideration  has  now 
been  given  to  the  creative  part  of  Section  1,  which  pro- 
vides that  "All  persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the  United 
States,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are 
citizens  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state  wherein 
they  reside.''  What  remains  is  the  protective  part  which 
declares  that  "No  state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law 
which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States ;  nor  shall  any  state  deprive 

Due  Process — 16 


242  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  122 

any  person  of  life,  Uberty  or  property ,  without  due 
process  of  law ;  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  juris- 
diction the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. ' '  As  explained 
heretofore  the  final  clause  guaranteeing  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  is  an  American  invention  that 
originated  with  the  framers  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, and  therefore  stands  entirely  apart  from  the  due 
process  clause  which  came  to  us  from  the  mother  country. 
The  equal  protection  clause  will  therefore  be  made  the 
subject  of  Part  III,  where  it  will  be  treated  entirely  apart 
from  the  due  process  clause,  which  is  the  subject  of  Part 
n.  The  two  clauses  have,  however,  one  motive  in  com- 
mon that  must  never  for  a  moment  be  lost  sight  of.  Prior 
to  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  the  citi- 
zens of  a  state  could  rely  for  due  process,  or  for 
protection  against  unequal  laws  upon  the  institutions 
of  the  state  alone.  When  such  protection  was  denied 
the  Federal  Government  had  no  right  whatever  to 
interfere.  Section  1  was  intended  to  fill  that  vacuum 
by  imposing  two  limitations  universal  in  their  appli- 
cation. In  the  words  of  the  Court  in  the  Civil  Eights 
Cases,  109  XJ.  S.  3.  **It  is  state  action  of  a  particular 
character  that  is  prohibited.  Individual  invasion  of 
individual  rights  is  not  the  subject-matter  of  the  Amend- 
ment. It  has  a  deeper  and  broader  scope.  It  nullifies  and 
makes  all  state  legislation,  and  state  action  of  every  kind, 
which  impairs  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  or  which  injures  them  in  life, 
liberty,  or  property  without  due  process  of  law,  or  which 
denies  to  any  of  them  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
It  not  only  does  this,  but,  in  order  that  the  national  will, 
thus  declared,  may  not  be  a  mere  brutum  fulmen,  the  last 
section  of  the  Amendment  invests  Congress  with  power 
to  enforce  it  by  appropriate  legislation. ' '  To  quote  again 
the  words  of  the  Court  in  Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310 : 
*'The  Fourteenth  Amendment,  it  has  been  held,  legiti- 
mately operates  to  extend  to  the  citizens  and  residents  of 
the  states  the  same  protection  against  arbitrary  state 


§  123  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSHIP  243 

legislation  affecting  life,  liberty,  and  property  as  is 
offered  by  the  Fifth  Amendment  against  similar  legisla- 
tion by  Congress. ' ' 

§123.  Due  process  clauses  of  Fifth  and  Fourteenth 
amendments  should  receive  identical  construction.  There 
is  no  foundation  for  the  idea  that  the  ancient  English 
formula  of  due  process  of  law — ^thus  expressed  in  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  *'No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life, 
liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law;*'  and 
thus  expressed  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  **nor 
shall  any  state  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property,  without  due  process  of  law — '*  should  not 
receive  an  identical  construction,  regardless  of  the  part 
of  the  constitution  in  which  it  is  contained.  The  fact 
that  the  formula  passed  first  into  the  Fifth  Amendment, 
and  thence  into  the  Fourteenth  only  strengthens  the  idea 
that  it  should  have  the  same  meaning  in  both.  It  is  not 
likely  that  any  doubt  would  ever  have  been  entertained 
as  to  a  truth  so  obvious  had  it  not  have  been  for  the 
grave  mistake  made  in  the  definition  first  given  of  due 
process  as  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment  in  the  case 
of  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  and  Improvement  Co.,  18 
How.  272,  heretofore  examined  at  great  length.  The  fact 
was  then  emphasized  that  the  unsound  definition  thus 
given  was  formally  repudiated,  first  in  Hurtado  v.  Cali- 
fornia, 110  U.  S.  516,  and  then  in  Twining  v.  New  Jersey, 
211  TJ.  S.  78.  In  the  case  last  cited  the  Court  said:  **0f 
course,  the  part  of  the  Constitution  then  before  the 
Court  was  the  Fifth  Amendment.  If  any  different  mean- 
ing of  the  same  words,  as  they  are  used  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  can  be  conceived,  none  has  yet  appeared  in 
judicial  decision.'*  And  yet  something  like  a  doubt  had 
been  expressed  in  the  earlier  case  of  Carroll  v.  Greenwich 
Ins.  Co.,  199  TJ.  S.  401,  where  it  was  said  that  ''While 
we  need  not  affirm  that  in  no  instance  could  a  distinction 
be  taken,  ordinarily  if  an  act  of  Congress  is  valid  under 
the  Fifth  Amendment  it  would  be  hard  to  say  that  a  state 


244  DUB  PEOCESS  OF  LAW  §  123 

law  in  like  terms  was  void  under  the  Fourteenth.  It 
is  true  that,  by  the  provision  in  the  body  of  the  instru- 
ment, Congress  has  power  to  regulate  commerce,  and 
that  the  act  of  Congress  referred  to  in  the  cases  cited 
was  passed  in  pursuance  of  that  power.  But  even  if  the 
Fifth  Amendment  were  read  as  contemporaneous  with 
the  original  Constitution,  the  power  given  in  the  com- 
merce clause  would  not  be  taken  to  override  it  so  far  as 
the  Fifth  Amendment  protects  fundamental  personal 
rights.  It  is  only  on  the  ground  that  the  right  to  combine 
at  will  is  a  fundamental  personal  right  that  it  can  be  held 
to  be  protected  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  from  any 
abridgement  by  the  states. ' '  If  that  statement  was  really 
intended  to  express  a  doubt  as  to  the  question  at  issue, 
it  was  removed  by  the  subsequent  and  emphatic  declara- 
tion that  **If  any  different  meaning  of  the  same  words, 
as  they  are  used  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  can  be 
conceived,  none  has  yet  appeared  in  judicial  decision." 

§124.  Only  national  dtizMisliip  as  such  protected 
against  state  action  by  the  due  process  clause  of  Section 
1,  In  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  these  dec- 
larations were  made :  *  *  It  is  quite  dear,  then,  that  there 
is  a  citizenship  of  the  United  States  and  a  citizenship  of 
a  state,  which  are  distinct  from  each  other  and  which 
depend  upon  different  characteristics  or  circumstances 
in  the  individual.  ...  If ,  then,  there  is  a  difference  be- 
tween the  privileges  and  immunities  belonging  to  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  as  such,  and  those  belonging  to  the 
citizen  of  the  state  as  such,  the  latter  must  rest  for  their 
security  and  protection  where  they  have  heretofore 
rested ;  for  they  are  not  embraced  by  this  paragraph  of 
the  Amendment.  .  .  .  Having  shown  that  the  privileges 
and  immunities  relied  on  in  the  argument  are  those  which 
belong  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  as  such,  and  that 
they  are  left  to  the  state  governments  for  security  and 
protection,  and  not  by  this  article  placed  under  the  special 
care  of  the  Federal  Government,  we  may  hold  ourselves 


§  124  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CITIZENSfflP  245 

excused  from  defining  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States  which  no  state  can  abridge, 
until  some  case  involving  these  privileges  may  make  it 
necessary  to  do  so.  •  •  .  But  it  is  useless  to  pursue  this 
branch  of  the  inquiry,  since  we  are  of  opinion  that  the 
rights  claimed  by  these  plaintiffs  in  error,  if  they  have 
any  existence,  are  not  privileges  and  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States  within  the  meaning  of  the 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  under  considera- 
tion. ' '  That  case  grew  out  of  an  attempt  upon  the  part 
of  the  butchers  of  New  Orleans  to  induce  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  to  annul  an  act  of  the  state 
legislature  creating  a  certain  monopoly,  because,  they 
said,  that  it  abridged  their  privileges  and  immunities  as 
citizens  of  the  United  States  of  property  rights  without 
due  process  of  law,  contrary  to  Section  1  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  The  Court  denied  relief  upon  the 
ground  that  whatever  rights  had  been  violated,  if  any, 
belonged  to  ** citizens  of  the  states  as  such,'*  and  not  to 
citizens  of  the  United  States  as  such.  In  other  words  that 
the  subject  matter  was  one  entirely  under  the  control  of 
the  police  power  of  the  State  of  Louisiana  whose  Supreme 
Court  had  approved  of  the  manner  in  which  it  had  been 
exercised  in  that  particular  case. 

In  order  to  guarantee  to  the  states  as  great  a  latitude 
as  possible  in  the  regulation  of  their  systems  of  interior 
law,  it  was  likewise  held  in  Hurtado  v.  California,  110 
U.  S.  516,  that  they  are  under  no  obligation  to  perpetuate 
the  grand  jury  as  a  means  of  presentment  even  in  a 
case  of  murder ;  that  a  conviction  for  murder  in  the  first 
degree  and  a  sentence  of  death,  where  the  prosecution 
was  begun  by  information,  is  not  illegal  by  reason  of  con- 
flict with  the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The  Court  said:  **We  are  to  construe  this 
phrase  (due  process  of  law)  in  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment by  the  t^us  loquendi  of  the  Constitution  itself.  The 
same  words  are  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment.  That 
article  makes  specific  and  express  provision  for  per- 


246  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  124 

petnating  the  institution  of  the  grand  jury,  so  far  as 
relates  to  prosecutions,  for  the  more  aggravated  crimes 
under  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  It  declares  that 
*No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital  or  other- 
wise infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  presentment  or  indict- 
ment of  a  grand  jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the  land 
or  naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia  when  in  actual  service  in 
time  of  war  or  public  danger;  nor  shall  any  person  be 
subject  for  the  same  offense  to  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy 
of  life  or  limb ;  nor  shall  he  be  compelled  in  any  criminal 
case  to  be  a  witness  against  himself/  It  then  imme- 
diately adds :  *nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property, 
without  due  process  of  law.  ^  According  to  a  recognized 
canon  of  interpretation,  especially  applicable  to  formal 
and  solemn  instruments  of  constitutional  law,  we  are 
forbidden  to  assume  without  clear  reason  to  the  contrary, 
that  any  part  of  this  most  important  Amendment  is 
superfluous.  The  natural  and  obvious  inference  is,  that 
in  the  sense  of  the  Constitution,  *due  process  of  law'  was 
not  meant  or  intended  to  include,  ex  vi  termini,  the  insti- 
tution and  procedure  of  a  grand  jury  in  any  case.  The 
conclusion  is  equally  irresistible,  that  when  the  same 
phrase  was  employed  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to 
restrain  the  action  of  the  states',  it  was  used  in  the  same 
sense  and  with  no  greater  extent;  and  that  if  in  the 
adoption  of  that  Amendment  it  had  been  part  of  its  pur- 
pose to  perpetuate  the  institution  of  the  grand  jury  in 
all  the  states,  it  would  have  embodied,  as  did  the  Fifth 
Amendment,  express  declarations  to  that  effect.  Due 
process  of  law  in  the  latter  refers  to  that  law  of  the  land, 
which  derives  its  authority  from  the  legislative  powers 
conferred  upon  Congress  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  exercised  within  the  limits  therein  pre- 
scribed, and  interpreted  according  to  the  principles  of 
the  common  law.  In  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  by 
parity  of  reason,  it  refers  to  that  law  of  the  land  in  each 
state,  which  derives  its  authority  from  the  inherent  and 
reserved  powers  of  the  state,  exerted  within  the  limits  of 


§  124  THE  NEW  NATIONAL  CTTIZENSHIP  247 

those  fundamental  principles  of  liberty  and  justice  which 
lie  at  the  base  of  all  of  our  civil  and  political  institutions, 
and  the  greatest  security  for  which  resides  in  the  right 
of  the  i)eople  to  make  their  own  laws,  and  alter  them  at 
their  pleasure.  *The  Fourteenth  Amendment,^  as  was 
said  by  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Mo.  v.  Lewis  [101  XJ.  S. 
22],  *does  not  profess  to  secure  to  all  persons  in  the 
United  States  the  benefit  of  the  same  laws  and  the  same 
remedies.  Great  diversities  in  these  respects  may  exist 
in  two  states  separated  only  by  an  imaginary  line.  On 
one  side  of  this  line  there  may  be  a  right  of  trial  by  jury 
and  on  the  other  side  no  such  right.  Each  state  pre- 
scribes its  own  modes  of  judicial  proceeding. '  ^  ^ 

The  same  line  of  reasoning  induced  the  Court,  in  Twin- 
ing V.  New  Jersey,  211  XJ.  S.  78,  to  hold  that  while  an 
exemption  from  self-incrimination  is  guaranteed  as 
against  the  action  of  the  Federal  Government  by  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  such  exemption  is  not  such  a  funda- 
mental right  of  national  citizenship  as  to  be  included 
among  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  which  the  state  governments  are  forbidden 
to  abridge  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Before  reach- 
ing the  conclusion  that  exemption  from  self-incrimination 
is  not  guaranteed  by  the  due  process  clause  of  that 
Amendment,  the  Court  said:  *'But  assuming  it  to  be 
true  that  the  exemption  from  self  incrimination  is  not, 
as  a  fundamental  right  of  national  citizenship,  included 
in  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  counsel  insist  that,  as  a  right  specifically  granted 
or  secured  by  the  Federal  Constitution,  it  is  included  in 
them.^^  Li  rejecting  that  contention  the  Court  said: 
''In  Maxwell  v.  Dow,  176  U.  S.  581,  where  the  plaintiff 
in  error  had  been  convicted  in  a  state  court  of  a  felony 
upon  an  information,  and  by  a  jury  of  eight  persons,  it 
was  held  that  the  indictment,  made  indispensable  by  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  and  the  trial  by  jury  guaranteed  by 
the  Sixth  Amendment,  were  not  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  as  those  words  were 


248  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  124 

used  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The  discussion  in 
that  case  ought  not  to  be  repeated.  All  the  arguments 
for  the  other  view  were  considered  and  answered,  the 
authorities  were  examined  and  analyzed,  and  the  decision 
rested  upon  the  ground  that  this  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  did  not  forbid  the  states  to  abridge  the 
personal  rights  enumerated  in  the  first  eight  Amendments, 
because  those  rights  were  not  within  the  meaning  of  the 
clause  *  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States.^  If  it  be  possible  to  render  the  principle  which 
governed  the  decision  more  clear,  it  is  done  so  by  the 
dissent  of  Mr.  Justice  Harlan.  We  conclude,  therefore, 
that  the  exemption  from  compulsory  self-incrimination 
is  not  a  privilege  or  immunity  of  national  citizenship 
guaranteed  by  this  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
against  abridgement  by  the  states.'' 


CHAPTER  VI 

OENBBAL  SCOPE  OF  THE  GUAKANTY  OF  DUE  PBOCESS 

§  125.  The  guaranty  in  English  law.  It  has  ever  been 
an  elementary  principle  of  American  constitutional  law 
that  every  state  legislature  is  endowed  by  its  very  nature 
with  the  omnipotence  of  the  English  Parliament,  save  so 
far  as  that  omnipotence  is  restrained  by  express  consti- 
tutional limitations.  That  invention  embodies  the  funda- 
mental difference  that  divides  two  kindred  political 
systems,  the  one  resting  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  people 
as  expressed  in  written  constitutions,  the  other  on  the 
sovereignty  of  Parliament.  All  of  the  national  move- 
ments in  England  through  which  the  charters  were 
won  were  directed  against  the  crown  and  not  against 
the  parliament.  **It  is  easy  to  see,^'  says  Mr.  Justice 
Miller  in  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  *Hhat 
when  the  great  Barons  of  England  wrung  from  King 
John,  at  the  point  of  the  sword,  the  concession  that 
neither  their  lives  nor  their  property  should  be  disposed 
of  by  the  crown,  except  as  provided  by  the  law  of  the 
land,  they  meant  by  *law  of  the  land^  the  ancient  and 
customary  laws  of  the  English  people,  or  laws  enacted  by 
the  parliament  of  which  those  barons  were  a  controlling 
element.  It  was  not  in  their  minds,  therefore,  to  protect 
themselves  against  the  enactment  of  laws  by  the  Par- 
liament of  England.^*  The  only  suggestion  ever  made 
in  England  that  a  limitation  could  be  put  by  law  upon 
the  onmipotent  Parliament  is  that  contained  in  Bonham  's 
Case,  8  Coke  118a,  where  Coke  says:  **And  it  appears 
in  our  books,  that  in  many  cases,  the  conmion  law  will 
control  acts  of  Parliament  and  sometimes  adjudge  them 
to  be  utterly  void;  for  when  an  act  of  Parliament  is 

249 


250  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  125 

against  common  right  and  reason,  or  repugnant  or  im- 
possible  to  be  performed,  the  common  law  will  control 
it  and  adjudge  such  act  to  be  void. ' '  A  closet  speculation 
equally  valueless  was  indulged  in  by  Blackstone  (i,  p.  40) 
who  says  that  *  *  the  law  of  nature  being  coeval  with  man- 
kind, and  dictated  by  God  himself,  is  of  course  superior  in 
obligation  to  any  other.  It  is  binding  over  all  the  globe, 
in  all  countries  and  at  all  times ;  no  human  laws  are  of  any 
validity  if  contrary  to  this;  and  such  of  them  as  are 
valid  derive  all  their  force  and  all  their  authority, 
mediately  or  immediately,  from  this  original.  ^  *  In  com- 
menting upon  that  declaration  Mr,  Dicey  has  said  that 
*^  expressions  are  sometimes  used  by  modem  judges 
which  imply  that  the  courts  might  refuse  to  enforce 
statutes  going  beyond  the  proper  limits  (internationally 
speaking)  of  parliamentary  authority.  But  to  words 
such  as  those  of  Blackstone,  and  to  the  obiter  dicta  of 
the  Bench,  we  must  give  a  very  qualified  interpretation. 
There  is  no  legal  basis  for  the  theory,  that  judges,  as 
exponents  of  morality,  may  overrule  acts  of  parliament. 
Language  which  might  seem  to  imply  this  amounts  in 
reality  to  nothing  more  than  the  assertion  that  the 
judges,  when  attempting  to  ascertain  what  is  the  mean- 
ing to  be  affixed  to  an  act  of  parliament,  will  presume 
that  i)arliament  did  not  intend  to  violate  the  ordinary 
rules  of  morality,  or  the  principles  of  international  law, 
and  will  therefore,  whenever  possible,  give  such  an 
interpretation  to  a  statutory  enactment  as  may  be  con- 
sistent with  the  doctrines  both  of  private  and  of  inter- 
national morality.'*  The  Law  of  the  Constitution,  pp. 
59-60.  Despite  Austin's  empty  contention  that  an  act  cif 
parliament,  which  violates  fundamental  principles,  though 
legal  and  binding,  may  still  be  unconstitutional,  (Province 
of  Jurisprudence,  Vol.  VI)  the  fact  is  and  has  always  been 
that  the  English  Parliament  is  legally  omnipotent.  Burke 
did  not  go  too  far  when  he  said  that  the  **  Parliament  of 
Great  Britain  sits  at  the  head  of  her  extensive  empire  in 
two  capacities.  One,  as  the  local  legislature  of  this  island, 


§  126     SCOPE  OF  GUARANTY  OP  DUB  PROCESS        251 

providing  for  all  things  at  home  immediately,  and  by  no 
other  instmment  than  the  executive  power.  The  other, 
and  I  think  her  nobler  capacity,  is  what  I  call  her  imperial 
character,  in  which,  as  from  the  throne  of  heaven,  she 
superintends  all  the  several  inferior  legislatures,  and 
guides  and  controls  them  all  without  annihilating  any.** 
Works,  4th  ed.  Vol.  ii,  p.  75. 

While  no  limitation  could  restrain  the  omnipotent 
parliament,  even  when  it  saw  fit  to  pass  bills  of  attainder 
and  other  statutes  providing  for  punishment  without 
trial,  it  was  a  recognized  principle  that,  as  against  the 
King  and  those  who  acted  under  his  authority,  the  person 
and  property  of  the  subject  were  protected  by  **the  law 
of  the  land, '  *  including  of  course  a  jury  in  a  proper  case. 
When  therefore  Henry  VI  granted  to  a  London  corpora- 
tion of  dyers  the  power  to  search  for  cloth,  coupled  with 
the  power  to  forfeit  it  when  it  was  found  to  be  dyed  with 
logwood,  it  was  held  that  a  charter  granting  such  a  right 
of  forfeiture  was  against  the  law  of  the  land,  because  no 
forfeiture  can  grow  by  letters  patent.  2  Inst.  47,  stated 
in  London's  Case,  8  Coke  125a.  In  the  same  way  it  was 
held  in  Bagg's  Case,  11  Coke  100,  that  the  law  of  the 
land  afforded  protection  against  any  unjust  or  arbitrary 
action  upon  the  part  of  a  municipal  corporation,  because, 
in  the  words  of  Lord  Coke,  such  corporations  **  derive 
their  authority  from  the  King.**  In  that  case  it  was 
held  that  unless  a  city  or  borough  had  express  authority 
to  do  so  by  its  charter  or  by  prescription,  it  could  not 
disfranchise  from  the  corporation  any  freeman  of  such 
city  or  borough.  In  the  absence  of  express  authority  it 
was  the  right  of  such  freeman,  under  the  provision  of 
the  Great  Charter,  to  be  convicted  before  removal  by  due 
process  of  law.  Reference  is  also  made  by  Coke  to  a  case 
in  which  it  was  adjudged  that  a  custom  in  a  city  was  void 
because  ** against  the  law  of  the  land.**  2  Inst.  46.  See 
McGehee,  p.  24  $q. 

§  126.  The  guaranty  in  American  law.  Why  does  the 
guaranty  of  due  process,  which  in  English  law  extends 


252  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  126 

only  to  executive  action,  extend  in  American  law  to  the 
three  departments  of  power,  executive,  legislative  and 
judicial!  The  answer  must  be  found  in  the  history  of 
the  process  through  which  American  constitutions,  state 
and  federal  came  into  existence.  When  the  tie  of  political 
dependence  that  bound  the  colonies  to  the  mother  country 
was  severed,  the  English  provinces  in  America  rose  to 
the  full  statute  of  sovereign  states.  **When  the  Revo- 
lution took  place  the  people  of  each  state  became  them- 
selves sovereign.  *  ^  And  as  soon  as  they  *  *  took  into  their 
own  hands  the  powers  of  sovereignty,  the  prerogatives 
and  regalities  which  before  belonged  either  to  the  crown 
or  the  Parliament  became  immediately  and  rightfully 
vested  in  the  state.  *^  Martin  v.  Lessee  of  Waddell,  16 
Pet.  410  sq.  On  the  10th  of  May,  1776,  the  Continental 
Congress  recommended  to  the  several  conventions  and 
assemblies  of  the  colonies  the  establishment  of  independ- 
ent governments  *  *  for  the  maintenance  of  internal  peace 
and  the  defense  of  their  lives,  liberties,  and  properties. '  ^ 
Before  the  end  of  the  year  in  which  the  reconunendation 
was  made,  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  colonies  had 
adopted  written  constitutions  in  which  were  restated  in 
a  dogmatic  form  all  of  the  seminal  principles  of  the 
English  constitutional  systenL  Thus  ended  that  mar- 
velous process  of  growth  through  which  the .  English 
colonies  in  America  were  rapidly  developed  into  a  group 
of  independent  commonwealths  in  which  each  individual 
member  was,  in  its  organic  structure,  a  substantial  repro- 
duction of  the  English  kingdouL  With  the  adoption  of 
the  written  constitutions  of  1776,  the  typical  English 
state  in  America  reached  its  full  growth. 

In  coming  into  existence  the  typical  American  state 
gave  birth  to  the  idea  of  constitutional  limitations  on  all 
state  powers,  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial,  a  purely 
American  invention  without  a  precedent  in  history.  Such 
limitations,  of  which  the  European  world  knew  nothing, 
grew  naturally  out  of  the  process  through  which  Amer- 
ican legislatures  were  organized.    From  the  very  begin- 


§  126     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS       253 

ning  the  powers  of  the  colonial  assemblies  were  more  or 
less  limited  through  the  terms  of  the  characters  by  which 
such  assemblies  were  either  created  or  recognized.  Even 
in  colonial  times  **  questions  sometimes  arose  whether 
the  statutes  made  by  these  assemblies  were  in  excess  of 
the  powers  conferred  by  the  charter ;  and  if  the  statutes 
were  found  in  excess,  they  were  held  invalid  by  the 
courts  this  is  to  say,  in  the  first  instance,  by  the  colonial 
courts,  or,  if  the  matter  was  carried  to  England,  by  the 
Privy  CounciL^*  The  colonial  charter  embodied  a  sys- 
tem of  government  established  by  a  superior  authority 
creating  a  subordinate  law-making  body  that  could  do 
everything  except  violate  the  terms  and  transcend  the 
powers  of  the  instrument  to  which  it  owed  its  existence. 
So  long  as  the  colony  remained  under  the  English  crown 
the  superior  authority  which  could  amend  or  remake 
the  system  of  government  was  the  English  crown  or 
Parliament.  When  the  tie  binding  the  colonies  to  the 
mother  country  was  severed,  that  authority  passed  over, 
not  to  the  state  legislature,  which  remained  limited,  as 
it  always  has  been,  but  to  the  people  of  the  independent 
commonwealth,  whose  will  speaks  through  what  is  now 
the  state  constitution,  acting  upon  every  department  of 
state  power,  executive,  legislative  and  judicial,  just  as 
the  will  of  the  crown  or  Parliament  had  spoken  through 
the  charters  of  1628  and  1691.  As  Mr.  Justice  Matthews 
has  well  said  in  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  TJ.  S.  516, 
*'In  this  country  written  constitutions  were  deemed 
essential  to  protect  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people 
against  the  encroachments  of  power  delegated  to  their 
governments,  and  the  provisions  of  Magna  Carta  were 
incorporated  into  bills  of  rights.  They  were  limitations 
upon  all  the  powers  of  government,  legislative  as  well  as 
executive  and  judicial.  It  necessarily  happened,  there- 
fore, that  as  these  broad  and  general  maxims  of  liberty 
and  justice  held  in  our  system  a  different  place  and  per- 
formed a  different  function  from  their  position  and  ofSce 
in  English  constitutional  history  and  law,  they  would 


254  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  126 

receive  and  justify  a  corresponding  and  more  compre- 
hensive interpretation.  Applied  in  England  only  as 
gaards  against  executive  usurpation  and  tyranny,  here 
they  have  become  bulwarks  also  against  arbitrary  legis- 
lation ;  but,  in  that  application,  as  it  would  be  incongruous 
to  measure  and  restrict  them  by  the  ancient  customary 
English  law,  they  must  be  held  to  guarantee  not  particu- 
lar forms  of  procedure,  but  the  very  substance  of 
individual  rights  to  life,  liberty  and  property.  Restraints 
that  could  be  fastened  upon  executive  authority  with 
precision  and  detail,  might  prove  obstructive  and  injuri- 
ous when  imposed  on  the  just  necessary  discretion  of 
legislative  power,  and,  while  in  every  instance,  laws,  that 
violated  express  and  specific  injunctions  and  prohibitions, 
might  without  embarrassment,  be  judicially  declared 
to  be  void,  yet,  any  general  principle  or  maxim  founded 
on  the  essential  nature  of  law,  as  a  just  and  reasonable 
expression  of  the  public  will  and  of  government,  as  insti- 
tuted by  popular  consent  and  for  the  general  good,  can 
only  be  applied  to  cases  coming  clearly  within  the  scope 
of  its  spirit  and  purpose,  and  not  to  legislative  provisions 
merely  establishing  forms  and  modes  of  attainment. 
Such  regulations,  to  adopt  a  sentence  of  Burke's  *may 
alter  the  mode  of  application  but  have  no  power  over  the 
substance  of  original  justice.'  Tract  on  the  Property 
Laws,  6  Burke's  Works,  ed.  Little  and  Brown,  323.'' 

While,  as  a  general  rule,  the  colonies,  after  being  trans- 
formed into  independent  states,  adopted  new  constitu- 
tions, the  charter  granted  to  Connecticut  in  1662  was 
continued  as  l^er  organic  law  until  1818 ;  and  that  granted 
to  Rhode  Island  in  1663  was  continued  as  her  organic  law 
until  1842.  And  it  is  certainly  worthy  of  note,  as  hereto- 
fore pointed  out,  that  one  of  the  first  caises,  if  not  the  very 
first,  in  which  a  legislative  enactment  was  declared  uncon- 
stitutional and  void,  on  the  ground  of  conflict  with  the 
constitution  of  a  state,  was  decided  under  the  charter  last 
named.  But  what  is  far  more  important  is  the  fact  that 
this  novel  and  supreme  power  of  declaring  an  act  of  the 


§126  SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OF  DUE  PROCESS    255 

legislature  void  was  assumed  by  the  state  oonrts,  as  a 
creation  of  judge-made  law,  without  a  line  or  word  of 
authority  on  the  subject  in  the  state  constitutions.  The 
state  judges  simply  reasoned  out  the  right  on  abstract 
principles.  As  an  illustration,  reference  may  be  made 
to  the  words  of  Wythe,  J.,  who,  in  the  case  of  Com.  v. 
Caton,  4  Call,  5,  said:  Nay,  more,  if  the  whole  legisla- 
ture, an  event  to  be  deprecated,  should  attempt  to  over- 
leap the  bounds  prescribed  to  them  by  the  people,  I,  in 
administering  the  public  justice  of  the  country,  will  meet 
the  united  powers,  at  my  seat  in  this  tribunal ;  and,  point- 
ing to  the  constitution,  will  say  to  them,  here  is  the 
limit  of  your  authority ;  and  hither  shall  you  go,  but  no 
farther.^'  When  the  new  system  of  limitations,  thus 
developed  in  the  states,  was  lifted  into  a  higher  sphere 
through  its  application  to  the  legislative  power  vested  in 
the  unique  federal  republic  created  by  the  constitution  of 
1787,  the  inevitable  outcome  was  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  the  only  court  in  history  that  has  ever 
assumed  the  right  to  pass  on  the  validity  of  a  national 
law.  As  there  is  no  line  or  word  in  the  federal  constitu- 
tion intimating  directly  the  existence  of  such  a  right,  it 
was  there  reasoned  out,  as  in  the  states,  as  a  matter  of 
judge-made  law.  Not  until  thirteen  years  after  the 
organization  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  the  first  attempt 
made,  in  the  casQ  of  Marbury  v.  Madison,  1  Cranch  137 
(1803),  to  put  the  stamp  of  nullity  upon  a  national  law; 
and  not  until  twenty  years  after  its  organization  was  the 
first  attempt  made,  in  the  case  of  Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6 
Cranch,  87,  (1810),  to  put  the  stamp  of  nullity  upon  a 
state  law — in  both  instances  by  reason  of  repugnancy  to 
the  Federal  constitution.  Thus,  by  means  of  judicial 
logic,  and  not  by  the  authority  of  «in  express  constitu- 
tional provision,  was  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  able  to  maintain  its  right  to  put  the  stapap  of 
nullity  upon  a  law,  stater  or  federal. 

The  limitation  imposed  upon  the  powers  of  a  state  for- 
bidding it  to  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  prop- 


256  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  126 

erty,  without  due  process  of  law,  extends  to  the  exercise 
of  executive,  legislative  or  judicial  power,  no  matter  by 
what  ofl5cers  or  agent,  or  agency  it  be  exercised,  so  it  be  by 
state  authority.  In  that  way  is  included  the  action  of  any 
subordinate  division  of  a  state,  such  as  a  municipal  cor- 
poration. After  referring  to  the  words  of  Section  I,  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  the  Supreme  Court  in 
Ex  parte  Virginia,  100  U.  S.  339,  said:  **They  have 
reference  to  the  actions  of  the  political  body  denominated 
the  state,  by  whatever  instruments  or  in  whatever  modes 
that  action  may  be  taken.  A  state  acts  by  its  legislative, 
its  executive  or  its  judicial  authorities.  It  can  act  in  no 
other  way.  The  constitutional  provision,  therefore,  must 
mean  that  no  agency  of  the  state,  or  of  the  officers  or 
agents  by  whom  its  powers  are  exerted,  shall  deny  to  any 
person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  Whoever,  by  virtue  of  public  positions  under  a 
state  government,  deprives  another  of  property,  life  or 
liberty  without  due  process  of  law,  or  denies  or  takes 
away  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  violates  the  con- 
stitutional inhibition ;  and  as  he  acts  in  the  name  of  and 
for  the  state,  and  is  clothed  with  the  state's  power,  his 
act  is  that  of  the  state.  This  must  be  so  or  the  constitu- 
tional inhibition  has  no  meaning.  Then  the  state  has 
clothed  one  of  its  agents  with  power  to  annul  or  to 
evade  if 

The  wrongful  acts  or  proceedings  of  individuals  sim- 
ply constitute  private  wrongs,  or  crimes  of  individuals. 
Such  acts  when  unsupported  by  state  authority,  do  not 
fall  within  the  purview  of  the  amendment.  In  the  case 
of  Yick  Wo  V.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356,  involving  the  valid- 
ity of  a  moinicipal  ordinance  of  the  City  and  County  of 
San  Francisco,  providing  that  it  should  be  unlawful  for 
any  person  to  engage  in  the  laundry  business  within  the 
corporate  limits  *' without  having  first  obtained  the  con- 
sent of  the  board  of  supervisors,  except  the  same  be 
located  in  a  building  construed  either  of  brick  or  stone,'* 
it  was  held  that  *  *  Though  the  law  itself  be  fair  on  its  face 


§  127     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        257 

and  impartial  in  appearance,  yet,  if  it  is  applied  and 
administered  by  public  authority  with  an  evil  eye  and  an 
unequal  hand,  so  as  practically  to  make  unjust  and  illegal 
discriminations  between  persons  in  similar  circum- 
stances,  material  to  theii*  rights,  the  denial  of  equal 
justice  is  still  within  the  prohibition  of  the  constitution. 
This  principle  of  interpretation  has  been  sanctioned  by 
this  court  in  Henderson  v.  Mayor,  eta,  of  New  York, 
92  U.  S.  259 ;  Chy  Lung  v.  Freeman,  92  U.  S.  275 ;  Ex  parte 
Va,,  100  U.  S.  339;  Neal  v.  Delaware,  103  U,  S.  370;  and 
Soon  Hing  v.  Crowley/'    [113  U.  S.  703.] 

§  127.  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  a  super- 
Yiaing  and  aniiTiniTTg  tribimaL  An  effort  has  been  made 
heretofore  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  prior  to  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  the  citizens  of  a  state 
could  rely  for  due  process  of  law  on  the  institutions  of 
the  state  alone;  and  when  such  protection  was  denied 
the  Federal  Government  had  no  right  whatever  to  inter- 
fere. The  original  constitution  guaranteed  nothing  more 
than  a  republican  form  of  government  in  each  state,  and 
the  right  of  the  citizens  of  each  state  to  all  the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  several  states,  a  state  of 
things  in  which  private  property  might  have  been  confis- 
cated and  vested  rights  divested  by  the  states  without  the 
possibility  of  intervention  by  the  Federal  courts.  Such 
courts  possessed  no  authority  to  interfere  with  state 
action,  executive,  legislative  or  judicial,  except  in  the  case 
of  bills  of  attainder  or  laws  impairing  the  obligation  of 
contract.  The  prohibition  against  ex  post  facto  laws  was 
limited  strictly  to  criminal  cases.  In  the  Words  of 
Mr.  Justice  Field,  employed  in  Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa, 
18  Wkll.  129,  '*  Before  this  amendment  (14)  and  the 
Thirteenth  Amendment  were  adopted,  the  states  had 
supreme  authority  over  all  these  matters,  and  the 
National  Government^  except  in  a  few  particulars,  could 
afford  no  protection  to  the  individual  against  arbitrary 
and  oppressive  legislation.     After  the  Civil  war  had 

Dae  Proceflfl — ^17 


258  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  127 

closed^  the  same  authority  was  asserted,  and,  in  the  states 
recently  in  insurrection,  was  exercised  to  the  oppression 
of  the  freemen;  and  towards  the  citizens  of  the  North 
seeking  residence  there,  or  citizens  resident  there  who 
had  maintained  their  loyalty  during  the  war  for  nation- 
ality, a  feeling  of  jealousy  and  dislike  existed  which  could 
not  fail  soon  to  find  expression  in  discriminating  and 
hostile  legislation.  It  was  to  prevent  the  possibility  of 
such  legislation  in  future,  and  its  enforcement  where 
already  adopted,  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was 
directed.  It  grew  out  of  the  feeling  that  a  Union  which 
had  been  maintained  by  such  costly  sacrifices  was,  after 
all,  worthless  if  a  citizen  could  not  be  protected  in  all  his 
fundamental  rights  everywhere — ^North  and  South,  East 
and  West — ^throughout  the  limits  of  the  Republic.  The 
amendment  was  not,  as  held  in  the  opinion  of  the  major- 
ity, primarily  intended  to  confer  citizenship  on  the  negro 
race.  It  had  a  much  broader  purpose;  it  was  intended 
to  justify  legislation,  extending  the  protection  of  the 
National  Government  over  the  common  rights  of  all  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States,  and  thus  obviate  objections  to 
the  legislation  adopted  for  the  protection  of  the  emanci- 
pated race.  It  was  intended  ta  make  it  possible  for  all 
persons,  which  necessarily  included  those  of  every  race 
and  color,  to  live  in  peace  and  security  wherever  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  nation  reached.  It,  therefore,  recog- 
nized, if  it  did  not  create,  a  national  citizenship,  «nd  made 
all  persons  citLsens  except  those  who  preferred  to  remain 
under  the  protection  of  a  foreign  government;  and 
declared  that  their  privileges  and  immunities,  which 
embraced  the  fundamental  rights  belonging  to  citizens  of 
all  free  governments,  should  not  be  abridged  by  any 
state.*' 

In  order  to  fill  the  vacuum  thus  described,  as  existing 
under  the  original  constitution,  was  adopted  the  amend- 
ment in  question  which  in  the  language  of  the  Supreme 
Court  (Hibben  v.  Smith,  191 U.  S.  310, 325),  '* legitimately 
operates  to  extend  to  the  citizens  and  residents  of  the 


§  127     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OF  DUE  PROCESS        259 

states  the  same  protection  against  arbitrary  state  legislar 
tion  affecting  life,  liberty  and  property  as  if  offered  by 
the  Fifth  Amendment  against  similar  legislation  by  Con- 
gress/' The  result  is  that  if  the  state  fails  to  guarantee 
due  process  of  law  and  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States,  as  such,  the  Federal  judi- 
ciary can  supervise  the  performance  of  that  duty  in  such 
a  way  as  to  vest  the  ultimate  decision  of  every  question, 
involving  due  process  of  law  and  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws,  in  the  Federal  courts.  But  in  the  particular 
case  the  Federal  court  can  only  determine  whether  the 
state  has  failed  in  that  duty;  and,  in  that  event,  it  can 
only  declare  the  proceedings  void.  The  vital  question 
therefore  in  every  case  is  whether  or  no  the  person  who 
complains  has  been  deprived  by  official  state  action  of 
some  right  or  immunity  guaranteed  to  him  by  virtue  of 
his  national  citizenship,  considered  as  a  thing  separate 
and  apart  from  his  state  citizenship,  because  it  was 
settled  at  the  outset  'Hhat  there  is  a  citizenship  of  the 
United  States  and  a  citizenship  of  the  state,  which  are 
distinct  from  each  other  and  which  depend  upon  different 
characteristics  or  circumstances  in  the  individual.  * '  Only 
the  privileges  and  immunities  that  belong  to  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  as  such  are  placed  by  the  amendment 
under  its  protection ;  those  belonging  to  the  citizen  of  the 
states  as  such  **must  rest  for  their  security  and  protec- 
tion where  they  have  heretofore  rested ;  for  they  are  not 
embraced  by  this  paragraph  of  the  amendment. '^  The 
majority  of  the  court  who  determined  in  the  Slaughter 
House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  to  confine  the  amendment 
within  the  narrowest  possible  limits  determined  so  to 
limit  the  revolution  wrought  by  it  as  to  prevent  a  radical 
change  of  the  whole  theory  of  the  relations  of  the  state 
and  federal  governments  to  each  other,  and  of  both  gov- 
ernments to  the  people.  It  was  therefore  held  in  United 
States  V.  Cruikshank,  92  U.  S.  542,  that  **The  Fourteenth 
Amendment  prohibits  a  state  from  depriving  any  person 
of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law; 


260  DUE  PEOCESS  OF  LAW  §  127 

but  this  adds  nothing  to  the  rights  of  one  citizen  as 
against  another.  It  simply  furnished  an  additional  guar- 
anty against  any  encroachment  by  the  states  upon  the 
fundamental  rights  which  belong  to  every  citizen  as  a 
member  of  society. '  ^  And  so  it  was  said  in  Ee  Kemmler, 
136  U.  S.  436,  that  ''The  Fourteenth  Amendment  did  not 
radically  change  the  whole  theory  of  the  relations  of  the 
state  and  federal  governments  to  each  other,  and  of  both 
governments  to  the  people.  The  same  person  may  be  at 
the  same  time  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  and  a  citizen 
of  the  state.  Protection  to  life,  liberty,  and  property 
rests,  primarily  with  the  states,  and  the  amendment  fur- 
nishes an  additional  guaranty  against  any  encroachment 
upon  those  fundamental  rights  which  belong  to  citizen- 
ship, and  which  the  state  governments  were  created  to  se- 
cure.'^ The  internal  sovereignty  of  the  state  thus  re- 
mained BO  unimpaired  that  it  could  still  exercise  the 
sovereign  rights  of  taxation,  eminent  domain,  the  police 
power,  the  administration  of  justice,  in  civil  and  criminal 
cases,  with  no  restraint  whatever  so  long  as  the  guaran- 
tees in  favor  of  the  new  national  citizenship  were  not  vio- 
lated. It  was  also  considered  necessary  so  to  limit  the 
scope  of  the  amendment  as  to  prevent  the  Federal  courts 
from  being  submerged  under  a  mass  of  new  litigation  in- 
volving a  review  of  nearly  every  transaction  between  the 
state  and  its  citizens.  Its  f  ramers  had  no  idea  of  convert- 
ing the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  into  a  general 
court  of  appeal  with  jurisdiction  so  wide  and  plenary  as  to 
enable  it  to  review  all  cases  involving  the  taking  away 
of  life,  liberty  and  property  when  only  questions  of 
equitable  consideration  or  broad  ideas  of  justice  are 
involved.  That  court  remains  as  before  a  court  not  of 
general  but  special  appeal  with  power  to  supervise  under 
the  amendment  in  question  only  when  the  oflBcial  action 
of  the  state  has  violated  either  its  provisions,  or  those 
of  some  act  of  Congress  passed  in  pursuance  of  it. 

When  the  question  involves  only  the  conformity  of  the 
act  with  the  constitution  of  a  state,  the  decision  of  its 


§  127     SCOPE  OP  QUABANTT  OP  DUE  PROCESS        261 

highest  court  is  final  no  matter  how  harsh  or  oppressive 
the  act  may  be.    In  Kirtland  v.  Eotchkiss,  100  U.  S.  491 , 
involving  the  state  power  of  taxation,  the  Court  said: 
' '  It  may  therefore,  be  regarded  as  the  established  doctrine 
of  this  court,  that  so  long  as  the  state,  by  its  system  of 
taxation  does  not  intrench  upon  the  legitimate  authority 
of  the  Union,  or  violate  any  right  recognized  or  secured 
to  the  citizen  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  this 
court  as  between  the  citizen  and  his  state,  can  afford  no 
relief  against  state  taxation,  however  unjust,  oppressive 
or  onerous/*   The  Federal  courts  have  nothing  whatever 
to  do  with  the  policy  or  expediency  of  state  laws,  nor  is 
the  hardship  or  injustice  of  such  laws  necessarily  an 
objection  against  their  constitutional  validity,   *  *  The  rule, 
briefly  stated,  is  that  whenever  an  act  of  the  legislature 
is  challenged  in  court  the  inquiry  is  limited  to  the  ques- 
tion of  power,  and  does  not  extend  to  the  matter  of  expe- 
diency, the  motives  of  the  legislators,  or  the  reasons 
which  were  spread  before  them  to  induce  the  passage 
of  the  act.    This  principle  rests  upon  the  independence  of 
the  legislature  as  one  of  the  co-ordinate  departments  of 
the  government.  *  *   Angle  v.  Chicago,  St.  Paul,  etc.,  Eail- 
way,  151 U.  S.  1.    There  is  no  denial  of  due  process  when 
the  law  is  executed  according  to  the  established  forms 
and  usages  of  a  particular  state,  provided  they  embody 
the  fundamentals,  no  matter  how  much  they  may  differ  in 
form  from  the  laws  of  another  state.    As  Mr.  Justice 
Bradley  said  in  a  leading  case :  *  *  The  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment does  not  profess  to  secure  to  all  persons  in  the 
United  States  the  benefit  of  the  same  laws  and  the  same 
remedies.    Great  diversities  in  these  respects  may  exist 
in  two  states  separated  only  by  an  imaginary  line.    On 
one  side  of  this  line  there  may  be  a  right  of  trial  by  jury, 
and  on  the  other  side  no  such  right.   Each  state  prescribes 
its  own  modes  of  judicial  proceeding.    If  diversities  of 
laws  and  judicial  proceedings  may  exist  in  the  several 
states  without  violating  the  equality  clause  in  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  there  is  no  solid  reason  why  there 


262  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  127 

may  not  be  such  diversities  in  different  parts  of  the  same 
state. ' '  Bowman  v.  Lewis,  101  U.  S.  22.  As  the  Court 
well  said  in  a  kindred  case,  involving  the  presence  of  due 
process  in  a  proceeding  for  the  collection  of  state  taxes, 
it  is  always  necessary  **to  distinguish  between  the 
essentials  of  due  process  of  law  under  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  and  matters  which  may  or  may  not  be 
essential  under  the  terms  of  a  state  assessing  or  taxing 
law.  The  two  are  neither  correlative  nor  coterminous. 
The  first,  due  process  of  law,  must  be  found  in  the  state 
statute  and  can  not  be  departed  from  without  violat- 
ing the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  The  other 
depends  on  the  law-making  power  of  the  states,  and,  as  it 
is  solely  the  result  of  such  authority,  may  vary  or  change 
as  the  legislative  will  of  the  state  may  see  fit  to  ordain. 
It  follows  that  to  determine  the  existence  of  one  (due 
process  of  law)  is  the  final  province  of  this  court,  while 
the  ascertainment  of  the  other  (that  is,  what  is  merely 
essential  under  the  state  statute)  is  a  state  question 
within  the  final  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  last  resort 
in  the  several  states.  When,  then,  a  state  court  decides 
that  a  particular  formality  was  or  was  not  essential 
under  the  state  statute,  such  decision  presents  no  federal 
question,  providing  always  the  statute,  as  thus  construed, 
does  not  violate  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  bv 
depriving  of  property  without  due  process  of  law.  This 
paramount  requirement  being  fulfilled,  as  to  other  mat- 
ters, the'  state  *s  interpretation  of  its  own  laws  is  con- 
trolling and  decisive. ' '  Castello  v.  McConnico,  168  U.  S. 
674.  In  upholding  the  validity  of  a  state  statute  limit- 
ing the  hours  of  labor  in  mines,  the  Court,  in  Holden 
V.  Hardy,  169  U.  S.  366,  said:  **We  have  no  disposi- 
tion to  criticise  the  many  authorities  which  hold  that 
state  statutes  restricting  the  hours  of  labor  are  uncon- 
stitutional. Indeed,  we  are  not  called  upon  to  express  an 
opinion  upon  this  subject.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  of  them 
that  they  have  no  application  to  cases  where  the  legis- 
lature had  adjudged  that  a  limitation  is  necessary  for  the 


§  127     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUB  PROCESS        263 

preservation  of  the  health  of  employees,  and  there  are 
reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that  snch  determination 
is  supported  by  the  facts.  The  question  in  each  case  is 
whether  the  legislature  has  adopted  the  statute  in  exer- 
cise of  a  reasonable  discretion,  or  whether  its  action  be 
a  mere  excuse  for  an  unjust  discrimination,  or  the  oppres- 
sion, or  spoliation  of  a  particular  case.  The  distinction 
between  these  two  different  classes  of  enactments  can  not 
be  better  stated  than  by  a  comparison  of  the  views  of 
this  court  found  in  the  opinion  in  Barbier  v.  Connolly, 
113  U.  S.  27,  and  Soon  Hing  v.  Crowley,  113  U.  S.  703, 
with  those  later  expressed  in  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118 
U.  S.  356.  * '  Mere  errors  and  irregularities  in  the  decision 
of  a  state  court  acting  within  its  jurisdiction,  do  not 
involve  a  denial  of  due  process,  so  long  as  the  funda- 
mentals are  observed.  In  Arrowsmith  v.  Harmoning,  118 
U.  S.  194,  a  case  in  which  a  minor  complained  that  he  had 
been  deprived  of  dup  process  in  a  sale  of  his  estate  by  his 
guardian  under  a  judicial  order,  the  court  said:  **The 
bond  in  question  was  a  matter  of  procedure  only,  and  if 
it  ought  to  have  been  required  the  court  erred  in  order- 
ing a  sale  without  having  first  caused  it  to  be  filed  and 
.  approved.  At  most,  this  was  an  error  of  judgment  in 
the  court.  The  constitutional  provision  is,  *Nor  shall  any 
state  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law.'  Certainly  a  state  can  not  be 
deemed  guilty  of  a  violation  of  this  constitutional  obli- 
gation simply  because  one  of  its  courts,  while  acting  within 
its  jurisdiction,  has  made  an  erroneous  decision. '*  In 
Iowa  Central  Railroad  Co.  v.  Iowa,  160  U.  S.  389,  wherein 
it  was  held  that  the  refusal  of  a  jury  trial  is  not  a  denial 
of  a  right  protected  by  the  Federal  constitution,  even 
though  it  may  have  been  clearly  erroneous  to  construe  the 
laws  of  the  state  as  justifying  the  refusal, — ^the  Court 
said :  **  As  said  by  this  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Chief 
Justice  Fuller,  in  Leeper  v.  Texas,  139  U.  S.  462,  468: 
*Law  in  its  regular  course  of  administration  through 
courts  of  justice  is  due  process,  and  when  secured  by  the 


264  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  127 

law  of  the  state  the  constitutional  requirement  is  satis- 
fied.' There  was  a  ^regular  course  of  administratipn'  in 
the  case  at  bar,  as  that  term  was  employed  in  the  case 
cited.  It  is  manifest  that  it  was  never  contemplated  by 
the  framers  of  the  constitution  that  this  court  should 
sit  in  review,  as  an  appellate  court,  of  such  a  question  as 
that  presented  by  the  record  in  the  case  at  bar,  viz., 
whether  or  not  the  highest  court  of  a  state  erred  in  hold- 
ing that  it  could  rightfully  determine  from  the  statements 
in  the  pleadings  filed  by  both  parties  to  a  controversy 
pending  before  it,  that  the  averments  of  an  answer  set 
forth  no  defense  to  the  claim  of  the  plaintiff.  *  * 

But  while  it  is  thus  settled  that  erroneous  decisions 
of  a  state  court  do  not  deny  due  process  so  long  as  they 
are  limited  to  questions  involving  conformity  with  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  the  state,  the  fact  remains  that 
such  decisions  must  not  deprive  a  person  of  those  funda- 
mental rights  which  the  Federal  constitution  guarantees. 
Such  rights  must  not  be  abridged  either  by  the  law  which 
the  court  is  administering  or  by  the  conduct  of  the  court 
itself  while  acting  under  it.  In  United  States  v.  Walker, 
109  U.  S.  258,  the  Court  said:  *'In  the  case  of  Windsor  v. 
McVeigh,  93  U.  S.  274,  Mr.  Justice  Field,  after  a  review 
of  the  cases  bearing  upon  this  subject,  announces  their 
result  as  follows :  *  The  doctrine  invoked  by  counsel,  that 
when  a  court  has  once  acquired  jurisdiction  it  has  a  right 
to  decide  every  question  which  arises  in  the  case,  and  its 
judgment,  however  erroneous,  can  not  be  collaterally 
assailed,  is  undoubtedly  correct  as  a  general  proposition, 
but  is  subject  to  many  qualifications  in  its  application. 
It  is  only  correct  when  the  court  proceeds,  after  acquir- 
ing jurisdiction  of  the  cause,  according  to  established 
modes  governing  the  class  to  which  the  case  belongs,  and 
does  not  transcend,  in  the  extent  or  character  of  its  judg- 
ment, the  law  which  is  applicable  to  it. ' ' '  Such  was  the 
basic  principle  of  the  decision  in  Wetmore  v.  Karrick, 
205  U.  S.  141,  in  which  the  Court  said :  *  *  To  sanction  a 
proceeding  rendering  a  new  judgment  without  notice  at  a 


§  127     SCOPE  OP  GUABANTT  OP  DUE  PROCESS        265 

subsequent  term,  and  hold  that  it  is  a  judgment  rendered 
with  jurisdiction,  and  binding  when  set  up  elsewhere, 
would  be  to  violate  the  fundamental  principles  of  due 
process  of  law  as  we  understand  them,  and  do  violence  to 
that  requirement  of  every  system  of  enlightened  juris- 
prudence which  judges  after  it  hears,  and  condemns  only 
after  a  party  has  had  an  opportunity  to  present  his 
defense.    By  the  amendment  and  new  judgment  the  pro- 
ceedings are  given  an  effect  against  the  defendant  in 
error  which  they  did  not  have  when  he  was  discharged 
from  them  by  the  judgment  of  dismissal.    By  the  judg- 
ment of  dismissal  the  court  lost  jurisdiction  of  the  cause 
and  of  the  person  of  the  defendant.    A  new  judgment 
in  personam  could  not  be  rendered  against  the  defendant 
until,  by  voluntary  appearance  or  due  service  of  process, 
the  court  had  agSn  Quired  jurisdiction  over  hL    As 
a  matter  of  common  right,  before  such  action  could  be 
taken  he  should  have  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  and 
present  objections  to  the  rendition  of  a  new  judgment,  if 
such  existed.'^    In  Wood  v.  Chesborough,  228  U.  S.  672, 
the  court  reiterated  the  long  established  doctrine  so 
clearly  announced  in  West  Chicago  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Illi- 
nois, 201  U.  S.  506,  to  the  effect  that  **A  state  court  can 
not,  by  resting  its  judgment  upon  some  ground  of  local 
or  general  law,  defeat  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  if  a  Federal  right 
or  immunity  was  specially  set  up  or  claimed  which,  if 
recognized  and  enforced,  would  require  a  different  judg- 
ment.'*   In  restating  that  rule  in  Wood  v.  Chesborough 
the  Court  said  *  *  that  the  sufficiency  of  the  Federal  right 
set  up  can  not  be  evaded  if  necessary  to  the  determina- 
tion of  the  case,  and,  it  may  be  admitted,  that  of  such 
necessity  this  court  must  in  each  instance  decide.    To  the 
extent  necessary  to  do  so  the  power  exists  as  a  necessary 
incident  to  a  decision  upon  the  claim  of  denial  of  the 
Federal  right. '  *    In  Chapman  v.  Goodnow,  123  U.  S.  540, 
it  was  held  that  *' If  a  Federal  question  is  fairly  presented 
by  the  record  and  its  decision  is  actually  necessary  to 


266  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  127 

the  determination  of  the  case,  a  judgment,  which  rejects 
the  claim,  but  avoids  all  reference  to  it,  is  as  much  against 
the  right,  within  the  meaning  of  Section  709  of  the  Re- 
vised Statutes,  as  if  it  had  been  specifically  referred  to 
and  the  right  directly  refused.'* 

§128.  Congress  as  a  protecting  and  enforcing  body. 

It  was  the  manifest  purpose  of  the  far-sighted  framers 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  not  only  to  arm  the  Fed- 
eral judiciary  with  the  negative  power  to  annul  all  state 
action,  executive,  legislative  and  judicial,  when  in  deroga- 
tion of  the  rights  possessed  by  national  citizens  as  such, 
but  also  to  arm  the  Congress  with  the  positive  power  to 
protect  and  enforce  such  rights  by  direct  legislation.  Sec- 
tion 5  of  the  amendment  provides  that  **The  Congress 
shall  have  power  to  enforce,  by  appropriate  legislation, 
the  provisions  of  this  article/*  In  Eolden  v.  Hardy, 
169  U.  S.  366,  the  Court  said:  ''The  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, which  was  finally  adopted  July  28,  1868,  largely 
expanded  the  power  of  the  Federal  courts  and  Congress, 
and  for  the  first  time  authorized  the  former  to  declare 
invalid  all  laws  and  judicial  decisions  of  the  states  abridg- 
ing the  rights  of  citizens  or  denying  them  the  benefit  of 
due  process  of  law.*'  In  view  of  the  fact  that  Congress 
had  already,  first,  such  express  power  to  legislate  for  the 
protection  of  all  rights  as  is  given  it  by  the  direct  grant 
contained  in  the  constitution ;  second,  that  it  had  already 
the  implied  power  or  duty  to  protect  its  citizens  in  the 
enjoyment  of  all  rights  conferred  on  them,  as  a  correla- 
tive to  the  grant  of  such  rights, — ^it  is  not  strange  that 
the  fresh  grant  of  legislative  power  contained  in  Section 
5  of  the  amendment  in  question  should  have  suggested 
to  some  minds  the  thought  that  Congress  had  been  thereby 
armed  with  an  express  power  to  enact  a  code  of  munici- 
pal  law  for  the  states,  providing,  among  other  things,  for 
the  enjoyment  of  due  process  by  citizens  of  the  several 
states.  The  first  answer  to  be  found  to  that  alarming 
and  far-reaching  suggestion  was  embodied  in  a  reductio 


§  128     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OF  DUB  PROCESS        267 

ad  horible,  which  maintained  that  the  admission  of  the 
existence  of  snch  a  new  power  in  Congress  would  mean 
a  radical  change  in  the  whole  theory  of  the  relations  of 
the  state  and  Federal  governments  to  each  other  and  of 
both  governments  to  the  people,  a  result  which  the  Su- 
preme Court,  in  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall  36, 
declared  was  not  intended. 

When  the  momentous  question  was  presented  in  the 
case  of  the  United  States  v.  Cruikshank,  92  U.  S.  542, 
the  Court  said:  **We  have  in  our  political  system  a  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  and  a  government  of  the 
several  states.  Each  one  of  these  governments  is  dis- 
tinct from  the  others,  and  each  has  citizens  of  its  own 
who  owe  it  allegiance,  and  whose  rights,  within  its  juris- 
diction, it  must  protect.  The  same  person  may  be  at  the 
same  time  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  and  a  citizen 
of  a  state,  but  his  rights  of  citizenship  under  one  of  these 
governments  will  be  different  from  those  he  has  under 
the  other.  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  74.  *  *  * 
The  Fourteenth  Amendment  prohibits  a  state  from  deny- 
ing to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws;  but  this  provision  does  not,  any  more 
than  the  one  which  precedes  it  and  which  we  have  just 
considered  add  anything  to  the  rights  which  one  citizen 
has  under  the  constitution  against  another.  The  equality 
of  the  rights  of  citizens  is  a  principle  of  republicanism. 
Every  republican  government  is  in  duty  bound  to  protect 
all  its  citizens  in  the  enjoyment  of  this  principle,  if  within 
its  power.  That  duty  was  originally  assumed  by  the 
states;  and  it  still  remains  there.  The  only  obligation 
resting  upon  the  United  States  is  to  see  that  the  states 
do  not  deny  the  right.  This  the  amendment  guarantees, 
but  no  more.  The  power  of  the  National  Government  is 
limited  to  the  enforcement  of  this  guaranty. ' '  Such  was 
the  prelude  to  the  Civil  Rights  Cases,  109  U.  S.  3,  in 
which  the  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Bradley, 
said:  "The  1st  section  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
which  is  the  one  relied  on,  after  declaring  who  shall  be 


268  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  128 

Icitizens  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  several  states,  is 
prohibitory  in  its  character,  and  prohibitory  upon  the 
states.  It  declares  that  ^No  state  shall  make  or  enforce 
any  law  which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States ;  nor  shall  any  state  de- 
prive any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law;  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  juris- 
diction the  equal  protection  of  the  laws/  It  is  state 
action  of  a  particular  character  that  is  prohibited.  Indi- 
vidual invasion  of  individual  rights  is  not  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  amendment.  In  has  a  deeper  and  broader 
scope.  It  nullifies  and  makes  void  all  state  legislation 
and  state  action  of  every  kind,  which  impairs  the  priv- 
ileges and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
or  which  injures  them  in  life,  liberty  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  or  which  denies  to  any  of  them  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  It  not  only  does  this,  but,  in 
order  that  the  national  will,  thus  declared,  may  not  be  a 
mere  brutum  fvlmen,  the  last  section  of  the  amendment 
invests  Congress  with  power  to  enforce  it  by  appropriate 
legislation.  To  enforce  whaif  To  enforce  the  prohibi- 
tion. To  adopt  appropriate  legislation  for  correcting 
the  effects  of  such  prohibited  state  laws  and  state  acts, 
and  thus  to  render  them  effectually  null,  void  and  innocu- 
ous. This  is  the  legislative  power  conferred  upon  Con- 
gress and  thus  is  the  whole  of  it.  It  does  not  invest 
,  Congress  with  power  to  legislate  upon  subjects  which  are 
within  the  domain  of  state  legislation;  but  to  provide 
modes  of  relief  against  state  legislation  or  state  action, 
of  the  kind  referred  to.  It  does  not  authorize  Congress 
to  create  a  code  of  municipal  law  for  the  regulation  of 
private  rights;  but  to  provide  modes  of  redress  against 
the  operation  of  state  laws,  and  the  action  of  state  officers, 
executive  or  judicial,  when  these  are  subversive  of  the 
fundamental  rights  specified  in  the  amendment.  Positive 
rights  and  privileges  are  undoubtedly  secured  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  but  they  are  secured  by  way  of 
prohibition  against  state  laws  and  state  proceedings 


^ 


§  128     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUB  PBOCESS        269 

affecting  those  rights  and  privileges,  and  power  given 
Congress  to  legislate  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  such 
prohibition  into  effect ;  and  such  legislation  must,  neces- 
sarily, be  predicated  upon  such  supposed  state  laws  or 
state  proceedings,  and  be  directed  to  the  correction  of 
their  operation  and  effect  A  quite  full  discussion  of  this 
aspect  of  the  amendment  may  be  found  in  United  States 
V.  Cruikshank,  92  U.  S.  542;  Va.  v.  Rives,  100  XT.  S.  313, 
and  Ex  parte  Va.,  100  U.  S.  339. '^ 

After  it  had  been  thus  firmly  settled  that  the  amend- 
ment in  question  *Moes  not  invest  Congress  with  power 
to  legislate  upon  subjects  which  are  within  the  domain  of 
state  legislation,*'  it  was  necessarily  held  in  Presser  v. 
Illinois,  116  U.  S.  252,  that  a  state  statute  prohibiting 
independent  military  companies  from  drilling  and  parad- 
ing, unless  licensed  by  the  governor,  does  not  deprive  a 
citizen  of  any  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Federal  consti- 
tution ;  In  re  Kemmler,  136  U.  S.  436,  that  a  state  statute 
is  valid  providing  for  the  electrocution  of  criminals ;  and 
in  Leeper  v.  Texas,  139  U.  S.  462,  **That  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  the  powers  of  states  in  dealing  with 
crime  within  their  borders  are  not  limited,  except  |that  no 
state  can  deprive  particular  persons,  or  classes  of  per- 
sons of  equal  and  impartial  justice  imder  the  law;  that 
law  in  its  regular  course  of  administration  through  courts 
of  justice  is  due  process,  and  when  secured  by  the  law  of 
the  state  the  constitutional  requirement  is  satisfied;  and 
that  due  process  is  so  secured  by  laws  operating  on  all 
alike,  and  not  subjecting  the  individual  to  the  arbitrary 
exercise  of  the  powers  of  government  unrestrained  by  the 
established  principles  of  private  right  and  distributive 
justice.  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516,  535,  and 
cases  cited. ' '  By  that  luminous  statement  the  truth  was 
emphasized  that  the  amendment  in  question  did  not  take 
away  from  any  state  the  inherent  sovereign  right,  pos- 
sessed by  it,  before  the  Union  was  formed,  to  regulate  its 
interior  life  by  a  system  of  law  deemed  by  it  necessary  to 
advance  its  special  local  wants  and  peculiar  interests  and 


270  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  128 

traditions.  The  amendment  in  question  does  not  require 
any  state  to  mould  legal  procedure  in  strict  compliance 
with  the  technical  rules  of  the  common  law,  nor  does  it 
deny  to  any  state  the  right  to  regulate  in  any  reasonable 
way  its  system  of  police  and  internal  order.  And  yet  the 
fact  remains  that  with  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  the  exercise  of  every  state  power  passed 
under  the  yoke  of  its  paramount  authority.  Every  state 
can  perform  every  function  precisely  as  it  did  before,  pro- 
vided that  its  performance  does  not  violate  the  mandate : 
*'No  state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall 
abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States ;  nor  shall  any  state  deprive  any  person  of 
life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law ;  nor 
deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws.*'  Any  exhaustive  treatment  of  the 
subject  must  therefore  involve;  first,  a  classification  of 
the  various  subject-matters  upon  which  state  power  oper- 
ates ;  second,  an  examination  of  the  sphere  within  which 
such  power  may  be  exercised  in  each  particular  case,  with- 
out an  infraction  of  the  limitations  which  the  amendment 
imposes. 

§129.  Due  process  the  common  heritage  of  all  the 
states.  An  effort  has  heretofore  been  made  to  emphasize 
the  all  important  fact  that  the  constitutional  principle 
embodied  in  the  phrase,  '^due  process  of  law,'*  a  purely 
English  invention,  is  the  common  heritage  of  all  the 
states,  and  drawn  from  a  single  source — chapter  39  of  the 
Great  Charter  of  1215.  Within  narrow  limits  the  history 
has  been  unfolded  of  the  famous  formula  from  its  advent 
in  the  Great  Charter  down  to  its  embodiment  in  the 
American  state  constitutions  adopted  in  1776  or  shortly 
thereafter.  Emphasis  was  then  given,  first,  to  the  fact 
that  during  the  five  hundred  and  sixty-one  years  interven- 
ing between  those  dates  the  meaning  of  the  formula  varied 
from  age  to  age,  each  generation  perceiving  in  it  its  own 
peculiar  conception  of  civil  liberty  and  law ;  second,  to  the 


§  129     SCOPE  OP  GUABANTY  QP  DXJB  PROCESS        271 

fact  that  our  American  states  adopted  it  with  the  mean« 
ing  attached  to  it  in  England,  not  at  the  time  of  the  emi- 
gration, but  at  the  time  of  the  severance  from  the  mother 
country  in  1776.  The  first  notable  extension  given  to  the 
old  formula  in  the  new  land  was  that  which  resulted  from 
its  application  to  all  three  departments  of  state  power, 
including  of  course  the  legislative.  The  founders  of  our 
state  systems  were  careful  to  abolish  the  idea  of  an 
omnipotent  parliament  and  the  possible  spoliation  or 
arbitrary  denial  of  personal  rights  upon  the  part  of  the 
executive  under  the  maxim  that  **the  King  can  do  no 
wrong.*'  In  the  words  of  a  great  jurist:  ''In  this 
country  written  constitutions  were  deemed  essential  to 
protect  the  rights  of  the  people  against  the  encroach- 
ments of  power  delegated  to  their  governments,  and  the 
provisions  of  Magna  Carta  were  incorporated  into  Bills 
of  Eights.  They  were  limitations  upon  all  the  powers  of 
government,  legislative,  as  well  as  executive  and  judicial. 
.  .  .  In  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  by  parity  of  rea- 
son, it  (due  process)  refers  to  that  law  of  the  land  in  each 
state,  which  derives  its  authority  from  the  inherent  and 
reserved  powers  of  the  state,  exerted  within  the  limits  of 
those  fundamental  principles  of  liberty  and  justice  which 
lie  at  the  base  of  all  our  civil  and  political  institutions, 
and  the  greatest  security  for  which  resides  in  the  right 
of  the  people  to  make  their  own  laws,  and  alter  them  at 
their  pleasure.**  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516. 
And  yet  despite  the  fact  that  all  of  the  states  drew  the 
famous  formula  from  a  common  source;  that  all  of 
them  accepted  it  with  the  meaning  attached  to  it  in  the 
mother  country  in  1776;  that  all  of  them  so  expanded 
it  as  to  embrace  all  three  departments  of  state  power, 
it  never  has  secured  to  all  persons  the  benefit  of  the 
same  laws  and  same  remedies  in  every  state.  As  each 
state  has  always  possessed  the  power  to  give  local  color 
to  its  own  conception  of  ''due  process,**  no  violation 
of  the  formula  occurs  so  long  as  the  law  of  a  particular 
state  is  executed  according  to  its  customary  forms  or 


272  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  129 

establisherl  usages.  Therefore  the  Court  sud  in  Bowman 
V.  Lewis,  101  U.  S.  22:  "The  Pourteenth  Amendment 
doe3  not  profess  to  secure  to  all  persona  in  the  United 
States  the  benefit  of  the  same  laws  and  the  same  reme- 
dies. Great  diversities  in  these  respects  may  exist  in  two 
states  separated  only  by  an  imaginary  line.  On  one  side 
of  this  line  may  be  a  right  of  trial  by  jury,  and  the  other 
side  no  sucli  right.  Each  state  prescribes  its  own  modes 
of  judicial  proceeding."  In  the  prior  case  of  Walker  v. 
Sauvinet,  92  U.  S.  90,  the  Court  had  said:  "The  states, 
so  far  as  tins  amendment  (Art.  VII)  is  concerned,  are 
left  to  regulate  trials  in  their  own  courts  in  their  own 
way.  A  trial  by  jury  in  suits  at  common  law  pending  in 
the  state  courts  is  not,  therefore,  a  privilege  or  immunity 
of  national  citizenship,  which  the  states  are  forbidden  by 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  abridge.  A  state  can  not 
deprive  a  person  of  his  properly  without  due  process  of 
law ;  but  this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  all  trials  in 
the  state  courts  affecting  the  property  of  persons  must 
be  by  jury.  This  requirement  of  the  constitution  is  met, 
if  the  trial  is  had  according  to  the  settled  course  of  judi- 
cial proceedings.  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  &  I.  Co.,  18 
How.  280.  Due  process  of  law  is  process  according  to 
the  law  of  the  state.  This  process  in  the  state  is  regu- 
lated by  the  law  of  the  state.  Our  power  over  the  law  is 
only  to  determine  whether  it  is  in  conflict  with  the  supreme 
law  of  the  land;  that  is  to  say,  with  the  constitution  and 
laws  of  the  United  States  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  or 
with  any  treaty  made  under  the  authority  of  the  United 
States."  In  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  the 
Court  said :  "  it  is  not  possible  to  hold  that  where  by  the 
laws  of  the  state  the  party  aggrieved  has,  as  regards  the 
issues  affecting  his  property,  a  fair  trial  in  a  court  of 
justice,  according  to  the  modes  of  proceeding  applicable 
to  such  case,  that  he  has  been  deprived  of  that  property 
without  due  process  of  law."  In  Kennard  v.  Louisiana, 
92  U.  S.  480,  where  the  question  was  whether  a  mode  of 
trying  the  title  to  an  office,  in  which  there  was  no  pro- 


§  129     SCOPE  OP  GUAEANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        273 

vision  for  a  jury,  was  dne  process  of  law,  its  validity 
was  affirmed.  The  Court  said:  **From  this  it  appears 
that  ample  provision  has  been  made  for  the  trial  of  the 
contestation  before  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction; 
for  bringing  the  party  against  whom  the  proceeding  is 
had  before  the  court  and  notifying  him  of  the  case  he  is 
required  to  meet;  for  giving  him  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard  in  his  defense ;  for  thie  deliberation  and  judgment 
of  the  court;  for  an  appeal  from  this  judgment  to  the 
highest  court  of  the  state,  and  for  hearing  and  judg- 
ment there.  A  mere  statement  of  the  facts  carries  with 
it  a  complete  answer  to  all  the  constitutional  objec- 
tions urged  against  the  validity  of  the  act. '  *  And  yet  the 
fact  that  due  process  of  law  is  process  according  to  the 
system  of  law  obtaining  in  each  state,  and  not  according 
to  any  general  law  of  the  United  States,  does  not  imply 
that  the  right  of  a  state  to  prescribe  its  own  laws  and 
procedure  is  without  limitations.  In  Hurtado  v.  Califor- 
nia, 110  U.  S.  516,  the  Court  said:  **But  it  is  not  to  be 
supposed  that  these  (state)  legislative  powers  are  abso- 
lute and  despotic,  and  that  the  amendment  prescribing 
due  process  of  law  is  too  vague  and  indefinite  to  operate 
as  a  practical  restraint.  It  is  not  every  act,  legislative 
in  form,  that  is  law.  Law  is  something  more  than  mere 
will  exerted  as  an  act  of  power.  •  •  •  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Mississippi,  in  a  well  considered  case  of  Brown 
V.  Comrs.,  50  Miss.  468,  speaking  of  the  meaning  of  the 
phrase  *due  process  of  law,'  says:  'The  principle  does 
not  demand  that  the  laws  existing  at  any  point  of  time 
shall  be  irrepealable,  or  that  any  forms  of  remedies  shall 
necessarily  continue.  It  refers  to  certain  fundamental 
rights  which  that  system  of  jurisprudence,  of  which  ours 
is  a  derivative,  has  always  recognized.  If  any  of  these  are 
disregarded  in  the  proceedings  by  which  a  person  is 
condenmed  to  the  loss  of  life,  liberty  or  property,  then 
the  deprivation  has  not  been  by  *due  process  of  law.' 
'It  must  be  conceded,'  said  this  Court,  speaking  through 
Mr.  Justice  Miller,  in  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Topeka,  20  Wall. 

Dae  Process — ^18 


274  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  129 

655-662,  *  that  there  are  such  rights  in  every  free  govern- 
ment beyond  the  control  of  the  state.  *  ' '  In  emphasizing 
the  same  principle  the  Court  said  in  Wynehamer  v.  The 
People,  13  N,  Y.  378:  **To  say,  as  has  been  suggested, 
that  'the  law  of  the  land,^  or  'due  process  of  law,'  may 
mean  the  very  act  of  legislation  which  deprives  the 
citizen  of  his  rights,  privileges  or  property,  leads  to  a 
simple  absurdity.  The  constitution  would  then  mean, 
that  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  his  property  or  rights, 
unless  the  legislature  shall  pass  a  law  to  effectuate  the 
wrong,  and  this  would  be  throwing  the  restraint  entirely 
away.  .  .  .  Where  rights  of  property  are  admitted  to 
exist,  the  legislature  can  not  say  they  shall  exist  no  longer ; 
nor  will  it  make  any  difference,  although  a  process  and  a 
tribunal  are  appointed  to  execute  the  sentence.  If  this 
is  the  'law  of  the  land,*  and  'due  process  of  law,'  within 
j  the  meaning  of  the  constitution,  then  the  legislature  is 
omnipotent.  It  may,  under  the  same  interpretation,  pass 
a  law  to  take  away  liberty  or  life  without  a  pre-existing 
cause,  appointing  judicial  and  executive  agencies  to  exe- 
cute its  will.  Property  is  placed  by  the  constitution  in 
the  same  category  with  liberty  and  lif  e. ''  Thus  it  appears 
that  while  each  state  is  given  a  wide  latitude  and  broad 
discretion  as  to  the  forms  and  modes  in  which  it  may 
regulate  judicial  pi^ocedure  and  the  rights  of  property 
within  its  limits,  all  such  state  regulation  offends  against 
I  the  Federal  constitution  when  it  fails  to  provide  due 
I  process  by  ignoring  "certain  fundamental  rights  which 
1  that  systeni  of  jurisprudence,  of  which  ours  is  a  deriva- 
tive, has  always  recognized. ' ' 

§130.  Notable  attempts  to  define  due  process.    The 

gravest  desideratum  in  English  and  American  law  is  and 
has  ever  been  a  clear,  comprehensive  and  authoritative 
definition  of  the  elements  which,  under  all  circumstances 
and  conditions,  constitute  due  process  of  law,  as  a  guar- 
anty of  "certain  fundamental  rights  which  that  system 
of  jurisprudence,  of  which  ours  is  a  derivative,  has  always 


L 


§  130     SC50PE  OP  GUARANTY  OF  DUE  PROCESS        275 

recognized.  ^ '  The  mother  country,  from  which  the  doc- 
trine  of  due  process  was  drawn,  furnished  no  such  defini- 
tion  to  the  colonies ;  and,  after  they  were  transformed  into 
sovereign  states,  each  armed  with  a  wide  discretion  as  to 
the  form  in  which  and  the  extent  to  which  due  process 
should  be  recognized,  they  naturally  failed  to  evolve  a 
definition  sufficiently  authoritative  to  win  the  acceptance 
of  all.  Not  until  the  guaranty  of  due  process  passed  into 
the  Federal  constitution,  first,  in  the  Fifth  Amendment  as 
a  limitation  on  the  powers  of  the  Federal  government; 
second,  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  as  a  limitation  on 
the  powers  of  the  state  governments,— did  the  hope  arise 
'  of  an  authoritative  definition  from  a  single  tribunal 
armed  with  the  power  to  enforce  its  mandates.  The  good 
work  began  in  earnest  when  in  the  Dartmouth  College 
case,  4  Wheat.  518,  involving  the  validity  of  an  act  of  a 
state  legislature  taking  away  franchises  and  rights  vested 
in  the  college  by  a  prior  charter,  the  contention  was  made 
that  such  act  violated  that  provision  of  the  New  Hamp- 
shire constitution  which  declared  that  no  one  shall  be 
deprived  of  ''property,  privileges  or  immunities  but  by 
the  judgment  of  his  peers  or  the  law  of  the  land.'* 
Mr.  Webster,  in  defining  the  term  due  process  in  its  rela- 
tion to  substantive  rights  as  well  as  procedure,  in  a  case 
in  which  the  act,  in  the  nature  of  a  judgment  operating 
on  rights  already  acquired,  was  directed  against  a  single 
corporation,  and  passed  without  giving  to  it  a  legal 
opportunity  to  defend,  said:  ''By  the  law  of  the  land  is 
most  clearly  intended  the  general  law ;  a  law  which  hears 
before  it  condenms;  which  proceeds  upon  inquiry,  and 
renders  judgment  only  after  trial.  The  meaning  is  that 
every  citizen  shall  hold  his  life,  liberty,  property  and 
immunities  under  the  protection  of  the  general  rules 
which  govern  society.  Everything  which  may  pass  under 
the  form  of  an  enactment  is  not  therefore  to  be  consid- 
ered the  law  of  the  land.  If  this  act  were  so,  acts  of 
attainder,  bills  of  pains  and  penalties,  acts  of  confiscation, 
acts  reversing  judgments,  and  acts  directly  transferring 


276  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  130 

one  man's  estate  to  another,  legislative  judgments, 
decrees,  and  forfeitures,  in  all  possible  forms,  Vonld  be 
the  law  of  the  land.  Such  a  strange  construction  would 
render  constitutional  provisions  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance completely  inoperative  and  void.  It  would  tend 
directly  to  establish  the  union  of  all  powers  in  the  le^- 
lature.  There  would  be  no  general  permanent  law  for 
courts  to  administer  or  men  to  live  under."  The  famous 
case  in  question  was  decided  at  the  February  term,  1819, 
and  at  that  term  wm  also  decided  Bank  of  Columbia  v. 
Okely,  4  Wheat  235,  invohing  the  validity  of  the  act  of 
the  Assembly  of  Maryland  of  1793,  incorporating  the 
bank,  and  giving  to  it  a  summary  process  by  execution, 
in  the  nature  of  an  attachment,  against  its  debtors  who 
had,  by  express  consent,  in  writing,  made  the  bonds,  bills, 
or  notes,  by  them  drawn  or  indorsed,  negotiable  at  the 
bank.  In  holding  that  the  act  in  question  was  not  repug- 
nant to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  or  to  that  of 
Maryland  the  Court  said :  "That  this  view  of  the  subject 
is  giving  full  effect  to  the  Seventh  Amendment  of  the  Con- 
stitution, is  not  only  deducible  from  the  general  intent, 
but  from  the  express  wording  of  the  article  referred  to. 
Had  the  terms  been,  that  'the  trial  by  jury  shall  be  pre- 
served,' it  might  have  been  contended  that  they  were 
imperative,  and  could  not  be  dispensed  with.  But  the 
words  are,  that  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  pre- 
served, which  places  it  on  the  foot  of  a  lex  pro  se  intra- 
ducta,  and  the  benefit  of  it  may  therefore  be  relinquished. 
As  to  the  words  from  Magna  Carta,  incorporated  into  the 
constitution  of  Maryland,  after  volumes  spoken  and  writ- 
ten with  a  view  to  their  exposition,  the  good  sense  of 
mankind  at  length  settled  down  to  this :  that  they  were 
intended  to  secure  the  individual  from  the  arbitrary 
exercises  of  the  powers  of  government,  unrestrained  by 
the  established  principles  of  private  rights  and  distribu- 
tive justice."  After  that  definition  of  the  "law  of  the 
land"  by  Mr.  Justice  Johnson,  quoted  in  many  cases,  and 
ranked  with  that  of  Webster,  the  subject  was  involved  in 


§  130     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUB  PROCESS        277 

serious  confusion  by  the  indefensible  decision  rendered 
by  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  in  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  and 
Improvement  Co.,  18  How.  272,  in  which  the  court  under- 
took to  define,  for  the  first  time,  the  term  **due  process 
of  law*'  as  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment,  and  to 
adjudge  that  such  due  process  had  not  been  denied  Samiuel 
Swartwout  in  a  case  in  which  his  land  had  been  sold 
under  a  warrant  issued  by  the  solicitor  of  the  treasury 
under  an  act  of  Congress  of  May  15, 1820,  authorizing  the 
issuance  of  such  warrant.  It  was  admitted  by  the  Court 
that  the  proceedings  fixing  the  sum  of  $1,374,119.65  as  a 
lien  on  the  land  of  Swartwout  were  purely  ex  parte;  that 
he  had  no  notice  from  or  hearing  before  the  purely  min- 
isterial ofl&cers  by  whom  that  so-called  judgment  was 
rendered;  and  that  the  purely  ministerial  officers  who 
attempted  to  render  the  so-called  judgment  had  no  judi- 
cial powers  whatever.  The  definition  given  of  due  process 
in  that  case  is  this:  **The  words  *due  process  of  law,* 
were  undoubtedly  intended  to  convey  the  same  meaning 
as  the  words  *by  the  law  of  the  land,'  in  Magna  Carta. 
Lord  Coke,  in  his  commentary  on  these  words  (21  inst. 
50),  says  they  mean  due  process  of  law.  The  constitu- 
tions which  had  been  adopted  by  the  several  states  before 
the  foundation  of  the  Federal  constitution,  following  the 
language  of  the  Great  Charter  more  closely,  generally 
contained  the  words,  *but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers, 
or  the  law  of  the  land.*  **  Nothing  need  be  added  here  to 
the  demonstration  heretofore  made  that  the  deadly  origi- 
nal sin  embodied  in  that  definition  consisted  of  the  refusal 
to  accept  the  vital  historical  fact  that  the  English  con- 
stitutional law  that  passed  into  our  first  state  constitu- 
tions, and  thence  into  the  first  eight  amendments  to  the 
Federal  constitution,  was  drawn  from  the  reformed 
English  system  as  Blackstone  defined  it  in  1758,  and  not 
from  the  unref ormed  system  as  Coke  described  it  in  1632, 
when  the  Star  Chamber  and  High  Commission  were 
intact.  In  openly  repudiating  the  definition  of  due  process 
contained  in  the  case  in  question,  the  Court,  in  Hurtado 


273 


DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§130 


V.  Califoniia,  110  17.  S.  516,  said:  "It  is  urged  upon  ns, 
however,  in  argument,  that  the  claim  made  in  behalf  of 
the  plaintiff  in  error  is  supiwrted  by  the  decision  of  this 
coart  in  Murray  v.  Hoboken  Land  and  Improvement 
Ccmipany,  18  How.  272.  The  point  in  the  ease  cited  arose 
in  reference  to  a  Bnnunary  proceeding,  questioned  on 
that  account,  as  due  process  of  law.  The  answer  was : 
however  exceptional  it  may  be,  aa  tested  by  definitions 
and  principles  of  ordinary  procedure,  nevertheless,  this, 
in  substance,  has  been  inmiemorially  the  actual  law  of  the 
laud  and,  therefore,  is  due  process  of  law.  But  to  hold 
that  such  a  diaracteristic  is  essential  to  due  process  of 
law,  would  be  to  deny  every  quality  of  the  law  but  its  age, 
and  to  render  incapable  of  progress  or  improvement.  It 
would  be  to  stamp  upon  our  jurisprudence  the  unchange- 
ahleness  attributed  to  the  laws  of  the  Medes  and  Per- 
sians, This  would  be  all  the  more  singular  and  surpris- 
ing, in  this  quick  and  active  age,  when  we  consider  that 
owing  to  the  progressive  development  of  legal  ideas  and 
institutions,  the  words  of  Magna  Carta  stood  for  very 
different  things  at  the  time  of  the  separation  of  the  Amer- 
ican colonies  from  what  they  represented  originally." 

Turning  from  the  definitions  given  of  the  due  process 
clause  as  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  like  defini- 
tions, often  mere  descriptions  of  due  process,  as  embod- 
ied in  the  Fourteenth,  we  find  the  Court  saying  in  Kon- 
nard  v.  Louisiana,  92  U.  S.  480,  that,  "It  is  substantially 
admitted  by  counsel  in  the  argument  that  such  is  not  the 
case  (denial  of  due  process)  if  it  has  been  done  'In  the 
due  course  of  legal  proceedings,  according  to  those  rules 
and  forms  which  have  been  established  for  the  protection- 
of  piivate  rights.'  From  this  it  appears  that  ample  pro- 
vision bas  been  made  for  the  trial  of  the  contestation 
before  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction;  for  bringing  the 
party  against  whom  the  proceeding  is  had  before  the 
court,  and  notifying  him  of  the  case  he  is  required  to 
meet ;  for  giving  him  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  bis 
defense;  for  the  deliberation  of  the  court;  for  an  appeal 


~\ 


§  130     SCOPE  OP  GUABANTY  OP  DUE  PEOCESS        279 

from  this  judgment  to  the  highest  court  of  the  state,  and 
for  hearing  and  judgment  there.  A  mere  statement  of  the 
facts  carries  with  it  a  complete  answer  to  all  the  consti- 
tutional objections  urged  against  the  validity  of  the  act.  * ' 
In  Pennoyer  v.  Neff ,  95  XJ.  S.  714,  the  Court  said :  ' '  What- 
ever  difficulty  may  be  experienced  in  giving  to  those  terms 
(due  process  clause  of  Fourteenth  Amendment)  a  defini- 
tion which  will  embrace  every  possible  exertion  of  power 
affecting  private  rights,  and  exclude  such  as  is  forbidden, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  of  their  meaning  when  applied  to 
judicial  proceedings.  They  then  mean  a  course  of  legal 
proceedings  according  to  those  rules  and  principles  which 
have  been  established  in  our  systems  of  jurisprudence  for 
the  protection  and  enforcement  of  private  rights.  To 
give  such  proceedings  any  validity,  there  must  be  a 
tribunal  competent  by  its  constitution — ^that  is,  by  the  law 
of  its  creation — ^to  pass  upon  the  subject  matter  of  the 
suit ;  and,  if  that  involves  merely  a  determination  of  the 
personal  liability  of  the  defendant,  he  must  be  brought 
within  its  jurisdiction  by  service  of  process  within  the 
state,  or  his  voluntary  appearance.  *  ^ 

In  Ex  parte  Wall,  107  U-  S.  265,  the  Court  said:  ^*It 
is  a  mistaken  idea  that  due  process  of  law  requires  a 
plenary  suit  and  a  trial  by  jury,  in  all  cases  where  prop- 
erty or  personal  rights  are  involved.  The  important  right 
of  personal  Uberty  is  generally  determined  by  a  single 
judge,  on  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  using  affidavits  or 
depositions  for  proofs,  where  facts  are  to  be  established. 
Assessments  for  damages  and  benefits  occasioned  by 
public  improvements  are  usually  made  by  commissioners 
in  a  summary  way.  Conflicting  claims  of  creditors, 
amounting  to  thousands  of  dollars,  are  often  settled  by 
the  courts  on  affidavits  or  depositions  alone.  And  courts 
of  chancery,  bankruptcy,  probate  and  admiralty  admin- 
ister immense  fields  of  jurisprudence  without  trial  by 
jury.  In  all  cases,  that  kind  of  procedure  i^  due  process 
of  law,  which  is  suitable  and  proper  to  the  nature  of  the 
case,  and  sanctioned  by  the  established  customs  and 


280  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  130 

usages  of  the  courts."  In  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  Dist 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  the  Court  said:  "It  is  sufficient  to 
observe  here,  that  by  *due  process'  is  meant  one  which, 
following  the  forms  of  law,  is  appropriate  to  the  case  and 
just  to  the  parties  to  be  afFected.  It  must  be  pursued  in 
the  ordinary  mode  prescribed  by  law ;  it  must  be  adapted 
to  the  end  to  be  attained;  and  wherever  it  is  necessary 
for  the  protection  of  the  parties,  it  must  give  them  an 
opportunity  to  be  heard  respecting  the  justice  of  the 
judgment  sought.  The  clause  in  question  means,  there- 
fore, that  there  can  be  no  proceeding  against  life,  liberty 
or  property  which  may  result  in  the  deprivation  of  either, 
without  the  observance  of  those  general  rules  established 
in  our  system  of  jurisprudence  for  the  security  of  private 
rights."  In  Freeland  v.  "Williama,  131  U.  S.  405,  the 
Court  said  "that  the  remedy  provided  by  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  State,  as  carried  out  by  the  ancient  proceed- 
ing of  a  bill  in  a  court  of  equity,  was  not  void  for  want 
of  due  process  of  law,  nor  in  conflict  with  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States."  In  BeU's  Gap  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Pcnn.,  134  U.  S.  232,  the  Court  said:  "The 
process  of  taxation  does  not  require  the  same  kind  of 
notice  as  is  required  in  a  suit  at  law,  or  even  in  pro- 
ceedings for  taking  private  property  under  the  power  of 
eminent  domain.  It  involves  no  violation  of  due  process 
of  law  when  it  is  executed  according  to  customary  forms 
and  established  usages,  or  in  subordination  to  the  princi- 
ples which  underlie  them."  In  Caldwell  v.  Texas,  137 
tJ.  S.  692,  the  Court  said :  * '  Law,  in  its  regular  course  of 
administration  through  courts  of  justice,  is  due  process, 
and  when  secured  by  the  law  of  the  state,  the  constitu- 
tional requisition  is  satisfied.  2  Kent,  Com.  13.  And  due 
process  is  so  secured  by  laws  operating  on  all  alike,  and 
not  subjecting  the  individual  to  the  arbitrary  exerdse  of 
the  powers  of  government,  unrestrained  by  the  estab- 
lished principles  of  private  right  and  distributive  justice. 
Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Okely,  4  Wheat  235."  In  Hallinger 
v.  Davis,  146  IT.  S.  314,  in  whidi  it  was  held  that  trials 


§  130     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        281 

had  under  the  New  Jersey  statute  authorizing  persons 
indicted  for  murder  to  plead  guilty  and  submit  the  degree 
of  their  guilt  to  the  determination  of  the  court,  are  due 
process — ^the  Court  said:  **In  Re  Kemmler,  136  IT.  S. 
436,  a  fruitless  effort  was  made  to  induce  this  Court  to 
hold  that  a  statute  of  the  State  of  New  York,  providing 
that  punishment  of  death  should  be  inflicted  by  an  elec- 
trical apparatus,  was  void  under  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, and  it  was  said :  ^  The  enactment  of  this  statute  was 
in  itself  within  the  legitimate  sphere  of  the  legislative 
power  of  the  state  and  in  the  observance  of  those  general 
rules  prescribed  by  our  system  of  jurisprudence;  and  the 
Legislature  of  the  State  of  New  York  determined  that  it 
did  not  inflict  cruel  and  unusual  punishment,  and  its 
courts  have  sustained  that  determination.  We  can  not 
perceive  that  the  state  has  thereby  abridged  the  privi- 
leges or  immunities  of  the  petitioner,  or  deprived  him  of 
due  process  of  law.'  Applying  the  principles  of  these 
decisions  to  the  case  before  us  we  are  readily  brought  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  appellant,  in  voluntarily  availing 
himself  of  the  provisions  of  the  statute  and  electing  to 
plead  guilty,  was  deprived  of  no  right  or  privilege  within 
the  protection  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment^'  In 
Giozza  V.  Tieman,  148  U.  S.  657,  the  Court  said:  **The 
amendment  does  not  take  from  the  states  these  powers  of 
police  that  were  reserved  at  the  time  the  original  consti- 
tution was  adopted.  Undoubtedly  it  forbids  any  arbi- 
trary deprivation  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  and  secures 
equal  protection  to  all  under  like  circumstances  in  the 
enjoyment  of  their  rights;  but  it  was  not  designed  to 
interfere  with  the  power  of  the  state  to  protect  the  lives, 
liberty,  and  property  of  its  citizens,  and  to  promote  their 
health,  morals,  education,  and  good  order.  Barbier  v. 
Connolly,  113  U.  S.  27,  31 ;  Re  Kemmler,  136  U.  S.  436. 
Nor  in  respect  of  taxation  was  the  amendment  intended 
to  compel  the  state  to  adopt  an  iron  rule  of  equality ;  to 
prevent  the  classification  of  property  for  taxation  at  dif- 
ferent rates;  or  to  prohibit  legislation  in  that  regard, 


282  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  130 

special  either  in  the  extent  of  which  it  operates  or  the 
objects  sought  to  be  obtained  by  it.  It  is  enough  that 
there  is  no  discrimination  in  favor  of  cftie  against  another 
of  the  same  elasB.  In  Seott  v.  McNeal,  154  U.  S.  34,  in 
whicli  it  was  held  that  "No  judgment  of  a  court  is  due 
process  of  law,  if  rendered  without  jurisdiction  in  the 
court,  or  without  notice  to  the  party" — the  Court 
reaffirmed  the  definition  of ' '  due  process  of  law ' '  as  given 
by  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Penoyer  v.  NefF,  95  U.  S.  714. 
In  Holden  v.  Hardy,  169  U.  S.  366,  it  was  held  that 
a  state  statute  limiting  the  period  of  employment  of 
working  men  in  underground  mines,  or  in  the  smelt- 
ing, redaction,  or  refining  of  ores  or  metals,  to  eight 
hours  a  day  and  making  its  violation  a  misdemeanor, 
is  a  constitutional  exercise  of  the  police  power — the 
Court  said:  "This  Court  has  never  attempted  to  de- 
fine with  precision  the  words  'due  process  of  law,'  nor 
is  it  necessary  to  do  so  in  this  case.  It  is  sufficient  to  say 
that  there  are  certain  immutable  principles  of  justice 
which  inhere  in  the  very  idea  of  free  government  which 
no  member  of  the  Union  may  disregard,  as  that  no  man 
shall  be  condemned  in  his  person  or  property  without  duo 
notice  and  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  in  his  defense." 
In  Reetz  v.  Michigan,  188  TJ.  S.  505,  in  which  it  was  held 
that  due  process  requires  no  special  provision  for  grant- 
ing a  hearing  to  applicants  for  registration  by  the  board 
of  registration  in  medicine  when  provision  is  made  for 
meetings  of  the  board  at  specified  times  at  the  state  capi- 
tol^tlie  Court,  adopting  the  language  of  Mr.  Justice 
Matthews  in  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516,  said : 
"  '  It  follows  that  any  legal  proceeding  enforced  by  public 
authority,  whether  sanctified  by  age  and  custom,  or  newly 
devised  in  the  discretion  of  the  legislative  power,  in  fur- 
therance of  the  general  public  good,  which  regards  and 
preserves  these  principles  of  liberty  and  justice,  must  be 
held  to  be  due  process  of  law.*  Neither  is  the  right  of 
appeal  essential  to  due  process  of  law.  In  nearly  every 
state  are  statutes  giving,  in  criminal  cases  of  a  minor 


§  130     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        283 

nature,  a  single  trial,  without  any  right  of  review.'*  In 
the  recent  and  important  case  of  Ochoa  v.  Hernandez, 
230  XJ.  S.  139,  in  which  the  construction  of  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  was  involved  the  Court, 
speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Pitney,  said :  **  Without  the 
guaranty  of  *due  process'  the  right  of  private  property 
can  not  be  said  to  exist,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  known 
to  our  laws.  The  principle,  known  to  the  common  law 
before  Magna  Carta,  was  embodied  in  that  Charter 
(2  Coke,  Inst  45,  50),  and  has  been  recognized  since  the 
Revolution  as  among  the  safest  foundations  of  our  insti- 
tutions. Whatever  else  may  be  uncertain  about  the  defini- 
tion of  the  term  *due  process  of  law,'  all  authorities  agree 
that  it  inhibits  the  taking  of  one  man's  property  and 
giving  it  to  another,  contrary  to  settled  usages  and  modes 
of  procedure,  and  without  notice  or  an  opportunity  for  a 
hearing.  *'  This  long  procession  of  definitions,  or  rather 
descriptions  of  the  elements  that  constitute  due  process, 
will  end  with  definitions  of  due  process  given  by 
three  famous  text  writers  which  have  received  general 
approval.  Mr.  Justice  Story  in  his  Commentary  on  the 
Constitution  (5  ed.  1945),  has  said:  **Due  process  in 
each  particular  c&se  means  such  an  exertion  of  the  powers 
of  government  as  the  settled  maxinls  of  law  permit  and 
sanction,  and  under  such  safeguards  for  the  protection 
of  individual  rights  as  those  maxims  prescribe  for  the 
class  of  cases  to  which  the  one  being  dealt  with 
belongs.'*  Kent,  in  his  Commentaties  (II,  3)  says:  **It 
may  be  received  as  a  self-evident  proposition,  universally 
understood  and  acknowledged  throughout  this  country, 
that  no  person  can  be  taken  or  imprisoned,  or  disseised 
of  his  freehold,  or  liberties,  or  estates,  or  exiled  or  con- 
demned, or  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  unless 
by  the  law  of  the  land,  or  the  judgment  of  his  peers.  The 
words,  by  the  law  of  the  land,  as  used  in  Magna  Carta, 
in  reference  to  this  subject,  are  understood  to  mean  due 
process  of  law,  that  is,  by  indictment  or  presentment  of 
good  and  lawful  men;  and  this,  says  Lord  Coke,  is  the 


284  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  130 

true  sense  and  exposition  of  those  words. "  Judge  Cooley 
in  his  Constitutional  Limitations  (354-55)  says:  "Per- 
haps no  definition  is  more  often  quoted  than  that  given 
by  Mr.  Webster  in  the  Dartmouth  College  Case  [4  Wheat. 
518] :  'By  the  law  of  the  land  is  most  clearly  intended 
the  general  law :  A  law  which  hears  before  it  condemns ; 
which  proceeds  upon  inquiry,  and  renders  judgment  only 
after  trial.  The  meaning  is  that  every  citizen  shall  hold 
life,  liberty,  property,  and  immunities,  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  general  rules  which  govern  society.  Every- 
thing which  may  pass  under  the  form  of  an  enactment  is 
not,  therefore  to  be  considered  the  law  of  the  land. '  .  .  . 
While  every  man  has  a  right  to  require  that  his  own  con- 
troversies shall  be  judged  by  the  same  roles  which  are 
applied  in  the  controversies  of  his  neighbors,  the  whole 
community  is  also  entitled,  at  all  times,  to  demand  the 
protection  of  the  ancient  principles  which  shield  private 
rights  against  arbitrary  interference,  even  though  snch 
interference  may  be  under  a  rule  impartial  in  its  opera- 
tion. It  is  not  the  partial  nature  of  the  rule,  so  much  as 
its  arbitrary  and  unusual  character,  that  condemns  it  as 
unknown  to  the  law  of  the  land." 

§  131.  Difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  complete  and  authori- 
tative definition— The  rule  of  inclusion  and  ezcltuion. 

No  critical  mind  ciii  examine  the  foregping  definitions  of 
due  process,  if  such  they  may  be  called,  without  being 
impressed  with  the  fact  that  the  basic  diflBculty  in  the 
way  of  a  complete  and  authoritative  definition  applicable 
to  all  cases  consists  of  the  radical  differences  existing 
between  the  many  subject-matters  to  which  it  mnst  be 
applied.  A  proceeding  in  which  the  taking  is  enforced 
by  the  sovereignty  of  a  state  through  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion, or  througli  that  of  eminent  domain,  where  the 
process  does  not  require  the  same  kind  of  a  tribunal 
or  the  same  kind  of  a  notice  as  is  required  in  a  suit  at 
law,  certainly  differs  very  widely  from  a  litigation 
between  private  individuals  in  a  court  whose  jurisdiction 


§  131     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        285 

must  be  perfect,  and  in  which  equal  law  must  be  admin- 
istered after  adequate  legal  notice  and  a  hearing  con- 
ducted according  to  traditional  law.  In  the  words  of 
Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  in  two  notable  cases:  **In  judging 
what  is  *due  process  of  law^  respect  must  be  had  to  the 
cause  and  object  of  the  taking,  whether  under  the  taxing 
power,  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  or  the  power  of 
assessment  for  local  improvements,  or  none  of  these ;  and, 
if  found  to  be  suitable  or  admissible  in  the  special  case, 
it  will  be  adjudged  to  be  *due  process  of  law;'  but,  if 
found  to  be  arbitrary,  oppressive,  and  unjust,  it  may  be 
declared  to  be  not  *due  process  of  law.'  '*  Davidson  v. 
New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97.  Concurring  opinion.  Again : 
*  *  The  process  of  taxation  does  not  require  the  same  kind 
of  notice  as  is  required  in  a  suit  at  law,  or  even  in  proceed- 
ings for  taking  private  property  under  the  power  of 
eminent  domain.  It  involves  no  violation  of  due  process 
of  law,. when  it  is  executed  according  to  customary  forms 
and  established  usages,  or  in  subordination  to  the  princi- 
ples which  underlie  them.*'  Bell's  Gap  R.  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania, 134  U.  S.  232.  In  the  presence  of  such  diflS- 
culties  rendering  impossible  any  comprehensive  and 
explicit  definition  equally  applicable  to  an  ever  changing 
series  of  widely  different  subject-matters,  the  Court,  in 
Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  wisely  resolved  to 
adopt,  as  the  only  practical  expedient,  the  rule  of  inclu- 
sion and  exclusion,  stated  in  the  following  form :  *  *  But, 
apart  from  the  inmainent  risk  of  a  failure  to  give  any 
definition  which  would  be  at  once  perspicuous,  compre- 
hensive and  satisfactory,  there  is  wisdom,  we  think,  in 
the  ascertaining  of  the  intent  and  application  of  such  an 
important  phrase  in  the  Federal  constitution,  by  the 
gradual  process  of  judicial  inclusion  and  exclusion,  as 
the  cases  presented  for  decision  shall  require,  with  the 
reasoning  on  which  such  decisions  may  be  founded.  * '  In  \ 
other  words,  when  a  given  case  is  presented,  it  must  first 
be  classified,  before  the  question  can  be  asked  whether  or 
no  due  process  has  been  denied  when  the  deprivation  is 


DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§131 


tested  by  the  special  standard  appropriate  to  such  a  sub- 
ject-matter. ThuB  under  the  rule  of  inclusion  and  exclu- 
sion the  mental  process  involves,  first,  a  classification  of 
the  particQlar  subject-matter ;  second,  a  selection  of  the 
standard  of  due  process  applicable  to  it;  third,  the  appE- 
cation  of  that  standard  to  the  subject-matter  as  classified. 
So  in  the  last  analysis  the  real  duty  imposed  npon  the 
text  writer  is  that  of  offering  to  the  practitioner  the  rules 
which,  under  the  decided  cases,  will  best  enable  Mm,  first, 
to  classify  the  subject-matter  of  his  suit ;  second,  to  deter- 
mine what  are  the  essential  elements  of  due  process  when 
such  a  subject-matter  is  involved. 

§  132.  Fundamental  requisites  of  due  process — ^Notice. 

All  the  authorities  agree  that  the  fundamental  requisites 
of  due  process  are,  first,  adequate  notice ;  second,  a  hear- 
ing; third,  the  application  of  equal  laws ;  fourth,  jurisdic- 
tion, when  proceedings  before  a  regularly  constituted 
court  are  in  question.  Of  each  in  its  order.  A  certain  kind 
of  notice  is  required  in  judicial  proceedings  before  courts 
strictly  organized ;  another  in  proceedings  before  admin- 
istrative boards  and  officers ;  another  in  the  levy  and  col- 
lection of  taxes ;  and  still  another  in  cases  involving  public 
improvements.  In  all  cases,  it  must  be  remembered,  that 
the  reasonableness  of  the  notice  required  under  a  state 
statute  involves  a  vital  element  of  due  process,  and  that 
the  decision  of  a  state  court  on  that  question  is  not  binding 
on  the  Federal  Supreme  Court.  In  Scott  v.  McNeal,  154 
U.  S.  34,  the  Court  said:  "Upon  a  writ  of  error  to 
review  the  judgment  of  the  highest  court  of  a  state  npon 
the  ground  that  the  judgment  was  against  a  right  claimed 
under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  tiiis  court  is 
no  more  bound  by  that  court's  construction  of  a  statute 
of  the  territory,  or  of  the  state,  when  the  question  is 
whether  the  statute  provided  for  the  notice  required  to 
constitute  due  process  of  law,  than  when  the  question  is 
whether  the  statute  created  a  contract  which  has  been 
impaired  by  a  subsequent  law  of  the  state,  or  whether 


^ 


§  132     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        287 

the  original  liability  created  by  the  statute  was  such  that 
a  judgment  upon  it  has  not  been  given  due  faith  and 
credit  in  the  courts  of  another  state.  In  every  such  case, 
this  court  must  decide  for  itself  the  true  construction  of 
the  statute.  Huntington  v.  AtbuU,  146  U.  S.  657, 683, 684 ; 
Mobile  and  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Tennessee,  153  U.  S.  486.  No 
judgment  of  a  court  is  due  process  of  law,  if  rendered 
without  jurisdiction,  or  without  notice  to  the  party.  *  *  In 
Boiler  V.  Holly,  176  U.  S.  398,  the  Court  said:  **The 
question  in  dispute,  then,  is  whether  a  notice  served  upon 
the  plaintiff  in  Rockingham  county,  Virginia,  December 
30, 1890,  to  appear  in  Limestone  county,  Texas,  on  Janu- 
ary 5>  1891,  to  answer  the  foreclosure  suit  is  due  process 
of  law  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment f  Without  undertaking  to  determine  what  is  a  rea- 
sonable notice  to  non-residents,  we  are  of  opinion,  under 
the  circumstances  of  this  case,  and  considering  the  dis- 
tance between  the  place  of  service  and  the  place  of  return, 
that  five  days  was  not  a  reasonable  notice,  or  due  process 
of  law ;  that  the  judgment  obtained  upon  such  notice  was 
not  binding  upon  the  defendant  Roller,  and  constitutes  no 
bar  to  the  prosecution  of  this  action.^*  But  as  the  power 
to  prescribe  the  length  of  the  notice  is  vested  in  the  legis- 
lature, a  very  clear  case  of  unreasonableness  must  be 
made  out  before  the  courts  will  interfere.  In  the  case  of 
Bellingham  Bay,  etc,  R.  Co.  v.  New  Whatcom,  172  XJ.  S. 
314,  in  which  a  railroad  company  complained  that  a  reas- 
sessment against  its  property  for  the  cost  of  a  local 
improvement  was  wanting  in  due  process,  because  the 
notice  was  not  reasonable,  the  Court  said:  **The  fact 
that  the  owner  after  being  notified  is  required  to  appear 
and  file  his  objections  within  ten  days,  is  thus  the  sole 
ground  of  complaint.  But  how  many  days  can  the  courts 
fix  as  a  minimum?  How  much  time  can  be  adjudged 
necessary  as  a  matter  of  law  for  preparing  and  filing 
objections  1  How  many  and  intricate  and  diflBcult  are  the 
questions  involved?  Regard  must  always  be  had  to  the 
probable  necessities  of  ordinary  cases.    No  hardship  to 


P! 


288  DUE  PaOCESS  OF  LAW  §  132 

a  particular  individual  can  invalidate  a  genera!  rule." 
As  a  general  rule  it  may  be  said  that  the  notice  is  suffi- 
cient when  the  person  who  is  to  be  deprived  of  life, 
liberty,  or  property  has  at  some  stage  of  the  proceedings 
an  opportunity  to  present  objections  to  the  action  pro- 
posed against  him  to  a  court  having  authority  to  give 
effect  to  such  objections,  provided  it  considers  them  valid. 
Wilson  V.  Standerfer,  184  U.  S.  399,  415.  It  has  even 
been  held  that,  after  judgment  in  a  suit,  a  rule  to  show 
cause  why  he  should  not  be  compelled  to  pay  the  amount 
of  it  against  a  person  not  a  party  was  sufficient;  and  that 
the  same  was  due  process  when  followed  by  a  hearing 
wherein  an  opportunity  to  defend  was  given.  Louisville, 
etc.,  K.  Co.  v.  Schmidt,  177  U.  S.  230.  See  also,  Simon  v. 
Craft,  182  U.  S.  436 ;  Hooker  v.  Los  Angeles,  188  U.  S.  314, 
318.  The  proceeding  may  constitute  due  process  when  a 
remedy  is  given  by  motion  in  a  state  court  which  gives 
notice  and  affords  an  opportunity  to  be  heard.  Iowa  C.  B. 
Co.  V.  Iowa,  160  U.  S.  389.  But  due  process  did  not  exist 
when  a  court,  acting  under  tie  erroneous  belief  that  no 
action  had  been  taken  in  the  case  for  a  year  rendered  a 
judgment  of  dismissal,  then  set  aside  such  judgment  after 
the  term,  or  the  rule  day  which,  under  the  local  practice, 
is  equivalent  to  the  end  of  the  term,  without  motion  or 
proceedings  to  vacate  the  judgment,  and  without  notice, 
proceeded  to  render  a  personal  judgment  against  the 
defendant.  "Wetmore  v.  Karriek,  205  U.  S.  141.  A  person 
was  not  deprived  of  liberty  without  due  process  of  law  in 
a  trial  of  the  issue  of  lunacy  under  the  Code  of  Ala.,  pro- 
viding that  the  sheriff  may  take  possession  of  the  person 
"and,  if  consistent  with  his  health  or  safety  have  him 
present  at  the  place  of  trial,"  when  notice  of  the  inquisi- 
tion was  served  on  tlie  lunatic,  who  was  not  personally 
present  because  after  an  examination  by  a  physician,  it 
was  deemed  to  be  inconsistent  with  her  health  and  safety 
that  tlie  sheriff  should  produce  her  on  the  trial.  Simon 
V.  Craft,  182  U.  S.  427.  In  Chaloner  v.  Sherman,  242 
U.  S.  455,  the  Court  said:    "The  proceedings  were  held 


§  132     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        289 

in  New  York  City  where  much  of  plaintiff  *s  property 
was  located.   For  over  two  years  prior  to  the  entry  of  the 
earUer  order  plaintiff  had  been  an  inmate  of  Blooming- 
dale,  a  private  hospital  near  that  city.    At  each  stage  of 
the  proceedings  leading  up  to  the  order  of  June  23,  he 
[Chaloner]  was  personally  served  there  with  notice  and 
was  given  an  opportunity  to  be  heard.     Thus  he  had 
notice  of  the  motion,  on  May  19,  to  appoint  the  conmiis- 
sion  de  lunatico  inquirendo;  of  the  inquisition  of  June 
12 ;  and  of  the  motion  to  confirm  the  inquisition  and  for 
the  appointment  of  a  conmiittee  on  June  23.  .  .  .    At  the 
inquisition  the  commission  and  the  jury  after  hearing 
witnesses,  concluded  that  his  attendance  was  unnecessary 
and  did  not  require  him  to  attend.    There  was  evidence 
that  his  enforced  attendance  would  be  detrimental  to  his 
mental  health.    As  the  plaintiff  had  notice  and  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard  at  each  stage  of  these  proceedings 
the  essential  elements  of  due  process  of  law  were  fully 
met,  and  the  court  had  jurisdiction  to  enter  the  order. 
It  is  not  open  to  collateral  attack,  although  plaintiff 
was   then   under   commitment   at   Bloomingdale.     See 
Simon  v.  Craft,  182  XJ.  S.  427/^    When  due  process  is 
wanting  in  a  proceeding  in  which  judgment  is  taken  in  a 
state  court  under  a  warrant  of  attorney  annexed  to  a 
promissory  note,  authorizing  confession  of  judgment  **in 
favor  of  the  holder,  ^ '  when  the  party  in  whose  favor  the 
judgment  was  rendered  has  ceased,  before  the  beginning 
of  the  suit,  to  be  the  owner  of  the  note,  is  settled  in 
National  Exch.  Bank  v.  Wiley,  195  U.  S.  257.    For  fur- 
ther illustrations  of  this  branch  of  the  subject,  see  Old 
Wayne  Mut.  L.  Ass  *n  v.  McDonough,  204  U.  S.  8 ;  Han- 
over Nat.  Bank  v.  Moyses,  186  XJ.  S.  181;  Hamilton  v. 
Brown,  161  XJ.  S.  256 ;  Cunnius  v.  Beading  School  District, 
198  XJ.  S.  458;  Bothschild  v.  Knight,  184  XJ.  S.  334;  Leigh 
V.  Green,  193  XJ.  S.  79 ;  Johnson  v.  Chicago  &  P.  Elevator 
Co.,  119  XJ.  S.  388;  St.  Mary's  Franco-American  Petro- 
leum Co.  V.  West  Virginia,  203  XJ.  S.  183 ;  Lynde  v.  Lynde, 
181  U.  S.  183 ;  LouisvUle  &  N.  B.  Co.  v.  Schmidt,  177  U.  S, 

Due  ProcesB — 19 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§132 


230;  Laarg  v.  Rigney,  160  U.  S.  531;  Kanffman  v.  Wool- 
ers,  138  U.  S.  285;  Pittsburg,  C,  C.  and  St.  L.  B.  Co.  v. 
Backos,  154  U.  S.  421;  Central  of  Georgia  R.  Co.  v. 
Wright,  207  U.  S.  127 ;  Longyear  v.  Toolan,  209  U.  S.  414 ; 
Home  Teleph.  and  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles,  211  U.  S. 
265;  Ontario  Land  Co.  v.  Tordy,  212  U.  S.  152;  North 
American  Storage  Co.  v.  Chicago,  211  U.  S.  306;  Watson 
V.  Maryland,  218  U.  S.  173;  Kentnoky  Union  Co.  v.  Ken- 
tucky, 219  U.  S.  140 ;  Washington  ex  rel.  Oregon  R.  and 
Nav.  Co.  V.  Fairchild,  224  U.  S.  510;  Ross  v.  Stewart,  227 
U.  S.  530;  Clement  Nat.  Bank  v.  Vermont,  231  U.  S.  120. 
Taming  next  to  proceedings  before  boards  and  officers 
special  reference  must  be  made  to  Chicago,  M.  and  S.  P. 
R.  Co.  V.  Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  418,  in  which  it  was  held 
that  there  was  not  the  semblance  of  due  process  where 
neither  summons  or  notice  to  a  carrier,  nor  hearing  was 
provided  for,  before  a  raUroad  commission  ascertained 
and  declared  what  it  was  to  declare,  without  opportunity 
provided  for  the  company  to  introduce  witnesses  before 
it  In  San  Diego  Land  and  Town  Co.  v.  National  City, 
174  XT.  S.  739,  it  was  held  that  in  as  much  as  the  constitu- 
tion of  California  gives  notice  of  the  fact  that  ordinances 
will  be  passed  annually  in  February  to  take  effect  on  July 
Ist  next,  with  certain  other  details,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
dne  process  that  formal  notice  be  given  as  to  the  precise 
day  upon  which  water  rates  will  be  fixed  by  ordinance. 
ti  Reetz  V.  Michigan,  188  TT.  S.  505,  the  Court  said: 
**Wben  a  statute  fixes  the  time  and  place  of  meeting  of 
any  board  or  tribunal,  no  special  notice  to  parties  inter- 
ested is  required.  The  statute  is  itself  sufficient  notice. 
If  the  plaintiff  in  error  has  applied  at  any  meeting  for 
a  hearing,  the  board  would  have  been  compelled  to  grant 
it,  and  if  on  snch  hearing  his  offer  of  or  demand  for  testi- 
mony had  been  refused,  the  question  might  have  been 
fairly  presented  to  the  state  courts,  to  what  extent  the 
action  of  the  board  had  deprived  him  of  his  rights."  See 
also,  Buttfield  v.  Stranahan,  192  V.  S.  470;  Passavant  v. 
United  States,  148  U.  S.  214;  United  States  v.  Heinszen, 


§  132     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUB  PBOCESS        291 

206  TJ.  S.  370 ;  Public  Clearing  House  v.  Coyne,  194  U.  S. 
497;  Williams  v.  Eggleston,  170  U.  S.  304;  Chicago,  B. 
and  Q.  B.  Co.  v.  Nebraska  ex  rel.  Omalia,  170  U.  S.  57; 
Interstate  Commerce  Cont  v.  Illinois  C.  B.  Co.,  215  U.  S. 
452 ;  Monongahela  Bridge  Co.  v.  United  States,  216  U.  S. 
177 ;  Beaves  v.  Ainsworth,  219  U.  S.  296 ;  Ochoa  v.  Her- 
nandez, 230  U.  S.  139;  United  States  ex  rel.  Brown  v. 
Lane,  232  U.  S.  598. 

In  considering  cases  involving  pubUc  improvements 
prominence  should  be  given  to  Hagar  v.  Beclamation  Dis- 
trict No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  in  which  it  was  held  that  the 
judgment  did  not  deprive  the  owner  of  his  property  with- 
out  due  process,  when  by  the  laws  of  the  state  a  tax, 
assessment,  servitude  or  other  burden  is  imposed  upon 
property  for  the  public  use,  and  provision  made  for 
notice  to  the  person  taxed,  and  opportunity  given  for  con- 
testing the  charge  thus  imposed  in  the  ordinary  courts  of 
justice.  In  Paulsen  v.  Portland,  149  U.  S.  30,  it  was  held 
that  when  the  charter  of  a  city  grants  power  to  construct 
sewers,  the  validity  of  such  a  grant  does  not  depend  upon 
an  explicit  statement  either  of  the  necessity  or  the  time 
and  manner  of  notice  to  the  taxpayer  of  an  assessment 
for  the  construction  of  a  sewer.  In  Bauman  v.  Boss,  167 
U.  S.  548,  it  was  held  that  a  landowner's  property  was  not 
taken  without  due  process  where  the  legislature,  in  taxing 
lands  benefited  by  a  highway  or  other  public  improve- 
ment, made  provision  for  a  notice  to  each  landowner  and 
for  hearing  him.  In  Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310,  it 
was  held  that  even  where  the  judgment  of  the  local  body 
making  the  assessment  is  conclusive,  due  process  is  not 
denied  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed  for  a  local 
improvement  where  an  opportunity  is  given  him  to  be 
heard  before  the  body  making  the  assessment.  In  Ballard 
V.  Himter,  204  U.  S.  241,  it  was  held  that  due  process  may 
exist  even  when  the  nonresident  owners  of  land  **  within 
a  levee  district  did  not  have  personal  notice  of  the  pend- 
ency of  a  suit  to  collect  the  levee  taxes  assessed  on  their 
lands. '*    See  also,  Fallbrook  Irrig.  District  v.  Bradley, 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§132 


164  U.  S.  112;  Detroit  v.  Parker,  181  U.  S.  399;  Parsona 
V.  District  of  Columbia,  170  U.  S.  45;  Voight  v.  Detroit, 
184  U.  S.  115;  Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  184  U.  S.  432;  Carson 
V.  Sewer  Com'rs,  182  U.  S.  398;  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125 
U.  S.  345;  Bellingham  Bay  and  B.  C.  E.  Co.  v.  New 
Whatcom,  172  U.  S.  314;  Weyerhaueser  v.  Minnesota, 
176  U.  S.  550;  Londoner  v.  Denver,  210  TJ.  S.  373;  Cleve- 
land, C,  C.  and  St.  L.  E.  Co.  v.  Porter,  210  U.  S.  177; 
District  of  Colombia  v.  Brooke,  214  F.  S.  138;  Briscoe  v. 
Rudolph,  221  TJ.  S.  547;  Soliah  v.  Heskin,  222  V.  S.  522; 
TJnited  States  ex  rel.  Turner  v.  Fisher,  222  V.  S.  204; 
Reitler  v.  Harris,  223  XT.  S.  437;  McGovem  v.  New  York, 
229  U.  S.  363 ;  Ettor  v.  Tacoma,  228  TJ.  S.  148 ;  Richards  v. 
Washington  Terminal  Co.,  233  TJ.  S.  546;  Kiyder  v.  Wil- 
son, 242  U.  S.  171 ;  Vandalia  Railroad  Co.  v.  Public  Service 
Commission,  242  U.  S.  255. 

The  question  of  the  sufficiency  of  notice  in  tax  cases  will 
be  specially  considered  hereafter  under  that  head. 

§  133.  Fundamental  requisites  of  due  process — ^Hear- 
ing. Text  writers  and  digest  makers  usually  link  to- 
gether "Notice  and  hearing"  as  one  phrase  for  the 
reason,  no  doubt,  that  the  two  distinct  rights  are  so  inter- 
laced that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  consider  the  one 
without  reference  to  the  other.  Mr,  Justice  Earl  well  said 
in  Stuart  v.  Palmer,  74  N.  T.  183,  188,  that  "It  is  not 
enough  that  the  owners  may  by  chance  have  notice,  or  that 
they  may  as  a  matter  of  favor  have  a  hearing.  The  law 
must  require  notice  and  give  them  the  right  to  a  hearing 
and  an  opportunity  to  be  heard.  It  matters  not  upon  the 
question  of  the  constitutionality  of  such  a  law,  that  the 
assessment  has  in  fact  been  fairly  apportioned.  The  con- 
stitutional validity  of  law  is  to  be  tested  not  by  what  was 
done  under  it,  but  by  what  may  by  its  authority  be  done. ' ' 
The  difficulty  is  to  determine  whether  or  no  in  a  particu- 
lar case  there  has  been  such  a  hearing  as  the  constitu- 
tional gnaranty  contemplates.  In  tax  proceedings,  and  in 
certain  summary  processes  before  administrative  officers. 


"^ 


§  133     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUB  PBOCESS        293 

while  the  right  to  a  hearing  has  been  invariably  recog- 
nized, the  formalities  attending  it  have  been  reduced  to 
the  minimnnL  In  the  State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  92  U.  S. 
575,  involving  the  validity  of  a  state  law  providing  for 
the  assessment  of  railroad  property  by  a  state  board  of 
equalization,  setting  at  a  time  and  place  designed,  and  fix- 
ing the  assessments  by  the  aid  of  a  schedule  of  such  prop- 
erty made  by  its  own  officers,  the  Court  said :  * '  The  main 
function  of  this  board  is  to  equalize  these  assessments 
over  the  whole  state.  If  they  find  that  a  county  has  had 
its  property  assessed  too  high  in  reference  to  the  general 
standard,  they  may  reduce  its  valuation;  if  it  has  been 
fixed  too  low,  they  raise  it  to  that  standard.  When  they 
raise  it  in  any  county  they  necessarily  raise  it  on  the  prop- 
erty of  every  individual  who  owns  any  in  that  county. 
Must  each  one  of  these  have  notice  and  a  separate  hear- 
ingf  If  a  railroad  company  is  by  law  entitled  to  such 
notice,  surely  every  individual  is  equally  entitled  to  it. 
Yet  if  this  be  so,  the  expense  of  giving  notice,  the  delay 
of  hearing  each  individual,  would  render  the  exercise  of 
the  main  function  of  the  Board  impossible.  The  very 
moment  you  come  to  apply  to  the  individual  the  right 
claimed  by  the  corporation  in  this  case,  its  absurdity  is 
apparent.  Nor  is  there  any  hardship  in  the  matter.  This 
board  has  its  time  of  sitting  fixed  by  law.  Its  sessions 
are  not  secret.  No  obstruction  exists  to  the  appearance  of 
anyone  before  it  to  assert  a  right  or  redress  a  wrong ;  and, 
in  the  business  of  assessing  taxes,  this  is  all  that  can  be 
reasonably  asked.*'  In  perfect  harmony  with  the  fore- 
going are  the  Kentucky  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  115  U.  S. 
321,  in  which  the  Court  said:  '*And  if  the  plaintiffs  in 
error  have  the  constitutional  right  to  such  hearing,  for 
which  they  contend,  the  statute  is  properly  to  be  con- 
strued so  as  to  recognize  and  respect  it,  and  not  to  deny 
it.  The  Constitution  and  the  statute  will  be  construed 
together  as  one  law.  This  was  the  principle  of  construc- 
tion applied  by  this  court,  following  the  decisions  of  the 
state  court,  in  Neal  v.  Delaware,  103  U.  S.  370,  where 


296 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§133 


It 


The  law  must  require  notice  to  them,  and  give  them  the 
right  to  a  hearing  and  an  opportunity  to  be  heard.  *  The 
soundness  of  this  doctrine  has  repeatedly  been  recognized 
by  this  court.  Thus  in  Security  Trust  Co.  v.  Lexington, 
203  U.  S.  323,  333,  the  court,  by  Mr.  Justice  Peckham, 
said,  with,  respect  to  an  assessment  for  back  taxes :  *if  the 
statute  did  not  provide  for  a  notice,  in  any  form,  it  is 
not  material  that  as  a  matter  of  grace  of  favor  notice  may 
have  been  given  of  the  proposed  assessment.  It  is  not 
what  notice,  uncalled  for  by  the  statute,  the  taxpayer  may 
have  received  in  a  particular  case  that  is  material,  but 
the  question  is,  whether  any  notice  is  provided  by  the 
statute'  (citing  the  New  York  case).  So,  in  Central  of 
Georgia  Ry.  v.  Wright,  207  U.  S.  127, 138,  the  Court  said : 
*This  notice  must  be  provided  as  an  essential  part  of  the 
statutory  provision  and  not  awarded  as  a  mere  matter 
of  favor  or  grace.'  In  Roller  v.  Holly,  176  U.  S.  398,  409, 
the  Court  declared :  *  The  right  of  a  citizen  to  due  process 
of  law  must  rest  upon  a  basis  more  substantial  than  favor 
or  discretion.'  And  in  Louis,  and  Nash.  R.  R.  v.  Stock 
Yards  Co.,  212  U.  S.  132, 144,  it  was  said :  *The  law  itself 
must  save  the  parties*  rights,  and  not  leave  them  to  the 
discretion  of  the  courts  as  such. '  * 

Special  reference  should  also  be  made  to  the  leading 
case  of  Hovey  v.  Elliott,  167  XJ.  S.  409,  heretofore  ex- 
amined, in  which  the  right  to  a  hearing  under  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  was  given  a 
notable  exposition.  The  Court  then  said:  '*Can  it  be 
doubted  that  due  process  of  law  signifies  a  right  to  be 
heard  in  onfe^s  defense!  If  the  legislative  department  of 
the  government  were  to  enact  a  statute  conferring  the 
right  to  condemn  the  citizen  without  any  opportunity  of 
being  heard,  would  it  be  pretended  that  such  an  enact- 
ment would  not  be  violative  of  the  constitution!  If  this 
be  true,  as  it  undoubtedly  is,  how  can  it  be  said  that  the 
judicial  department,  the  source  and  foundation  of  justice 
itself,  has  yet  the  authority  to  render  lawful  that  which 
if  done  under  express  legislative  sanction  would  be  viola- 


il  M 


il 


I 


m 


§  134     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        297 

tive  of  the  Constitution.  .  .  .  The  decree  therefore 
awards  the  property  of  the  defendant  to  the  complainant 
upon  the  hypothesis  of  fact  that  by  contract  the  defendant 
had  transferred  the  right  to  this  property  to  the  com- 
plainant. If  the  court  had  power  to  do  this,  by  denying 
the  right  to  be  heard  to  the  defendant,  what  plainer  illus- 
tration could  there  be  taking  property  of  one  and  giving 
it  to  another  without  hearing  or  without  process!'* 

§  134.  Fundamental  requisites  of  due  process — ^Oener- 
ality  and  equality  of  laws.  In  Caldwell  v.  Texas,  137 
U.  S.  691,  the  Court  said :  *  *  By  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment the  powers  of  the  states  in  dealing  with  crime  within 
their  borders  are  not  limited,  but  no  state  can  deprive 
particular  persons  or  classes  of  persons  of  equal  and 
impartial  justice  under  the  law.  Law,  in  its  regnilar 
course  of  administration  through  courts  of  justice,  is  due 
process,  and  when  secured  by  the  law  of  the  state,  the 
constitutional  requisition  is  satisfied.  2  Kent.  Com.  13. 
And  due  process  is  so  secured  by  laws  operating  on  all 
alike,  and  not  subjecting  the  individual  to  the  arbitrary 
exercise  of  the  powers  of  government,  unrestrained  by  the 
established  principles  of  private  right  and  distributive 
justice.  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Okely,  4  Wheat.  235,  244. 
The  power  of  the  state  must  be  exerted  within  the  limits 
of  those  principles,  and  its  exertion  can  not  be  sustained 
when  special,  partial  and  arbitrary.  Hurtado  v.  Califor- 
nia,  110  U.  S.  516,  535.  The  same  principles  were  re- 
stated with  even  greater  emphasis  in  Leeper  v.  Texas, 
139  U.  S.  462.  The  conception  thus  expressed  of  the  gen- 
erality and  equality  of  laws,  as  a  necessary  part  of  due 
process,  is  purely  an  American  creation.  Even  in  Coke 's 
time  the  idea  was  in  full  force  that  the  Parliament  of 
Great  Britain  was  a  **High  Court'*  armed  with  the  power 
to  make  special  decrees  in  individual  cases  in  the  form  of 
acts  of  legislation.  Coke  says :  **  As  every  court  of  justice 
hath  laws  and  customs  for  its  direction, — some  the  civil 
and  canon,  some  the  common  law,  others  their  own  pecu- 


298  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  134 

liar  laws  and  customs, — so  the  high  court  of  parliament 
hath  its  own  law,  called  the  lex  et  consuetude  parlia- 
menti/^  The  author  has  attempted  elsewhere  (Origin 
and  Growth  Am.  Const.,  p.  146)  to  emphasize  the  fact 
that  no  distinct  or  definite  division  of  the  powers  of  gov- 
ernment into  executive,  legislative  and  judicial  ever 
existed  in  the  English  system,  either  in  theory  or  in  fact. 
In  his  Spirit  of  Laws  (bk.  xi,  ch.  6)  Montesquieu  simply 
described  the  very  imperfect  division  which  he  perceived 
in  the  English  Constitution,  and  the  political  maxim 
usually  attributed  to  him,  that  the  three  departments  of 
power  shall  forever  remain  separate  and  distinct  was 
adopted  by  the  original  thirteen  states  in  the  same  quali- 
fied sense  in  which  it  was  understood  in  the  English  sys- 
tem. Speaking  of  the  constitution  of  the  mother  country, 
Madison  said :  * '  On  the  slightest  view  of  the  British  con- 
stitution we  must  perceive  that  the  legislative,  executive, 
and  judiciary  departments  are  by  no  means  totally  sepa- 
rate and  distinct  from  each  other. '^  Speaking  of  the 
constitution  of  the  state  he  spid :  * '  If  we  look  into  the  con- 
stitutions of  the  several  states,  we  find,  that,  notwith- 
standing the  emphatical,  and,  in  some  instances,  the 
unqualified  terms  in  which  the  axiom  has  been  laid  down, 
there  is  not  a  single  instance  in  which  the  several 
departments  of  power  have  been  kept  absolutely  sepa- 
rate and  distinct.'*  Federalist,  No.  xlvi,  pp.  335,  337. 
Each  state  constitution,  after  stating  the  maxim  in  ques- 
tion in  a  far  too  absolute  form,  has  made  such  a  qualified 
division  between  the  three  powers  as  it  deemed  best 
for  its  own  interests  and  convenience;  and  the  Supreme 
Court  has  held  that  it  will  regard  such  a  division  as  a 
matter  of  state  law  not  within  the  purview  of  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  In  Dreyer 
V.  Illinois,  187  U.  S.  71,  84,  the  Court  said:  ** Whether 
the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  powers  (of  a 
state)  shall  be  kept  altogether  distinct  and  separate,  or 
whether  persons  or  collections  of  persons  belonging  to 
one  department  may  in  respect  to  some  matters  exert 


§  134     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        299 

powers  which,  strictly  speaking,  pertain  to  another  de- 
partment of  government,  is  for  the  determination  of  the 
state.  And  its  determination  one  way  or  the  other  can 
not  be  an  element  in  the  inquiry,  whether  the  due  process 
of  law  prescribed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  has  been 
respected  by  the  state  or  its  representatives,  when  dealing 
with  matters  involving  life  or  liberty.  *  When  we  speak,' 
said  Story,  *of  a  separation  of  the  three  departments  of 
government,  and  maintain  that  separation  is  indispen- 
sable to  public  liberty,  we  are  to  understand  this  maxim 
in  a  limited  sense.'  Story,  Const  5th  ed.  393. ' '  In  Liv- 
ingston V.  Moore,  7  Pet.  546,  the  court  speaking  through 
Mr.  Justice  Johnson,  said:  **The  objection  made  to  the 
exercise  of  this  power  is,  that  it  is  one  of  a  judicial  char- 
acter,  and  could  not  exist  in  the  Legislature  of  a  country 
having  a  constitution  which  distributes  the  powers  of 
government  into  legislative,  executive  and  judicial.  •  .  . 
The  power  existing  in  every  body  politic  is  an  absolute 
despotism ;  in  constituting  a  government,  the  body  politic 
distributes  that  power  as  it  pleases,  and  in  the  quantity  it 
pleases,  and  imposes  what  checks  it  pleases  upon  its  public 
functionaries.  The  natural  distribution  and  the  necessary 
distribution  to  individual  security,  is  into  legislative,  ex- 
ecutive and  judicial;  but  it  is  obvious  that  every  com- 
munity, may  make  a  perfect  or  imperfect  separation  and 
disposition  of  these  powers  at  its  will.  It  has  pleased 
Pennsylvania,  in  her  constitution,  to  make  what  most 
jurists  would  pronounce  an  imperfect  separation  of  those 
powers.*'  See  also,  Kendall  v.  United  States  ex  rel. 
Stokes,  12  Pet.  524 ;  Watkrns  v.  Hohnan,  16  Pet.  25 ;  Os- 
bom  V.  Bank  of  United  States,  9  Wheat  738 ;  Wayman 
V.  Southard,  10  Wheat.  1;  Pennsylvania  v.  Wheeling  & 
B.  Bridge  Co.,  18  How.  421 ;  Kilboum  v.  Thompson,  103 
U.  S.  168. 

The  omnipotent  Parliament  of  Great  Britain,  which 
claimed  to  be  a  "High  Court*'  with  a  law  of  its  own,  pos- 
sessed not  only  the  physical  power  but  the  theoretical 
rights  to  make  all  kinds  of  judicial  decrees  and  to  pass 


300 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§134 


IK 


' 


1 


all  kinds  of  special  acts  applicable  to  one  individual  or  to 
any  class  of  individuals  which  it  might  see  fit  to  subject 
to  its  paramount  authority.  It  is  not  therefore  strange 
that  from  such  a  source  should  have  flowed  through  many 
centuries  the  stream  of  ^^acts  of  attainder,  bills  of  pains 
and  penalties,  acts  of  confiscation,  acts  reversing  judg- 
ments, and  acts  directly  transferring  one  man's  estate  to 
another,  legislative  judgments,  decrees,  and  forfeitures,*' 
against  which  Webster  thundered  in  the  Dartmouth  Col- 
lege Case,  4  Wheat  518.  And  yet  against  such  arbitrary 
enactments  or  decrees  there  was  from  the  time  of  the 
Great  Charter  a  spirit  of  opposition  based  on  the  con- 
sciousness that  they  were  in  violation  of  * '  the  law  of  the 
land"  which  its  vital  chapter  embodied.  As  early  as  the 
reign  of  Edward  II,  in  which  it  was  declared  by  statute 
that ' '  the  matters  to  be  established  for  the  estate  of  the 
king  and  his  heirs,  and  for  the  estate  of  the  realm  and  of 
the  people,  should  be  treated,  accorded,  and  established  in 
parliament  by  the  king,  and  by  the  assent  of  the  prelates, 
earls,  and  barons,  and  the  commonalty  of  the  realm,  ac- 
cording as  had  been  before  accustomed, — "  the  disinher- 
itance and  exile  of  the  Despencers,  decreed  in  an  assembly 
of  magnates  irregularly  summoned,  was  reversed  in  a 
later  parliament  on  the  ground  that  the  *  *  said  award  was 
made  without  calling  them  [the  Despencers]  to  answer, 
and  without  the  assent  of  the  prelates,  which  are  peers 
of  the  realm  in  parliament,  and  against  the  Great  Charter 
of  the  franchises  of  England,  which  says  that  no  freeman 
shall  he  banished  or  other  way  destroyed,  but  by  lawful 
judgment  of  his  peers  or  the  law  of  the  la/nd,  and  for  that 
they  were  not  called  in  court  to  make  answer,  and  for 
these  errors  and  for  that  the  causes  in  the  said  award 
were  not  duly  proved.'^  When  in  1330  the  sentence 
against  the  Earl  of  Arundel  was  annulled,  his  son  peti- 
tioned the  king  to  consider  how  his  father  was  taken, 
imprisoned,  and  put  to  death  and  his  lands  and  chattels 
forfeited  ** against  the  law  and  custom  of  the  country;" 
and  the  supplementary  statute  of  1354  was  enacted  on  a 


§  134     SCX)PE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUE  PROCESS        301 

petition  stating  that  there  was  no  record  or  evidence  of 
any  just  cause  showing  that  said  Earl  ought  to  have  been 
destroyed  or  put  to  death  **  without  judgment  and  due 
process  of  law'*  {scmz  juggement  et  due  process  de  lei). 
In  the  same  year  the  attainder  of  Roger,  Earl  of  Morti- 
mer, was  reversed  upon  the  petition  of  his  heir,  alleging 
that  the  record  of  the  attainder  was  *  *  erroneous  and  de- 
fective at  all  points,  especially  in  so  far  as  the  said  earl 
was  put  to  death  and  disinherited  without  any  accusation 
and  without  .being  put  to  judgment  or  to  answer  {sam 
estre  mesne  en  juggement  ou  en  respons).^^  Proceedings 
against  the  Despencers,  1  How.  S.  Tr.  33 ;  2  Rot.  Pari.  55, 
4  Edw.  in.  A.  D.  1330;  2  Rot.  Pari.  256,  257,  28  Edw.  III. 
A.  D.  1354 ;  2  Rot.  Pari.  256, 28  Edw.  HL  A.  D.  1354.  See 
McGehee,  pp.  65-67. 

In  another  place  the  author  has  said :  ^  ^  In  connection 
with  the  despotic  practices  which  at  this  time  pervaded 
the  administration  of  justice  in  the  ordinary  tribunals, 
should  also  be  noted  the  gravest  of  all  judicial  abuses 
which,  during  the  reigns  of  Henry  VI  and  Edward  IV, 
recurred  with  shocking  frequency  in  the  proceedings  of 
the  high  court  of  parliament  itself.  Although  bills  of 
attainder  had  been  employed  at  a  much  earlier  day,  it  was 
during  the  period  of  passion  engendered  by  the  civil  war 
that  the  summary  power  to  punish  criminals  by  statute 
was  for  the  first  time  perverted  and  abused.  The  calm 
and  deliberate  exercise  of  the  judicial  power  of  the  whole 
parliament  by  process  of  impeachment,  wherein  the  com- 
mons as  the  grand  inquest  of  the  realm  were  required  to 
maintain  their  accusations  by  sufficient  evidence  adduced 
before  the  lords  sitting  as  judges,  but  satisfied  the  neces- 
sities of  a  dynastic  struggle  in  which  the  victors  were 
ever  eager  for  the  heads  of  the  vanquished.  Far  bet- 
ter adapted  to  this  condition  of  things  was  the  proceeding 
by  bills  of  attainder,  in  which,  if  the  parliament  saw  fit  to 
refuse  to  hear  the  accused  in  his  defense,  the  validity  of 
the  judgment  could  never  be  questioned  in  any  court 
whatsoever.    The  accused,  even  under  a  bill  of  attainder, 


a 


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f  I 


»  I 


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i     \: 


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t^ 


:i 


302 


DXJE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§134 


was,  however,  as  a  matter  of  grace,  usually  permitted  to 
defend  himself  both  by  counsel  and  witnesses.  ^  The  pro- 
ceedings of  parliament  in  passing  bills  of  attainder,  and 
of  pains  and  penalties,  do  not  vary  from  those  adopted  in 
regard  to  other  bills.  They  may  be  introduced  in  either 
house,  but  ordinarily  commence  in  the  house  of  lords: 
they  pass  through  the  same  stages ;  and  when  agreed  to 
by  both  houses,  they  received  the  royal  assent  in  the  usual 
form.  But  the  parties  who  are  subjected  to  these  pro- 
ceedings are  admitted  to  defend  themselves  by  counsel 
and  witnesses,  before  both  houses ;  and  the  solemnity  of 
the  proceedings  would  cause  measures  to  be  taken  to  en- 
force the  attendance  of  members  upon  their  service  in 
parliament.'  '*  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Eng.  Const., 
i,  pp.  582-3.  It  seems  to  be  clear  that  during  the 
reign  of  Henry  VIII  the  practice  was  first  established  of 
condemning,  without  citation  or  opportunity  to  be  heard, 
those  who  were  ready  to  answer  in  the  ordinary  courts. 
The  judges,  after  some  hesitation,  declared  under  pres- 
sure that  while  such  a  procedure  was  dangerous,  if  a  bill 
of  attainder  was  so  passed  its  validity  could  not  be  ques- 
tioned at  law.  Against  such  an  injustice,  so  contrary  to 
**the  law  of  the  land,*'  public  opinion  naturally  revolted, 
and  to  such  an  extent  that  earnest  protestations  were 
heard  in  the  Commons  upon  the  passage  of  such  a  bill 
against  Lord  Admiral  Seymour  in  1549.  And  yet  such 
judicial  legislation  continued  to  be  employed,  whenever  it 
became  necessary  for  the  crown  to  depart  from  the  usual 
and  orderly  administration  of  justice,  down  to  the  bill 
presented  against  Queen  Caroline  in  1820.  In  the  words 
of  a  great  authority:  ** Bills  of  attainder  were,  in  the 
reign  of  Henry  Vlll,  used  instead  of  impeachments ;  as 
for  instance  in  the  cases  of  Wolsey  Thomas  Cromwell, 
Queen  Katherine  Howard,  the  Duke  of  Norfolk,  and  the 
Earl  of  Surrey.  They  have  occurred  occasionally  in  our 
later  history.  The  most  memorable  case  is  that  of  Lord 
Strafford.  Other  instances  are  those  of  Lord  Danby,  the 
Duke  of  Monmouth,  and  Sir  John  Fennick.    As  instances 


§  134     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OP  DUB  PEOCESS        303 

of  a  bill  of  pains  and  penalties  I  may  refer  to  the  bill 
against  Bishop  Atterbury,  and  to  the  bill  against  Queen 
Caroline,  which  will  probably  long  continue  to  be  referred 
to  as  the  last  instance  of  such  legislation/'  Stephen, 
Hist.  Crim,  Law,  i,  p.  161, 

The  primary  purpose  of  the  framers  of  our  original 
state  constitutions, — ^prefaced  by  bills  of  rights  epitomiz- 
ing the  seminal  principles  of  English  constitutional  law 
as  it  existed  in  1776, — was  to  make  impossible  here  all 
forms  of  arbitrary  and  confiscatory  legislation,  whether 
in  the  form  of  ex  post  facto  laws,  or  laws  lacking  general- 
ity and  equality,  and  ignoring  the  division  between  leg- 
islative and  judicial  power,  under  which  could  be 
confiscated  or  forfeited  the  life,  Uberty  or  property  of  a 
private  citizen  by  a  legislative  edict  passed  in  defiance  of 
**the  law  of  the  land/'  In  the  language  of  Cummings  v. 
Missouri,  4  Wall.  277,  323:  **If  the  punishment  be  less 
than  death,  the  Act  is  termed  a  bill  of  pains  and  penalties. 
Within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution,  bills  of  attainder 
include  bills  of  pains  and  penalties.  In  these  cases  the 
legislative  body,  in  addition  to  its  legitimate  functions, 
exercises  the  powers  and  oflSce  of  judges ;  it  assumes,  in 
the  language  of  the  text  books,  judicial  magistracy;  it 
pronounces  upon  the  guilt  of  the  party,  without  any  of 
the  forms  or  safeguards  of  trial ;  it  determines  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  proofs  produced,  whether  conformable  to 
the  rules  of  evidence  or  otherwise ;  and  it  fixes  the  degree 
of  punishment  in  accordance  with  its  own  notions  of  the 
enormity  of  the  offense. ' '  The  fact  was  also  recognized 
that  confiscatory  legislation  directed  against  private  prop- 
erty is  just  as  lacking  in  due  process  as  legislative  de- 
crees imposing  penalties  for  crime.  In  Davidson  v.  New 
Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  the  Court  said:  **But  when,  in  the 
year  of  grace  1866,  there  is  placed  in  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States  a  declaration  that  ^No  state  shall  de- 
prive any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law,'  can  a  state  make  anything  due  process  of 
law  which,  by  its  own  legislation,  it  chooses  to  declare 


304  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  134 

sucht  To  affirm  this  is  to  hold  that  the  prohibition  to  the 
states  is  of  no  avail,  or  has  no  application  where  the 
invasion  of  private  rights  is  affected  under  the  forms  of 
state  legislation.  It  seems  to  ns  that  a  statute  which 
declared  in  terms,  and  without  more,  that  the  full  and 
exclusive  title  of  a  described  piece  of  land,  which  is  now 
in  A,  shall  be  and  is  hereby  vested  in  B,  would,  if  effectual, 
deprive  A  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision."  In 
Van  Home  v.  Dorrance,  2  Dall.  304>  in  which  it  was  held 
that  the  right  of  acquiring  and  holding  property  is  not 
ex  gratia  from  the  Legislature,  but  ex  debito  from  the  con- 
stitution, the  Court  said:  "If  this  be  the  Legislature  of  a 
republican  government,  in  which  the  preservation  of 
property  is  made  sacred  by  the  constitution,  I  ask,  wherein 
it  differs  from  the  mandate  of  an  Asiatic  prince!  Om- 
nipotence in  legislation  is  despotism.  According  to  the 
doctrine,  we  have  nothing  that  we  can  call  our  own,  or  are 
sure  of  for  a  moment ;  we  are  all  tenants  at  wUl,  and  hold 
our  landed  property  at  the  mere  pleasure  of  the  Le^s- 
lature." 

The  primary  purpose  of  the  founders  of  American  con- 
stitutional law  was  to  wipe  out  the  entire  system  of  legis- 
lative despotism  over  life,  liberty  and  property,  based  in 
England  not  only  upon  a  denial  of  the  right  to  due  process, 
but  also  upon  the  denial  of  the  principles  demanding  gen- 
erality and  equality  in  the  laws.  Their  effort  was,  first,  to 
subject  all  state  power — executive,  legislative  and  judicial 
— to  the  yoke  of  constitutional  limitations  consisting  of 
epitomies  of  English  constitutional  law  as  it  existed  in 
1776 ;  second,  to  further  limit  the  legislative  power  with 
the  requirement  that  all  laws  must  be  equal  and  general. 
The  end  in  view  has  been  thus  expressed  in  Sears  v.  Cot- 
trell,  5  Mich.  351:  "By  the  law  of  the  land  we  under- 
stand laws  that  are  general  in  their  operation,  and  that 
affect  the  rights  of  all  alike,  and  not  a  special  act  of  the 
legislature,  passed  to  affect  the  rights  of  an  individual 
against  his  will  and  in  a  way  in  which  the  same  rights 


§  134     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OF  DtJE  PROCESS        305 

of  other  persons  are  not  affected  by  existing  laws.  Such 
an  act,  nnless  expressly  authorized  by  the  Constitution, 
or  clearly  coming  within  the  general  scope  of  legislative 
power,  would  be  in  conflict  with  this  part  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  for  that  reason,  if  no  other,  be  void. '  ^  In  Giozza 
V.  Tieman,  148  U.  S.  657,  the  Court  said :  *' And  due  proc- 
ess of  law  within  the  meaning  of  the  amendment  is  secured 
if  the  laws  operate  on  all  alike,  and  do  not  subject  the 
individual  to  an  arbitrary  exercise  of  the  powers  of  gov- 
ernment. Leeper  v.  Texas,  139  U.  S.  462.  *  ^  It  was  easy 
enough  to  give  scientific  definition  to  the  new  American 
ideal  of  equal  laws;  the  practical  difficulty  has  been  to 
convert  that  ideal  into  a  working  rule  capable  of  applica- 
tion to  existing  conditions.  In  practice  it  has  been  neces- 
sarily modified  by  two  important  exceptions,  First,  where 
the  state  constitution  does  not  expressly  limit  the  power  of 
the  legislature  to  pass  special  or  local  laws  (See  Waite  v. 
Santa  Cruz,  184  U.  S.  302),  it  may  pass  laws  confined  in 
their  operation  to  particular  localities  without  offending 
against  the  constitutional  limitation  in  question;  second, 
in  the  language  of  Giozza  v.  Tieman,  just  cited,  **Nor  in 
respect  of  taxation  was  the  amendment  intended  to  com- 
pel the  state  to  adopt  an  iron  rule  of  equality ;  to  prevent 
the  classification  of  property  for  taxation  at  different 
rates;  or  to  prohibit  legislation  in  that  regard,  special 
either  in  the  extent  to  which  it  operates  or  the  objects 
sought  to  be  obtained  by  it.  It  is  enough  that  there  is  no 
discrimination  in  favor  of  one  against  another  class. 
BelPs  Gap  R.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  134  U.  S.  232;  Home 
Ins.  Co.  V.  New  York,  134  U.  S.  594 ;  Pacific  Exp.  Co.  v. 
Seibert,  142  U.  S.  339.  And  due  process  of  law  within  the 
meaning  of  the  amendment  is  secured  if  the  laws  operate 
on  all  alike  and  do  not  subject  the  individual  to  an  arbi- 
trary exercise  of  the  powers  of  government.  Leeper  v. 
Texas,  139  U.  S.  462.''  An  elaborate  exposition  of  this 
state  right  of  classification  is  contained  in  State  Rail- 
road Tax  Cases,  92  U.  S.  575,  and  Kentucky  Railroad 
Cases,  115  TJ.  S.  321,  heretofore  cited  for  another  purpose. 

Dae  Proeesv— 20 


DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§134 


In  Dow  V.  Beidelman,  125  U.  S.  680,  the  Court  said :  "The 
Legislature,  in  the  exercise  of  its  power  of  regulating 
fares  and  freights,  may  classify  the  raUroada  according 
to  the  amount  of  the  business  which  they  have  done  or 
appear  likely  to  do.  .  .  .  If  the  same  rule  is  applied 
to  all  railroadB  of  the  same  class,  there  is  no  violation  of 
the  constitutional  provision  securing  to  all  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws.  ...  It  was  proper,  therefore,  to 
provide  in  aome  way  for  an  adaptation  of  the  rates  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  different  roads;  and  the  General 
Assembly,  in  the  exercise  of  its  legislative  discretion,  has 
seen  fit  to  do  this  by  a  system  of  classification.  Whether 
this  was  the  best  that  could  have  been  done  is  not  for  us 
to  decide.*'  In  Louisville  and  N.  B.  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  183 
U.  S.  503,  it  was  held  that  the  constitution  and  statutes  of 
Kentucky  giving  to  a  railroad  commission, — not  a  mere 
administrative  body  but  a  constitutional  tribunal, — ^power 
to  make  exceptions  in  particular  cases,  after  investigation, 
from  the  general  prohibition  of  greater  rates  for  shorter 
than  for  longer  banls,  did  not  infringe  the  guaranty  of  due 
process  contained  in  the  Federal  constitution.  It  is  only 
necessary  that  the  regulation  in  question  shall  operate 
uniformly  on  each  cIms.  Chicago  K.  Co.  v.  Iowa  (4  U.  S. 
155).  In  harmony  with  that  principle  it  was  said  in 
Adams  v.  New  York,  192  V.  S.  585, — in  response  to  the 
contention  "that  the  law  of  the  state  of  New  York  (344b) 
which  makes  the  possession  by  persons  other  than  a  public 
officer  of  papers  or  documents,  being  the  record  of  chances 
or  slips  in  what  is  commonly  known  as  policy,  or  policy 
slips,  or  the  possession  of  any  paper,  print,  or  writing 
commonly  used  in  playing  or  promoting  the  game  of  pol- 
icy, presumption  of  possession  thereof  knowingly,  in  vio- 
lation of  344a,  is  a  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  that  it  deprives 
a  citizen  of  his  liberty  and  property  without  due  process 
of  law, — "  that  "It  is  argued,  lastly,  that  §344h  is  un- 
constitutional because  the  possession  of  the  policy  tickets 
is  presumptive  evidence  against  all  except  public  officers, 


§  135     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OF  DUE  PROCESS        307 

and  it  is  urged  that  public  officials,  from  the  governor  to 
notaries  public,  would  thus  be  excluded  from  the  terms  of 
the  law  which  apply  to  all  non-official  persons.  This 
provision  was  evidently  put  into  the  statute  for  the  pur- 
pose of  excluding  the  presumption  raised  by  possession 
where  such  tickets  or  slips  are  seized  and  are  in  the  cus- 
tody of  officers  of  the  law.  This  was  the  construction 
given  to  the  act  by  the  New  York  courts,  and  is  the  only 
one  consistent  with  its  purposes.  The  construction  sug- 
gested would  lead  to  a  manifest  absurdity,  which  has  not 
received,  and  is  not  likely  to  receive  judicial  sanction.'* 
Thus  it  was  settled  that  the  constitutional  principle  re- 
quiring a  regulation  to  operate  uniformly  on  each  class 
was  not  violated  by  a  law  providing  that  the  possession 
of  policy  slips  **by  any  person  than  a  public  officer'* 
shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  that  the  possessor  has  them 
knowingly,  simply  by  reason  of  the  exception  of  public 
officers,  when  it  is  plain  that  the  exception  applies  only 
to  such  public  officers  as  have  acquired  possession  of 
such  slips  in  the  performance  of  their  official  duties. 

Such  then  is  the  nature  of  the  fundamental  requisite  of 
due  process,  so  far  as  generality  and  equality  of  laws  is 
concerned,  which,  with  its  inevitable  exceptions,  is  an 
element  inherent  in  due  process  in  its  American  form.  As 
such  it  existed  long  before  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  and  is  therefore  something  entirely  separate 
and  apart  from  the  guaranty  embodied  in  its  provision 
that  no  state  shall  *'deny  to  any  person  within  its  juris- 
diction the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. '  * 

§  135.  Fundamental  requisites  of  due  process — Juris- 
diction. The  system  of  law  by  analogy,  generally  known 
as  international  law,  rests  upon  the  postulate  that  terri- 
tory and  jurisdiction  are  co-extensive.  As  a  general  rule 
a  sovereign  state  has  jurisdiction  over  all  persons  and 
things  within  its  territorial  limits,  and  in  some  instances 
such  jurisdiction  over  both  extends  beyond  its  limits  and 
thus  becomes  exterritorial.     Jurisdiction  is  in  fact  an 


DUB  PBOCESS  OP  LAW 


§135 


attribute  inherent  in  sovereignty  that  follows  it  wherever 
it  goes.  As  Chief  Justice  Marshall  has  expressed  it : "  The 
jurisdiction  of  the  nation  within  its  own  territory  is  neces- 
sarily exclusive  and  absolute.  It  is  susceptible  of  no 
limitation  not  imposed  by  itself."  The  Schooner  Ex- 
change V.  McFaddon,  7  Cranch.  136.  Or  in  the  ampler 
phrase  of  Foelix  "every  state  possesses  the  power  of  reg- 
ulating the  conditions  on  which  real  or  personal  property, 
within  its  territory,  may  be  held  or  transmitted ;  and  of 
determining  the  state  and  capacity  of  all  persons  therein, 
as  well  as  the  validity  of  the  contracts  and  other  acts 
which  arise  there,  and  the  rights  and  obligations  which  re- 
sult from  them ;  and  finally  of  prescribing  the  conditions 
on  which  suits  at  law  may  be  commenced  and  carried  on 
within  its  territory. ' '  Droit  Int.  Prive,  9.  From  this  gen- 
eral right  of  control  results  the  exclusive  power  of  every 
state  to  fix  by  legislation  the  personal  and  civil  status  of 
its  citizens  and  the  status  and  condition  of  all  real  and 
personal  properiy  situated  within  its  limits  whether  be- 
longing to  citizens  or  aliens.  Under  our  Federal  consti- 
tution the  several  states  bear  to  each  other  the  relations 
of  independent  sovereignties  save  so  far  as  such  sover- 
eignty is  modified  by  its  provisions,  notable  among  which 
are  those  which  declare  first  that  "The  citizens  of  each 
state  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and  immunities  of 
citizens  in  the  several  states;"  second,  that  "full  faith 
and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each  state  to  the  public  acts, 
records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  every  other  state." 
In  Lafayette  Ins.  Co.  v.  French,  18  How.  404,  the  Court 
said:  "The  Act  of  May  26,  1790  (1  Stat,  at  L.,  122), 
gives  to  a  judgment  rendered  in  any  state  such  faith  and 
credit  as  it  had  in  the  courts  of  the  state  where  it  was 
recovered.  But  this  provision,  though  general  in  its 
terms,  does  not  extend  to  judgment  rendered  against 
persons  not  amenable  to  the  jurisdiction  rendering  the 
judgments.  D  'Arcy  v.  Ketehum,  11  How.  165.  And  con- 
sequently notwithstanding  the  Act  of  Congress,  whenever 
an  action  is  brought  in  one  state  on  a  judgment  recovered 


§  135     SCOPE  OP  GUARANTY  OF  DUE  PROCESS        309 

in  another,  it  is  not  enough  to  show  it  to  be  valid  in  the 
state  where  it  was  rendered ;  it  must  also  appear  that  the 
defendant  was  either  personally  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  state,  or  had  legal  notice  of  the  suit,  and  was  in 
some  way  subject  to  its  laws,  so  as  to  be  bound  to  appear 
and  contest  the  suit,  or  suffer  judgment  by  default.  In 
more  general  terms,  the  doctrine  of  this  court,  as  well  as 
the  courts  of  many  of  the  states,  is  that  this  Act  of  Con- 
gress was  not  designed  to  displace  that  principle  of 
natural  justice  which  requires  a  person  to  have  notice  of 
a  suit  before  he  can  be  conclusively  bound  by  its  result ; 
nor  those  rules  of  public  law  which  protect  persons  and 
property  within  one  state  from  the  exercise  of  jurisdic- 
tion over  them  by  another. ' ' 

As  that  decision  was  rendered  in  1855,  long  before 
the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  the  Federal 
courts  had  then  no  right  to  consider  whether  or  no  due 
process  of  law  was  guaranteed  in  the  proceedings  culmi- 
nating in  judgments  rendered  in  a  state  court  against 
persons  or  property  within  its  limits.  In  the  leading  case 
of  Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714,  decided  in  1877,  after 
conditions  had  been  changed  by  the  adoption  of  the 
amendment  in  question,  the  Court  said :  *  *  Since  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution, the  validity  of  such  judgments  may  be  directly 
questioned,  and  their  enforcement  in  the  state  resisted, 
oiji.the  ground  that  proceedings  in  a  court  of  justice  to 
determine  the  personal  rights  and  obligations  of  parties 
over  whom  that  court  had  no  jurisdiction,  do  not  consti- 
tute due  process  of  law.  Whatever  difficulty  may  be  expe- 
rienced in  giving  to  those  terms  a  definition  which  will 
embrace  every  possible  exertion  of  power  affecting  pri- 
vate rights,  and  exclude  such  as  is  forbidden,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  of  their  meaning  when  applied  to  judicial 
proceedings.  They  then  mean  a  course  of  legal  proceed- 
ings according  to  those  rules  and  principles  which  have 
been  established  in  our  system  of  jurisprudence  for  the 
protection  and  enforcement  of  private  rights.    To  give 


CHAPTER  VII 

DTTE  PBOCESS  AND  JUBISDICTION 

§  136.  A  competent  tribunal  and  notice.  As  the  right 
to  notice  and  hearing  constitutes  the  essence  of  due 
process  of  law  neither  element  can  exist  in  a  judicial  pro- 
ceeding in  which  there  is  a  total  absence  of  jurisdiction 
over  the  person  or  thing  to  be  affected  by  the  judgment. 
**To  give  such  proceedings  any  validity  there  must  be  a 
tribunal  competent  by  its  constitution — that  is  by  the  law 
of  its  creation — to  pass  upon  the  subject-matter  of  the 
suit ;  and,  if  that  involves  merely  a  determination  of  the 
personal  liability  of  the  defendant,  he  must  be  brought 
within  its  jurisdiction  by  service  of  process  within  the 
state,  or  his  voluntary  appearance. ' '  Pennoyer  v.  Neff , 
95  U.  S.  714. 

In  Windsor  v.  McVeigh,  93  U.  S.  274, — in  which  it  was 
held  that  no  sentence  of  a  court  is  a  judicial  determination 
entitled  to  respect  in  any  other  court  when  it  is  pro- 
nounced against  a  party  without  adequate  notice  and  with- 
out an  opportunity  to  be  heard, — the  Court  said:  *'That 
there  must  be  notice  to  a  party  of  some  kind,  actual  or  con- 
structive, to  a  valid  judgment  affecting  his  rights,  is  ad- 
mitted. Until  notice  is  given,  the  court  has  no  jurisdiction 
in  any  case  to  proceed  to  judgment,  whatever  its  authority 
may  be,  by  the  law  of  its  organization,  over  the  subject- 
matter.  But  notice  is  only  for  the  purpose  of  affording 
the  party  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  upon  the  claim 
or  the  charges  made ;  it  is  a  sunmions  to  him  to  appear 
and  speak,  if  he  has  anything  to  say  why  the  judgment 
sought  should  not  be  rendered.  A  denial  to  a  partj'^  of 
the  benefit  of  a  notice  would  be  in  effect  to  deny  that  he  is 
entitled  to  notice  at  all,  and  the  sham  and  deceptive  pro- 

312 


m 


§  136  DUE  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION  313 

ceeding  had  better  be  omitted  altogether.  It  would  be 
like  saying  to  a  party :  appear,  and  you  shall  be  heard ; 
and,  when  he  has  appeared,  saying:  your  appearance 
shall  not  be  recognized,  and  you  shall  not  be  heard.  In 
the  present  case,  the  district  court  not  only  in  effect  said 
this,  but  inunediately  added  a  decree  of  condemnation, 
reciting  that  the  default  of  all  persons  had  been  duly 
entered.  It  is  difficult  to  speak  of  a  decree  thus  rendered 
with  moderation ;  it  was,  in  fact,  a  mere  arbitrary  edict, 
clothed  in  the  form  of  a  judicial  sentence. ' '  In  Scott  v. 
McNeal,  154  U.  S.  34,  the  Court  said:  **No  judgment  of 
a  court  is  due  process  of  law,  if  rendered  without  juris- 
diction in  the  court,  or  without  notice  to  the  party.  The 
words  '  due  process  of  law,  ^  when  applied  to  judicial  pro- 
ceedings, as  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Field,  speaking  for 
this  court,  ^mean  a  course  of  legal  proceedings  according 
to  those  rules  and  principles  which  have  been  established 
in  our  systems  of  jurisprudence  for  the  protection  and 
enforcement  of  private  rights.  To  give  such  proceedings 
any  validity  there  must  be  a  tribunal  competent  by  its 
constitution — ^that  is,  by  the  law  of  its  creation — ^to  pass 
upon  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit ;  and  if  that  involves 
merely  a  determination  of  the  personal  liability  of  the 
defendant,  he  must  be  brought  within  its  jurisdiction  by 
service  of  process  within  the  state,  or  his  voluntary 
appearance. '  Pennoyer  v.  Neff ,  95  IT.  S.  714,  733. ' '  See 
also,  Hassell  v.  Wilcox,  130  IT.  S.  493 ;  Hilton  v.  Guyot, 
159  U.  S.  167;  Iowa  C.  E.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  160  U.  S.  389;  New 
Orleans  Water  Works  v.  New  Orleans,  164  U.  S.  480; 
Hovey  v.  Elliott,  167  U.  S.  409 ;  Blake  v.  McClung,  172 
U.  S.  230;  Simon  v.  Craft,  182  U.  S.  427;  National  Exch. 
Bank  v.  Wiley,  195  U.  S.  257;  Old  Wayne  Unit.  Ass'n  v. 
McDonough,  204  U.  S.  8 ;  Wetmore  v.  Karrick,  205  U.  S. 
141;  Bemheimer  v.  Converse,  206  U.  S.  516;  Longyear 
V.  Toolan,  209  U.  S.  414;  Ontario  Land  Co.  v.  Yordy,  212 
U.  S.  152 ;  Kentucky  Union  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  219  U.  S. 
140;  McCaughey  v.  Lyall,  224  U.  S.  558;  Soliah  v. 
Heskin,  222  U.  S.  522;  Blum  v.  Nelson,  222  U.  S.  1; 


314 


DITE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


$136 


Jacob  V.  Roberts,  223  U.  S.  261;  Michi^n  Trust  Co.  v. 
Ferry,  228  IT.  S.  346;  Plymoatb  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania, 
232  U.  S.  531 ;  Strauss  v.  Foxworth,  231 V.  S.  162 ;  Sturges 
&  Burn  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Beaucbam,  231  U.  S.  320;  Miedreicli 
V.  Lauenstein,  232  U.  S.  236 ;  Herbert  v.  Bicknell,  233  U.  S. 
70;  Grannia  v.  Ordean,  234  TJ.  S.  385;  Selig  v.  Hamilton, 
234  U.  S.  653;  Western  Life  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Eupp,  235 
U.  S.  261;  Baltimore  &  0.  B.  Co.  v.  Hostetter,  240  U.  S. 
620;  New  York  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dunlevy,  241  U.  S.  518; 
G.  &  C.  Merriam  Co.  v.  Saalfield,  241  U.  S.  22. 


§-137.  Necessity  of  service  to  validity  of  judgment. 

The  law  of  the  land  authorizes  no  court  to  render  a  judg- 
ment or  decree  against  a  person  or  his  estate  until  he  has 
been  notified  by  service  of  process  to  appear  and  defend. 
HoUingsworth  v.  Barbour,  4  Pet.  466.  A  person  who  has  * 
not  been  served  with  process,  actual  or  constructive,  or 
who  has  had  no  notice  of  proceedings  has  had  no  day  in 
court,  and  therefore  can  not  be  bound  by  a  judgment 
in  personam.  Harris  v.  Hardeman,  14  How.  334.  Until 
citation  is  issued  and  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  given, 
no  one  can  be  said  to  have  had  his  day  in  court.  Mason 
V.  Eldred,  6  Wall.  231.  Unless  a  party  voluntarily 
appears,  or  is  found  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court, 
so  as  to  be  served  with  process,  a  court  can  not,  in  the 
ordinary  administration  of  justice,  render  a  judgment  or 
decree  against  him.  Cooper  v.  Reynolds,  10  Wall.  308; 
Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Tmmble,  10  Wall.  367. 
At  conmion  law  a  court  can  not  exercise  jurisdiction  over 
a  party,  unless  he  voluntarily  appears,  or  is  served  Tvith 
process  within  the  court's  territorial  jurisdiction.  Mexi- 
can C.  E.  Co.  V.  Pinkney,  149  U.  S.  194.  Unless  a  person 
has  agreed  in  advance  to  accept,  or  does  actually  accept 
some  other  form  of  service  as  sufficient,  the  notice  must 
be  personally  served  upon  him  within  the  territorial  juris- 
diction of  the  court  by  whose  judgment  his  personal  liabil- 
ity is  to  be  ascertained.  Wilson  v.  Seligman,  144  U.  S.  41. 
Where  there  has  been  no  service  on  the  defendant,  or 


§  137  DUE  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION  315 

appearance  entered  for  him,  and  he  is  never  in  conrt,  a 
proceeding  to  enforce  a  lien  npon  a  mining  daim  can  not 
work  a  transfer  of  title  to  such  claim.  Turner  v.  Sawyer, 
150  U.  S.  578.  Unless  process  has  been  served  upon  a 
defendant  who  is  an  inhabitant  of  the  district,  or  unless 
he  waives  the  necessity  for  it  by  an  appearance,  no  judg- 
ment can  be  rendered  by  a  Federal  Court  against  such  a 
defendant.  In  the  absence  of  such  notice,  or  waiver,  an 
original  proceeding  is  not  only  voidable,  but  absolutely 
void.  Walden  v.  Craig,  14  Pet.  147 ;  Levy  v.  Fitzpatrick, 
15  Pet.  167.  A  different  rule  applies  to  the  decision  of  a 
collateral  question,  when  the  parties  are  already  before 
the  court.  Walden  v.  Craig,  14  Pet.  147.  Where  there 
are  several  defendants,  the  judgment  is  a  nullity  as  to  the 
one  not  served  with  process,  if  he  did  not  appear.  Shelton 
V.  TiflSn,  6  How.  163.  For  a  special  application  of  the  rule 
in  a  case  iu  which  only  twenty  out  of  sixty-four  parties 
to  a  decree  were  served  with  process,  or  voluntarily 
appeared  in  the  proceeding,  see  Godfrey  v.  Terry,  97 
U.  S.  171.  A  delivery  of  the  summons  at  the  usual  place 
of  defendant's  abode,  to  his  wife,  in  accordance  with  the 
procedure  established  by  the  court  in  question,  was  held 
to  be  a  proper  service  of  the  process  of  the  United  States 
provisional  court  for  Porto  Eico.  Santiago  v.  Nogueras, 
214  U.  S.  260.  For  the  conditions  under  which  substituted 
service  will  satisfy  the  requirements  of  due  process,  see 
Jacob  v.  Roberts,  223  U.  S.  261.  As  to  service  upon 
**  unknown  claimants  of  interests  in  the  premises  adverse 
to  the  plaintiff,''  see  Priest  v.  Las  Vegas,  232  U.  S.  604. 
As  to  service  in  a  proceeding  culminating  in  the  fore- 
closure of  a  mortgage  wherein  it  was  claimed  that  there 
was  a  lack  of  due  process,  despite  the  fact  that  the  state 
had  made  provision  for  the  service  of  process,  and  the 
original  party  in  the  foreclosure  proceeding  had  done  all 
the  law  required  in  the  issue  of  and  attempt  to  serve 
process,  reported  to  the  court  by  the  sheriff,  contrary  to 
the  fact,  as  duly  made,  see  Miedreich  v.  Lauenstein,  232 
U,  S.  236.   Where  a  party  had  actual  knowledge  of  a  suit 


316 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§137 


before  the  time  for  Bning  out  a  writ  of  error  had  expired, 
and  where  he  might  have  brought  about  a  setting  aaide  of 
the  judgment  and  a  retrial  of  the  case,  it  was  held  that 
the  principal  defendant  in  a  gamiBhment  snit  in  a  conrt 
having  jurisdiction  over  small  debts  was  not  deprived 
of  due  process  because  a  judgment  by  default  was  taken 
against  him,  after  such  service  of  process  only  as  that 
provided  by  Hawaii  Bev.  Laws,  2114,  i.  e.,  the  leaving  a 
copy  of  the  summons  at  his  last  and  usual  place  of  abode. 
Herbert  v.  Bicknell,  233  U.  S.  70.  See  Grannis  v.  Ordean," 
234  U.  S.  385;  Simon  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  236  V.  S.  115; 
Washington-Virginia  R.  Co.  v.  Real  Estate  Trust  Co., 
238  U.  S.  185. 

§  138.  Oxaing  lack  of  notice  or  service  by  appeu«nce. 

Defects  in  procedure  waived  by  appearance,  Penhallow  v. 
Doane,  3  Dall.  54.  All  antecedent  irregularity  of  service 
of  process  cured  by  defendant's  appearance  by  attorney, 
Knox  V.  Summers,  3  Cranch  496.  Where  the  defendant 
has  appeared  and  pleaded  to  the  issue,  no  question  on 
process  can  arise,  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts,  12  Pet 
657.  But  an  objection  that  goes  to  the  power  of  the  court 
over  the  subject-matter  or  parties  is  not  waived  by 
appearance  and  pleading  to  the  issue.  Ibid.,  657.  As  a 
corporation  can  only  appear  by  attorney,  such  an  appear- 
ance to  plead  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  can  not  be 
a  waiver  of  objection  to  the  jurisdiction,  Commercial  & 
E.  Bank  v.  Stocomb,  14  Pet.  60.  When  made  by  individ- 
ual defendants  in  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction,  an 
appearance  by  attorney  waives  all  objection  to  the  court's 
jurisdiction,  Ibid.,  60.  A  defendant  may  waive  the  per- 
sonal privilege  of  having  a  suit  against  him  only  in  the 
district  of  which  he  is  an  inhabitant  by  pleading  to  the 
merits,  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  B.  Co.  v.  McBride,  141  U.  S.  127. 
A  waiver  of  the  objection  that  he  was  not  an  inhabitant 
of  the  district  or  found  therein  is  made  by  a  defendant 
who  appears  without  making  an  exception,  Gracie  v. 
Palmer,  8  Wheat  699.   Any  right  to  challenge  thereafter 


"^ 


§  138  DUE  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION  317 

the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  on  the  ground  that  the  suit 
has  not  been  brought  in  the  proper  district  is  waived  by 
a  party  who,  in  the  first  instance,  appears  and  pleads  to 
the  merits.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  McBride,  141  U.  S. 
127.  A  nonresident  waives  his  privilege  and  makes  a 
voluntary  appearance,  when  he  appears  by  counsel  and 
moves  to  dismiss  the  bill  for  want  of  jurisdiction  and  also 
for  want  of  equity,  Jones  v.  Andrews,  10  Wall.  327.  When 
a  defendant  makes  a  special  appearance  in  order  to  move 
that  the  service  of  process  be  set  aside,  any  illegality  in 
such  service  by  which  jurisdiction  must  be  obtained,  is 
not  waived,  even  by  an  answer  to  the  merits  after  such  a 
motion  is  overruled,  Harkness  v.  Hyde,  98  U.  S.  476; 
Mexican  C.  E,  Co.  v.  Pinkney,  149  IT.  S.  194.  A  proceed- 
ing in  rem  is  converted  into  a  proceeding  in  personam  by 
the  appearance  of  the  defendant.  Cooper  v.  Reynolds, 
10  Wall.  308.  See  also,  Creighton  v.  Kerr,  20  Wall.  8. 
It  was  held  that  a  proceeding  lacked  due  process  when 
a  judgment  was  taken  in  a  state  court  under  a  warrant 
of  attorney  attached  to  a  promissory  note,  directing  a 
confession  of  judgment  **in  favor  of  the  holder, '*  when 
the  party  in  whose  favor  the  judgment  was  rendered  had 
ceased  to  own  it,  or  to  be  entitled  to  receive  the  proceeds 
to  his  own  use,  before  the  commencement  of  the  suit. 
National  Exch.  Bank  v.  Wiley,  195  TJ.  S.  257.  Since  in 
such  cases  the  consent  of  both  parties  can  not  confer 
jurisdiction,  it  was  held  that  an  objection  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion based  upon  a  total  lack  of  any  controversy  of  a 
Federal  character  was  not  waived  by  a  general  appear- 
ance of  the  plaintiff  in  a  Federal  circuit  court  after  the 
case  had  been  removed  from  a  state  court.  Re  Winn,  213 
U.  S.  458.  When  an  appearance  is  entered  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  presenting  the  question  of  jurisdiction  and 
removing  the  cause  from  a  state  to  a  Federal  court  such 
an  appearance  does  not  amount  to  a  general  appearance 
in  the  suit.  Commercial  Mut.  Accident  Co.  v.  Davis,  213 
XJ.  S.  245.  In  passing  upon  the  waiver  of  illegal  service 
in  a  case  removed  from  the  state  to  the  Federal  court,  the 


318 


DUE  PE0C3BSS  OF  LAW 


§138 


CI 


It 


Supreme  Court  said:  ** Plaintiff  further  contends  that, 
under  the' Mississippi  Code,  the  filing  of  the  petition  for 
removal  constitutes  a  general  entry  of  appearance ;  that 
therefore,  if  29  does  not  compel  the  removing  party  to 
plead  to  the  declaration  within  thirty  days,  *then  under 
914,  U.  S.  Eev.  Stat.,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  p.  684,  the 
*  practice,  pleadings,  forms,  and  modes  of  proceeding*  in 
the  state  court  adopted  by  the  Federal  court,  would  make 
the  plea  to  the  jurisdiction  here  in  the  district  court  a 
general  entry  of  appearance,  and  would  require  a  plea  to 
the  merits  at  the  next  term  of  the  district  court  under  the 
Code  of  the  State,'  because  *  a  special  is  a  general  entry  of 
appearance  under  3946,  Code  of  1906.'  The  contention 
is  untenable.''  Cain  v.  Com.  Pub.  Co.,  232  U.  S,  134, 
citing  Goldey  v.  Morning  News,  156  U.  S.  518,  and  Me- 
chanical App.  Co.  V.  Castleman,  215  U.  S.  437.  See  also 
Arizona  &  New  Mexico  By.  v.  Clark,  235  U.  S.  669. 

§  139.  Jurisdiction  over  nonresident  persons.  A  state 
can  not  justly  exercise  jurisdiction  over  a  person  owing 
it  no  allegiance,  simply  because  he  is  found  within  its 
limits.  Mills  v.  Duryee,  7  Cranch  481.  If  service  is  made 
outside  of  its  limits,  a  territorial  court  can  have  no  juris- 
diction to  render  a  personal  judgment  against  any  one. 
Harkness  v.  Hyde,  98  U.  S.  476.  And  yet  the  mere  fact 
that  a  defendant  is  without  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
is  not  conclusive  evidence  that  the  judgment  is  void, 
because  he  may  have  authorized  counsel  to  defend  the  suit 
in  his  absence.  Landes  v.  Brant,  10  How.  348.  Jurisdic- 
tion may  be  so  acquired  as  to  sustain  a  judgment  against 
foreigners  who  have  a  storehouse  and  agent  in  the  coun- 
try, and  who  have  appeared  and  are  engaged  in  litigation 
simply  to  prevent  their  property  within  the  jurisdiction, 
but  not  in  the  custody  of  the  court,  from  being  seized  to 
satisfy  any  judgment  that  might  be  rendered  against 
them.  Hilton  v.  Guyot,  159  U.  S.  113.  It  is  elementary 
that  a  personal  judgment  against  a  nonresident  is  invalid 
in  an  ordinary  civil  case  where  the  service  of  process  has 


! 


§  140  DUE  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION  319 

been  by  publication.  In  order  to  render  the  judgment  or 
decree  of  the  court  effectual  it  must  have  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject-matter  or  the  parties.  A  money  judgment 
rendered  against  a  nonresident  defendant  served  only  by 
the  publication  of  process  against  him  is  without  jurisdic- 
tion, and  therefore  lacking  in  due  process  of  law.  Pen-' 
noyer  v.  Neff,  95  XJ.  S.  714.  In  that  case  the  Court  said : 
^'The  force  and  effect  of  judgments  rendered  against  non- 
residents without  personal  service  of  process  on  them,  or 
their  voluntary  appearance,  have  been  the  subject  of  fre- 
quent consideration  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  several  states,  as  attempts  have  been  made  to 
enforce  such  judgments  in  states  other  than  those  in 
which  they  were  rendered,  under  the  provision  of  the  con- 
stitution requiring  that  *Full  faith  and  credit  shall  be 
given  in  each  state  to  the  public  acts,  records  and  judicial 
proceedings  of  every  other  state;'  •  .  .  Since  the 
adoption  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Federal 
Constitution,  the  validity  of  such  judgments  may  be 
directly  questioned,  and  their  enforcement  in  the  state 
resisted,  on  the  ground  that  proceedings  in  a  court  of 
justice  to  determine  the  personal  rights  and  obligations 
of  parties  over  whom  that  court  has  no  jurisdiction  do  not 
constitute  due  process  of  law.''  See  also.  Cooper  v. 
Reynolds,  10  Wall.  308;  Brooklyn  v.  Etna  L.  Ins.  Co., 
99  U.  S.  362 ;  Empire  Twp.  v.  Darlington,  101  XT.  S.  87 ; 
Grover  &  B.  Sewing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Radcliffe,  137  IT.  S. 
287;  Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  United  States,  221  U.  S.  1; 
Jacob  V.  Roberts,  223  IT.  S.  261 ;  Miedreich  v.  Lauenstein, 
232  U.  S.  236 ;  Herbert  v.  Bicknell,  233  U.  S.  70 ;  Grannis 
V.  Ordean,  234  IT.  S.  385 ;  Mercelis  v.  Wilson,  235  U.  S. 
579;  Simon  v.  Southern  Railway,  236  U.  S.  115. 

§  140.  Jurisdiction  over  nonresident  corporations.    In 

the  recent  case  of  Riverside  and  Dan  River  Cotton  Mills 
v.  Menefee,  237  IT.  S.  189,  it  was  held  that  a  corporation, 
no  more  than  an  individual,  is  subject  to  be  condemned 
without  a  hearing  in  violation  of  the  due  process  clause ; 


Ml'     |. 

I  « 


320  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  140 

and  the  mere  fact  that  one  who  is  a  director,  but  who  is 
not  a  resident  agent,  of  a  foreign  corporation  resides 
within  the  state  does  not  give  the  courts  of  that  state" 
jurisdiction  over  a  corporation  which  is  not  doing  busi- 
ness and  has  no  resident  agent  therein.  The  Court  speak- 
ing through  Mr,  Chief  Justice  White,  said:  **That  to 
condemn  without  a  hearing  is  repugnant  to  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  needs  noth- 
ing but  statement  Equally  well  settled  is  it  that  the 
courts  of  one  state  can  not,  without  a  violation  of  the  due 
process  clause,  extend  their  authority  beyond  their  juris- 
diction so  as  to  condemn  the  resident  of  another  state 
when  neither  his  person  nor  his  property  is  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court  rendering  the  judgment,  since 
that  doctrine  was  long  ago  established  by  the  decision  in 
Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  95  U,  S.  714.  .  .  .  Whatever  long 
ago  may  have  been  the  difficulty  in  applying  the  princi- 
pies  of  Pennoyer  v.  Neff  to  corporations,  that  is,  in  deter- 
mining when,  if  at  all,  a  corporation  created  by  the  laws 
of  one  state  could  be  sued  in  the  courts  of  another  sov- 
ereignty, because  of  the  conception  that  as  an  ideal  being 
a  corporation  could  not  migrate  and  its  officers  in  going 
into  another  sovereignty  did  not  take  with  them  their 
power  to  represent  the  corporation,  such  difficulty  ceased 
to  exist  with  the  decision  of  this  court  rendered  more  than 
thirty  years  ago  in  St.  Clair  v.  Cox,  106  U.  S.  350,  which, 
together  with  the  leading  cases  which  have  followed,  have 
been  already  referred  to.*^  The  cases  in  question  are, 
Freeman  v.  Alderson,  119  U.  S.  185,  Wilson  v.  Seligman, 
144  U.  S.  41;  Scott  V.  McNeal,  154  U.  S.  34;  Caledonian 
Coal  Co.  V.  Baker,  196  U.  S.  432 ;  Haddock  v.  Haddock, 
201  U.  S.  562;  Clark  v.  Wells,  203  U.  S.  164;  Hunter  v. 
Mutual  Reserve  Life  Ins.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  573.  In  St.  Clair 
V.  Cox,  the  Court  said:  *'A  corporation  of  one  state  can 
not  do  business  in  another  state  without  the  latter 's  con- 
sent, express  or  implied,  and  that  consent  may  be  accom- 
panied with  such  conditions  as  it  may  think  proper  to 
impose.    As  said  by  this  court  in  Ins.  Co.  v.  French, 


§  141  DUB  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION  321 

'  These  conditions  must  be  deemed  valid  and  effectual  by 
other  states  and  by  this  court,  provided  they  are  not 
repugnant  to  the  Constitutions  or  laws  of  the  United 
States  nor  inconsistent  with  those  rules  of  public  law 
which  secure  the  jurisdiction  and  authority  of  each  state 
from  encroachment,  by  all  others,  or  that  principle  of 
natural  justice  which  forbids  condemnation  without 
opportunity  for  defense.  18  How.  407 ;  Paul  v,  Virginia, 
8  Wall.  181.  The  state  may  therefore,  impose  as  a  condi- 
tion upon  which  foreign  corporation  shall  be  permitted 
to  do  business  within  her  limits,  that  it  shall  stipulate 
that,  in  any  litigation  arising  out  of  its  transactions  in 
the  state,  it  will  accept  as  suflScient  the  service  of  process 
on  its  agents  or  persons  specially  designated;  and  the 
condition  would  be  eminently  fit  and  just.  And  such 
condition  and  stipulation  may  be  implied  as  well  as. 
expressed.  If  a  state  permits  a  foreign  corporation  to  do 
business  within  her  limits,  and  at  the  same  time  provides 
that  in  suits  against  it  for  business  there  done,  process 
shall  be  served  upon  its  agents,  the  provision  is  to  be 
deemed  a  condition  of  the  permission ;  and  corporations 
that  subsequently  do  business  in  the  state  are  to  be 
deemed  to  assent  to  such  condition  as  fully  as  though 
they  had  specially  authorized  their  agents  to  receive 
service  of  process.  Such  condition  must  not,  however, 
encroach  upon  that  principle  of  natural  justice  which 
requires  notice  of  a  suit  to  a  party  before  he  can  be  bound 
by  it.  It  must  be  reasonable,  and  the  service  provided  for 
should  be  only  upon  such  agents  as  may  be  properly 
denied  representative  of  the  foreign  corporation.  The 
decision  we  have  already  referred  sustains  these  views.** 
See  Simon  v.  Southern  Eailway,  236  IT.  S.  115. 

§141.  Proceedings  in  rem.  In  the  leading  case  of 
Windsor  v.  McVeigh,  93  U.  S.  279, — ^involving  the  validity 
of  an  act  of  Congress  authorizing  the  confiscation  of  the 
property  of  rebels,  in  which  the  owner  of  the  land  seized 
appeared  and  filed  an  answer,  stricken  out  by  the  trial 

Due  Proee8»— 21 


I 


I 


i! 


w 


n 

itJ; 
I' 


322 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§141 


court  on  the  ground  that  it  appeared  from  it  that  the 
owner  was  **  within  the  Confederate  lines  and  a  rebel, — *' 
the  Supreme  Court  said :  *  *  The  jurisdiction  acquired  by 
the  seizure  is  not  to  pass  upon  the  question  of  forfeiture 
absolutely,  but  to  pass  upon  that  question  after  oppor- 
tunity has  been  afforded  to  its  owner  and  parties  inter- 
ested to  appear  and  be  heard  upon  the  charges.  To  this 
end,  some  notification  of  the  proceedings,  beyond  that 
arising  from  the  seizure,  prescribing  the  time  within 
which  the  appearance  must  be  made,  is  essential.  Such 
notification  is  usually  given  by  monition,  public  proclama- 
tion, or  publication  in  some  other  form.  The  manner  of 
the  notification  is  immaterial.'*  In  Roller  v.  Holly,  176 
TJ.  S.  398,  it  was  held  in  a  suit  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  lien 
upon  land  within  the  state  that  personal  service  on  non- 
residents,  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  may  be 
suflficient.  The  Court  said :  * '  Without  undertaking  to  de- 
termine what  is  a  reasonable  notice  to  nonresidents,  we 
are  of  opinion,  under  the  circumstances  of  this  case,  and 
considering  the  distance  between  the  place  of  service  and 
the  place  of  return,  that  five  days  was  not  a  reasonable 
notice,  or  due  process  of  law ;  that  the  judgment  obtained 
upon  such  notice  was  not  binding  upon  the  defendant 
EoUer,  and  constitutes  no  bar  to  the  prosecution  of  this 
action.  *'  A  creditor  is  not  deprived  of  property  without 
due  process  of  law  where  debts  to  nonresident  creditors 
are  attached  at  the  place  of  the  debtor's  residence.  Roths- 
child V.  Knight,  184  U.  S.  334.  A  nonresident  defendant, 
who  has  no  property  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court, 
is  not  deprived  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law 
by  the  garnishment  of  a  resident  debtor  to  reach  a  debt 
due  him.  King  v.  Cross,  175  U.  S.  396.  Because  there  was 
no  publication,  under  the  act  of  June  30,  1902,  against 
unknown  heirs  or  next  of  kin,  until  after  the  verdict,  no 
suggestion  being  made  at  any  time  that  there  were  no 
such  persons,  the  court  will  not  at  the  instance  of  the 
caveator  set  aside  probate  proceedings  in  the  District  of 
Columbia  in  which  a  verdict  sustaining  the  will  had  been 


§  142  DUB  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION  323 

rendered  by  a  jury  after  a  trial  of  the  issues  made  up 
under  a  caveat  Lewis  v.  Luckett,  221  U.  S,  554,  In 
MichigMi  Trust  Co.  v.  Ferry,  228  U.  S-  346,  Edward  P. 
Ferry  was  appointed  executor  by  the  Ottawa  probate 
court,  qualified  and  entered  upon  his  duties.  In  1878 
he  removed  to  Utah,  and  becoming  incompetent,  was 
put  under  guardianship  of  two  sons.  The  Court  said: 
**  Jurisdiction  is  power,  and  the  power  of  the  Michigan 
court  was  not  affected  by  the  insanity  of  Ferry.  The 
authority  of  the  state  to  remove  him  and  to  require  his 
account  to  be  settled  at  the  same  time  remained,  and 
therefore,  subject  to  any  restrictions  that  might  be 
imposed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  it  was  for  the 
state  to  determine  how  he  should  be  represented,  and 
steps  should  be  taken  to  protect  his  rights.  As  the  juris- 
diction extended  only  to  the  cause,  and  not  to  any  inde- 
pendent proceeding  for  guardianship,  the  orders  made 
necessary  were  orders  in  the  cause. ' '  It  is  scarcely  neces- 
sary to  add  here  that  in  order  to  force  all  cases  of  valid 
service  by  construction  or  substitution  within  the  class 
of  proceedings  in  rem,  the  idea  of  the  res  has  been 
extended  to  such  intangible  things  as  the  probate  of  wills, 
and  the  grant  of  letters  of  administration.  *  *  The  decree 
of  the  court  admitting  the  will  to  probate  is  in  the  nature 
of  a  judgment  in  rem  which  establishes  the  will  against 
all  the  world.  ^'  Bonnemot  v.  Gill,  167  Mass.  338.  Li 
Cunnius  v.  Beading  School  Dist.,  198  U.  S.  458, — ^in  which 
the  grant  of  letters  of  administration  was  treated  in  effect 
as  a  proceeding  in  rem, — ^the  court  held  that  the  notice 
fixing  the  period  of  a  person's  absence  from  his  last 
domicil  in  the  state  was  not  so  unreasonable  as  to  render 
the  statute  in  question  repugnant  to  the  due  process  of 
law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 


§142.  Divorce  proceedings,  strictly  speaking,  neither 
in  rem  nor  in  personam.  An  able  text  writer  has  said: 
**As  preliminary  to  a  discussion  of  the  principles  gov- 
erning the  effect  of  foreign  divorce,  it  is  necessary  to 


« 


''^ 


s 


324 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§142 


observe  the  important  distinctions  between  judicial  pro- 
ceedings in  personam  and  in  rem.  The  purpose  of  a  pro- 
ceeding in  personam  is  to  impose,  through  the  judgment 
or  decree  of  the  court  whose  aid  is  invoked,  some  respon- 
sibility or  liability  directly  upon  the  person  of  the  defend- 
ant. ...  Of  this  character  are  criminal  prosecutions, 
suits  to  compel  a  defendant  to  perform  some  specific  act 
or  actions  to  fasten  a  general  pecuniary  liability  upon 
him.  A  proceeding  in  rem,  on  the  other  hand,  is  aimed 
not  at  the  person  of  the  defendant,  but  at  his  property 
or  some  other  thing  within  the  power  and  jurisdiction  of 
the  court.  Most  important  consequences  flow  from  the 
distinction  between  these  modes  of  procedure.  The  Four- 
teenth Amendment  to  the  Federal  constitution  provides 
that  no  state  shall  deprive  any  person,  life,  liberty,  or 
property  without  due  process  of  law;  that  is,  without 
notice  and  reasonable  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  his  own 
behalf.  But  the  notice  required  under  this  constitutional 
provision  is  very  different  in  the  two  modes  of  procedure. 
In  proceedings  in  personam,  no  judgment  or  decree 
against  a  defendant  is  valid  unless  he  has  been  person- 
ally served  with  notice  of  the  action  or  suit  within  the 
territorial  limits  of  the  court  ^s  jurisdiction,  or  has  volun- 
tarily appeared.  This  much  is  always  required,  and  in 
some  instances  even  more.  But  in  proceedings  in  rem, 
if  the  res  be  within  the  court's  jurisdiction,  due  process 
of  law  does  not  demand  that  actual  notice  of  the  suit 
should  be  served  upon  the  defendant  personally.  Even 
though  he  be  a  nonresident  of  the  forum,  the  law  pre- 
sumes that  he  keeps  in  touch  with  his  property,  wherever 
it  is  situated,  and  that  he  will  be  straightway  informed  if 
any  peril  threatens  it.  •  .  .  Divorce  causes  being 
proceedings  quasi  in  rem,  it  becomes  important  and  neces- 
sary to  determine  what  is  the  res,  for  the  court 's  jurisdic- 
tion in  proceeding  in  rem  depends  upon  its  jurisdiction 
of  the  res.  It  is  generally  admitted  that  the  res  is  the 
marriage  status,  which  includes  the  status  of  both  con- 
sorts, the  situs  of  the  status  of  each  being  his  or  her 


§  142  DUE  PROCESS  AND  JUKISDIOTION  325 

domicil  Strictly  speaking^  therefore,  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  status  of  the  husband  or  wife  belongs  to  the  courts 
of  his  or  her  domicil,  and  to  no  other,  because  those  courts 
alone  have  jurisdiction  of  the  res.  But  in  the  case  of 
marriage  the  status  is  double  or  correlative  status. 
There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  husband  without  a  wife, 
or  a  wife  without  a  husband.  Hence  when  a  court 
assumes  to  pronounce  a  decree  destroying  the  marriage 
status  of  one  of  the  consorts,  it  must  necessarily  destroy 
so  far  as  its  decree  has  any  effect  at  all,  the  status  of  the 
other  consort  also.  If  then  the  consorts  are  domiciled  in 
different  states,  it  is  a  matter  of  grave  importance  to 
ascertain  how  far  the  power  of  the  courts  of  either  of 
these  domicils  extends  in  dissolving  the  marital  union.'' 
Minor,  Conflict  of  Laws,  pp.  184  sq. 

Only  with  the  foregoing  principles  clearly  in  view  is 
it  possible  to  understand  and  apply  the  decisions,  not  very 
numerous,  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  has  expounded  this  abstruse  subject  of  jurisdic- 
tion which,  without  exaggeration,  may  be  said  to  embody 
the  metaphysics  of  American  law.  In  divorce  cases  the 
jurisdiction  must  depend  upon  the  domicil  of  one  or  both 
of  the  parties,  because  every  state  claims,  as  a  part  of  its 
sovereignty,  the  right  to  determine  the  status  of  its  domi- 
ciled subjects  or  citizens.  In  Bell  v.  Bell,  181  U.  S.  175, 
the  Court  said:  **No  valid  divorce  from  the  bond  of 
matrimony  can  be  decreed  on  constructive  service  by  the 
courts  of  a  state  in  which  neither  party  is  domiciled. '* 
See  also,  Streitwolf  v.  Streitwolf ,  181  U.  S.  179 ;  Winston 
V.  Winston,  189  U.  S.  507.  The  right  of  a  state  to  deter- 
mine the  status  of  its  domiciled  citizens  necessary 
involves  the  res,  because  *  *  the  res  is  the  marriage  status, 
which  includes  the  status  of  both  consorts,  the  situs  of 
the  status  of  each  being  his  or  her  domicil. ' '  It  is  there- 
fore certain,  first,  that  where  neither  party  has  a  hona 
fide  domicil  in  the  state  wherein  the  decree  of  divorce  is 
rendered  (a  question  not  dependent  entirely  on  local 
law)  the  decree,  not  binding  in  any  other  state,  is  not 


;   I 


I;)        t 


IK     t 


t 


I 


■  ! 


■  J  i   l|    i 


326 


DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§142 


within  the  due  faith  and  credit  clause  of  the  constitution 
(Bell  V.  Bell,  181  U.  S.  175) ;  second,  that  where  both  par- 
ties are  domiciled  in  the  state  granting  the  divorce,  by  a 
decree  made  after  proper  service  of  process,  it  is  within 
the  full  faith  and  credit  clause  of  the  Constitution,  and 
valid  everywhere  (Atherton  v.  Atherton,  181  U.  S.  155) ; 
third,  that  the  same  conditions  exist  where  one  of  the  par- 
ties has  voluntarily  appeared,  though  not  personally 
served  with  process  within  the  state  ( Cheever  v.  Wilson, 
9  Wall,  108 ;  Lynde  v.  Lynde,  181 U.  S.  183).  In  Pennoyer 
V.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  734,  the  Court,  after  explaining  the  rules 
as  to  the  validity  of  state  judgments  in  rem  and  in 
personam,  was  careful  to  say:  **To  prevent  any  mis- 
application of  the  views  expressed  in  this  opinion,  it  is 
proper  to  observe  that  we  do  not  mean  to  assert,  by 
anything  that  we  have  said,  that  a  state  may  not  author- 
ize proceedings  to  determine  the  status  of  one  of  its  citi- 
zens toward  a  nonresident,  which  would  be  binding  within 
the  state,  though  made  without  service  of  process  or  per- 
sonal notice  to  the  nonresident.  •  •  .  One  of  the  par- 
ties guilty  of  acts  for  which,  by  the  law  of  the  state,  a 
dissolution  may  be  granted,  may  have  removed  to  a 
state  where  no  dissolution  is  permitted.  The  complain- 
ing party  would,  therefore,  fail  if  a  divorce  were  sought 
in  the  state  of  the  defendant;  and  if  application  could  not 
be  made  to  the  tribunals  of  the  complainant's  domicil  in 
such  case,  and  proceedings  be  there  instituted  without 
personal  service  of  process,  or  personal  notice  to  the 
offending  party,  the  injured  citizen  would  be  without 
redress. ' ' 

Only  when  proceedings  for  divorce  are  regarded  as 
quasi  in  rem,  with  the  marriage  status  of  the  parties  the 
res  or  subject-matter  in  dispute  as  the  real  ground  of 
jurisdiction,  is  it  possible  to  fix  the  extraterritoriality  of 
divorce  decrees  upon  a  basis  in  harmony  with  general 
theory.  And  yet  even  then  the  extraterritoriality  of  such 
decrees  can  not  so  extend  beyond  the  dissolution  of  the 
marriage  status  as  to  fix  to  such  judgments  the  qualities 


§  142  DUB  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION  327 

of  a  judgment  in  personam.  It  can  not  draw  after  it  the 
payment  of  alimony,  unless  it  be  decreed  after  the  volun- 
tary appearance  of  the  nonresident  defendant.  In  Lynde 
V.  Lynde,  181  U.  S.  183,  the  Court  said:  ''The  husband, 
as  the  record  shows,  having  appeared  generally  in  answer 
to  the  petition  for  alimony  in  the  court  of  chancery  in 
New  Jersey,  the  decree  of  that  court  for  alimony^  was 
binding  on  him.  Laing  v.  Rigney,  160  U.  S.  531. '  *  In  the 
case  of  Barber  v.  Barber,  21  How.  582,  in  which  a  decree 
for  divorce  and  alimony  was  rendered,  both  parties  being 
domiciled  in  New  York,  the  court  held  that  such  a  decree 
or  judgment  rendered  in  any  state  of  the  Union,  the  court 
having  jurisdiction,  will  be  carried  into  judgment  in  any 
other  state,  there  to  have  the  same  effect  that  it  has  in  the 
state  in  which  rendered.  See  also,  Cheever  v.  Wilson, 
9  Wall.  108,  in  which  the  defendant  made  a  voluntary 
appearance.  While  in  Cheely  v.  Clayton,  110  U.  S.  701, 
a  divorce  was  held  to  be  void  because  the  court  had  not 
acquired  jurisdiction  in  accordance  with  the  local  law,  it 
waa  said  that  **the  courts  of  the  state  of  the  domicil  of 
the  parties  doubtless  have  jurisdiction  to  decree  a  divorce, 
in  accordance  with  its  laws,  for  any  cause  allowed  by  those 
laws,  without  regard  to  the  place  of  the  marriage,  or  to 
that  of  the  commission  of  the  offense  for  which  the 
divorce  is  granted;  and  a  divorce  so  obtained  is  valid 
everywhere. ' ' 

Reference  must  next  be  made  to  the  notable  case  of 
Atherton  v.  Atherton,  181  U.  S.  155,  decided  in  1900,  in 
which  it  appeared  that  ^  *  On  October  17, 1888,  the  parties 
were  married  at  Clinton,  Oneida  County,  New  York,  the 
plaintiff  being  a  resident  of  that  place,  and  the  defendant 
a  resident  of  Louisville,  Kentucky.  Immediately  after 
the  marriage,  the  parties  went  to  and  resided  at  Louis- 
ville in  the  house  with  the  defendant's  parents,  had  a 
child  bom  to  them  on  January  8,  1890,  and  there  con- 
tinued to  reside  as  husband  and  wife  until  October  3, 
1891.  Then,  owning  to  his  cruel  and  abusive  treatment, 
without  fault  on  her  part,  she  left  him,  taking  the  child 


328 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§142 


i 


with  her,  and  in  a  few  days  thereafter  returned  to  her 
mother  at  Clinton,  and  has  ever  since  resided  there  with 
her  mother,  and  is  a  resident  of  and  domiciled  in  the  state 
of  New  York,  and  has  not  lived  or  cohabited  with  the 
defendant.  * '  After  the  lapse  of  a  sufficient  time  required 
by  the  laws  of  Kentucky  the  husband  sued  there  for 
divorce  on  the  ground  of  desertion,  making  affidavit  under 
the  local  law  as  to  defendant's  residence  and  postoffice. 
Thereupon  an  order  was  made  warning  the  defendant  to 
defend  within  sixty  days,  and  appointing  an  attorney  for 
such  defendant,  '*  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  make  diligent 
efforts  to  inform  the  defendant  by  mail  concerning  the 
pendency  and  nature  of  the  action, '*  and  report  to  the 
court.  After  a  careful  observance  of  all  the  requirements 
of  the  Kentucky  law  a  decree  of  divorce  was  granted  the 
husband.  When  the  wife  brought  a  subsequent  action  in 
New  York  for  divorce  on  the  ground  of  cruelty  the  court 
of  that  state,  refusing  to  recognize  the  Kentucky  decree 
as  binding  there,  rendered  a  decree  of  divorce  in  the 
wife's  favor  on  the  ground  set  up  by  her,  it  being  dis- 
tinctly held  that  she  had  acquired  a  separate  domicil  in 
New  York  by  reason  of  the  husband's  cruelty.  On  that 
theory  the  New  York  court  maintained  its  jurisdiction. 
Its  decree  was  reversed  by  the  Federal  Supreme  Court  on 
the  ground  that  the  Kentucky  court  had  acquired  juris- 
diction of  the  case  by  the  constructive  service  provided  by 
the  local  law,  and  that  its  judgment  was  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  full  faith  and  credit  clause  of  the  Constitution, 
and  therefore  binding  in  all  the  states.  It  was  careful, 
however,  to  say :  ' '  This  case  does  not  involve  the  validity 
of  a  divorce  granted  on  constructive  service,  by  the  court 
of  a  state  in  which  only  one  of  the  parties  ever  had  a 
domicil;  nor  the  question  to  what  extent  the  good  faith 
of  the  domicil  may  be  afterwards  inquired  into.  In  this 
case,  the  divorce  in  Kentucky  was  by  the  court  of  the  state 
which  had  always  been  the  undoubted  domicil  of  the 
husband  and  which  was  the  only  matrimonial  domicil  of 
the  husband  and  wife.    The  single  question  to  be  decided 


§1 


DUE  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION 


is  the  validity  of  that  divorce,  granted  after  such  notice 
had  been  given  as  was  required  by  the  statutes  of  Ken- 
tucky." The  conrt  clearly  admitted  that  the  constructive 
service  brought  the  res  before  the  court,  if  not  the  non- 
resident wife.  In  speaking  of  the  validity  of  the  con- 
structive notice  required  by  the  Kentucky  law  it  said: 
"The  undisputed  facta  show  that  such  efforts  were 
required  by  the  statute^  of  Kentucky  and  were  actually 
made,  to  give  the  wife  actual  notice  of  the  suit  in  Ken- 
tacky,  as  to  make  the  decree  of  the  court  there  granting 
a  divorce  upon  the  ground  that  she  had  abandoned  her 
husband,  as  binding  on  her  as  if  she  had  been  served  with 
notice  in  Kentucky,  or  had  voluntarily  appeared  in  the 
suit  Binding  her  to  that  full  extent,  it  established, 
beyond  contradiction,  that  she  hiid  abandoned  her  hus- 
band, and  precludes  her  from  asserting  that  she  left  him 
on  account  of  his  cruel  treatment,"  as  asserted  in  her  suit 
in  New  York.  Certainly  the  decision  in  question  clearly 
settled  the  fact  that  where  reasonable  efforts  to  give  a 
nonresident  defendant  actual  notice  are  required  by  the 
state  law,  and  are  actually  made,  actual  notice  of  divorce 
proceedings  is  not  required  in  th^  court  of  a  state,  which 
had  always  been  the  domicil  of  the  plaintiff  and  the  only 
matrimonial  domicil  of  the  consorts.  It  was  held  that  as 
all  the  requirements  of  the  local  law  were  complied  with, 
the  decree  for  abandonment  was  as  binding  on  the  absent 
wife  in  a  court  of  a  state  in  which  she  resided  as  if  she 
had  been  served  with  notice  in  Kentucky,  or  had  entered 
a  voluntary  appearance  there.  The  Conrt  said:  "The 
purpose  and  effect  of  a  decree  of  divorce  from  the  bond 
of  matrimony  by  a  court  of  competent  jiuisdiction  are  to 
change  the  existing  status  or  domestic  relation  of  hus- 
band and  wife,  and  to  free  them  both  from  the  bond.  The 
marriage  tie,  when  thus  severed  as  to  one  party,  ceases  to 
bind  either.  A  husband  without  a  wife,  or  a  wife  without 
a  hnsband,  is  unknown  to  the  law." 

In  Haddock  v.  Haddock,  201  U.  S.  562  (1905)  the  court 
by  a  majority  of  one  (Brown,  Harlan,  Brewer  and  Holmes, 


330 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§142 


JJ.  dissenting)  virtually  reversed  Atherton  v.  Atherton, 
181  U.  S.  155,  in  a  decision  holding  that  a  decree  against 
a  nonresident  def'endant  in  a  divorce  proceeding,  who  did 
not  appear  and  was  only  constructively  served  with 
notice  of  the  pendency  of  the  suit,  is  not  enforceable  in 
all  the  other  states  by  virtue  of  thjB  full  faith  and  credit 
clause  of  the  Federal  constitution,  because  mere  domicil 
within  the  state  of  one  party  to  the  marriage  does  not 
give  the  courts  of  that  state  jurisdiction  to  render  such  a 
decree.  Mr.  Justice  Holmes  in  his  dissenting  opinion 
said :  * '  It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  present 
decision  purports  to  respect,  and  not  to  overrule,  Ather- 
ton V.  Atherton,  For  that  reason,  among  others,  I  spend 
no  time  in  justifying  that  case.  And  yet  it  appears  to  me 
that  the  whole  argxunent  which  prevails  with  tiie  majority 
of  the  court  is  simply  an  argument  that  Atherton  v. 
Atherton  is  wrong.  I  have  tried  in  vain  to  discover  any- 
thing tending  to  show  a  distinction  between  that  case  and 
this.'*  In  Sistare  v.  Sistare,  218  U.  S.  1,  it  was  held  that 
the  protection  of  the  full  faith  and  credit  clause  of  the 
Federal  constitution  can  not  be  denied  to  the  decrees  of 
New  York  courts  for  the  future  payment  of  alimony 
through  annulments  or  modifications  by  such  courts  as  to 
overdue  and  unsatisfied  instalmentsw 

In  the  recent  case  of  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  226  U.  S. 
551,  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  courts  of  the  state  of 
the  domicil  of  the  husband,  and  the  only  matrimonial 
domicil,  have  jurisdiction  to  render  a  decree  in  his  favor 
entitled  to  full  faith  and  credit  in  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia, despite  the  fact  that  the  wife  had  left  the  jurisdiction, 
and  could  only  be  served  by  publication, — ^the  Court  said : 
*'This  subject,  in  its  relation  to  actions  for  divorce,  has 
been  most  exhaustively  considered  by  this  court  in  two 
recent  cases :  Atherton  v.  Atherton,  181  U.  S.  155 ;  Had- 
dock V.  Haddock,  201 U.  S.  562.  In  the  Atherton  case  the 
matrimonial  domicil  was  in  Kentucky,  which  was  also 
the  domicil  of  the  husband.  The  wife  left  him  there  and 
returned  to  the  home  of  her  mother  in  the  state  of  New 


I 


!  142  DUE  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION  331 

York.  He  began  suit  in  Kentncky  for  a  divorce  a  vinculo 
matrimonii  because  of  his  abandonment,  which  was  a 
cause  of  divorce  by  the  laws  of  Kentncky,  and  took  such 
proceedings  to  give  her  notice  as  the  laws  of  that  state 
required,  which  included  mailing  of  notice  to  the  post- 
office  nearest  her  residence  in  New  York.  No  response  or 
appearance  having  been  made  by  her,  the  Kentucky  court 
proceeded  to  take  evidence  and  grant  to  the  husband  an 
absolute  decree  of  divorce.  It  was  held  that  this  decree 
was  entitled  to  full  faith  and  credit  in  the  courts  of  New 
York.  In  the  Haddock  case,  the  husband  and  wife  were 
domiciled  in  New  York,  and  the  husband  left  her  there, 
and  after  some  years,  acquired  a  domicil  in  Connecticut, 
and  obtained  in  that  state,  and  in  accordance  with  its 
laws,  a  judgment  of  divorce,  based  upon  eonstmctive,  and 
not  actual  service,  service  of  process  on  the  wife,  she  hav- 
ing meanwhile  retained  her  domicil  in  New  York,  and 
having  made  no  appearance  in  the  action.  The  wife 
afterwards  sued  for  divorce  in  New  York,  and  obtained 
personal  service  in  that  state  upon  the  husband.  The 
New  York  court  refused  to  give  credit  to  the  Connecticut 
judgment,  and  this  court  held  that  there  was  no  violation 
of  the  full  faith  and  credit  clause  in  the  refusal,  and  this 
because  there  was  not  at  any  time  a  matrimonial  domicil 
in  the  state  of  Connecticut,  and  therefore  the  res — the 
marriage  status — ^was  not  within  the  sweep  of  the  judicial 
power  of  that  state.  In  the  present  case  it  appears  that 
the  parties  were  married  in  the  state  of  Virginia,  and 
had  a  matrimonial  domicil  there,  and  not  in  the  District 
of  Columbia  or  elsewhere.  The  husband  had  his  actual 
domicil  in  that  state  at  all  times  until  and  after  the 
conelnsion  of  the  litigation.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  under 
the  decision  in  the  Atherton  ease  and  the  principles  upon 
which  it  rests,  that  the  state  of  Virginia  bad  jurisdiction 
over  the  marriage  relation,  and  the  proper  courts  of  that 
state  could  proceed  to  adjudicate  respecting  it  upon 
grounds  recognized  by  the  laws  of  that  state,  although 
the  wife  had  left  the  jurisdiction  and  could  not  be  reached 


332 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§142 


by  formal  process.  But  in  order  to  make  a  divorce  valid, 
even  when  granted  by  the  courts  of  the  state  of  the  mat- 
rimonial domicily  there  must  be  notice  to  the  defendant, 
either  by  service  of  process,  or  (if  the  defendant  be  a 
nonresident)  by  such  publication  or  other  constructive 
notice  as  is  required  by  the  law  of  thi  state.  Cheely  v. 
Clayton,  110  U.  S.  701 ;  Atherton  v.  Atherton,  181  U.  S. 
155.  In  Cheely  v.  Clayton,  because  the  notice  was  pub- 
lished against  the  defendant  without  making  such  effort 
as  the  local  law  required  to  serve  process  upon  her  within 
the  state,  this  court  held,  following  repeated  decisions  of 
the  state  court,  that  the  decree  of  divorce  was  wholly  void 
for  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  court  that  granted  it ;  and 
that  the  liberty  conferred  by  the  local  statute  upon  a  de- 
fendant on  whom  constructive  service  only  had  been 
made,  to  apply  within  three  years  to  set  the  decree  aside, 
did  not  make  it  valid  when  the  constructive  service  was 
so  defective.*'  The  lucid  exposition  made  in  this  recon- 
ciling opinion  may  be  regarded  as  the  existing  law  on 
this  difficult  subject. 


§  143.  When  judgments  are  subject  to  collateral  attack. 

In  considering,  as  was  necessary  in  the  preceding  section, 
the  full  faith  and  credit  clause  of  the  Federal  constitution 
as  to  judgments  of  sister  states,  it  is  necessary  to  remem- 
ber that  it  has  no  reference  to  judgments  rendered  with- 
out jurisdiction.  As  the  fact  of  jurisdiction  is  always 
open  to  inquiry,  the  record  of  a  judgment  rendered  in  a 
sister  state  may  be  attacked  collaterally  as  to  the  existence 
of  the  jurisdictional  facts  involved  in  it.  In  Hanley  v. 
Donoghue,  116  U.  S.  4,  the  Court  said:  ** Judgments  re- 
covered in  one  state  of  the  Union,  when  proved  in  the 
courts  of  another,  differ  from  judgments  recovered  in  a 
foreign  country  in  no  other  respect  than  that  of  not  being 
re-examined  upon  the  merits,  nor  impeachable  for  fraud 
in  obtaining  them,  if  rendered  by  a  court  having  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  cause  and  the  parties.  Buckner  v.  Finley, 
2  Pet.  586;  McEhnoyle  v.  Cohen,  13  Pet.  312,  324;  D^Arcy 


il43 


DUE  PBOCESS  AND  JURISDICTION 


V.  Ketchnm,  11  How.  165,  176;  Christmas  v.  Enesell,  5 
Wail. '290,  305;  Thompson  v.  Whitman,  18  Wall.  457." 
The  proceedings  are  not  merely  voidable  but  void,  and 
may  be  rejected  when  collaterally  attacked,  if  there  is  a 
total  want  of  jurisdiction.  Bose  v.  Himely,  4  Cranch 
241;  Griffith  V.  Frazier,  8  Cranch  9;  Elliot  v.  Piersol,  1 
Pet.  328;  Shriver  v.  Lynn,  2  How.  43;  Williamson  v. 
Berry,  8  How.  495.  A  judgment  is  void  and  subject  to 
collateral  attack  when  rendered  without  jurisdiction  of 
the  defendant.  No  error  can  be  considered  that  does  not 
show  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  court  that  rendered  the 
judgment  condemning  the  property,  where  confiscation 
proceedings  are  brought  before  the  court  collaterally  as 
the  foundation  of  the  defendant's  title.  Tyler  v.  Defrees, 
11  Wall.  331.  In  the  leading  case  of  Scott  v.  McNeal,  154 
U.  S.  34,  in  which  the  Court  said:  "The  fundamental 
question  in  this  case  is  whether  letters  of  administration 
upon  the  estate  of  a  person  who  is  in  fact  alive  have  any 
validity  or  effect  against  him;"  and  in  which  the  plain- 
tiff clfiimed  "that  to  give  effect  to  the  probate  proceed- 
ings under  the  circumstances  would  be  to  deprive  him  of 
his  property  without  due  process  of  law," — it  was  held 
that  "No  judgment  of  a  court  ia  due  process  of  law,  if 
rendered  without  jurisdiction  in  the  court,  and  without 
notice  to  the  party."  Approved  in  Hilton  v.  Guyot,  159 
U.  S.  164 ;  New  Orleans  Water  Works  Co.  v.  New  Orleans, 
164  IT.  S.  480,  and  distinguished  in  Hamilton  v.  Brown, 
161  U.  S.  274,  wherein  it  was  held  that  a  judgment  in  an 
escheat  proceeding  is  conclusive  against  all  having  con- 
structive notice  by  "publication.  The  judgment  of  a  court 
which  has  once  acquired  jurisdiction  is  unassailable  col- 
laterally only  when  after  acquiring  jurisdiction,  it  pro- 
ceeds according  to  established  modes  governing  the  class 
to  which  the  particular  case  belongs.  When  it  transcends, 
in  the  extent  and  character  of  its  judgment,  the  law  ap- 
plicable to  it,  its  judgment  is  not  only  erroneous  but  void. 
Windsor  v.  McVeigh,  93  V.  S.  274.  See  also,  United 
States  V.  Walker,  109  XJ.  S.  258.    A  judgment  is  not  only 


334 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§143 


voidable  but  void  and  subject  to  collateral  attack  when 
rendered  in  excess  of  jurisdiction.  Re  Terry,  128  U.  S. 
289. 

In  United  States  v.  Morse,  218  U.  S.  493,  in  which  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia  had  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  res  and  the  parties,  in  a  proceeding  for  the 
sale  of  an  infant's  real  estate  for  purposes  of  investment, 
it  was  held  that  the  decree  was  not  open  to  collateral 
attack,  despite  the  error  of  the  court  in  holding  that  a 
case  had  been  made  either  under  its  statutory  authority, 
or  under  its  inherent  power  as  a  court  of  equity.  In  Bris- 
coe V.  Eudolph,  221  U.  S.  547 — upon  an  objection  chal- 
lenging an  assessment  as  excessive,  and  asserting  that  a 
second  jury  should  have  been  called  under  the  local  code, 
— it  was  held  that  a  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  District,  confirming  a  special  assessment  for  benefits 
resulting  from  a  street  extension,  can  not  be  attacked 
collaterally,  since  the  matter  complained  of  was,  at  best, 
only  an  error  reviewable  on  appeal.  See  also,  Johannes- 
sen  V.  United  States,  225  U.  S.  227 ;  Herbert  v.  Crawford, 
228  U.  S.  204;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  226  U.  S.  551; 
Priest  V.  Board  of  Trustees,  232  U.  S.  604 ;  Magruder  v. 
Drury,  235  U.  S.  106 ;  Simon  v.  Southern  Eailway,  236 
U.  S.  115.  Special  reference  should  be  made  in  this  con- 
nection to  Riverside  Mills  v.  Menefee,  237  U.  S.  189,  in 
which  it  was  held :  first,  that  due  process  of  law  can  not 
be  denied  in  fixing,  by  judgment,  against  one  beyond  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court,  an  amount  due,  even  though  the 
enforcement  of  the  judgment  be  postponed  until  execu- 
tion issue ;  second,  that  the  fact  that  a  judgment  rendered 
without  due  process  of  law  may  not,  under  the  full  faith 
and  credit  clause,  be  enforced  in  another  state,  affords  no 
ground  for  the  court  entering  a  judgment  without  juris- 
diction in  violation  of  due  process  of  law.  In  reachinsf 
those  conclusions  the  Court  said:  **It  is  self-evident  that 
the  application  of  these  settled  principles  establishes  the 
error  of  the  decision  of  the  court  below  unless  it  be  that 
the  distinction  upon  which  the  court  acted  be  well  founded, 


§143 


DUE  PROCESS  AND  JURISDICTION 


that  is,  that  the  enforcement  of  dne  process  under  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  without  influence  upon  the 
power  to  render  the  judgment  since  that  limitation  wa8 
pertinent  only  to  the  determination  of  when  and  how  the 
judgment  after  it  was  rendered  could  be  enforced.  But 
this  doctrine  while  admitting  the  operation  of  the  due 
process  clause,  simply  declines  to  make  it  effective.  That 
is  to  say,  it  recognizes  the  right  to  invoke  the  protection 
of  the  clause  but  denies  its  remedial  efBciency  by  postpon- 
ing its  operation  and  thus  permitting  that  to  be  done 
which  if  the  constitutional  guaranty  were  applied  would 
be  absolutely  prohibited.  But  the  obvious  answer  to  the 
proposition  is  that  wherever  a  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion is  applicable,  the  duty  to  enforce  it  is  imperative  and 
all  embracing,  and  no  act  which  it  forbids  may  therefore 
be  permitted."    See  also,  Doran  v.  Kennedy,  237  U.  S. 


CHAPTER  Vin 

STATE  POWEB  OP  TAXATION  AND  DUB  PBOCESS 

§  144.  Taxing  power  of  the  Imperial  Parliament.    The 

charters  under  which  our  colonial  governments  were  or- 
ganized were  royal  grants ;  they  were  not  concessions  from 
the  English  legislature.  In  contemplation  of  English 
law  the  whole  group  of  colonial  governments  in  America, 
created  or  confirmed  by  royal  charters,  were  mere  cor- 
porations created  by  the  King  and  subject,  like  all  others 
of  their  kind,  to  his  visitorial  power,  and  to  the  power  of 
his  courts,  to  dissolve  them  in  a  proper  case  presented  for 
the  purpose.  But  until  some  cause  of  forfeiture  arose, 
the  grant,  as  between  the  crown  and  the  patentees,  was 
irrevocable, — it  being  the  settled  doctrine  of  English 
law  that  after  a  grant  of  corporate  power  made  by  the 
Crown  had  been  once  accepted,  the  Crown  could  not  re- 
sume the  grant  without  the  consent  of  those  in  whom 
its  privileges  had  been  vested.  The  irrevocable  rights 
thus  acquired  by  the  colonists  as  against  the  Crown  were 
revocable,  however,  at  the  hands  of  the  Parliament.  Un- 
der the  theory  of  the  English  Constitution,  then,  as  now, 
*  *Its  power  is,  legally  speaking,  illimitable.  It  may  create 
and  abolish  and  change,  at  its  pleasure,  with  or  without 
the  assent  of  the  people  or  corporation  to  be  thereby 
affected. ' '  Dillon,  Municipal  Corporations,  i,  109,  2d  ed., 
and  cases  cited.  In  the  hands  of  a  tax-loving  statesman 
like  Grenville  that  imperial  theory  was  not  confined  to 
mere  supervision ;  in  such  hands  it  was  held  to  mean  that 
the  Imperial  Parliament  could  at  any  moment  override 
the  acts  of  the  colonial  assemblies,  without  consulting 
their  wishes  at  all,  and  tax  and  legislate  for  the  people  of 

336 


§146 


STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION 


MassachnsettB  and  Virginia  jnst  as  it  conld  for  the  people 
of  Kent  and  Middlesex. 

§  145.  Extension  of  parliamentary  control  over  the 
colonies.  At  the  outset  the  English  colonies  in  America, 
created  by  the  Crown  on  land  considered  as  terra  regis, 
were  not  subjected  to  the  control  of  Parliament  The 
earliest  form  of  direct  legislative  control  to  which  any  of 
the  colonists  were  subjected,  in  the  form  of  ordinances  or 
instructions  for  their  government,  emanated,  not  from  the 
law-making  power  of  the  King  in  Parliament,  but  from 
the  King  in  Council.  With  the  founding  of  the  colonies, 
and  with  the  organization  of  their  political  systems,  the 
Crown  had  everything  to  do,  the  Parliament  practically 
nothing.  Apart  from  the  control  which  had  existed  from 
the  beginning  over  their  external  affairs  in  matters  of 
trade  and  navigation,  the  colonies,  prior  to  the  latter  part 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  had  not  been  drawn  within  the 
widening  circle  of  its  imperial  authority.  In  their  local 
legislatures  the  colonists  had  learned  how  to  tax  them- 
selves, and  how  to  regulate  their  home  affairs  through 
laws  of  their  own  making.  Losing  sight  of  the  fact  that 
England  had  grown  into  an  empire  since  the  work  of  col- 
onization began,  the  colonists  clave  to  the  earlier  concep- 
tion which  regarded  the  home  Parliament  simply  as  the 
legislative  organ  of  the  United  Kingdom.  As  such,  they 
held  that  it  had  no  right  to  invade  the  jurisdictions  of 
their  colonial  assemblies  in  order  to  legislate  directly 
upon  their  internal  concerns. 


§  146.  Colonies  tnuisformed  into  sovereign  states. 
When  the  tie  of  political  dependence  that  bound  the  colo- 
nies to  the  mother  country  was  severed,  the  English  prov- 
inces in  America  rose  to  the  fuU  statute  of  sovereign 
states.  "When  the  Revolution  took  place  the  people  of 
each  state  became  themselves  sovereign."  And  so  soon 
as  they  "took  into  their  own  hands  the  powers  of  sov- 
ereignty the  prerogatives  and  regalities  which  before 

Doe  Proeeu — 22 


•  I 

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j 

1 

t 

!• 

1 

r 

i: 

338  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  146 

belonged  either  to  the  Crown  or  the  Parliament  became 
immediately  and  rightfully  vested  in  the  state. '  *  Martin 
V.  The  Lessee  of  Waddell,  16  Pet.  410,  416.  On  the  10th 
of  May,  1776,  the  Continental  Congress  recommended 
to  the  several  conventions  and  assemblies  of  the  colonies 
the  establishment  of  independent  governments  '  *  for  main- 
tenance of  internal  peace  and  the  defence  of  their  lives, 
liberties,  and  properties.*'  Before  the  end  of  the  year 
in  which  the  recommendation  was  made,  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  colonies  had  adopted  written  constitutions  in 
which  were  restated  in  a  dogmatic  form  all  of  the  seminal 
principles  of  the  English  constitutional  system.  Thus 
ended  that  marvelous  process  of  growth  through  which 
the  English  colonies  in  America  were  rapidly  developed 
into  a  group  of  independent  commonwealths  in  which 
each  was,  in  its  organic  structure,  a  substantial  reproduc- 
tion of  the  English  Kingdom. 

§147.  Constitutional  limitations  an  American  inven- 
tion. Subject  to  a  grave  limitation,  the  unlimited  taxing 
power  of  the  omnipotent  Parliament  passed  at  its  birth 
into  every  American  state  legislature.  It  has  ever  been  an 
elementary  principle  of  American  constitutional  law  that 
every  state  legislature  is  endowed  by  its  very  nature  with 
the  omnipotence  of  the  English  Parliament,  save  so  far 
as  that  omnipotence  is  restrained  by  express  constitu- 
tional limitations.  Such  limitations,  of  which  the  Euro- 
pean world  knew  nothing,  grew  naturally  out  of  the 
process  through  which  American  legislatures  came  into 
existence.  From  the  very  beginning  the  powers  of  the 
colonial  assemblies  were  more  or  less  limited  through  the 
terms  of  the  charters  by  which  such  assemblies  were  either 
created  or  recognized.  Even  in  colonial  times  *  *  questions 
sometimes  arose  .  .  .  whether  the  statutes  made  by 
these  assemblies  were  in  excess  of  the  powers  conferred 
by  the  charter ;  and  if  the  statutes  were  found  in  excess, 
they  were  held  invalid  by  the  courts,  that  is  to  say,  in  the 
first  instance,  by  the  colonial  courts,  or,  if  the  matter 


§148 


STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION 


was  carried  to  England  by  the  Privy  Conncil.'*  Bryce, 
The  Am.  Commonw.,  i,  243.  While,  as  a  general  rule, 
the  colonies,  after  being  transformed  into  independent 
states,  adopted  new  constitutions,  the  charter  granted 
to  Connecticat  in  1662  was  continued  as  her  organic 
law  until  1818;  and  that  granted  to  Bhode  Island  in 
1663  was  continued  as  her  organic  law  until  1842.  It  is 
worthy  of  note  that  one  of  the  first  cases,  if  not  the  very 
first,  in  which  a  lepslative  enactment  was  declared  uncon- 
stitutional and  void,  on  the  ground  of  conflict  with  the 
constitution  of  a  state,  was  decided  under  the  charter  last 
named.  But  what  is  far  more  important  is  the  fact  that 
this  novel  and  supreme  power  of  declaring  an  act  of  the 
legislature  void  was  assumed  by  the  state  courts,  as  a 
matter  of  judge  made  law,  without  a  line  or  word  on  the 
subject  in  any  state  constitution.  And  here  may  be  quoted 
the  words  of  "Wythe,  J.,  who,  in  Com.  v.  Caton,  4  Call 
(Va.),  5,  said:  "Nay,  more,  if  the  whole  legislature,  an 
event  to  be  deprecated,  should  attempt  to  overleap  the 
bounds  prescribed  to  them  by  the  people,  I,  in  adminis- 
trating the  public  justice  of  the  country,  will  meet  the 
united  powers,  at  my  seat  in  this  tribunal ;  and,  pointing 
to  the  constitution,  will  say,  to  them,  Here  is  the  limit  of 
your  authority;  and  hither  shall  you  go,  but  no  further." 

§  14S.  Nature  and  extent  of  limitations  on  state  taxing 
power — Exemption  of  governmental  agencies.  Passing 
from  generals  to  particulars  it  now  becomes  necessary  to 
indicate  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  limitations  imposed 
upon  the  taxing  power  of  a  state,  first,  by  the  peculiar 
structure  of  our  dual  system  of  government ;  second,  by 
the  fundamental  principles  of  judicial  administration  em- 
bodied in  the  American  theory  of  due  process  of  law. 
The  idea  of  an  indestructible  Union  of  indestructible 
states  rests  necessarily  upon  the  principle  that  neither 
the  state  nor  Federal  Government  may  tax  the  property, 
the  agencies,  or  operations  of  the  other,  for  the  conclusive 
reason  that  the  power  to  tax  carries  with  it  the  power  to 


iJ, 


:  T 


■'t 


340 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§148 


destroy.  In  the  leading  case  of  McCuUoch  v.  Maryland, 
4  Wheat.  316,  in  which  it  was  settled  that  the  banks  of 
the  United  States  had  the  constitutional  right  to  establish 
its  branches  within  any  state;  and  that  the  state  within 
which  such  branches  may  be  established,  can  not,  without 
violating  the  constitution,  tax  that  branch, — ^the  Court 
said :  *  *  If  the  states  may  tax  one  instrument,  employed 
by  the  government  in  the  execution  of  its  powers,  they 
may  tax  any  and  every  other  instrument.  They  may  tax 
the  mail,  they  may  tax  the  mint,  they  may  tax  patent- 
rights;  they  may  tax  the  papers  of  the  custom-house; 
they  may  tax  judicial  process ;  they  may  tax  all  the  means 
employed  by  the  government,  to  an  excess  which  would 
defeat  all  the  ends  of  government.  This  was  not  intended 
by  the  American  people.  They  did  not  design  to  make 
their  government  dependent  on  the  states.  •  .  .  the 
states  have  no  power,  by  taxation  or  otherwise,  to  retard, 
impeach,  burden,  or  in  any  manner  control  the  opera- 
tions of  the  constitutional  laws  enacted  by  Congress  to 
carry  into  execution  the  powers  vested  in  the  general  gov- 
ernment.^^ As  illustrations  of  the  application  of  this 
principle,  see  Weston  v.  Charleston,  2  Pet.  466 ;  Bank  of 
Commerce  v.  New  York  City,  2  Black  732 ;  Van  Allen  v. 
Assessors,  3  Wall.  590 ;  Collector  v.  Day,  11  Wall.  113 ; 
Ward  V.  Maryland,  12  Wall.  418 ;  Van  Rocklin  v.  Tennes- 
see, 117  U.  S.  151;  United  States  v.  Baltimore  Electric 
Railroad  Co.,  17  Wall.  322 ;  Wisconsin  Central  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Price  County,  133  U.  S.  496;  Pollock  v.  Farmers' 
Loan,  etc.,  Co.,  157  TJ.  S.  429;  United  States  v.  Richart, 
188  U.  S.  438;  United  States  v.  Hvoslef,  237  U.  S.  1; 
Thames  and  Mersey  Ins.  Co.  v.  United  States,  237 
U.  S.  19. 


§  149.  Federal  power  to  regulate  interstate  commerce 
not  to  be  hampered  by  state  taxation.  While  the  instru- 
mentalities of  interstate  commerce  if  within  a  state,  may 
be  subjected  to  taxation  by  it,  the  exercise  of  the  power 
to  regulate  interstate  commerce,  which  is  vested  solely  in 


§150 


STATE  POWER  OP  TAXATION 


the  national  government,  can  not  be  hampered  hy  the 
imposition  of  a  state  tax  npon  the  privilege  of  transacting 
such  commerce.  Leloup  v.  Port  of  Mobile,  127  U.  S.  640 ; 
Pullman's  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  141  U.  S.  18; 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Ohio  State  Auditor,  165  U.  S. 
194;  Atlantic  &  P.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia,  190  U.  S. 
160;  Allen  v.  Pullman's  Palace  Car  Co.,  191  U.  S.  171; 
Keprer  v.  Stewart,  197  U.  S.  60;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co. 
V.  Babcoek,  204  U.  S.  585 ;  Pullman  Co.  v.  Knott,  235  U.  S. 
23;  Cornell  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Sohmer,  235  U.  S.  549; 
Hendrick  v.  Maryland,  235  U.  S.  610;  Heyman  v.  Havs, 
236  U.S.  178. 


§  150.  State  can  only  tax  proper^  within  its  jurisdic- 
tion. Dne  process  of  law  is  denied  to  the  owner  of 
property  when  it  is  taxed  by  a  state  in  defiance  of  the 
rale  which  provides  that  its  taxes,  no  matter  what  their 
form,  may  be  levied  only  on  property,  persons,  and  busi- 
ness within  its  jurisdiction.  When  real  property  or  tan- 
gible personal  property  is  iu  question  jurisdiction  depends 
not  npon  the  domicil  of  the  owner  but  upon  the  actual 
situs  of  the  thiug  to  be  taxed.  In  Bewey  v.  Des  Moines, 
173  U.  S.  193,  the  Court  said:  "The  jurisdiction  to  tax 
exists  only  in  regard  to  persons  and  property  or  upon  the 
business  done  within  the  state,  and  such  jurisdiction  can 
not  be  enlarged  by  reason  of  a  statute  which  assumes  to 
make  a  nonresident  personally  liable  to  pay  a  tax  of  the 
nature  of  the  one  in  question.  All  subjects  over  which 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  state  extends  are  objects  of 
taxation.  Cooley  's  Taxation,  1st  ed.,  pp.  3, 4 ;  Borroughs, 
Taxation,  sec.  6.  The  power  of  the  state  to  tax  extends  to 
all  objects  within  the  sovereignty  of  the  state.  Per  Mr. 
Justice  Clifford,  in  Hamilton  Mfg.  Company  v.  Massa- 
chusetts, 6  Wall.  632,  639.  The  power  to  tax  is,  however, 
limited  to  persons,  property  and  business  within  the  state, 
and  it  can  not  reach  the  person  of  a  nonresident.  Case 
of  the  State  Tax  on  Poreign-held  Bonds,  15  Wall.  300, 319. 
In  Cooley 's  Taxation,  Ist  ed.,  p.  121,  it  is  said  that  'a  state 


342 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§150 


can  no  more  subject  to  its  power  a  single  person  or  a 
single  article  of  property  whose  residence  or  legal  situs  is 
in  another  state  than  it  can  subject  all  the  citizens  or  all 
the  property  of  such  other  state  to  its  power.'  '*  See 
Louisville,  etc.,  Ferry  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  188  TJ.  S.  385; 
Delaware,  etc,  R.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  198  V.  S.  341; 
Union  Refrigerator  Transit  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  199  U.  S. 
194;  Cornell  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Sohmer,  235  U.  S.  549; 
Wright  V.  Central  of  Georgia  Ry.,  236  U.  S.  674;  Wilson 
Cypress  Co.  v.  Del  Poyo,  236  U.  S.  635;  Heyman  v.  Hays, 
236  TJ.  S.  178;  Bothwell  v.  Bingham  County,  237  U.  S. 
642;  Equitable  Life  Society  v.  Pennsylvania,  238  U.  S. 
143. 

§  151.  Taxation  of  corporate  proper^  (dtnated  In  ser- 
•ral  stat^.  In  taxing  corporationB  two  things  are  to  be 
considered;  first,  the  four  elements  to  be  taxed — capital 
stock  in  the  hands  of  the  corporation ;  shares  of  the  capi- 
tal stock  in  the  hands  of  the  individual  stockholders ;  cor- 
porate property;  corporate  franchises;  (Tennessee  v. 
Whiteworth,  117  U.  S.  129)  second,  that  when  the  corpo- 
ration has  property  in  more  than  one  state  each  state  in 
taxing  its  portion  must  exclude  the  value  of  the  portions 
situated  beyond  its  limits.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Atty.  Gen.,  125  U.  S.  530;  Pullman's  Palace  Car  Co.  v. 
Pennsylvania,  141  U.  S.  18;  Fargo  v.  Hart,  193  U.  S.  490; 
Delaware,  etc.,  E.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  198  U.  S.  341.  In 
the  case  last  cited — in  which  it  was  held  that  a  domestic 
corporation  was  deprived  of  its  property  without  doe 
process  of  law  by  an  appraisement  of  its  capital  stock, 
which  included  the  value  of  coal  mined  by  it  within  the 
state,  but  situated  in  other  states,  where  it  was  awaiting 
sale  when  the  appraisement  was  made — the  Conrt  said : 
"It  is  plain  that  in  the  case  at  bar  the  coal  had  lost  its 
situs  in  Pennsylvania  by  being  transported  from  that 
state  to  foreign  states  for  the  purposes  of  sale,  with  no 
intention  that  it  should  ever  return  to  its  state  of  origin. 
It  was,  therefore,  as  much  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the 


"•^ 


S151a 


STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION 


state  of  PeQnsylvaiiia  to  tax  it  as  was  the  Indiana  fran- 
chise in  the  case  just  cited,  and  it  has  been  taxed  just  as 
directly  and  specifically  under  the  facts  stated  in  this  case 
as  was  the  Indiana  franchise^  taxed  in  Kentucky  by  the 
valuation  of  the  Kentucky  franchise,  which  value  waa  in- 
creased by  the  value  of  the  franchise  created  by  Indiana." 
See  also,  Pullman  Co.  v.  Knott,  235  U.  S.  23.  In  Wright 
V.  Louis,  and  Nash.  B.  R.,  236  V.  S.  690,  the  Court  said: 
"The  railroads  not  being  domiciled  in  G-eorgia  are  not 
taxable  there  for  stock  and  bonds  of  other  companies 
merely  appearing  to  be  owned  by  them."  In  Equitable 
Life  Society  v.  Pennsylvania,  238  U.  S.  143,  it  was  held 
that  as  a  state  has  the  right  to  tax  life  insurance  com- 
panies upon  business  done  within  the  state,  measuring  the 
tax  upon  the  premiums  on  policies  of  residents  of  the 
state,  such  companies  are  not  deprived  of  their  property 
without  due  process  of  law  because,  in  estimating  the 
amount  of  premiums,  those  paid  by  the  residents  of  for- 
eign insurance  companies  outside  of  the  state  are  in- 
cluded. The  Court  said:  "The  only  question  concerns 
the  mode  of  measuring  the  tax.  Flint  v.  Stone  Tracy  Co., 
220  U.  S.  107, 162, 163.  As  to  that  a  certain  latitude  must 
be  allowed.  It  is  obvious  that  many  incidents  of  the  con- 
tract are  likely  to  be  attended  to  in  Pennsylvania,  such  as 
payment  of  dividends  when  received  in  cash,  sending  an 
adjuster  into  the  state  in  case  of  dispute,  or  making  proof 
of  death.  See  Connecticut  Mutual  Life  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Spratley,  172  IT.  S.  602,  611;  Pennsylvania  Lumbermen's 
Mutual  Fire  Insurance  Co.  v.  Meyer,  197  U.  S.  407, 415." 


§  151a.  Due  process  not  denied  by  state  statute  impos- 
ing annual  frandiise  tax  on  a  consolidated  railway  cor- 
poration. In  Kansas  City  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Stiles,  242 
tr.  S.  Ill,  it  was  held  that  neither  the  due  process,  com- 
merce, or  equal  protection  of  the  laws  clauses  of  the 
Federal  constitution  were  violated  by  an  Alabama  statute 
imposing  the  annual  franchise'  tax  exacted  from  domestic 
corporations  upon  a  consolidated  railway  corporation  ex- 


344 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§151a 


isting  by  virtue  of  the  consolidation  under  concurrent 
acts  of  the  states  of  Alabama,  Mississippi  and  Tennessee, 
of  three  independent  and  distinct  railroad  corporations 
created  by  and  formerly  operating  solely  within  the  re- 
spective states  named,  and  in  meaisuring  such  tax  by  the 
entire  capital  stock  of  the  consolidated  corporation,  in- 
stead of  measuring  it  by  the  amount  of  capital  employed 
in  the  state,  as  is  done  in  the  case  of  foreign  corporations, 
where  the  consolidating  statute  expressly  provided  that 
the  consolidated  corporation  shall  be  subject  in  all  re- 
spects to  the  laws  of  the  state  as  a  domestic  corporation. 
The  Court  said :  *  *  The  Alabama  supreme  court  has  held 
that  the  railroad  company  is  a  corporation  organized 
under  the  laws  of  that  state,  and,  as  such,  subject  to  the 
franchise  tax  imposed  by  that  section  of  the  statute. 
.  .  .  When  the  companies  comprised  in  this  consolida- 
tion sought  to  avail  themselves  of  the  laws  of  Alabama, 
they  were  asking  a  privilege  and  right  which,  subject  to 
the  limitations  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  was  within 
the  authority  of  the  state.  This  principle  was  succinctly 
stated  in  Ashley  v.  Ryan,  153  U.  S.  436,  442.  ..  .  This 
doctrine  has  been  affirmed  since.  Louisville  &  N.  B.  Co. 
V.  Kentucky,  161 U.  S.  677,  703,  and  previous  cases  in  this 
court  therein  cited;  Interstate  Consol.  Street  B.  Co.  v. 
Massachusetts,  207  U.  S.  79,  84.  The  railroads  com- 
prising this  consolidation  entered  upon  it  with  the  Ala 
bama  statute  before  them  and  under  its  conditions,  and, 
subject  to  constitutional  objections  as  to  its  enforcement, 
they  can  not  be  heard  to  complain  of  the  terms  under 
which  they  voluntarily  invoked  and  received  the  grant  of 
corporate  existence  from  the  state  of  Alabama. '  ^ 


§  152.  Taxation  of  tangible  personal  property.  Until 
it  passes  beyond  its  limits  and  becomes  subject  to  federal 
regulation  as  an  export  or  as  having  actually  entered  into 
commerce  between  the  states,  the  state  possesses  the 
power  to  tax  all  tangible  personal  property  within  its 
jurisdiction.   When  in  Brown  v.  Maryland,  12  Wheat.  419, 


§152 


STATE  POWER  OP  TAXATION 


345 


the  qnestion  arose  whether  a  state  could  limit  the  right  of 
Congress  to  regulate  foreign  commerce  by  requiring  the 
importer  of  foreign  articles  to  take  out  a  license  from  the 
state  before  being  permitted  to  sell  a  bale  or  package  so 
imported,  the  Court  said :  "There  is  no  difference  in  the 
effect  between  a  power  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  an  article, 
and  the  power  to  prohibit  its  introduction  into  the  conn- 
try.  .  .  .  It  is  sufficient  for  the  present  to  say,  generally 
that  when  the  importer  baa  so  acted  upon  the  thing  im- 
ported that  it  has  become  incorporated  and  mixed  up  with 
the  mass  of  property  in  the  county,  it  has,  perhaps,  lost  its 
distinctive  character  as  an  import,  and  has  become  subject 
to  the  taxing  power  of  the  state."  While  remaining  in 
the  original  package  "a  tax  upon  it  is  too  plainly  a  duty 
on  imports  to  escape  the  prohibition  in  the  Constitution." 
In  Coe  V.  Errol,  116  U.  S.  517,  the  Court  said:  "But  no 
definite  rule  has  been  adopted  with  regard  to  the  point  of 
time  at  which  the  taxing  power  of  the  state  ceases  as  to 
goods  exported  to  a  foreign  country  or  to  another  state. 
What  we  have  already  said,  however,  in  relation  to  the 
products  of  a  state  intended  for  exportation  to  another 
state  will  indicate  the  view  which  seems  to  us  the  sound 
one  on  that  subject,  namely:  that  such  goods  do  not  cease 
to  be  part  of  the  general  mass  of  the  property  in  the  state, 
subject,  as  such,  to  its  jurisdiction  and  to  taxation  in  the 
usual  way  until  they  have  been  shipped  or  entered  with  a 
common  carrier  for  transportation  to  another  state  or 
have  been  started  upon  such  transportation  in  a  continu- 
ous route  or  journey."  When  such  property  thus  trans- 
ported reaches  its  destination  it  mingles  with  the  general 
mass  of  property  of  the  state  into  which  it  is  received  and 
there  becomes  subject  to  taxation.  Brown  v.  Houston, 
114  U.  S.  622 ;  Pittsburgh  Coal  Co.  v.  Bates,  156  U.  S.  577. 
In  American  Refrigerator  Transit  Co.  v.  Hall,  174  U.  S. 
70 — in  which  it  was  held  that  where  refrigerator  cars  are 
employed  as  vehicles  of  transportation  in  the  interchange 
of  interstate  commerce,  the  state  may  tax  the  average 
nnmber  of  such  oars  used  by  railroads  within  the  state, 


n 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


SI 


but  owned  by  a  foreign  corporation  which  has  no  office  or 
place  of  business  within  the  state — ^the  Court  shid:  "It 
having  been  settled,  as  we  have  seen,  that  where  a  corpo- 
ration of  one  state  brings  into  another,  to  use  and  employ, 
a  portion  of  its  movable  personal  property,  itis  legitimate 
for  the  latter  to  impose  upon  snch  property,  thus  used 
and  employed,  its  fair  share  of  the  burdens  of  taxation 
imposed  upon  similar  property  used  in  like  way  by  its 
own  citizens,  we  think  that  such  a  tax  may  be  properly 
assessed  and  collected,  in  cases  like  the  present,  where  the 
specific  and  individual  items  of  property  bo  used  and  em- 
ployed were  not  continuously  the  same  but  were  constantly 
changing  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  business  and 
that  the  tax  may  be  fixed  by  an  appraisement  and  valua- 
tion of  the  average  amount  of  property  thus  habitually 
used  and  employed.  Nor  would  the  fact  that  such  cars 
were  employed  aa  vehicles  of  transportation  in  the  inter- 
change of  interstate  commerce  render  their  taxation 
invalid.  Marye  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  B.  Co.,  127  U.  S. 
123;  Pullman's  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  141 TJ.  S. 
18."  While  property  thus  at  rest  may  be  taxed  by  a 
state,  property  in  transit  from  one  state  to  another  can 
not  be.  In  Kelly  v.  Rhoades,  188  IT.  S.  1,  the  Court  said: 
"The  question  to  be  determined  then  is  whether  the  stock 
of  the  plaintiff  (a  flock  of  10,000  sheep,  which  was  being 
driven  from  Utah  by  direct  route  across  Wyoming  to 
Nebraska  at  the  rate  of  about  9  miles  a  day)  was  brought 
into  the  state  for  the  purpose  of  being  grazed  at  the  time 
it  was  assessed  for  taxation.  .  .  .  The  substance  of 
these  cases  is  that,  while  the  property  is  at  rest  for  an 
indefinite  time  awaiting  transportation,  or  awaiting  a  sale 
at  its  place  of  destination,  or  at  an  intermediate  point,  it 
is  subject  to  taxation.  But  if  it  be  actually  in  trtmsit  to 
another  state,  it  becomes  the  subject  of  interstate  com- 
merce, and  is  exempt  from  local  assessment."  See  also, 
Diamond  Match  Co.  v.  Ontonagon,  188  TT.  S.  82,  95.  In 
Cornell  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Sohmer,  235  U.  S.  549,  the 
Court  said:  "But  transportation  between  the  parts  of  a 


§153 


STATE  POWER  OP  TAXATION 


347 


8tat«  IB  not  interstate  commerce,  excladed  from  the  taxing 
power  of  the  state,  because  as  to  a  part  of  the  journey 
the  course  is  over  the  territory  of  another  state.  Lehigh 
Valley  R.  E.  v.  Pennsylvania,  145  U.  S.  192;  Ewing  v. 
City  of  Leavenworth,  226  U.  S.  464;  and  see  CinciDnati 
Packet  Co.  v.  Bay,  200  U.  S.  179, 183." 


§  163.  Taxation  of  intan^fible  personal  proper^.    An 

able  text  writer,  in  considering  the  situs  of  debts  for  the 
purpose  of  taxation,  has  said:  "The  general  practice  is 
to  treat  debts  as  located,  for  purposes  of  taxation,  at  the 
creditor's  domicil,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  they  may 
have  their  situs  there  for  that  purpose.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  would  seem  that,  if  the  creditor  were  domiciled 
in  one  state  and  the  debtor  in  another,  there  should  be  no 
reason  why  the  latter  state  (which  is  the  situs  of  the  obli- 
gation and  the  actual  situs  of  the  debt)  can  not  lay  a  tax 
upon  the  creditor's  property  actually  situated  there, 
namely,  the  debtor's  obligation  to  pay,  provided  in  so 
doing,  it  does  not  impair  the  obligation  of  contracts.  And 
some  courts  have  upheld  such  taxation."  Minor,  Con- 
flict of  Laws,  p.  281,  citing  Bridges  v.  Griflin,  33  Ga.  113 ; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Collector,  100  U.  S.  595;  United  States  v. 
R.  R.  Co.,  106  IT.  S.  327;  Finch  v.  York  County,  19  Neb. 
50.  The  same  anthor  then  adds :  * '  But,  strangely  enou^^, 
the  general  trend  of  judicial  opinion  seems  to  be  in  the 
direction  of  regarding  such  taxation  as  unlawful,  upon 
the  ground  that  the  debtor  has  no  property  in  the  debt 
which  can  be  taxed,"  citing  State  Tax  on  Foreign-held 
Bonds,  15  Wall.  300,  319,  320,  involving  the  right  to  tax 
bonds  held  by  nonresidents  and  secured  by  state  mort- 
gages. In  that  notable  case  the  maxim,  mohUia  seguun- 
tur  personam  was  fully  and  emphatically  recognized.  In 
announcing  the  principle  that  debts  can  have  no  situs 
apart  from  the  residence  of  the  creditor,  the  Court  said : 
"It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  actual  situs  of  personal 
property  which  has  a  visible  and  tangible  existence,  and 
not  the  domicil  of  its  owner,  will  in  many  eases,  deter- 


348 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§153 


mine  the  state  in  which  it  may  be  taxed.  The  same  thing 
is  true  of  public  securities  consisting  of  state  bonds  and 
bonds  of  municipal  bodies,  and  circulating  notes  of  bank- 
ing institutions;  the  former,  by  general  usage  have 
acquired  the  character  of  and  are  treated  as  property,  in 
the  place  where  they  are  found,  though  removed  from  the 
domicil  of  the  owner;  the  latter  are  treated  and  pass  as 
money  wherever  they  are.  But  other  personal  property, 
consisting  of  bonds,  mortgages,  and  debts  generally,  has 
no  situs  independent  of  the  domicil  of  the  owner,  and 
certainly  can  have  none  where  the  instruments,  as  in  the 
present  case,  constituting  the  evidences  of  debt,  are  not 
separated  from  the  possession  of  the  owners. ''  The  prin- 
ciple thus  broadly  stated  was  soon  modified  in  Tappan  v. 
Merchants  Nat.  Bank,  19  Wall.  490,  wherein  it  was  held 
that  personal  property,  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  may 
be  separated  from  the  person  of  the  owner,  and  he  may 
be  taxed  on  its  own  account  at  the  place  where  it  is  actu- 
ally located ;  that  shares  of  stock  in  a  national  bank,  being 
personal  property,  may  be  separated  by  the  law  which 
creates  them  from  the  person  of  the  owner,  and  a  situs  of 
their  own  given  them  for  the  purposes  of  taxation.  See 
also.  State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  92  U.  S.  607;  Pullman's 
Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  141  U.  S.  18;  Corry  v. 
Baltimore,  196  U.  S.  466.  In  Blackstone  v.  Miller,  188 
XJ.  S.  206,  the  Court  said:  ** There  is  no  conflict  between 
our  views  and  the  point  decided  in  the  case  reported 
under  the  name  of  State  Tax  on  Foreign-held  Bonds,  15 
Wall.  300.  The  taxation  in  that  case  was  on  the  interest 
on  bonds  held  out  of  the  state.  Bonds  and  negotiable 
instruments  are  more  than  merely  evidences  of  debt.  The 
debt  is  inseparable  from  the  paper  which  declares  and 
constitutes  it,  by  a  tradition  which  comes  down  from  more 
archaic  conditions.  Bacon  v.  Hooker,  177  Mass.  335,  337. 
Therefore,  considering  only  the  place  of  the  property,  it 
was  held  that  bonds  held  out  of  the  state  could  not  be 
reached.  The  decision  has  been  cut  down  to  its  precise 
point  by  later  cases.    Savings  &  Loan  Soc.  v.  Multnomah 


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II 

§  154  STATE  POWER  OP  TAXATION  349 

County,  169  U.  S.  421,  428;  New  Orleans  v.  Stempel,  175 
U.  S.  309,  319,  320."  In  Liverpool  &  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Assessors,  221  U.  S.  346,  the  Court  said :  ' '  The 
legal  fiction  expressed  in  the  maxim  mobilia  sequuntur 
personam  yields  to  the  fact  of  actual  control  elsewhere. 
And  in  the  case  of  credits,  though  intangible,  arising  as 
did  those  in  the  present  instance,  the  control  adequate  to 
confer  jurisdiction  may  be  found  in  the  sovereignty  of  the 
debtor's  domicil.  The  debt,  of  course,  is  not  property  in 
the  hands  of  the  debtor;  but  it  is  an  obligation  of  the 
debtor,  and  is  of  value  to  the  creditor,  because  he  may 
be  compelled  to  pay;  and  power  over  the  debtor  at  his 
domicil  is  control  of  the  ordinary  means  of  enforcement. 
Blackstone  v.  Miller,  180  U.  S.  205,  206.  Tested  by  the 
criteria  afforded  by  the  authorities  we  have  cited,  Louisi- 
ana mnst  be  deemd  to  have  had  jurisdiction  to  impose 
the  tax."  See  Orient  Ins.  Co.  v.  Board  of  Assessors,  221 
U.  S.  358 ;  Southern  P.  Co.  v.  Kentucky  ex  rel  Alexander, 
222  U.  S.  63. 

§  154.  Exemptions  ^om  taxation  strictly  construed. 

It  is  well  settled  that  a  state,  acting  through  its  legis- 
lature, may  exempt  the  property  of  particular  persons, 
or  particular  parcels  of  property  from  taxation,  perpetu- 
ally or  for  a  specified  period,  unless  restrained  by  an  ex- 
press constitutional  limitation.  In  Mobile  and  Ohio 
Railroad  Company  v.  Tennessee,  153  U.  S.  486,  it  was 
held  that  an  exemption  from  taxation  was  granted  for  the 
purposes  and  to  the  extent  stated  by  a  provision  in  the 
charter  of  that  company  declaring  that '  *  no  tax  shall  ever 
be  laid  on  said  road  or  its  fixtures  which  shall  reduce  the 
dividends  below  8  per  cent."  As  early  as  Piqua  Branch 
of  State  Bank  v.  Knoop,  16  How.  369,  it  was  held  that  a 
state  had  the  constitutional  power  to  make  a  binding  con- 
tract, imposing  a  specific  tax  on  a  bank  in  lieu  of  all  other 
taxes.  It  was  also  held  at  a  very  early  day  that  unless  a 
state  has  manifested  a  deliberate  purpose  to  abandon  its 
taxing  power,  no  such  intention  will  be  presumed.     In 


350 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§154 


^H 

^H^H^H^^H 

1      ^H 

1 

^■1 
1     ^Hl 

iB^H^Ull 

Providence  Bank  v.  Billings,  4  Pet  514,  the  Court  said: 
' '  It  would  seem  that  the  relinquishment  of  such  a  power 
is  never  to  be  assumed.  We  will  not  say  that  a  state  may 
not  relinquish  it;  that  a  consideration  sufficiently  valu- 
able to  induce  a  partial  release  of  it  may  not  exist ;  but  as 
the  whole  community  is  interested  in  retaining  it  undi- 
minished, that  community  has  a  right  to  insist  that  its 
abandonment  ought  not  to  be  presumed  in  a  case  in  which 
the  deliberate  purpose  of  the  state  to  abandon  it  does  not 
appear.'*  Unless  its  intention  to  do  so  has  been  declared 
in  positive  and  unmistakable  terms,  the  legislature  can 
not  be  presumed  to  have  intended  to  surrender  the  taxing 
power.  New  Orleans  City  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  New  Orleans, 
143  U.  S.  192.  An  exemption  from  taxation  must  appear 
with  absolute  distinctness  as  the  taxing  power  is  neces- 
sary to  the  very  existence  of  government.  Wilmington  & 
W.  R.  Co.  V.  Alsbrook,  146  U.  S.  279 ;  Phoenix  F.  &  M. 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Tennessee,  161  U.  S.  174.  In  Wells  v.  Savan- 
nah, 181  TJ.  S.  531,  539,  the  Court  said:  **The  payment 
of  taxes  on  account  of  property  otherwise  liable  to  taxa- 
tion can  only  be  avoided  by  clear  proof  of  a  valid  contract 
of  exemption  from  such  payment,  and  the  validity  of  such 
contract  presupposes  a  good  consideration  therefor.  If 
the  property  be  in  its  nature  taxable,  the  contract  exempt- 
ing it  from  taxation  must,  as  we  have  said,  be  clearly 
proved.  It  will  not  be  inferred  from  facts  which  do  not 
lead  irresistibly  and  necessarily  to  the  existence  of  the 
contract.''  Every  reasonable  doubt  must  be  resolved 
against  the  existence  of  a  contract  involving  an  exemption 
from  taxation.  Tucker  v.  Ferguson,  22  Wall.  527.  As 
such  exemptions  are  in  derogation  of  the  conamon  right 
as  well  as  that  of  the  sovereign,  they  are  not  to  be 
extended  beyond  the  express  and  necessary  requirements 
of  the  language,  construed  strictissimi  juris.  Yazoo  &  M. 
VaUey  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  132  U.  S.  174. 

In  New  York  ex  rel.  Metropolitan  Street  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
State  Board  of  Tax  Commissioners,  199  U.  S.  1,  a  serious 
attempt  was  made  to  draw  under  the  protection  of  the  due 


§154 


STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION 


process  clauae  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  exemptions 
from  taxation  claimed  by  public  service  corporations 
operating  street  railways,  which  had  paid  already  a  lump 
sum,  or  were  paying  annually  specific  amounts  or  a  fixed 
percentage  of  receipts  for  the  privilege  of  occupying  the 
streets.  It  was  contended  that  there  was  an  impairment 
of  the  obligation  of  contracts  and  a  denial  of  due  process 
of  law  by  a  state  statute  imposing  a  subsequent  tax  on  the 
franchises  of  such  corporations,  despite  the  fact  that  such 
taxing  statute  provided  for  the  deduction  from  the  tax 
levied  of  smns  being  paid  by  the  corporations  for  the  use 
of  the  streets.  In  overruling  such  contentions  the  Court 
said:  "We  are  of  opinion  that  no  contract  right  of  the 
relator  was  impaired  by  the  legislation  in  question.  It  is 
further  insisted  that  the  special  franchise  tax  law  denies 
the  relator  the  eqaal  protection  of  the  laws  and  due 
process  in  three  separate  and  distinct  aspects,  namely: 

(1)  in  that  it  adds  to  the  obligations  of  their  various  con- 
tracts while  preserving  all  the  burdens  of  those  contracts; 

(2)  in  that  it  provides  for  the  deduction  of  annual  pay- 
ments covered  by  existing  contracts  for  the  amount  of 
tax  levied,  by  reason  of  which  deduction  those  who  agreed 
to  pay  for  their  franchise,  lump  sums  or  annual  amounts 
less  than  the  net  tax  are  discriminated  against;  and  (3) 
in  that  it  discriminates  against  them  and  subjects  them  to 
taxation,  while  their  competitors,  operating  under  the 
surfaces  of  many  of  the  same  streets,  are  to  be  exempted. 
The  first  specification  is  answered  by  the  conclusion  that 
we  have  reached  in  respect  to  the  claim  of  an  impairment 
of  contract  obligations ;  for  if  there  was  no  such  impair- 
ment, the  fact  that  the  companies  have  escaped  the  burden 
for  these  many  years  is  their  good  fortune,  and  in  no  man- 
ner discharges  them  from  the  ordinary  burdens  of  taxa- 
tion which  the  present  law  imposes.  With  respect  to  the 
second,  it  may  be  observed  that  the  lump  sum  is  so 
obviously  a  payment  for  the  franchise  that  it  can  not  be 
considered  in  any  just  sense  as  possessing  the  nature  of 
a  tax.    It  is  not  even  rental.    It  is  like  money  paid  for  a 


352 


DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§154 


tract  of  land, — ^part  of  the  purchase  price.  It  does  not, 
like  a  percentage  of  the  gross  receipts,  vary  with  the 
changes  of  business,  has  no  resemblance  to  a  continuing 
discharge  of  the  obligation  which  property  is  under  for 
contribution  to  the  support  of  the  government.  Further, 
this  whole  matter  of  allowing  a  reduction  on  account  of 
that  which  is  spoken  of  as  *in  the  nature  of  a  tax,'  is  a 
matter  of  grace  on  the  part  of  the  legislature.  The  fran- 
chises granted  were,  as  we  have  held,  subject  to  taxation, 
and  the  fact  that  upon  equitable  considerations,  the  state 
has  consented  that  a  certain  reduction  shall,  in  some  cases, 
be  made,  does  not  entitle  every  holder  of  a  franchise  to  a 
like  reduction.  It  is  akin  to  an  exemption,  and  there  is 
nothing  in  the  Federal  Constitution  to  prevent  a  state 
from  granting  exemptions  from  taxation.  BelPs  Gap  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Pennsylvania,  134  U.  S.  232.'* 

§  155.  Taxation  must  be  for  a  public  purpose.  A  state 
conunits  an  act  of  confiscation  and  deprives  the  citizen 
of  due  process  of  law  when  a  contribution  is  levied  upon 
his  property  in  violation  of  the  fundamental  principle 
which  demands  that  the  taxing  power  of  a  constitutional 
government  can  only  be  exercised  for  the  public  use  and 
benefit.  In  the  leading  case  of  Citizens'  Sav.  and  L. 
Ass'n  V.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655,  the  Court  said:  **The 
power  to  tax  is,  therefore,  the  strongest,  the  most  pervad- 
ing of  all  the  powers  of  government,  reaching  directly  or 
indirectly  to  all  classes  of  the  people.  It  was  said  by 
Chief  Justice  Marshall  in  the  case  of  McCuUoch  v.  Md., 
4  Wheat.  431,  that  the  power  to  tax  is  the  power  to  de- 
stroy. A  striking  instance  of  the  truth  of  the  proposition 
is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  existing  tax  of  ten  per  cent, 
imposed  by  the  United  States  on  the  circulation  of  all 
other  banks  than  the  National  Banks,  drove  out  of  ex- 
istence every  state  bank  of  circulation  within  a  year  or 
two  after  its  passage.  This  power  can  as  readily  be  em- 
ployed against  one  class  of  indi^dduals  and  in  favor  of 
another,  so  as  to  ruin  the  one  class  and  give  unlimited 


§  155  STATE  POWER  OP  TAXATION  353 

wealth  and  prosperity  to  the  other,  if  there  is  no  implied 
limitation  of  the  uses  for  which  power  may  be  exercised. 
To  lay,  with  one  hand,  the  power  of  the  government  on 
the  property  of  the  citizen,  and  with  the  other  bestow 
it  upon  favored  individuals  to  aid  private  enterprises  and 
build  up  private  fortunes,  is  none  the  less  a  robbery 
because  it  is  done  under  the  form  of  law  and  is  called 
taxation.  This  is  not  legislation.  It  is  a  decree  under 
legislative  forms.  .  .  .  We  have  established,  we 
think,  beyond  cavil,  that  there  can  be  no  lawful  tax  which 
is  not  laid  for  a  public  purpose.  It  may  not  be  easy  to 
draw  the  line  in  all  cases  so  as  to  decide  what  is  a  public 
purpose  in  this  sense  and  what  is  not."  The  duty  rests 
primarily  with  the  legislature  of  course  to  determine  what 
is  or  is  not  such  a  public  use  as  will  authorize  the  employ- 
ment of  the  taxing  power.  In  the  words  of  the  Court,  in 
the  case  just  cited,  "It  is  undoubtedly  the  duty  of  the 
legislature,  which  imposes  or  authorizes  municipalities 
to  impose  a  tax  to  see  that  it  is  not  to  he  used  for  purposes 
of  private  interest  instead  of  a  public  use,  and  the  courts 
can  only  be  justified  in  interposing  when  a  violation  of 
this  principle  is  clear  and  the  reason  for  interference 
cogent.  And  in  deciding  whether,  in  the  given  case,  the 
object  for  which  taxes  are  assessed  falls  upon  one  side  or 
the  other  of  the  line,  they  most  be  governed  mainly  by  the 
course  and  usage  of  the  government,  the  objects  for  which 
taxes  have  been  customarily  and  by  long  course  of  legis- 
lation levied,  what  objects  or  purposes  have  been  consid- 
ered necessary  to  the  support  and  for  the  proper  use  of 
the  government,  whether  state  or  municipal." 

There  is  however  a  Federal  power  which  sits  above  the 
state  power  and  determines  for  itself  what  is  or  is  not  a 
pnblic  nse,  regardless  of  the  decisions  of  state  courts.  In. 
Pallbrook  Irrigation  District  v.  Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112,  it 
was  held  that  when  the  taking  for  any  other  than  a  public 
use  is  alleged  to  be  a  deprivation  of  private  property 
without  due  process  of  law,  the  question  whether  the  tak- 
ing was  for  any  other  than  a  public  nse  is  a  Federal  qnes- 

DdsT 


354 


DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§155 


tion,  despite  the  absence  of  any  prohibition  in  the  Federal 
Constitution  acting  upon  the  states^  and  denying  their 
right  to  take  private  property  for  any  but  a  public  use. 
In  that  case  the  Court  said :  **If  the  act  of  the  state  legis- 
lature as  construed  by  its  highest  court  conflicts  with  the 
Federal  Constitution  or  with  any  valid  act  of  Congress,  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  circuit  court  and  of  this  court  to  so 
decide,  and  to  thus  enforce  the  provision  of  the  Federal 
Constitution.  The  following  are  some  of  the  numerous 
cases  in  which  this  principle  has  been  announced  and  car- 
ried into  effect :  Shelby  v.  Guy,  11  Wheat.  361 ;  Nesmith 
V.  Sheldon,  7  How.  812 ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Kearney,  11 
How.  297 ;  Webster  v.  Cooper,  14  How.  488 ;  Lefl5ngwell  v. 
Warren,  2  Black.  599 ;  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District  107, 
111  U.  S.  701,  704 ;  Detroit  v.  Osborne,  135  U.  S.  492.  We 
should  not  be  justified  in  holding  the  act  to  be  in  violation 
of  the  state  constitution  in  the  face  of  clear  and  repeated 
decisions  of  the  highest  court  of  the  state  to  the  contrary 
under  the  pretext  that  we  were  deciding  principles  of  gen- 
eral  constitutional  law.  If  the  act  violates  any  provision, 
expressed  or  properly  implied  or  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion, it  is  our  duty  to  so  declare  it,  but  if  it  do  not,  there  is 
no  justification  for  the  Federal  courts  to  run  counter  to 
the  decisions  of  the  highest  state  courts  upon  questions 
involving  the  construction  of  state  statutes  or  constitu- 
tions, on  any  alleged  ground  that  such  decisions  are  in 
conflict  with  sound  principles  or  general  constitutional 
law.  The  contrary  has  not  been  held  in  this  court  by  the 
case  of  Citizens'  Sav.  &  L.  Ass'n  v.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655. '^ 
Either  general  or  local  taxation  may  be  authorized  by 
the  legislature,  after  the  fact  has  been  settled  that  the 
use  to  which  the  tax  is  to  be  applied  is  a  public  one.  In 
the  case  of  Mobile  County  v.  Kunball,  102  tJ.  S.  691,— 
where  a  tax  was  levied  upon  the  people  of  that  county  for 
a  harbor  improvement  for  the  special  benefit  of  the 
county  and  the  general  benefit  of  the  whole  state, — ^the 
court,  in  upholding  an  act  authorizing  the  issue  of  bonds 
to  meet  the  expenses,  held  that  it  was  not  a  taking  of 


§  155  STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION  355 

private  property  for  pnblic  nse  within  the  meaning  of  the 
constitutional  clanse.  The  Conrt  said :  "It  was  the  loan 
of  the  credit  of  the  county  for  a  work  public  in  its  char- 
acter, designed  to  be  of  general  benefit  to  the  state,  but 
more  especially  and  immediately  to  the  county.  The 
expenses  of  the  work  were  of  course  to  be  ultimately 
defrayed  by  taxation  upon  the  property  and  people  of  the 
county."  Approved  in  Washer  v.  BuUitt  Co.,  110  U.  S. 
564;  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  355;  Charlotte,  etc., 
R.  R.  V.  Gibbes,  142  TJ.  S.  395;  Fallbrook  Irr.  Diet.  v. 
Bradley,  X64  U.  S.  X5X;  Baoman  v.  Ross^  167  U.  S.  589; 
Norwood  V.  Baker,  172  XT.  S.  278.  Thus  it  has  been 
settled  that  after  a  public  work  has  been  properly  author- 
ized, the  legislature,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  consti- 
tutional restraint,  may  determine  the  manner  in  which  the 
taxation  necessary  to  defray  the  expense  may  be  imposed. 
See  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District,  111  XT.  S.  705.  In  the 
case  of  Wilson  v.  Lambert,  168  U.  S.  611,  in  which  it  was 
held  that  special  assessments  on  property  in  the  District 
of  Columbia  for  a  public  park  in  that  District  for  the 
benefit  of  the  entire  people  of  the  United  States  were  not 
unconstitutional,  as  a  deprivation  of  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  the  Court  said:  "The  residents  and 
property  holders  of  the  District  of  Columbia  most  be 
regarded  as  coming  within  the  class  of  beneficiaries ;  and, 
so  far  from  being  injured  by  the  declaration  that  the 
park  shall  also  have  a  national  character,  it  is  apparent 
that  thereby  the  welfare  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  District 
will  be  promoted."  Emphasis  must  however  be  given 
here  to  the  fact  that  if  the  purpose  for  which  a  tax  is 
levied  is  purely  local,  its  burdens  can  not  be  imposed  upon 
another  community  or  upon  other  property  in  no  way 
benefited  by  its  proceeds.  Speaking  on  that  subject  in 
Morford  v.  Muger,  8  Iowa  82,  the  Court  said;  "There 
must  be  some  limit  to  this  legislative  discretion;  which,  in 
the  absence  of  any  other  criterion,  is  held  to  consist  in  the 
discrimination  to  he  made  between  what  may  reasonably 
he  deemed  a  just  tax,  for  which  a  just  compensation  is 


1  i' 


356  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  155 

provided  in  the  object  to  which  it  is  devoted,  and  that 
which  is  palpably  not  a  tax,  but  which,  nnder  the  form  of 
a  tax,  is  the  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use 
without  just  compensation.  If  there  be  such  a  flagrant 
and  palpable  departure  from  equality  in  the  burden 
imposed;  if  it  be  imposed  for  the  benefit  of  others,  and 
for  purposes  in  which  those  objecting  have  no  interest, 
and  are,  therefore,  not  bound  to  contribute,  it  is  no  matter 
in  what  form  the  power  is  exercised — ^whether  in  the 
unequal  levy  of  the  tax,  or  in  the  regulation  of  the  bounda- 
ries  of  the  local  government,  which  results  in  subjecting 
the  party  unjustly  to  local  taxes,  it  must  be  regarded 
as  coming  within  the  prohibition  of  the  constitution 
designed  to  protect  private  rights  against  aggression, 
however  made,  and  whether  under  the  color  of  recognized 
power  or  not. ' '  Unless  however  there  is  a  clear  abuse  of 
the  legislative  discretion,  unless  the  object  of  the  tax  is 
palpably  of  no  benefit  to  the  particular  community  or  dis- 
trict taxed,  or  to  the  property  taxed,  it  will  be  sustained 
under  a  construction  based  upon  the  presumption  that 
such  legislation  is  valid.  See  Wilson  v.  Lambert,  168 
U.  S.  611 ;  Henderson  Bridge  Co.  v.  Henderson,  173  U.  S. 
592 ;  Booth  v.  Woodburg,  32  Conn.  128. 

§  156.  Legislature  may  act  directly  or  delegate  its  func- 
tions to  local  authorities.  In  dealing  with  that  question 
in  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345, — ^in  which  it  was 
held  that  while  a  state  legislature  may  commit  the  ascer- 
tainment of  a  sum  to  be  raised  by  taxation,  and  of  the 
benefited  district  to  commissioners,  it  is  not  bound  to  do 
so; — the  Court  said:  '*The  legislature,  in  the  exercise 
of  its  power  of  taxation,  has  the  right  to  direct  the  whole 
or  a  part  of  the  expense  of  a  public  improvement,  such  as 
the  laying  out,  grading  or  repairing  of  a  street,  to  be 
assessed  upon  the  owners  of  lands  benefited  thereby,  and 
the  determination  of  the  territorial  district  which  should 
be  taxed  for  a  local  improvement  is  within  the  province  of 
legislative  discretion.   Willard  v.  Presburg,  14  Wall.  676 ; 


S 156  STATE  POWEB  OF  TAXATION  357 

Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97 ;  Mobile  Connty  v. 
KimbaU,  102  U.  S.  691;  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District, 
111  U.  S.  701.  If  the  legislature  provides  for  notice  to 
and  hearing  of  each  proprietor,  at  some  stage  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, npon  the  question  what  proportion  of  the  tax 
shall  be  assessed  npon  Ms  land,  there  is  no  taking  of  his 
property  withont  due  process.  MeMillen  v.  Anderson, 
95  U.  S.  37 ;  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans  and  Hagar  v.  Recla- 
mation District,  above  cited."  In  Walston  v.  Nevin,  128 
U.  S.  578, — in  which  it  was  held  that  the  definition  of  the 
taxing  district  and  the  method  of  the  apportionment  are 
all  within  the  legislative  power, — ^the  Court  said:  "And 
whenever  the  law  operates  alike  on  all  persons  and  prop- 
erty, similarly  situated,  equal  protection  can  not  be  said 
to  be  denied.  Wurts  v.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S.  606;  Rich- 
mond, F.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Richmond,  96  V.  S.  529."  See 
also,  Paulsen  v.  Portland,  149  IT.  S.  30;  Fallbrook  Irr. 
Diet.  V.  Bradley,  164  TT.  S.  112 ;  Bamnan  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S. 
548 ;  Parsons  v.  District  of  Columbia,  170  TJ.  S.  45 ;  French 
V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  181  U.  S.  324;  Louisville, 
etc,  R.  Co.  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  197  U.  S.  430; 
Galveston,  Harrisburg  &  San  Antonio  Ry.  v.  Texas,  210 
TJ.  S.  217, 221 ;  WiUonghby  v.  Chicago,  235  U.  S.  45 ;  Choc- 
taw &  Golf  R.  R.  V.  Harrison,  235  V.  S.  298 ;  Tost  v.  Dallas 
Connty,  236  U.  S.  50;  Equitable  Life  Society  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania, 238  U.  S.  143.  In  the  case  of  Banman  v.  Ross, 
above  quoted,  the  Court  said  that  "the  legislature  in  the 
exercise  of  the  right  of  taxation  has  the  authority  to  direct 
the  whole  or  such  part  as  it  may  prescribe,  of  the  expense 
of  a  public  improvement,  such  as  the  establishing,  the 
widening,  the  grading  or  the  repair  of  a  street,  to  be 
assessed  npon  the  owners  of  lands  benefited  thereby. 
.  ,  .  The  rule  of  apportionment  among  the  parcels  of 
land  benefited  also  rests  within  the  discretion  of  the  legis- 
lature, and  may  be  directed  to  be  in  proportion  to  the 
position,  the  frontage,  the  area,  or  the  market  value  of 
the  lands,  or  in  proportion  to  the  benefits  as  estimated  by 
commissioners."    See  also,  Mattingly  v.  District  of  Co- 


358 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§156 


lumbia,  97  U.  S.  687,  692 ;  King  v.  Portland,  184  U.  S. 
161 ;  Chadwick  v.  Kelly,  187  U.  S.  540;  Seattle  v.  Kelleher, 
195  U.  S.  351. 

There  are  however  some  states  in  which  it  has  been 
held  that  the  legislature  exceeds  its  powers  in  making 
statutory  rules*  fixing  absolutely  the  proportion  of  ex- 
pense to  be  borne  by  abutting  owners,  or  which  fail  to 
provide  for  the  indenmification  of  the  land  owner  sub- 
jected to  the  operation  of  the  law,  in  the  event  the  cost  of 
the  improvements  shall  exceed  the  benefits  conferred.  See 
State  V.  Newark,  37  N.  J.  L.  415 ;  Tide  Water  Co.  v.  Coster, 
18  N.  J.  Eq.  518 ;  and  Provident  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Jersey  City, 
113  U.  S.  506,  all  quoted  by  McGehee,  Due  Process  of  Law, 
p.  249.  These  cases  contend  that  there  is  no  longer  a 
rightful  exercise  of  the  taxing  power  but  an  unconstitu- 
tional employment  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  when 
a  rule  of  apportionment  is  adopted  by  the  legislature  that 
fails  to  provide  for  the  equalizing  of  benefits  to  burdens 
in  individual  cases,  for  the  reason  that,  if  the  method  of 
apportionment  is  fixed  absolutely  by  the  legislature,  the 
burden  in  individual  cases  may  exceed  the  benefits,  thus 
involving  the  taking  of  private  property  for  a  public  use 
without  compensation. 


§157.  Due  process  requires  compensation  to  owner 
when  property  is  taken  by  state  for  public  use.  In  the 
notable  case  of  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172  U.  S.  269,  it  was 
held :  first,  that  no  matter  whether  private  property  is 
taken  by  the  state  directly,  or  under  its  authority  due 
process  requires  compensation  to  be  made  or  secured  to 
the  owner ;  second,  that  there  is  a  taking,  under  the  form 
of  taxation,  of  private  property  for  public  use  without 
compensation,  when  there  is  an  exaction  from  the  owner 
of  such  property  of  the  cost  of  a  public  improvement  in 
substantial  excess  of  the  special  benefits  accruing  to  him ; 
that  to  the  extent  of  such  excess  the  taking  is  illegal; 
third,  that  there  is  a  taking  of  private  property  for  public 
use  without  compensation  when  there  is  a  special  assess- 


3157 


STATE  POWER  OP  TAXATION 


ment  upon  abutting  property  by  the  front  foot  that  does 
not  take  into  accoont  special  benefits  for  the  entire  cost 
and  expense  of  opening  a  street,  including  not  only  the 
amonnt  to  be  paid  for  the  land,  bnt  the  cost  and  expense 
of  the  proceedings.  The  Court  said :  "But  the  power  of 
the  legislature  in  these  matters  is  not  unlimited.  There 
is  a  point  beyond  which  the  legislative  department,  even 
when  exerting  the  power  of  taxation,  may  not  go  con- 
sistently with  the  citizen's  right  of  property.  As  already 
indicated,  the  principle  underlying  special  assessments  to 
meet  the  cost  of  public  improvements  is  that  the  property 
upon  which  they  are  imposed  is  peculiarly  benefited,  and 
therefore  the  owners  do  not,  in  fact,  pay  anything  in 
excess  of  what  they  receive  by  reason  of  such  improve- 
ment But  the  guaranties  for  the  protection  of  private 
property  would  be  seriously  impaired,  if  it  were  estab- 
lished as  a  rule  of  constitutional  law,  that  the  imposition 
by  the  legislature  upon  particular  private  proper^  of  the 
entire  cost  of  a  public  improvement,  irrespective  of  any 
peculiar  benefits  accruing  to  the  owner  from  such  improve- 
ments, could  not  be  questioned  by  Mm  in  the  courts  of  the 
country.  It  is  one  thing  for  the  legislature  to  prescribe 
it  as  a  general  rule  that  property  abutting  on  a  street 
opened  by  the  public  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  spe- 
cially benefited  by  such  improvement,  and  therefore 
should  specially  contribute  to  the  cost  incurred  by  the 
public.  It  is  quite  a  different  thing  to  lay  it  down  as  an 
absolute  rule  that  sudi  property,  whether  it  is  in  fact 
benefited  or  not  by  the  opening  of  the  street,  may  be 
assessed  by  the  front  foot  for  a  fixed  sum  representing 
the  whole  cost  of  the  improvement,  and  without  any  right 
in  the  property  owner  to  show,  when  an  assessment  of 
that  kind  is  made,  or  is  about  to  be  made,  that  the  sum 
so  fixed  is  in  excess  of  the  benefits  received.  In  our  judg- 
ment the  exaction  from  the  owner  of  private  property  of 
the  cost  of  a  public  improvement  in  substantial  excess  of 
the  special  benefits  accruing  to  him  is,  to  the  extent  of 
such  excess,  a  taking  under  the  guise  of  taxation  of  pri- 


I      I 

I 


i    : 


360 


DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§157 


vate  property  for  public  use  without  compensatioiL  We 
say  'substantial  excess'  because  exact  equality  of  taxa- 
tion is  not  always  attainable,  and  for  that  reason  the 
excess  of  cost  over  special  benefits,  unless  it  be  of  a  mate- 
rial character,  ought  not  to  be  regarded  by  a  court  of 
equity  when  its  aid  is  invoked  to  restrain  the  enforce- 
ment of  a  special  assessment.  * ' 

The  foregoing  case,  which  seems  to  <condenm  the  front 
foot  rule  when  applied  absolutely  without  any  provision 
for  a  preliminary  hearing  upon  benefits  conferred,  and  to 
establish  the  rule  that  special  assessments  must  be  so 
limited  by  the  benefits  received  that  there  shall  be  no 
taking  in  ' '  substantial  excess ' '  of  such  benefits,  must  be 
read  in  connection  with  a  series  of  qualifying  cases 
decided  in  1901,  as  follows :  French  v.  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Co.,  181  U.  S.  324;  Wight  v.  Davidson,  181  U.  S. 
371;  Tonawanda  v.  Lyon,  181  U.  S.  389;  Webster  v. 
Fargo,  181 U.  S.  394;  Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  181  U.  S. 
396 ;  Detroit  v.  Parker,  181  U.  S.  399 ;  Wormley  v.  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  181  U.  S.  402;  Shumate  v.  Herman, 
181  U.  S.  402 ;  Farrell  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Commis- 
sioners, 181  U.  S.  404.  In  French  v.  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Co.,  it  was  held  that  there  was  no  taking  of  pri- 
vate property  for  a  public  use  without  due  process  of 
law  when  the  apportionment  of  the  entire  cost  of  a  street 
pavement  upon  the  abutting  lots  according  to  their  front- 
age was  authorized  by  the  legislature  without  any  pre- 
liminary hearing  as  to  benefits.  The  Court  said:  **But 
we  agree  with  the  supreme  court  of  Missouri,  in  its  view 
that  such  is  not  the  necessary  legal  import  of  the  decision 
in  Norwood  v.  Baker  [172  IJ.  S.  269].  That  was  a  case 
where,  by  a  village  ordinance  apparently  aimed  at  a  single 
person  a  portion  of  whose  property  was  condemned  for 
a  street,  the  entire  cost  of  opening  the  street,  including 
not  only  the  full  amount  paid  for  the  strip  condemned, 
but  the  cost  and  expenses  of  the  condemnation  proceed- 
ings was  thrown  upon  the  abutting  property  of  the  person 
whose  land  was  condenmed.    This  appeared  both  to  the 


U58 


STATE  POWER  OP  TAXATION 


361 


court  below  and  to  a  majority  of  the  jndges  of  this  court, 
to  be  an  abuse  of  law,  an  act  of  confiscation,  and  not  a 
valid  exercise  of  the  taxing  power.  ,  .  .  That  this 
decision  did  not  go  to  the  extent  claimed  by  the  plaintiff 
in  error  in  this  case  is  evident,  because  in  the  opinion  of 
the  majority  it  is  expressly  said  that  the  decision  was  not 
inconsistent  with  our  decisions  in  Parsons  v.  District  of 
Columbia,  170  U.  S.  45,  56;  and  in  Spencer  v.  Merdiant, 
125  U.  S.  345,  357."  In  Tonawanda  v.  Lyon,  181  U.  S. 
389,  the  Court  said:  "It  was  not  the  intention  of  the 
court,  in  that  case  (Norwood  v.  Baker,  172  U.  S.  269),  to 
hold  that  the  general  and  special  taxing  systems  of  the 
states,  however  long  existing  and  sustained  as  valid  by 
their  courts,  have  been  subverted  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
The  purpose  of  that  amendment  is  to  extend  to  the  citi- 
zens and  residents  of  the  states  the  same  protection 
against  arbitrary  state  legislation  aifecting  life,  liberty, 
and  property,  as  is  afforded  by  the  Fifth  Amendment 
against  similar  legislation  by  Congress.  The  case  of 
Norwood  v.  Baker  presented,  as  the  judge  in  the  court  in 
the  present  case  well  said,  'considerations  of  peculiar 
and  extraordinary  hardship,'  amounting,  in  the  opinion  of 
a  majority  of  the  judges  of  this  court,  to  actual  confisca- 
tion of  private  property  to  public  use,  and  bringing  the 
case  fairly  within  the  reach  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment." See  King  v.  Portland,  184  U.  S.  61;  Voigt  v. 
Detroit,  184  U.  S.  115;  Chadwick  v.  Kelly,  187  U.  S.  540; 
Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310;  Seattle  v.  Kelleher,  195 
U.  S.  351 ;  Willonghby  v.  Chicago,  235  U.  S.  45. 

§158.  Collection  of  taxes  by  sammary  proceedings. 

How  far  the  summary  methods  of  seizure  and  sale  neces- 
sarily employed  in  the  collection  of  taxes  are  consistent 
with  the  principles  involved  in  due  process  of  law  is  a 
question  which  has  given  rise  to  grave  discussion  in  both 
the  state  and  Federal  courts.  It  has  been  held  in  several 
states  that  a  forfeiture  of  lands  can  not  be  declared  by 


IKhIIiH 

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ip 


ill 


362 


liUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§158 


the  state  as  a  penalty  for  the  nonpayment  of  taxes  with- 
out adequate  provision  for  some  procedure  in  which  the 
owner  may  have  the  opportunity  upon  notice  to  defend 
against  such  forfeiture.  See  Marshall  v.  McDaniel,  12 
Bush  378;  Griffin  v.  Mixon,  38  Miss.  424;  Parish  v.  East 
Coast  Cedar  Co.,  133  N.  Car.  478.  In  other  states  abso- 
lute forfeiture  have  been  held  to  be  constitutional.  Wild 
v.  Serpell,  10  Gratt.  405 ;  Levasser  v.  Washburn,  11  Gratt. 
572 ;  McClure  v.  Maitland,  24  W.  Va.  561 ;  Holly  Eiver  Coal 
Co.  v.  Howell,  36  W.  Va.  486.  ,When  in  McMillen  v. 
Anderson,  95  U.  S.  37,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  was  called  upon  to  deal  with  the  subject  under  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  it  was  held  that  it  does  not  re- 
quire that  taxes  shall  be  collected  through  a  judicial  pro- 
ceeding ;  neither  does  it  require  that  the  person  taxed  by  a 
state  law  shall  be  present  or  have  an  opportunity  to  be 
present  when  the  tax  is  assessed  against  him.  The  Court 
said:  '*The  mode  of  assessing  tax  in  the  states  by  the 
Federal  Government,  and  by  all  governments,  is  neces- 
sarily summary,  that  it  may  be  speedy  and  effectual.  By 
summary  is  not  meant  arbitrary,  or  unequal,  or  illegal. 
It  must,  under  our  Constitution,  be  lawfully  done.  But 
that  does  not  mean,  nor  does  the  phrase  'due  process  of 
law'  mean  by  a  judicial  proceeding.  The  Nation  from 
whom  we  inherit  the  phrase  'due  process  of  law'  has 
never  relied  upon  the  courts  of  justice  for  the  collection 
of  her  taxes,  though  she  passed  through  a  successful 
revolution  in  resistance  to  unlawful  taxation.  We  need 
not  here  go  into  the  literature  of  that  constitutional  pro- 
vision, because,  in  any  view  that  can  be  taken  of  it,  the 
statute  under  consideration  does  not  violate  if 

In  1898  was  decided  the  case  of  King  v.  Mullins,  171 
U.  S.  404,  in  which  the  Court  said :  '  *  The  question  of  con- 
stitutional law  thus  presented  is  one  of  unusual  gravity. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  clause 
in  the  national  Constitution  which  this  court  is  now  asked 
to  interpret  is  a  part  of  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and 
that  it  must  be  given  full  force  and  effect  throughout  the 


S 158  STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION  363 

entire  Union.  The  due  process  of  law  enjoined  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  must  mean  the  same  thing  in  all 
the  states.  On  the  other  hand,  a  decision  of  this  court 
declaring  that  that  amendment  forbids  a  state,  by  force 
alone  of  its  Constitution  or  statutes,  and  without  inquisi- 
tion or  inquiry  in  any  form,  to  take  to  itself  the  absolute 
title  to  lands  of  the  citizen  because  of  his  failure  to  put 
them  on  record  for  taxation  or  to  pay  the  taxes,  might 
greatly  disturb  the  land  titles  of  two  states,  under  a  sys- 
tem which  has  long  been  upheld  and  enforced  by  their 
respective  legislatures  and  courts.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, our  duty  is  not  to  go  beyond  what  is  necessary 
to  the  decision  of  the  particular  case  before  us.  If  the 
rights  of  the  parties  in  this  case  can  he  fully  determined 
witbont  passing  upon  the  general  question  whether  the 
clause  of  the  West  Virginia  Constitution  in  question, 
alone  considered,  is  consistent  with  the  national  Consti- 
tution, that  question  may  properly  be  left  for  examina- 
tion until  it  arises  in  some  case  in  which  it  must  be 
decided."  While  thus  postponing  the  decision  of  the 
vital  question,  the  court  declared  that  where  the  conten- 
tion is  made  that  a  state  constitution  provides  for  a 
forfeiture  of  property  for  nonpayment  of  taxes  without 
due  process  of  law,  it  will  examine  the  statutes  of  the 
state  in  connection  with  the  constitution  as  a  connected 
whole  in  order  to  determine  whether  a  system  of  taxation 
exists  which  in  its  especial  features  is  consistent  with  due 
process  of  law.  The  end  was  not  reached  until  the  deci- 
sion made  in  1909  in  King  v.  West  Virginia,  216  II.  S.  92, 
the  author  being  of  counsel,  in  which  the  court  assumed 
that  the  vital  question  it  had  declined  in  express  terms  to 
pass  upon  in  King  v.  Mullins,  had  been  actually  decided  in 
that  case.  The  language  used  is  this :  "The  only  serious 
question  in  the  case,  if  we  assume  that  King  saved  it,  is 
whether  the  West  Virginia  Constitution  and  statute  are 
consistent  with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  But  that 
question  was  answered  in  King  v.  Mullins,  171  U.  S.  404. 
The  construction  of  the  state  constitution  by  the  state 


364 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§158 


court  as  not  confined  in  its  operation  to  the  title  vested  and 
remaining  in  the  state  when  the  Constitution  went  into 
effect  (which,  of  course,  is  final)  is  the  only  natural  con- 
struction and  was  to  be  expected.  .  •  .  The  question 
is  not  open  and  we  shall  discuss  it  no  more. ' '  Thus,  by 
an  unprecedented  method  of  reasoning,  the  conclusion 
was  finally  reached  that  a  state  constitution  which  pro- 
vides absolutely  that  lands  shall  be  forfeited  for  nonpay- 
ment of  taxes  and  a  failure  for  five  years  in  succession  to 
place  them  on  the  land  books,  guarantees  due  process  of 
law,  provided  the  legislature  subsequently  passes  statutes 
affording  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  which  the  constitu- 
tion itself  expressly  denied.  See  to  the  same  effect  Ken- 
tucky Union  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  219  U.  S.  140,  in  which  the 
Court  said:  **The  state  of  West  Virginia,  by  its  Consti- 
tution, in  1872,  inaugurated  a  system  of  forfeiture  of 
lands  for  nonpajmtient  of  taxes  in  some  respects  analo- 
gous to  the  one  now  under  consideration.  .  .  •  In  the 
present  case  the  statute  does  not  undertake  to  forfeit  the 
lands  for  the  failure  to  register  them  and  pay  the  taxes 
upon  them  for  the  years  stated  without  a  judicial  pro- 
ceeding by  which  the  owner  of  the  title  may  have  the 
taxes  assessed,  and,  upon  payment  thereof  the  forfeiture 
avoided ;  and  the  forfeiture  is  declared  only  after  a  judi- 
cial proceeding  instituted  by  the  commonwealth's  attor- 
ney, in  which  there  is  opportunity  for  a  hearing  and  after 
which  the  forfeiture  may  be  declared.  The  case  of  King 
V.  MuUins,  supra,  was  followed  and  approved  in  this  court 
in  King  v.  West  Virginia,  216  U-  S.  92,  and  in  Fay  v. 
Crozier,217U.S.455.'^ 


§159.  Notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings.  Even  in 
the  most  summary  proceedings  for  the  collection  of  taxes, 
including  such  as  the  West  Virginia  and  Kentucky  tax 
cases  just  cited,  involving  a  forfeiture  of  the  title  to  the 
land  itself,  the  courts  always  recognize  the  principle  that 
the  legislature  must  afford  to  the  taxpayer  notice  of  some 
kind  and  a  hearing,  or  an  opportunity  to  be  heard.    As 


%  159  STATE  POWBB  OF  TAXATION  365 

the  character  of  the  notice  and  the  nature  of  the  hearing 
differ  widely  according  to  the  subject-matters  involved, 
nothing  like  precise  definitions  of  either  can  be  attempted. 
It  is  only  possible  to  reproduce  the  more  notable  indica- 
tions given  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  to  what  will  or  will 
not  be  considered  by  it  aa  adequate  notice  and  hearing  in 
certain  classes  of  cases.  The  right  in  question  practically 
disappears  when  the  legislature  itself  levies  directly  gen- 
eral taxes,  in  the  form  of  an  annual  levy,  a  fi^ed  time 
being  given  within  which  the  assessment  shall  be  made,  a 
fixed  time  and  place  being  set  for  the  equalization  of  the 
assessment  and  the  levy  of  the  tax.  In  Tarpin  v.  Lemon, 
187  U.  S.  58,  the  Court  said:  "Exactly  what  due  process 
of  law  requires  in  the  assessment  find  collection  of  gen- 
eral taxes  has  never  yet  been  decided  by  this  court, 
although  we  have  had  frequent  occasion  to  hold  that,  in 
proceedings  for  the  condemnation  of  land  under  the  laws 
of  eminent  domain  or  for  the  imposition  of  special  taxes 
for  local  improvements,  notice  to  the  owner  at  some  stage 
of  the  proceedings,  as  well  as  an  opportunity  to  defend, 
is  essential.  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345;  Huling 
v.  Kaw  Valley  R.  B.  &  Improv.  Co.,  130  U.  S.  559 ;  Hagar 
V.  Eeclamation  Dist.  No.  108,  111  XT.  S.  701;  Paulsen  v. 
Portland,  149  U.  S.  30.  But  laws  for  the  assessment  of 
general  taxes  stand  upon  a  somewhat  different  footing 
and  are  construed  with  the  utmost  liberality  sometimes 
even  to  the  extent  of  holding  that  no  notice  whatever  is 
necessary.  Due  process  of  law  was  well  defined  by 
Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  Dist.  No.  108, 
111  U.  S.  701,  in  the  following  words:  'It  is  sufficient  to 
observe  here  that  by  'due  process*  is  meant  one  which, 
following  the  forms  of  law,  is  appropriate  to  the  case, 
and  just  to  the  parties  to  be  affected.  It  must  be  pursued 
in  the  ordinary  mode  prescribed  by  law;  it  must  be 
adapted  to  the  end  to  be  attained;  and  whenever  it  is 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  parties  it  must  give 
them  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  respecting  the  justice  of 
the  judgment  sought.'  "    Proceedings  for  the  assessment 


i     'i 


366 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§159 


and  collection  of  taxes  are  so  far  similar  to  proceedings 
in  rem  that  notice  by  publication  has  been  held  sufficient 
to  confer  jurisdiction.  Lent  v.  Tillson,  140  U.  S.  316; 
Paulsen  v.  Portland,  149  U.  S.  30;  Merchants'  Bank  v. 
Pennsylvania,  167  U.  S.  461 ;  Bellingham  Bay  R.  Co,  v. 
New  Whatcom,  152  U.  S.  318. 

In  Glidden  v.  Harrington,  189  U.  S.  255,  the  Court,  in 
upholding  an  assessment  of  'Hhe  ordinary  annual  tax 
upon  personal  property,*' — said:  '* These  proceedings 
are  sufficient  to  constitute  due  process  of  law.  Although, 
with  respect  to  this  class  of  taxes,  we  have  never  had 
occasion  to  determine  exactly  what  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  required,  we  have  held  that  the  proceedings 
should  be  construed  with  the  utmost  liberality,  and,  while 
a  notice  may  be  required  at  some  stage  of  the  proceedings, 
such  notice  need  not  be  personal,  but  may  be  given  by 
publication  or  by  posting  notices  in  public  places.  It  can 
only  be  said  that  such  notices  shall  be  given  as  are  suit- 
able  in  a  given  case,  and  it  is  only  where  proceedings  are 
arbitrary,  oppressive,  or  unjust  that  they  are  declared  to 
be  not  due  process  of  law. ' '    See  cases  there  cited. 

Here  the  distinction  must  be  carefully  drawn  between 
specific  and  ad  valorem  taxes,  because  by  the  selection  of 
one  or  the  other  form  the  right  of  the  individual  to  notice 
and  hearing  may  be  narrowed  or  widened  by  the  legis- 
lature.  In  Hagar  v.  Eeclamation  District,  No.  108,  111 
U.  S.  709,  the  Court  said :  ' '  Of  the  different  kind  of  taxes 
which  the  state  may  impose  there  is  a  vast  number  of 
which,  from  their  nature,  no  notice  can  be  given  to  the 
taxpayer,  nor  would  notice  be  of  any  possible  advantage 
to  him,  such  as  poll  taxes,  license  taxes  (not  dependent 
upon  the  extent  of  his  business),  and  generally  specific 
taxes  on  things,  persons  or  occupations.  In  such  cases 
the  legislature,  in  authorizing  the  tax,  fixes  its  amounts, 
and  that  is  the  end  of  the  matter.  If  the  tax  be  not  paid, 
the  property  of  the  delinquent  may  be  sold  and  be  thus 
deprived  of  his  property.  Yet  there  can  be  no  question, 
that  the  proceediug  is  due  process  of  law,  as  there  is  no 


§159 


STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION 


inquiry  into  the  weight  of  evidence,  or  other  element  of  a 
judicial  natnre,  and  nothing  conid  be  changed  hy  hearing 
the  taxpayer.  .  .  .  Bnt  where  a  tax  Is  levied  on  prop- 
erty, not  specifically  hut  according  to  its  value,  to  be 
ascertained  by  assessors  appointed  for  that  purpose  upon 
such  evidence  as  they  may  obtain,  a  different  principle 
comes  in.  The  officers,  in  estimating  the  value,  act  judi- 
cially, and  in  most  of  the  states  provision  is  made  for  the 
correction  of  errors  committed  by  them,  through  boards 
of  revision  or  equalization,  sitting  at  designated  periods 
provided  by  law,  to  hear  complaints  respecting  the 
justice  of  the  assessments.  The  law,  in  prescribing  the 
time  when  such  complaints  will  be  heard,  gives  all  the 
notice  required,  and  the  proceeding  by  whidi  the.  valua- 
tion is  determined,  though  it  may  be  foUowed,  if  the  tax 
be  not  paid,  by  a  sale  of  the  delinquent's  property,  is  due 
process  of  law."  Thus  the  distinction  is  clearly  drawn 
between  those  cases  in  which  the  legislature  has  nothing 
to  do  but  to  fix  the  rate  of  taxation  upon  property  of  a 
definite  and  certain  value,  such  as  money,  the  face  value 
of  secnrities,  the  interest  on  bonds  and  the  like  (Dollar 
Sav.  Bank  v.  United  States,  19  "Wall.  240;  United  States 
V.  Philadelphia  R.  Co.,  123  U.  S.  113 ;  Bell 's  Gap  R.  Co.  v. 
Pennsylvania,  134  U.  S.  232),  and  those  in  which  the  tax 
is  levied  "on  property,  not  specifically  but  according  to 
its  value,  to  be  ascertained  by  assessors  appointed  for 
that  purpose,  upon  such  evidence  as  they  may  obtain," 
through  a  quasi  judicial  proceeding.  When  the  legis- 
lature selects  the  specific  instead  of  the  ad  valorem 
method,  it  may  become  necessary  for  it  to  make  a  direct 
adjudication  without  notice  or  hearing  of  the  amount  due 
from  the  individual  taxpayer.  In  Hodge  v.  Masoatine 
County,  196  U.  S.  276, — involving  the  validity  of  an  Iowa 
statute  imposing  an  annual  charge  upon  cigarette  dealers 
and,  "upon  the  real  property  and  the  owner  thereof," — 
the  Court  said:  "Coming  now  to  the  provisions  for  its 
enforcement,  it  is  clear  that,  as  to  the  person  actually 
carrying  on  the  business,  no  notice  of  the  assessment  or 


■J 
I 
t 


•  t 


368 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§159 


levy  of  the  tax  is  necessary.  If  the  person  carries  on  the 
husiness,  the  imposition  of  the  tax  follows  as  a  matter  of 
course.  There  is  no  discretion  as  to  the  amount  McMil- 
len  V.  Anderson,  95  U.  S.  37 ;  Hagar  v.  Beclamation  Dist. 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701 ;  Turpin  v.  Lemon,  187  U.  S.  51 ; 
Ee  Smith,  104  Iowa  199.  *' 

As'  each  of  the  original  states  developed  its  own  theory 
of  due  process  as  a  part  of  its  state  system,  including  of 
course  its  own  peculiar  proceedings  for  the  assessment 
and  collection  of  taxes,  long  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the 
existing  Federal  Constitution,  there  has  always  been  a 
disposition  to  consider  whether  a  given  proceeding  for 
the  assessment  and  collection  of  taxes  is  in  accordance 
with  the  due  process  doctrine  existing  in  that  state.  It 
was  therefore  said  in  Bell 's  Gap  E.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania, 
134  U.  S.  232 :  *  *  The  process  of  taxation  does  not  require 
the  same  kind  of  notice  as  is  required  in  a  suit  at  law,  or 
even  in  proceedings  for  taking  private  property  under 
the  power  of  eminent  domain.  It  involves  no  violation  of 
due  process  of  law  when  it  is  executed  according  to  cus- 
tomary forms  and  established  usages,  or  in  subordination 
to  the  principles  which  underlie  them ' ' ;  and  in  Turpin  v. 
Lemon,  187  U.  S.  57:  **and  it  would  appear  that  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  would  be  satisfied  by  show- 
ing that  the  usual  course  prescribed  by  the  state  laws 
required  notice  to  the  taxpayer  and  was  in  conformity 
with  natural  justice.'*  The  most  complete  definition, 
however,  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  notice  in  tax  proceedings 
is  that  given  by  the  court  in  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans, 
96  U.  S.  97, — a  case  in  which  the  plaintiff  in  error  resisted 
an  assessment  of  his  real  estate  in  the  City  of  New 
Orleans  for  draining  the  swamps  of  that  city.  The  Court 
said :  *  *  That  whenever  by  the  laws  of  a  state,  or  by  state 
authority,  a  tax,  assessment,  servitude,  or  other  burden 
is  imposed  upon  property  for  the  public  use,  whether  it 
be  of  the  whole  state  or  of  some  more  linuted  portion  of 
the  community,  and  those  laws  provide  for  a  mode  of  con- 
firming or  contesting  the  charge  thus  imposed,  in  the 


§159 


STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION 


ordinary  courts  of  jastice,  with  such  notice  to  the  person, 
or  such  proceeding  in  regard  to  the  property  as  is  appro- 
priate to  the  nature  of  the  case,  tiie  judgment  in  such 
proceedings  can  not  be  said  to  deprive  the  owner  of  his 
property  without  dae  process  of  law,  however  obnoxious 
it  may  be  to  other  objections."  In  the  Kentucky  Bail- 
road  Tax  Cases,  115  TJ.  S.  336,  the  Court— after  approv- 
ing the  rules  as  to  notice  laid  down  in  Davidson  v.  New 
Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  and  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  said,  in  special  reference  to  the  case 
last  named:  "In  that  case  the  statute  of  California, 
which  conferred  the  jurisdiction,  authorized  any  defense, 
going  either  to  the  validity  or  to  the  amount  of  the  tax 
assessed,  to  be  pleaded.  What  inquiries  may  be  per- 
mitted in  such  cases,  of  course,  is  a  matter  that  depends 
upon  the  particular  provisions  of  the  law  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion. In  the  absence  of  sach  provisions,  and  as  a  princi- 
ple of  general  jurisprudence,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  any 
defense  is  admissible  which  establishes  the  illegality  of 
the  proceeding,  resulting  in  the  alleged  assessment, 
whether  because  it  is  in  violation  of  the  local  law  which 
is  relied  on  as  conferring  the  authority  upon  which  it  is 
based  or  because  it  constitutes  a  denial  of  a  right  secured 
to  the  party  complaining,  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States." 

From  the  foregoing  authorities  it  clearly  appears  that 
when  in  proceedings  for  the  assessment  and  collection 
of  taxes  notice  is  necessary  at  all,  it  need  notj  as  a  general 
rule,  be  personal  notice.  And  yet  no  personal  judgment 
against  a  nonresident  owner  in  a  proceeding  strictly 
against  property  to  enforce  by  sale  a  lien  for  unpaid 
taxes  is  valid  unless  he  has  been  personally  served  with 
notice,  or  has  voluntarily  appeared.  In  Dewey  v.  Des 
Moines,  173  TJ.  S.  203,  the  Court  said:  "A  judgment 
without  personal  service  against  a  nonresident  is  only 
good  so  far  as  it  affects  the  property  which  is  taken  or 
brought  under  the  control  of  the  court  or  other  tribunal 
in  an  ordinary  action  to  enforce  a  personal  liability,  and 
Ihie  Proeess— 24 


!    i    .• 


370 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§159 


no  jurisdiction  is  thereby  acquired  over  the  person  of  a 
nonresident  further  than  respects  the  property  so  taken. 
•  .  .  The  jurisdiction  to  tax  exists  only  in  regard  to 
persons  and  property  or  npon  business  done  within  the 
state,  and  such  jurisdiction  can  not  be  enlarged  by  reason 
of  a  statute  which  assumed  to  make  a  nonresident  per- 
sonally liable  to  pay  a  tax  of  the  nature  of  the  one  in 
question.  .  .  .  The  power  to  tax  is,  however,  limited 
to  persons,  property  and  business  within  the  state,  and  it 
can  not  reach  the  person  of  a  nonresident.  Case  of  the 
State  Tax  on  Foreign-held  Bonds,  15  Wall.  300,  319.'' 
While  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  property  owner  should 
be  present  when  his  property  is  assessed,  he  must  at  some 
sta«e  of  the  proceeding's  be  given  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard  as  to  the  amount  of  the  tax,  before  some  kind  of  a 
board  of  equalization  or  review  constituted  for  that  pur- 
pose. McMillen  v.  Anderson,  95  U.  S.  88;  Spencer  v. 
Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345 ;  Pahner  v.  McMahon,  133  U.  S. 
669 ;  Paulsen  v.  Portland,  149  U.  S.  30 ;  Pittsburgh  E.  Co. 
V.  Board  of  Public  Works,  172  U.  S.  45 ;  Gallup  v.  Schmidt, 
183  U.  S.  301,  307 ;  Voigt  v.  Detroit,  184  U.  S.  115 ;  Hodge 
V.  Muscatine  County,  196  U.  S.  276. 

And  so  it  has  been  settled  that  an  importer  can  not 
demand  the  right  to  be  present  throughout  the  appraise- 
ment, when  the  collection  ot  duties  on  imported  mer- 
chandise is  in  question.  He  can  not  demand  the  right  to 
be  confronted  by  the  witnesses  or  to  cross-examine  them. 
Auffmordt  v.  Hedden,  137  U.  S.  310.  If  the  appraisers 
do  not  exceed  their  statutory  powers,  and  have  not  pro- 
ceeded contrary  to  law,  the  values  fixed  by  them,  in  the 
absence  of  fraud,  are  conclusive.  Passavant  v.  United 
States,  148  U.  S.  214;  Origet  v.  Hedden,  155  U.  S.  228. 
As  the  appraisers  are  qimsi  judicial  oflScers  their  ascer- 
tainment of  values,  through  summary,  constitute  due 
process  of  law.  In  Hilton  v.  Merrit,  110  U.  S.  97,  the 
Court  said :  *  *  Plaintiffs  in  error  contend  further,  that  a 
denial  of  the  right  to  bring  an  action  at  law  to  recover 
duties  paid  under  an  alleged  excessive  valuation  of  dutia- 


i  160  STATE  POWER  OP  TAXATION  371 

blc  merchandise  is  depriving  the  importer  of  his  property 
without  dae  process  of  law  and  is  therefore  forbidden  by 
the  Constitution  of  the  tTnited  States.  The  cases  of 
Murray's  Lessee  v.  Hoboken  L.  &  I.  Co.,  18  How.  272,  and 
Springer  v.  United  States,  102  XT.  S.  586,  are  conclusive 
on  this  point  against  the  plaintiffs  in  error."  See  also, 
Eamshaw  v.  United  States,  146  U.  S.  60 ;  Pasaavant  v. 
United  States,  148  U.  S.  214. 

§  160.  Sesidniiin.  of  taxing  power  renuUninj^  in  the 
state.  Early  in  this  chapter  the  observation  was  made 
that  every  state  legislature  is  endowed  with  all  the 
omnipotence  of  the  English  parliament  save  so  far  as 
that  omnipotence  is  restrained:  first,  by  the  limitations 
imposed  by  our  dual  system  of  Federal.  Government; 
second,  by  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  constitution  of 
the  state  itself.  An  attempt  was  then  made  to  indicate,  in 
a  somewhat  systematic  way,  just  what  those  limitations. 
Federal  and  state  really  are.  After  the  areas  covered  by 
such  limitations  have  been  deducted,  the  remainder  repre- 
sents the  residnum  of  taxing  power  still  vested  in  a  state 
legislature.  That  snch  residuum  is  very  large  no  one  can 
doubt  after  an  examination  of  the  notable  exposition  con- 
tained in  McCuUoch  v.  Maryland,  4  Wheat.  316,  in  which 
the  Court  speaking  through  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  said : 
"Whether  the  state  of  Maryland  may  without  violating 
the  constitution,  tax  that  branch!  That  the  power  of 
taxation  is  one  of  vital  importance;  that  it  is  retained  by 
the  states ;  that  it  is  not  abridged  by  the  grant  of  a  similar 
power  to  the  government  of  the  Union;  that  it  is  to  be 
concurrently  exercised  by  the  two  governments:  are 
truths  which  have  never  been  denied.  .  .  .  The  argu- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  state  of  Maryland  is  not  that  the 
states  may  directly  resist  the  law  of  Congress,  but  that 
they  may  exercise  their  acknowledged  powers  upon  it, 
and  the  constitution  leaves  them  this  right  in  confidence 
that  they  will  not  abuse  it  Before  we  proceed  to  exam- 
ine this  argument  and  to  subject  it  to  the  test  of  the  con- 


{    r 


372 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§160 


stitution,  we  must  be  permitted  to  bestow  a  few  considera- 
tions on  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  original  right  of 
taxation^  which  is  acknowledged  to  remain  in  the  states. 
It  is  admitted  that  the  power  of  taxing  the  people  and 
their  property  is  essential  to  the  very  existence  of  gov- 
ernment, and  may  be  legitimately  exercised  on  the  sub- 
jects to  which  it  is  applicable,  to  the  utmost  extent  to 
which  the  government  may  choose  to  carry  it.  The  only 
security  against  the  abuse  of  this  power  is  found  in  the 
structure  of  the  government  itself.  In  imposing  a  tax, 
the  legislature  acts  upon  its  constituents.  This  is  in 
general  a  sufficient  security  against  erroneous  and  oppres- 
sive taxation.  The  people  of  a  state,  therefore,  give  to 
their  government  a  right  of  taxing  themselves  and  their 
property  and  as  the  exigencies  of  government  can  not  be 
limited,  they  prescribe  no  limits  to  the  exercise  of  this 
right,  resting  confidently  on  the  interest  of  the  legislators 
and  on  the  influence  of  the  constituents  over  their  repre- 
sentatives, to  guard  them  against  its  abuse.  .  .  .  All 
subjects  over  which  the  sovereign  power  of  a  state 
extends,  are  objects  of  taxation ;  but  those  over  which  it 
does  not  extend,  are,  upon  the  soundest  principles,  exempt 
from  taxation.  This  proposition  may  almost  be  pro- 
nounced self-evident.  The  sovereignty  of  a  state  extends 
to  everything  which  exists  by  its  authority  or  is  intro- 
duced by  its  permission ;  but  does  it  extend  to  those  means 
which  are  employed  by  Congress  to  carry  into  execu- 
tion— ^powers  conferred  on  that  body  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States  t  ...  If  we  measure  the  power  of 
taxation  residing  in  a  state,  by  the  extent  of  sovereignty 
which  the  people  of  a  single  state  possess,  and  can  confer 
on  its  government,  we  have  an  intelligible  standard, 
applicable  to  every  case  to  which  the  power  may  be 
applied.  We  have  a  principle  which  leaves  the  power  of 
taxing  the  people  and  property  of  a  state  unimpaired; 
which  leaves  to  a  state  the  command  of  all  its  resources, 
and  which  places  beyond  its  reach,  all  those  powers  which 
are  conferred  by  the  people  of  the  United  States  on  the 


S160 


STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION 


373 


government  of  the  Union,  and  all  those  means  which  are 
given  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  those  powers  into 
execution." 

The  famous  and  luminous  dictiim  thus  pronoonced  by 
the  great  Chief  Justice  is  generally  cited  to  maintain  the 
proposition  that  a  state,  apart  from  constitutional  limita- 
tions, may  exercise  its  taxing  power  on  all  the  objects  to 
which  it  extends — persons,  property,  and  occupations — 
to  the  utmost  limit  to  which  it  may  choose  to  carry  it, — 
the  remedy  for  any  abuse  of  such  power  being  political 
not  judicial.  That  principle  is  a  part  of  the  English 
inheritance  equally  applicable  to  the  Federal  and  state 
governments.  Heine  v.  Levee  Commissioners,  19  WaU. 
655,  660;  State  Railroad  Tax  Cases,  92  U.  S.  575,  615; 
Palmer  v.  McMahon,  133  U.  S.  660,  669.  In  Meriwether 
v.  Garrett,  102  TJ.  S.  472,  the  Court  said :  "The  levying 
of  taxes  is  not  a  judicial  act.  It  has  no  elements  of  one. 
It  is  a  high  act  of  sovereignty  to  be  performed  only  by 
the  legislature  upon  considerations  of  policy,  necessity, 
and  the  public  welfare.  .  .  .  Having  the  sole  power 
to  authorize  the  tax,  it  (the  legislative  power)  must 
equally  possess  the  sole  power  to  prescribe  the  means  by 
which  the  tax  shall  be  collected,  and  to  designate  the 
oflScers  through  whom  its  will  shall  be  enforced."  And 
so  it  has  been  held  that  the  amount  of  the  tax  to  be  levied 
is  exclusively  within  the  discretion  of  the  legislature. 
Spencer  v.  Merchant,  123  XJ.  S.  355 ;  New  Orleans  v.  Dun- 
can, 2  La.  Ann.  186;  People  v.  Fitch,  148  N.  Y.  78.  An 
inseparable  incident  to  the  power  of  taxation  is  that  of 
apportionment.  In  People  v.  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  419,  it 
was  said :  ' '  The  power  of  taxing  and  the  power  of  appor- 
tioning taxation  are  identical  and  inseparable.  Taxes  can 
not  be  laid,  without  apportionment,  and  the  power  of 
apportionment  is  therefore  unlimited,  unless  it  be 
restraiaed  as  a  part  of  the  power  of  taxation."  A  state 
legislature  also  possesses  the  ri^ht  of  classification  and 
exemption.  It  may  not  only  classify  the  subjects  of  taxa- 
tion, but  it  may  also  determine  the  basis  of  assessment 


374 


DXJB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§160 


I 


and  the  manner  in  which  the  assessment  may  be  made, 
subject  only  to  the  limitation  that  all  property  or  persons 
within  a  given  class  shall  receive  like  treatment  In  the 
leading  case  of  Bell's  Gap  R.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  134 
U.  S.  232,  the  Court  said  that  a  state  "may  if  it  chooses 
exempt  certain  classes  of  property  from  any  taxation  at 
all,  such  as  churches,  libraries,  and  the  property  of  chari- 
table institutions..  It  may  impose  different  specific  taxes 
upon  different  trades  and  professions,  and  may  vary  the 
rates  of  excise  upon  various  products;  it  may  tax  real 
estate  and  personal  property  in  a  different  manner;  it 
may  tax  visible  property  only  and  not  tax  securities  for 
payment  of  money ;  it  may  allow  deductions  from  indebt- 
edness, or  not  allow  them.  .  .  .  We  think  that  we  are 
safe  in  saying  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not 
intended  to  compel  the  state  to  adopt  an  iron  rule  of 
equal  taxation.  If  that  were  its  proper  construction,  it 
would  not  only  supersede  all  those  constitutional  pro- 
visions and  laws  of  some  of  the  states,  whose  object  is  to 
secure  equality  of  taxation,  and  which  are  usually  accom- 
panied with  qualifications  deemed  material ;  but  it  would 
render  nugatory  those  discriminations  which  the  best 
interests  of  society  require. '^  See  also,  Minot  v.  Phila- 
delphia, W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  Wall.  206 ;  Tucker  v.  Fergu- 
son, 22  Wall.  527 ;  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tennessee, 
153  U.  S.  486. 

Apart  from  the  power  of  the  state  to  impose  general 
taxes  through  an  annual  levy,  it  can  impose  special  and 
local  assessments  determining  at  the  same  time  the  limits 
of  the  taxing  district  as  an  incident  necessarily  involved 
in  the  taxing  power.  Williams  v.  Eggleston,  170  U.  S. 
304.  Thus  in  providing  for  such  public  improvements  as 
involve  the  draining  or  irrigation  of  lands,  the  opening 
and  grading  of  streets,  and  the  laying  of  sewer-pipes,  the 
legislative  power  must  pass  not  only  upon  the  necessity 
of  the  improvements  and  the  method  by  which  the 
expense  must  be  defrayed,  but  upon  the  limits  of  the  area 
upon  which  the  burden  must  be  imposed,  and  the  appor- 


§160 


STATE  POWER  OF  TAXATION 


375 


tionment  of  sncb  burden  among-  the  several  parcels  lying 
within  such  area.  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  Dist.  No.  108, 
111  U.  S.  701;  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345;  Nor- 
wood V.  Baker,  172  U.  S.  269.  In  Banman  v.  Boss,  167 
V.  S.  548,  the  Court  said:  "The  legislature,  in  the  exer- 
dse  of  the  right  of  taxation,  has  the  authority  to  direct 
the  whole  or  such  part  as  it  may  prescribe,  of  the  expense 
of  a  public  improvement,  such  as  the  establishing,  the 
widening,  the  grading,  or  the  repair  of  a  street,  to  be 
assessed  npon  the  owners  of  lands  benefited  thereby. 
Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97;  .  .  .  The 
class  of  lands  to  be  assessed  for  the  purpose  may  be 
either  determined  by  the  legislature  itself,  by  defining  a 
territorial  district,  or  by  other  designation ;  or  it  may  be 
left  by  the  legislature  to  the  determination  of  commis- 
sioners, and  be  made  to  consist  of  such  lands,  and  such 
only,  as  the  commissioners  shall  decide  to  benefit. 
Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345,  and  Shoemaker  v. 
United  States,  147  U.  S.  282.  Fallbrook  Irrig.  Dist.  v. 
Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112.  ...  The  rule  of  apportion- 
ment among  the  parcels  of  ^and  benefited  also  rests 
within  the  discretion  of  the  legislature,  and  may  be 
directed  to  be  in  proportion  to  the  position,  the  frontage, 
the  area  or  the  market  value  of  the  lands,  or  in  propor- 
tion to  the  benefits  as  estimated  by  the  commissioners. 
Mattingly  v.  District  of  Columbia,  97  TJ.  S.  687. ' '  And  so 
the  legislature  may  by  direct  action  determine  absolutely 
the  necessity  for  the  improvement,  the  area  to  be  bene- 
fited by  it,  and  the  rate  of  apportionment;  or  it  may  dele- 
gate to  the  local  authorities  the  power  to  consider  and 
pass  upon  all  such  questions. 

Thus  it  appears  that  while  the  power  of  taxation,  which 
belongs  exclusively  to  the  legislature,  can  not  be  dele- 
gated by  it  either  to  other  departments  of  the  govern- 
ment or  to  private  corporations,  it  may  be  delegated  to 
those  instrumentalities  of  the  state  known  as  municipal 
corporations,  instituted  for  the  more  convenient  applica- 
tion of  state  power  to  local  concerns.   Rees  v.  Watertown, 


376  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  160 

19  Wall.  107;  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472; 
United  States  v.  New  Orleans,  98  TJ.  S.  381.  In  the  case 
last  cited  the  Court  said :  *  *  The  position  that  the  power 
of  taxation  belongs  exclusively  to  the  legislative  branch 
of  the  government,  no  one  will  controvert.  Under  our 
system  it  is  lodged  nowhere  else.  But  it  is  a  power  that 
may  be  delegated  by  the  legislature  to  municipal  corpora- 
tions, which  are  merely  instrumentalities  of  the  state  for 
the  better  administration  of  the  government  in  matters 
of  local  concern.  When  such  a  corporation  is  created,  the 
power  of  taxation  is  vested  in  it  as  an  essential  attribute, 
for  all  the  purposes  of  its  existence,  unless  its  exercise 
be  in  express  terms  prohibited.  *  ^  But  no  matter  whether 
a  state  legislature  exercises  its  taxing  power  absolutely 
and  directly,  or  indirectly  and  conditionally  through  a 
municipal  corporation,  it  does  so  subject  to  that  constitu- 
tional limitation  known  as  due  process  of  law,  which 
annuls  it  the  moment  it  attempts  to  pass  the  bounds  which 
its  principles  define.  Those  principles  antedate  all 
American  constitutions,  and  no  state  legislature  has  the 
power  to  change  them.  In  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans, 
96  U.  S.  97,  the  Court  said:  **But  when,  in  the  year  of 
grace  1866,  there  is  placed  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  a  declaration  that  *No  state  shall  deprive 
any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process 
of  law,*  can  a  state  make  anything  due  process  of  law 
which,  by  its  own  legislation,  it  chooses  to  declare  such  T 
To  affirm  this  is  to  hold  that  the  prohibition  to  the  states 
is  of  no  avail,  or  has  no  application  where  the  invasion  of 
private  rights  is  affected  under  the  forms  of  state  legisla- 
tion. ' '  In  Dorman  v.  State,  34  Ala.  216,  the  Court  said : 
*'If  life,  liberty,  and  property  could  be  taken  away  by  the 
direct  operation  of  a  statute,  the  enjoyment  of  these 
rights  would  depend  upon  the  wiU  and  caprice  of  the 
legislature,  and  the  provision  (of  the  constitution)  would 
be  a  mere  nullity.  ^ ' 


CHAPTEE  IX 

STATE  POWEB  OP  EMINENT  DOMAIN  AND  DUE  PBOCESS — ^FEDERAL 

BIGHT  OP  SUPEBVISION 

§161.  Review  heretofore  made  of  federal  power  of 
eminent  domain.  In  the  review  heretofore  made  of  the 
Federal  power  of  eminent  domain  an  effort  was  made  to 
explain;  first  the  origin  and  general  nature  of  that 
power ;  second,  the  fact  that  it  is  necessarily  vested  in  all 
states,  federal  as  well  as  single ;  third,  that  as  vested  in 
onr  Federal  Government  it  is  paramount  to  the  like  power 
vested  in  the  states ;  fourth,  that  such  paramount  power 
so  vested  can  only  be  asserted  subject  to  the  limitation 
embodied  in  the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fifth 
Amendment  amplified  and  emphasized  ad  it  is  by  the 
additional  provision:  **nor  shall  private  property  be 
taken  for  public  use,  without  just  compensation. '  *  With 
such  a  preface  clearly  in  view  it  will  be  easier  to  explain 
that  just  as  the  paramount  power  of  eminent  domain 
vested  in  our  Federal  Government  is  limited  by  the  due 
process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  so  the 
corresi)onding  power  vested  in  the  state  governments  is 
limited,  first,  by  the  appropriate  clauses  of  the  state  con- 
stitutions ;  second,  by  the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  Only  in  that  way  can  we  reach 
the  all  important  conclusion  that  the  Federal  Supreme 
Court,  in  enforcing  the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  is  limited  to  a  review  of  the  pro- 
ceedings had  in  the  state  courts  for  the  appropriation  of 
private  property  to  public  uses,  in  order  to  determine 
whether  such  state  proceedings  rested  upon  any  rule  of 
law  which  absolutely  disregarded  the  owner's  right  to 

377 


378 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§161 


just  compensation.    To  that  Federal  right  of  review  this 
chapter  will  be  specially  devoted. 


§162.  Power  of  eminent  domain  inherent  in  states. 

In  Kohl  V.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  367,  the  Court  said: 
^'No  one  doubts  the  existence  in  the  state  governments  of 
the  right  of  eminent  domain— a  right  distinct  from  and 
paramount  to  the  right  of  ultimate  ownership.  It  grows 
out  of  the  necessities  of  their  being,  not  out  of  the  tenure 
by  which  lands  are  held.  It  may  be  exercised,  though  the 
tends  are  not  held  by  grant  from  the  Government,  either 
mediately  or  immediately,  and  independent  of  the  con- 
sideration whether  they  would  escheat  to  the  Government 
in  case  of  failure  of  heirs.  The  right  is  the  offspring  of 
political  necessity ;  and  it  is  inseparable  from  sovereignty, 
unless  denied  to  it  by  its  fundamental  law.  Vatl.  ch.  20, 
34;  Bynk.,  lib.  2,  ch.  15;  Kent,  Com.  338-340;  Cooley, 
Const.  Lun.,  584,  et  seq/^  In  Searl  v.  School  District 
No.  2, 133  U.  S.  553,  the  Court  said:  '*The  Constitution 
of  the  state  of  Colorado  provides  *that  no  person  shall 
be  deprived  of  Ufe,  liberty  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law';  and  'that  private  property  shall  not  be 
taken  or  damaged,  for  public  or  private  use,  without  just 
compensation.  .  .  .'  The  circuit  court  was  not  dealing 
with  an  action  of  ejection  or  trespass,  but  simply  with  a 
proceeding  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain. 
That  right  is  the  offspring  of  political  necessity,  and  is 
inseparable  from  sovereignty  unless  denied  by  its  funda- 
mental  law.  It  can  not  be  exercised  except  upon  condi- 
tion that  just  compensation  shall  be  made  to  the  owner, 
and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  state,  in  the  conduct  of  the  inquest 
by  which  the  compensation  is  ascertained,  to  see  that  it  is 
just  not  merely  to  the  individual  whose  property  is  taken, 
but  to  the  public  which  is  to  pay  it.  Garrison  v.  New 
York,  21  Wall.  196,  204;  Kohl  v.  United  States,  91  U.  S. 
367,  371. '^  Approved  in  Chicago,  etc.,  E.  R.  v.  Chicago, 
166  U.  S.  238 ;  Bauman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  574;  Norwood  v. 
Baker,  172  U.  S.  277. 


§  163        STATE  POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN  379 

§  163.  Dnty  of  state  to  guarantee  protection  to  life, 
liberty  tmd  property  through  due  process.  An  attempt 
has  been  made  heretofore  to  explain  in  some  detail  the 
different  forms  in  which  chapter  39  of  the  Great  Charter, 
out  of  which  the  modem  doctrine  of  due  process  of  law 
has  arisen,  were  reproduced  in  the  constitutions  of  the 
original  states.  As  there  was  no  common  arbiter,  no 
common  standard  for  imitation,  apart  from  the  general 
principles  to  be  drawn  from  the  mother  country,  there 
were  naturally  wide  divergences  in  local  usage ;  wide  dif- 
ferences of  opinion  as  to  what  constituted  due  process  in 
a  given  case.  On  one  side  of  a  state  line  the  right  to  trial 
by  jury  in  a  certain  proceeding  might  exist,  while  on  the 
other,  it  might  be  denied  under  identical  circumstances. 
And  so  the  state  constitutions  bare  naturally  differed  in 
their  provisions  as  to  eminent  domain,  and  the  state 
courts  in  the  interpretations  put  upon  them.  While  the 
general  rule  prevails  that  the  determination  of  what  is  a 
public  use,  justifying  an  appropriation  of  private  prop- 
erty, is  purely  a  legislative  function,  in  certain  states 
there  are  constitutional  provisions  declaring  the  question 
to  be  purely  a  judicial  one  to  be  determined  "without 
regard  to  any  legirfative  assertion  that  the  use  is  public." 
Savannah  v.  Hancock,  91  Mo.  54 ;  Healy  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Morris,  33  Wash.  490;  McGehee,  Due  Process  of  Law, 
pp.  256,  261.  In  Massachusetts  it  has  recently  been  held 
that  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain  a  condemnation 
is  warranted  for  purposes  purely  aesthetic.  An  act  for- 
bidding the  erection  of  any  house  around  Copley  Square 
in  the  City  of  Boston  to  a  height  greater  than  ninety  feet, 
and  providing  for  compensation  to  all  persons  damages 
by  such  a  rule,  was  upheld  aa  a  valid  exercise  of  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  "for  the  benefit  of  the  public  who  use 
Copley  Square."  Atty.-Gen.  v.  Williams,  174  Mass.  476, 
affirmed  in  Williams  v.  Parker,  188  U.  S.  491.  As  elabo- 
rated  heretofore,  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  due  process  of  law  waa  secured  to  the  citi- 
zens of  the  several  states  by  their  institutions  alone;  and 


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380 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§163 


when  it  was  denied  them  the  Federal  Government  had 
no  power  to  interfere;  the  Federal  judiciary  possessed 
no  right  of  review  whatever. 

§  164.  Right  to  review  state  action  established  by  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  That  amendment  did  not  attempt 
to  disturb  the  primary  duty  of  the  states  to  provide  for 
the  protection  of  life,  liberty  and  property  through  the 
due  process  of  law  established  by  their  own  constitutions ; 
it  was  simply  intended  as  an  additional  guaranty  to  the 
freshly  created  national  citizen,  upon  which  he  could  rely 
for  due  process  from  the  Federal  Government,  in  the 
event  that  the  government  of  his  state  failed  him.  It  did 
not  propose  to  make  any  radical  change  in  the  ancient 
theory  of  the  relations  of  the  state  and  Federal  Govern- 
ment to  each  other  and  of  both  governments  to  the  people. 
Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36.  In  United  States  v. 
Cruikshank,  92  U.  S.  542,  the  Court  said:  **The  Four- 
teenth Amendment  prohibits  a  state  from  depriving  any 
person  pf  life,  liberty  or  property,  without  due  process  of 
law ;  but  this  adds  nothing  to  the  rights  of  one  citizen  as 
against  another.  It  simply  furnishes  an  additional  guar- 
anty against  any  encroachment  by  the  states  upon  the  fun- 
damental rights  which  belong  to  every  citizen  as  a  member 
of  society.  ^  ^  See  also.  In  re  Kemmler,  136  U.  S.  436 ;  Orr 
V.  Gihnan,  183  U.  S.  278,  286.  The  primary  function  of 
the  Federal  courts  imder  the  amendment  in  question  is  to 
determine  whether  the  state,  by  some  official  action,  has 
failed  in  the  duty  to  provide  due  process ;  if  so,  then  the 
proceedings  must  be  declared  void.  Thus,  in  every  such 
case,  the  sole  and  only  question  is  this :  Has  the  act  of 
the  state  violated  the  provision  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment or  a  valid  act  of  Congress  made  in  pursuance 
thereof. 


§  165.  Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago— Regard  must 
be  had  to  substance,  not  to  form.  In  that  case  (166  U.  S. 
226)  is  to  be  found  a  striking  illustration  of  the  appliea- 


S 165       STATE  POWER  OP  EMINENT  DOMAIN  381 

tion  of  the  supervisory  power  in  question,  invoked  to 
remedy  the  denial  of  due  process  by  a  state  in  a  proceed- 
ing involving  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  In  reaching 
the  conelusion  that  the  owner  of  private  property,  taken 
under  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  receives  just  com- 
pensation, although  a  nominal  sum,  if  it  be  awarded  to 
him  as  a  full  and  fair  equivalent  for  the  thing  taken  from 
him  for  the  public,  the  Court  said:  "It  is  therefore 
necessary  to  inquire  at  the  outset  whether  *due  process' 
requires  compensation  to  be  made  or  secured  to  the  owner 
of  private  property  taken  for  public  nse,  and  also  as  to 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  final  judgment  of  the 
highest  court  of  a  state  in  a  proceeding  instituted  to  con- 
demn such  property  for  public  use  may  be  reviewed  by 
this  court.  .  .  .  Nor  is  the  contention  that  the  rail- 
road company  has  been  deprived  of  its  property  without 
due  process  of  law  entirely  met  by  the  suggestion  that  it 
had  due  notice  of  the  proceedings  for  condemnation, 
appeared  in  court,  and  was  admitted  to  make  defense. 
It  is  true  that  this  Court  has  said  that  a  trial  in  a  court 
of  justice  according  to  the  modes  of  proceeding  applicable 
to  such  a  case,  secured  by  the  laws  operating  on  all  alike, 
and  not  subjecting  the  individual  to  the  arbitrary  exer- 
cise of  the  powers  of  government  unrestrained  by  the 
established  principles  of  private  right  and  distributive 
justice — the  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  subject- 
matter  and  of  the  parties,  and  the  defendant  having  full 
opportunity  to  be  heard — met  the  requirments  of  due 
process  of  law.  United  States  v.  Cruiksbank,  92  U.  S. 
542,  554 ;  Leeper  v.  Texas,  139  F.  S.  462, 468.  But  a  state 
may  not,  by  any  of  its  agencies,  disregard  the  prohibi- 
tions of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Its  judicial  authori- 
ties may  keep  within  the  letter  of  the  statute  prescribing 
forms  of  procedure  in  the  courts  and  give  the  parties 
interested  the  fullest  opportunity  to  be  heard,  and  yet  it 
might  be  that  its  final  action  would  be  inconsistent  with 
that  amendment.  In  determining  what  is  due  process  of 
law  regard  must  be  had  to  substance,  not  to  form.    This 


II 


382 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§165 


Court,  referring  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  has  said  : 
*  Can  a  state  make  anything  due  process  of  law  which,  by 
its  own  legislation,  it  chooses  to  declare  such!  To  aflSirm 
this  is  to  hold  that  the  prohibition  to  the  states  is  of  no 
avail,  or  has  no  application  where  the  invasion  of  private 
rights  is  affected  under  the  forms  of  legislation. '  David- 
son V.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97, 102.  The  same  question 
could  be  propounded,  and  the  same  answer  should  be 
made,  in  reference  to  judicial  proceedings  inconsistent 
with  the  requirement  of  due  process  of  law.  If  compen- 
sation for  private  property  taken  for  public  use  is  an 
essential  element  of  due  process  of  law  as  ordained  by 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  then  the  final  judgment  of  a 
state  court,  under  the  authority  of  which  the  property  is 
in  fact  taken,  is  to  be  deemed  the  act  of  the  state  within 
the  meaning  of  that  amendment. ' ' 

§  166.  Fallbrook  Irrigation  District  v.  Bradley— Heed 
to  be  given  to  decisions  of  state  courts  construing  state 
statutes  and  constitutions.  In  that  case  (164  U.  S.  112), 
while  the  theory  of  the  supervisory  power  in  question  is 
clearly  recognized,  there  is  at  the  same  time  a  strong 
disposition  manifested  to  find  in  such  precedure  as  the 
states  provide  the  elements  of  due  process  which  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  requires.  The  Court  said :  *  *  The 
decree  is  based  upon  the  sole  ground  that  the  act  (an 
irrigation  act  of  California)  violates  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution in  that  it  in  substance  authorizes  the  taking  of  the 
land  of  the  appellee  'without  due  process  of  law.'  .  .  . 
If  the  act  of  the  state  legislature  as  construed  by  its  high- 
est court  conflicts  with  the  Federal  Constitution  or  with 
any  valid  act  of  Congress,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  circuit 
court  and  of  this  court  to  so  decide,  and  to  thus  enforce 
the  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  The  follow- 
ing are  some  of  the  numerous  cases  in  which  this  princi- 
ple has  been  announced  and  carried  into  effect :  Shelby 
V.  Guy,  11  Wheat.  361;  Nesmith  v.  Sheldon,  7  How.  812; 
Van  Rensselaer  v.  Kearney,  11  How.  297;  Webster  v. 


S  166       STATE  POWER  OP  EMINENT  DOMAIN  383 

Cooper,  14  How.  488;  Leffingwell  v.  Warren,  2  Black  599; 
Hagar  v.  Keclamation  Dist.  No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  704  j 
Detroit  v.  Osborne,  135  IT.  S.  492.  We  shoald  not  be 
justified  in  holding  the  act  to  be  in  violation  of  the  state 
constitution  in  the  face  of  clear  and  repeated  decisions  of 
the  highest  court  of  the  state  to  the  contrary,  under  the 
pretest  that  we  were  deciding  principles  of  general 
constitutional  law.  If  the  act  violates  any  provision, 
expressed  or  properly  implied,  of  the  Federal  Constitu- 
•  tion,  it  is  our  duty  to  so  declare  it,  but  if  it  do  not,  there 
is  no  justification  for  the  Federal  courts  to  run  counter 
to  the  decisions  of  the  highest  state  courts  upon  questions 
involving  the  construction  of  state  statutes  or  constitu- 
tions, or  any  alleged  ground  that  such  decisions  are  in 
conflict  with  sound  principles  of  general  constitutional 
law.  The  contrary  has  not  been  held  in  this  court  by  the 
case  of  Citizens'  Sav.  L.  Ass'n  v.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655. 
It  is  claimed,  however,  that  the  citizen  is  deprived  of  his 
property  without  due  process  of  law,  if  it  be  taken  by  or 
under  state  authority  for  any  other  than  a  public  use, 
either  under  the  guise  of  taxation  or  by  the  assumption 
of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  In  that  way  the  question 
whether  private  property  has  been  taken  for  any  other 
than  a  public  use  becomes  material  in  this  court,  even 
where  the  taking  is  under  the  authority  of  the  state 
instead  of  the  Federal  G-overnment.  Is  this  assessment, 
for  the  nonpayment  of  which  the  land  of  the  pjaintiff  was 
to  be  sold,  levied  for  a  public  purpose  I  The  question  has, 
in  substance  been  answered  in  the  affirmative  by  the 
people  of  California,  and  by  the  legislative  and  judicial 
branches  of  the  state  government.  .  .  .  The  use  must 
be  regarded  as  a  public  use,  or  else  it  would  seem  to  follow 
that  no  general  scheme  of  irrigation  can  be  formed  or 
carried  into  effect."  Thus  while  admitting  that  the  ques- 
tion whether  private  property  has  been  taken  for  any 
other  than  a  public  use  is  a  Federal  question,  the  right 
to  decide  that  question  was  conceded  to  the  state 
authorities. 


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DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


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§167.  Henderson  Brid^re  Co.  v.  Hendenon— It  must 
clearly  appear  that  state  taxation  is  really  spoliation. 

In  that  case  (173  U.  S.  592),  involvmg  the  right  to  review 
the  judgment  of  the  highest  court  of  a  state  upon  the 
ground  that  it  denied  the  due  process  of  law  guarantied 
by  the  Federal  Constitution, — the  Court  said :  *  *  It  is  said 
that  the  bridge  property  outside  of  low-water  mark  on 
the  Kentucky  shore  is  so  far  beyond  the  reach  of  munici- 
pal protection  by  the  authorities  of  the  City  of  Hen- 
derson that  it  can  not  be  said  to  receive  any  benefits 
whatever  from  the  municipal  government,  and  that  to 
impose  taxes  for  the  benefit  of  the  city  upon  such  prop- 
erty is  a  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  with- 
out just  compensation,  and  therefore  inconsistent  with 
the  due  process  of  law  ordained  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
Chicago,  Burlington  &  Q.  B.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  166  U.  S. 
226,  241.  It  is  conceivable  that  taxation  may  be  of  such 
a  nature  and  so  burdensome  as  properly  to  be  character- 
ized a  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  without 
just  compensation.  But  in  order  to  bring  taxation 
imposed  by  a  state  or  under  its  authority  within  the  scope 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  National  Constitu- 
tion the  case  should  be  so  clearly  and  palpably  an  illegal 
encroachment  upon  private  rights  as  to  leave  no  doubt 
that  such  taxation  by  its  necessary  operation  is  really 
spoliation  under  the  guise  of  exerting  the  power  to  tax. 
As  an  act  of  Congress  should  not  be  declared  unconstitu- 
tional unless  its  repugnancy  to  the  supreme  law  of  the 
land  is  too  clear  to  admit  of  dispute,  so  a  local  regulation 
under  which  taxes  are  imposed  should  not  be  held  by  the 
courts  of  the  Union  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  National 
Constitution  unless  that  conclusion  be  unavoidable.  All 
doubt  as  to  the  validity  of  legislative  enactment  must  be 
resolved,  if  possible,  in  favor  of  the  binding  force  of  such 
enactments. ' '  See  "Wheeler  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  E. 
Co.,  178  U.  S.  321 ;  King  v.  Portland,  184  U.  S.  61. 


§  169       STATE  POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN  385 

§  168.  Hoolrar  v.  Lob  Angeles— Case  must  be  clearly 
stated  in  trial  court.  That  case  (188  XT.  S.  314),  empha- 
sizes the  necessity  for  stating  clearly  in  the  trial  court 
the  ease  which  the  party,  who  claims  that  his  property  has 
been  taken  without  just  compensation,  desires  to  present 
for  review  in  the  Federal  tribunals.  On  that  subject  the 
Court  said :  ' '  The  truth  is  there  is  nothing  in  this  record 
adequately  showing  that  the  state  courts  were  led  to  snp- 
poee  that  any  claim  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  was  made  by  plaintiffs  in  error,  or  that  any  ruling 
involved  a  decision  against  a  right  set  up  by  them  under 
that  instrument.  In  Sayward  v.  Denny,  158  U.  S.  180, 
after  stating  the  contention  of  plaintiff  in  error  that  the 
effect  of  the  judgment  of  the  state  court  was  'to  deprive 
him  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law,  or  to 
deny  him  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  and  amounted 
to  a  decision  adverse  to  the  right,  privilege,  or  immunity 
of  plaintiff  in  error  under  the  Constitution,  of  being  pro- 
tected from  such  deprivation  or  denial,'  we  said:  'But 
it  nowhere  affirmatively  appears  from  the  record  that 
snch  a  right  was  set  up  or  claimed  in  the  trial  court  when 
the  demurrer  to  the  complaint  was  overruled,  or  evidence 
admitted  or  excluded,  or  instructions  given  or  refused, 
or,  in  the  supreme  court  in  disposing  of  the  rulings  below. 
.  .  .  We  are  not  called  on  to  revise  these  views  of  the 
principles  of  general  law  considered  applicable  to  the  case 
in  hand.  It  is  enough  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  record 
to  indicate  that  the  state  courts  were  led  to  suppose  that 
plaintiff  in  error  claimed  protection  under  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  from  the  several  rulings,  or  sus- 
pect that  each  ruling  as  made  involved  a  decision  against 
a  right  specially  set  up  trader  that  instrument.'  " 


§  169.  Clark  v.  Nash — Respect  to  be  given  to  state  defi- 
nitions of  a  public  use.  In  that  ease  (198  U.  S.  361),  the 
Court  held  that,  under  the  peculiar  conditions  existing  in 
Utah,  an  individual  landowner  might  proceed  under  a 
state  statute  authorizing  a  condemnation  for  a  public  use 

Doe  Proeew— 8S 


386 


DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§169 


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of  a  right  of  way  across  his  neighbor's  land,  for  the 
enlargement  of  an  irrigation  ditch  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  in  that  way  water  from  a  stream,  in  which  he 
had  an  interest,  with  which  to  irrigate  land,  that  would 
otherwise  remain  valueless.  In  answer  to  a  vigorous  con- 
tention that  the  use  for  which  the  condemnation  was 
sought  was  not  a  public  use  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  the  Court  said:  *'This  Court 
has  stated  that  what  is  a  public  use  may  frequently  and 
largely  depend  upon  the  facts  surrounding  the  subject, 
and  we  have  said  that  the  people  of  a  state,  as  also  its 
courts,  must,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  more  familiar 
with  such  facts,  and  with  the  necessity  and  occasion  for 
the  irrigation  of  the  lands,  than  can  anyone  be  who  is  a 
stranger  to  the  soil  of  the  state,  and  that  such  knowledge 
and  familiarity  must  have  their  due  weight  with  the  state 
courts.  Fallbrook  Irrig.  District  v.  Bradley,  164  U.  S. 
112,  159.  It  is  true  that  in  the  Fallbrook  case  the  ques- 
tion was  whether  the  use  of  the  water  was  a  public  use 
when  a  corporation  sought  to  take  land  by  condemnation 
under  a  state  statute,  for  the  purpose  of  making  reser- 
voirs and  digging  ditches  to  supply  landowners  with  the 
water  the  company  proposed  to  obtain  and  save  for  such 
purpose.  This  Court  held  that  such  use  was  public.  The 
case  did  not  directly  involve  the  right  of  a  single  indi- 
vidual to  condemn  land  under  a  statute  providing  for  that 
condemnation. ' '  It  is  very  difficult  of  course  to  reconcile 
that  extreme  conclusion  reached  in  this  case,  simply 
because  peculiar  local  conditions  in  Utah  made  such  a 
rule  convenient,  with  the  theory  so  emphatically  stated  in 
Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  that  no  state  has 
the  right  to  **make  anything  due  process  of  law  which,  by 
its  own  legislation,  it  chooses  to  declare  such. ' ' 

§  170.  Hanigault  v.  Springs— When  flooding  does  not 
constitute  a  taking.  In  that  case  (199  IT.  S.  473),  it  was 
held  that  when  flooding  can  be  prevented  by  raising  the 
height  of  the  dikes  around  the  lands,  a  flooding  of  lands 


§  171        STATE  POWER  OP  EMINENT  DOMAIN 


387 


consequent  upon  the  private  erection  of  a  dam  under  a 
state  statute  enacted  in  the  exercise  of  the  police  power 
to  promote  the  drainage  of  lowlands  does  not  constitute 
a  taking  requiring  compensation  to  be  made  to  the  owner 
in  order  to  afford  the  due  process  of  law  guaranteed  by 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  In  support  of  that  conclu- 
sion the  Court  said :  *  *  The  damage  claimed  by  the  plain- 
tiff in  the  interruption  of  access  to  his  lands  and  the 
impairment  of  his  right  to  navigate  the  creek  does  not 
demand  separate  consideration.  We  Imve  repeatedly 
held  that  where  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has, 
for  the  purposes  of  improving  the  navigation  of  a  river, 
erected  piers  or  other  structures  by  which  access  to  plain- 
tiff ^s  land  is  rendered  more  difficult,  there  is  no  claim  for 
compensation.  Gibson  v.  United  States,  166  U.  S.  269; 
Scranton  v.  Wheeler,  179  U.  S.  141.  We  see  no  reason 
why  the  same  principle  should  not  apply  to  cases  where 
the  state  legislature,  exercising  its  police  power,  directs 
a  certain  dam  to  be  built,  and  thereby  incidentally  impairs 
access  to  lands  above  the  dam.  In  both  cases  the  sover- 
eign is  exercising  its  constitutional  right, — in  one  case  in 
improving  the  navigation  of  the  river,  and  in  the  other, 
in  draining  its  lowlands,  and  thereby  enhancing  the  value 
for  agricultural  purposes. '  ^ 


§  171.  Ohicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois— When  there 
is  no  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use.  In  that 
case  (200  U.  S.  561),  the  Court,  after  declaring  *Hhat  the 
failure  of  the  state  court  to  pass  on  the  Federal  right  or 
immunity  specially  set  up,  of  record,  is  not  conclusive,  but 
this  Court  will  decide  the  Federal  question  if  the  neces- 
sary effect  of  the  judgment  is  to  deny  a  Federal  right  or 
immunity  specially  set  up  or  claimed,  and  which,  if  recog- 
nized and  enforced,  would  require  a  judgment  different 
from  one  resting  upon  some  ground  of  local  or  general 
law," — ^held  that  there  was  no  taking  of  private  property 
for  public  use,  requiring  compensation  in  order  to  afford 
the  due  process  of  law  required  by  the  Fourteenth 


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DUB  PBOCBSS  OF  LAW 


§171 


Amendmenty  throngh  the  imposition  upon  a  railway  com- 
pany of  the  entire  cost  of  removing  and  rebuilding  a 
railway  bridge  and  culvert  rendered  necessary  by  the 
proposed  widening  and  deepening  of  the  channel  of  a 
creek  hy  commissioners  of  drainage  acting  under  the 
provisions  of  the  Illinois  farm  drainage  act  of  July  1, 
1885.  In  support  of  that  conclusion  the  Court  said :  *  *  We 
assume,  also,  without  discussion — as  from  the  decisions 
of  the  state  courts,  we  may  properly  assume — ^that  the 
draining  of  this  large  body  of  lands  so  as  to  make  them 
fit  for  human  habitation  and  cultivation  is  a  public  pur- 
pose, to  accomplish  which  the  state  may,  by  appropriate 
agencies,  exert  the  general  powers  it  possesses  foi"  the 
common  good.  By  the  removal  of  water  from  large  bodies 
of  land,  the  state  court  has  said,  and  by  ^the  subjection  of 
such  lands  to  cultivation,  they  are  made  to  bear  their 
proper  proportionate  burden  to  the  support  of  the  inhabi- 
tants and  the  commerce  of  the  state,  their  value  is  in- 
creased, and  thereby  their  contribution  in  taxes  to  the 
state  and  local  governments  is  increased/  [Chicago,  B. 
&Q.R.  Co.  V.  People],  212  111. 103, 119,  .  •  .  Indeed 
it  is  admitted  that  the  plan  of  the  commissioners  is  appro- 
priate and  the  best  that  can  be  devised  for  draining  the 
lands  in  question. ' '  In  a  very  vigorous  dissenting  opinion 
Mr.  Justice  Brewer,  after  characterizing  the  judgment  of 
the  court  *  *  a  grievous  wrong  to  owners  of  private  prop- 
erty, ' '  said :  *  *  Whenever  any  unjust  burden  is  cast  upon 
the  owner  of  private  property  which  can  not  be  supported 
under  the  power  of  eminent  domain  or  that  of  taxation, 
it  is  referred  to  the  police  power.  But  no  exercise  of  the 
police  power  can  disregard  the  constitutional  guaranties 
in  respect  to  the  taking  of  private  property,  due  process, 
and  equal  protection,  nor  should  it  override  the  demands 
of  natural  justice.  The  question  in  the  case  is  not  how  far 
the  state  may  go  in  compelling  a  railroad  company  to 
expend  money  in  increasing  its  facilities  for  transporta- 
tion, but  how  far  it  can  go  in  charging  upon  the  company 
the  cost  of  improving  farms  alon^  the  line  of  its  road.'' 


:i   '.    . ' 


II  ill 


§  172        STATE  POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN 


389 


See  Strickley  v.  Highland  Boy  Gold  Min,  Co.,  200  U.  S- 
527 ;  West  Chicago  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  201 U.  S.  506 ; 
Boston  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  Boston,  217  U.  S.  189. 


§  172.  Noble  State  Bank  v.  Haskell— Use  really  public, 
when  judged  by  the  ultimate  and  not  by  the  proximate 
effect.  In  that  case  (219  U.  S.  104,  575),  the  court  held 
(575)  that  a  state  statute  authorizing  the  levy  and  collec- 
tion of  an  assessment,  based  on  average  daily  deposits 
from  every  bank  existing  under  the  laws  of  the  state,  for 
the  purpose  of  creating  a  guaranty  fund  to  secure  to  de- 
positors the  full  payment  of  their  deposits,  in  the  event 
any  such  bank  should  become  insolvent,  did  not  deprive 
any  solvent  bank  of  its  life,  liberty  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  because  the  taking  was  for  a  public 
use,  although,  judged  from  the  proximate  effect  of  the 
taking,  the  use  seemed  to  be  a  private  one.  In  its  first 
opinion  (104)  the  Court  said:  **The  plaintiff  says  that 
it  is  solvent  and  does  not  want  the  help  of  the  guaranty 
fund,  and  that  it  can  not  be  called  upon  to  contribute 
toward  securing  or  paying  the  depositors  in  other  banks, 
consistently  with  article  1,  §  10,  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  .  .  . 
In  answering  that  question,  we  must  be  cautious  about 
pressing  the  broad  words  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
to  a  drily  logical  extreme.  Many  laws  which  it  would  be 
vain  to  ask  the  court  to  overthrow  could  be  shown,  easily 
enough,  to  transgress  a  scholastic  interpretation  of  one  or 
another  of  the  great  guaranties  in  the  Bill  of  Rights. 
They  more  or  less  limit  the  liberty  of  the  individual,  or 
they  diminish  property  to  a  certain  extent.  We  have  few 
scientifically  certain  criteria  of  legislation,  and  as  it  often 
is  difficult  to  mark  the  line  where  what  is  called  the  police 
power  of  the  states  is  limited  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  judges  should  be  slow  to  read  into  the  lat- 
ter a  nolumus  mutare  as  against  the  lawmaking  power. ' ' 
The  difficulty  in  understanding  what  that  statement  really 
means  may  be  relieved  somewhat  by  the  following  sup- 


390 


DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


8172 


plement  contamed  in  the  opinion  denying  a  rehearing: 
"We  fally  understand  the  practical  importance  of  the 
question,  and  the  very  powerful  argument  tiiat  can  he 
made  ftgainst  the  wisdom  of  the  le^slation,  but  on  that 
point  we  have  nothing  to  say,  as  it  is  not  our  concern. 
Clark  V.  Nash,  198  U.  S.  361;  Strickley  v.  Highland  Boy 
Gold  Min.  Co.,  200  U.  S.  527,  were  cited  to  establish,  not 
that  property  might  be  taken  for  a  private  use,  bat  that, 
among  the  public  uses  for  which  it  might  be  taken,  were 
some  which,  if  looked  at  only  in  their  immediate  aspect, 
according  to  the  proximate  effect  of  the  taking,  might 
seem  to  be  private.  This  case,  in  our  opinion,  is  of  that 
sort." 


§  173.  Ettor  V.  Tscoma— When  a  vested  ri^ht  is  pro- 
tected against  destruction  by  a  repeal  of  the  remedy.    In 

that  case  (228  U.  S.  148),  the  Court  held  that  there  is  a 
vested  right  of  property,  protected  by  the  due  process  of 
law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  from  destruc- 
tion by  a  repeal,  after  the  damage  is  done,  of  the  compen- 
satory provision  of  a  certain  law  of  the  State  of  Wash- 
ington, the  sole  legislative  authority  for  the  municipal 
action,  providing  for  abutting  owners  the  right  of  com- 
pensation for  consequential  damages  arising  from  an  orig- 
inal street  grading  under  mnnicipal  direction.  The  Court 
said:  "The  necessary  effect  of  the  repealing  act,  as  con- 
strued and  applied  by  the  court  below,  was  to  deprive  the 
plaintiff  in  error  of  any  remedy  to  enforce  the  fixed  liabil- 
ity of  the  city  to  make  compensation.  This  was  to  deprive 
the  plaintiffs  in  error  of  a  right  which  had  vested  before 
the  repealing  act, — a  right  which  was  in  every  sense  a 
property  right.  Nothing  remained  to  be  done  to  complete 
the  plaintiffs*  right  to  compensation  except  the  ascer- 
tainment of  the  amount  of  damage  to  their  property.  The 
right  of  the  plaintiffs  in  error  was  fixed  by  the  law  in 
force  when  their  property  was  damaged  for  public  pur- 
jwses,  and  the  right  so  vested  can  not  be  defeated  by  sub- 
sequent legislation.    El^n  v.  Eaton,  83  HI.  535 ;  Healy  v. 


S 175        STATE  POWEB  OP  EMINENT  DOMAIN  391 

New  Haven,  49  Coim.  394;  Harrington  v.  Berkshire,  22 
Pick.  263 ;  People  ex  rel.  Fountain  v.  Westchester  County, 
4  Barb.  64,  are  cases  arising  under  street  or  highway 
statutes." 


§  174.  McGovern  v.  New  Ym-k— There  must  be  some- 
thing more  than  an  ordinary  honest  mistake  of  law.  In 
that  case  {229  U.  S.  363)  the  court  held  that  where  made 
without  prejudice,  in  due  form,  and  after  a  full  and  fair 
hearing,  an  award  to  the  owner  of  one  of  the  many  parcels 
of  land  taken  by  eminent  domain  for  a  site  for  a  reservoir 
for  a  municipal  water  supply,  can  not  be  said  to  deny  due 
process  of  law,  because  the  courts  and  commissioners 
refused  to  take  into  consideration  the  value  of  the  land  as 
a  part  of  a  natural  reservoir  site.  The  Court  said: 
"When  property  is  taken  by  eminent  domain,  it  equally 
is  recognized  that  there  must  be  something  more  than  an 
ordinary  honest  mistake  of  law  in  the  proceedings  for 
compensation  before  a  party  can  make  out  that  the  state 
has  deprived  him  of  his  property  unconstitutionally.  A. 
Backus  Jr.  &  Sons  v.  Fort  Street  Union  Depot  Co.,  169 
U.  S.  557, 575, 576.  As  it  is  put  in  the  case  most  frequently 
cited  in  favor  of  the  right  to  a  writ  of  error,  *we  are  per- 
mitted only  to  inquire  whether  the  trial  court  prescribed 
any  rule  for  the  guidance  of  the  jury  that  was  in  absolute 
disregard  of  the  company's  right  to  juet  compensation.' 
And  again  the  final  judgment  of  a  state  court  'ought  not 
to  be  held  in  violation  of  the  due  process  of  law  enjoined 
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  unless  1^  the  the  rulings 
upon  questions  of  law  the  company  was  prevented  from 
obtaining  sabstantially  any  compensation.'  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  Chicago,  166  TJ.  S.  226,  246,  247;  Appleby 
V.  Buffalo,  221  U.  S.  524,  531,  532." 

§  175.  New  York  v.  Sage— The  mle  by  which  the  value 
of  property  should  be  measnred.  In  that  case  (239  TJ.  S. 
57)  the  Court  said:  "This  is  a  proceeding  for  the  taking 
of  land  for  the  Ashokan  reservoir,  similar  to  the  one  be- 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§175 


fore  ns  in  McGovern  v.  New  York,  229  U.  S.  363.  .  .  . 
No  doubt  when  this  class  of  questions  first  arose  it  was 
said  in  a  general  way  that  adaptability  to  the  purposes  for 
which  the  land  conid  be  need  most  profitably  was  to  be 
considered,  and  that  is  tme.  But  it  is  to  he  considered 
only  BO  far  as  the  public  would  have  considered  it  if  the 
land  had  been  offered  for  sale  in  the  absence  of  the  city's 
exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  The  fact  that 
the  most  profitable  use  could  be  made  only  in  connection 
with  other  land  is  not  conclnsive  against  its  being  taken 
into  account,  if  the  union  of  properties  necessary  is  so 
practicable  that  the  possibility  would  affect  the  market 
price.  But  what  the  owner  is  entitled  to  is  the  value  of  the 
property  taken,  and  that  means  what  it  fairly  may  be  be- 
lieved that  a  purchaser  in  fair  market  conditions  would 
be  given  for  it  in  fact, — not  what  a  tribunal  at  a  later  date 
may  think  a  purchaser  would  have  been  wise  to  ^ve,  nor  a 
proportion  of  the  advance  due  to  its  union  with  other 
lots." 


§  176.  Union  Lime  Co.  v.  Ohicajro  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.— No 
nnlawful  taking  even  when  the  extension  of  a  spur  track 
is  for  the  benefit  of  a  sing'le  indostry.  In  that  case  (233 
IT.  S.  211)  it  was  held  that  by  the  exercise  of  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  nnder  a  state  statute  condemning  the 
land  required  for  the  extension  of  a  spur  track  ordered 
by  the  state  railroad  commission  there  was  no  taking  of. 
private  property  for  a  private  nse,  forbidden  by  the  due 
process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  even 
when  such  extension  may  be  for  the  benefit  of  a  single 
industry,  burdened  with  the  initial  cost.  The  Court  said : 
"The  assignments  of  error  come  to  the  single  point, — 
as  to  the  character  of  the  use.  The  state,  through  its 
highest  court,  declares  the  use  to  be  a  public  one,  and  we 
should  accept  its  judgment  unless  it  is  clearly  without 
ground.  Fallbrook  Irrisr.  Dist.  v.  Bradley.  164  U.  S.  112, 
160 ;  Clark  v.  Nash,  198  V.  S.  361,  369 ;  Strickley  v.  High- 
land Boy  Gold  Min.  Co.,  200  U.  S.  527,  531 ;  Offield  v.  New' 


§177       STATE  POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN  393 

York,  N.  H.  &  H.  E.  Co.,  203  U.  S.  372,  377;  Haviston  v. 
DanviUe  &  W.  R.  Co.,  208  U.  S.  598,  607.  The  general 
authority  to  exercise  the  power  of  eminent  domain  for 
the  eonstniction  of  spnrs  is  found  in  1831  a,  Stat.  (Wis.). 
.  .  .  The  supreme  court  of  the  state  Bustained  the 
validity  of  this  provision  in  Chicago  &  N.  W.  E.  Co.  v. 
Morehoase,  112  Wis.  1,  holding  that  'the  fact  that  a  spilr 
track  may  run  to  a  single  industry  does  not  militate 
against  the  devotion  of  the  property  thereto  being  a  pub- 
lic use  thereof,  so  long  as  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the 
track  is  to  serve  all  persons  who  may  desire  it,  and  all 
can  demand,  as  a  right,  to  be  served  without  discrimina- 
tion.' "  See  also.  Grand  Trunk  E.  Co.  v.  Michigan  E. 
C(Hnmission,  231  U.  S.  457;  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  E.  Co. 
V.  Minneapolis,  232  TJ.  S.  430. 


§  177.  Brand  v.  Union  Elevated  R.  Co.— What  should 
be  excluded  In  a  proceeding  to  recover  for  a  decline  in 
market  value.  In  that  case  (238  U.  S.  586),  it  was  held 
that  where  the  only  proof  concerning  the  market  value  of 
the  property  before  or  immediately  after  the  road  was 
built  shows  that  no  change  in  such  value  occurred,  and 
there  was  no  proof  as  to  what  increase,  if  any,  resulted 
from  the  improvement,  the  property  rights  of  an  abuttmg 
proprietor  were  not  taken  without  compensation  contrary 
to  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
because,  in  a  proceeding  by  him  to  recover  for  the  decline 
in  market  value  resulting  from  the  erection  and  operation 
of  an  elevated  railway  in  the  street,  the  judge  at  the  trial 
directed  a  verdict  in  favor  of  the  railway  company,  in 
which  he  refused  to  submit  questions  of  damage  to  the 
jury  under  positive  instruction  to  exclude  from  the 
market  value  subsequent  to  the  construction  of  the  rail- 
way snch  increase,  if  any,  as  resulted  from  facilities  aris- 
ing out  of  the  improvement  itself .  The  Court  said :  "The 
suit  is  for  loss  of  market  value  consequent  upon  erection 
and  operation  of  the  elevated  road,  and  is  now  prosecuted 
upon  the  theory  that  the  trial  judge  erred  in  not  submit- 


^ 


DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§177 


ting  questions  of  damage  to  the  jury  under  positive 
instruction  to  exclude  from  market  value  subsequent  to 
the  construction  such  enhancement,  if  any,  as  resulted 
from  facilities  furnished  by  the  improvement  itself.  It 
was,  of  course,  necessary  for  the  court  to  determine 
whether  there  was  any  evidence  upon  which  such  loss  could 
be  found.  Rv  merely  viewing  the  property  in  1909  the 
jury  could  not  ascertain  its  market  value  either  before  or 
just  after  the  road  was  built,  and  the  only  testimony  relat- 
ing thereto  showed  no  change  occurred.  Neither  could 
the  jury  tell  without  evidence  what  enhancement,  if  any, 
resulted  from  the  improvement,  and  the  record  discloses 
none.  In  the  circumstances  we  think  the  refusal  to  give 
positive  direction  to  exclude  from  consideration  some- 
t}ung  impossible  of  ascertainment  was  dearly  right." 


CHAPTER  X 

STATE  POUCE  POWEB  AND  DUE  FB0CBS3 

§  ire.  English  origin  of  state  police  power.  In  draw- 
ing to  itself  the  right  to  initiate  and  control  legislation, 
the  English  parliament  stopped  short  of  complete  victory, 
— it  left  in  the  hands  of  the  King  in  council  an  undefined 
residuum  of  legislative  power  which  was  for  a  long  time 
exercised  in  the  making  and  revoking  of  a  class  of  tem- 
porary enactments  known  as  ordinances.  The  ordaining 
power  of  the  King  in  council  became  of  immense  impor- 
tance after  Edward  IV  and  Henry  VII  had  completed  the 
work  of  reorganizing  and  consolidating  the  powers  of  the 
monarchy.  Under  the  Tudor  system  the  council  hecame, 
as  in  the  Norman  and  early  Angevin  days,  the  body  from 
which  emanated  all  the  more  important  acts  of  govern- 
ment, whether  administrative,  legislative  (by  way  of  ordi- 
nance), fiscal,  or  political.  As  Mr.  Dicey  {The  Privy 
Council,  p.  50)  has  expressed  it:  "It  had  at  one  moment 
to  settle  questions  of  policy;  at  another  to  provide  funds, 
by  which  the  administration  could  be  carried  on ;  at  an- 
other to  review  minute  accounts,  to  communicate  with 
aliens  or  merchants,  or  to  interfere  for  the  preservation 
of  the  King's  peace."  The  source  of  the  strength  of  the 
Tudor  system  of  government  was  not  in  a  standing  army, 
but  in  the  moral  force  of  the  royal  authority,  which  exer- 
cised a  supervising  and  directing  power  over  every  branch 
of  the  administration  through  the  council,  whose  functions 
were  to  a  limited  extent  legislative  as  well  as  judicial  and 
political.  And  when  the  destiny  of  England  widened 
through  the  planting  of  colonies  in  the  New  "World  by 
adventurers  who  derived  their  right  to  the  soil  from 
charters  granted  by  the  crown  and  not  by  the  parlia- 


396 


DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 


§178 


ment,  the  council  was  called  upon  to  assume  still  another 
vitally  important  branch  of  administration.  The  govern- 
ing power  in  the  colony  was  usually  vested  in  a  local 
legislature,  limited  by  the  charter,  which  sat  as  a  subordi- 
nate body  subject  to  the  control  of  the  King  in  council,  to 
whom  all  matters  passed  in  the  last  resort.  In  the  home- 
land the  council  likewise  undertook  to  supervise,  and  to 
a  certain  extent  control,  every  branch  of  the  political 
administration,  from  parliament  itself  down  to  the  local 
self-governing  agencies.  But  chief  among  the  council 's 
functions  as  an  administrative  body  were  those  that 
related  to  the  finances,  the  regulation  of  commerce, 
including  the  intercourse  with  foreign  merchants,  the 
supervision  of  the  church  and  the  preservation  of  the 
peace.  And  finally  a  central  control  was  exercised  by  the 
privy  council  over  vaccination  and  the  prevention  of 
disease.  See  the  author's  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Eng. 
Const.,  i,  pp.  252,  546,  547 ;  ii,  pp.  565,  580,  585. 


§179.  The  typical  English  state  in  America.  When 
the  tie  of  political  dependence  that  bound  the  colonies  to 
the  mother  country  was  severed,  the  EngUsh  provinces  in 
America  rose  to  the  full  stature  of  sovereign  states. 
**When  the  Revolution  took  place  the  people  of  each 
state  became  themselves  sovereign''  (Martin  v.  The  Les- 
see of  Waddell,  16  Pet.  460) ;  and  so  soon  as  they  *Hook 
into  their  own  hands  the  powers  of  sovereignty,  the  pre- 
rogatives and  regalities  which  before  belonged  either  to 
the  crown  or  the  parliament,  became  immediately  and 
rightfully  vested  in  the  state"  (Ibid.,  p.  416).  Into  each 
of  the  state  legislatures  passed  the  entire  deposit  of 
purely  legislative  power  which  the  English  parliament 
had  won.  And  so  it  has  ever  been  an  elementary  prin- 
ciple of  American  constitutional  law  that  every  state 
legislature  is  endowed  by  its  very  nature  with  the  om- 
nipotence of  the  English  parliament,  save  so  far  as  that 
omnipotence  is  restrained  by  the  express  terms  of  con- 
stitutional limitations.    But  into  the  corporate  person  of 


§  180  STATE  POLICE  POWER  397 

the  typical  American -Btate  passed  alao  certain  "preroga- 
tives and  regalities" — not  clearly  defined — ^whieh  had 
never  been  vested  in  or  exercised  by  the  English  parlia- 
ment, to  wit,  the  high  state  functions,  whether  adminis- 
trative, legislative  (by  way  of  ordinance),  fiscal,  or 
political  which,  down  to  the  settlement  of  this  country, 
had  been  exercised  exclusively  by  the  King  in  council. 
Out  of  those  "prerogatives  and  regalities,"  once  vested 
in  the  King  in  council,  has  been  evolved,  through  judicial 
interpretation,  what  is  now  known  as  the  police  power  in 
the  "United  States.  The  exercise  of  that  power,  once  be- 
longing in  the  main  to  the  King  in  coundl,  is  now  vested 
in  the  state  legislatures  as  an  addition  or  supplement  to 
the  purely  legislative  powers  derived  hy  them  from  par- 
liament as  a  legislative  body;  and  is  subject  of  course,  to 
all  limitations  imposed  by  the  state  and  federal  consti- 
tutions. 

§  180.  The  police  power  as  defined  hj  American  jurists 
and  text  writers.  So  far  as  the  author  knows,  the  fore- 
going is  the  first  attempt  ever  made  to  indicate  histor- 
ically the  source  from  which  the  police  power,  as  now 
vested  in  the  typical  American  state,  was  derived.  In 
the  light  of  that  exposition,  it  wUl  be  far  easier  to  grasp 
the  meaning  of  the  definitions  which  attempt  to  state 
dogmatically  what  the  power  in  question  really  is.  In 
Thorpe  v.  Rutland  R.  E.,  27  Vt.  150,  Redfield,  C.  J.,  said: 
"This  police  power  of  the  state  extends  to  the  protection 
of  the  lives,  limbs,  health,  comfort  and  quiet  of  all  per- 
sons, and  the  protection  of  all  property  within  the  state. 
According  to  the  maxim,  sic  utere  tuo  at  alienum,  non 
laedas,  it  being  of  universal  application,  it  must  of  course 
be  within  the  range  of  legislative  action  to  define  the 
mode  and  manner  in  which  every  one  may  so  use  his  own 
as  not  to  injure  others." 

In  Com.  V.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53,  Shaw,  C.  J.,  defined  the 
police  power  as  "the  power  vested  in  the  legislature  by 
the  Constitution,  to  make,  ordain,  and  establish  all  man- 


I 

I 

i  398  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  180 

« 

ner  of  wholesome  and  reasonable  laws,  statutes,  and  ordi- 
nances, either  with  penalties  or  without,  not  repugnant  to 
the  Constitution,  as  they  shall  judge  to  be  for  the  good 
and  welfare  of  the  commonwealth  and  of  the  subjects  of 
the  same/'  In  describing  the  object  of  the  police  power 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  Barbier  v. 
Connolly,  113  U.  S.  31,  declared  it  to  be  **  to  prescribe 
regulations  to  promote  the  health,  peace,  morals,  educa- 
tion, and  good  order  of  the  people,  and  to  legislate  so  as 
to  increase  the  industries  of  the  state,  develop  its  re- 
sources, and  add  to  its  wealth  and  prosperity. ' '  In  Law- 
ton  V.  Steele,  152  U.  S.  133,  the  same  Court  said:  **It  is 
universally  conceded  to  include  everything  essential  to 
the  public  safety,  health,  and  morals,  and  to  justify  the 
destruction  or  abatement,  by  summary  proceedings,  of 
whatever  may  be  regarded  as  a  public  nuisance.  Under 
this  power  it  has  been  held  that  the  state  may  order  the 
destruction  of  a  house  falling  to  decay  or  otherwise  en- 
dangering the  lives  of  passersby;  the  demolition  of  such 
as  are  in  the  path  of  a  conflagration ;  the  slaughter  of  dis- 
eased cattle ;  the  destruction  of  decayed  or  unwholesome 
food;  the  prohibition  of  wooden  buildings  in  cities;  the 
regulation  of  railways  and  other  means  of  public  con- 
veyance, and  of  interments  in  burial  grounds ;  the  restric- 
tions of  objectionable  trades  to  certain  localities;  the 
compulsory  vaccination  of  children ;  the  confinement  of  the 
insane  or  those  afflicted  with  contagious  diseases;  the 
restraint  of  vagrants,  beggars,  and  habitual  drunkards ; 
the  suppression  of  obscene  publications  and  houses  of  ill 
fame ;  and  the  prohibition  of  gambling  houses  and  places 
where  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold.  Beyond  this,  how- 
ever, the  state  may  interfere  wherever  the  public  inter- 
ests demand  it,  and  in  this  particular  a  large  discretion 
is  necessarily  vested  in  the  legislature  to  determine,  not 
only  what  the  interests  of  the  public  require,  but  what 
measures  are  necessary  for  the  protection  of  such  inter- 
ests. ' '  Judge  Cooley  has  said :  *  *  The  police  of  a  state,  in 
a  comprehensive  sense,  embraces  its  whole  system  of 


§  180  STATE  POLICE  POWER  399 

internal  regulation,  hy  which  the  state  seeks  not  only  to 
preserve  the  pnblic  order  and  to  prevent  offenses  against 
the  state,  but  also  to  establish  for  the  interconrse  of 
citizens  with  citizens  those  rules  of  good  manners  and 
good  neighborhood  which  are  calculated  to  prevent  a  con- 
flict of  rights,  and  to  insure  to  each  the  nnintermpted 
enjoyment  of  his  own  so  far  as  is  reasonably  consistent 
with  a  like  enjoyment  of  rights  by  others.'*  Const  Lim. 
572.  When  in  the  License  Cases,  5  How.  504,  583,  Taney, 
C.  J.,  asked  the  question,  "What  are  the  police  powers 
of  a  state!"  he  answered:  "They  are  nothing  more  or 
less  than  the  powers  of  government  inherent  in  every 
sovereignty  to  the  extent  of  its  dominions.  And  whether 
a  state  passes  a  quarantine  law,  or  a  law  to  panish 
offenses,  or  to  establish  courts  of  justice,  or  requiring 
certain  instruments  to  be  recorded  to  regulate  commerce 
within  its  own  limits,  in  every  case  it  exercises  the  same 
power;  that  is  to  say,  the  power  of  sovereignty,  the  power 
to  govern  men  and  things  within  the  linuts  of  its  domin- 
ion." In  Manigault  v.  Springs,  199  U.  S.  478,  the  Court, 
in  recognizing  the  distinction  between  the  wider  and  nar- 
rower meaning  of  the  term  police  power,  said:  "It  only 
remains  to  consider,  in  connection  with  this  branch  of  the 
case,  whether  the  act  of  the  general  assembly  of  1903 
was  a  proper  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state. 
Of  this  we  have  no  doubt.  Although  it  was  not  an  exercise 
of  that  power  in  its  ordinarily  accepted  sense  of  protect- 
ing the  health,  lives,  and  morals  of  the  community,  it  is 
defensible  in  its  broader  meaning  of  providing  for  the 
general  welfare  of  the  people  by  the  reclamation  of 
swampy,  overflowed,  and  infertile  lands,  and  the  erection 
of  dams,  levees,  and  dikes  for  that  purpose."  In  Louis- 
vUIe  &  N.  E.  Co.  V.  Kentucky,  161  U.  S.  677,  it  was  held 
that  the  legislature  is  endowed  with  a  wide  discretion 
beyond  the  reach  of  judicial  inquiry,  if  it  is  exercised  bona 
fide  for  the  protection  of  the  public,  whenever  it  is  neces- 
sary for  it  to  deal  with  matters  contrary  to  public  policy 
or  inimical  to  the  public  interest. 


400 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§181 


! 


v§181.  Delegation  of  police  power  to  municipalities. 

As  such  corporations  are  mere  agencies  created  by  the 
state  for  the  purposes  of  local  government,  a  large  part  of 
its  police  power  is  usually  delegated  to  them,  subject  to 
such  limitations  as  are  contained  in  the  grants  by  which 
it  is  conferred.  It  is  thus  well  settled  that,  subject  to  con- 
stitutional limitations,  and  such  further  limitations  as  the 
legislature  may  impose,  a  municipality  may  enact  ordi- 
nances for  the  promotion  of  the  health,  comfort,  con- 
venience, good  order  and  general  welfare  of  its  citizens. 
In  Fischer  v.  St.  Louis,  194  U.  S.  370,  the  Court  said : 
*  *  The  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  its  municipali- 
ties to  regulate  and  suppress  all  such  places  or  occupa- 
tions as,  in  its  judgment,  are  likely  to  be  injurious  to  the 
health  of  its  inhabitants,  or  to  disturb  people  Uving  in  the 
inmaediate  neighborhood  by  loud  noises  or  offensive 
odors,  is  so  clearly  within  the  police  power  as  to  be  no 
longer  open  to  question.  Ee  Linhan,  72  Cal.  114 ;  Quincy 
V.  Kennard,  151  Mass.  563;  Love  v.  Recorder's  Court 
Judge,  128  Mich.  545. ' '  And  in  California  Reduction  Co. 
V.  Sanitary  Reduction  Works,  199  U.  S.  306,  it  was  held 
that  municipal  ordinances  were  not  wanting  in  the  due 
process  of  law  required  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
even  when  some  of  the  substances  destroyed,  possessing 
some  value,  were  taken  without  compensation  under  a 
system  that  required  all  garbage  and  other  refuse  matter 
to  be  delivered  at  a  crematory  or  reduction  plant,  there  to 
be  destroyed  at  the  expense  of  the  person  or  corporation 
conveying  the  same.  As  the  exercise  of  the  police  power 
does  not  involve  the  **  taking '*  of  property  as  such  as  in 
eminent  domain,  no  obligation  to  make  compensation  is 
imposed  when  its  loss  of  destruction  is  an  incidental  and 
necessary  consequence.  1  Dillon,  Munic.  Corp.,  4th  ed. 
141 ;  Ex  parte  Lacey,  108  Cal.  326 ;  State  v.  Campbell,  64 
N.  H.  402 ;  Health  Dept.  v.  Trinity  Church,  145  N.  Y.  32 ; 
Com.  V.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53 ;  Thorpe  v.  Rutland  R.  Co.,  27 
Vt.  140 ;  McGehee,  pp.  203,  303. 
In  devising  schemes  for  the  execution  of  the  police 


o\ 


§1 


STATE  POLICE  POWER 


power  the  legislature  may  east  upon  public  officials  func- 
tions purely  administrative  (Reagan  v.  Farmers'  Loan 
and  Trust  Co.,  154  U.  S.  362) ;  or  it  may  clothe  them  with 
functions,  judicial  or  quasi-judicial,  without  a  denial  of 
due  process,  provided  even  a  general  notice  and  hearing 
is  guaranteed  in  matters  of  fact  involving  private  right. 
In  Reetz  v.  Michigan,  188  U.  S.  509,  the  Court  said: 
"When  a  statute  fixes  the  time  and  the  place  of  meeting 
of  any  board  or  tribunal,  no  special  notice  to  parties  inter- 
ested is  required.  If  plaintiff  in  error  had  applied  at  any 
meeting  for  a  hearing  the  board  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  grant  it,  and  if  on  such  hearing  his  offer  or 
demand  for  testimony  had  been  refused,  the  question 
might  have  been  fairly  presented  to  the  state  courts  to 
what  extent  the  action  of  the  board  had  deprived  him  of 
his  rights." 


§  182.  Reasonableness  as  a  limitation  on  the  police 
power.  In  Tick  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356,  the  Court 
held  that  "Though  the  law  itself  be  fair  on  its  face  and 
impartial  in  appearance,  yet,  if  it  is  applied  and  adminis- 
tered by  public  authority  with  an  evil  eye  and  unequal 
hand,  so  as  practically  to  make  unjust  and  illegal  dis- 
criminations between  persons  in  similar  circumstances, 
material  to  their  rights,  the  denial  of  equal  justice  is  still 
within  the  prohibition  of  the  Constitution."  That  conclu- 
sion was  reached  after  the  court  had  declared  that  "The 
same  principle  has  been  more  freely  extended  to  the  quasi 
legislative  acts  of  inferior  municipal  bodies,  in  respect  to 
which  it  is  an  ancient  jurisdiction  of  judicial  tribunals  to 
pronounce  upon  the  reasonableness  and  consequent  valid- 
ity of  their  by-laws.  In  respect  to  these,  it  was  the 
doctrine  that  every  by-law  must  be  reasonable,  not  incon- 
sistent with  the  charter  of  the  corporation,  nor  with  any 
statute  of  Parliament,  nor  with  the  general  principles  of 
the  common  law  of  the  land,  particularly  those  having 
relation  to  the  liberty  of  the  subject  or  the  rights  of  pri- 
vate property."    See  also,  Powell  v.  Pennsylvania,  127 

Due  Proceaa — 26 


402 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


U.  S.  677 ;  Morgan  *s  Steamship  Co.  v.  Louisiana,  118  U.  S. 
455;  Holden  v.  Hardy,  16  U.  S.  366;  Lake  Shore,  etc., 
R.  Co.  V.  Ohio,  173  U.  S.  285;  L'Hote  v.  New  Orleans,  177 
U.  S.  587 ;  Jacobson  v.  Massachusetts,  197  U.  S.  469 ;  Cun- 
nius  V.  Reading  School  Dist.,  198  U.  S.  469;  Lochner  v. 
New  York,  198  U.  S.  53 ;  Muller  v.  Oregon,  208  U.  S.  416 ; 
New  York  ex  rel.  Silz  v.  Hesterberg,  211  U.  S.  31 ;  Welch 
V.  Swasey,  214  XT.  S.  91 ;  Waters-Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  Deselms, 
212  U.  S.  159 ;  Waters-Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas,  212  U.  S. 
86;  Ling  Su  Fan  v.  United  States,  218  U.  S.  302;  Laurel 
Hill  Cemetery  v.  San  Francisco,  216  U.  S.  358;  Kidd, 
Dater  &  Price  Co.  v.  Musselman  Grocer  Co.,  217  U.  S. 
461;  Shelvin-Carpenter  Co.  v.  Minnesota,  218  U.  S.  57; 
American  Land  Co.  v.  Zeiss,  219  U.  S.  47 ;  Noble  State 
Bank  v.  Haskell,  219  U.  S.  104;  Assaria  State  Bank  v. 
Dolley,  219  U.  S.  121;  Engel  v.  O^Malley,  219  U.  S.  128; 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Castle,  224  U.  S.  541 ;  Murphy  v. 
California,  225  U.  S.  623 ;  Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  South 
Dakota,  226  U.  S.  157 ;  Hutchinson  v.  Valdosta,  227  TJ.  S. 
303 ;  Adams  v.  Milwaukee,  228  U.  S.  572 ;  Schmiedinger  v. 
Chicago,  226  U.  S.  578 ;  Purity  Extract  &  T.  Co.  v.  Lynch, 
226  U.  S.  192;, Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Cram,  228  U.  S. 
70 ;  Barrett  v.  Indiana,  229  U.  S.  26 ;  Eubank  v.  Richmond, 
226  U.  S.  137 ;  Plymouth  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  232 
U.  S.  531 ;  German  Alliance  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  233  U.  S. 
389 ;  Coppage  v.  Kansas,  236  U.  S.  1.  From  the  foregoing 
cases  it  clearly  appears  that  as  reasonableness  is  primar- 
ily a  subject  for  the  determination  of  the  legislature,  the 
courts  will  not  set  the  legislative  judgment  as  to  reason- 
ableness aside  and  substitute  its  own  in  its  stead  except 
when  it  is  manifest  that  the  law  in  which  the  legislature 
has  embodied  its  will  is  arbitrary  or  enacted  in  bad  faith. 
Whether  the  application  of  a  police  regulation,  reasonable 
in  itself,  is,  under  the  circumstances  of  a  particular  case, 
reasonable  or  arbitrary,  is  a  question  of  fact,  which  can 
not  be  raised  for  the  first  time  in  the  appellate  court.  In 
Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Minnesota,  193  U.  S.  53, 
the  Court  said :  *  *  The  charge  is  that  the  property  of  plain- 


it 


m 


§  183  STATE  POLICE  POWER  403 

tiff  in  error  is  taken  withont  due  process  of  law;  bat 
whether  so  taken  is  made  to  depend  upon  a  question  of 
fact, — the  requirement  of  *  an  unnecessary  and  wh^y  use- 
less expenditure  of  money. '  It  is  well  established  that  on 
error  to  a  state  court  this  court  can  not  re-examine  the 
evidence,  and  when  the  facts  are  found  we  are  concluded 
by  such  finding.    Egan  v.  Hart,  165  U.  S.  188. ' ' 

§  183.  Tested  rights  as  a  limitation  on  police  power. 

Whenever  the  defense  of  dae  process  is  set  up  against  the 
exercise  of  the  state's  police  power  or  its  general  legis- 
lative power,  it  must  appear  that  the  state's  action  inter- 
fered with  the  private  right  of  some  individual  or 
corporation.  In  Pennie  v,  Reis,  132  U.  S.  464,  relief  was 
denied  because  a  police  officer  who  had  contributed  to  a 
fund,  a  certain  portion  of  which  should  on  the  death  of 
each  officer  be  paid  to  his  representatives,  had  no  vested 
right  in  such  fund,  prior  to  his  death.  The  Court  said : 
"Being  a  fund  raised  in  that  way,  it  was  entirely  at  the 
disposal  of  the  government,  until  by  the  happening  of  one 
of  the  events  stated — the  resignation,  dismissal  or  death 
of  the  oflScer — the  right  to  the  specific  sum  promised 
became  vested  in  the  officer  or  his  representative."  In 
New  Orleans  v.  New  Orleans  Water  Works  Co.,  142  IT.  S. 
79,  it  was  held  that  no  one  can  be  said  to  be  deprived  of 
his  property  without  due  process,  unless  it  appears  that 
such  person  has  a  property  in  the  particular  thing  of 
which  he  is  alleged  to  have  been  deprived.  In  the  words  of 
the  Court:  "The  only  property  of  which  it  was  deprived 
was  the  right  it  had  possessed  imder  the  Act  of  1877  of 
paying  for  its  water  supply  in  taxes;  but,  if  this  were 
property  at  all,  even  within  the  liberal  definition  of  that 
word  given  by  Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  in  Campbell  v.  Holt, 
115  U.  S.  620,  630,  it  waa  not  such  a  vested  right  as  was 
beyond  the  control  of  the  Legislature.  * '  See  also,  Morley 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  146  U.  S.  162 ;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
R.  Co.  V.  Nebraska,  170  U.  S.  57;  Gritts  v.  Fisher,  224 
U.  S.  640;  Choate  v.  Trapp,  242  F.  S.  665;  English  v. 


404 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§183 


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& 


yt 


t» 


t  :.ii  1 


ii  :i 


ft 


Richardson,  224  U.  S.  680 ;  Ettor  v.  Tacoma,  228  U.  S. 
148 ;  Rainey  v.  United  States,  232  U.  S.  310 ;  Willoughby 
V.  Ch5(J|go,  235  U.  S.  45. 

§  184.  The  right  of  forfeiture.  And  yet  even  when  the 
right  to  property  is  vested  the  legislature  may  decree  its 
confiscation  and  destmction  as  a  penalty  for  its  misuse  in 
certain  ways.  **It  may  be  stated  that  the  decisions  of  the 
courts,  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  have  very  gen- 
erally sustained  laws  for  the  prohibition  of  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liqnors  in  any  manner,  form  or  bulk  what- 
ever,  and  on  the  ground  that  the  trade  works  an  injury  to 
society,  and  may,  therefore,  be  prohibited.^'  Tiedeman's 
Limitations  of  Police  Power,  p.  304,  citing  Fisher  v. 
McGirr,  1  Gray  26,  in  which  the  court,  speaking  through 
Shaw,  C.  J.,  said  that  **the  property  of  which  injurious  or 
dangerous  use  is  made  shall  be  seized  and  confiscated,  be- 
cause either  it  is  so  unlawfully  used  by  the  owner  or  per- 
son having  the  power  of  disposal  or  by  some  person  with 
whom  he  has  placed  and  intrusted  it,  or  at  least  that  he  has 
so  carelessly  and  negligently  used  his  power  and  control 
over  it  that  by  his  default  it  has  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
those  who  have  made  and  intended  to  make  the  injurious 
or  dangerous  use  of  it,  of  which  the  public  have  a  right  to 
complain,  and  from  which  they  have  a  right  to  be  relieved. 
Therefore,  as  well  to  abate  the  nuisance  as  to  punish  the 
offending  or  careless  owner  the  proi>erty  may  be  justly 
declared  forfeited,  and  either  sold  for  the  public  benefit 
or  destroyed,  as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  may  require 
and  the  wisdom  of  the  legislature  direcf  As  to  the 
validity  of  legislation  providing  for  similar  forfeitures, 
see  Ridgeway  v.  West,  60  Ind.  371 ;  Hastings  v.  Hang,  85 
Mich.  87;  Com.  v.  Gaming  Implements,  119  Mass.  332; 
The  Alexander,  60  Fed.  R.  914;  McCandlish  v.  Com.,  76 
Va.  1002 ;  Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  623 ;  Kidd  v.  Pear- 
son,  128  U.  S.  1.  In  the  case  last  named  the  court  held 
that  a  law  of  Iowa  authorizing  the  abatement  as  a  nui- 
sance of  a  distillery  used  for  the  unlawful  manufacture 


ftbU  :<l 


§185 


STATE  POUCB  POWER 


405 


and  sale  of  mtozicating  liquors  did  not  conflict  with  the 
due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The 
principles  of  that  case  were  approved  in  Qeer  v.  Connec- 
ticut, 161  U.  S.  531,  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  police 
power  of  a  state  may  be  so  exercised  as  to  preserve  game 
birds  as  a  valuable  food  supply  for  its  people,  through  a 
prohibition  of  their  transportation  beyond  lie  state, 
despite  the  fact  that  interstate  commerce  may  be  indi- 
rectly and  remotely  affected  thereby. 

§  185.  LimitatioiLs  on  the  enjoyment  of  property.    The 

state,  while  protecting  the  public  safety,  health  or  morals, 
may  so  exercise  the  police  power  as  to  destroy  or  dimin- 
ish the  value  of  property  employed  in  a  particular  pur- 
suit, without  involving  snch  a  taking  for  the  public  use  as 
will  compel  compensation  to  the  owner  suffering  thereby, 
111  Boston  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  97  U.  S.  25,  the 
Conrt, — after  holding  that  the  charter  of  the  Boston  Beer 
Co.,  conferring  the  right  to  manufacture  malt  Uquors  in 
Boston,  did  not  constitute  a  contract,  the  obligation  of 
which  was  impaired  by  the  Prohibitory  Liquor  Law 
passed  in  1869, — said :  "We  do  not  mean  to  say  that  prop- 
erty actually  in  existence,  and  in  which  the  right  of  the 
owner  has  become  vested,  may  be  taken  for  the  public 
good  without  due  compensation.  But  we  infer  that  the 
liquor  in  this  case,  as  in  the  case  of  Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa, 
18  Wall.  129,  was  not  in  existence  when  the  liquor  law 
of  Massachusetts  was  passed.  Had  the  plaintiff  in  error 
relied  on  the  existence  of  the  property  prior  to  the  law,  it 
behooved  it  to  show  that  fact.  But  no  such  fact  is  shown, 
and  no  such  point  is  taken.  The  plaintiff  in  error  boldly 
takes  the  ground  that  being  a  corporation  it  has  a  right 
by  contract  to  manufacture  and  sell  beer  forever,  not- 
withstanding and  in  spite  of  any  exigencies  which  may 
occur  in  the  morals  or  the  health  of  the  community,  re- 
quiring snch  manufacture  to  cease.  We  do  not  so  under- 
stand the  rights  of  the  plaintiff.  The  Legislature  had  no 
power  to  confer  any  snch  rights."    Proceeding  on  the 


Ul 


406 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§185 


same  lines  the  court,  iii  Northwestern  Fertilizing  Co.  v. 
Hyde  Park,  97  U.  S.  659,  held  that  no  exemption  from 
the  police  power  resulted  from  a  charter  authorizing  the 
manufacture  of  animal  matter  into  a  fertilizer  in  a  certain 
selected  locality,  because  such  diarter  did  not  constitute 
a  contract  guaranteeing  such  an  exemption,  no  matter 
how  serious  the  nuisance  might  become  in  the  future  by 
reason  of  growth  or  population  in  such  locality.  In  Stone 
V.  Mississippi,  101  IT.  S.  814,  the  Court, — after  holding 
that  no  legislature  can  curtail  the  power  of  its  successors 
to  make  sucU  laws  as  they  may  deem  necessary  in  matters 
of  police, — said :  *  *  The  contrax^ts  which  the  Constitution 
protects  are  those  that  relate  to  property  rights,  not  gov- 
ernmental. It  is  not  always  easy  to  tell  on  which  side  of 
the  line  that  separates  governmental  from  property 
rights  a  particular  case  is  to  be  put ;  but  in  respect  to  lot- 
teries there  can  be  no  difficulty. '  *  In  Mugler  v.  Kansas, 
123  U.  S.  623,  it  was  held  that  there  was  no  conflict 
between  the  Prohibition  Law  of  Kansas  and  that  clause 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  which  provides  that  **No 
state  shall,  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  abridge 
the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States;  nor  shall  any  state  deprive  any  person  of  life, 
liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law;'*  that 
by  the  adoption  of  the  amendment  in  question  the 
states  did  not  intend  to  restrict  the  exercise  of  their  police 
powers  for  the  protection  of  the  health,  morals  or  safety 
of  the  community ,  that  a  prohibition  simply  upon  the  use 
of  property  declared  by  the  legislative  power  to  be  inju- 
rious to  the  health,  morals  or  safety  of  the  public, 
can  not  in  any  proper  sense  be  deemed  a  taking  of 
property  for  the  public  benefit;  that  when  any  illegal 
manufacture  or  traffic  is  injurious  to  such  interest,  the 
state  has  power  to  declare  any  place  employed  or  main- 
tained for  such  illegal  traffic  or  manufacture  a  common 
nuisance,  which  may  be  abated,  despite  the  incidentiil 
inconvenience  which  individuals  or  corporations  may 
suffer.    That  principle,  which  always  subordinates  the 


S186 


STATE  POLICE  POWER 


407 


rights  of  indlTidaais  in  bannful  materials  to  the  general 
welfare,  underlies  California  Eeduetion  Co.  v.  Sanitary 
Reduction  Works,  199  U.  S.  306,  in  which  it  was  held  that 
a  municipal  ordinance  requiring  garbage  to  be  delivered 
and  destroyed  at  a  designated  crematory  at  the  expense 
of  the  person  delivering  the  same  is  not  a  taking  of  pri- 
vate property  for  the  public  use  without  compensation, 
even  if  the  substances  so  destroyed  may  have  had  some 
elements  of  value;  and  Gardner  v.  Michigan,  199  U.  S. 
325,  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  due  process  of  law  clause 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  violated  by  an 
ordinance  ^ving  to  a  city  contractor  the  exclusive  right 
to  collect  and  dispose  of  garbage,  so  far  as  it  relates  tx) 
the  refuse  from  hotel  tables,  although  such  refuse  might 
be  valuable  as  food  for  swine,  and  for  other  purposes. 


§  186.  Property  or  bnitmess  clothed  with  a  public  inter- 
est. In  the  great  case  of  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113, 
in  which  it  was  held  that  when  private  property  is  devoted 
to  a  public  nse,  it  is  subject  to  public  regulation,  the  Court 
said:  "Property  does  become  clothed  with  a  public  inter- 
est when  used  in  a  manner  to  make  it  of  public  conse- 
quence, and  affect  the  community  at  large.  When,  there- 
fore, one  devotes  his  property  to  a  use  in  which  the  public 
has  an  interest,  he,  in  effect,  grants  to  the  public  an  inter- 
est in  that  nse,  and  must  submit  to  be  controlled  by  the 
public  for  the  common  good,  to  the  extent  of  the  interest 
he  has  thus  created.  He  may  withdraw  his  grant  by  dis- 
continuing the  use ;  but  so  long  as  he  maintains  the  use,  he 
must  submit  to  the  control.  Thus,  as  to  ferries.  Lord  Hale 
says,  in  his  treatise  De  Jure  Maris,  1  Harg.  L.  Tr.  6,  the 
Bang  has  'A  right  of  franchise  or  privilege,  that  no  man 
may  set  up  a  common  ferry  for  all  jmssengers,  without 
a  prescription  time  out  of  mind,  or  a  charter  from  the 
Bang,  .  .  .  because  it  doth  in  consequence  tend  to  a 
common  charge,  and  is  become  a  thing  of  public  interest 
and  use,  and  every  man  for  his  passage  pays  a  toll,  which 
is  a  common  charge,  and  every  ferry  ought  to  be  under  a 


408 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§186 


public  regulation/  .  .  .  And  again,  as  to  wharves 
and  wharfingers,  Lord  Hale,  in  his  treatise  De  Portibus 
Maris,  already  cited,  says:  *A  man,  for  his  own  private 
advantage,  may  in  a  port  or  town,  set  up  a  wharf  or 
crane,  and  may  take  what  rates  he  and  his  customers  can 
agree  for  cranage,  wharfage,  houselage,  pesage,  for  the 
doth  no  more  than  is  lawful  for  any  man  to  do,  viz. :  make 
the  most  of  his  own.  ...  If  the  King  or  subject  have 
a  public  wharf,  into  which  all  persons  that  come  to  that 
port  must  come  and  unlade  or  lade  their  goods  as  for 
the  purpose,  because  they  are  the  wharves  only  licensed 
by  the  Queen,  or  because  there  is  no  other  wharf  in  that 
port,  as  it  may  fall  out  where  a  port  is  newly  erected ;  in 
that  case  there  can  not  be  taken  arbitrary  and  excessive 
duties  for  cranage,  wharfage,  pesage,  etc.,  neither  can 
they  be  enhanced  to  an  immoderate  rate,  but  the  duties 
must  be  reasonable  and  moderate,  though  settled  by  the 
King's  license  or  charter.  For  now  the  wharfs  cmd  crane 
and  other  conveniences  are  affected  with  a  pvhlic  interest ^ 
and  they  cease  to  be  juris  privati  only ;  as  if  a  man  set  out 
a  street  in  new  building  on  his  own  land,  it  is  now  no 
longer  bare  private  interest,  but  is  affected  by  a  public 
interest.' '' 

Thus  it  appears  that  in  defining  the  scope  of  the  police 
power  over  *  *  property  affected  by  a  public  interest, ' '  as 
employed  by  ferrymen,  warfingers,  innkeepers,  ware- 
housemen, millers,  and  common  carriers,  the  court  based 
its  judgment  upon  medival  precedents  current  at  a  time 
when  the  police  power  of  the  state,  as  enforced  not  only 
by  the  King  in  parliament  but  by  the  King  in  council, 
covered  an  almost  indefinable  area,  embracing  the  regu- 
lation of  both  prices  and  wages.  (See  Freund,  Pol. 
Power,  374 ;  Cunningham,  Growth  of  English  Com.,  vol. 
II,  p.  232 ;  The  Power  of  the  State  to  Regulate  Prices  and 
Charges,  by  G.  A.  Finkelnburg,  32  Am.  L.  Rev.  502 ;  note 
to  Munn  Case,  16  Am.  Law  Reg.  N.  S.  539 ;  McGehee,  pp. 
315-316).  The  principle  of  a  virtual  monopoly  as  a  basis 
for  the  doctrine  in  question, — ^thus  stated  by  Mr.  Justice 


§186 


STATE  POLICE  POWER 


409 


Bradley  in  his  dissenting  opinion  in  Sinking  Fund  Cases, 
99  U.  S.  700,  747:  "When  an  emqloyment  or  business 
.  .  .  becomes  a  practical  monopoly,  to  which  the  citi- 
zen is  compelled  to  resort,  and  by  means  of  which  a  tribute 
can  be  exacted  from  the  community,  it  is  subject  to  regu- 
lation by  the  legislative  power, — '*  was  however  ap- 
parently abandoned  in  Brass  v.  Stoeser,  153  U.  S.  391, 
403,  and  later  cases.  By  the  Munn  case,  and  the  othor 
so-called  "granger  cases"  the  doctrine  was  firmly  settled 
that  although  the  warehouses  affected  are  used  by  those 
engaged  in  interstate  commerce  as  well  as  in  conmicrce 
within  the  state,  a  state  statute  fixing  the  maximum  of 
charges  for  the  storage  of  grain  is  not  unconstitutional  as 
a  regulation  of  commerce  (Hall  v.  De  Cuir,  95  U.  S.  487; 
Morgan's  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Board  of  Health,  118  U.  S.  467; 
Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  E.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  118  U.  S.  564) ;  Ihat 
a  statute  fixing  a  maximum  charge  for  the  storage  of 
grain  does  not  violate  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
granted  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  (Stone  v.  Farm- 
ers' Loan  and  T.  Co.,  116  U.  S.  335) ;  that  as  private 
property  devoted  to  a  public  use  is  subject  to  public 
regulation,  the  legislature  of  a  state  can,  under  the 
Federal  Constitution,  fix  maximum  rates  for  the  storage 
of  grain  in  warehouses  in  the  state ;  that  "for  protection 
against  abuses  by  legislatures  the  people  must  resort  to 
the  polls,  not  to  the  courts. ' '  (Munn  v.  IlUnois,  94  U.  S. 
113, 133, 134). 

In  German  Alliance  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  233  U.  S.  389,  the 
Court,  after  reviewing  Munn  V.  Illinois,  said:  "The  cases 
need  no  explanatory  or  fortifying  comment.  They  demon- 
strate that  a  business,  by  circumstances  and  its  nature, 
may  rise  from  private  to  be  a  public  concern,  and  be 
subject  in  consequence,  to  governmental  regulation.  And 
they  demonstrate,  to  apply  the  language  of  Judge  An- 
drews in  the  Budd  Case  (117  N.  Y.  27),  that  the  attempts 
made  to  place  the  right  of  public  regulation  in  the  cases 
in  which  it  has  been  exerted,  and  of  which  we  have  given 
example,  upon  the  ground  of  special  privileges  conferred 


410 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§186 


by  the  public  on  those  affected,  can  not  be  supported. 
*  The  underlyiu^  principle  is  that  business  of  certain  kinds 
hold  such  a  peculiar  relation  to  the  public  interest  that 
there  is  superinduced  upon  it  the  right  of  public  regula- 
tion. '  Is  the  business  of  insurance  within  the  principle  f 
It  would  be  a  bold  thing  to  say  that  principle  is  fixed, 
inelastic,  in  the  precedents  of  the  past,  and  can  not  be 
applied  though  modem  economic  conditions  may  make 
necessary  or  beneficial  its  application.  In  other  words, 
to  say  that  government  possessed  at  one  time  a  greater 
power  to  recognize  the  public  interest  in  a  business  and 
its  regulation  to  promote  the  general  welfare  than  gov- 
ernment possesses  to-day.  We  proceed,  then,  to  consider 
whether  the  business  of  insurance  is  within  the  prin- 
ciple.*^ The  outcome  was  the  conclusion  that  the  fire 
insurance  business  is  so  far  affected  with  a  public  interest 
as  to  justify  a  regulation  of  its  rates  by  the  legislature 
without  offense  to  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  despite  the  fact  that  no  public  trust 
is  imposed  upon  the  property,  and  that  the  pubUc  may 
not  have  a  legal  right  to  demand  and  receive  service. 


§  187.  Interstate  Commerce  act  and  the  common  law. 

The  principles  of  the  common  law  applicable  to  common 
carriers  regulated  the  railway  traffic  of  this  country  prior 
to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  Interstate  Com.  Com. 
V.  Baltimore  &  0.  E.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  263.  In  the  absence 
of  such  statutory  regulation  a  railroad  company  owes 
only  such  duties  to  the  public  or  to  individuals,  corpo- 
rations or  associations  as  the  common  law,  or  some  cus- 
tom having  the  force  of  law,  has  established.  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Denver  &  N.  0.  R.  Co.,  110  U.  S.  667. 
The  act  of  Congress  to  regulate  commerce  of  the  United 
States,  foreign  and  interstate,  created  a  commission 
which  is  a  body  corporate,  entitled  to  apply  to  the  judicial 
power  for  the  enforcement  of  its  orders.  Texas  &  P.  R. 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  162  U.  S.  197.  But  that  act 
leaves  common  carriers  free,  as  they  were  at  common  law, 


§188 


STATE  POLICE  POWER 


to  make  special  contracts  for  the  increase  of  tlieir  busi- 
ness, to  classify  their  traffic  and  to  apportion  their  rates 
BO  as  to  meet  the  necessities  of  commerce,  provided  they 
observe  the  prohibitions  that  their  charges  shall  not  be 
unreasonable  or  unjust,  and  that  they  shall  not  unjustly 
discriminate,  so  as  to  give  undue  preference  or  advan- 
tage to  persons  or  traffic  similarly  situated.  Cincinnati, 
N.  0.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  162  U.  S. 
184.  Provided  there  is  no  violation  of  the  limitation  that 
the  carriage  shall  not  be  required  without  reward  or 
upon  conditions  amounting  to  the  taking  of  property  for 
public  nse  without  just  compensation,  and  that  it  does 
not  amount  to  a  regulation  of  foreign  or  interstate  com- 
merce, a  state  legislature  has  the  power  to  prescribe  the 
rates  of  a  railroad  company  for  the  carriage  of  persons 
and  merchandise  within  its  limits,  in  the  absence  of  any 
provision  in  the  charter  of  the  company  constituting  a 
contract  vesting  in  it  absolute  control  over  such  traffic. 
Georgia  R.  &  Bkg.  Co.  v.  Smith,  128  U.  S.  174. 

§188.  Keasonableness  of  rates  and  the  delegation  of 
legislatiTe  power.  In  the  Railroad  Commission  Cases, 
116  TJ.  S.  307,  the  Court  said:  "This  power  to  regulate  is 
not  a  power  to  destroy,  and  limitation  is  not  the  eqoivar 
lent  of  confiscation.  Tinder  pretense  of  regulating  fares 
and  freights,  the  state  can  not  require  a  railroad  corpora- 
tion to  carry  persons  or  property  without  reward ;  neither 
can  it  do  that  which  in  law  amounts  to  a  taking  of  private 
property  for  public  use  without  just  compensation,  or 
without  due  process  of  law."  See  also,  Chicago,  M.  and 
St.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  418.  Merely  the 
power  to  fix  reasonable  charges,  leaving  the  state  free, 
within  the  limits  of  its  general  authority,  to  declare  what 
shall  be  deemed  reasonable,  is  conferred  by  a  grant  to  a 
railroad  company  of  the  power  "from  time  to  time  to  fix, 
regulate,  and  receive  the  tolls  and  charges"  to  be  received 
by  it  for  transportation.  Railroad  Com.  Cases,  116  U.  S. 
307.    The  courts  can  only  interfere  when  railroad  rates 


410 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§186 


by  the  public  on  those  affected,  can  not  be  supported. 
*  The  underlying  principle  is  that  business  of  certain  kinds 
hold  such  a  peculiar  relation  to  the  public  interest  that 
there  is  superinduced  upon  it  the  right  of  public  regula- 
tion. '  Is  the  business  of  insurance  within  the  principle  f 
It  would  be  a  bold  thing  to  say  that  principle  is  fixed, 
inelastic,  in  the  precedents  of  the  past,  and  can  not  be 
applied  though  modem  economic  conditions  may  make 
necessary  or  beneficial  its  application.  In  other  words, 
to  say  that  government  possessed  at  one  time  a  greater 
power  to  recognize  the  public  interest  in  a  business  and 
its  regulation  to  promote  the  general  welfare  than  gov- 
ernment possesses  to-day.  We  proceed,  then,  to  consider 
whether  the  business  of  insurance  is  within  the  prin- 
ciple.** The  outcome  was  the  conclusion  that  the  fire 
insurance  business  is  so  far  affected  with  a  public  interest 
as  to  justify  a  regulation  of  its  rates  by  the  legislature 
without  offense  to  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  despite  the  fact  that  no  public  trust 
is  imposed  upon  the  property,  and  that  the  public  may 
not  have  a  legal  right  to  demand  and  receive  service. 


§  187.  Interstate  Commerce  act  and  the  common  law. 

The  principles  of  the  common  law  applicable  to  common 
carriers  regulated  the  railway  traffic  of  this  country  prior 
to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  Interstate  Com.  Com. 
V.  Baltimore  &  0.  E.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  263.  In  the  absence 
of  such  statutory  regulation  a  railroad  company  owes 
only  such  duties  to  the  public  or  to  individuals,  corpo- 
rations or  associations  as  the  common  law,  or  some  cus- 
tom having  the  force  of  law,  has  established.  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  E.  Co.  V.  Denver  &  N.  0.  E.  Co.,  110  U.  S.  667. 
The  act  of  Congress  to  regulate  commerce  of  the  United 
States,  foreign  and  interstate,  created  a  commission 
which  is  a  body  corporate,  entitled  to  apply  to  the  judicial 
power  for  the  enforcement  of  its  orders.  Texas  &  P.  E. 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  162  U.  S.  197.  But  that  act 
leaves  common  carriers  free,  as  they  were  at  common  law, 


1 188  STATE  POLICE  POWER  ^j, 

to  make  special  contracts  for  the  increase  of  their  busi 
ness,  to  classify  their  traffic  and  to  apportion  their  rates 
so  as  to  meet  the  necessities  of  commerce  mo^riJ^  *i! 
observe  the  prohibitions  that  their  cha^Xhr^l  t 
nnreasonable  or  nnjnst,  and  that  they  shall  not  unjnstlv 
discrumnate,  so  as  to  give  nndue  preference  or  advln 

^  &  T  Tp  %    "^r  T^^'^^  «^*'^«*^-    Cine  wT 
N.  0.  &  T.  P.  E.  Co.  V.  Interstate  Com  Com    moiT^' 

184.  Provided  there  is  no  violation  ofThe'^SaU^^^^^^^ 
the  carnage  shall  not  be  reqnired  without  reward  «* 
upon  conditions  amounting  to  the  taking  of  vvoZr^f 
pubhc  use  without  iust  compensation,  and  thaHt^Hn 
not  amount  to  a  regulation  of  foreign  or  "nte^^^^^^^  1^' 
merce  a  state  legislature  has  the  Zer^pretrih^Z 
rates  of  a  railroad  company  for  tho  /.«    •    i'^^scriDe  the 
and  merchan^se  within  its  limitrf^  i     5®  ^^  Persons 
provision  in  the  charter  of  T  !'  *^^®°<^  ^^  anj 

contract  vesting  in  it  aW "Sf"^  constituting  a 
Georgia E.  & Bkg.  Co. v. Smift, ^ U.  rm"'^  *''^* 

§  188.  ReasonaUeneas  ot  mj. 

gislative  power.   In  the  Itaiir^S^,*^®  del^gatton  of 

7^  XT  a   onT  +l,«n L^  ..'^^llPoad  Conim;„„:-_   « 


■^warrtS 


I 

ll 

'J 

I 


without  due  process  of  law."  a. J^  '^^PensatL^  i 

St.  P.  B.  Co.  T.  Minnesota,  1^/?'  ^^T*  "^I 

power  to  fix  reasonable  cWo  i  ^:  ^^^-U^r^'  !?^ 

Lhin  the  limits  of  its  generaK'"^  theT?  ^ /^^ 

shall  be  deemed  reasonable,  ig  ^2"^,  to  de^w  ^?^' 

railroad  company  of  the  power  «'f,  ^  V  a  m  * 

regulate,  and  receive  the  toUs  and  C^<>  to  K„*J  '^ 

by  U  for  transportation.  KaUroad  >«%  W     •  ^ 

307.    The  courts  can  only  interfet^  Jj  Vs,  Ug*^^^ 


414  DUE  PKOCESS  OF  LAW  §  189 

arbitrarily  selected,  such  as  the  giving  to  purchasers  of 
one  thousand  mile  tickets  rights  denied  to  the  public 
generally.  Such  a  discrimination  constitntea  a  taking 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law.  Lake  Shore, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  V.  Smith,  173  XJ.  S.  684.  The  starting  point 
of  any  estimate  of  reasonable  rates  must  be  the  present 
value  of  the  property  employed  in  the  public  service,  and 
the  owner  is  deprived  of  his  property  without  just  com- 
pensation when  the  rate  imposed  fails  to  give  "a  fair 
return"  on  that  value.  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S.  466; 
San  Diego  Land  Co.  v.  National  City,  174  U.  S.  739; 
Colling  V.  Kansas  City  Stock  Yards  Co.,  183  U.  S.  79,  91. 
In  estimating  the  value  of  the  property  in  the  public 
service,  "the  original  cost  of  construction,  the  amount 
expended  in  permanent  improvements,  the  amount  and 
market  value  of  ita  bonds  and  stocks,  the  present  as 
compared  with  the  original  cost  of  construction,  the  prob- 
able earning  capacity  of  the  property  under  particular 
rates  prescribed  by  statute,  and  the  smn  required  to  meet 
operating  expenses,  are  all  matters  for  consideration,  and 
are  to  be  given  such  weight  as  may  be  just  and  right  in 
each  case."  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S.  466.  fThe  public 
are  not  however  to  be  oppressed  with  increased  rates 
necessary  to  meet  a  bond  issue  exceeding  a  fair  valua- 
tion, reckless  operating  expenses  or  a  fictitious  capital- 
ization. Reagan  v.  Farmers'  L.  &  F.,  etc,  Co.,  154  U.  S. 
362;  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  TT.  S.  466;  San  Diego  Land  Co. 
V.  National  City,  174  U.  S.  739.  And  yet  the  interest  of 
mortgage  bondholders  must  be  considered,  because  if  the 
interest  due  on  such  debts  can  not  be  paid  the  result  ordi- 
narily is  confiscation.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v,  Dey,  35 
Fed.  Rep.  866.  In  that  case  it  was  held  that  "when  the 
proposed  rates  will  give  some  compensation,  however 
small,  the  courts  have  no  power  to  interfere,"  a  rule  that 
has  yielded  to  the  more  mature  conclusion  that  reason- 
ableness is  always  an  equitable  question  under  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Board 
of  Railroad  Com'rs,  78  Fed.  Rep.  261.    In  Cotting  v. 


§  189  STATE  POLICE  POWER  415 

Kansas  City  Stock  Yards  Co.,  183  V.  S.  79,  the  Court 
said:  "It  has  not  been  held  affinnatiTely,  that  the  legis- 
lature may  enforce  rates  which  stop  only  tiiis  side  of 
confiscation  and  leave  the  property  in  tiie  hands  and 
under  the  care  of  the  owners  without  any  remuneration 
for  its  use."  A  railroad  company  can  not,  however, 
"claim  the  right  to  earn  a  net  profit  from  every  mUe, 
section,  or  other  part  into  which  the  road  might  be 
divided,  nor  attack  as  unjust  a  regulation  which  fixed  a 
rate  at  which  some  such  part  would  be  unremunerative." 
St  Louis,  etc,  E.  Co.  v.  Gill,  156  U.  S.  649.  When  there 
has  been  a  consolidation  of  several  pre-existing  lines,  the 
reasonableness  of  the  rate  fixed  for  the  new  entity  is  to 
be  determined  by  its  effect  on  its  entire  line,  and  not  by 
its  effect  on  any  one  road  belonging  to  the  original  enti- 
ties. In  measuring  the  rights  of  the  public  the  courts 
must  look  into  all  of  the  conditions  surrounding  the  actual 
value  of  the  property:  "There  may  have  been  extrava- 
gance and  needless  expenditure  of  money;  there  may  be 
waste  in  the  management  of  the  road ;  enormous  salaries ; 
unjust  discrimination  as  between  individual  shippers,  re- 
sulting in  general  loss.  The  construction  may  have  been 
at  a  time  when  material  and  labor  were  at  the  highest 
price,  so  that  the  actual  cost  far  exceeds  the  present 
value."  Reagan  v.  Farmers'  L.  &  T.,  etc.,  Co.,  154  IT.  S. 
362.  No  matter  whether  the  rates  be  established  by  the 
legislature  itself,  or  by  one  of  its  creations  in  the  form 
of  an  administrative  board,  "The  question  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  a  rate  or  charge  for  transportation  by  a  rail- 
road company,  involving  as  it  does  the  element  of 
reasonableness  both  as  regards  the  company  and  as 
regards  the  public,  is  eminently  a  question  for  judicial 
investigation,  requiring  due  process  of  law  for  its  deter- 
mination." Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Minnesota,  134  IT.  S. 
418.  In  Lonisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Kentncky,  183  U.  S.  503, 
a  ruling  requiring  the  same  rates  for  long  and  short  hanls 
was  sustained.  Where  the  business  is  one  the  state  might 
perform  and  the  owner  of  the  property  is  deliberately 


416  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  189 

performing  state  functions,  with  the  aid  of  state  fran- 
chises, "He  expresses  his  willingness  to  do  the  work  of 
the  state,  aware  that  the  state  in  the  discharge  of  its  pub- 
lic duties  is  not  guided  solely  by  a  question  of  profit.  It 
may  rightfully  determine  that  the  particular  service  is  of 
such  importance  to  the  public  that  it  may  be  conducted 
at  a  pecuniary  loss,  having  in  view  a  larger  general 
interest  At  any  rate,  it  does  not  perform  its  services 
with  the  single  idea  of  profit  Its  thought  is  the  general 
public  welfare."  Getting  v.  Kansas  City  Stock  Yards 
Co.,  183  U.  S.  79.  When  however  the  business  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  private  enterprise  and  becomes  subject  to 
governmental  control,  solely  because  it  is  affected  with 
a  public  interest,  the  rule  is  otherwise,  as  its  owner  is 
not  doing  the  work  of  the  state,  nor  can  he  appropriate 
its  powers.  Under  such  conditions  it  is  but  just  that  the 
owner  of  such  a  business  should  be  "subject  to  the  ordi- 
nary conditions  of  the  market  and  the  freedom  of  con- 
tract. He  can  force  no  one  to  sell  to  him,  he  can  not 
prescribe  the  price  he  shall  pay.  .  .  .  He  has  a  right 
to  do  business.  He  has  a  right  to  charge  for  each  separate 
service  that  wbicii  is  a  reasonable  compensation  there- 
for, and  the  legislature  may  not  deny  him  such  reason- 
able compensation ;  and  may  not  interfere  simply  because 
out  of  the  multitude  of  his  transactions,  the  amount  of 
his  profits  is  large."  Cotting  v.  Kansas  City  Stock  Yards 
Co.,  183  U.  S.  79. 

§  190.  fiecent  cases  on  the  subject  of  rates  and  dne 
process.  In  Peoria  Gas  &  Electric  Co.  v.  Peoria,  200 
U.  S.  48,  it  was  held  that  a  contract  to  fix  the  price  of 
gas  between  rival  gas  companies,  made  in  violation  of 
Illinois  antitrust  act  of  June  11, 1891,  did  not,  after  they 
had  ceased  to  act  under  it,  take  away  their  right  to  invoke 
the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment in  order  to  defeat  a  municipal  ordinance  having  the 
effect,  through  the  establishment  of  unremunerative 
rates,  of  taking  private  property  for  pablic  use  without 


5 190  STATE  POUCE  POWER  417 

compenBation.  In  Seaboard  A.  L.  Railway  v.  Florida, 
203  U.  S.  261,  it  was  held  that  due  process  of  law  was  not 
denied  to  a  railway  company  whose  transportation  of 
phosphates  constitutes  about  one-sixth  of  its  local  freight 
business,  by  an  order  of  a  state  railroad  commission  com- 
manding that  the  local  freight  rate  for  phosphates  should 
not  be  more  than  1  cent  per  ton  per  mile,  when  the  rate  so 
fixed  was  nearly  2  mills  per  ton  greater  than  the  average 
local  freight  rate  of  the  c<Knpany.  In  Ex  parte  Young, 
209  F.  S.  123,  it  was  held  that  as  the  act  of  a  state  legis- 
lature fixing  rates  for  the  transportation  of  either  freight 
or  passengers  is  deemed  prima  facie  valid,  the  burden 
of  proof  rests  on  the  carrier  who  undertakes  to  maintain 
the  contrary.  In  Railroad  Commission  v.  Cumberland 
Teleph.  and  Teleg.  Co.,  212  IT.  S.  414,  it  was  held  that  a 
telephone  company  seeking  to  enjoin,  as  unreasonable  and 
confiscatory,  the  enforcement  of  rates  fixed  by  a  state 
commission,  mast  assume  the  burden  of  proving  what 
part,  if  any,  of  the  depreciation  fund  accumulated  by  it 
from  receipts,  was  added  to  the  capital  upon  which 
dividends  are  to  be  paid.  In  Prentis  v.  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  Co.,  211  U.  S.  210,  it  was  held  that  although  the 
Virginia  State  Corporation  Commission  is,  for  some 
purposes,  a  court,  acting  only  after  hearing  and  inquiry, 
the  Establishment  by  it  of  railway  passenger  rates  is  not 
res  adjudicata  in  a  suit  seeking  injunctive  relief  on  the 
ground  that  such  rates  are  confiscatory,  because  proceed- 
ings to  establish  rates  are  in  their  very  nature  legislative 
and  not  judicial.  In  Northern  P.  K.  Co.  v.  North  Dakota, 
216  IT.  S.  579,  it  was  held  that  where  a  state  court  has 
enjoined  a  carrier  from  farther  violations  of  a  state  law 
fixing  rates  for  the  transportation  of  coal  within  the 
state,  against  the  contention  that  the  maximum  rates  so 
fixed  are  confiscatory,  the  Federal  Supreme  Court  will 
afifirm  the  judgment,  if  the  evidence  leaves  the  question 
of  reasonableness  in  doubt,  without  prejudice  however  to 
the  right  of  the  carrier  to  reopen  the  case,  if,  after  a 
further  trial,  it  believes  it  can  demonstrate  more  clearly 

Due  Vnam — 27 


418  DUE  PEOCBSS  OP  LAW  §  190 

the  fact  that  such  rates  are  confiscatory.  In  Simpson  v. 
Shepard,  230  TJ.  S.  352,  the  Court  said :  **  Are  the  state's 
acts  and  orders  confiscatory!  The  rate-making  power 
is  a  legislative  power  and  necessarily  implies  a  range  of 
legislative  discretion.  We  do  not  sit  as  a  board  of  revi- 
sion to  substitute  our  judgment  for  that  of  the  legislature, 
or  of  the  commission  lawfully  constituted  by  it,  as  to 
matters  within  the  province  of  either.  San  Diego  Land 
&  Town  Co.  V.  Jasper,  189  U.  S.  439,  446.  The  case  falls 
within  a  well  defined  category.  Here  we  have  a  general 
schedule  of  rates,  involving  the  profitableness  of  the  inter- 
state operations  of  the  carrier,  taken  as  a  whole,  and  the 
inquiry  is  whether  the  state  has  over-stepped  the  consti- 
tutional limit  by  making  the  rates  so  unreasonably  low 
that  the  carriers  are  deprived  of  their  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  and  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.''  It  was  held  that  an  interstate  carrier's  intra- 
state rate  may  not  be  fixed  so  low  by  the  state  that  its 
entire  revenue  from  all  sources,  interstate  and  intrastate, 
after  deducting  only  operating  expenses  and  taxes,  shall 
amount  to  only  about  4  per  cent  on  the  value  of  its 
property  within  the  state.  *  *  In  view  of  the  actual  results 
of  the  business  in  the  state,  and  the  clearly  established 
facts  with  respect  to  the  conditions  of  traffic  upon  this 
road,  the  conclusion  can  not  be  escaped  that  the  rates 
prescribed  by  the  acts  and  orders  of  Minnesota  would 
not  permit  a  fair  return  to  this  company."  United 
States  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  234  U.  S.  476, 
involved  the  correctness  of  a  decree  of  the  Commerce 
Court,  enjoining  the  enforcement  of  an  order  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  based  upon  the  long 
and  short  haul  clause  of  the  act  to  regulate  com- 
merce. After  construing  that  act  the  Supreme  Court 
held  that  the  Commerce  Court  had  erred;  that  the  due 
process  of  law  clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution  had 
not  been  violated  because  the  act  in  question,  as  con- 
strued by  said  commission,  does  not  authorize  the  arbi- 
trary destruction  of  the  rights  of  persons  or  communities. 


§  191  STATE  POLICE  POWER  419 

In  Northern  P.  E.  Co.  v.  North  Dakota,  236  V.  S.  585,  it 
was  held  that  a  state  law  was  confiscatory  and  due  process 
as  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  denied, 
where  the  maximum  intrastate  rates  fixed  for  the  trans- 
portation of  coal  in  carload  lots,  taking  into  account  the 
entire  traflSe  to  which  such  rates  are  applied,  compel 
the  carrier  to  transport  the  commodity  for  less  than  cost, 
or  without  substantial  compensation  in  addition  to  cost, 
even  when  the  return  to  the  carrier  from  its  entire  intra- 
state business  may  be  adequate.  In  Milwaakee  Elec.  B. 
and  L.  Co.  V.  Railroad  Com.,  238  XT.  S.  174,  it  was  held 
that  a  street  railway  company  was  not  deprived  of  its 
property  without  due  process  of  law  by  the  exercise  of  a 
state's  lawful  power  to  fix  street  railway  rates,  notwith- 
standing a  municipal  rate  ordinance,  called  a  "contract- 
ing ordinance."  See,  by  way  of  illustration,  O'Keefe  v. 
United  States,  240  U.  S.  294,  holding  that  where  Congress 
has  forbidden  them  from  considerations  affecting  the 
public  welfare,  a  trunk  line  railway  has  no  right  pro- 
tected by  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment 
to  build  up  its  business  by  paying  tap  line  railroads 
rebates  or  bonuses.  And  also  United  States  v.  Mer- 
chants &  M.  Traffic  Asso.,  242  U.  S.  178. 

§  191.  Police  power  to  promote  public  convenience.    In 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  200  U.  S.  561,  a  case 
involving  the  police  power  and  due  process,  it  was  held 
that  a  state's  police  power  embraces  regulations  framed 
to  promote  the  public  convenience  or  the  general  pros- 
perity, as  well  as  those  designed  to  promote  the  public 
health,  the  public  morals,  or  the  public  safety.  In  the 
case  in  question  the  Court  said:  "The  learned  counsel 
for  the  railway  company  seem  to  think  that  the  adjudica- 
tions relating  to  the  police  power  of  the  state  to  protect 
the  public  health,  the  public  morals,  and  the  public  safety 
are  not  applicable,  in  principle,  to  eases  where  the  police 
power  is  exerted  for  the  general  well-being  of  the  com- 
munity apart  from  any  question  of  the  pablic  health,  the 


DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


1191 


public  morals,  or  the  public  safety.  Hence,  he  presses  the 
thought  that  the  petition  in  this  case  does  not  in  words 
suggest  that  the  drainage  in  question  h&s  anything  to  do 
with  the  health  of  the  drainage  district,  but  only  avers  that 
the  system  of  drainage  adopted  by  the  commissioners  will 
reclaim  the  lands  of  the  district  and  make  them  tillable 
or  fit  for  cultivation.  We  can  not  assent  to  the  view  es- 
pressed  by  counseL  We  hold  that  the  police  power  of  a 
state  embraces  regulations  designed  to  promote  the  pub- 
lic convenience  or  the  general  prosperity,  as  well  as 
regulations  designed  to  promote  the  public  health,  the 
public  morals,  or  the  public  safety.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
E.  Co.  V.  Ohio,  173  U.  S.  285,  292 ;  Gihnan  v.  Philadelphia, 
3  Wall.  713,  729;  Pound  v.  Turck,  95  IT.  S.  459,  464;  Han- 
nibal &  St.  J.  E.  Co.  V.  Husen,  95  TT.  S.  470."  See  to  the 
same  offeet,  Bacon  v.  Walker,  204  U.  S.  311,  governing 
Bown  V.  Walling,  204  V.  S.  320. 

§  192.  Felice  power  and  the  exclusion  of  snicide  as  a 
defense  on  policies  of  life  insurance.  In  Whitfield  v. 
Aetna  L.  Ins.  Co.,  205  U.  S.  489,  it  was  held  that,  unless 
suicide  was  contemplated  at  the  time  application  was 
made  for  the  policy,  the  exclusion  of  suidde  as  a  defense 
in  suits  on  policies  of  life  insurance,  effected  by  the  Mo. 
Rev.  Stat,  of  1879,  is  a  legitimate  exercise  of  police  power 
bythestnte.  In  that  case  the  Court  said :  "That  the  stat- 
ute is  a  legitimate  exercise  of  police  power  by  the  state 
can  not  be  successfully  disputed.  An  insurance  company 
is  not  bound  to  make  a  contract  which  is  attended  by  the 
results  indicated  by  the  statute  in  question.  If  it  does 
business  at  all  in  the  state,  it  must  do  so  subject  to  such 
valid  regulations  as  the  state  may  choose  to  adopt.  Even 
if  the  statute  in  question  could  be  fairly  regarded  by  the 
court  as  inconsistent  with  public  policy  or  some  morality, 
it  can  not,  for  that  reason  alone,  be  disregarded;  for  it  is 
the  province  of  the  state,  by  its  legislature,  to  adopt  such 
policy  as  it  deems  best,  provided  it  does  not,  in  so  doing, 
come  into  conflict  with  the  Constitution  of  the  state  or 


STATE  POLICE  POWER 


■421 


the  Constitntion  of  the  "CTnited  States."  It  is  hardly  nec- 
essary to  add  that  if  the  exercise  of  this  high  and  ques- 
tionable state  function  can  not  be  justified  as  an  asser- 
tion of  the  police  power,  the  sappresaion  of  the  right  to 
make  a  particular  defense  in  a  court  of  justice  is  mani- 
festly a  denial  of  due  process  of  law. 

§  193.  Due  process  not  infringed  by  limitation  on  hours 
of  labor  of  women.  In  MuUer  v.  Oregon,  208  U.  S.  412, 
it  was  held  that  the  limitation  of  the  hours  of  labor  of 
women  employed  in  lamidries  to  ten  hours  daily,  made 
by  the  Oregon  Laws  of  1903,  does  not  infringe  the  due 
process  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  The 
Court  said :  ' '  We  held  in  Lochner  v.  New  York,  198  U.  S. 
45,  that  a  law  providing  that  no  laborer  shall  be  required 
or  permitted  to  work  in  bakeries  more  than  sixty  hours  in 
a  week  or  ten  hours  in  a  day  was  not,  as  to  men,  a  legiti- 
mate exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state,  but  an 
unreasonable,  unnecessary,  and  arbitrary  interference 
with  the  right  and  liberty  of  the  individual  to  contract  in 
relation  to  his  labor,  and  as  such  was  in  conflict  with,  and 
void  under  the  Federal  Constitution.  That  decision  is 
invoked  by  plaintiff  in  error  as  decisive  of  the  question 
before  us.  But  this  assumes  that  the  differences  between 
the  sexes  does  not  justify  a  different  rule  respecting  a 
restriction  of  the  hours  of  labor.  .  .  .  The  two  sexes 
differ  in  structure  of  body,  in  the  functions  to  be  per- 
formed by  each,  in  the  amount  of  physical  strength,  in  the 
capacity  for  long  continued  labor,  particularly  when  done 
standing,  the  influence  of  vigorous  health  upon  the  future 
well  being  of  the  race,  the  self-reliance  which  enables  one 
to  assert  full  rights,  and  in  the  capacity  to  maintain  the 
struggle  for  existence.  This  difference  justifies  a  differ- 
ence in  legislation,  and  upholds  that  which  is  designed  to 
compensate  for  some  of  the  burdens  which  rest  upon 
her." 


§  194.  Due  process  not  denied  by  the  prevention  of  the 
diversion  of  waters.    In  Hudson  County  Water  Co.  v. 


422  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  194 

MeCarter,  209  17.  S.  349,  it  was  held  that  a  law  of  New 
Jer&ej  preventing  a  riparian  owner  from  diverting  the 
waters  of  a  stream  of  that  state  into  any  other  state, 
for  use  therein,  does  not  conflict  either  with  the  due 
process  of  law  or  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  guar- 
anteed by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The  Court  said: 
"It  sometimes  is  difficult  to  fix  the  boundary  stones 
between  the  private  right  of  property  and  the  police 
power  when,  as  in  the  case  at  bar,  we  know  of  few  deci- 
sions that  are  much  in  point.  But  it  is  recognized  that 
the  state,  as  quasi-sovereign  and  representative  of  the 
interests  of  the  public,  has  a  standing  in  court  to  protect 
the  atmosphere,  the  water,  and  the  forests  within  its 
territory,  irrespective  of  the  assent  or  dissent  of  the 
private  owners  of  the  land  most  immediately  concerned. 
Kansas  v.  Colorado,  185  tl.  S.  125,  141,  142;  Georgia  v. 
Tennessee  Copper  Co.,  206  IT.  S.  230,  238.  What  it  may 
protect  by  suit  in  this  court  from  interference  in  the 
name  of  property  outside  of  the  state's  jurisdiction,  one 
would  think  that  it  could  protect  by  statute  from  inter- 
ference in  the  same  name  within.  On  this  principle  of 
public  interest  and  police  power,  and  not  merely  as  the 
inheritor  of  a  royal  prerogative,  the  state  may  make 
laws  for  the  preservation  of  game,  which  seems  a  stronger 
case.    Greer  v.  Connecticut,  161  TJ.  S.  519,  534." 

§  195.  Dne  process  and  the  prohibition  of  ezportJation 

of  Philippine  coin.  In  Ling  Su  Fan  v.  United  States,  218 
U.  S.  302,  it  was  held  that  the  prohibition  against  the 
exportation  of  Philippine  silver  coin  from  the  Philippine 
Islands  under  penalty  of  forfeiture  and  fine  or  imprison- 
ment, did  not  deprive  the  owner  of  such  coin  of  due 
process  of  law.  The  Court  said :  * '  Conceding  the  title  of 
the  owner  of  such  coins,  yet  there  is  attached  to  such 
ownership  those  limitations  which  public  policy  may  re- 
quire by  reason  of  their  quality  as  a  legal  tender  and  as 
a  medium  of  exchange.  .  .  .  However  unwise  a  law 
may  be,  aimed  at  the  exportation  of  such  coins,  in  the  face 


S196 


STATE  POLICE  POWEB 


of  the  axioms  against  obstmcting  the  free  flow  of  com- 
merce, there  can  be  no  serious  donbt  but  that  the  power  to 
coin  money  iuclndes  the  power  to  prevent  its  outflow  from 
the  coontry  of  its  origin.  To  jnstify  the  exercise  of  such  a 
power  it  is  only  necessary  that  it  shall  appear  that  the 
means  are  reasonably  adapted  to  conserve  the  general 
public  interest,  and  are  not  an  arbitrary  interference  with 
private  rights  of  contract  or  property.  The  law  here 
in  question  is  plainly  within  the  limits  of  the  police  power, 
and  not  an  arbitrary  or  unreasonable  interference  with 
private  rights." 

§  196.  Forbiddinj:  burial  within  city  limits.    In  Laurel 

Hill  Cemetery  v.  San  Francisco,  216  U.  S.  358,  it  was 
held  that  an  ordinance  forbidding  the  burial  of  the  dead 
in  a  burial  ground  situated  within  the  limits  of  the  city 
and  county  of  San  Francisco  did  not  deprive  the  owner 
of  such  burial  gronnd  of  its  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  The  Court  said :  "The  only  question  that  needs 
to  be  answered,  if  not  the  only  one  before  us,  is  whether 
the  plaintiff's  property  is  taken  contrary  to  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  In  considering  it,  the  allegation  as 
to  the  large  tracts  available  for  burying  purposes  may 
be  laid  on  one  side.  The  plaintiff  has  no  grievance  with 
regard  to  them.  The  Winnebago,  205  U.  S.  354,  360. 
Moreover,  it  is  said  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  state  that 
burial  within  the  San  Francisco  city  or  county  limits 
already  was  forbidden  by  statute,  except  in  existing 
cemeteries  or  such  as  might  be  established  by  the  board 
of  supervisors.  The  board  of  supervisors  passed  the 
ordinance  now  complained  of;  so  that,  as  pointed  out  by 
the  court,  the  ordinance  in  effect  merely  prohibited 
burials  in  existing  cemeteries.  .  .  .  the  extent  to 
which  le^lation  may  modify  and  restrict  the  uses  of 
property  consistently  with  the  Constitution  is  not  a  ques- 
tion for  pure  abstract  theory  alone.  Tradition  and  the 
habits  of  the  coromnnity  count  for  more  than  logic.  Since, 
as  before  the  making  of  constitutions,  regulations  of 


424 


DUE  PROCESS  OP,  LAW 


§196 


li 


burial  and  prohibition  of  it  in  certain  spots,  especially  in 
crowded  cities,  have  been  f  amilier  to  the  Western  world. 
This  is  shown  sufficiently  by  the  cases  cited  by  the  court 
below ;  e.  g.,  Coates  v.  New  York,  7  Cow.  585 ;  Kincaid  's 
Appeal,  66  Pa.  411 ;  Sohier  v.  Trinity  Church,  109  Mass. 
1,  21 ;  Carpenter  v.  Yeadon,  86  C.  C.  A.  122, 158  Fed.  766. 
The  plaintiff  must  wait  until  there  is  a  change  of  prac- 
tice, or  at  least  established  consensus  of  civilized  opinion, 
before  it  can  expect  this  court  to  overthrow  the  rules  that 
the  lawmakers  and  the  court  of  his  own  state  uphold. '  ^ 

§  197.  Due  process  not  denied  by  Michigan  Sajles-in- 
Bulk  act.  In  Kidd,  Dater  &  Price  Co.  v.  Musselman 
Grocer  Co.,  217  U.  S.  457,  it  was  held  that  a  valid  exercise 
of  the  police  power,  not  in  conflict  with  either  the  due 
process  or  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  clauses  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  was  embodied  in  the  act  in  ques- 
tion (1905)  which  avoided,  as  against  creditors,  sales  in 
bulk  otherwise  than  in  the  regular  course  of  business, 
unless  an  inventory  was  made  at  least  five  days  before  the 
sale,  the  purchaser  receiving  a  list  of  the  seller's  creditors 
and  notifying  them  of  the  proposed  sale  personally,  or  by 
registered  mail,  at  least  five  days  before  its  completion, 
a  purchaser  not  complying  with  the  statute  being  made 
a  receiver  for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors  of  the  seller. 
The  Court  said :  * '  Substantially  the  same  arguments  are 
urged  as  were  presented  in  Lemieux  v.  Young,  211  U.  S. 
489,  decided  after  this  writ  of  error  was  sued  out.  .  .  . 
The  requirement  of  the  Michigan  law,  that  a  full  and 
detailed  inventory  shall  be  made  does  not  seem  to  us  to 
be  oppressive  and  arbitrary,  as,  in  bone  fide  purchases  of 
stocks  of  goods  in  bulk,  a  careful  purchaser  is  solicitous 
to  demand  such  an  inventory,  and  in  the  purchase  in 
question  an  inventory  was  in  fact  made.  Nor  can  we  say, 
in  view  of  the  ruling  in  the  Lemieux  Case,  to  the  effect 
that  a  state  may,  without  violating  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  require  that  creditors  be  constructively 
notified  of  the  proposed  sale  of  a  stock  of  goods  in  bulk, 


STATE  POUCE  POWER 


425 


that  a  requirement  for  what  is  in  effect  actnal  notice  to 
each  creditor  is  so  QDreasonable  as  to  be  a  mere  arbitrary 
exertion  of  power,  beyond  the  aQthority  of  the  legislature 
to  exert." 


§  198.  Creation  of  depositors'  guaranty  fund  valid 
exerdse  of  police  power.  In  Noble  State  Bank  v.  Haskell, 
219  tJ.  S.  104:,  it  was  held  that  a  valid  exercise  of  the 
police  power,  not  depriving  a  solvent  bank  of  its  liberty 
or  property  without  due  process  of  law,  was  embodied  in 
a  state  statute  authorizing  the  levy  and  collection  from 
every  bank  existing  under  the  laws  of  the  state  of  an 
■assessment  based  upon  average  daily  deposits,  for  the 
purpose  of  creating  a  depositors'  guaranty  fund  to  secure 
the  full  payment  of  deposits  in  the  event  such  bank 
becomes  insolvent.  The  Court  said:  "The  only  contract 
that  it  (the  bank)  relies  on  is  its  charter.  That  is  subject 
to  alteration  or  repeal,  as  nsual,  so  that  the  obligation 
hardly  could  be  said  to  be  impaired  by  the  act  of  1907 
before  us,  unless  that  statute  deprives  the  plaintiff  of 
liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law.  See 
Sherman  v.  Smith,  1  Black  587.  Whether  it  does  so  or 
not  is  the  only  question  in  the  case.  In  answering  that 
question,  we  must  be  cautious  about  pressing  the  broad 
words  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  a  drily  logical 
extreme.  Many  laws  which  it  would  be  vain  to  ask  the 
court  to  overthrow  could  be  shown,  easily  enough,  to 
transgnress  a  scholastic  interpretation  of  one  or  another 
of  the  great  guaranties  in  the  Bill  of  Rights.  They  more 
or  less  limit  the  liberty  of  the  individual,  or  they  dimin- 
ish property  to  a  certain  extent.  "We  have  few  scien- 
tifically certain  criteria  of  legislation,  and  as  it  often  is 
difficult  to  mark  the  time  where  what  is  called  the  police 
power  of  the  states  is  limited  by  the  Constitution  of  tiie 
United  States,  judges  should  be  slow  to  read  into  the 
latter  a  nolumus  mutare  as  against  the  lawmaking  power. 
...  In  short,  when  the  Oklahoma  legislature  declares 
by  implication  that  free  banking  is  a  public  danger,  and 


426 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§198 


1 


:i 


that  incorporation,  inspection,  and  the  above  described 
co-operation  are  necessary  safeguards,  this  court  cer- 
tainly can  not  say  it  is  wrong. ' '  In  denying  an  applica- 
tion for  rehearing  the  original  opinion  was  amended  by 
this  additional  statement:  ** Clark  v.  Nash,  198  U.  S. 
361 ;  Strickley  v.  Highland  Boy  Gold  Min.  Co.,  200  U.  S. 
527,  were  cited  to  establish,  not  that  property  might  be 
taken  for  a  private  use,  but  that,  among  the  public  uses 
for  which  it  might  be  taken,  were  some  which,  if  looked  at 
only  in  their  immediate  aspect,  according  to  the  proxi- 
mate effect  of  the  taking,  might  seem  to  be  private.  This 
case,  in  our  opinion,  is  of  that  sort.  The  analysis  of  the 
police  power,  whether  correct  or  not,  was  intended  to. 
indicate  an  interpretation  of  what  has  taken  place  in  the 
past,  not  to  give  a  new  or  wider  scope  to  the  power.  '* 

§  199.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  prohibiting 
the  use  of  advertising  trucks  or  vans.  In  Fifth  Avenue 
Coach  Co.  V.  City  of  New  York,  221  U.  S.  467,  it  was  held 
that  a  valid  exercise  of  the  police  power,  not  depriving 
a  stage  coach  company  of  its  property  without  due  proc- 
ess of  law,  was  embodied  in  a  municipal  ordinance  pro- 
hibiting the  use  of  advertising  trucks,  vans,  or  wagons 
in  the  streets  of  the  city.  The  Court  said :  *'The  court  (of 
appeals)  cited  Com.  v.  McCafferty,  145  Mass.  384,  in 
which  an  ordinance  was  sustained  which  prohibited  the 
placing  or  carrying  on  sidewalks,  show  board&,  placards, 
or  signs  for  the  purpose  of  there  displaying  the  same. 
It  was  said  in  this  case,  that  the  tendency  and  effect  of 
such  signs  might  be  to  collect  crowds,  and  thus  interfere 
with  the  use  of  the  sidewalks  by  the  public,  and  lead  to 
disorder,  and  that  such  a  provision  applicable  to  the 
crowded  streets  of  a  populous  city  was  not  unreason- 
able. .  .  .  Plaintiff's  stages  are  therefore  brought 
under  even  a  broader  principle  than  that  of  its  charter. 
The  same  rule  is  applied  to  that  as  to  other  wagons,  and 
within  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  illustrated  in  Com. 
V.  McCafferty,  supra.    We  concur  with  the  court  of  ap- 


3  201  STATE  POUCE  POWER  427 

peals,  for  we  can  not  say  that  it  was  an  arbitrary  exercise 
of  such  power." 

§  200.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  prohibiting 
billiard  or  pool  rooms.  In  Murphy  v.  California,  225 
U.  S.  623,  it  was  held  that  a  valid  exercise  of  the  police 
power,  not  depriving  the  proprietor  of  an  existing  billiard 
and  pool  room  of  his  property  withont  due  process  of  law, 
was  embodied  in  a  municipal  ordinance  prohibiting  the 
keeping  of  billiard  or  pool  tables  for  hire  or  public  use, 
while  permitting  hotel  keepers  to  maintain  a  billiard  or 
pool  room  in  which  their  regular  and  registered  guests 
may  play.  The  Court  said:  "The  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment protects  the  citizen  in  hifi  right  to  engage  in  any 
lawful  buainees,  but  it  does  not  prevent  legislation 
intended  to  regulate  useful  occupation  which,  because  of 
their  nature  or  location,  may  prove  injurious  or  offensive 
to  the  public.  Neither  does  it  prevent  a  municipality 
from  prohibiting  any  business  which  is  inherently  vicious 
and  harmful.  But,  between  the  useful  business  which 
may  be  regulated  and  the  vicious  business  which  can  be 
prohibited  lie  many  nonuaeful  occupations  which  may  or 
may  not  be  harmful  to  the  public,  according  to  local  con- 
ditions, or  the  manner  in  v/hicb  conducted.  .  .  .  The 
ordinance  is  not  aimed  at  the  game,  but  at  the  pleice ;  and 
where,  in  the  exercise  of  the  police  power,  the  municipal 
authorities  determine  the  keeping  of  such  resorts  should 
be  prohibited,  the  courts  can  not  go  behind  their  finding 
and  inquire  into  local  conditions ;  or  whether  the  defend- 
ant's hall  was  an  orderly  establishment,  or  had  been 
conducted  in  such  manner  as  to  produce  the  evils  sought 
to  be  prevented  by  the  ordinance,'*  citing  Booth  v. 
Illinois,  184  V.  S.  425,  429. 

§201.  Unconstitutional  exercise  of  police  power  in 
establishing  a  building  line.  In  Eubank  v.  Richmond, 
226  U.  S.  137,  it  was  held  that  a  municipal  ordinance 
passed  under  the  authority  of  the  laws  of  Virginia,  re- 


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DXJE  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§201 


quiring  the  committee  on  streets,  at  the  request  of  the 
owners  of  two-thirds  of  the  abutting  property  to  estab- 
lish a  building  line  on  the  side  of  the  square  on  which 
such  property  abuts,  not  less  than  five  nor  more  than 
thirty  feet  from  the  street  line,  was  a  violation  of  the 
due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The 
Court  said:  '*It  leaves  no  discretion  in  the  committee 
on  streets  as  to  whether  the  street  line  shall  or  shall  not 
be  established  in  a  given  case.  The  action  of  the  com- 
mittee is  determined  by  two-thirds  of  the  property  own- 
ers. In  other  words,  part  of  the  property  owners  front- 
ing on  the  block  determine  the  extent  of  use  that  other 
owners  shall  make  of  their  lots,  and  against  the  restric- 
tion they  are  impotent.  .  .  .  One  person  having  a 
two-thirds  ownership  of  a  block  may  have  that  power 
against  a  number  having  a  less  collective  ownership.  If 
it  be  said  that  in  the  instant  case  there  is  no  such  con- 
dition presented,  we  answer  that  there  is  control  of  the 
property  of  plaintiff  in  error  by  other  owners  of  prop- 
erty, exercised  under  the  ordinance.  This,  as  we  have 
said,  is  the  vice  of  the  ordinance,  and  makes  it,  we  think, 
an  unreasonable  exercise  of  the  police  power.  *' 

§  202.  Due  process  not  denied  by  prohibition  of  local 
sales  of  malt  liquors,  whether  intoxicants  or  not.  In 
Purity  Extract  and  Tonic  Co.  v.  Lynch,  226  U.  S.  192,  it 
was  held  that  the  due  process  of  law  guaranteed  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  denied  by  the  assertion 
of  its  police  power  by  the  State  of  Mississippi  in  the  form 
of  a  law  prohibiting  local  sales  of  malt  liquors,  whether 
intoxicants  or  not  The  Court  said:  '*It  does  not  follow 
because  a  transaction,  separately  considered,  is  innocu- 
ous, it  may  not  be  included  in  a  prohibition  the  scope  of 
which  is  regarded  as  essential  in  the  legislative  judgment 
to  accomplish  a  purpose  within  the  admitted  power  of 
the  government.  Booth  v.  Illinois,  184  U.  S.  425 ;  Otis  v. 
Parker,  187  U.  S.  606 ;  Ah  Sin  v.  Wittman,  198  U.  S.  500, 
504;  New  York  ex  rel.  Silz  v.  Hesterberg,  211  U.  S.  31; 


S  203  STATE  POLICE  POWER  429 

Murphy  v.  Califoniia,  225  U.  S.  623.  ...  It  was  compe- 
tent for  the  legislature  of  Mississippi  to  recognize  the 
difficulties  besetting  the  administration  of  laws  aimed  at 
the  prevention  of  traffic  in  intoxicants.  It  prohibited, 
among  other  things,  the  sale  of  'malt  liquors.'  In  thus 
dealing  with  a  class  of  beverages  which,  in  general,  are 
regarded  as  intoxicating,  it  was  not  bound  to  resort  to  a 
discrimination  with  respect  to  ingredients  and  processes 
of  manufacture  which,  in  the  endeavor  to  eliminate  innoc* 
U0U8  beverages  from  the  condemnation,  would  facilitate 
subterfuges  and  frauds  and  fetter  the  enforcement  of  the 
law.  A  contrary  conclusion,  logically  pressed,  would  save 
the  nominal  power  while  preventing  its  effective  exercise. 
.  .  .  The  inquiry  must  be  whether,  considering  the  end 
in  view,  the  statute  passes  the  bounds  of  reason  and 
assumes  the  character  of  a  merely  arbitrary  fiat.  .  .  . 
The  state,  within  the  limits  we  have  stated,  must  decide 
upon  the  measures  that  are  needful  for  the  protection  of 
its  people,  and,  having  regard  to  the  artifices  which  are 
used  to  promote  the  sale  of  intoxicants  under  the  guise  of 
innocent  beverages,  it  would  constitute  an  unwarrantable 
departure  from  accepted  principle  to  hold  that  the  pro- 
hibition of  the  sale  of  all  malt  liquors,  including  the  bev- 
erage in  question,  was  beyond  its  reserved  powers." 

§  203.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  re^ro^ting 
si»  of  loaves  of  bread.  In  Schmidinger  v.  Chicago,  226 
U.  S.  578,  it  was  held  that  the  due  process  clause  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  offended  by  a  municipal 
ordinance  fixing  the  weight  of  the  standard  loaf  of  bread 
to  be  sold  in  the  city  of  Chicago  at  one  pound,  and  pro- 
hibiting the  making  or  selling  of  loaves  not  up  to  the 
weight  of  the  standard  loaf,  or  of  a  specific  fractional 
part  or  multiple  of  such  loaf .  The  Court  said :  "Further- 
more, laws  and  ordinances  of  the  character  of  the  one  here 
under  consideration,  and  tending  to  prevent  frauds,  and 
requiring  honest  weights  and  measures  in  the  sale  of 
articles  of  general  consumption,  have  long  been  consid- 


430 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§203 


ered  lawful  exertions  of  the  police  power.  McLean  v. 
Arkansas,  211  U.  S.  550;  Freund,  Pol.  Power,  274,  275. 
Laws  prescribing  standard  sizes  of  loaves  of  bread  and 
prohibiting,  with  minor  exceptions,  the  sale  of  other  sizes, 
have  been  sustained  in  the  courts  of  Massachusetts  and 
Michigan.  Com.  v.  McArtkur,  152  Mass.  522;  People  v. 
Wagner,  86  Mich.  594.  .  .  .  Thousands  of  transac- 
tions in  bread  in  the  city  of  Chicago  are  with  people  who 
buy  in  small  quantities,  perhaps  a  loaf  at  a  time,  and, 
exercising  the  judgment  which  the  law  imposed  upon  it, 
the  council  has  passed  an  ordinance  to  require  such  peo- 
ple to  be  sold  loaves  of  bread  of  full  weight.  We  can  not 
say  that  the  fixing  of  these  standards  in  the  exercise  of 
the  legislative  discretion  of  the  council  is  such  an  unrea- 
sonable and  arbitrary  exercise  of  the  police  power  as  to 
bring  the  case  within  the  rare  class  in  which  this  court 
may  declare  such  legislation  void  because  of  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  securing  due  process  of  law  from 
deprivation  by  state  enactments. ' ' 

§  204.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  requiring 
instaUation  of  water-doBets  under  certain  conditions. 

In  Hutchinson  v.  Valdosta,  227  U.  S.  303,  it  was  held  that 
the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was 
not  offended  by  a  municipal  ordinance  adopted,  under  the 
authority  of  the  laws  of  Georgia,  by  an  inland  town  con- 
taining less  than  6,000  inhabitants,  under  which  the  owners 
of  property  abutting  on  any  street  along  which  sewer 
mains  had  been  laid  were  compelled  to  install  water- 
closets  in  their  houses,  and  connect  them  with  the  main 
sewer  within  thirty  days  from  the  enactment  of  the  ordi- 
nance, under  penalty  of  fine  and  imprisonment.  The 
Court  said:  **It  is  the  conmaonest  exercise  of  the  police 
power  of  a  state  or  city  to  provide  for  a  system  of  sewers, 
and  to  compel  property  owners  to  connect  therewith. 
And  this  duty  may  be  enforced  by  criminal  penalties. 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Brooke,  214  IT.  S.  138.    It  may  be 


5  205a  STATE  POLICE  POWBE  431 

that  an  arbitrary  exercise  of  the  power  could  be  re- 
strained, bnt  it  would  have  to  be  palpably  bo  to  justify  a 
court  in  interfering  with  so  salutary  a  power  and  one  so 
necessary  to  the  public  health." 

§  205.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  conceming 
milk  not  subjected  to  tuberculin  test.  In  Adams  v.  Mil- 
waukee, 228  U.  S.  572,  it  was  held  that  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  offended  by 
an  ordinance  providing  for  the  confiscation,  forfeiture, 
and  immediate  destruction  of  milk,  not  conforming  to  the 
requirements  forbidding  the  shipment  into  the  city  of 
milk  draton  from  cows  outside,  unless  such  cows  shall 
have  first  been  subjected  to  the  tuberculin  test,  and  an 
officieJ  certificate  of  their  exemption  from  tuberculosis 
or  other  diseases  shall  have  been  filed  with  the  health 
officer.  The  Court  said:  "The  different  situations  of  the 
animals  require  different  regulations.  Cows  kept  outside 
the  city  camiot  be  inspected  by  the  health  officer;  they  can 
be  inspected  by  a  licensed  veterinary  surgeon,  and  a  cer- 
tificate of  the  fact  and  the  identity  of  the  cows  and  the 
milk  authenticated  as  required  by  the  ordinance.  The 
requirements  are  not  unreasonable;  they  are  properly 
adaptive  to  the  conditions.  They  are  not  discriminatory ; 
they  have  proper  relation  to  the  purpose  to  be  accom- 
plished. That  purpose  and  the  necessity  for  it  we  can 
not  question.  Jacobson  v.  Massachusetts,  197  TJ.  S.  11 ; 
Laurel  Hill  Cemetery  v.  San  Francisco,  216  TJ.  S.  358; 
Mutual  Loan  Co.  v.  Martell,  222  U.  S.  225 ;  Purity  Extract 

6  Tonic  Co.  V.  Lynch,  226  IT.  S.  192 ;  Grossman  v.  Luman, 
192  U.  S.  189;  New  Orleans  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Drainage 
Cwnmission,  197  U.  S.  453." 

§  205a.  Due  process  not  denied  by  statutes  ^ox^bitinj^ 
the  saleaa  "ice  cream"  of  a  product  ocmtaininfr  less  than 
a  fixed,  percentage  of  butter  fat.  In  Hutchinson  Ice  Cream 
Co.  V.  Iowa,  242  U.  S.  153,  the  Court  said:  "The  right 
•  of  the  state  under  the  police  power  to  regulate  the  sale 


432  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  S  205a 

of  products  with  a  view  to  preventing  frauds  or  pro- 
tecting the  public  health  is  conceded  by  plaintiffs  in  error. 
And  they  do  not  contend  that  the  particular  percentages 
of  butter  fat  set  by  Iowa  and  Pennsylvania  are  so  exact- 
ing as  to  be  in  themselves  nnreasonable.  .  .  .  The  ice 
cream  of  commerce  is  not  iced  or  frozen  cream.  It  is  a 
frozen  confection — a  compound.  The  ingredients  of  this 
compound  may  vary  widely  in  character,  in  the  number 
used,  and  in  the  proportions  in  which  they  are  used.  .  .  . 
Plaintiffs  in  error  contend  that  as  ice  cream  is  shown 
to  be  a  generic  term  embracing  a  large  namber  and 
variety  of  products,  and  the  term  as  used  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  the  use  of  dairy  cream  in  its  composition,  it 
is  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  to  limit  the  ice  cream  of 
commerce  to  that  containing  a  fixed  minimum  of  butter 
fat.  But  the  legislature  may  have  found  in  these  facts 
persuasive  evidence  that  the  public  welfare  required  the 
prohibition  enacted.  .  .  .  Laws  prohibiting  the  sale  of 
milk  or  cream  containing  less  than  fixed  percentages  of 
butter  fat  present  a  familiar  instance  of  such  legislation. 
Cases  in  the  state  courts  upholding  laws  of  this  character 
are  referred  to  in  the  margin.  This  court  has  repeatedly 
sustained  the  validity  of  similar  prohibitions.  Schmid- 
inger  v.  Chicago,  226  tJ.  S.  578;  Armour  &  Co.  v.  North 
Dakota.  240  U.  S.  510." 

§  206.  Dae  process  not  denied  by  state  law  regfnlating' 
barrier  pillars  between  adjoining  coal  properties.  In 
Plymouth  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  232  V.  S.  531,  it  was 
held  that  the  Pennsylvania  act  of  June  2, 1891,  prescribing 
the  width  of  the  barrier  pillar  to  be  left  between  ad- 
joining coal  properties,  which  must  be  sufficient  to  protect 
the  employees  of  either  mine  in  case  the  other  shall 
be  abandoned  and  allowed  to  fill  with  water,  is  not  so 
uncertain  or  unjust  as  to  constitute  a  taking  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law,  because  such  width  of  pillar 
is  to  be  determined  under  the  statute  "by  the  engineers 
of  the  adjoining  property  owners,  together  with  the 


S207 


STATE  POLICE  POWER 


inspector  of  tbe  dietrict  ia  which  the  mine  ia  situated," 
nor  because  the  statute  does  not  require  that  notice  be 
given  to  the  leasor,  being  satisfied  with  reasonable  notice 
to  the  leasee,  nor  prescribe  the  procedure,  nor  give  a  right 
to  appeal.  The  Court  said:  "Indeed,  the  statute  seems 
to  contemplate  some  judicial  control,  for  it  prescribes  no 
penalty  for  a  violation  of  the  findings  of  the  engineers 
and  inspector,  nor  any  mode  of  enforcing  their  determina- 
tion except  by  a  suit  for  injunction  under  art  15  of  the 
act.  In  such  a  suit  a  party  deeming  himself  aggrieved 
becaase  of  arbitrary  action  by  the  statutory  tribunal  may 
presumably  have  his  opportunity  to  be  heard  with 
respect  to  this  aa  well  as  other  fundamental  defenses. 
.  .  .  it  is  a  general  and  fundamental  rule  that  if  a 
statute  be  reasonably  susceptible  of  two  interpretations, 
one  of  which  would  render  it  unconstitutional  and  the 
other  valid,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  couri;8  to  adopt  that 
construction  which  upholds  its  validity,  .  .  .  We 
think  it  not  an  unreasonable  construction  that  if  the  en- 
gineers disagree  they  shall  submit  their  differences  to  the 
inspector,  and  that  a  determination  agreed  on  by  one  of 
them  in  conjunction  with  the  inspector  shall  fulfill  the 
requirements  of  the  act.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
this  tribunal  is  to  settle,  not  a  private  property  right,  but 
a  matter  affecting  the  public  safety ;  hence,  in  the  absence 
of  clear  language  to  the  contrary,  the  section  is  open  to 
the  construction  that,  as  in  other  public  matters,  a  ma- 
jority of  the  referees  or  arbitrators  may  act.  Omaha  v. 
Omaha  "Water  Co.,  218  U.  S.  180,  192." 


§207.  Constitational  exercise  of  the  police  power  in 
reference  to  depositors'  {piaranty  fund.  In  Lankford  v. 
Platte  Iron  Works  Co.,  235  U.  S.  461,  it  was  held  that  the 
police  power  asserted  under  the  Oklahoma  laws  upon, 
this  subject,  heretofore  considered,  did  not  offend  the 
due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
because  the  state  instead  of  committing  the  fund  to  the 
mere  ministerial  administration  of  the  banking  board. 
Due  Proecw— 28 


f 


434 


DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW 


§207 


«. 


X  -r 


i  > 


saw  fit  to  vest  the  title  to  the  fund  in  itself.  The  Court 
said:  ^^This  court,  in  Noble  State  Bank  v.  Haskell,  219 
U.  S.  104,  sustained  the  constitutionality  of  the  act  as  an 
exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state.  The  law  in  its 
general  purpose  was  there  presented  and  passed  on.  The 
relation  of  the  state  to  the  fund  did  not  come  up  for 
consideration,  but  necessarily  this  is  but  a  detail  in  ad- 
ministration, not  one  affecting  legality  of  the  law.  The 
creation  of  the  fund  was  said  to  be  justified  by  its  purpose, 
and  the  power  of  the  state  was  declared  adequate  to  ac- 
complish it.  *The  purpose  of  the  fund,*  it  was  said,  *is 
shown  by  its  name.  It  is  to  secure  the  full  repayment  of 
deposits.'  Where  the  state  should  vest  the  title  to  the 
fund  for  the  purpose  of  its  administration  was  inmaa- 
terial  to  the  essence  of  the  power  to  creat  the  fund. 
Whether  the  state  should  commit  it  to  the  mere  minis- 
terial administration  of  the  bank  commissioner  and 
banking  board,  and  subject  them  to  controversies  with 
depositors,  or  draw  around  them  the  circle  of  its  im- 
munity, was  a  matter  within  its  competency  to  determine, 
and  we  are  brought  to  the  question  of  interpretation — 
which  has  the  state  done  f  To  that  question  this  answer 
was  given:  **It  appears  that  the  law  intended  to  give  to 
the  state  as  definite  a  title  to  the  depositors'  guaranty 
fund  as  to  the  common  school  fund ;  as  definite,  therefore, 
as  the  title  of  South  Carolina  to  the  assets  of  the  state  dis- 
pensary, which  was  the  subject  in  Murray  v.  Wilson  Dis- 
tilling Co.,  212  U.  S.  578.  In  both  cases  there  were 
ultimate  beneficiaries — ^in  the  pending  case,  the  bank 
depositors;  in  the  other  case,  the  creditors  of  the  dis- 
pensary. And  the  purpose  of  the  law — or,  if  you  will,  the 
command  of  the  law — in  each  case  was  or  is  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  claims  of  those  beneficiaries.  The  fund,  having 
this  ultimate  destination,  does  not  take  its  administra- 
tion from  the  officers  of  the  state,  or  subject  them  to  judi- 
cial control.  We  can  not  assume  that  it  will  not  be 
faithfully  managed  and  applied. ' ' 


§  208  STATE  POLICE  POWER  435 

§  208.  Due  process  denied  by  Kansas  act  inflicting  pen- 
alties on  employer  for  imposing  certain  conditions  on 
employee.  The  Kansas  act  of  March  13,  1903,  as  con- 
strued and  applied  by  the  highest  court  of  that  state 
(State  v.  Coppage,  87  Kan.  752),  imposed  fine  or  impris- 
onment upon  an  employer  or  his  agent  for  having  pre- 
scribed as  a  condition  upon  which  one  may  secure 
employment,  or  remain  in  the  service  of,  snch  employer 
(such  employment  being  terminable  at  will)  that  the  em- 
ployee shall  enter  into  an  agreement  not  to  become  or 
remain  a  member  of  any  labor  organization  while  so 
employed,  such  employee  being  subject  to  no  disability  or 
incapacity  depriving  him  of  the  right  to  exercise  a  volun- 
tary choice.  In  declaring  that  said  act,  as  so  applied 
and  construed,  is  repugnant  to  the  due  process  clause  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  the  Court  in  Coppage  v. 
Kansfia,  236  U.  S.  1,  said:  "When  a  man  is  called  upon 
to  agree  not  to  become  or  remain  a  member  of  the  union 
while  working  for  a  particular  employer,  he  is  in  effect 
only  asked  to  deal  openly  and  frankly  with  his  employer, 
so  as  not  to  retain  the  employment  upon  terms  to  which 
the  latter  is  not  willing  to  agree.  And  the  liberty  of  mak- 
ing contracts  does  not  include  a  liberty  to  procure  em- 
ployment frcan  an  onwilling  employer,  or  without  a  fair 
understanding.  Nor  may  the  employer  be  foreclosed  by 
legislation  from  exercising  the  same  freedom  of  dioice 
that  is  the  right  of  the  employee.  To  ask  a  man  to  agree, 
in  advance,  to  refrain  from  affiliation  wifh  the  union  while 
retaining  a  certain  position  of  employment,  is  not  to  ask 
him  to  ^ve  np  any  part  of  his  constitutional  freedom. 
He  is  free  to  decline  the  employment  on  those  terms, 
just  as  the  employer  may  decline  to  offer  employment 
on  any  other;  for  'it  takes  two  to  make  a  bargain.'  Hav- 
ing accepted  employment  on  those  terms,  the  man  is  still 
free  to  join  the  anion  when  the  period  of  employment 
expires;  or,  if  employed  at  will,  then  at  any  time  upon 
simply  quitting  the  employment.  And,  if  bound  by  his 
own  agreement  to  refrain  from  joining  during  a  stated 


436  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  208 

period  of  employment,  he  is  in  no  different  situation  from 
that  which  is  necessarily  incident  to  term  contracts 
in  general.  For  constitutional  freedom  of  contract  does 
not  mean  that  a  party  is  to  be  as  free  after  maldng  a 
contract  as  before;  he  is  not  free  to  break  it  without 
accountability, '  * 


§  209.  Due  process  not  denied  by  the  so-called  Ohio 
^'run-of-mine''  or  ^'anti-screen''  law.  In  Bail  and  Biver 
Coal  Co.  V.  Taple,  236  U.  S.  338,  it  was  held  that  the  Ohio 
*  *  run-of-mine ' '  or  **  anti-screen'*  law, — requiring  the  pay- 
ment to  coal  miners,  whose  compensation  is  fixed  on  the 
basis  of  ton  or  other  weight,  according  to  the  total  of  all 
the  coal  contained  in  the  mine  car  in  which  it  has  been 
removed  from  the  mine,  provided  that  no  greater  per- 
centage of  dirt  and  impurities  shall  be  contained  therein 
than  that  ascertained  to  be  unavoidable  by  the  state  In- 
dustrial Commission,  whose  orders  are  subject  to  review ; 
and  provided  that  nothing  therein  contained  shall  dimin- 
ish the  right  of  a  miner  and  his  employer  to  agree  upon 
deductions  by  the  scheme  known  as  docking,  on  account 
of  such  impurities, — does  not  impair  the  freedom  of  con- 
tract secured  by  the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  The  Court  said:  **The  objection 
that  the  law  is  unconstitutional  as  unduly  abridging  the 
freedom  of  contract  in  prescribing  the  particular  method 
of  compensation  to  be  paid  by  employers  to  miners  for 
the  production  of  coal  was  made  in  the  case  of  McLean 
V.  Arkansas,  211  U.  S.  539,  in  which  this  court  sustained 
a  law  of  the  state  of  Arkansas,  requiring  coal  mined  to 
be  paid  for  according  to  the  run-of-mine  system  accord- 
ing to  its  weight  when  brought  out  of  the  mine  in  cars. 
In  that  case  the  constitutional  objections  founded  upon 
the  right  of  contract  which  are  made  here  were  consid- 
ered and  disposed  of.  This  court  has  so  often  affirmed 
the  right  of  the  state,  in  the  exercise  of  its  police  power, 
to  place  reasonable  restraints  like  that  here  involved, 
upon  the  freedom  of  contract,  that  we  need  only  refer  to 


§  211  STATE  POLICE  POWER  437 

some  of  the  cases  in  passing.  Scbmidinger  v.  Chicago, 
226  IT.  S.  578;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  McGuire,  219 
U.  S.  549,  and  cases  therein  cited  and  reviewed." 

§  210.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  prohiMtiiifr 
brick  yards  in  certain  portions  of  a  city.  In  Hadacheck 
V.  Lob  Angeles,  239  IT.  S.  394,  the  plaintiff  in  error,  who 
had  been  convicted  of  a  misdemeanor  for  the  violation  of 
an  ordinance  of  the  City  of  Los  Angeles,  which  makes  it 
unlawful  for  any  person  to  establish  or  operate  a  brick 
yard,  or  brick  kiln,  or  any  establishment,  factory  or  place 
for  the  manufacture  or  burning  of  brick  within  described 
limits  in  the  city, — claimed  that  such  ordinance  did  not 
state  a  public  offense,  and  that  it  was  in  violation  of  the 
due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
The  court  held  that,  without  a  violation  of  that  clause, 
the  police  power  might  be  exerted  under  proper  condi- 
tions to  declare,  under  particular  circtimstances  and  in 
particular  localities,  specified  businesses,  such  as  brick 
making,  which  are  not  nuisances  per  se,  to  be  nuisances 
in  fact  and  law. 

§  211.  Dne  process  not  denied  by  police  statute  requir- 
ing hotel  keepers  to  give  notice  to  guests  in  case  of  Are. 

In  Miller  v.  Strahl,  239  U.  S.  426,  it  was  held  that  a  state 
may  prescribe  the  duties  of  hotel  keepers  lu  regard  to 
taking  precautions  against  fire  and  to  giving  notice  to  ful- 
fill the  obligations  imposed  on  such  business;  that  rules 
of  conduct  must  necessarily  be  expressed  in  general  terms 
and  depend  upon  varying  circnmstances ;  that  a  police 
statute  requiring  hotel  keepers  to  give  notice  to  guests  in 
case  of  fire  is  not  lacking  in  due  process  of  law  because  it 
does  not  prescribe  fixed  rules  of  conduct.  Nash  v.  United 
States,  229  U.  S.  373,  followed,  and  International  Har- 
vester Co.  V.  Missouri,  234  U.  S.  199,  distinguished.  The 
Court  said:  "It  is  entirely  aside  from  the  questions  in 
the  case  and  the  requirements  of  the  statute  to  consider 
the  dismays  and  perils  of  an  extrane  situation,  and  what 


438  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  211 

then  might  be  expected  of  courage  or  excused  to  timidity. 
It  was  one  of  the  purposes  of  the  statute  to  preclude  such 
extremity. ' ' 

§  211a.  Due  process  not  denied  by  ordinance  subjecting 
business  of  private  detective  to  police  supervision.    In 

Lehon  v.  Atlanta,  242  U.  S.  53,  the  Court  said  that  the  con- 
tention of  the  plaintiff  in  error,  *  *  in  its  most  general  form, 
is  that  the  ordinances  abolish  the  occupation  of  private 
detective  by  the  requirement  of  application  for  a  permit 
to  the  police  conmiission  of  the  city,  the  approval  of  the 
chief  of  police,  oath  of  oflSce,  and  to  work  under  police 
supervision.  These  requirements,  it  is  insisted,  offend 
the  due  process  and  equal  protection  clauses  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  The  contention  makes  a  Federal  question,  and, 
as  we  are  not  disposed  to  consider  it  frivolous,  a  motion 
to  dismiss  which  is  made  will  be  denied.  .  .  .  The  ex- 
tent of  the  police  power  of  the  state  has  been  too  recently 
explained  to  need  further  enunciation.  The  present  case 
is  easily  within  its  principle.  It  would  be  very  conunon- 
place  to  say  that  the  exercise  of  the  police  is  one  of  the 
necessary  activities  of  government,  and  all  that  pertains 
to  it  may  be  subjected  to  regulation  and  surveillance  as 
a  precaution  against  perversion.  The  Atlanta  ordinances 
do  no  more.  * ' 

§  212.  Due  process  not  denied  by  legislation  declaring 
the  emission  of  dense  smoke  in  cities  a  nuisance.    In 

Northwestern  Laundry  v.  Des  Moines,  239  U.  S.  486,  the 
Court  said:  **The  protection  of  the  due  process  and 
equal  protection  clauses  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
is  invoked.  It  is  insisted  that  the  ordinance  is  void  be- 
cause its  standard  of  efficiency  requires  the  remodeling 
of  practically  all  furnaces  which  were  in  existence  at  the 
time  of  its  adoption ;  it  forbids  remodeling  or  substituted 
equipment  without  a  prescribed  license;  it  forbids  new 
construction  without  such  license;  it  fails  to   specify 


S  213  STATE  POLICE  POWER  439 

approved  equipment,  and  instead  delegates  first  to  the 
inspector,  and,  second,  to  the  smoke  abatement  commis- 
sion, the  nuregiilated  discretion  to  arbitrarily  prescribe 
the  requirements  in  each  case,  without  reference  to  any 
other  as  to  the  required  character  of  smoke  prevention 
device,  thus  making  the  right  of  complainants  and  their 
class  to  own  and  operate  such  fnmaces  subject  to  the 
pleasure  of  the  inspector  and  commission.*'  It  was  held 
that  a  state,  in  the  exercise  of  its  police  power,  may  by 
direct  legislation  or  through  authorized  municipalities, 
declare  the  emission  of  dense  smoke  in  cities  or  populous 
neighborhoods  a  nuisance  and  restrain  it;  and  regula- 
tions to  tiiat  effect,  if  not  arbitrary,  are  not  unconstitu- 
tional under  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  even  though  they  effect  the  use  of  property 
or  subject  the  owner  to  expense  in  complying  with  their 
terms. 

§  213.  Dne  process  not  denied  by  statute  Teqniring  full 
switching  crews  on  railroads  exceeding  one  hundred 
miles  in  len^rtb*  In  St.  L.  and  Iron  Mt.  By.  v.  Arkansas, 
240  U.  S.  518,  it  was  held  that  a  statute  of  the  st^te  of 
Arkansas,  requiring  full  switching  crews  on  railroads 
exceeding  one  hundred  miles  in  length,  is  not  unconsti- 
tutional as  depriving  the  owning  company  of  its  prop- 
erty without  doe  process  of  law.  The  Court  said:  "In 
the  case  of  Chicago,  Rock  Island  and  Pacific  Ry.  v.  Arkan- 
sas, 219  U.  S.  453,  a  statute  of  Arkansas  was  considered 
which  required  freight  trains  to  be  equipped  with  crews 
consisting  of  an  engineer,  a  foreman,  a  conductor,  and 
three  brakemen, '  regardless  of  any  modern  equipment  or 
automatic  couplings  and  air  brakes.'  .  .  .  The  statute 
did  not  apply  to  railroads  whose  line  or  lines  did  not  ex- 
ceed fifty  miles  in  length,  nor  to  any  railroad,  regardless 
of  length  of  its  line,  where  the  freight  train  should  consist 
of  less  than  twenty-five  cars.  The  statute  was  sustained 
on  the  authority  of  prior  cases  against  charges  of  con- 
flict with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  and  the  commerce 


440  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  213 

clause  of  the  Constitution.    We  need  not  cite  the  cases 
relied  on  or  repeat  the  argument  of  the  court. ' ' 

§214.  Due  process  not  denied  by  statute  imposing 
license  taxes  on  the  privilege  of  using  profit  sharing 
coupons  and  trading  stamps.  In  Tanner  v.  Little,  240 
U.  S.  369,  it  was  held  that  a  statute  of  the  state  of  Wash- 
ington of  1913,  imposing  license  taxes  on  the  privilege 
of  using  profit  sharing  couj)on8  and  trading  stamps,  is  in 
its  essential  particulars  similar  to  the  statute  of  Florida 
sustained  in  East  v.  Van  Deman  and  Lewis,  240  U.  S. 
342 ;  that  such  statute  was  properly  enacted  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  police  power  of  tiie  state  in  regard  to  matters 
subject  to  regulation,  and  that  it  is  not  unconstitutional 
under  the  Federal  Constitution  as  interfering  with  or 
burdening  interstate  commerce,  impairing  the  obligation 
of  contracts,  denying  equal  protection  of  the  law,  or 
depriving  merchants  of  their  property  without  due 
process  of  law.  The  Court  said :  '*  Discrimination  aside, 
the  power  to  enact  the  legislation  we  need  not  discuss, 
but  may  refer  to  the  opinion  in  East  v.  Van  Deman  and 
Lewis.  Of  course,  it  is  in  the  exercise  of  the  police  power 
of  the  state.  We  will  not  here  define  it  or  its  limitations. 
As  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Brown,  in  Camfield  v.  United 
States,  167  U.  S.  518,524,  citing  Eideout  v.  Knox,  148 
Mass.  368:  *The  police  power  is  not  subject  to  any  defi- 
nite limitations,  but  is  coextensive  with  the  necessities  of 
the  case  and  the  safeguard  of  the  public  interests.^  In 
the  view  that  the  license  is  prohibitive  we  may  concur, 
and  concede  that  such  is  the  effect  given  it  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  state  in  State  v.  Pitney,  80  Wash. 
699,  one  of  the  cases  submitted  with  this  one.  And  we 
think  it  was  competent  for  the  state  to  give  it  that  effect. '  * 

§  215.  Due  process  not  denied  by  the  fixing  of  certain 
absolute  liabilities.  In  St.  Louis,  etc.,  E.  Co.  v.  Matthews, 
165  U.  S.  1, — a  case  in  which  the  validity  of  a  statute  of 


§215 


STATE  POLICE  POWER 


441 


Missouri,  declaring  railroad  companiee  liable  absolutely 
for  fires  caused  hy  their  engines,  was  upheld, — the  Court 
said :  "The  right  of  the  citizen  not  to  have  his  property 
burned  without  compensation  is  no  less  to  be  regarded 
than  the  right  of  the  corporation  to  set  it  on  fire.  To 
require  the  utmost  care  and  diligence  of  the  railroad  cor- 
porations in  taking  precautions  against  the  escape  of  fire 
from  their  engines  might  not  a£ford  sufficient  protection 
to  the  owners  of  property  in  the  neighborhood  of  rail- 
roads. When  both  parties  are  equally  faultless,  the  legis- 
lature may  properly  consider  it  just  that  the  duty  of 
insuring  private  property  against  loss  or  injury  caused 
by  the  use  of  dangerous  instruments  should  rest  upon 
the  railroad  company,  which  employs  the  instrumentB 
and  creates  the  peril  for  its  own  profit,  rather  than  upon 
the  owner  of  the  property,  who  has  no  control  over  or 
interest  in  those  instruments."  To  the  same  effect  is 
Jones  V.  Brim,  165  U.  S.  180, — a  case  in  which  a  Utah 
statute,  providing  that  persons  driving  stock  along  high- 
ways should  be  liable  for  damages  done  by  the  animals 
in  destroying  the  banks  of,  or  in  rolling  rocks  into,  the 
highway, — was  upheld  against  the  objection  that  it  denied 
due  process.  The  Court  said:  "In  effect  the  legislature 
declared  that  the  passage  of  droves  or  herds  of  animals 
over  a  hillside  highway  was  go  likely,  if  great  precau- 
tions, were  not  observed,  to  result  in  damage  to  the  road, 
that  where  this  damage  followed  such  driving,  there 
ought  to  be  no  controversy  over  the  existence  or  non- 
existence of  negligence,  but  there  should  be  an  absolute 
legal  presumption  to  that  effect  resulting  from  the  fact 
of  having  driven  the  herd.  ...  It  was  obviously  the 
province  of  the  state  legislature  to  provide  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  legal  presumption  to  be  deduced  from 
a  given  state  of  facts,  and  the  creation  by  law  of  such 
presumptions  is,  after  all,  but  an  illustration  of  the  power 
to  classify.  ...  As  the  statute  clearly  specifies  the 
condition  under  which  the  presumption  of  negligence 


442  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  215 

axises  and  provides  for  the  ascertainment  of  liability  by 
judicial  proceedings,  there  is  no  foundation  for  the  asser- 
tion that  the  enforcement  of  such  ascertained  liability 
constitutes  a  taking  of  property  without  due  process  of 
law/' 


CHAPTER  XI 

PBOPBBT;  BIOBTS  as  PBOTECTED  BT  due  FBOOESS — ^VESTED 
BIOHTS  AND   THEIB  IMPAIBMENT 

§  216.  Ohapter  39  of  Magna  Carta  and  its  amendments. 

The  protection  extended  by  dne  process  of  law  to  the 
great  trilogy  of  rights  known  as  "life,  liberty,  and  prop- 
erty" has  as  its  historical  comer  stone  the  famous  chap- 
ter 39  of  Magna  Carta  which  provided  that  "No  freeman 
shall  be  arrested,  or  detained  in  prison,  or  deprived  of  his 
freehold,  or  outlawed,  or  banished,  or  in  any  wise  mo- 
lested ;  and  we  will  not  set  forth  against  him,  nor  send 
against  him,  unless  by  the  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers 
and  by  the  law  of  the  land."  An  additional  protection 
was  given  to  property  rights  when  that  provision  was 
widened  in  the  reissues  of  the  Great  Charter  by  the 
insertion  in  the  second  (2  Hen.  Ill,  1217)  and  third 
(9  Hen.  HI,  1225)  of  the  words,  "of  his  freehold  or  lib- 
erties, or  free  cnstoms  (de  libero  tenemento  suo  vel  Ub- 
ertatibus,  vel  liberis  consuetudinihus  suts).'*  After  that 
amendment  the  chapter,  in  its  final  form,  provided  that 
"No  freeman  shall  be  arrested,  or  detained  in  prison,  or 
deprived  of  his  freehold,  or  liberties,  or  free  customs,  or 
outlawed,  or  bamshed,  or  in  any  way  molested ;  and  we 
will  not  set  forth  against  him,  nor  send  against  him, 
unless  by  the  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers  and  by  the 
law  of  the  land." 


§  217.  Orowth  in  England  of  the  idea  of  vested  rights. 

Emphasis  has  been  given  heretofore  to  the  fact  that  the 
baronial  leaders  of  the  English  parliament  who  estoried 
the  Great  Charter  from  King  John  were  intent  upon 
imposing  limitations  in  favor  of  "life,  liberty  and  prop- 
443 


444  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  217 

erty"  upon  the  crown  and  not  npon  the  legislature.  The 
idea  of  imposing  constitutional  limitations  in  favor  of  the 
rights  of  ^'Ufe,  liberty  and  property'^  upon  an  omnipo- 
tent  parliament  involved  a  contradiction  in  terms.  And 
yet  while  in  theory  the  power  of  parliament  is  and  always 
has  been  admitted  to  make  any  modifications  in  such 
rights  as  its  wisdom  or  caprice  might  suggest,  the  belief 
has  steadily  developed  that  there  are,  under  what  is  called 
*  *  the  law  of  the  land, ' '  certain  fundamental  rights,  involv- 
ing substauce  as  contrasted  with  form,  which  even  an 
omnipotent  parliament  should  not  disturb  arbitrarily. 
That  vague  conception  of  a  'tested  right, ^'  as  against  the 
English  parliament,  has  been  thus  vaguely  expressed  by 
Austin  ( Jur.  5  ed.,  856-857)  who  says :  ** When  it  is  said 
that  the  legislature  ought  not  to  deprive  persons  of  the 
'vested  rights,'  all  that  is  meant  is  this:  that  the  rights 
styled  *  vested'  are  sacred  or  inviolable,  or  are  such  as  the 
parties  ought  not  to  be  deprived  of  by  the  legislature. 
Like  a  thousand  other  propositions,  which  sound 
speciously  to  the  ear,  it  is  either  purely  identical  and  tells 
us  nothing,  or  begs  the  question  in  issue.'*  Again  he 
says  (857)  **If  it  [the  claim  that  parliament  ought  not  to 
deprive  subjects  of  their  vested  rights]  means  that  there 
are  no  cases  in  which  the  rights  of  parties  are  not  to 
yield  to  questions  of  expediency,  the  proposition  is  mani- 
festly false,  and  conflicts  with  the  practice  of  every 
legislature  on  earth.  In  every  case,  for  example,  in 
which  a  road  or  canal  is  run  by  authority  of  parliament 
through  the  land  of  private  persons,  the  rights,  or  vested 
rights,  of  the  private  owners  are  practically  abolished  by 
the  legislature.  They  are  compelled  to  yield  up  a  por- 
tion of  their  rights  of  exclusion,  and  to  receive  compen- 
sation agreeably  to  the  provisions  of  the  act.*'  Thus  the 
principle  has  ever  been  recognized  by  English  jurists 
that  the  enjoyment  by  the  individual  of  the  rights  of  life, 
liberty,  and  property,  even  in  their  most  perfect  form,  is 
always  subject  to  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  state,  which 
may  be  asserted  through  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 


{218 


VESTED  BIGHTS 


the  taxing  power  and  the  police  power,  whenever  the 
public  good  may  require  it.  At  the  same  time  the 
emphatic  condemnation  by  the  Roman  jurists  of  all  retro- 
active laws,  well  expressed  in  the  maxim  of  Papinian 
(Nemo  potest  mutare  consilium  suum  in  alterius  inju- 
riant,  Dig.  50,  17,  75),  was  recognized  as  early  as  the 
thirteenth  century  by  Braoton  (lib.  4,  §  228  (nova  consti- 
tutio  futuris  formam  imponere  debet  et  non  praeteritis) 
was  repeated  at  a  later  day  by  Coke  (2  Inst.  292)  and 
Bacon  (De  Ang.  Sci.  lib.,  8,  c.  3,  aph.  47-51),  "and  applied 
by  the  English  courts  in  the  only  way  possible  under  an 
omnipotent  parliament ;  namely,  as  a  rule  of  construction 
to  the  effect  that  a  statute  will  never  be  held  to  divest 
vested  rights  if  it  is  capable  of  any  other  meaning." 
McGhee,  pp.  153-4,  quoting  Gilmore  v.  Shuter,  1  Vent. 
330,  2  Show.  16,  2  Lev.  227,  T.  Jones  108,  2  Mod.  310; 
Courch  V.  Jeffries,  4  Burr.  2460. 

§218.  Development  of  idea  of  "vested  rights"  ad- 
vanced by  constitutional  limitations  on  legislative  power. 
Nothing  did  more  to  develop  the  very  imperfect  concep- 
tion of  a  "vested  right"  as  it  existed  in  the  mother  coun- 
try at  the  time  of  the  American  Bevolution  than  the 
American  invention  of  constitutional  limitations  on  legis- 
lative power,  evolved  out  of  the  process  through  which 
the  English  colonies  on  our  Atlantic  seaboard  were  trans- 
formed into  sovereign  states.  In  that  way  a  long  step 
forward  was  taken  by  the  demonstration  that  the  legis- 
lative as  well  as  the  executive  power  of  a  state  can  be 
restrained  by  constitutional  limitations,  any  violation  of 
which  can  be  annulled  by  the  judgment  of  any  court. 
In  another  work  (Jurisdiction  and  Procedure  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  pp.  2-5)  the  author 
has  attempted  to  explain  in  some  detail  the  ori^n  of  the 
American  system  of  constitutional  limitations  on  state 
powers,  executive  and  legislative,  as  illustrated  by  the 
earlier  decisions  of  th.e  state  courts.  He  then  said :  "In 
speakiDg  of  the  case  of  Trevett  v.  "Wheeden,  decided  in 


446  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  218 

Bhode  Island  in  1786,  in  which  an  act  was  declared  void 
because  it  impaired  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  guaranteed 
by  the  colonial  charter,  Judge  Cooley  said  that  *it  is 
worthy  of  note  that,  the  first  case  in  which  a  legislative 
enactment  was  declared  unconstitutional  and  void,  on  the 
ground  of  incompatibility  with  the  constitution  of  a  state, 
was  decided  under  one  of  the  royal  charters. '  Const  Lim, 
p.  26,  note  1.  Those  who  claim  that  the  honor  of  a  first 
decision  belongs  to  North  Carolina  base  their  contention 
on  the  case  of  Doe  ex  dem.  Bayard  v.  Singleton,  decided, 
in  the  first  instance  by  the  supreme  court  judges  on  cir- 
cuit in  May,  1786.  See  1  Taylor,  Origin  and  Growth  of 
English  Const,  p.  80,  note.  It  is  admitted,  however, 
that  the  North  Carolina  caae  did  not  come  before  the 
supreme  court  of  that  state  until  November,  1787,  when 
an  act  passed  in  1785,  authorizing  summary  proceedings 
in  suits  concerning  confiscated  property,  was  declared 
void  because  destructive  of  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  a 
decision  which  removed  from  the  docket  many  cases  of 
like  character.  1  N.  C.  5  (1  Martin,  p.  1,  48).  .  .  . 
Those  who  claim  the  honor  in  question  for  New  Jersey 
contend  that  at  some  uncertain  date,  prior  to  1785,  Chief 
Justice  Brearley  held,  in  Holmes  v.  Walton,  cited  in 
9  N.  J.  L.  44,  an  act  void  which  provided  for  trials  by 
juries  consisting  of  six  men.  The  fact  that  that  decision 
was  made  prior  to  1785  depends  upon  a  statement  made 
by  Gouveneur  Morris  in  an  address  to  the  assembly  of 
Pennsylvania  in  that  year,  to  the  effect  that  *a  law  was 
once  passed  in  New  Jersey  which  the  judges  pronounced 
unconstitutional,  and  therefore  void.'  Jared  Spark's 
Life  of  Gouveneur  Morris,  vol.  3,  p.  438.  See  also  the 
vague  reference  to  the  case  in  opinion  of  Kirkpatrick, 
Ch.  J.,  in  State  v.  Parkhurst,  9  N.  J.  L.  444,  appx.  Those 
who  claim  the  honor  for  Virginia  rely  upon  the  case  of 
Com.  V.  Caton,  which  came  before  the  court  of  appeals 
of  that  state  in  November,  1782.  4  Call.  (Va.)  5-21.  As 
the  chief  advocate  of  that  claim  admits  that  *  there  was 
not  a  direct  conflict  between  the  so-called  law  and  the 


§  218  VESTED  RIGHTS  447 

Constitution,  and  therefore  tlie  remarks  of  tlie  judges  are 
to  be  regarded  as  obiter  dicta,  it  ia  hard  to  onderstand 
how  Virginia  can  be  considered  as  a  party  to  a  contro- 
versy the  essence  of  which  is  the  actual  annnhnent  of  a 
legislative  act,  on  the  ground  of  conflict  with  a  state  con- 
stitution.' (Carson,  History  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
p.  121,  where  the  whole  subject  is  well  stated.)  Pendle- 
ton, president  of  the  court,  expressly  states  that  the  con- 
stitutionality of  a  legislative  act  was  not  before  the  court 
in  that  case:  'I  am  happy,'  he  says,  *'m  being  of  opinion 
there  is  no  occasion  to  consider  it  upon  this  occasion.' 
It  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  abstract  right  of  a  state 
court  to  declare  a  legislative  act  void  was  nobly  and 
forcibly  declared  in  that  case  by  Wythe  J.,  who  said: 
'Nay,  more,  if  the  whole  legislature,  an  event  to  be  depre- 
cated, should  attempt  to  overleap  the  bounds  prescribed 
to  them  by  the  people,  I,  in  administering  the  public 
justice  of  the  country,  will  meet  the  united  powers,  at 
my  seat  in  this  tribunal ;  and,  pointing  to  the  constitution, 
will  say  to  them  here  is  the  limit  of  your  anthority;  and 
hither  shall  you  to  go,  but  no  further.'  The  Reporter 
says  that  Chancellor  Blair  and  the  rest  of  the  judges 
were  of  the  same  opinion  as  to  the  abstract  right.  See 
also  Rives 's  Life  of  Madison,  Vol.  2,  pp.  262  et  seq.  In 
Bowman  v.  Middleton,  1  Bay  252,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
South  Carolina  held  in  1792  that  an  act  passed  by  the 
colonial  legislature  in  1712  was  ipso  facto  void  because 
in  contravention  of  Magna  Carta."  It  is  all  important 
to  note  the  fact  that  in  all  or  nearly  all  these  early  cases 
in  which  acts  of  state  legislatures  were  declared  void,  it 
was  because  they  attempted  to  intermeddle  with  the 
sacred  right  of  trial  by  a  jury  composed  of  twelve  men. 
It  was  everywhere  assumed  that  the  right  to  a  trial  by 
a  jury  so  constituted  was  guaranteed  by  '*the  law  of  the 
iMid,"  or  in  other  words,  by  the  due  process  clause  of 
Magna  Carta,  invariably  embodied,  in  some  form,  in  the 
state  constitutions. 


448  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  219 

§  219.  Formula  in  Declaration  of  Independence.    The 

mandate  of  the  Continental  Congress  under  which  our 
first  state  constitutions  were  formed  was  preceded  by  the 
adoption  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  in  which  it 
is  declared,  as  a  self-evident  truth,  that  all  men  **are 
endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  inalienable  rights, 
and  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of 
happiness/'  a  formula  substantially  equivalent  to  the 
older  phrase,  ^Mife,  liberty,  and  property.'^  In  his  dis- 
senting opinion  in  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall. 
36,  Mr.  Justice  Field  says  that  the  *  *  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment was  intended  to  give  practical  effect  to  the  Declara- 
tion of  1776  of  inalienable  rights,  rights  which  are  the 
gift  of  the  Creator,  which  the  law  does  not  confer,  but 
only  recognizes. ' '  The  same  great  judge,  in  his  dissent- 
ing opinion  in  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113,  said:  **By 
the  term  *  life, '  as  here  used  something  more  is  meant  than 
mere  animal  existence.  The  inhibition  against  its  depri- 
vation extends  to  all  those  limbs  and  faculties  by  which 
life  is  enjoyed.  The  provision  equally  prohibits  the 
mutilation  of  the  body  by  the  amputation  of  an  arm  or 
leg,  or  the  putting  out  of  an  eye,  or  the  destruction  of  any 
other  organ  of  the  body  through  which  the  soul  conmiuni- 
cates  with  the  outer  world.  The  deprivation  not  only  of 
life,  but  of  whatever  God  has  given  to  every  one  with  life, 
for  its  growth  and  enjoyment,  is  prohibited  by  the  pro- 
vision in  question,  if  its  efficacy  be  not  frittered  away  by 
judicial  decision.*'  In  AUgeyer  v.  Louisiana,  165  U.  S. 
578,  the  Supreme  Court,  in  defining  the  *4iberty*'  men- 
tioned in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  has  said  that  it 
**  means  not  only  the  right  of  the  citizen  to  be  free  from 
the  mere  physical  restraint  of  his  person,  as  by  incarcera- 
tion, but  the  term  is  deemed  to  embrace  the  right  of  the 
citizen  to  be  free  in  the  enjoyment  of  all  his  faculties ;  to 
be  free  to  use  them  in  all  lawful  ways ;  to  live  and  work 
where  he  will ;  to  earn  his  livelihood  by  any  lawful  calling ; 
to  pursue  any  livelihood  or  avocation ;  and  for  that  pur- 
pose to  enter  into  all  contracts  which  may  be  proper,  neo- 


§  220  VESTED  EIGHTS  449 

essary,  and  essential  to  his  carrying  out  to  a  successful 
conclusion  the  purposes  above  mentioned.'*  From  that 
broad  and  comprehensive  definition  it  clearly  appears 
that  the  word  ** liberty''  as  thus  employed  does  not  mean 
simply  personal  liberty  as  understood  by  English  jurists 
and  statesmen  (see  C.  E.  Shattuck's  article  4  Harv.  L. 
Rev,  365,  quoted  in  1  Thayer,  Cases,  Const.  Law,  644, 
note),  but  a  wider  ** liberty"  which  protects  a  number  of 
the  rights  embraced  within  in  the  guaranty  of  *' prop- 
erty" in  the  same  provision.  McGehee,  pp.  138-144.  But 
it  is  folly  to  contend  that  the  rights  of  **life,  liberty,  and 
property,"  as  defined  in  American  constitutions,  state 
and  federal,  are  inalienable  or  unalterable,  when  the 
necessities  of  the  sovereign  require  either  their  modifica- 
tion or  abolition.  They  all  exist  sjibject  to  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  sovereign,  acting  through  the  taxing  power, 
the  police  power,  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  or  other 
supreme  powers  which  may  demand  their  modification  or 
abolition.  In  Jacobson  v.  Massachusetts,  197  U.  S.  29, 
the  Court  said  that  a  citizen  or  person  may  be  compelled 
*  *  by  force  if  need  be,  against  his  will  and  without  regard 
to  his  personal  wishes  or  his  pecuniary  interests,  or  even 
his  religious  or  political  convictions,  to  take  his  place  in 
the  ranks  of  the  army  of  his  country  and  risk  the  chance 
of  being  shot  down  in  its  defence. ' '  The  real  purpose  of 
the  guaranty  in  question  is  to  protect  the  individual 
against  the  exercise  of  purely  personal  and  arbitrary 
power  by  placing  him  under  the  protection  of  what  Lieber 
calls  **a  government  of  law  as  contradistinguished  to  a 
government  of  functionaries  " ;  or  what  the  Massachusetts 
Bill  of  Bights  calls  **a  government  of  laws  and  not  of 
men."   See  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356,  370. 

§  220.  No  state  shall  make  any  law  impauring  the  obli- 
gation of  contracts.  A  little  more  than  ten  years  after 
the  birth  of  the  American  system  of  constitutional  limita- 
tions as  embodied  in  the  state  constitutions  of  1776,  the 
movement  to  define  and  protect  ** vested  rights"  made  a 

Bne  Process— 29 


450  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  220 

second  advance  when  the  continental  Congress  adopted 
the  Ordinance  for  the  government  of  the  Northwestern 
Territory  which  provided,  among  other  things,  *Hhat  no 
law  onght  ever  to  be  made  or  have  force  in  the  said 
territory  that  shall  in  any  manner  whatever  interfere 
with  or  affect  private  contracts  or  engagements  bona  fide 
and  without  fraud  previously  formed.'*  No  matter 
whether  that  epoch  making  thought  had  its  origin  in  the 
brain  of  Lee  or  Dane  (Meigs,  Growth  Const,  p.  183),  it 
passed  from  the  Continental  Congress  into  the  Federal 
Convention  on  August  28,  1787  (The  Madison  Papers, 
Vol.  m,  pp.  1443-44)  when  Eufus  King  moved  to  add  to 
the  prohibition  against  ex  post  facto  laws  and  bills  of 
attainder,  **in  the  words  used  in  the  Ordinance  of  Con- 
gress establishing  new  states,  a  prohibition  on  the  states 
to  interfere  in  private  contracts/'  Not  long  after 
Mr.  Dickinson  had  informed  the  Convention  that,  accord- 
ing to  Blackstone  (1  Com.  132),  the  phrase  ex  post  facto 
related  only  to  criminal  cases,  the  great  clause  for  the 
preservation  of  the  ** obligation  of  contracts*'  passed  into 
the  existing  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

§221.  Contract  clause  limited  to  vested  rights  that 
arise  out  of  it.  In  Sturges  v.  Crowninshield,  4  Wheat. 
122,  Marshall,  C.  J.,  said:  **What  is  the  obligation  of  a 
contract?  and  what  will  impair  itt  It  would  seem  diflS- 
cult  to  substitute  words  which  are  more  intelligible  or 
less  liable  to  misconstruction,  than  those  which  are  to  be 
explained.  A  contract  is  an  agreement  in  which  a  party 
undertook  to  do,  or  not  to  do,  a  particular  thing.  The 
law  binds  him  to  perform  his  undertaking,  and  this  is,  of 
course,  the  obligation  of  his  contract.'*  The  clause  in 
question  embraces  only  contracts  concerning  property  or 
some  object  of  value,  and  conferring  rights  that  may  be 
asserted  in  a  court  of  justice.  Hunt  v.  Hunt,  97  U.  S. 
444.  The  protected  contracts  are  those  that  relate  to 
property  rights,  not  government.  Stone  v.  Miss.,  101 
U.  S.  814.    The  prohibition  against  the  states  embraces 


§  222  VESTED  BIGHTS  451 

all  contracts,  executed  and  executory,  whether  between 
individuals  or  a  state  and  individuals.  Green  v. 
Biddle,  8  Wheat.  1;  Charles  River  Bridge  v,  Warren 
Bridge,  11  Pet.  582 ;  Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  107  U.  S.  750. 
It  is  only  those  contracts  in  existence  when  the  hostile 
law  is  passed  that  are  protected ;  the  states  may  legislate 
as  to  contracts  thereafter  made  as  they  see  fit.  Denny  v. 
Bennett,  128  U.  S.  489.  A  state  statute  can  not  be  held  to 
be  unconstitutional  merely  on  the  ground  that  it  divests 
a  right  previously  vested;  the  clause  extends  only  to 
vested  rights  which  arise  out  of  and  have  their  origin  in 
contract.  Satterlee  v.  Matthewson,  2  Pet.  380 ;  Watson  v. 
Mercer,  8  Pet.  110;  Charles  River  Bridge  v.  Warren 
Bridge,  11  Pet.  420.  The  Supreme  Court  is  specially 
charged  with  the  high  duty  to  take  care  that  the  prohibi- 
tion against  states  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts 
shall  neither  be  evaded  nor  frittered  away.  Murphy  v. 
Charleston,  96  U.  S.  432. 

§  222.  The  Fifth  Amendment.  On  the  heels  of  the  con- 
tract clause  came  the  Fifth  Amendment,  promoting  the 
development  of  the  idea  of  vested  rights  by  introducing 
into  our  Federal  Constitution,  for  the  first  time,  the  guar- 
anty of  due  process  in  the  provision  that  no  person  shall 
**be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law.  * '  That  safeguard  was  amplified  by  other 
provisions  guaranteeing  trial  by  jury,  and  forbidding 
double  jeopardy,  self  incrimination,  and  the  taking  of  pri- 
vate property  for  public  use  without  just  compensation. 
But  the  guaranties  thus  introduced  by  that  amendment 
were  not  prohibitions  operating  on  the  states ;  they  were 
simply  limitations  upon  the  powers  of  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment itself.  '  *  The  people  of  the  United  States  framed 
such  a  government  for  the  United  States  as  they  sup- 
posed best  adapted  to  their  situation  and  best  calculated 
to  promote  their  interests.  The  powers  they  conferred 
upon  this  government  were  to  be  exercised  by  itself;  and 
the  limitations  on  power,  if  expressed  in  general  terms, 


452  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  222 

are  naturally,  and,  we  think,  necessarily  applicable  io 
the  government  created  by  this  instrument.  * '  Barron  v. 
Baltimore,  7  Pet  243.  See  also,  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S. 
123;  Kelly  v.  Pittsburgh,  104  U.  S.  78;  FaUbrook  Irriga- 
tion Dist.  V.  Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112. 

§  223.  The  great  vacutim  to  be  filled.  From  what  has 
just  been  said  it  appears  that  while  the  states  were  for- 
bidden by  the  contract  clause  to  impair  the  obligation  of 
contracts,  they  were  not  forbidden  by  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment to  deprive  private  persons  of  due  process  of  law, 
as  there  was  no  prohibition  against  retrospective  state 
legislation.  Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  the  states  were  at  liberty  to  pass  laws  depriv- 
ing private  persons  of  due  process  of  law;  the  only 
security  such  persons  possessed  in  proceedings  by  the 
state  had  to  be  found,  if  at  all,  in  its  constitution  and 
laws.  At  the  time  in  question  the  power  of  the  states  to 
pass  retrospective  laws,  not  ex  post  facto  nor  impairing 
the  obligation  of  contracts,  was  clearly  recognized  (Dart- 
mouth College  V.  Woodward,  4  Wheat.  518;  Baltimore, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  V.  Nesbit,  10  How.  395),  even  when  such  laws 
divested  rights  of  property  antecedently  vested  (Watson 
V.  Mercer,  8  Pet.  110).  See  also.  Carpenter  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania, 17  How.  463;  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24  How. 
296;  Beloit  v.  Morgan,  7  Wall  624;  Drehman  v.  Stifle, 
8  Wall.  603;  St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Rogers,  16  Wall. 
663;  Ewell  v.  Daggs,  108  U.  S.  157;  Williams  v.  Paine, 
169  U.  S.  79). 

§224.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment.  To  fill  the  vacuum 
just  described  was  adopted  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
the  capstone  of  the  Constitution,  which  while  it  does  not 
prohibit  retrospective  laws  as  such  (League  v.  Texas,  184 
U.  S.  156)  does  forbid  all  arbitrary  interference  with 
fundamental  rights,  including  vested  rights  of  property, 
regardless  of  the  source,  contractual  or  otherwise,  from 
which  such  vested  rights  emanated.   It  was  therefore  held 


§  225  VESTED  RIGHTS  453 

in  Bradley  v.  Lightcap,  195  U.  S.  1,  that  a  law,  divesting  a 
right  vested  under  a  contract,  thus  impairing  its  obliga- 
tion by  working  a  deprivation  of  a  right  of  property,  is 
offensive  to  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In  that  case  the  Court  said:  ** Accepting 
the  construction  of  the  act  by  the  state  court,  and  its 
coiiclusion  that  it  applies  to  Mrs.  Bradley,  then  the  ques- 
tion is  whether  such  a  statute  so  applied  does  not  impair 
the  obligation  of  the  contract  previously  existing  between 
the  mortgagee  and  the  mortgagor,  or  deprive  the  mort- 
gagee of  property  rights  without  due  process!  That 
question  was  raised  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Dlinois,  and 
the  court  held  that  it  did  not.  201  HI.  511.  Confessedly, 
subsequent  laws  which  in  their  operation  amount  to  the 
denial  of  rights  accruing  by  a  prior  contract  are  obnox- 
ious to  constitutional  objections.  ...  As  we  have 
said,  when  Mrs.  Bradley  took  this  mortgage  there  was 
no  statutory  limitation  as  to  the  time  within  which  a 
master  ^s  deed  must  be  taken  out,  and  no  loss  of  right  by 
reason  of  failure  to  do  so  was  prescribed.  After  she  had 
filed  her  bill,  and  while  she  was  in  possession,  the  act  of 
1872  went  into  effect,  and,  it  may  be  conceded,  limited 
Mrs.  Bradley  ^s  right  to  obtaining  a  deed  on  foreclosure 
sale,  and  so  far  affected  any  remedy  through  a  deed  she 
might  have  had.  But,  reading  the  act,  as  the  view  of  the 
supreme  court  compels  us  to  do,  as  taking  away  her  right 
to  maintain  her  possession,  we  are  of  opinion  that  it  mate- 
rially impairs  the  obligation  of  her  contract,  cmd  deprives 
her  of  property  without  due  process  of  law/^ 

§  225.  What  constitutes  a  vested  right.  In  Calder  v. 
Bull,  3  Dall.  386,  it  was  held  that  a  right  vested  in  a  citi- 
zen means  that  he  has  the  power  to  do  certain  acts,  or  to 
possess  certain  things,  according  to  the  law  of  the  land. 
Speaking  of  vested  rights  of  property,  Mr.  Justice  Chase 
said  in  that  case :  *  *  If  anyone  has  a  right  of  property 
such  a  right  is  a  perfect  and  exclusive  right ;  but  no  one 
can  have  such  right,  before  he  acquired  a  better  right  to 


454  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  225 

the  property  than  any  other  person  in  the  world/*  In 
Sim's  Lessee  v.  Irvine,  3  DalL  425,  it  was  held  that  a  legal 
right  once  established  and  incorporated  as  such  with  prop- 
erty and  tenures,  notwithstanding  any  new  distribution 
of  judicial  powers,  must  be  treated  as  such  by  the 
courts.  In  Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6  Cranch  87,  it  was  held  that 
where  a  law  is  in  its  nature  a  contract,  and  absolute  rights 
have  vested  under  it,  a  repeal  of  such  law  can  not  divest 
such  rights.  See  also,  Poindexter  v.  Greenhow,  114  U.  S. 
270.  In  Frisbie  v.  Whitney,  9  Wall.  187,  it  was  held  that 
when  all  the  precedent  conditions  prescribed  by  the  pre- 
emption laws,  including  the  payment  of  the  price  of  the 
land,  have  been  satisfied  by  the  settler,  he,  for  the  first 
time,  acquires  a  vested  interest  in  the  premises  occupied 
by  him,  of  which  he  can  not  be  subsequently  divested.  In 
Pearsall  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  161  U.  S.  673,  the 
Court  said:  **A  *  vested  right'  is  defined  by  Feame  in 
his  work  upon  Contingent  Remainders,  as  *an  immediate, 
fixed  right  of  present  or  future  enjoyment ; '  and  by  Chan- 
cellor Kent  as  *  an  immediate  right  of  present  enjoyment, 
or  a  present  fixed  right  of  future  enjoyment'  4  Kent., 
Com.  202.''  Cooley,  Const.  Law,  332,  in  drawing  the  dis- 
tinction between  vested  and  expectant  rights,  has  said 
that  **  rights  are  vested,  in  contradistinction  to  being 
expectant  or  contingent.  They  are  vested  when  the  right 
to  enjoyment,  present  or  prospective,  has  become  the 
property  of  some  particular  person  or  persons,  as  a  pres- 
ent interest.  They  are  expectant  when  they  depend  upon 
the  continued  existence  of  the  present  condition  of  things 
until  the  happening  of  some  future  event.  They  are  con- 
tingent when  they  are  only  to  come  into  existence  on  an 
event  or  condition  which  may  not  happen  or  be  performed 
-until  some  other  event  may  prevent  their  vesting." 
**  Accepting  the  words,  in  accordance  with  convenience 
and  settled  usage,  as  synonymous  with  rights  protected 
by  the  law  of  the  land  or  due  process  of  law,  the  essential 
qualities  of  a  vested  right  are  that  it  must  be  a  funda- 
mental right,  which  is  concerned  with  substance  as  con- 


§  225  VESTED  RIGHTS  455 

trasted  with  form,  and  it  must  be  complete  and  perfect 
in  a  definite  person,  either  over  particular  things  (vested 
right  of  property)  or  enforceable  in  favor  of  definite 
persons  whenever  in  the  future  conditions  already- 
determined  arise  (vested  personal  rights)/*  McGehee, 
p.  144-5. 

In  Amett  v.  Eeade,  220  IT.  S.  311,  it  was  held  that  the 
husband  had  no  vested  rights  in  the  community  prop- 
erty acquired  prior  to  the  New  Mexico  law  of  1901,  of 
which  he  would  be  deprived  by  the  application  to  such 
property  of  a  certain  section  of  that  law.  The  Court  said : 
* '  We  should  require  more  than  a  reference  to  Randall  v. 
Krieger,  23  Wall.  137,  as  to  the  power  of  the  legislature 
over  an  inchoate  right  of  dower,  to  make  us  believe  that 
a  law  could  put  an  end  to  her  interest  without  compensa- 
tion consistently  with  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.'*  In  Gritts  v.  Fisher,  224  U.  S.  640,  it  was  held 
that  members  of  the  Cherokee  tribe  living  on  September 
1, 1902,  and  enrolled  under  the  act  of  July  1,  1902,  were 
not  deprived  of  their  vested  rights  to  participate  in  the 
allotment  and  distribution  of  the  remaining  tribal 
lands  and  funds — ^their  individual  allotments  not  being 
affected — ^by  the  provision  of  the  act  of  April  26,  1906, 
admitting  newly  bom  members  of  the  tribe  to  the  allot- 
ment and  distribution  from  which  they  were  excluded  by 
the  earlier  act,  if  bom  after  September  1, 1902.  See  also 
as  to  vested  right  to  exemption  from  state  taxation,  pro- 
tected by  the  Federal  Constitution  against  abrogation  by 
Congress  during  a  given  period,  English  v.  Richardson, 
224  U.  S.  680;  Choate  v.  Trapp,  224  U.  S.  665.  In  Wil- 
loughby  V.  City  of  Chicago,  235  U.  S.  45,  it  was  held  tha  t 
by  the  overruling  of  earlier  decisions  so  as  to  render  real 
property  liable  for  an  assessment  for  the  benefits  result- 
ing from  the  widening  of  a  street,  after  the  damages  for 
the  part  taken  have  been  fixed  by  judgment  in  due  form, 
no  vested  rights  of  the  owners  of  such  property  can  be 
said  to  be*  interfered  with. 


456  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  226 

§  226.  Rights  below  the  standard  of  vested  rights.    In 

the  language  of  Austin  (2  Jurisp.  5th  ed.  856),  *'When 
we  oppose  a  vested  or  present  to  a  future  or  contingent 
right,  we  are  not,  I  apprehend,  opposing  a  right  of  one 
class  to  a  right  of  another,  but  we  are  rather  opposing  a 
right  to  a  chance  or  possibility  of  a  right  *  ^  First  among 
such  chances  or  possibilities  are  certain  expectancies,  or 
mere  contingencies  which  are  not  in  any  full  and  com- 
plete sense  rights  at  all.  In  Bandall  v.  Krieger,  23  Wall. 
137,  it  was  held  that  during  the  life  of  the  husband,  the 
right  of  dower  is  a  mere  expectancy  or  possibility,  and 
during  that  period  the  legislature  may  increase  or  dimin- 
ish it  or  may  take  it  away  entirely.  It  was  therefore  held 
in  that  case  that  there  was  no  violation  of  vested  rights 
when  a  married  woman's  claim  to  dower  in  land  con- 
veyed was  taken  away  by  a  legislative  act  giving  validity 
to  an  ineffectual  acknowledgment  of  the  deed  of  a  mar- 
ried woman.  And  so  a  husband  has  no  such  vested  right 
in  the  future  profits  of  his  wife's  land,  as  may  not  be 
taken  away  by  statute,  Neilson  v.  Kilgore,  145  U.  S.  487. 
In  Pennie  v.  Reis,  132  U.  S.  464,  it  was  held  that  neither 
police  officers  or  their  representatives  had  such  vested 
right  in  a  public  fund  created  by  statute,  to  be  paid  to 
them  upon  their  disability,  death  or  resignation,  as  pre- 
vented the  repeal  or  modification  of  such  statute  prior 
to  the  happening  of  any  such  event.  In  Mobile  Transp. 
Co.  V.  Mobile,  187  U.  S.  479,  it  was  held  that  as  an  Ala- 
bama statute,  granting  to  the  city  of  Mobile  so  much  of 
the  shore  and  soil  under  an  adjacent  tidal  stream  as  is 
within  the  city  boundaries,  amounted  to  no  more  than  a 
declaration  that  the  rights  possessed  by  the  state  in  such 
shore  and  soil  were  granted  to  such  city,  no  vested  rights 
of  owners  of  land  adjacent  to  such  stream  were  disturbed 
thereby.  In  Randall  v.  Krieger,  23  Wall.  137,  it  was  held 
that  the  expectation  of  a  person  that  he  will  succeed  as 
heir  to  the  fee  simple  estates  of  a  living  ancestor  or  to 
his  estates  in  fee  tail  is  not  a  vested  right ;  until  that 
event  (the  ancestor's  death)  occurs  the  law  of  descent 


§  227  VESTED  RIGHTS  457 

and  distribution  may  be  moulded  according  to  the  will 
of  the  legislature.  In  tKe  same  category  stands  a  joint 
tenant's  claim  to  take  by  survivorship  property  held  in 
joint  tenancy.    Holbrook  v.  Finney,  4  Mass.  568. 

§227.  Curative  legislation.  Mention  must  here  be 
made  of  the  right  of  a  state  to  enact  curative  legislation 
for  the  perfection  of  rights  already  equitably  vested  by 
the  removal  of  certain  technical  defects  in  legal  titles  by 
reason  of  the  omission  of  certain  formalities  the  state 
might  have  dispensed  with  in  the  first  instance.  Vested 
rights  are  not  thereby  interfered  with;  **Laws  curing 
defects  which  would  otherwise  operate  to  frustrate  what 
must  be  presumed  to  be  the  desire  of  the  party  affected, 
can  not  be  considered  as  taking  away  vested  rights* 
Courts  can  not  regard  rights  as  vested  contrary  to  the 
justice  and  equity  of  the  case.*'  State  v,  Newark,  27 
N.  J.  L.  197.  A  proceeding  may  be  validated  by  a  retro- 
spective act  curing  its  irregularities,  whenever  such  pro- 
ceeding might  have  been  authorized  in  advance  by  the 
legislature.  Bolles  v.  Brimfield,  120  U.  S.  759;  Street  v. 
United  States,  133  U.  S.  299 ;  Thompson  v.  Lee  County, 
3  Wall.  327;  St.  Joseph  Twp.  v.  Eogers,  16  Wall.  644; 
Thompson  v.  Perrine,  103  U.  S.  806. 

The  claim  of  a  party  to  such  irregular  proceeding, 
because  of  its  irregularity,  to  insist  on  titles  which,  but 
for  that  irregularity,  would  have  passed  to  others,  is  not 
a  vested  right  protected  by  the  Constitution,  and  is  subor- 
dinate to  the  equitable  rights  acquired  under  the  proceed- 
ing validated.  Eaverty  v.  Fridge,  3  McLean  230 ;  Barton 
V.  Morris,  15  Ohio  408 ;  Chestnut  v.  Shane,  16  Ohio  599. 
The  rights  of  third  persons,  depending  on  the  invalidity 
of  the  original  proceeding,  and  acquired  bona  fide  before 
the  curative  act,  are  vested,  and  therefore  exempt  from 
its  operation.  Brinton  v.  Seevers,  12  Iowa  389 ;  Barrett 
V.  Barrett,  120  N.  C.  127 ;  McGehee,  p.  156-8,  &  notes.  See 
also,  Wilkinson  v.  Leland,  2  Pet.  627 ;  McFaddin  v.  Evans- 


458  DXJE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  227 

Snider-Buel  Co.,  185  TJ.  S.  505 ;  Satterlee  v.  Mathewson, 
2  Pet.  380 ;  Randall  v.  Krieger,  23  Wall.  137. 

§  227a.  No  vested  right  in  any  general  role  of  law  or 
policy  of  legislation*  In  Chicago  &  A.  B.  Co.  v.  Tran- 
barger,  238  U.  S.  67,  the  Court  said:  **For  just  as  no 
person  has  a  vested  right  in  any  general  rule  of  law  or 
policy  of  legislation  entitling  him  to  insist  that  it  shall 
remain  unchanged  for  his  benefit  (Munn  v.  Illinois,  94 
U.  S.  113, 134;  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516,  532; 
Buttfield  V.  Stranahan,  192  U.  S.  470, 493 ;  Martin  v.  Pitts- 
burg &  L.  E.  R.  Co.,  203  U.  S.  284),  so  an  immunity  from  a 
change  of  the  general  rules  of  law  will  not  ordinarily  be 
implied  as  an  unexpressed  term  of  an  express  contract. 
See  Gross  v.  United  States  Mortg.  Co.,  108  U.  S.  477; 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  132  U.  S.  75, 83.''  In  hold- 
ing that  a  mere  departure  by  the  courts  of  a  state  from  a 
rule  of  property  established  by  prior  decisions  does  not 
violate  any  equity  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  the 
Court,  in  O'Neil  v.  Northern  Colorado  Irrig.  Co.,  242 
TJ.  S.  20,  said : '  *  It  is  suggested  that  the  cases  cited  estab- 
lished a  rule  of  property  and  that  any  departure  from  it 
violated  the  plaintiff's  rights  under  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  But  we  already  have  said  that  the  cases  do 
not  establish  the  rule  supposed,  and  if  they  did,  something 
more  would  be  necessary  before  the  plaintiff  could  come 
to  this  court.  Saner  v.  New  York,  206  U.  S.  536,  547,  548 ; 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Tranbarger,  238  U.  S.  67,  76." 

§  228.  Right  of  a  state  to  regulate  its  procedure.  En- 
tirely apart  from  the  two  classes  just  described  of  imper- 
fect rights,  below  the  standard  of  vested  rights,  affecting 
vested  rights  of  property  only,  stands  the  great  subject 
of  procedure,  affecting  the  rights  of  life,  liberty  and  prop- 
erty,— ** adjective  law,"  which  can  not  confer  a  vested 
right  because  *  *  there  is  no  vested  right  in  a  mode  of  pro- 
cedure. "  League  v.  Texas,  184  U.  S.  156 ;  Backus  v.  Fort 
Street  Union  Depot  Co.,  169  IT.  S.  557.    And  yet  the  con- 


§  229  VESTED  RIGHTS  459 

trol  of  a  state  over  its  procedure  is  not  absolute.  '  *  The 
state  has  full  control  over  the  procedure  in  its  courts, 
both  in  civil  and  criminal  cases,  subject  only  to  the  quali- 
fication that  such  procedure  must  not  work  a  denial  of 
fundamental  rights,,  or  conflict  with  ^specific  applicable 
provisions  of  ihe  Federal  Constitution/'  Brown  v.  New 
Jersey,  175  U.  S.  175.  See  also  West  v.  Louisiana,  194 
U.  S.  263. 

§229.  All  laws  unpauing  vested  rights  within  the 
scope  of  due  process.  It  is  all-important  to  keep  steadily 
in  view  the  foregoing  distinctions  between  vested  rights 
and  such  expectancies,  possibilities  and  contingencies  as 
do  not  measure  up  to  that  standard,  because  the  first 
question  that  arises  in  every  case  is  whether  or  no  the 
right  involved  is  a  vested  right,  or  a  right  of  the  con- 
tingent class  below  that  standard.  If  the  right  is  vested, 
then  the  next  question  that  arises  is  whether  or  no  there 
has  been  such  an  arbitrary  interference  with  such  a 
fundamental  right  as  will  bring  the  infraction  within  the 
due  process  clauses  of  the  Constitution.  There  are  a 
great  many  lawful  interferences  that  may  take  place  witli 
a  vested  right,  such  for  instance  as  result  from  a  proper 
exercise  of  the  taxing  power,  the  power  of  eminent 
domain,  the  police  power,  and  such  supreme  sovereign 
powers  as  the  Federal  Government  may  constitutionally 
exercise.  As  the  due  process  clauses  do  not  prohibit 
retroactive  laws  as  such  (League  v.  Texas,  184  U.  S.  156, 
161),  a  vested  right  may  be  impaired  without  redress  by 
such  a  law  provided  the  interference  is  not  purely  arbi- 
trary in  character.  In  the  recent  case  of  Wagner  v. 
Leser,  239  U.  S.  207,  the  Court  said:  '* Taking  the 
decision  in  this  court  together,  we  think  that  it  results 
that  the  legislature  of  a  state  may  determine  the  amount 
to  be  assessed  for  a  given  improvement  and  designate 
the  lands  and  property  benefited  thereby,  upon  which  the 
assessment  is  to  be  made  without  first  giving  an  oppor- 
tunity to  the  owners  of  the  property  assessed  to  be  heard 


460  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  229 

upon  the  amount  of  the  assessment  or  the  extent  of  the 
benefit  conferred.  We  do  ^ot  understand  this  to  mean 
that  there  may  not  be  cases  of  such  flagrant  abuse  of  legis- 
lative power  as  would  warrant  the  intervention  of  a  court 
of  equity  to  protect  the  constitutional  rights  of  land 
owners,  because  of  arbitrary  and  wholly  unwarranted 
legislative  action.  The  constitutional  protection  against 
deprivation  of  property  without  due  process  of  law  would 
certainly  be  available  to  persons  arbitrarily  deprived  of 
their  private  rights  by  such  state  action,  whether  under 
the  guise  of  legislative  authority  or  otherwise.*'  In 
0  'Neill  V.  Learner,  239  IT.  S.  244,  the  announcement  was 
made  that  **We  have  repeatedly  said  that  the  provisions 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  embodying  fundamental 
conceptions  of  justice,  can  not  be  deemed  to  prevent  a 
state  from  adopting  a  public  policy  for  the  irrigation  of 
arid  lands  or  for  the  reclamation  of  wet  or  overflowed 
lands.  .  .  .  there  is  nothing  in  the  Federal  Constitution 
which  denies  to  them  the  right  to  formulate  this  policy 
or  to  exercise  the  power  of  eminent  domain  to  carry  it 
into  effect. ' '  In  Myles  Salt  Co.  v.  Iberia  Drainage  Dist., 
239  U.  S.  478,  the  Court  held,  first,  that  although  under 
the  laws  of  Louisiana  the  action  of  the  police  jury  in 
determining,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  what  prop- 
erty shall  be  included  in  a  drainage  district  can  not  be 
inquired  into  except  on  a  special  averment  of  fraud,  one 
not  charging  fraud  or  attacking  the  state  statute,  may 
attack  the  law  as  administered  as  depriving  him  of  his 
property  without  due  process  of  law  by  the  inclusion 
within  a  drainage  district  of  property  in  no  wise  benefited 
by  the  proposed  system;  second,  that  power  arbitrarily 
exerted,  imposing  a  burden  without  a  compensating 
advantage  of  any  kind,  amounts  to  confiscation  and  vio- 
lates the  due  process  provision  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment. **We  are  not  dealing,"  said  the  Court,  **with 
motives  alone,  but  as  well  with  their  resultant  action ;  we 
are  not  dealing  with  disputable  grounds  of  discretion  or 
disputable  degrees  of  benefit,  with  an  exercise  of  power 


§  230  VESTED  RIGHTS  461 

determined  by  considerations  not  of  the  improvement  of 
plaintiff's  property,  but  solely  of  the  improvement  of  the 
property  of  others — ^power,  therefore,  arbitrarily  exerted, 
imposing  a  burden  without  a  compensating  advantage  of 
any  kind."  Li  Gast  Realty  Co.  v.  Schneider  Granite  Co., 
240  IT.  S.  55,  the  Court  said :  *  *  The  legislature  may  cre- 
ate taxing  districts  to  meet  the  expense  of  local  improve- 
ments, and  may  fix  the  basis  of  taxation  without  encoun- 
tering the  Fourteenth  Amendment  unless  its  action  is 
palpably  arbitrary  or  a  plain  abuse.  Houck  v.  Little 
River  Drainage  District,  239  TJ.  S.  254,  262. '^  In  Embree 
V.  Kansas  City  Road  Dist.,  240  TJ.  S.  242,  the  Court  said : 
^^A  legislative  act  of  this  nature  [establishing  zones  of 
benefits  with  graduate  ratings  for  assessments]  can  be 
successfully  called  in  question  only  when  it  is  so  devoid 
of  any  reasonable  basis  as  to  be  essentially  arbitrary  and 
an  abuse  of  power.  Wagner  v.  Leser,  239  U.  S.  207; 
Houck  V.  Little  River  Drainage  District,  239  U.  S.  254 ; 
Myles  Salt  Co.  v.  Schneider  Granite  Co.,  240  U.  S.  55.'' 


§  230.  Application  of  the  rule  of  inclusion  and  ezdu- 
sion.  From  the  authorities  just  cited  it  clearly  appears 
that  when  a  fundamental  or  vested  right  has  been  im- 
paired, and  redress  is  sought  under  the  due  process  clause 
either  of  the  Fifth  or  Fourteenth  Amendments,  it  can  be 
had  (entirely  apart  from  the  specific  guarantees  of  the 
Fifth  Amendments),  only  **when  it  (the  act  causing  the 
impairment)  is  so  devoid  of  any  reaaonable  basis  as  to  be 
essentially  arbitrary  and  an  abuse  of  power.''  If  an 
assertion  of  power  by  a  state  legislature  is  assailed,  it 
can  not  be  successful,  unless  its  action  is  palpably  arbi- 
trary or  a  plain  abuse.  No  more  delicate  or  difficult 
function  was  ever  confided  to  a  court  of  last  resort  than 
that  imposed  upon  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  whenever  it  is  called  upon  to  apply  such  abstract 
formulas  to  the  concrete  facts  of  a  particular  case.  As 
there  were  no  precedents  to  guide  it,  either  in  the  juris- 
prudence of  this  country  or  any  other,  that  court  at  the 


462  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  230 

beginning  of  its  real  work,  mapped  out  the  only  course 
possible  when  it  adopted  in  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans, 
96  U.  S.  97,  the  famous  rule  of  inclusion  and  exclusion 
under  which  the  court,  without  defining  the  meaning  of 
the  phrase,  due  process  of  law,  attempts  in  each  case  to 
ascertain  its  intent  and  meaning  *  *  by  the  gradual  process 
of  judicial  inclusion  and  exclusion,  as  the  cases  presented 
for  decision  shall  require,  with  the  reasoning  on  which 
such  decisions  may  be  founded.'*  In  attempting  to  in- 
terpret the  real  meaning  of  the  mass  of  judge-made  law 
thus  piled  up  during  a  period  of  nearly  fifty  years,  the 
text  writer  is  likewise  forced  to  adopt  a  rule  of  inclusion 
and  exclusion,  under  which  he  can  only  hope  to  lift  up 
from  a  voluminous  and  rapidly  growing  literature  such 
cases  as  are  really  leading,  instructive  and  illustrative  of 
the  processes  of  reasoning  the  court  habitually  employs. 
Upon  that  principle  what  remains  of  this  chapter, 
specially  devoted  to  property  rights  as  protected  by  due 
process,  will  be  arranged. 


§231.  Legitimate  modification  of  rights  of  abutting 
owner.  In  Sauer  v.  New  York,  206  U.  S.  536,  it  was  held 
that  as  an  abutting  owner  has  no  easement  of  light,  air, 
or  access  as  against  any  improvement  of  the  street  for 
the  purpose  of  adapting  it  to  public  travel,  such  owner  is 
not  deprived  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law 
when  a  municipality  erects  in  one  of  its  streets,  under  a 
statute  making  no  provision  for  compensation  to  abutting 
owners,  an  elevated  iron  viaduct  for  the  public  use, 
by  which  travelers  are  enabled  to  use  such  street  in  con- 
nection with  other  streets,  where,  under  the  law  of  the 
state  as  expounded  by  its  highest  court,  such  owner  has 
no  easement  of  light,  air  or  access.  The  Court  said: 
**In  earlier  and  simpler  times  the  surface  of  the  streets 
was  enough  to  accommodate  all  travel.  But  under  the 
more  complex  conditions  of  modern  urban  life,  with  its 
high  and  populous  buildings,  and  its  rapid  interurban 
transportation,  the  requirements  of  public  travel  are 


§  232  VESTED  RIGHTS  463 

largely  increased.  Sometimes  the  increased  demands 
may  be  met  by  subways  and  sometimes  by  viaducts.  The 
construction  of  either  solely  for  public  travel  may  well 
be  held  by  a  state  court  to  be  a  reasonable  adaptation 
of  the  streets  to  the  uses  for  which  they  were  primarily 
designed. ' '  Here  we  have  a  vivid  illustration  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  subtle  and  refining  hand  of  judge-made 
law  is  permitting  state  power  to  modify  private  rights  in 
such  a  way  as  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  a  complex  and 
advancing  society. 

§  232.  How  the  outstanding  shares  of  an  owner  of  stodc 
may  be  condemned  without  denial  of  due  process.    The 

same  principle  received  a  different  application  in  Offield 
V.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  203  U.  S.  372,  in  which 
it  was  held  that  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  was  not  violated  by  the  condemnation  for  a 
public  use  of  outstanding  shares  in  a  railroad  company 
owned  by  a  person  who  refused  to  agree  to  the  terms  of 
purchase.  The  Court  said :  *  *  The  power  of  the  state  to 
declare  uses  of  property  to  be  public  has  lately  been 
'  decided  in  Clark  v.  Nash,  198  U.  S.  361,  and  in  the  case 
of  Strickley  v.  Highland  Boy  Gold  Min.  Co.,  200  U.  S. 
527.  These  <3ases  exhibit  more  striking  examples  of  the 
power  of  a  state  than  the  case  at  bar.  In  the  first  case 
the  statute  of  the  state  permitted  an  individual  to  enlarge 
the  ditch  of  another  to  obtain  water  for  his  own  land ;  in 
the  second  case  the  statute  authorized  the  condemnation 
of  a  right  of  way  to  transport  ore  from  a  mine  to  a  rail- 
road station.  .  .  .  The  ultimate  purpose  of  defend- 
ant in  error  in  the  case  at  bar  is  the  improvement  of  the 
New  Haven  &  Derby  Railroad,  which  *  connects  [we  quote 
from  the  opinion  of  the  supreme  court  of  errors,  New 
York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Offield,  77  Conn.  419]  at  New 
Haven,  on  the  east,  with  four,  and  at  its  western  ter- 
minals with  two,  important  railroad  lines  owned  by  the 
plaintiff  (defendant  in  error).'    ...    In  this  purpose 


464  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  232 

the  public  has  an  interest^  and  to  accomplish  it  the  court 
applied  the  statute. ' ' 

§233.  Power  of  a  state  to  reorganise  a  co-operatiye 
association  without  consent  of  its  members.  In  Polk  v. 
Mutual  Reserve  Fund  L.  Ass'n,  207  U.  S.  310,  it  was  held 
that  a  state  has  the  power  to  reorganize  an  association, 
insuring  lives  upon  the  co-operative  plan,  as  a  mutual 
level  premium  company,  under  a  new  name  and  without 
the  consent  of  its  members,  without  taking  away  vested 
rights,  privileges  or  property  rights  of  its  members  as 
protected  by  due  process.  The  Court  said:  **A  similar 
question  was  before  the  court  in  Wright  v.  Minnesota 
Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  193  U.  S.  657,  where  it  was  held  that  a 
law  of  Minnesota,  authorizing  an  assessment  insurance 
company  to  change  its  business  to  that  of  insurance  upon 
a  regular  premium  basis,  was  not  in  violation  of  this  pro- 
vision of  the  constitution.  •  .  .  In  fact,  the  only  sug- 
gestion of  a  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
made  to  us  is  that  the  reincorporation,  under  the  circum- 
stances of  this  case,  deprived  the  complainants  of  vested 
rights  and  privileges  and  property  rights  under  their 
contracts,  without  due  process  of  law.  Since  the  incor- 
poration has  deprived  the  complainants  of  no  vested 
rights,  privileges,  or  property,  the  contention  fails.'* 

§  234.  Power  of  a  state  to  make  discriminating  prop- 
erty classifications.  In  Welch  v.  Swasey,  214  U.  S.  91, 
it  was  held  that  property  is  not  taken  without  due  process 
of  law  by  state  legislation  making  a  discrimination  or 
classification  between  the  commercial  and  residential  sec- 
tions of  Boston,  by  limiting  the  maximum  height  of  build- 
ings in  the  commercial  district  to  125,  and  in  the  residen- 
tial district  to  from  80  to  100  feet,  when  the  highest 
court  of  the  state  has  upheld  such  legislation  as  a  legiti- 
mate exercise  of  the  police  power.  The  Court  said :  **The 
particular  circumstances  prevailing  at  the  place  or  in  the 
state  where  the  law  is  to  become  operative, — whether  the 


§  235  VESTED  RIGHTS  465 

statute  is  really  adapted,  regard  being  had  to  all  the  dif- 
ferent and  material  facts,  to  bring  about  the  results 
desired  from  its  passage ;  whether  it  is  well  calculated  to 
promote  the  general  and  public  welfare, — are  all  matters 
which  the  state  court  is  familiar  with ;  but  a  like  famili- 
arity can  not  be  ascribed  to  this  court,  assuming  judicial 
notice  may  be  taken  of  what  is  or  ought  to  be  generally 
known.  For  such  reason  this  court,  in  cases  of  this  kind, 
feels  the  greatest  reluctance  in  interfering  with  the  well 
considered  judgments  of  the  court  of  the  state  whose 
people  are  to  be  affected  by  the  operation  of  the  law.  * ' 

§235.  Right  to  compel  abutting  owner  of  dwelling 
house  to  connect  it  with  a  sewer.  In  District  of  Columbia 
V.  Brooke,  214  U.  S.  138,  it  was  held  that  the  attempt 
made  in  an  act  of  Congress  creating  a  drainage  system  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  under  which  an  abutting  owner 
is  assessed  for  the  expense  of  connecting  her  property 
with  a  sewer,  give  a  controlling  evidential  effect  to  the 
existence  of  such  improvements,  does  not  deprive  such 
owner  of  due  process  of  law.  The  Court  said:  ** How- 
ever, the  question  of  the  power  of  Congress,  broadly  con- 
sidered, to  discriminate  in  its  legislation,  is  not  necessary 
to  decide,  for,  whether  such  power  is  expressly  or  im- 
pliedly prohibited,  the  prohibition  can  not  be  stricter  or 
more  extensive  than  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  is  upon 
the  states.  That  amendment  is  unqualified  in  its  declara- 
tion that  a  state  shall  not  *  deny  to  any  person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.'  Passing 
on  that  amendment,  we  have  repeatedly  decided — so  often 
that  a  citation  of  the  cases  is  unnecessary — ^that  it  does 
not  take  from  the  states  the  power  of  classification.  And 
also  that  such  classification  need  not  be  either  logically 
appropriate  or  scientifically  accurate.  The  problems 
which  are  met  in  the  government  of  human  beings  are 
different  from  those  involved  in  the  examination  of  the 
objects  of  the  physical  world,  and  assigning  them  to  their 
proper  associates." 

Due  ProcesB— 30 


466  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  236 

§  236.  Right  of  Congress  to  confiscate  an  o£Bice  without 
compensation.  In  Alvrez  y  Sanchez  v.  United  States, 
216  U.  S.  167,  it  was  held  that  without  a  violation  of  the 
due  process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  Congress 
could  confiscate  the  office  of  solicitor  of  the  courts  of  first 
instance  in  the  capital  of  Porto  Rico,  lawfully  purchased 
in  perpetuity,  prior  to  the  occupation  of  the  island  by  the 
military  authorities  of  this  country,  and  the  cession  of  the 
island  to  the  United  States.  The  Court  said:  **It  is 
clear  that  claimant  is  not  entitled  to  be  compensated  for 
his  office  by  the  United  States  because  of  its  exercise  of 
an  authority  unquestionably  possessed  by  it  as  the  lawful 
sovereign  of  the  island  and  its  inhabitants.  The  abolition 
of  the  office  was  not,  we  think,  in  violation  of  any  pro- 
vision of  the  Constitution,  nor  did  it  infringe  any  right 
of  property  which  the  claimant  court  assert  as  against 
the  United  States.  See  O'Reilly  de  Camara  t.  Brooke, 
209  U.  S,  45.'^ 


§  237.  How  railroad  property  may  be  burdened  by  the 
construction  of  a  bridge  over  a  highway.  In  Cincinnati, 
I  and  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Connersville,  218  U.  S.  336,  it  was  held 
that  the  guaranty  of  due  process,  requiring  that  com- 
pensation be  made  when  private  property  is  taken  for 
public  use,  was  not  violated  when  the  expense  of  con- 
structing a  railway  bridge  over  a  highway,  made  neces- 
sary by  the  action  of  a  municipality  in  opening  such  high- 
way through  the  railway  company's  embankment,  was 
cast  upon  such  company.  The  Court  said :  *  *  If  the  rail- 
way company  was  not  entitled  to  compensation  on  account 
of  the  construction  of  this  bridge, — ^whether  regard  be 
had  to  the  Fifth  or  the  Fourteenth  Amendments  of  the 
Constitution,  or  to  the  general  reserved  police  power  of 
the  state, — then  it  is  clear  that  the  jury  were  not  mis- 
directed as  to  what  should  be  considered  by  them  in  esti- 
mating the  damages  which,  under  the  law,  the  railway 
company  was  entitled  to  recover.  The  question  as  to  the 
right  of  the  railway  company  to  be  reimbursed  for  any 


S  239  VESTED  EIGHTS  467 

moneys  necessarily  expended  in  constructing  the  bridge 
in  question  is,  we  think,  concluded  by  former  decisions  of 
this  court ;  particularly  by  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  E.  Co.  v.  Illi- 
nois, 200  U.  S.  562,  584,  591 ;  New  Orleans  Gaslight  Co.  v. 
Drainage  Com'rs,  197  U.  S.  453;  New  York  &  N.  E.  R. 
Co.  V.  Bristol,  151  U.  S.  556,  571 ;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  B.  Co. 
V.  Chicago,  166  U.  S.  226 ;  Northern  Transp.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, 99  U.  S.  635. ' ' 

§238.  Amounts  awarded  as  damages  against  lands 
within  a  designated  area  in  street  extension  proceedings. 
In  Briscoe  v.  Rudolph,  221  U.  S.  547,  it  was  held  that  an 
act  of  Congress  providing  that  one  half  the  amount 
awarded  as  damages  in  certain  street  extension  proceed- 
ings be  assessed  against  the  lands  within  a  designated 
area  as  benefits,  considering  the  benefits  received  by  each 
lot  within  such  area,  where  there  is  nothing  to  show 
that  the  actual  assessments  thereunder  were  in  substan- 
tial excess  of  the  benefits,  was  not  a  taking  of  private 
property  for  public  use  without  compensation.  The 
Court  said :  *'In  Webster  v.  Fargo,  181  U.  S.  394,  it  was 
held  that  a  state  might  create  such  special  taxing  dis- 
tricts, and  charge  the  whole  or  part  of  the  cost  of  local 
improvement  upon  the  property  in  the  district  either 
according  to  valuation,  superficial  area  or  frontage.  That 
it  is  within  the  power  of  Congress  to  create  a  special 
improvement  district,  and  charge  the  cost  of  an  improve- 
ment therein  according  to  the  benefits  received  by  prop- 
ertv  within  such  district,  has  been  more  than  once 
affirmed.  Bauman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548 ;  Wight  v.  David- 
son, 181  U.  S.  371 ;  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia,  205 
IT.  S.  135;  Columbia  Heights  Realty  Co.  v.  Rudolph,  217 
U.S.  547." 

§239.  Restraint  on  land  owner  drawing  unnatural 
quantities  of  mineral  waters  from  common  source  of  sup- 
ply. In  Lindsley  v.  Natural  Carbonic  Gas  Co.,  220 
U.  S.  61,  it  was  held  that  a  statute  of  New  York  forbid- 


468  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  239 

ding  a  landowner  engaged  in  collecting  and  vending  as  a 
separate  commodity  the  carbonic  acid  gas  contained  in 
natural  mineral  waters  in  a  common  underground  reser- 
voir  from  pumping  or  drawing  artificially,  by  meansi  of 
wells  on  his  property,  unnatural  quantities  of  such  water 
from  the  common  source  of  supply,  and  wasting  them  to 
the  injury  or  impairment  of  the  rights  of  other  proprie- 
tors, did  not  deprive  such  landowner  of  the  due  process  of 
law  secured  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The  Court 
in  this  unique  case  said:  '^Coming  to  the  provision  in 
question,  it  is  necessary  to  inquire  what  construction  has 
been  put  upon  it  by  the  highest  court  of  the  state,  for  that 
construction  must  be  accepted  by  the  courts  of  the  United 
States,  and  be  regarded  by  them  as  a  part  of  the  provision 
when  they  are  called  upon  to  determine  whether  it  vio- 
lates any  right  secured  by  the  Federal  Constituttion. 
Weightman  v.  Clark,  103  U.  S.  256,  260;  Morley  v.  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  E.  Co.,  146  TJ.  S.  162, 166;  Olsen  v.  Smith, 
195  IT.  S.  333,  342.  The  court  of  appeals  of  the  state  had 
the  statute  before  it  in  Hawthorn  v.  Natural  Carbouio 
Gas.  Co.,  194  N.  Y.  326,  and  again  in  People  v.  New  York 
Carbonic  Acid  Gas  Co.,  196  N.  Y.  421,  and  the  elaborate 
opinions  then  rendered  disclose  that  the  court,  having 
regard  to  the  title  of  the  act  and  to  the  doctrine  of  correla- 
tive rights  in  percolating  waters  which  prevails  in  that 
state,  as  recognized  in  Forbell  v.  New  York,  164  N.  Y.  522, 
construed  this  provision,  not  as  prohibiting  the  specified 
acts  absolutely  or  unqualifiedly,  but  only  when  the  min- 
eral waters  are  drawn  from  a  source  of  supply  not  con- 
fined to  the  lands  of  the  actor,  but  extending  into  or 
through  the  lands  of  others,  and  then  only  when  the  draft 
made  upon  that  source  of  supply  is  unreasonable  or  waste- 
ful, considering  that  is  a  coequal  right  in  all  the  surface 
owners  to  draw  upon  it.  In  other  words,  the  court,  by 
processes  of  interpretation  having  its  approval,  read  into 
the  provision  an  exception  or  qualification  making  it  inap- 
plicable where  the  waters  are  not  drawn  from  a  common 
source  of  supply,  and 'also  where,  if  they  be  drawn  from 


§  241  VESTED  RIGHTS  469 

sncli  a  source,  no  injury  is  done  thereby  to  others  having 
a  like  right  to  resort  to  it.'*  The  fact  that  the  highest 
court  of  state  may  thus  amend  an  act  of  the  legislature, 
by  ** processes  of  interpretation  having  its  approval/' 
before  it  is  svhjected  to  the  final  test,  is  rich  in  philo- 
sophic interest. 

§240.  State  control  over  deposits  in  savinlfs  banks, 
inactive  and  unclaimed  for  thirty  years.  In  Provident 
Institution  for  Savings  v.  Malone,  221  U.  S.  660,  it  was 
held  that  a  statute  directing  that  deposits  in  a  savings 
bank  that  have  remained  inactive  and  unclaimed  for 
thirty  years,  in  cases  where  the  claimant  is  unknown  or 
the  depositor  can  not  be  found,  shall  be  paid  to  the  treas- 
urer and  receiver  general  of  the  state  to  be  held  by  him 
as  trustee  for  the  use  of  the  true  owner  or  his  legal  rep- 
resentatives, does  not  deprive  such  bank  of  its  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  The  Court  said :  *  *  The  stat- 
ute here  is  reasonable  in  its  terms  and  is  so  framed  as 
to  work  injustice  to  no  one.  It  only  applies  to  cases 
where  no  deposit  has  been  made,  no  interest  added  on  pass 
book,  no  check  drawn  against  the  account,  for  thirty  years, 
and  where  no  claunant  is  known,  and  the  depositor  can 
not  be  found. ' ' 

§241.  Making  a  municipality  liable  for  damages  to 
property  within  its  limits  caused  by  a  mob.  In  Chicago 
V.  Sturges,  222  IT.  S.  313,  it  was  held  that  a  statute  of 
Illinois,  saving  to  the  property  owner  his  action  against 
rioters  and  giving  to  the  municipality  a  lien  upon  any 
judgment  against  participants  for  reimbursement,  or  a 
remedy  to  the  municipality  directly  against  the  individ- 
uals causing  the  damage,  to  the  amount  of  any  judgment 
it  may  have  paid  the  sufferer,  did  not  deny  due  process  to 
the  municipality  because  it  imposed  upon  it  liability  for 
three-fourths  of  the  damage  done  to  property  within  its 
limits  by  a  mob  or  riot,  irrespective  of  any  question  of  the 
power  of  such  municipality  to  have  prevented  the  same  by 


470  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  241 

its  own  acts.  In  the  words  of  Mr.  Justice  Lurton:  **It  is 
said  that  the  act  denies  to  the  city  due  process  of  law, 
since  it  imposes  liability  irrespective  of  any  question  of 
the  power  of  the  city  to  have  prevented  the  violence,  or 
of  negligence  in  the  use  of  its  power.  •  .  •  The  state 
is  the  creator  of  subordinate  municipal  governments.  It 
vests  in  them  the  police  powers  essential  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  law  and  order.  It  imposes  upon  them  the  duty  of 
protecting  property  situated  within  their  limits  from  the 
violence  of  such  public  breaches  of  the  peace  as  are  mobs 
and  riots.  This  duty  and  obligation  thus  intrusted  to  the 
local  subordinate  government  is  by  this  enactment  em- 
phasized and  enforced  by  imposing  upon  the  local  com- 
munity absolute  liability  for  property  losses  resulting 
from  the  violence  of  such  tumults. '  ^  It  was  likewise  held 
that  due  process  was  not  denied  to  a  township,  compelled 
by  the  power  of  a  state  to  levy  and  collect,  as  one  of  its 
political  divisions,  taxes  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the 
amount  assessed  against  such  township  for  the  public 
benefits  accruing  from  the  construction  of  a  drain.  Soliah 
V.  Heskin,  222  U.  S.  522. 

§  242.  Due  process  denied  to  a  railroad  company  sub- 
jected to  double  liability  and  an  attorney's  fee.  Only 
at  long  intervals  does  the  court  find  a  case  in  which  it 
can  actually  enforce  the  protection  guaranteed  by  due 
process.  Belief  was  given  in  St.  Louis,  L  M.  &  S.  B.  Co. 
V.  Wyime,  224  U.  S.  354,  in  which  it  was  held  that  a  rail- 
road company's  property  was  taken  without  due  process 
of  law  by  an  Arkansas  statute  imposing  double  liability 
and  an  attorney's  fee  for  a  refusal  to  pay  within  thirty 
days  an  excessive  demand  for  the  killing  of  live  stock  by 
one  of  its  trains.  The  Court  said :  *  *  The  owner  of  two 
horses  which  were  killed  within  the  state  by  a  train  of  a 
railroad  company  served  upon  the  company  a  written 
notice  demanding  damages  in  the  sum  of  $500.  The  com- 
pany refused  to  pay  the  demand,  and  after  the  expiration 
of  thirty  days  the  owner  brought  suit  in  a  court  of  the 


§  243  VESTED  RIGHTS  471 

state  to  recover  his  damages^  alleged  in  the  complaint  to  he 
$400.  A  trial  by  jury  resulted  in  a  verdict  for  the  owner, 
assessing  his  damages  at  the  amount  sued  for,  and  the 
court,  deeming  the  statute  applicable,  gave  judgment  for 
double  that  amount  and  for  an  attorney's  fee  of  $50.  The 
company  objected  that  the  statute,  as  thus  applied,  was 
repugnant  to  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  •  .  .  We  think  the  conclusion  is  un- 
avoidable that  the  statute,  as  so  construed  and  applied,  is 
an  arbitrary  exercise  of  the  powers  of  government  and 
violative  of  the  fundamental  rights  embraced  within  the 
conception  of  due  process  of  law.  It  does  not  merely  pro- 
vide a  reasonable  incentive  for  the  prompt  settlement, 
without  suit,  of  just  demands  of  a  class  admitting  of 
special  treatment  by  the  legislature,  as  was  the  case  with 
the  statute  considered  in  Seaboard  Air  Line  Co.  v.  See- 
gers,  207  TJ.  S.  73,  but  attaches  onerous  penalties  to  the 
nonpayment  of  extravagant  demands,  thereby  making 
submission  to  them  the  preferable  alternative. ' ' 

§  243.  A  state  may  take  away  the  property  of  an  absen- 
tee, tmder  certain  circumstances,  without  a  denial  of  due 
process.  In  Blinn  v.  Nelson,  222  U.  S.  1,  it  was  held  that 
a  state  statute  fixing  the  time  for  the  distribution  of  the 
estate  of  an  absentee,  and  for  the  barring  of  actions  relat- 
ing to  the  property,  is  not  so  unreasonable  and  arbitrary 
as  to  offend  the  principles  embodied  in  due  process, 
because  its  provisions  bar  the  rights  of  the  absentee  abso- 
lutely after  one  year  from  a  receiver's  appointment,  in 
the  event  that  such  appointment  was  not  made  within 
thirteen  years  from  the  date  of  the  disappearance  of 
the  absentee,  in  other  words,  after  fourteen  years  from 
such  disappearance.  The  Court  said:  **If  the  legis- 
lature thinks  that  a  year  is  long  enough  to  allow  a 
party  to  recover  his  property  from  a  third  hand,  and 
establishes  that  time  in  cases  where  he  has  not  been 
heard  of  for  fourteen  years,  and  presumably  is  dead,  it 
acts  within  its  constitutional  discretion.    Now  and  then 


472  DUE  PEOCESS  OF  LAW  §  243 

an  extraordinary  case  may  turn  np,  but^  constitutional 
laWy  like  other  mortal  contrivances,  has  to  take  some 
chances,  and  in  the  great  majority  of  instances,  no  doubt, 
justice  is  done.  See  American  Land  Co.  v.  Zeiss,  supra 
(219  U.  S.  47,  67).  Shorter  time  than  one  year  has  been 
upheld.  Kentucky  Union  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  219  TJ.  S.  140, 
156 ;  Turner  v.  New  York,  168  TJ.  S.  90 ;  Terry  v.  Ander- 
son, 95  U.  S.  628.  See  Soper  v.  Lawrence  Bros.  Co.,  201 
U.S.  359,  369.'' 

§  244.  Creek  freedmen  by  blood  whose  names  had  been 
duly  entered  on  the  rolls  entitled  to  protection  by  due 
process.  In  United  States  ex  rel.  Turner  v.  Fisher,  222 
U.  S.  204,  the  Court  said:  **1.  Where,  under  the  provi- 
sions of  acts  of  Congress,  and  after  a  hearing,  the  names 
of  relators  were  duly  entered  as  Creek  freedmen  by  blood 
on  the  rolls  made  and  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Interior,  rights  were  acquired  of  which  the  freedmen 
could  not  be  deprived  without  that  character  of  notice 
and  opportunity  to  be  heard  essential  to  due  process  of 
law.  Garfield  v.  United  States,  211  U.  S.  249.  2.  Notice 
to  the  attorney  of  such  freedmen,  given  a  few  hours  before 
the  hearing  of  a  motion  to  strike  their  names,  on  the 
ground  that  their  enrollment  had  been  secured  by  per- 
jury, was  not  such  notice  as  afforded  due  process. 
Eoller  V.  Holly,  176  U.  S.  399 ;  Hagar  v.  Eeclamation  Dist. 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  708 ;  Iowa  C.  E.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  160  U.  S. 
393 ;  Hovey  v.  Elliott,  167  U.  S.  414.^^ 

§  245.  One  man's  property  can  not  be  taken  and  given 
to  another  contrary  to  settled  usages  and  modes  of  pro- 
cedure. Such  was  the  essence  of  the  notable  judgment 
rendered  in  Ochoa  v.  Hernandez  y  Morales,  230  U.  S.  139, 
in  which  the  Court  said :  **  Without  the  guaranty  of  'due 
process '  the  right  of  private  property  cannot  be  said  to 
exist,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  known  to  our  laws.  The 
principle,  known  to  the  common  law  before  Magna  Carta, 
was  embodied  in  that  Charter  (2  Coke,  Inst.  45,  50),  and 


§  246  VESTED  BIGHTS  473 

has  been  recognized  since  the  Revolution  as  among  the 
safest  foundations  of  our  institutions.  Whatever  else 
may  be  certain  about  the  definition  of  the  term  *due  proc- 
ess of  law, '  all  authorities  agree  that  it  inhibits  the  taking 
of  one  man's  property  and  giving  it  to  another  contrary 
to  settled  usages  and  modes  of  procedure,  and  without 
notice  or  an  opportunity  for  a  hearing.  .  .  .  With 
reference  to  statutes  of  limitations,  it  is  well  settled  that 
they  may  be  modified  by  shortening  the  time  prescribed, 
but  only  if  this  be  done  while  the  time  is  still  running, 
and  so  that  a  reasonable  time  still  remains  for  the  com- 
mencement of  an  action  before  the  bar  takes  effect.  Terry 
V.  Anderson,  95  U.  S.  628,  632;  Re  Brown,  135  IT.  S.  662, 
701,  705 ;  Wheeler  v.  Jackson,  137  IT.  S.  245,  255 ;  Turner 
V.  New  York,  168  TJ.  S.  90,  94;  Wilson  v.  Iseminger,  185 
U.  S.  55,  63.  .  .  .  Since  the  proceeding  for  convert- 
ing the  entry  of  possession  into  a  dominio  title,  as  well  as 
the  proceeding  for  an  entry  of  possession  itself,  was 
taken  without  notice  to  the  owners,  the  effect  of  the  judi- 
cial order  was  precisely  the  same  as  if  the  military  gov- 
ernor had  declared  that  the  property  in  question  should 
be  taken  from  the  lawful  owner  and  given  to  the  fraudu- 
lent occupanf 

§246.  When  the  property  rights  of  a  private  water 
company  may  be  taken  away  by  the  municipal  construc- 
tion of  a  competing  plant.  In  Madera  Waterworks  v. 
Madera,  228  U.  S.  454,  it  was  held  that  such  a  result  might 
be  worked  out,  without  a  violation  of  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  in  the  absence  of 
contract  immunity  from  such  competition,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  waterworks  company  may  be  forbidden  by  the 
local  law  to  apply  its  property  to  other  uses,  and  may  be 
called  upon  to  pay  taxes  to  help  its  rival  to  succeed.  The 
Court  said:  **An  appeal  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
to  protect  property  from  a  congenital  defect  must  be 
vain.  Abilene  Nat.  Bank  v.  DoUey,  228  U.  S.  1,  5.  It  is 
impossible  not  to  feel  the  force  of  the  plaintiff's  argument 


474  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  246 

as  a  reason  for  interpreting  the  Constitution  so  as  to 
avoid  the  result,  if  it  might  be,  but  it  comes  too  late. 
There  is  no  pretense  that  there  is  any  express  promise  to 
private  adventurers  that  they  shall  not  encounter  subse- 
quent municipal  competition.  We  do  not  find  any  lan- 
guage that  even  encourages  that  hope,  and  the  principles 
established  in  this  class  of  cases  forbid  us  to  resort  to  the 
fiction  that  a  promise  is  implied.  The  constitutional  pos- 
sibility of  such  a  ruinous  competition  is  recognized  in  the 
cases,  and  is  held  not  sufficient  to  justify  the  implication 
of  a  contract.  Hamilton  Gaslight  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Hamilton, 
146  U.  S.  258 ;  Joplin  v.  Southwest  Missouri  Light  Co.,  191 
U.  S.  150,  156;  Helena  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Helena,  195 
U.S.  383,  388,  392.*' 

§247.  Due  process  denied  by  imposition  of  excessive 
penalties.  In  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Tucker,  230  U.  S.  340, 
it  was  held  that  property  was  taken  without  due  process 
of  law,  contrary  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  through 
the  imposition  hy  a  state  statute  of  a  liability  of  $500  as 
liquidated  damages,  along  with  a  reasonable  attorney's 
fee,  for  every  charge  by  a  common  carrier  in  excess  of 
the  rates  therein  fixed  for  shipments  of  oil  between  points 
within  the  state.  The  Court  said:  **The  state  court, 
although  recognizing  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  is 
not  free  from  difficulty,  reached  the  conclusion  that  *so 
long  as  the  defendant  [the  carrier]  can  not  be  made  to 
suflfer  until  a  competent  court  has  passed  upon  the  justice 
of  the  legislative  rates,  the  guaranties  of  the  Federal 
Constitution  are  not  infringed. '  But  that  this  view  fails 
to  recognize  the  real  plight  of  the  carrier  is  made  plain 
by  the  following  extract  from  the  opinion  in  Ex  parte 
Young,  209  U.  S.  123 :  *If  the  law  be  such  as  to  make  the 
decision  of  the  legislature  of  the  commission  conclusive 
as  to  the  sufficiencv  of  the  rates,  this  court  has  held  such 
a  law  to  be  unconstitutional.  Chicago,  M,  &  St.  P.  R.  Co. 
V.  Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  418.  A  law  which  indirectly 
accomplishes  a  like  result  by  imposing  such  conditions 


§  248  VESTED  RIGHTS  475 

upon  the  ri^ht  to  appeal  for  judicial  relief  as  works  an 
abandonment  of  the  right  rather  than  face  the  conditions 
upon  which  it  is  offered  or  may  be  obtained  is  also  uncon- 
stitutional. It  may  therefore  be  said  that  when  the  pen- 
alties for  disobedience  are  by  fines  so  enormous  and 
imprisonment  so  severe  as  to  intimidate  the  company  and 
its  officers  from  resorting  to  the  courts  to  test  the  valid- 
ity of  the  legislation,  the  result  is  the  same  as  if  the  law 
in  terms  prohibited  the  company  from  seeking  judicial 
construction  of  laws  which  deeply  affect  its  rights/  *' 

§248.  Claim  of  abutting  owners  to  compensation  for 
consequential  diamages  a  vested  right  protected  by  due 
process.  In  Ettor  v.  Tacoma,  228  U.  S.  148,  it  was  held 
that  the  claim  of  abutting  owners  to  compensation  for 
consequential  damages  growing  out  of  an  original  street 
grading  made  under  municipal  direction,  drawn  from 
state  laws,  which  were  the  only  legislative  authorization 
for  such  municipal  action,  constituted  a  vested  right  of 
property  protected  from  destruction  by  a  repeal  of  the 
compensation  provision  after  the  damage  had  occurred. 
The  Court  said :  *  *  The  necessary  effect  of  the  repealing 
act,  as  construed  and  applied  by  the  court  below,  was  to 
deprive  the  plaintiffs  in  error  of  any  remedy  to  enforce 
the  fixed  liability  of  the  city  to  make  compensation.  This 
was  to  deprive  the  plaintiffs  in  error  of  a  right  which 
had  vested  before  the  repealing  act, — a  right  which  was 
in  every  sense  a  property  right.  Nothing  remained  to 
be  done  to  complete  the  plaintiffs '  right  to  compensation 
except  the  ascertainment  of  the  amount  of  damages  to 
their  property.  The  right  of  the  plaintiffs  in  error  was 
fixed  by  the  law  in  force  when  their  property  was  damaged 
for  public  purposes,  and  the  right  so  vested  can  not  be 
defeated  by  subsequent  legislation.  Elgin  v.  Eaton,  83 
111.  535 ;  Healy  v.  New  Haven,  49  Conn.  394 ;  Harrrington 
V.  Berkshire,  22  Pick.  263;  People  ex  rel.  Fountain  v. 
Westchester  County,  4  Barb.  64,  are  cases  arising  under 
street  or  highway  statutes.    The  principle  has  been  ap- 


476  DUE  PEOCESS  OF  LAW  §  248 

plied  in  reference  to  rights  axscruing  under  a  variety  of 
statutes  when  affected  by  a  subsequent  change  of  the  law. 
Pacific  Mail  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Joliffe,  2  Wall.  450;  Miller  v. 
Union  Mill  Co.,  45  Wash.  199 ;  Grey  v.  Mobile  Trade  Co., 
55  Ala.  388;  Stephens  v.  MarshaU,  3  Pinney  (Wis.)  203; 
Gorman  v.  McArdle,  67  Hun  484,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  479; 
Westervelt  v.  Gregg,  12  N.  Y.  202 ;  Creighton  v.  Pragg, 
21  Cal.  115;  State  Trust  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  P.  &  G.  R. 
Co.,  115  Fed.  367.^' 

§  249.  Initial  cost  of  spur  track  for  public  use  may  be 
imposed  upon  a  single  industry.  In  Union  Lime  Co.  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  233  U.  S.  211,  it  was  held  that 
the  condemnation  of  the  land  needed  for. the  extension  of 
a  railroad  spur  track  ordered  by  a  state  railroad  commis- 
sion, although  such  extension  be  made  for  the  present 
benefit  of  a  single  industry  that  is  to  bear  the  initial 
cost,  is  not  a  taking  of  private  property  protected  by  due 
process,  where  the  state  courts  declare  the  use  to  be  a 
public  use,  on  the  ground  that,  subject  to  the  subsequent 
equitable  division  of  initial  cost,  such  spur  track  is  an 
integral  of  the  railroad  system  and,  as  such,  at  the  service 
of  the  public.  The  Court  said:  **It  was  said  by  this 
Court  in  Hairston  v.  Danville  &  W.  R.  Co.,  208  U.  S.  598, 
608 :  *  The  uses  for  which  the  track  was  desired  are  not 
the  less  public  because  the  motive  which  declared  its 
location  over  this  particular  land  was  to  reach  a  private 
industry,  or  because  the  proprietors  of  that  industry 
contributed  in  any  way  to  the  cost.  There  is  a  clear  dis- 
tinction betwen  spurs  which  are  owned  and  operated  by 
a  common  carrier  as  a  part  of  a  system  and  under  its 
public  obligation  and  merely  private  sidings.  See  De 
Camp  V.  Hibemia  Underground  R.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  L.  43 ; 
Chicago,  B.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter,  43  Minn.  527 ;  XJlmer 
V.  Lime  Rock  R.  Co.,  98  Me.  579 ;  St.  Louis,  L  M.  &  S.  R. 
Co.  V.  Petty,  57  Ark.  359 ;  Dietrich  v.  Murdock,  42  Mo. 
279;  Bedford  Quarries  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  L  and  L.  R. 
Co.,  175  Ind.  303."    See  in  connection  with  this  case, 


§  251  VESTED  EIGHTS  477 

Grand  Trunk  E.  Co.  v.  Michigan  E.  Commission,  231 U.  S. 
457;  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  E.  Co.  v.  Minneapolis,  232 
U.  S.  430. 


§  250.  Due  process  denied  by  exaction  of  double  liabU- 
1^  for  failure  to  pay  damages  within  a  certain  time.  In 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  E.  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  232  U.  S.  628,  it 
was  held  that  there  was  a  taking  of  private  property 
without  due  process  through  a  state  law  imposing  a  double 
liability  on  a  railroad  company  failing  to  pay,  within 
sixty  days,  a  claim  for  damage  caused  by  fire  set  by  a 
locomotive,  except  where  the  owner  recovers  a  less  sum 
as  damages  than  the  amount  of  any  tender  by  such  com- 
pany, in  which  case  the  latter  is  to  recover  its  costs.  The 
court  rested  its  decision  upon  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  E.  Co. 
V.  Polt,  232  U.  S.  165,  in  which  it  was  said:  ''No  doubt 
the  states  have  a  large  latitude  in  the  policy  that  they 
will  pursue  and  enforce,  but  the  rudiments  of  fair  play 
required  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  are  wanting 
when  a  defendant  is  required  to  guess  what  a  jury  will 
find,  or  pay  double  if  that  body  sees  fit  to  add  1  cent  to 
the  amount  that  was  tendered,  although  the  tender  was 
obviously  futile  because  of  an  excessive  demand.  The 
case  is  covered  by  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  E.  Co.  v.  Wynne, 
224  U.  S.  354/' 

§  251.  When  double  liability  and  an  attorney's  fee  may 
be  exacted  without  denial  of  due  process.  In  Kansas 
City  S.  E.  Co.  V.  Anderson,  233  TJ.  S.  325,  it  was  held 
that  due  process  was  not  denied  by  the  imposition  under 
state  law  of  double  liability  and  an  attorney's  fee  upon 
a  railroad  company  refusing  to  pay  for  the  killing  of  live 
stock  by  one  of  its  trains  within  thirty  days  after  the 
owner's  demand,  when  the  justice  of  the  demand  is  fully 
established  in  the  suit  resulting  from  the  refusal  to  pay. 
The  Court  said:  **In  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  E.  Co.  v.  Polt, 
232  U.  S.  165,  a  statute  of  South  Dakota  was  passed  upon 
which  makes  a  railroad  liable  for  double  damages  if, 


478  DUE  PEOCESS  OF  LAW  §  251 

within  sixty  days  after  demand,  it  does  not  pay  the  dam- 
ages actually  sustained  for  property  destroyed  by  fire 
communicated  from  its  locomotive  engine.  The  plaintiflF 
in  the  case  got  a  verdict  for  less  than  he  demanded,  but 
for  more  than  the  railroad  offered.  Judgment  for  double 
the  amount  of  the  verdict  was  entered  and  sustained  by 
the  supreme  court  of  the  state.  It  was  reversed  by  this 
court,  the  ruling  of  the  Wynne  case,  supra,  being  applied. 
We  said :  *  The  case  is  not  like  those  in  which  a  moderate 
penalty  is  imposed  for  failure  to  satisfy  a  demand  found 
to  be  just.  Yazoo  &  M.  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson  Vinegar 
Co.,  supra  [226  U.  S.  217].'  It  is  contended,  however, 
that  the  statute  having  been  declared  unconstitutional  as 
applied  to  one  state  of  facts  that  properly  raises  the 
question,  it  is  void  for  all  purposes.  The  contention  is 
based  on  the  assumption  that  we  decided  the  statute  in 
the  Wynne  case  to  be  unconstitutional;  but  the  ground 
of  the  decision  was,  as  we  have  se^,  that  the  statute  was 
there  applied  to  a  case  where  the  plaintiff  in  the  action 
had  recovered  less  than  he  demanded  before  the  suit.  We 
decline  to  extend  our  opinion  to  cases  where  the  amount 
of  the  judgment  corresponded  to  the  demand;  in  other 
words,  declined  to  pronounce  the  act  entirely  unconstitu- 
tional.'* See  also,  Missouri,  K.  and  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris, 
234  U.  S.  412,  in  which  it  was  held  that  due  process  was 
not  denied  by  a  Texas  law  allowing  a  reasonable  attor- 
ney's fee,  not  exceeding  $20  to  the  successful  plaintiff  in 
a  litigation  in  which  such  attorney  is  actually  employed 
upon  a  claim  not  exceeding  $200,  against  *  *  any  person  or 
corporation  doing  business  in  this  state,  for  personal 
service  rendered,  or  for  labor  done,  or  for  material  fur- 
nished, or  for  overcharges  on  freight  or  express,  or  for 
any  claim  for  lost  or  damaged  freight,  or  for  stock  killed 
or  injured  by  such  person  or  corporation,  its  agent  or 
employees,"  where  the  claim  is  not  paid  in  thirty  days 
after  demand,  and  the  recovery  is  for  the  full  amount 
claimed. 


§  252  VESTED  EIGHTS  479 


§  252.  Due  process  not  denied  by  state  law  prohibiting 
killing  of  wild  bird  or  animal  by  unnaturalized  foreign- 
bom  resident  In  Patsone  v.  Pennsylvania,  232  U.  S. 
138,  it  was  held  that  there  was  no  deprivation  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law  by  a  state  statute  prohibiting 
the  killing  by  an  unnaturalized  foreign-born  resident  of 
any  wild  bird  or  animal,  except  in  defense  of  person  or 
proi)erty;  and  **to  that  end*'  making  it  unlawful  for  any 
such  person  to  own  or  be  possessed  of  a  rifle  or  shotgun. 
The  Court  said :  *  *  Under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  the 
objection  is  twofold :  unjustly  depriving  the  alien  of  prop- 
erty, and  discrimination  against  such  aliens  as  a  class. 
But  the  former  really  depends  upon  the  latter,  since  it 
hardly  can  be  disputed  that  if  the  lawful  object,  the  pro- 
tection of  wild  life  (Greer  v.  Connecticut,  161  U.  S.  519), 
warrants  the  discrimination,  the  means  adopted  for 
making  it  effective  also  might  be  adopted.  The  possession 
of  rifles  and  shotguns  is  not  necessary  for  other  purposes 
not  within  the  statute.  .  .  .  The  prohibition  does  not 
extend  to  weapons  such  as  pistols  that  may  be  supposed 
to  be  needed  occasionally  for  self  defense.  So  far,  the 
case  is  within  the  principle  of  Lawton  v.  Steele,  152  TJ.  S. 
133.  See  further.  New  York  ex  rel.  Silz  v.  Hesterberg, 
211  U.  S.  31 ;  Purity  Extract  &  Tonic  Co.  v.  Lynch,  226 
U.  S.  192.  The  discrimination  undoubtedly  presents  a 
more  diflScult  question.  But  we  start  with  the  general 
consideration  that  a  state  may  classify  with  reference  to 
the  evil  to  be  prevented,  and  that  if  the  class  discriminated 
against  is,  or  reasonably  might  be  considered  to  define 
those  from  whom  the  evil  mainly  is  to  be  feared,  it 
properly  may  be  picked  out.**  The  conclusion  reached 
on  that  branch  of  the  subject  is  this:  *'The  question 
therefore  narrows  itself  to  whether  this  court  can  say 
that  the  legislature  of  Pennsylvania  was  not  warranted 
in  assuming  as  its  premise  for  the  law  that  resident  un- 
naturalized aliens  were  the  peculiar  source  of  the  evil 
that  it  desired  to  prevent.  Barrett  v.  Indiana,  229  TJ.  S. 
26,29.** 


480  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  253 

§  253.  When  state  tax  imposed  upon  gross  earnings  of 
railroads  is  not  confiscatory.  In  Ohio  and  W.  B.  Co.  v. 
Dittey,  232  U.  S.  576,  it  was  held  that  a  state  tax  can  not 
be  said  to  be  confiscatory,  as  rendering  railway  franchises 
valueless,  merely  because  the  present  earnings  of  the  rail- 
road are  not  adequate  to  pay  more  than  can  be  derived 
from  high  grade  investments,  readily  available  on  the 
market,  or  may  not  even  be  adequate  to  defray  operating 
exi)en8es.  The  Court  said :  *  *  The  tax  is,  however,  in  sub- 
stance as  well  as  in  form,  an  excise  or  privilege  tax.  Its 
reasonableness,  unless  some  Federal  right  be  violated,  is 
within  the  discretion  of  the  state  legislature.  We  have 
seen  that  the  classification  adopted  can  not  be  deemed 
illusory;  that  is,  there  is  no  apparent  violation  of  the 
equality  provisions  of  the  state  Constitution  or  of  the 
*  equal  protection  *  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
although  railroad  and  pipe  line  companies  are  required 
to  pay  at  the  rate  of  4  per  cent  of  the  annual  intrastate 
earnings,  while  other  public-service  corporations  pay  a 
less  percentage.  It  is,  of  course,  entirely  settled  that  a 
state  can  not,  consistently  with  the  Federal  control  of 
interstate  commerce,  lay  such  taxes,  either  upon  property 
rights  or  upon  franchises  or  privileges,  as  in  effect  to 
burden  such  conmierce.  But  the  line  is  not  always  easily 
drawn,  as  recent  cases  sufficiently  show.  Galveston,  H.  & 
S.  A.  R.  Co.  V.  Texas,  210  U.  S.  217,  225,  229;  United 
States  Exp.  Co.  v.  Minnesota,  223  TJ.  S.  335, 344;  Williams 
V.  Talladega,  226  U.  S.  404, 416 ;  Baltic  Min.  Co.  v.  Massa- 
chusetts, 231  U.  S.  68.  The  present  act  does  not  on  its 
face  manifest  a  purpose  to  interfere  with  interstate  com- 
merce, afnd  we  are  unable  to  accept  the  historical  facts 
alluded  to  as  sufficient  evidence  of  a  sinister  purpose,  such 
as  would  justify  this  court  in  striking  down  the  law.*' 

§  254.  Due  process  not  denied  by  prohibiting  removal 
of  assets  from  safe  deposit  companies  under  certain  con- 
ditions. In  National  Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  Stead,  232 
U.  S.  58,  it  was  held  that  such  a  company  was  not  de- 


§  255  VESTED  EIGHTS  481 

prived  of  its  property  without  due  process  of  law  or 
arbitrarily  burdened  with  a  liability,  by  a  state  statute 
prohibiting  the  removal  of  the  contents  of  a  safe  deposit 
box,  after  the  death  of  the  renter,  whether  standing  solely 
in  his  name  or  held  jointly  with  others,  unless  the  com- 
pany retained  assets  sufficient  to  pay  the  state  inheritance 
tax.  The  Court  said :  *  *  The  Illinois  supreme  court  held 
that  the  relation  created  by  the  Deposit  Company  *s  con- 
tract was  that  of  bailor  and  bailee.  That  construction  by 
the  state  court  is  controlling,  unless,  as  claimed  by  the 
complainant,  it  makes  the  statute  violate  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  as  being  an  arbitrary  attempt  to  create  lia- 
bilities out  of  possession,  where  there  was  no  possession 
in  fact.  .  .  .  The  boxes  were  leased  with  the  knowl- 
edge that  the  state  had  so  legislated  as  not  only  to  protect 
the  interests  of  one  dying  after  the  rental,  but  also  to 
secure  the  payment  of  the  state  tax  out  of  whatever  might 
be  found  in  the  box  belonging  to  the  deceased.  The  incon- 
venience was  one  of  the  not  unreasonable  incidents  of  the 
joint  relationship.** 

§  255.  Due  process  not  denied  by  statute  declaring  that 
ten  years'  possession  by  a  disseizor  under  a  deed  gives 
title  to  all  land  covered  by  it.  In  Montoya  v.  Gonzales, 
232  U.  S.  375,  it  was  held  that  a  statute  of  Mexico  did  not 
deprive  of  their  property  without  due  process  of  law  the 
heirs  of  the  original  grantee  in  the  Alameda  land  grant 
by  providing  that  ten  years  *  possession  by  a  disseizor  of 
a  strip  of  such  grant,  lying  between  the  Eio  Grande  and 
the  foothills  to  the  West,  under  a  deed  purporting  to 
convey  the  land  from  the  river  westward  to  a  certain 
ridge,  gives  title  to  the  whole.  The  Court  said :  * '  They 
[the  interveners]  have  no  documentary  evidence  of  a 
title  derived  from  Juan  Gonzales,  but  they  and  their  pred- 
ecessors in  title  have  occupied  the  bottom  lands  between 
the  Eio  Grande  and  the  foothills  to  the  West  for  more 
than  ten  years  under  deeds  purporting  to  convey  a  fee 
simple  in  the  respective  strips  to  the  ridge  of  Eio  Puerco. 

Due  Process — 31 


482  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  255 

.  .  .  The  title  rests  upon  a  peculiar  statute  that  has 
been  in  force  unchanged  in  any  particular  affecting  this 
case,  it  is  said,  since  1858.  Comp.  Laws  1865,  chap.  73, 
§  1 ;  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  2937.  By  this  act,  possession  for 
ten  years,  under  a  deed  purporting  to  convey  a  fee  simple, 
of  any  lands  which  have  been  granted  by  Spain,  Mexico, 
or  the  United  States,  gives  title  in  fee  to  the  quantity  of 
land  specified  in  the  deed,  if,  during  the  ten  years,  no  claim 
by  suit  in  law  or  equity,  effectually  prosecuted,  shall  have 
been  set  up.  .  .  .  The  purpose  of  the  act  is  to  ripen 
disseizin  into  title  according  to  the  deed  under  which  the 
disseizor  holds,  and  it  is  especially  directed  against 
ancient  claims  such  as  the  appellants  set  up." 


§  256.  Right  to  alter  charters  can  not  be  so 
as  to  take  property  of  corporations  without  due  process. 

In  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  E.  Co.  v.  Wisconsin,  238  U.  S. 
491,  the  Court  said :  *  *  In  the  brief  of  counsel  for  the  state 
it  is  argued  that  the  statute  can  be  sustained  as  a  valid 
exercise  of  the  state's  reserved  power  to  alter  the  charter 
of  the  company.  That  question  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
raised  in  the  state  court,  nor  was  its  decision  based  on 
that  proposition.  Indeed,  such  a  ruling  would  seem  to 
have  been  opposed  to  State  ex  rel.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bailroad  Commission,  140  Wis.  157,  and  the  Water  Power 
Cases,  148  Wis.  124,  where  it  was  held  that  the  right  to 
amend  a  charter  does  not  authorize  the  taking  of  the 
company *s  property  without  just  compensation.  The 
same  view  has  been  repeatedly  expressed  in  the  decisions 
of  this  court.  For  example,  in  Shields  v.  Ohio,  95  U.  S. 
324,  it  was  said  that  *the  power  of  alteration  and  amend- 
ment is  not  without  limit.  The  alterations  must  be 
reasonable  .  .  .  and  be  consistent  with  the  scope  and 
object  of  the  act  of  incorporation.*  .  .  .  Again,  in 
Steams  v.  Minnesota,  179  U.  S.  223,  259,  it  was  held 
that  the  reserved  right  to  amend  a  corporate  charter  *  does 
not  confer  mere  arbitrary  power,  and  can  not  be  so  exer- 
cised as  to  violate  fundamental  principles  of  justice  by 


§  257  VESTED  RIGHTS  483 

.  .  .  taking  of  property  without  due  process  of  law/ 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  E.  Co.  v.  Smith,  173  U.  S,  690 ;  Stanis- 
laus County  V.  San  Joaquin  &  K.  River  Canal  &  Irrig.  Co., 
192  U.  S.  201 ;  Sinking  Fund  Cases,  99  U.  S.  720 ;  Miller  v. 
New  York,  15  Wall.  498.  See  also,  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  E. 
Co.  V.  Public  Utilities,  85  N.  J.  L.  28,  38,  where  it  was 
held  that,  under  such  a  power,  the  company  could  not  be 
required  to  furnish  free  transportation  to  certain  desig- 
nated o£Scials." 

§257.  Due  process  denied  by  prohibiting  the  letting 
down  of  an  unengaged  and  unoccupied  upper  berth  in 
sleeping  car.  In  the  foregoing  case  it  was  held  that 
property  was  taken  without  compensation,  in  violation  of 
the  guaranty  of  due  process,  by  a  state  statute  prohibit- 
ing the  letting  down  of  an  unengaged  and  unoccupied 
upper  berth  in  a  sleeping  car  when  the  lower  berth  in  the 
same  section  is  occupied.  The  Court  said:  **The  plain- 
tiff also  insists  that  the  requirement  that  the  upper  berth 
should  not  be  let  down  until  actually  engaged  also  de- 
prives the  company  of  its  right  of  management,  and  pre- 
vents it  from  conducting  its  business  so  aa  to  secure  the 
privacy  of  the  man  or  woman  occuping  the  lower  berth. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  refer  to  the  evidence  on  that  subject 
because  it  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  to  let 
down  the  upper  berth  during  the  night  would  necessarily 
be  an  intrusion  upon  the  privacy  of  those  occupying  lower 
berths.  For  the  glare  of  the  lights  and  the  noise  of  low- 
ering the  upper  berth  would  disturb  any  except  the 
soundest  sleepers.  In  this  respect  the  statute  would 
lessen  the  ability  of  the  company  to  furnish  the  place  of 
sleep  and  rest  it  offers  to  the  public*  A  sleeping  car  may 
not  be  an  4nn  on  wheels,*  but  the  operating  company  does 
engage  to  furnish  its  patrons  with  a  place  in  which  they 
can  rest  without  intrusion  upon  their  privacy.  Holding 
out  these  inducements  and  seeking  this  patronage,  the 
company  is  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  managing  its  busi- 
ness in  its  own  way  so  long  as  it  does  not  injuriously 


484  DUE  PEOCESS  OP  LAW  §  257 

affect  the  health,  comfort,  safety,  and  convenience  of  the 
public.  The  right  of  the  state  to  regulate  public  carriers 
in  the  interest  of  the  public  is  very  great.  But  that  great 
power  does  not  warrant  an  unreasonable  interference 
with  the  right  of  management,  or  the  taking  of  the  car- 
rier's property  without  compensation.  Lake  Shore  &  M. 
S.  E.  Co.  V.  Smith,  173  U.  S.  684;  Northern  P.  E.  Co.  v. 
North  Dakota,  236  U.  S.  585 ;  Washington  ex  rel.  Oregon 
E.  &  Nav.  Co.  V.  Fairchild,  224  U.  S.  510;  Missouri  P.  E. 
Co.  V.  Nebraska,  164  U.  S.  403 ;  Great  Northern  E.  Co.  v. 
Minnesota,  238  TJ.  S.  340,  ante.  Just  decided.  *  * 


§  258.  Due  process  not  denied  a  foreign  insurance  com- 
pany by  certain  requirements  as  to  investments  within 
a  state.  Li  South  Carolina  ex  rel.  Phoenix  Mut.  L.  Ins. 
Co.  V.  McMaster,  237  U.  S.  63,  it  was  held  that  due  process 
was  not  denied  by  the  act  of  a  state  insurance  commis- 
sion,— armed  with  the  power  to  determine,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  his  discretion,  which  applicants  for  the  privilege 
of  doing  insurance  business  in  the  state  shall  deposit  an 
approved  bond,  and  which  shall  deposit  approved  securi- 
ties,— in  refusing  to  accept  the  bond  of  a  surety  company 
tendered  with  the  application  of  the  insurance  company 
for  a  license,  unless  it  shall  invest  one-fourth  of  its  reserve 
on  South  Carolina  policiek  in  the  approved  securities  of 
that  state.  The  Court  said :  *  *  The  case  is  presented  here 
only  in  its  aspect  of  deprivation  of  alleged  rights  by  the 
Federal  Constitution.  We  fail  to  see  any  substantial 
merit  in  the  contention  that  the  applicant  has  been  de- 
prived of  due  process  of  law  in  the*  exercise  of  the  discre- 
tion given  to  the  commissioner  to  accept  or  reject 
applicants  for  the  insurance  privilege  under  the  laws  of 
the  state,  and  in  requiring  some  to  give  bonds  and  others 
to  deposit  securities,  after  having  investigated  their  con- 
dition and  methods  of  doing  business.*' 

§259.  When  maximum  intrastate  rates  are  confisca- 
tory and  deny  carriers  due  process.    In  Northern  P.  B. 


§  260  VESTED  EIGHTS  485 

Co.  V.  Dakota  ex  rel.  McCue,  236  U.  S.  585,  it  was  held 
that  a  law  of  that  state  fixing  maximnin  intrastate  rates 
for  the  transportation  of  coal  in  carload  lots  was  confisca- 
tory, because,  when  the  entire  traffic  to  which  such  rates 
are  applied  is  taken  into  account,  the  carrier  is  compelled 
to  transport  the  commodity  for  less  than  cost  or  without 
substantial  compensation,  although  the  return  to  the  car- 
rier may  be  adequate  from  its  entire  intrastate  operations. 
The  Court  said:  **But  a  different  question  arises  when 
the  state  has  segregated  a  commodity,  or  a  class  of  traffic, 
and  has  attempted  to  compel  the  carrier  to  transport  it 
at  a  loss  or  without  substantial  compensation,  even  though 
the  entire  traffic  to  which  the  rate  is  applied  is  taken  into 
account.  On  that  fact  being  satisfactorily  established, 
the  presumption  of  reasonableness  is  rebutted.  If  in  such 
a  case  there  exists  any  practice,  or  what  may  be  taken  to 
be  (broadly  speaking)  a  standard  of  rates  with  respect 
to  that  traffic,  in  the  light  of  which  it  is  insisted  that  the 
rate  should  still  be  regarded  as  reasonable,  that  should 
be  made  to  appear.  As  has  been  said,  it  does  not  appear 
here.  Frequently  attacks  upon  state  rates  have  raised 
the  question  as  to  the  profitableness  of  the  intrastate  busi- 
ness under  the  state  requirements.  But  the  decisions  in 
this  class  of  cases  (which  we  have  cited  in  the  margin) 
furnish  no  ground  for  saying  that  the  state  may  set  apart 
a  conmiodity  or  a  special  class  of  traffic  and  impose  upon 
it  any  rate  it  pleases,  provided  only  that  the  return  from 
the  entire  intrastate  business  is  adequate.*' 

§  260.  Due  process  denied  a  foreign  corporation  by  a 
money  judgment  rendered  upon  service  on  a  resident 
director.  In  Riverside  &  D.  E.  Cotton  Mills  v.  Menefee, 
237  U.  S.  189,  it  was  held  that  due  process  was  denied  by 
the  rendition  of  a  money  judgment  against  a  corporation 
organized  under  the  laws  of  another  state  upon  servicfe 
on  a  resident  director,  when  such  corporation  had  no 
qualified  agent  in  the  state  upon  whom  process  might  be 
served,  no  property  therein,  and  had  not  come  into  the 


486  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  260 

state  for  the  purpose  of  doing  business  therein.  The 
Court  said :  *  *  Whatever  long  ago  may  have  been  the  dif- 
ficulty in  applying  the  principles  of  Pennoyer  v.  Neff  [95 
IT.  S.  714]  to  corporations,  that  is,  in  determining  when, 
if  at  all,  a  corporation  created  by  the  laws  of  one  state 
could  be  sued  in  the  courts  of  another  sovereignty,  be- 
cause of  the  conception  that,  as  an  ideal  being,  a  corporar 
tion  could  not  migrate  and  its  officers,  in  going  to  another 
sovereignty,  did  not  take  with  them  their  power  to  repre- 
sent the  corporation,  such  difficulty  ceased  to  exist  with 
the  decision  of  this  court  rendered  more  than  thirty  years 
ago  in  St.  Clair  v.  Cox,  106  TJ.  S.  350,  which,  together 
with  the  leading  cases  which  have  followed  it,  has  been 
already  referred  to.  •  .  .  Without  restating  the  St. 
Clair  case  or  the  leading  cases  which  have  followed  and 
applied  it,  we  content  ourselves  with  saying  that  it  re- 
sults from  them  that  it  is  indubitably  established  that  the 
courts  of  one  state  may  not,  without  violating  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  render  a 
judgment  against  a  corporation  organized  under  the  laws 
of  another  state  where  such  corporation  has  not  come 
into  the  state  for  the  purpose  of  doing  business  therein, 
or  has  done  no  business  therein,  or  has  no  property 
therein,  or  has  no  qualified  agent  therein  upon  whom 
process  may  be  served. '  * 

§261.  A  state  may  make  certain  requirements  of  a 
member  of  a  Oreek  letter  fraternity  without  denying  him 
due  process  of  law.  In  Waugh  v.  Board  of  Trustees,  237 
U.  S.  589,  it  was  held  that  there  was  no  denial  of  due 
process  of  law  by  a  state  requirement  that  a  member  of 
a  chapter  of  a  Greek  letter  fraternity  at  another  college 
should  renounce  his  allegiance  to  and  affiliation  with  the 
same  before  admission  as  a  student  into  any  educational 
institution  supported  by  the  state,  despite  the  fact  that 
the  fraternity  to  which  he  belongs  may  be  a  disciplin- 
ary and  moral  force.  The  Court  said:  **It  is  said  that 
the  fraternity  to  which  complainant  belongs  is  a  moral 


§  262  VESTED  BIGHTS  487 

and  of  itself  a  disciplinary  force.  This  need  not  be  de- 
nied. But  whether  such  membership  maJ^es  against  dis- 
cipline was  for  the  state  of  Mississippi  to  determine.  It 
is  to  be  remembered  that  the  University  was  established 
by  the  state,  and  is  under  the  control  of  the  state,  and  the 
enactment  of  the  statute  may  have  been  induced  by  the 
opinion  that  membership  in  the  prohibited  societies 
divided  the  attention  of  the  students  and  distracted  from 
that  singleness  of  purpose  which  the  state  desired  to 
exist  in  its  public  educational  institutions.  It  is  not  for 
us  to  entertain  conjectures  in  opposition  to  the  views  of 
the  state,  and  annul  its  regulations  upon  disputable  con- 
siderations of  their  wisdom  or  necessity.  Nor  can  we 
accommodate  the  regulations  to  the  assertion  of  a  special 
purpose  by  the  applying  student,  varying,  perhaps,  with 
each  one,  and  dependent  alone  upon  his  promise.  *  * 

§  262.  Due  process  denied  by  taxation  without  juris- 
diction. In  Provident  Savings  L.  Assur.  Soc.  v.  Ken- 
tucky, 239  IT.  S.  103,  it  was  held  that  the  principle  that 
taxation  without  jurisdiction  violates  the  due  process  pro- 
vision of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  applies  to  the  asser- 
tion of  authority  on  the  part  of  the  state  to  exact  a  license 
tax  for  the  privilege  of  doing  acts  beyond  the  sphere  of 
local  control.  The  Court  said :  *  *  And  we  can  not  doubt 
that  the  question  whether  the  state  is  taxing  a  foreign 
corporation  for  a  privilege  not  granted— that  is,  whether 
the  acts  done  by  the  corporation  at  the  time  to  which  the 
tax  relates  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  subject  it  to  local 
authority  upon  the  ground  that  it  is  doing  acts  which  can 
only  be  done  with  the  permission  of  that  authority — ^must 
be  regarded  as  a  Federal  question.  Taxation  without 
jurisdiction  has  been  held  to  be  a  violation  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  (Louisville  &  Jefferson  Ferry  Co.  v. 
Kentucky,  188  XJ.  S.  385 ;  Del.,  Lack.  &  West  E.  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania,  198  U.  S.  341,  358 ;  Union  Ref  rig.  Transit  Co.  v, 
Kentucky,  199  U.  S.  194,  209) ;  and  the  principle  involved 
applies  to  the  assertion  of  authority  on  the  part  of  the 


488  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  262 

state  to  exact  a  license  tax  for  the  privilege  of  doing  actb 
which  lie  beyond  the  sphere  of  local  control.  *  * 

§263.  Due  process  denied  by  arbitrary  assertion  of 
power  imposing  burdens  without  an  advantage  of  any 
kind.  In  Myles  Salt  Co.  v.  Iberia  Drainage  Dist.,  239 
U.  S.  478,  it  was  held  that  power  arbitrarily  exerted, 
imposing  a  burden  without  a  compensating  advantage 
of  any  kind,  amounts  to  confiscation  and  violates  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment ;  that  such  a 
result  is  accomplished  by  the  action  of  a  local  adminis- 
trative body  in  including  land  within  a  drainage  district 
which  is  palpably  arbitrary,  such  inclusion  not  being  for 
the  purpose  of  benefiting  such  land  directly  but  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  revenue  therefrom.  The  Court 
said:  **We  are  not  dealing  with  motives  alone,  but  as 
well  with  their  resultant  action ;  we  are  not  dealing  with 
disputable  grounds  of  discretion  or  disputable  degrees 
of  benefit,  but  with  an  exercise  of  power  determined  by 
considerations  not  of  the  improvement  of  plaintiflP  *s  prop- 
erty but  solely  of  the  improvement  of  the  property  of 
others — power,  therefore,  arbitrarily  exerted,  imposing  a 
burden  without  a  compensating  advantage  of  any  kind.  *  * 

§264.  Legislature  can  not  create  taxing  district  by 
action  palpably  arbitrary  or  plain  abuse.  In  Gast  Realty 
and  I.  Co.  v.  Schneider  Granite  Co.,  240  U.  S.  55,  it  was 
held  that  a  state  legislature  may  create  taxing  district  to 
provide  for  the  expense  of  local  improvements,  without 
violating  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  unless  its  action 
is  palpably  arbitrary  or  a  plain  abuse.  The  Court  said : 
*  *  The  legislature  may  create  taxing  districts  to  meet  the 
expense  of  local  improvements,  and  may  fix  the  basis  of 
taxation  without  encountering  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment  unless  its  action  is  palpably  arbitrary  or  a  plain 
abuse.  Houck  v.  Little  River  Drainage  District,  239 
U.  S.  254,  262.  The  front-foot  rule  has  been  sanctioned 
for  the  cost  of  paving  a  street.    In  such  a  case  it  is  not 


§  264  VESTED  EIGHTS  489 

likely  that  the  cost  will  exceed  the  benefit,  and  the  law 
does  not  attempt  an  imaginary  exactness  or  go  beyond 
the  reasonable  probabilities.  French  v.  Barber  Asphalt 
Co.,  181  U.  S.  324 ;  Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  181  U.  S. 
396,  397.  So  in  the  case  of  a  square  bounded  by  principal 
streets,  the  land  might  be  assessed  half  way  back  from  the 
improvement  to  the  next  street.  Louis.  &  Nash.  R.  R.  v. 
Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  197  U.  S.  430.  But,  as  is 
implied  by  Houck  v.  Little  River  Drainage  District,  if  the 
law  is  of  such  a  character  that  there  is  no  reasonable 
presumption  that  substantial  justice  generally  will  be 
done,  but  the  probability  is  that  the  parties  will  be  taxed 
disproportionately  to  each  other  and  to  the  benefit  con- 
ferred, the  law  can  not  stand  against  the  complaint  of  one 
so  taxed.  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia,  250  TJ.  S.  135, 
139.'' 


CHAPTER  Xn 

PBOPEBTY  BIGHTS  AS  PBOTECTBD  BY  DUB  PBOCESS — ^FBEEDOM 

OF  CONTBACT 

§265.  The  word  ''liberty''  as  defined  in  state  law. 

The  word  *  liberty'*  as  an  element  in^that  famous  trilogy 
of  rights  defined  by  the  formula,  ''life,  liberty  and  prop- 
erty, ' '  means  far  more  than  ' '  the  rights  of  the  citizen  to 
be  free  from  the  mere  physical  restraint  of  his  person;** 
it  covers  and  protects  many  rights  embraced  within  the 
guaranty  given  by  the  word  ''property''  in  the  same 
formula.  Turning  to  the  states  as  the  first  source  of 
interpretation  we  find  that  in  State  v.  Goodwill,  33  W.  V. 
179,  the  Court  said :  ' '  The  vocation  of  an  employer,  as 
well  as  that  of  his  employee,  is  his  property.  Depriving 
the  owner  of  property  of  one  of  its  attributes  is  depriving 
him  of  property  under  the  provision  of  the  Constitution. 
People  V.  Otis,  90  N.  Y.  48.  The  right  to  use,  buy  and  sell 
property,  and  contract  in  respect  thereto,  including  con- 
tracts for  labor— which  is,  as  we  have  seen,  property- 
is  protected  by  the  constitution.  If  the  legislature  with- 
out any  public  necessity,  has  the  power  to  prohibit  or 
restrict  the  rights  of  contract  between  private  persons 
in  respect  to  one  lawful  trade  or  business  then  it  may 
prevent  the  prosecution  of  all  trades,  and  regulate  all 
contracts.*'  In  State  v.  Stewart,  59  Vt.  273,  the  Court 
said :  ' '  The  principle  upon  which  the  cases,  English  and 
American,  proceed,  is,  that  every  man  has  the  right  to 
employ  his  talents,  industry  and  capital  as  he  pleases, 
free  from  the  dictation  of  others;  and  if  two  or  more 
persons  combine  to  coerce  his  choice  in  this  behalf,  it  is  a 
criminal  conspiracy.  The  labor  and  skill  of  the  workman, 
be  it  of  high  or  low  degree,  the  plant  of  the  manufacturer, 

490 


§  266        FREEDOM  OP  CONTRACT  491 

the  equipment  of  the  fanner,  the  investments  of  com- 
merce, are  all  in  equal  sense  property. '*  In  Braceville 
Coal  Company  v.  People,  147  Dl.  66,  the  Court  said : "  The 
right  of  property  preserved  by  the  constitution,  is  the 
right  not  only  to  possess  and  enjoy  it,  but  also  to  acquire 
it  in  any  lawful  mode,  or  by  following  any  lawful  indus- 
trial pursuit  which  the  citizen,  in  the  exercise  of  the  lib- 
erty guaranteed,  may  choose  to  adopt.  Labor  is  the 
primary  foundation  of  all  wealth.  The  property  which 
each  one  has  in  his  own  labor  is  the  common  heritage. 
And,  as  an  incident  to  the  right  to  acquire  other  property, 
the  liberty  to  enter  into  contracts  by  which  labor  may  be 
employed  in  such  way  as  the  laborer  shall  deem  most 
beneficial,  and  of  others  to  employ  such  labor,  is  neces- 
sarily included  in  the  constitutional  guaranty. '^  See 
also.  Matter  of  Jacobs,  98  N.  Y.  98 ;  People  v.  Marx,  99 
N.  Y.  377.  In  Young's  Case  v.  Virginia,  101  Va.  853,  the 
Court  said:  '*The  word  *  liberty,*  as  used  in  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several  states,  is 
deemed  to  embrace  the  right  of  a  citizen  to  be  free  in  the 
employment  of  all  faculties ;  to  be  free  to  u*  them  in  all 
lawful  ways ;  to  live  and  work  where  he  will ;  to  earn  his 
livelihood  by  any  lawful  calling,  and  for  that  purpose  to 
enter  into  all  contracts  which  may  be  proper,  necessary, 
and  essential  to  his  carrying  out  to  a  successful  conclu- 
sion the  purpose  aforementioned.'' 

§266.  The  word  ''liberty"  as  defined  in  federal  law. 
In  his  concurring  opinion  in  Butchers'  Union,  etc.,  Co.  v. 
Crescent  City,  etc.,  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  746,  Justice  Field  said : 
**As  in  our  intercourse  with  our  fellow-men  certain  prin- 
ciples of  morality  are  assumed  to  exist,  without  which 
society  would  be  impossible,  so  certain  inherent  rights 
lie  at  the  foundation  of  all  governmental  action,  and  upon 
a  recognition  of  them  alone  can  free  institutions  be  main- 
tained. These  inherent  rights  have  never  been  more 
happily  expressed  than  in  the  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence, that  new  evangel  of  liberty  to  the  people :  *  We  hold 


492  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  266 

these  truths  to  be  self-evident, '  that  is,  so  plain  that  their 
truth  is  recognized  upon  their  mere  statement,  Hhat  all 
men  are  endowed, '  not  by  edicts  of  Emperors  or  decrees 
of  Parliament  or  Acts  of  Congress,  but  *  by  their  Creator, 
with  certain  inalienable  rights,'  that  is,  rights  which  can 
not  be  bartered  away  or  given  away  or  taken  away  ex- 
cept in  punishment  of  crime,  ^and  that  among  these  are 
life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  and  to  secure 
these,*'  not  grant  them  but  secure  them,  *  governments  are 
instituted  among  men  deriving  their  just  powers  from  the 
consent  of  the  governed. '  Among  these  inalienable  rights, 
as  proclaimed  in  that  great  documejut,  is  the  right  of  men 
to  pursue  their  happiness,  by  which  is  meant  the  right  to 
pursue  any  lawful  business  or  vocation,  in  any  manner 
not  inconsistent  with  the  equal  rights  of  others,  which 
may  increase  their  property  or  develop  their  faculties,  so 
as  to  give  to  them  their  highest  enjoyment.'*  The  same 
great  judge  in  his  dissenting  opinion  in  the  Slaughter 
House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  said  that  the  **  Fourteenth 
Amendment  was  intended  to  give  practical  effect  to  the 
Declaration  of  1776  of  inalienable  rights,  rights  which  are 
the  gift  of  the  Creator,  which  the  law  does  not  confer,  but 
only  recognizes.*'  In  his  dissenting  opinion  in  that  case, 
Justice  Swayne  said:  ** Property  is  every  thing  which 
has  an  exchangeable  value,  and  the  right  of  property 
includes  the  power  to  dispose  of  it  according  to  the  will 
of  the  owner.  Labor  is  property,  and  as  such  means 
protection.  The  right  to  make  it  available  is  next  in 
importance  to  the  rights  of  life  and  liberty.  *  *  In  AUgeyer 
V.  Louisiana,  165  U.  S.  578,  the  Court  said:  **The  'lib- 
erty* mentioned  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  means  not 
only  the  right  of  the  citizen  to  be  free  from  the  mere 
physical  restraint  of  his  person,  as  by  incarceration,  but 
the  term  is  deemed  to  embrace  the  right  of  the  citizen  to 
be  free  in  the  enjoyment  of  all  his  faculties ;  to  be  free 
to  use  them  in  all  lawful  ways ;  to  live  and  work  where 
he  will ;  to  earn  his  livelihood  by  any  lawful  calling ;  to 
pursue  any  livelihood  or  avocation ;  and  for  that  purpose 


§  267        FREEDOM  OF  CONTRACT  493 

to  enter  into  all  contracts  which  may  be  proper,  necessary, 
and  essential  to  his  carrying  out  to  a  successful  conclu- 
sion the  purposes  above  mentioned. ' '  In  Lochner  v.  New 
York,  198  U.  S,  45,  the  Court  said:  '^The  general  right 
to  make  a  contract  in  relation  to  his  business  is  part  of 
the  liberty  of  the  individual  protected  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  ...  Of 
course  the  liberty  of  contract  relating  to  labor  includes 
both  parties  to  it.  The  one  has  as  much  right  to  purchase 
as  the  other  to  sell  labor.''  In  Adair  v.  United  States, 
208  U.  S.  161,  the  Court  said:  **The  first  inquiry  is 
whether  the  part  of  the  tenth  section  of  the  act  of  1898 
upon  which  the  first  count  of  the  indictment  was  based,  is 
repugnant  to  the  Fifth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution, 
declaring  that  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  liberty  or 
property  without  due  process  of  law.  In  our  opinion 
that  section,  in  the  particular  mentioned,  is  an  invasion 
of  personal  liberty  as  well  as  of  the  right  of  property 
guaranteed  by  that  amendment.  Such  liberty  and  right 
embrace  the  right  to  make  contracts  for  the  purchase  of 
the  labor  of  otiiers,  and  equally  the  right  to  make  con- 
tracts for  the  sale  of  one's  labor;  each  right,  however, 
being  subject  to  the  fundamental  condition  that  no  con- 
tract, whatever  its  subject  matter,  can  be  sustained  which 
the  lata,  upon  reasonable  grownds,  forbids  as  inconsistent 
with  the  public  interests,  or  as  hurtful  to  the  public  order, 
or  as  detrimental  to  the  common  good/' 

§  267.  Freedom  of  contract  subject  to  certain  sovereign 
powers  of  the  state.  In  the  italicized  portion  of  the 
opinion  just  quoted  the  couii;  has  emphasized  the  fact  that 
the  rights  of  life,  liberty  and  property"  are  all  subject  to 
certain  sovereign  powers  of  the  state,  such  as  the  taxing 
power,  the  power  of  eminent  domain  and  the  police  power. 
Such  rights  are  not  therefore  in  any  strict  sense  either 
absolute  or  ** unalienable."  No  man  is  at  liberty  to 
carry  on  a  business  injurious  to  the  public  morals  or 
health,  or  to  enter  into  immoral  contracts.    Stone  v.  Mis- 


494  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  267 

sissippi,  101  U.  S,  814 ;  Loon  Hung  v,  Crowley,  113  U.  S. 
703 ;  Munger  v.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  623 ;  Kidd  v,  Pearson, 
128  U.  S.  16;  L'Hote  v.  New  Orleans,  177  U.  S-  587;  Booth 
V.  Illinois,  184  U.  S.  425;  Otis  v.  Parker,  187  U.  S.  606; 
Lottery  Case,  188  U.  S.  321 ;  Ah  Sin  v.  Wittman,  198  U.  S. 
500 ;  Foppino  v.  Speed,  199  U.  S.  501,  A  business  affected 
with  a  public  interest  may  be  regulated,  provided  due 
consideration  be  given  to  vested  rights  and  to  prior  con- 
tracts entered  into  by  the  state.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  B.  Co.  v. 
Paul,  173  U.  S.  404.  See  also,'  Gundling  v.  Chicago,  177 
TJ.  S.  188.  Purely  private  vocations  are,  sfi  a  general 
rule,  not  subject  to  restraint  by  state  power.  Li  Lochner 
v.  New  York,  198  U.  S.  45,  it  was  held  that  a  law  restrict- 
ing the  employment  of  bakers  to  sixty  hours  a  week  was 
arbitrary  interference  with  freedom  of  contract.  See 
also,  Matter  of  Jacobs,  98  N.  Y.  98 ;  Bessette  v.  People, 
193  111.  334 ;  People  v.  Beattie,  96  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  383. 
There  is  no  infringement,  however,  by  the  enactment  of 
mechanic's  lien  laws.  Provident  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Jersey 
City,  113  U.  S.  506.  A  state  has  however  no  power  to 
regulate  extra-territorial  contracts.  In  Allgeyer  v.  Louis- 
iana, 165  U.  S.  578,  it  was  said :  ''Although  it  may  be  con- 
ceded that  this  right  to  contract  in  relation  to  persons  or 
property  or  to  do  business  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
state  may  be  regulated,  and  some  prices  prohibited,  when 
the  contract  or  business  conflict  with  the  policy  of  the 
state  as  contained  in  its  statutes,  yet  the  power  does  not 
and  cannot  extend  to  prohibiting  a  citizen  from  making 
contracts  of  the  nature  involved  in  this  case  outside  of 
the  limits  and  jurisdiction  of  the  state,  and  which  are 
also  to  be  performed  outside  of  such  jurisdiction. ' ' 

§  268.  Right  of  a  state  to  regulate  monopolies  and  com- 
binations. While  such  enactments  modify  to  a  certain 
extent  the  freedom  of  contract,  a  state  has  the  right  to 
make  laws  to  regulate  and  suppress,  if  necessary,  monop- 
olies and  other  combinations  tending  to  control  prices. 
In  National  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas,  197  TJ.  S.  115,  it  was 


§  268        FREEDOM  OF  CONTRACT  495 

said:  **It  is  certainly  the  conception  of  a  large  body  of 
public  opinion  that  the  control  of  prices  through  combi- 
nations tends  to  restraint  of,  trade  and  to  monopoly, 
and  is  evil.  The  foundations  of  the  belief  we  are  not 
called  upon  to  discuss  nor  does  our  purpose  require  us 
to  distinguish  between  the  kinds  of  combinations  or  the 
degrees  of  monopoly.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  the  idea 
of  monopoly  is  liot  now  confined  to  a  grant  of  privilege. 
It  is  understood  to  include  a  *  condition  produced  by  the 
acts  of  mere  individuals. '  Its  dominant  thought  now  is, 
to  quote  another,  'the  notion  of  exclusiveness  or  unity;' 
in  other  words,  the  suppression  of  competition  by  the 
unification  of  interest  or  management,  or  it  may  be 
through  agreement  and  concert  of  action.  .  •  .  And 
this  concern  and  the  policy  based  upon  it  has  not  only 
expression  in  the  Texas  statutes ;  it  has  expression  in  the 
statutes  of  other  states  and  in  a  well  known  national 
enactment.  According  to  them  competition,  and  not  com- 
bination, should  be  the  law  of  trade.'*  In  Carroll  v. 
Greenwich  Ins.  Co.,  199  U.  S.  401,  the  Court  said :  *'Many 
state  laws  which  limit  the  freedom  of  contract  have  been 
sustained  by  this  court,  and  therefore  an  objection  to  this 
law  on  the  general  ground  that  it  limits  that  freedom  can 
not  be  upheld.  There  is  no  greater  sanctity  in  the  right 
to  combine  than  in  the  right  to  make  other  contracts. 
Indeed,  Mr.  Dicey  in  his  recent  work  on  Law  and  Public 
Opinion  in  England  during  the  Nineteenth  Century  indi- 
cates that  it  is  out  of  the  very  right  to  make  what  contracts 
one  chooses,  so  strenuously  advocated  by  Bentham,  that 
combinations  have  arisen  which  restrict  the  very  freedom 
that  Bentham  sought  to  attain  and  which  even  might 
menace  the  authority  of  the  state.  * '  In  Aikens  v.  Wiscon- 
sin, 195  U.  S.  194,  the  Court  said:  *'It  would  be  impos- 
sible to  hold  that  the  liberty  to  combine  to  inflict  such 
mischief,  even  upon  such  intangibles  as  business  or  repu- 
tation, was  among  the  rights  which  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  was  intended  to  preserve. *'  And  again: 
'^When  the  acts  consist  of  making  a  combination  calcu- 


496  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  268 

lated  to  cause  temporal  damages,  the  power  to  pmiish 
such  acts,  when  done  maliciously,  cannot  be  denied 
because  they  are  to  be  followed  and  worked  out  by  con- 
duct which  might  have  been  lawful  if  not  preceded  by  the 
acts.  No  conduct  has  such  an  absolute  privilege  as  to 
justify  all  possible  schemes  of  which  it  may  be  a  part. 
The  most  innocent  and  constitutionally  protected  of  acts 
or  omissions  may  be  made  a  step  in  a  criminal  plot,  and 
if  it  is  a  step  in  a  plot,  neither  its  innocence  nor  the  Con- 
stitution is  sufficient  to  prevent  the  punishment  of  the 
plot  by  law. ' ' 

§269.  Freedom  of  contract  as  defined  in  Adair  v. 
United  States.  Ih  Adair  v.  United  States,  208  U.  S.  161, 
already  referred  to,  the  Court  said :  * '  In  Lochner  v.  New 
York,  198  TJ.  S.  45,  which  involved  the  validity  of  a  state 
enactment  prescribing  certain  maximum  hours  for  labor 
in  bakeries,  and  which  made  it  a  misdemeanor  for  an 
employer  to  require  or  permit  an  employee  in  such  an 
establishment  to  work  in  excess  of  a  given  number  of 
hours  each  day,  the  Court  said:  'The  general  right  to 
make  a  contract  in  relation  to  his  business  is  part  of  the 
liberty  of  the  individual  protected  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  Allgeyer  v. 
Louisiana,  165  U.  S.  578.  Under  that  provision  no  state 
can  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law.  The  right  to  purchase  or  to  sell 
labor  is  part  of  the  liberty  protected  by  this  amendment, 
unless  there  are  circumstances  which  exclude  the  right. 
There  are,  however,  certain  powers  existing  in  the  sov- 
ereignty of  each  state  in  the  Union,  somewhat  vaguely 
termed  '  police  powers, '  the  exact  description  and  limita- 
tion of  which  have  not  been  attempted  by  the  courts.  .  .  . 
In  every  case  that  comes  before  this  court,  therefore, 
where  legislation  of  this  character  is  concerned,  and  where 
the  protection  of  the  Federal  Constitution  is  sought,  the 
question  necessarily  arises:  Is  this  a  fair,  reasonable, 
and  appropriate  exercise  of  the  public  power  of  the  state. 


§  270        FREEDOM  OF  CONTRACT         497 

or  is  it  an  unreasonable,  unnecessary  and  arbitrary  inter- 
ference with  the  right  of  the  individual  to  his  personal 
liberty  or  to  enter  into  those  contracts  in  relation  to 
labor  which  may  seem  to  him  appropriate  or  necessary 
for  the  support  of  himself  and  family?  Of  course,  the 
liberty  of  contract  relating  to  labor  includes  both  parties 
to  it.  The  one  has  as  much  right  to  purchase  as  the  other 
to  sell  labor.*  Although  there  was  a  diiference  of  opin- 
ion in  that  case  among  the  members  of  the  court  as  to 
certain  propositions,  there  was  no  disagreement  as  to 
the  general  proposition  that  there  is  a  liberty  of  contract 
which  can  not  be  unreasonably  interfered  with  by  legis- 
lation. *  * 

§  270.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  a  state  law 
preventing  miners  from  contracting  for  wages  on  a  cer- 
tain basis.  In  reaching  that  conclusion  in  McLean  v. 
Arkansas,  211  U.  S.  539,  the  Court  said:  ''That  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  in  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment thereof,  protects  the  right  to  make  contracts  for  the 
sale  of  labor,  and  the  right  to  carry  on  trade  or  business, 
against  hostile  state  legislation,  has  been  affirmed  in  de- 
cisions of  this  court,  and  we  have  no  disposition  to  ques- 
tion those  cases  in  which  the  right  has  been  upheld  and 
maintained  against  such  legislation.  AUgeyer  v.  Louisi- 
ana, 165  U.  S.  578 ;  Adair  v.  United  States,  208  U.  S.  161. 
But,  in  many  cases  in  this  court,  the  right  of  freedom  of 
contract  has  been  held  not  to  be  unlimited  in  its  nature, 
and  when  the  right  to  contract  or  carry  on  business  con- 
flicts with  laws  declaring  the  public  policy  of  the  state, 
enacted  for  the  protection  of  the  public  health,  safety,  or 
welfare,  the  same  may  be  valid,  notwithstanding  they  have 
the  effect  to  curtail  or  limit  the  freedom  of  contract.  It 
would  extend  this  opinion  beyond  reasonable  limits  to 
make  reference  to  all  the  cases  in  this  court  in  which 
qualifications  of  the  right  of  freedom  of  contract  have 
been  applied  and  enforced.  Some  of  them  are  collected 
in  Holden  v.  Hardy,  169  U.  S.  366,  in  which  it  was  held 

Due  Process — 32 


498  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  270 

that  the  hours  of  work  in  mines  might  be  limited.  In 
Knoxville  Iron  Co.  v.  Harbison,  183  U.  S.  13,  it  was  held 
that  an  act  of  the  legislature  of  Tennessee,  requiring  the 
redemption  in  cash  of  store  orders  or  other  evidences  of 
indebtedness  issued  by  employers  in  payment  of  wages 
due  to  employees,  did  not  conflict  with  any  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  protecting  the 
rights  of  contract  .  .  .  We  take  it  that  there  is  no 
dispute  about  the  fundamental  propositions  of  law  which 
we  have  thus  far  stated:  the  difficulties  and  diflferences 
of  opinion  arise  in  their  application  to  the  facts  of  a  given 
case. ' '  In  applying  the  principles  in  question  to  the  facts 
of  that  particular  case,  involving  the  validity  of  a  state 
statute  under  which  miners  employed  at  quantity  rates 
were  prevented  from  contracting  for  wages  upon  the  basis 
of  screened  coal  instead  of  the  weight  of  the  coal  as  orig- 
inally produced  in  the  mine,  the  Court  said :  **It  is  insisted 
that  the  miner  is  deprived  of  a  portion  .of  his  just  due 
when  paid  upon  the  basis  of  screened  coal,  because,  while 
the  price  may  be  higher,  and  theoretically  he  may  be  com- 
pensated for  all  the  coal  mined  in  the  price  paid  him  for 
screened  coal,  that  practically,  owing  to  the  manner  of  the 
operation  of  the  screen  itself,  and  its  diiferent  operation 
when  differently  adjusted,  or  when  out  of  order,  the  miner 
is  deprived  of  payment  for  coal  which  he  has  actually 
mined.  It  is  not  denied  that  the  coal  which  passes  through 
the  screen  is  sold  in  the  market.  It  is  not  for  us  to  say 
whether  these  are  actual  conditions.  It  is  sufficient  to 
say  that  it  was  a  situation  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
legislature,  concerning  which  it  was  entitled  to  judge  and 
act  for  itself  in  the  exercise  of  its  lawful  power  to  pass 
remedial  legislation. ' ' 

§  271.  Freedom  of  contract  not  destroyed  by  regulating 
distribution  of  railway  coal  cars.  In  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  v.  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company, 
215  U.  S.  452,  involving  the  duty  of  that  company  to  obey 
an  order  of  that  conmiission,  it  was  held  that  freedom  of 


§  272  PKE5ED0M  OP  CONTRACT  499 

contract  was  not  destroyed  by  a  requirement  that  a  rail- 
road company  in  making  its  daily  distribution  of  coal 
cars,  in  times  of  car  shortage,  to  the  bituminous  coal 
mines  on  its  line,  should  desist  from  its  practice  not  to 
count  the  fuel  cars  of  the  company  against  the  share  of 
the  mine  receiving  them,  on  the  theory  that  such  discrim- 
ination as  resulted  from  such  practice  arose  from  the  fact 
that  the  company  saw  fit  to  purchase  its  fuel  coal  from 
a  particular  mine  or  mines.  The  Court  said :  *  ^  The  right 
to  buy  is  one  thing,  and  the  power  to  use  the  equipment 
of  the  road  for  the  purpose  of  moving  the  articles  pur- 
chased in  such  a  way  as  to  discriminate  or  give  preference 
are  wholly  distinct  and  different  things.  The  insistence 
that  the  necessary  effect  of  an  order  compelling  the  count- 
ing of  company  fuel  cars  in  fixing,  in  case  of  shortage,  the 
share  of  cars  a  mine  from  which  coal  has  been  purchased 
will  be  entitled  to,  will  be  to  bring  about  a  discrimination 
against  the  mine  from  which  the  company  buys  its  coal, 
and  a  preference  in  favor  of  the  other  mines,  but  inveighs 
against  the  expediency  of  the  order. ' ' 

§  272.  Freedom  of  contract  not  unreasonably  abridged 
by  law  condemning  a  trade  agreement  between  retail 
lumber  dealers.  In  Grenada  Lumber  Company  v.  Missis- 
sippi, 217  U.  S.  433,  it  was  held  that  when  an  agreement 
between  retail  lumber  dealers  not  to  deal  with  any  manu- 
facturer or  wholesale  dealer  who  sells  direct  to  consumers 
in  localities  in  which  such  retail  dealers  conduct  their 
business  and  keep  a  sufficient  stock  to  meet  demands,  and 
to  inform  each  other  of  any  such  sales  was  condemned 
as  a  combination  in  restraint  of  trade  by  a  state  statute, 
as  construed  by  the  highest  court  of  the  state,  there  was 
no  such  unreasonable  abridgement  of  freedom  of  contract 
as  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  forbids.  The  Court  said : 
'*The  contention  is  that  this  statute  abridges  unreason- 
ably the  freedom  of  contract,  which  is  as  much  within  the 
protection  of  that  Amendment  as  is  liberty  of  person. 
That  any  one  of  the  persons  engaged  in  the  retail  lum- 


500  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  272 

ber  business  miglit  have  made  a  fixed  rule  of  conduct  not 
to  buy  his  stock  from  a  producer  or  wholesaler  who  should 
sell  to  consumers  in  competition  with  himself  is  plain.  No 
law  which  would  infringe  his  freedom  of  contract  in  that 
particular  would  stand.  But  when  the  plaintiffs  in  error 
combine  and  agree  that  no  one  of  them  will  trade  with 
any  producer  or  wholesaler  who  shall  sell  to  a  consumer 
within  the  trade  range  of  any  of  them,  quite  another  case 
is  presented.  An  act  harmless  when  done  by  one  may 
become  a  public  wrong  when  done  by  many  acting  in 
concert  for  it  then  takes  on  the  form  of  a  conspiracy,  and 
may  be  prohibited  or  punished  if  the  result  be  hurtful  to 
the  public  or  to  the  individual  against  whom  the  concerted 
action  is  directed.  Callan  v.  Wilson,  127  U.  S.  555,  556.*' 
See  also.  Western  Union  Telegraph  Company  v.  Com- 
mercial Milling  Company,  218  U,  S.  406. 

§273.  Freedom  of  contract  as  guaranteed  by  Fifth 
Amendment  not  denied  by  Carmack  amendment  of  June 
29,  1906.  In  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Railroad  Company  v. 
Riverside  Mills,  219  U.  S.  186,  it  was  held  that  the  Car- 
mack  amendment  of  June  29, 1906,  to  the  act  of  February 
4,  1887,  820, — ^by  which  an  interstate  carrier  voluntarily 
receiving  property  for  transportation  from  a  point  in  one 
state  to  a  point  in  another  is  made  liable  to  the  holder  of 
the  bill  of  lading  for  a  loss  anywhere  en  route,  regardless 
of  any  agreement  to  the  contrary,  with  a  right  of  recovery 
over  against  the  carrier  actually  causing  the  loss, — ^was  a 
constitutional  exercise  by  Congress  of  its  power  under 
the  commerce  clause  which  does  not  conflict  with  the  free- 
dom of  contract  guaranteed  by  the  Fifteenth  Amendment. 
The  Court  said :  *  *  It  is  obvious,  from  the  many  decisions 
of  this  court,  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  free- 
dom of  contract.  Contracts  which  contravene  public 
policy  can  not  be  lawfully  made  at  all ;  and  the  power  to 
make  contracts  may  in  all  cases  be  regulated  as  to  form, 
evidence,  and  validity  as  to  third  persons.  The  power  of 
government  extends  to  the  denial  of  liberty  of  contract  to 


§  273        FREEDOM  OP  CONTRACT  501 

the  extent  of  forbidding  or  regulating  every  contract 
which  is  reasonably  calculated  to  injuriously  affect  the 
public  interests.  Undoubtedly  the  United  States  is  a  gov- 
ernment of  limited  and  delegated  powers,  but  in  respect 
to  those  powers  which  have  been  expressly  delegated,  the 
power  to  regulate  commerce  between  the  states  being  one 
of  them,  the  power  is  absolute,  except  as  limited  by  other 
provisions  of  the  Constitution  itself.  Having  the  express 
power  to  make  rules  for  the  conduct  of  commerce  among 
the  states,  the  range  of  Congressional  discretion  as  to  the 
regulation  best  adapted  to  remedy  a  practice  found  ineffi- 
cient or  hurtful  is  a  wide  one.  .  •  .  The  rule  is 
adapted  to  secure  the  rights  of  the  shipper  by  securing 
unity  of  transportation  with  unity  of  responsibility.  The 
regulation  is  one  which  also  facilitates  the  remedy  of  one 
who  sustains  a  loss,  by  localizing  the  responsible  carrier. 
.  .  .  But  it  is  said  that  the  act  violates  the  Fifth 
Amendment  by  taking  the  property  of  the  initial  carrier 
to  pay  the  debt  of  an  independent  connecting  carrier 
whose  negligence  may  have  been  the  sole  cause  of  the 
loss.  But  this  contention  results  from  a  surface  reading 
of  the  act,  and  misses  the  true  basis  upon  which  it  rests. 
The  liability  of  the  receiving  carrier  which  results  in 
such  a  case  is  that  of  a  principal  for  the  negligence  of  his 
own  agents.  .  .  •  The  conclusion  we  reach  in  respect 
to  the  validity  of  the  amendment  has  the  support  of  some 
well-considered  cases.  Among  them  we  cite :  Smeltzer 
V.  St.  Louis  and  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  158  Fed.  649;  Pittsburg, 
C,  C.  and  St.  Louis  Bailroad  Company  v.  Mitchell,  175 
Ind.  196;  Louisville  and  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  133  Ky.  724.'' 
See  also,  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mottley,  219  U.  S.  467, 
in  which  it  was  held  that  by  the  provisions  of  the  act  of 
June  29,  1906,  86,  rendering  unenforceable  a  prior  con- 
tract, valid  when  made,  by  which  an  interstate  carrier 
agreed  to  issue  annual  passes  for  life  in  consideration  of 
a  release  of  a  claim  for  damage,— was  not  taking  away 
the  freedom  of  contract  which  the  Constitution  guar- 
antees. 


602  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  274 

§274.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  amend- 
ment of  Iowa  Code  defining  liability  of  railway  corpora- 
tions for  injuries.  In  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  B.  Co.  v.  McGuire, 
219  U.  S.  549,  it  was  held  that  the  amending  of  certain 
provisions  of  the  code  of  Iowa, — defining  the  liability  of 
railway  corporations  for  injuries  resulting  from  negli- 
gence and  mismanagement  in  the  operation  of  their  rail- 
ways, so  that  a  railroad  company  when  sued  on  such 
liability  is  precluded  from  making  the  defense  that  a 
recovery  is  barred  by  the  acceptance  of  benefits  under  a 
contract  of  membership  in  its  relief  department, — did  not 
infringe  the  freedom  of  contract  guaranteed  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  The  Court  said :  ' '  The  first  ground 
of  attack  is  that  the  statute  violates  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  by  reason  of  the  restraint  it  lays  upon  lib- 
erty of  contract.  This  section  of  the  Code  of  Iowa 
(§2071),  as  originally  enacted,  imposed  liability  upon 
railroad  corporations  for  injuries  to  employees,  although 
caused  by  the  negligence  or  mismanagement  of  fellow 
servants.  And  it  was  held  by  this  court  that  it  was  clearly 
written  the  competency  of  the  legislature  to  prescribe  this 
measure  of  responsibility,  Minneapolis  and  St.  L,  B,  Co. 
V.  Herrick,  127  U.  S,  210,  following  Missouri  P.  B,  Co.  v. 
Mackey,  127  U.  S.  205,  The  statute  in  its  original  form 
also  provided  that  *no  contract  which  restricts  such  lia- 
bility shall  be  legal  or  binding. '  Subsequent  to  this  enact- 
ment, the  railroad  company  established  its  relief  depart- 
ment, and  the  question  was  raised  in  the  state  court  as  to 
the  legality  of  the  provision  then  incorporated  in  the  con- 
tract of  membership,  by  which,  in  case  of  suit  for  dam- 
ages, the  payment  of  benefits  was  to  be  suspended  until 
the  suit  should  be  discontinued,  and  the  acceptance  of 
benefits  was  to  operate  as  a  full  discharge.  The  two  prin- 
cipal contentions  against  it  were,  first,  that  it  was  against 
public  policy,  and  second,  that  it  was  a  violation  of  the 
statute.  Both  were  overruled,  and  with  reference  to  the 
statute,  it  was  held  that  the  contract  of  membership  did 
not  fall  within  the  prohibition,  for  the  reason  that  it  did 


§  275  FREEDOM  OP  CJONTBACT  503 

not  restrict  liability  but  put  the  employee  to  his  election. 
Donald  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  B.  Co.,  93  Iowa  284 ;  Maine  v, 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  109  Iowa  260.  The  legislature 
then  amended  the  section  by  providing  expressly  that  a 
contract  of  this  sort  and  the  acceptance  of  benefits  should 
not  defeat  the  enforcement  of  the  liability  the  statute 
defined.  .  .  .  The  policy  of  the  amendatory  act  was 
the  same  as  that  of  the  original  statute.  Its  provision 
that  contracts  of  insurance  relief,  benefit  or  indemnity, 
and  the  acceptance  of  such  benefits,  should  not  defeat 
recovery  under  the  statute,  was  incidental  to  the  regula- 
tion it  was  intended  to  enforce.  Assuming  the  right  of 
enforcement,  the  authority  to  enact  this  inhibition  can 
not  be  denied.*' 


§  275.  Freedom  of  contract  not  interfered  with  by  need- 
ful state  regulation  of  boards  of  trade.  In  House  v. 
Mayes,  219  U.  S.  270,  it  was  held  that  constitutional  free- 
dom of  contract  was  not  impaired  by  the  regulation  of 
the  business  of  boards  of  trade,  organized  to  enforce  as 
between  its  members  a  high  standard  of  business  deal- 
ings, by  such  means,  neither  arbitrary  or  unreasonable, 
as  the  state  may  deem  necessary  to  protect  its  people 
against  such  unfair  practices  as  are  likely  to  occur.  The 
Court  said:  **That  it  is  with  the  state  to  devise  the 
means  to  be  employed  to  such  ends,  taking  care  always 
that  the  means  devised  do  not  go  beyond  the  necessities 
of  the  case,  have  some  real  or  substantial  relation  to  the 
objects  to  be  accomplished,  and  are  not  inconsistent  with 
its  own  constitution  or  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  .  .  .  The  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  well 
observed  that  the  object  of  the  statute  was  to  prevent  the 
enforcement  of  a  rule  of  a  board  of  trade,  under  the  ordi- 
nary operation  of  which  unfair  and  fraudulent  practices 
occur,  or  would  most  probably  occur,  in  the  sale  of  grain 
and  the  other  conmiodities  named.  .  .  .  Such  regula- 
tions do  not,  in  any  true  sense,  interfere  with  that 
*  liberty  of  contract*  which  the  individual  members  of  the 


504  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  275 

board  of  trade  are  undoubtedly  entitled,  under  the  Con- 
stitution to  enjoy,  without  unnecessary  interference  from 
government.  ^  *  See  also,  Broadnax  v.  Missouri,  219  U.  S. 
285,  in  which  it  was  likewise  held  that  there  was  no  uncon- 
stitutional interference  with  the  freedom  of  contract  by 
a  state  statute,  providing  that  the  keeping  of  a  place 
where  grains,  provisions,  and  other  commodities  and 
corporate  stocks  and  bonds  are  bought  and  sold,  but  not 
paid  for  and  delivered  at  the  time,  and  where  no  com- 
plete record  of  the  transactions,  including  a  minute  of 
the  time  of  delivery,  is  made  in  a  book  kept  for  the  pur- 
pose, and  no  memorandum  of  the  sale,  properly  stamped, 
is  given  the- purchaser,  is  a  criminal  offense. 

§276.  No  unwarranted  interference  with  freedom  of 
contract  in  Section  5  of  Employers'  Liability  act,  1908. 
In  Mondou  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  1 
(Second  Employers'  Liability  Cases)  it  was  held  that 
there  is  no  unconstitutional  interference  with  the  freedom 
of  contract  guaranteed  by  the  Fifth  Amendment  by  the 
fifth  section  of  the  employers'  liability  act,  of  April  22, 
1908,  which  puts  the  stamp  of  nullity  upon  any  contract, 
rule,  regulation,  or  device  the  purpose  of  intent  of  which 
is  to  enable  the  carrier  to  exempt  itself  from  the  liability 
created  therein.  The  Court  said:  *'But  of  this  it 
suffices  to  say,  in  view  of  our  recent  decisions  in  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  McGuire,  219  U.  S.  549,  Atlantic  Coast 
Lin^  R.  Co.  V.  Riverside  Mills,  219  U.  S.  186,  and  Balti- 
more &  Ohio  R.  Co.  V.  Interstate  Conunerce  Commission, 
221  U.  S.  612,  that  if  Congress  possesses  the  power  to 
impose  that  liability  which  we  here  hold  that  it  does,  it 
also  possesses  the  power  to  insure  its  efficacy  by  prohib- 
iting any  contract,  rule,  regulation,  or  device  in  evasion 
of  it.  Coming  to  the  question  of  classification,  it  is  true 
that  the  liability  which  the  act  creates  is  imposed  only  on 
interstate  carriers  by  railroad,  although  there  are  other 
interstate  carriers,  and  is  imposed  for  the  benefit  of  all 
employees  of  such  carriers  by  railroads  who  are  employed 


§  277        FBBEDOM  OF  CONTRACT  505 

in  interstate  commerce,  although  some  are  not  subjected 
to  the  peculiar  hazards  incident  to  the  operation  of  trains, 
or  to  hazards  that  differ  from  those  to  which  other 
employees  in  such  commerce,  not  within  the  act,  are 
exposed.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  this  classification  is 
violative  of  the  *due  process  of  law*  clause  of  the  Fifth 
Amendment.  Even  if  it  be  assured  that  that  clause  is 
equivalent  to  the  'equal  protection  of  the  laws*  clause 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  which  is  the  most  that  can 
be  claimed  for  it  here,  it  does  not  take  from  Congress  the 
power  to  classify  nor  does  it  condemn  exertions  of  that 
power  merely  because  they  occasion  some  inequalities. 
On  the  contrary,  it  admits  of  the  exercise  of  a  wide  dis- 
cretion in  classifying  according  to  general,  rather  than 
minute,  distinctions,  and  condemns  what  is  done  only  when 
it  is  without  any  reasonable  basis,  and  therefore  is  purely 
arbitrary.  Lindsley  v.  Natural  Carbonic  Gas  Co.,  220 
U.  S.  61.  Tested  by  these  standards,  this  classification  is 
not  objectionable.'* 

§  277.  Freedom  of  contract  not  interfered  with  by  ordi- 
nance fixing  the  size  of  loaves  of  bread.  In  Schmidinger 
V.  Chicago,  226  U.  S.  578,  it  was  held  that  the  freedom  of 
contract  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was 
not  interfered  with  by  reason  of  the  existence  of  a  con- 
siderable demand  in  the  city  of  Chicago  for  loaves  of 
bread  of  sizes  other  than  those  fixed  by  an  ordinance  of 
that  city  forbidding  the  sale  of  other  than  standard  sizes. 
The  Court  said :  *  *  It  is  further  urged  that  this  ordinance 
interferes  with  the  freedom  of  contract  guaranteed  by 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  for  it  is  said  that  there  is  a 
demand  for  loaves  of  bread  of  sizes  other  than  those  fixed 
in  the  ordinance,  which  demand  exists  among  many  people 
and  also  among  contractors  whose  business  requires 
special  sizes  to  be  made  for  them.  This  court  has  had 
frequent  occasion  to  declare  that  there  is  no  absolute 
freedom  of  contract.  The  exercise  of  the  police  power 
fixing  weights  and  measures  and  standard  sizes  must 


506  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  277 

necessarily  limit  the  freedom  of  contract  which  would 
otherwise  exist.  Snch  limitations  are  constantly  imposed 
upon  the  right  to  contract  f  reely^  because  of  restrictions 
upon  that  right  deemed  necessary  in  the  interest  of  the 
general  welfare.  So  long  as  such  action  has  a  reasonable 
relation  to  the  exercise  of  the  power  belonging  to  the  local 
legislative  body,  and  is  not  so  arbitrary  or  capricious  as 
to  be  a  deprivation  of  due  process  of  law,  freedom  of  con- 
tract is  not  interfered  with  in  {i  constitutional  sense.  See, 
in  this  connection,  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  McGuire, 
219  U.  S.  549,  and  the  previous  cases  in  this  court  re- 
viewed in  the  course  of  the  opinion  in  that  case. ' ' 

§  278.  Freedom  of  contract  not  abridged  by  state  law 
punishing  the  selling  of  goods  at  a  lower  rate  in  one  place 
than  another.  In  Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  South  Dakota, 
226  U.  S.  157,  it  was  held  that  a  law  of  South  Dakota 
punishing  the  selling  of  goods  at  a  lower  rate  in  one  place 
than  in  another,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  com- 
petition of  any  regular  established  dealer  therein,  or  to 
prevent  the  competition  of  any  person,  who  in  good  faith, 
intends  and  attempts  to  become  such  dealer,  does  not 
abridge  the  freedom  of  contract  guaranteed  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  The  Court  said:  **0n  the  first  of 
these  points  it  is  said  that  an  indefensible  classification 
may  be  disguised  in  the  form  of  a  description  of  the  acts 
constituting  the  offense,  and  it  is  urged  that  to  punish 
selling  goods  in  one  place  lower  than  at  another  in  effect 
is  to  select  the  class  of  dealers  that  have  two  places  of 
business  for  a  special  liability,  and  in  real  facts  is  a  blow 
aimed  at  those  who  have  several  lumber  yards  along  a 
line  of  railroad,  in  the  interest  of  independent  dealers. 
All  competition,  it  is  added,  imparts  an  attempt  to  destroy 
or  prevent  the  competition  of  rivals,  and  there  is  no  dif- 
ference in  principle  between  the  prohibited  act  and  the 
ordinary  efforts  of  traders  at  a  single  place.  The  prem- 
ises may  be  conceded  without  accepting  the  conclusion 
that  this  is  an  unconstitutional  discrimination.     If  the 


§  279  FBEEDOM  OF  CONTRACT  507 

legislature  shares  the  now  prevailing  belief  as  to  what  is 
public  policy,  and  finds  that  a  particular  instrument  of 
trade  war  is  being  used  against  that  policy  in  certain 
cases,  it  may  direct  its  law  against  what  it  deems  the 
evil  as  it  actually  exists  without  covering  the  whole  field 
of  possible  abuses,  and  it  may  do  so  none  the  less  that  the 
forbidden  act  does  not  differ  in  kind  from  those  that  are 
allowed.  Lindsley  v.  Natural  Carbonic  Gas  Co.,  220  U.  S, 
61 ;  Missouri  P.  B.  Co.  v.  Mackey,  127  U.  S.  205.  That  is 
not  the  arbitrary  selection  that  is  condemned  in  such 
cases  as  Southern  E.  Co.  v.  Greene,  216  XJ.  S.  400.  The 
Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not  prohibit  legislation 
special  in  character.  Magoun  v.  Illinois  Trust  and  Sav- 
ings Bank,  170  U.  S.  283.  It  does  not  prohibit  a  state 
from  carrying  out  a  policy  that  cannot  be  pronounced 
purely  arbitrary,  by  taxation  or  penal  laws.  Orient 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Daggs,  172  U.  S.  557,  562 ;  Quong  Wing 
V.  Kirkendall,  223  U.  S.  59,  62.  If  a  class  is  deemed  to 
present  a  conspicuous  example  of  what  the  legislature 
seeks  to  prevent,  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  allows  it 
to  be  dealt  with,  although  otherwise  and  merely  logically 
not  distinguishable  from  others  not  embraced  in  the  law. 
Carroll  v.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.,  199  U.  S.  401,  411.  We 
must  assume  that  the  legislature  of  South  Dakota  con- 
sidered that  people  selling  in  two  places  made  the  pro- 
hibited use  of  their  opportunities,  and  that  such  use  was 
harmful,  although  the  usual  efforts  of  competitors  were 
desired. '' 

§  279.  Freedom  of  contract  not  abridged  by  state  law 
making  it  a  crime  for  a  junk  dealer  to  buy  certain  mate- 
rials under  certain  circumstances.  In  Bosenthal  v.  New 
York,  226  U.  S.  260,  it  was  held  that  a  law  of  that  state, 
as  construed  by  its  highest  court,  making  it  a  crime  for 
a  dealer  in  junk,  metals,  or  second-hand  materials  to  buy 
or  receive  any  stolen  copper,  lead,  wire,  cable,  solder, 
brass  or  iron  used  by  or  belonging  to  a  railroad,  tele- 
graph,  telephone,  gas,  or  electric  light  company,  prior  to 


508  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  279 

diligent  inquiry  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether 
the  person  selling  or  delivering  it  has  a  legal  right  to 
dispose  of  the  same,  does  not  abridge  the  freedom  of 
contract  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The 
Court  said :  **  We  have  said  enough  to  indicate  the  char- 
acter of  the  arguments  employed  in  the  effort  to  show 
that  the  act  of  1903  is  wholly  arbitrary  and  constitutes 
so  groundless  an  interference  with  the  citizen's  liberty 
of  contract  as  to  bring  it  within  the  denunciation  of  the 
due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
It  seems  to  us  that  the  object  of  the  legislation  is  well 
within  the  legitimate  bounds  of  the  police  power  of  the 
state,  and  sustainable  upon  the  principles  discussed  in 
Mugler  V.  Kansas,  123  XJ.  S.  623, 626,  of  which  more  recent 
applications  are  to  be  found  in  Booth  v.  Illinois,  184  U.  S. 
425,  429,  and  Lemieux  v.  Young,  211  U.  S.  489.  See  also, 
Chicago,  B,  &  Q,  R.  Co.  v.  McGuire,  219  U.  S.  549,  568.'' 

§  280.  Freedom  of  contract  abridged  by  state  law  mak- 
ing it  a  crime  for  a  person  to  act  as  a  railway  conductor 
without  certain  qualifications.  In  Smith  v.  Texas,  233 
U.  S.  630,  it  was  held  that  a  law  of  that  state  making  it 
a  misdemeanor  for  any  one  to  act  as  a  conductor  on  a 
railway  train  without  previous  service  for  two  years  as  a 
freight  conductor  or  brakeman,  embodied  an  unconstitu- 
tional abridgment  of  the  freedom  of  contract  guaranteed 
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The  Court  said:  **The 
liberty  of  contract  is,  of  course,  not  unlimited ;  but  there 
is  no  reason  or  authority  for  the  proposition  that  condi- 
tions may  be  imposed  by  statute  which  will  admit  some 
who  are  competent  and  arbitrarily  exclude  others  who  are 
equally  competent  to  labor  on  terms  mutually  satisfac- 
tory to  employer  and  employee.  None  of  the  cases  sus- 
tains the  proposition  that  under  the  power  to  secure 
public  safety,  a  privileged  class  can  be  created  and  be 
theii  given  a  monopoly  of  the  right  to  work  in  a  special 
or  favored  position.  Such  a  statute  would  shut  the  door, 
without  a  hearing,  upon  many  persons  and  classes  of  per- 


§  282        FREEDOM  OP  CONTRACT  509 

sons  who  were  competent  to  serve,  and  wonld  deprive 
them  of  the  liberty  to  work  in  a  calling  they  were  quali- 
fied to  fill  with  safety  to  the  public  and  benefit  to 
themselves. ' ' 

§  281.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  state  law 
forbidding  emplojrment  of  a  child  or  woman  for  more 
than  ten  hours  a  day.  In  Biley  v.  Massachusetts,  232 
U.  S.  671,  it  was  held  that  a  law  of  that  state  forbidding 
the  employment  of  a  child  or  woman  for  more  than  ten 
hours  in  any  one  day,  or  more  than  fifty-six  hours  a  week, 
in  any  manufacturing  or  mechanical  establishment,  does 
not  infringe  the  freedom  of  contract  guaranteed  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  The  Court  said :  '  *  The  statute 
of  the  state  which  is  assailed  provides  that  no  child  or 
woman  shall  be  employed  in  laboring  in  any  manufactur- 
ing or  mechanical  establishment  more  than  ten  hours  in 
any  one  day,  except  as  hereinafter  provided  in  this  sec- 
tion, unless  a  different  apportionment  of  the  hours  of 
labor  is  made  for  the  sole  purpose  of  making  a  shorter 
day 's  work  for  one  day  of  the  week,  and  in  no  case  shall 
the  hours  of  labor  exceed  fifty-six  in  a  week.  .  .  .  The 
first  contention  of  plaintiff  in  error  is  that  the  statute 
restricts  the  right  to  sell  and  buy  labor,  and  therein 
infringes  the  liberty  of  contract  assured  by  article  14  of 
the  Amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
The  contention  is  untenable  expressed  in  this  generality. 
In  MuUer  v.  Oregon,  208  U.  S.  412,  against  a  similar  con- 
tention, a  statute  of  Oregon  was  sustained  which  pro- 
hibited the  employment  of  women  in  mechanical  factories 
or  laundries  working  more  than  ten  hours  during  any  one 
day  with  power,  as  in  the  Massachusetts  statute,  to  appor- 
tion the  hours  through  the  day.*' 


§  282.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  state  law 
forbidding  the  issuance  of  irredeemable  orders  in  pay- 
ment of  labor.  In  Keokee  Consolidated  Coke  Co.  v.  Tay- 
lor, 234  U.  S.  224,  it  was  held  that  freedom  of  contract  was 


510  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  282 

not  infringed  by  a  Virginia  statute  forbidding  any 
person,  corporation  or  firm,  engaged  in  mining  coal 
or  ore,  or  manufacturing  iron  or  steel,  or  any  other 
kind  of  manufacturing,  to  issue,  for  the  payment  of 
labor,  any  order  not  purporting  to  be  redeemable  for  its 
face  value  in  the  lawful  money  of  the  country.  The  Court 
said :  *  *  Of  course  we  do  not  go  behind  the  constructioo 
given  to  the  state  law  by  the  state  courts.  The  abjections 
that  are  urged  here  are  that  the  statute  interferes  with 
freedom  of  contract,  and,  more  especially  that  it  is  class 
legislation  of  a  kind  supposed  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment ;  a  West  Virginia  decision  upon 
a  similar  statute  being  cited  to  that  effect.  State  v.  Good- 
will, 33  W.  Va.  179.  The  former  of  these  objections, 
however,  is  disposed  of  by  Knoxville  Iron  Co.  v.  Harbi- 
son, 183  U.  S.  13,  and  Dayton  Coal  &  I.  Co.  v.  BartoD, 
183U.  S.  23.^' 

§283.  Freedom  of  contract  not  limited  by  a  MisBOuri 
statute  against  combinations.  In  International  Har- 
vester Co.  V.  Missouri,  234  U.  S.  199,  it  was  held  that  a 
statute  of  that  state  against  combinations  tending  to 
lessen  competition  in  the  importation,  manufacture, 
transportation,  or  sale  of  commodities,  does  not  limit  the 
freedom  of  contract  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  even  when  its  prohibitions  are  applied  to  a 
combination  that  has  benefited  instead  of  injured  the 
public.  The  Court  said:  '*(1)  The  specification  under 
this  head  is  that  the  Supreme  Court  found,  it  is  con- 
tended, benefit — not  injury — to  the  public  had  resulted 
from  the  alleged  combination.  Granting  that  this  is  not 
an  overstatement  of  the  opinion,  the  answer  is  immediate. 
It  is  too  late  in  the  day  to  assert  against  statutes  which 
forbid  combinations  of  competing  companies  that  a  par- 
ticular combination  was  induced  by  good  intentions  and 
has  had  some  good  effect.  Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  United 
States,  209  U.  S.  56,  62 ;  Standard  Sanitary  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
United  States,  226  U.  S.  20,  49.    The  purpose  of  such 


§  284        FREEDOM  OF  CONTRACT  511 

statutes  is  to  secure  competition  and  preclude  combina- 
tions which  tend  to  defeat  it.  And  such  is  explicitly  the 
purpose  and  policy  of  the  Missouri  statutes;  and  they 
have  been  sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  which 
precludes  a  state  from  adopting  and  enforcing  such 
policy.  To  so  decide  would  be  stepping  backwards.  Car- 
roll V.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.,  199  U.  S.  401 ;  Central  Lumber 
Co.  V.  South  Dakota,  226  U.  S.  157. '^ 

§284.  Freedom  of  contract  denied  by  application  of 
nonforfeiture  provisions  of  statute  of  one  state  so  as  to 
invalidate  policy  loan  agreement  made  in  another.  In 
New  York  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Head,  234  U.  S.  149,  it  was  held 
that  the  freedom  of  contract  guaranteed  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  was  denied  by  the  application  of  the 
nonforfeiture  provisions  of  a  Missouri  statute  in  such  a 
way  as  to  invalidate  a  policy  loan  agreement  made  in 
New  York  between  a  life  insurance  corporation  of  tliat 
state  and  the  beneficiary,  residing  in  New  Mexico,  and 
the  settlement  made  in  New  York  in  accordance  with  such 
agreement,  and  in  harmony  with  its  laws,  although  the 
original  contract  was  made  in  Missouri,  which  had 
imposed  as  a  condition  of  the  license  granted  to  the 
insurance  company  to  do  business  in  the  state,  that  it 
should  be  subject  to  its  laws  just  as  if  it  were  a  corpora- 
tion of  its  own  creation.  The  Court  said:  **It  is  illus- 
trated as  regards  the  right  to  freedom  of  contract  by  the 
ruling  in  AUgeyer  v.  Louisiaua,  165  U.  S.  578,  and  it  finds 
expression  in  the  decisions  of  this  court  affirmatively 
establishing  that  a  state  may  not  consistently  with  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  extend  its 
authority  beyond  its  legitimate  jurisdiction  either  by  way 
of  the  wrongful  exertion  of  judicial  power  or  the  unwar- 
ranted exercise  of  the  taxing  power.  And  an  analysis 
of  the  opinion  of  the  court  below  makes  it  clear  that  its 
ruling  was  rested  not  upon  any  doubt  concerning  the 
obvious  operation  of  the  Constitution  which  we  have 


512  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  284 

pointed  out,  but  because  it  was  deemed  that  the  peculiar 
facts  and  circumstances  of  this  case  took  it  out  of  the  gen- 
eral rule  and  caused  it  to  be  therefore  a  law  unto  itself.'^ 
The  Court  in  rejecting  that  assumption  said:  **But  when 
this  reasoning  is  analyzed,  we  think  it  affords  no  ground 
whatever  for  taking  this  case  out  of  the  general  rule  and 
making  the  distinction  relied  upon.  This  is  so  as  the 
proposition  can  not  be  maintained  without  holding  that 
because  a  state  has  power  to  license  a  foreign  insurance 
company  to  do  business  within  its  borders,  and  the  author- 
ity to  regulate  such  business,  therefore  a  state  has  power 
to  regulate  the  business  of  such  company  outside  its 
borders,  and  which  would  otherwise  be  beyond  the  state's 
authority/' 

§  285.  Freedom  of  contract  denied  by  state  law  making 
it  a  crime  for  an  employer  to  impose  a  certain  condition 
on  employee.    In  Coppage  v.  Kansas,  236  U.  S.  1,  it  was 

held,  that  the  freedom  of  contract  guaranteed  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  denied  by  a  law  of  that  state, 
as  construed  and  applied  by  its  highest  court,  imposing 
criminal  punishment  upon  an  employer  or  his  agent  for 
having  prescribed  as  a  condition  upon  which  one  may 
secure  employment  (terminable  at  will),  under,  or  remain 
in  the  service  of  such  employer  that  the  employee  (free 
to  exercise  a  voluntary  choice)  shall  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment not  to  become  or  remain  a  member  of  any  labor 
organization  while  so  employed.  After  carefully  analyz- 
ing and  comparing  the  judgment  in  Adair  v.  United 
States,  208  U.  S.  161,  the  Court  said:  *'When  a  man  is 
called  upon  to  agree  not  to  become  or  remain  a  member 
of  the  union  while  working  for  a  particular  employer,  he 
is  in  effect  only  asked  to  deal  openly  and  frankly  with  his 
employer,  so  as  not  to  retain  the  employment  upon  terms 
to  which  the  latter  is  not  willing  to  agree.  And  the  lib- 
erty of  making  contracts  does  not  include  a  liberty  to 
procure  employment  from  an  unwilling  employer,  or 
without  a  fair  understanding.    Nor  may  the  employer  be 


§  285        FREEDOM  OF  CONTRACT  513 

foreclosed  by  legislation  from  exercising  the  same  free- 
dom of  choice  that  is  the  right  of  the  employee.  To  ask 
a  man  to  agree^  in  advance,  to  refrain  from  affiliation  with 
the  nnion  while  retaining  a  certain  position  of  employ- 
menty  is  not  to  ask  him  to  give  np  any  part  of  his  consti- 
tutional freedom.  He  is  free  to  decline  the  employment 
on  those  terms,  just  as  the  employer  may  decline  to  offer 
employment  on  any  other:  For  4t  takes  two  to  make  a 
bargain. '  Having  accepted  employment  on  those  terms, 
the  man  is  still  free  to  join  the  union  when  the  period  of 
employment  expires;  or,  if  employment  at  will,  then  at 
any  time  upon  simply  quitting  the  employment.  And,  if 
bound  by  his  own  agreement  to  refrain  from  joining 
during  a  stated  period  of  employment,  he  is  in  no  differ- 
ent situation  from  that  which  is  necessarily  incident  to 
term  contracts  in  general.  For  constitutional  freedom  of 
contract  does  not  mean  that  a  party  is  to  be  as  free  after 
making  a  contract  as  before ;  he  is  not  free  to  break  it 
without  accountability.  Freedom  of  contract,  from  the 
very  nature  of  the  thing,  can  be  enjoyed  only  by  being 
exercised ;  and  each  particular  exercise  of  it  involves  mak- 
ing an  engagement  which,  if  fulfilled,  prevents  for  the  time 
any  inconsistent  course  of  conduct.  So  much  for  the  rea- 
son of  the  matter,  let  us  turn  again  to  the  adjudicated 
cases.  The  decision  in  the  Adair  Case  is  in  accord  with 
the  almost  unbroken  current  of  authorities  in  the  state 
courts.  .  .  .  The  right  that  plaintiff  in  error  is  now 
seeking  to  maintain  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Kansas,  in  an  earlier  case  [Coffeyville  Vitrified  Brick  and 
Tile  Co.  V.  Perry,  69  Kan.  297]  to  be  within  the  protection 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  and  therefore  beyond 
legislative  interference.  ...  In  five  other  states  the 
courts  of  last  resort  have  had  similar  acts  under  con- 
sideration, and  in  each  instance  have  held  them  uncon- 
stitutional.'* See  State  v.  Julow,  129  Mo.  163;  Gillespie 
V.  People,  188  HI.  176 ;  State  ex  rel.  Zilhner  v.  Kreutzberg, 
114  Wis.  530;  People  v.  Marcus,  185  N.  Y.  257;  State 
ex  rel.  Smith  v.  Daniels,  118  Minn.  155.    Thus  sustained, 

I>ne  Procefls— 33 


514  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  285 

both  by  reason  and  authority,  the  court  in  Coppage  v. 
Kansas,  236  U.  S.  1,  held  ^^that  the  Kansas  act  of  March 
13,  1903,  as  construed  and  applied  so  as  to  punish  with 
fine  or  imprisonment  an  employer  or  his  agent  for  merely 
prescribing,  as  a  condition  upon  which  one  may  secure 
employment  under  or  remain  in  the  service  of  such 
employer,  that  the  employee  shall  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment not  to  become  or  remain  a  member  of  any  labor 
organization  while  so  employed,  is  repugnant  to  the  ^  due 
process  *  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  and  there- 
fore void.*' 

§  286.  Employment  at  the  will  of  the  parties  does  not 
make  it  employment  at  the  will  of  others.  The  statement 
made  in  Coppage  v.  Kansas,  236  U.  S.  21,  that  its  princi- 
ples apply  to  an  employment  terminable  at  will,  suggests 
a  reference  to  the  later  case  of  Truax  v.  Baich,  239  TJ.  S. 
33,  involving  the  application  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  in  which 
the  Court  said :  *  *  That  under  an  employment  at  will  the 
complainant  could  be  discharged  at  any  time,  for  any 
reason  or  for  no  reason,  the  motive  of  the  employer  being 
inunaterial.  The  conclusion,  however,  that  is  sought  to  be 
drawn,  is  too  broad.  The  fact  that  the  employment  is  at 
the  will  of  the  parties,  re^spectively,  does,  not  make  it  one 
at  the  will  of  others.  The  employee  has  manifest  interest 
in  the  freedom  of  the  employer  to  exercise  his  judgment 
without  illegal  interference  or  compulsion  and,  by  the 
weight  of  authority,  the  unjustified  interference  of  third 
persons  is  actionable  although  the  employment  is  at  wiU. 
Moran  v.  Dunphy,  177  Mass.  485,  487 ;  Berry  v.  Donovan, 
188  Mass.  353 ;  Brennan  v.  United  Hatters,  73  N.  J.  L. 
729,  743;  Perkins  v.  Pendleton,  90  Me.  166;  Lucke  v. 
Clothing  Cutters,  77  Md.  396 ;  London  Guar.  &  Ace.  Co.  v. 
Horn,  101  HI.  App.  355;  S.  C,  206  111.  493;  Chipley  v. 
Atkinson,  23  Fla.  206 ;  Blumenthal  v.  Shaw,  23  C.  C.  A. 
290;  S.  C,  77  Fed.  Bep.  954. '*  In  this  connection  refer- 
ence should  be  made  to  the  very  recent  case  of  Larkin, 


§  286        FREEDOM  OP  CONTRACT  515 

et  al.  V.  Long,  [1915]  A.  C.  814-846,  at  pp.  829,  830. 
H.  L.  (1),  in  which  it  was  said:  ** Every  person  has  a 
right  under  the  law  as  between  himself  and  his  fellow 
subjects,  to  full  freedom  in  disposing  of  his  own  labor 
or  his  own  capital,  according  to  his  own  will.  It  follows 
that  every  person  is  subject  to  the  correlative  duty  aris- 
ing therefrom,  and  is  prohibited  from  any  obstruction  to 
the  fullest  exercise  of  this  right,  which  can  be  made  com- 
patible with  the  exercise  of  similar  rights  by  others.  But 
it  is  equally  true  that  the  members  of  trade  unions  are 
bound  to  respect  the  right  of  other  workmen  to  work  for 
whom  they  please,  on  what  terms  and  at  what  times  they 
please,  so  long  as  they  do  nothing  illegal,  and  are  also 
bound  to  respect  the  right  of  an  employer  to  undertake 
any  work  he  pleases  to  undertake,  and  to  employ  what 
workmen  he  chooses,  on  whatever  terms  they  both  agree 
to,  unless  there  is  something  unlawful  in  his  action.  If, 
therefore,  any  two  or  more  members  of  a  trade  union, 
whatever  its  rules  may  be,  wilfully  and  knowingly  com- 
bine to  injure  an  employer  by  inducing  his  workmen  to 
break  their  contracts  with  him,  or  not  to  enter  into  con- 
tracts with  him,  resulting  in  damage  to  him,  that  is  an 
entirely  different  matter.  That  is  an  invasion  of  liberty 
of  action  of  others,  and  has  no  analogy  to  the  action  of  the 
defendant  in  the  Mogul  Case  (1) ;  for  there,  as  Lord 
Halsbury  pointed  out  in  Quinn  v.  Leathem  (2),  no  legal 
right  has  been  interfered  with,  no  coercion  of  mind  or 
will  had  been  effected,  all  were  left  free  to  trade  on  what 
terms  they  will,  and  nothing  was  done  except  in  rival 
trading  which  could  be  supposed  to  interfere  with  the 
appellant's  interest.'^  See  also.  South  Wales  Miners' 
Federation  v.  Glamorgan  Coal  Co.,  [1905]  A.  C.  239; 
H.  L.  (E) ;  Howard  v.  Banner,  decided  in  the  Chancery 
Division  of  the  High  Court,  on  June  4, 1901,  and  reported 
in  The  Times  Law  Beports,  Vol.  XVII,  p.  348 ;  Quinn  v. 
Leathem  (1901)  70  L.  J.  P.  C.  76,  97.  (s.  c,  1901  A.  C. 
495.)  27  E.  R.  C.  66  Id.  ed.,  1908  Supplement;  Lumley  v. 
Gye  (1853)  2  E.  &  B.  216. 


516  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  S  287 

§287.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  the  so- 
called  Ohio  ''run-of-mine''  or  ''anti-screen"  law.    In 

Bail  and  Biver  Coal  Co.  v.  Yaple,  236  U.  S.  338,  the  Court 
said :  ^ '  The  objection  that  the  law  is  unconstitntional  as 
unduly  abridging  the  freedom  of  contract  in  prescribing 
the  particular  method  of  compensation  to  be  paid  by 
employers  to  miners  for  the  production  of  coal  was  made 
in  the  case  of  McLean  v.  Arkansas,  211 U.  S.  539,  in  which 
this  court  sustained  a  law  of  the  state  of  Arkansas, 
requiring  coal  mined  to  be  paid  for  according  to  the  run- 
of-mine  system  according  to  its  weight  when  brought  out 
of  the  mine  in  cars.  In  that  case  the  constitutional  objec- 
tions founded  upon  the  right  of  contract  which  are  made 
here,  were  considered  and  disposed  of.  This  court  has  so 
often  afiSrmed  the  right  of  the  state,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
police  power,  to  place  reasonable  restraints  like  that  here 
involved,  upon  the  freedom  of  contract,  that  we  need  only 
refer  to  some  of  the  cases  in  passing.  Schmidinger  v. 
Chicago,  226  U.  S.  578;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  B.  Co.  v. 
McGuire,  219  U.  S.  549,  and  cases  therein  cited  and 
reviewed. '^ 

§288.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  certain 
statutes  regulating  the  employment  of  women.  In  Mil- 
ler V.  Wilson,  236  U.  S.  373,  it  was  held  that  the  California 
statute  of  1911,  forbidding  the  employment  of  women  in 
certain  designated  establishments  for  more  than  eight 
hours  in  one  day,  or  forty-eight  hours  in  one  week,  does 
not,  when  applied  to  women  employed  in  hotels,  conflict 
with  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, as  an  infringement  of  the  freedom  of  contract  guar- 
anteed therein;  The  Court  said:  **A8  the  liberty  of  con- 
tract guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  is  freedom  from 
arbitrary  restraint, — not  inomaunity  from  reasonable 
regulation  to  safeguard  the  public  interest, — ^the  question 
is  whether  the  restrictions  of  the  statute  have  reason- 
able relation  to  a  proper  purpose.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  B. 
Co.  V.  McGuire,  219  U.  S.  549;  Erie  B.  Co.  v.  Williams, 


§  289        FREEDOM  OP  CONTRACT  517 

233  U.  S.  685 ;  Coppage  v,  Kansas,  236  U.  S.  1, 18.  Upon 
this  point,  the  recent  decisions  of  this  court  upholding 
other  statutes  limiting  the  hours  of  labor  of  women  must 
be  regarded  as  decisive. ' '  It  was  likewise  held  in  Bosley 
V.  McLaughlin,  236  XT.  S.  385,  that  the  freedom  of  con- 
tract guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not 
infringed  by  the  California  statute  of  1911,  as  amended 
in  1913,  forbidding  a  graduate  woman  pharmacist  em- 
ployed in  a  hospital  to  work  more  than  eight  hours  in  one 
day,  or  forty-eight  hours  in  one  week;  and  forbidding 
women  student  nurses  in  a  hospital  training  school  to 
work  more  than  eight  hours  in  one  day,  or  forty-eight 
hours  in  one  week.  It  was  also  held  that  the  freedom  of 
contract  in  question  was  not  impaired  through  the  exten- 
sion by  the  California  statute  of  1913  of  the  prohibi- 
tions of  the  statute  of  1911  to  women  employed  in  hospi- 
tals, such  as  matrons,  seamstresses,  bookkeepers,  office 
assistants,  and  persons  engaged  in  household  work. 

§289.  Freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  Florida 
statute  imposing  special  license  taxes  on  merchants  using 
profit  sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps.  In  Bast  v. 
Van  Deman  and  Lewis,  240  XJ.  S.  342,  the  Court  said: 
'*  Having  disposed  of  the  other  contentions  of  complain- 
ants, we  are  brought  to  a  consideration  of  the  question 
whether  the  statute  of  Florida  offends  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution. 
In  other  words,  does  the  statute  interfere  with  the  busi- 
ness liberty  of  complainants?  Is  it  an  illegal  meddling 
with  a  lawful  calling  and  a  deprivation  of  freedom  of 
contract?  This  is  the  contention,  and  it  is  attempted  to 
be  supported  by  the  assertion  that  the  schemes  detailed 
in  the  bill  are  but  a  method  of  advertising  and,  as  such 
mere  allurements  to  customers,  not  detrimental  in  any 
way  to  the  public  health  and 'morals,  nor  obstructive  of 
the  public  welfare ;  but  are  a  means  of  enterprise,  mere 
incidents  of  the  business  of  complainants  and  as  benefi- 
cial to  their  customers  as  to  them.    .    .    .    These  con- 


518  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  289 

tentions  have  the  support  of  a  number  of  cases.  They 
are  opposed  by  others,  not  nearly  so  numerous  as  the  sup- 
porting cases  but  marking  a  change  of  opinion.  Both 
sets  of  cases  indicate  by  the  statutes  passed  upon  a  per- 
sistent legislative  effort  against  the  schemes  under  review 
or  some  form  of  them,  beginning  in  1880  and  repeated 
from  time  to  time  until  the  statute  in  controversy  was 
passed  in  1913.  In  such  differences  between  judicial  and 
legislative  opinion  where  should  the  choice  bet  .  .  . 
Complainants  allege  that  the  license  tax  which  the  statute 
imposes  is  of  prohibitory  character  and  assert  that  they 
are  exercising  inviolable  rights  and  privileges  wMch 
the  excess  of  the  tax  prevents  in  violation  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment;  they  contend  that  hence  the  statute 
is  invalid.  It  is  not  certain  from  the  allegations  of  the 
bill  that  the  tax  is  of  the  asserted  character,  but  granting 
it  to  be  so  we  have  shown  that  the  business  schemes 
described  in  the  bill  are  not  protected  from  regulation  or 
prohibition  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
Lawton  v.  Steele,  152  U.  S.  133 ;  Booth  v.  Illinois,  184 
U.  S.  425 ;  Otis  v.  Parker,  187  U,  S.  606 ;  see  also,  Dobbins 
V.  Los  Angeles,  195  U.  S.  223,  238 ;  Murphy  v.  California, 
225  U.  S.  623 ;  Postal  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Charleston,  153 
U.  S.  692,  699;  MoCray  v.  United  States,  195  U.  S.  27; 
Kehrer  v.  Stewart,  197  U.  S.  60 ;  Hammond  Packing  Co. 
V.  Montana,  233  U.  S.  331.'^ 


CHAPTEB  Xm 

PBOPBBTY  BIGHTS  AS  PBOTECTED  BY  DUE  PBOCESS— 

LIMITATIONS  AND  BEMEDIES 

§  290.  Statutes  of  limitation  regarded  as  rules  of  pro- 
cedure. As  statutes  of  limitation  are  generally  regarded 
as  rules  of  procedure  affecting  not  the  right  but  the  rem- 
edy (Fullerton  v.  Bank  of  United  States,  1  Pet.  604; 
Townsend  v.  Jamison,  9  How.  407;  Barrett  v.  Holmes, 
102  U.  S.  651 ;  Michigan  Ins.  Co,  v.  Eldred,  130  U.  S.  693 ; 
Hill  V.  Merchants'  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  134  U.  S.  515;  McCul- 
lough  V.  Virginia,  172  U.  S.  102),  they  are  not  unconstitu- 
tional either  as  denying  due  process  of  law  or  as  impairing 
the  obligation  of  contracts  when  a  reasonable  time,  the 
nature  and  circumstances  of  the  case  being  taken  into 
account,  is  allowed  for  the  bringing  of  the  action  after  the 
passage  of  the  statute  and  before  the  bar  takes  effect.  In 
Terry  v.  Anderson,  95  IT.  S.  628,  the  Court  said : ' '  The  par- 
ties to  a  contract  have  no  more  a  vested  interest  in  a  par- 
ticular limitation  which  has  been  fixed,  than  they  have  in 
an  unrestricted  right  to  sue.  They  have  no  more  a  vested 
interest  in  the  time  for  the  commencement  of  an  action 
then  they  have  in  the  form  of  the  action  to  be  com- 
menced; and  as  to  the  forms  of  action  or  modes  of 
remedy,  it  is  well  settled  that  the  Legislature  may  change 
them  at  its  discretion  provided  adequate  means  of  enforc- 
ing the  right  remain.  ...  In  all  such  cases,  the  question 
is  one  of  reasonableness,  and  we  have,  therefore,  only  to 
consider  whether  the  time  allowed  in  this  statute  is, 
under  all  the  circumstances,  reasonable.  Of  that  the 
Legislature  is  primarily  the  judge ;  and  we  can  not  over- 
rule the  decision  of  that  department  of  the  government, 
unless  a  palpable  error  has  been  committed.  *'    The  sub- 

519 


520  DUE  PB0CES3  OF  LAW  §  290 

ject  of  limitations  is  within  the  control  of  the  legislature 
as  a  part  of  the  lex  fori;  and  it  may  increase  or  diminiah 
the  period  of  limitation  for  existing  causes  of  action. 
Great  Western  Tel.  Co.  v.  Purdy,  162  U.  S.  329;  Davis  v. 
MillS)  194  U.  S.  451.  Unless  some  special  featare  is 
obnoxious  to  constitutional  objections,  general  and  spe- 
cial laws  of  limitation  are  recognized  and  sustained  as 
founded  on  sound  policy.  Nash  v.  Fletcher,  44  Miss.  609 ; 
Preston  v.  Louisville,  84  Ky.  118 ;  Saloy  v.  Woods,  40  La. 
Ann.  585 ;  Perry  v.  Turner,  55  Mo.  418 ;  Smith  v.  Cleve- 
land, 17  Wis.  556;  Madden  v.  Lancaster  County,  65 
Fed.  188. 

§  291.  The  constitational  limitation  of  reasonableness. 

Every  state  exercising  the  power  to  pass  statutes  of  limi- 
tation must  do  so  subject  to  the  fundamental  condition 
that  a  reasonable  time  shall  be  allowed  for  the  exercise 
of  the  right  of  action,  whether  existing  or  prospective, 
after  it  comes  within  the  prospective  or  present  opera- 
tion of  the  statute  and  before  the  bar  becomes  effective. 
Gwin  V.  Brown,  21  App.  Cas.  (D.  C.)  295;  Central  Bank 
V.  Solomon,  20  Ga.  408 ;  Norris  v.  Tripp,  111  Iowa  115 ; 
Auld  V.  Butcher,  2  Kan.  135;  MacNichol  v.  Spence,  83 
Me.  87 ;  Gilbert  v.  Ackerman,  159  N.  T.  118 ;  Culbeth  v. 
Downing,  121 N.  C.  205 ;  Osborne  v.  Lindstrom,  9  N.  D.  1 ; 
Peterson  v.  Delaware,  9  Kulp  552 ;  Stoddard  v.  Owings, 
42  S.  C.  88 ;  Sohn  v.  Waterson,  17  Wall.  596 ;  Pereles  v. 
Watertown,  19  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,980,  6  Biss.  79 ;  Society 
for  Propagation  of  Gospel  v.  Wheeler,  22  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
13,156,  2  Gall  105 ;  Lamb  v.  Powder  River  Live  Stock  Co., 
132  Fed.  434.  The  period  of  limitation  fixed  by  the  legis- 
lature is  always  subject  to  judicial  review  and  will  be 
declared  unreasonable,  and  as  such  unconstitutional, 
where  it  is  so  manifestly  inadequate  as  to  amount  to  a  de- 
nial of  justice.  Gwin  v.  Brown,  21  App.  Cas.  (D.  C.)  295 ; 
Osborne  v.  Lindstrom,  9  N.  D.  1 ;  Pereles  v.  Watertown, 
19  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10,980,  6  Biss.  79;  Williams  v.  Port 
Chester,  72  N.  Y.  App.  Biv.  505,  76  N.  Y.  Supp.  631 ;  Lam 


§  292  LIMITATIONS  AND  EBMEDIES  521 

V.  Powder  River  Live  Stock  Co.,  132  Fed.  434 ;  Cyc.  of 
L.  and  P.  rd.  25,  pp.  986-7.  A  statute  shortening  the  period 
of  limitation  is  not  within  the  constitutional  power  of  the 
legislature,  unless  a  reasonable  time,  taking  into  con- 
sideration the  nature  of  the  case,  is  allowed  for  the  bring- 
ing of  a  suit  after  the  passage  of  the  statute  and  before 
the  bar  takes  effect.  Turner  v.  New  York,  168  U.  S.  90. 
See  also,  McGahey  v.  Virginia,  135  U.  S.  662.  An  exist- 
ing right  of  action  can  not  be  taken  away  by  shortening 
the  period  of  limitation  to  a  time  which  has  expired 
already.  Sohn  v.  Waterson,  17  Wall.  596.  The  statute 
is  void,  if  the  period  fixed  by  it  is  unreasonably  short,  and 
designed  to  defeat  the  remedy  upon  pre-existing  con- 
tracts which  is  a  part  of  their  obligation.  Edwards  v. 
Kearzey,  96  TJ.  S.  595.  A  statute  is  unreasonable  and 
obnoxious  to  the  objection  that  it  impairs  the  rights  of 
private  property,  if  it  bars  a  past  right  of  action  without 
any  provision  for  a  period  within  which  an  action  may 
be  brought.  Hope  v.  Johnson,  2  Terg.  123 ;  United  States 
v.  Sampernac,  1  Hampst.  118;  Cutts  v.  Hardee,  38  Ga. 
350 ;  Eathbone  v.  Bradford,  1  Ala.  312 ;  Coosa  River  S. 
Co.  V.  Barclay,  30  Ala.  120;  Holcome  v.  Tracy,  2  Minn. 
241;  Cook  v.  Wood,  1  McCord  L.  139;  Beltzhoover  v. 
Yewell,  11  Gil.  &  J.  212 ;  Cox  v.  Berry,  13  Ga.  306 ;  Bill- 
ings  V.  Hall,  7  Cal.  1;  Blackford  v.  Pether,  1  Black.  36; 
Griffin  v.  McKenzie,  7  Ga.  163 ;  Ward  v.  Kelts,  12  Wend. 
137 ;  Eckstein  v.  Shoemer,  3  Meart.  15 ;  Frey  v.  Kirk,  4 
Gil.  &  J.  509;  Hawkins  v.  Barney,  5  Pet.  458;  Charles 
Kiver  Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,  11  Pet.  420 ;  Satterlee  v. 
Matthewson,  16  Serg.  &  R.  169 ;  Weister  v.  Hade,  52  Penn. 
474.  See  Ed.  note  Co-op.  ed.  Supreme  Court  Reports, 
No.  34,  p.  660.  Subject  to  the  foregoing  exceptions  such 
statutes  are  valid;  and,  applying  to  the  remedy  merely, 
their  retroactive  operation  is  no  objection  to  them. 

§  292.  When  statutes  of  limitation  may  be  retroactive. 
The  Federal  Constitution  does  not  deprive  a  state  of  the 
right  to  enact  retroactive  laws  divesting  vested  rights, 


522  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  292 

provided  they  do  not  impair  contract  obligations  and  are 
not  ex  post  facto.  Watson  v.  Mercer,  8  Pet.  88 ;  Charles 
Eiver  Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,  11  Pet.  420;  Baltimore 
&  S.  R.  Co.  V.  Nesbit,  10  How.  395.  Such  laws  may  be 
proper  or  necessary  as  relate  back  to  a  period  ante- 
cedent to  their  enactment,  and  which  have  the  effect  of 
saving  time  from  the  statute  of  limitations  or  of  excusing 
acts  which  were  unlawful  when  committed.  Calder  v. 
Bull,  3  Dall.  386.  *  *  A  retroactive  effect  has  accordingly 
been  given  statutes  providing  a  new  mode  of  enforcing 
claims  against  the  state  (Chapman  v.  State,  104  Cal.  690) 
or  county  (Oilman  v.  Contra  Costa  County,  6  Cal.  676), 
authorizing  the  issue  of  executions  (Myers  v.  Moran,  113 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  427)  and  attachments  (Kuehn  v.  Paroni, 
20  Nev.  203;  Rouge  v.  Rouge,  114  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  421; 
Swartz  V.  Lawrence,  12  Phila.  181)  in  cases  where 
they  were  not  permitted  before,  authorizing  a  particular 
procedure  for  the  settlement  of  estates  (Fitzhugh  v.  Fitz- 
hugh,  6  B.  Mon.  4),  authorizing  the  foreclosure  of  mort- 
gages in  certain  cases  (Kennebec,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Portland, 
<»tc.,  R.  Co.,  59  Me.  9),  relating  to  the  enforcement  of  liens 
(Orman  v.  Crystal  River  R.  Co.,  5  Colo.  App.  493),  regu- 
lating the  parties  to  an  action  for  death  by  wrongful  act 
(Berry  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  52  Kan.  759),  relating 
to  the  remedy  on  bonds  given  by  an  insolvent  petitioner 
(State  V.  Burke,  2  Gill.  (Md.)  79),  relating  to  the  limita- 
tions of  actions  (Stine  v.  Bennett,  13  Minn.  153;  Crooks 
V.  Crooks,  4  Grant  Cp.  (N.  C.)  615;  Notman  v.  Crooks, 
10  N.  C.  Q.  B.  105),  relating  to  the  extension  of  chattel 
mortgages  ( Aultman,  etc.,  Mach.  Co.  v.  Fish,  120  HI.  App. 
314),  allowing  recoupment  of  usurious  interest  (Bowen 
V.  Phillips,  55  Ind.  226),  making  compliance  with  certain 
conditions  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  the  validity  of  cer- 
tain defenses  (Erskine  v.  Glidden,  Me.  [1886],  3  Atl. 
651),  and  even  to  statutes  relating  to  procedure  in  crim- 
inal cases  (State  v.  Maine,  16  Wis.  398).  But  any 
generalization  founded  on  the  distinction  between  right 
and  remedy  is  attended  with  some  danger  because  of  the 


§  293  LIMITATIONS  AND  REMEDIES  523 

difficulty  of  drawing  the  distinction  accurately  (Kent  v. 
Gray,  53  N.  H.  576,  579) ;  and  where  the  remedy  is  taken 
away  altogether  (Knight  v.  Lee,  [1893]  1  Q.  B.  41,  62 
L.  J.  Q.  B.  28),  or  is  encumbered  with  conditions  that 
would  render  it  useless  or  impracticable  to  pursue  it 
(Ball  V.  Anderson,  196  Pa,  St.  86),  where,  under  the  guise 
of  making  a  change  in  the  remedy  a  new  right  or  obliga- 
tion is  created  (Ladianapolis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Kercheval, 
16  Ind.  84;  Plummer  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  152  Fed. 
206;  Dixen  v.  Winnipeg  Electric  St.  R.  Co.,  11  Mani- 
toba 528),  or  where  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to 
give  the  statutes  only  prospective  operation  is  dearly 
expressed  in  the  act  (Crawford  v.  State,  Minor  (Ala.) 
143;  People  v.  Hays,  4  Cal.  127;  Louisiana  Citizens* 
Bank  v.  Devnoodt,  25  La.  Ann.  628;  Fuller  v.  Grand 
Rapids,  40  Mich.  395 ;  Lovell  v.  Arnold,  2  Leigh  16 ;  Sears 
V.  Mahoney,  66  Fed.  860),  it  will  not  be  construed  to  effect 
remedies  and  procedure  as  to  causes  of  action  answering 
before  its  passage. ''  Cyc  of  L.  and  P.  Vol.  3,  pp.  1213-14. 
In  Kentucky  Union  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  219  U.  S.  140,  it  was 
held  that  a  statute  of  that  state  was  not  lacking  in  due 
process  which  forfeited  to  the  state,  for  the  benefit  of 
actual  occupants  in  adverse  possession,  in  case  of  failure 
of  the  owner  or  claimant  to  list  the  lands  and  pay  the 
taxes  therein  for  certain  specified  years,  because  the 
effect  was  to  cut  down  the  period  of  limitation  in  which 
actions  could  be  brought  by  the  holders  of  the  title  to 
recover  against  adverse  claimants. 

§  293.  When  exemption  from  suit,  by  the  ending  of  the 
completed  statutory  period,  becomes  a  vested  right. 
Bearing  in  mind  the  generally  recognized  distinction 
between  the  effect  of  a  statute  of  limitations  when  it  is 
based  on  the  possession  of  real  or  personal  property  and 
when  it  defines  a  mere  i)eriod  of  prescription  for  the 
assertion  of  a  right  of  action  (Townsend  v.  Jamson, 
9  How.  407),  it  may  be  said  that  when  it  is  based  on  pos- 
session it  ripens  into  a  title  which  is  a  vested  right, 


524  DUE  PB0GE33  OF  LAW  §  293 

because  adverse  possession  for  the  period  prescribed  by 
statute  confers  a  title  as  perfect  and  complete  as  a  grant 
Such  a  vested  right  the  legislature  cannot  defeat  or  take 
away  by  subsequent  legislation.     Atkinson  v.  Dunlap, 
50  Me.  Ill;  Bagg's  App.,  43  Pa.  512;  Eyder  v.  Wilson, 
41  N.  J.  L.  9 ;  Sprechler  v.  Wakeley,  11  Wis.  432 ;  Hoden 
V.  James,  11  Mass.  396;  Lewis  v.  Webb,  3  Me.  326;  Wood- 
man V.  Fulton,  47  Miss.  682;  Naught  v.  Oneal,  Breese 
(111.)  36;  Gordner  v.  Stephens,  1  Heisk.  280;  Parish  v. 
Edgar,  15  Wis.  532;  Martin  v.  Martin,  35  Ala.  560; 
Sharon  v.  Tucker,  144  U.  S.  533 ;  Toltec  Ranch  Co.  v. 
Cook,  191  U.  S.  532;  Davis  v.  Mills,  194  U.  S.  456;  North- 
em  Pac.  R.  Co.  V.  Ely,  197  U.  S.  1.    A  very  different  con- 
dition of  things  exists  when  a  statute  is  only  a  legislative 
bar  to  a  right  of  action,  as  for  a  debt,  because  the  debt  is 
not  paid  by  lapse  of  time,  nor  is  there  in  equity  any  vested 
right  not  to  pay  the  debt,  even  after  the  statutory  period 
has  barred  the  right  of  action.    In  explaining  that  dis- 
tinction in  Campbell  v.  Holt,  115  U.  S.  620,  the  Court  said : 
^^The  English  and  American  statutes  of  limitation  have 
in  many  cases  the  same  effect,  and,  if  there  is  any  con- 
flict of  decisions  on  the  subject,  the  weight  of  authority 
is  in  favor  of  the  proposition  that,  where  one  has  had  the 
peaceable,  undisturbed,  open  i>ossession  of  real  or  per- 
sonal property,  with  an  assertion  of  his  ownership,  for 
the  period  which,  under  the  law,  would  bar  an  action  for 
its  recovery  by  the  real  owner,  the  former  has  acquired 
a  good  title — a  title  superior  to  that  of  the  latter,  whose 
neglect  to  avail  himself  of  his  legal  rights  has  lost  him 
his  title.    This  doctrine  has  been  repeatedly  asserted  in 
this  court.    Leffmgwell  v.  Warren,  2  Black  599;  Croxall 
V.  Shererd,  5  Wall.  289 ;  Dickerson  v.  Colgrove,  100  U.  S. 
583 ;  Bicknell  v.  Comstock,  113  U.  S.  152.    It  is  the  doc- 
trine of  the  English  courts,  and  has  been  often  asserted 
in  the  highest  courts  of  the  states  of  the  "Union.    It  may 
therefore,  very  well  be  held  that  in  an  action  to  recover 
real  or  personal  property  where  the  question  is  as  to  the 
removal  of  the  bar  of  the  statute  of  limitations  by  a  legis- 


§  294  LIMITATIONS  AND  REMEDIES  529 

lative  act  passed  after  the  bar  has  become  i>erfect)  such 
act  deprives  the  party  of  his  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  The  reason  is^  that,  by  the  law  in  existence 
before  the  repealing  act,  the  property  had  become  the^ 
defendant's.  Both  the  legal  title  and  the  real  ownership 
had  become  vested  in  him,  and  to  give  the  act  the  effect 
of  transferring  this  title  to  plaintiff  would  be  to  deprive 
him  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law. 

But  we  are  of  opinion  that  to  remove  the  bar  which 
the  statute  of  limitations  enables  a  debtor  to  interpose 
to  prevent  the  payment  of  his  debt  stands  on  very  differ- 
ent ground.  A  case  aptly  illustrating  this  difference  in 
the  effect  of  the  statute  of  limitations  is  found  in  3  J.  J. 
Marshall's  Ky.  R.  364  (Smart  v.  Baiigh),  in  which  the 
opinion  was  delivered  by  Chief  Justice  Robertson,  .  .  . 
^  A  debt  barred  by  time  is  a  sufficient  consideration  for  a 
new  assumpsit.  The  statute  of  limitations  only  disquali- 
fies the  plaintiff  to  recover  a  debt  by  suit  if  the  defendant 
rely  on  time  in  his  plea.  It  is  a  personal  privilege, 
accorded  by  law  for  reasons  of  public  expediency;  and 
the  privilege  can  only  be  asserted  by  plea. '  The  distinc- 
tion between  the  effect  of  statutes  of  limitation  in  vesting 
rights  to  real  and  personal  property  and  its  operation  as 
a  defense  to  contracts,  is  well  stated  in  Jones  v.  Jones, 
18  Ala.  248.  See  also,  LangdelPs  Equity  Pleadings, 
§§  118,  et  sequitur/'  Approved  in  Sharon  v.  Tucker, 
144  U.  S.  544 ;  In  re  Burton,  29  Fed.  639 ;  Hulbert  v.  Clark, 
128  N.  Y.  298. 

§294.  Montoyo  v.  Oonsales.  In  that  case  (232  U.  S. 
375),  it  was  held  that  by  **a  peculiar  statute,*'  not  **the 
ordinary  statute  of  limitation,'*  under  which  ten  years* 
possession  by  a  disseizor  of  a  strip  of  a  grant  lying 
between  the  Bio  Grande  and  the  foothills  to  the  west, 
under  a  deed  purporting  to  convey  the  land  from  the 
river  westward  to  the  ridge  of  Rio  Puerco,  and  giving 
title  to  the  whole  did  not  deprive  the  heirs  of  the  original 
grantee  in  the  Alameda  land  grant  of  their  property 


626  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  294 

without  due  process  of  law.  The  Court  said:  **It  only 
remains  to  consider  whether  there  is  anything  in  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  to  prevent  the  statute  from 
.doing  its  work.  We  limit  our  inquiry  to  its  operation  in 
the  present  case,  and  do  not  speculate  as  to  whether  other 
cases  could  be  put  in  which  the  letter  of  some  part  of  the 
law  could  not  be  sustained.  As  applied  to  the  inter- 
veners, the  statute  simply  enacts  that  possession  for  ten 
years  of  the  front  and  cultivable  portion  of  a  strip  under 
a  deed  carrying  the  whole  of  it  back  to  the  ridge  of  the 
Puerco  shall  give  title  to  the  whole.  We  can  see  no  taking 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law  in  this.  A  statute 
of  limitation  may  give  title.  Toltec  Ranch  Co.  v.  Cook, 
191  U.  S.  532;  Davis  v.  Mills,  194  U,  S.  451,  456;  United 
States  V.  Chandler-Dunbar  Water  Power  Co.,  229  U.  S. 
447.  The  disseizee  has  notice  of  the  law  and  of  the  fact 
that  he  is  dispossessed,  and  that  a  deed  to  the  disseizor 
may  purport  to  convey  more  than  is  fenced  in.  If  he 
chooses  to  wait  ten  years  without  bringing  suit,  he  is  not 
in  a  position  to  complain  of  the  consequences, — ^at  least, 
not  when,  as  in  the  present  case,  the  deeds  do  not  purport 
to  convey  more  than  a  reasonable  man  probable  would 
have  anticipated.  See  Soper  v.  Lawrence  Bros.  Co.,  201 
U.S.  359.^' 

§295.  Sight  of  the  legislature  to  change  remedies. 
Just  as  a  state  has  the  general  and  undoubted  right  to 
enact  statutes  of  limitation,  it  has  the  general  and 
undoubted  right  to  change  remedies.  It  may  be  stated  in 
general  terms  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  vested 
right  in  particular  remedies.  In  Bank  of  Columbia  v. 
Okely,  4  Wheat.  235,  the  Court  said:  **The  forms  of 
administering  justice,  and  the  duties  and  i>owers  of  courts 
as  incident  to  the  exercise  of  a  branch  of  sovereign  power, 
must  ever  be  subject  to  legislative  will,  and  the  jwwer 
over  them  is  inalienable,  so  as  to  bind  subsequent  legis- 
latures.*' In  this  case  it  was  held  that  a  certain  sum- 
mary proceeding  for  the  collection  of  debts  given  to  the 


S  296  LIMITATIONS  AND  BEMEDIES  527 

Bank  by  the  legislature  of  Maryland  was  not  a  part  of 
its  corporate  franchises,  and  was  therefore  subject  to 
repeal  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature.  In  reaching 
that  conclusion  Mr.  Justice  Johnson,  speaking  for  the 
court,  gave  this  famous  definition  of  ^Mue  process  of 
law,'*  or  the  **law  of  the  land,'*  which  has  been  ranked 
with  that  given  by  Webster  in  the  Dartmouth  College 
Case:  **As  to  the  words  from  Magna  Carta,  incorpo- 
rated into  the  constitution  of  Maryland,  after  volumes 
spoken  and  written  with  a  view  to  their  exposition,  the 
good  sense  of  mankind  has  at  length  settled  down  to  this : 
that  they  were  intended  to  secure  the  individual  from  the 
arbitrary  exercise  of  the  powers  of  government,  unre- 
strained by  the  established  principles  of  private  rights 
and  distributive  justice."  And  yet  the  undoubted  right 
of  a  legislature  to  change  forms  of  action  and  modes  of 
procedure  is  like  the  right  to  enact  statutes  of  limitations 
subject  to  such  serious  qualifications  as  to  make  such 
qualifications  or  exceptions  as  important  as  the  rule 
itself. 

§296.  Qualiflcations  of  the  foregoing  rule.  While  a 
state  may  regulate  at  pleasure  the  modes  of  proceeding 
in  its  courts,  in  relation  to  past  as  well  as  future  con- 
tracts (Bronson  v.  Kinzie,  1  How.  311 ;  Cook  v.  MoflFat, 
5  How.  315) ;  while  it  may  modify  existing  remedies  and 
even  substitute  others  without  impairing  the  obligation 
of  the  contract,  if  a  sufficient  remedy  be  left,  or  another 
sufficient  one  be  provided  (Memphis  v.  United  States, 
97  U.  S.  293;  Tennessee  ex  rel.  Bloomstein  v.  Sneed, 
96  TJ.  S.  69) ;  while  whatever  belongs  merely  to  the 
remedy  may  be  altered  according  to  the  will  of  the  legis- 
lature (Hill  V.  Merchants'  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  134  U.  S.  515), 
a  state  law  so  affecting  the  remedy  which  existed  when  a 
contract  was  made  as  substantially  to  impair  and  lessen 
the  value  of  the  contract  is  void  as  impairing  its  obliga- 
tion. Planters  Bank  v.  Sharp,  6  How.  301;  Seibert  v. 
Lewis,  122  XJ.  S.  284.    The  obligation  of  a  contract  is 


528  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  296 

impaired  whenever  legislation  lessens  the  efficiency  <^ 
the  means  which,  at  the  time  of  making  a  contract^  the 
law  provided  for  its  enforcement  as  by  postponing  or 
retarding  such  enforcement  Louisiana  ex  rel.  Banger  v. 
New  Orleans,  102  U.  S.  203,  cited  in  Louisiana  v.  Pitts- 
burg, 105  U.  S.  301 ;  Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  107  XJ.  S.  750. 
As  a  state  can  not  enact  a  law  acting  directly  upon  the 
terms  of  a  contract,  so  it  can  not  pass  a  law  professing 
only  to  regulate  the  remedy  when  in  fact  it  impairs  the 
obligation  of  the  contract.  Grantly  v,  Ewing,  3  How.  707. 
If  a  state  statute  impairs-  th,e  means  provided  by  ftiw 
for  the  enforcement  of  a  contract  at  the  time  of  its 
making,  it  is  unconstitutional  and  void.  Louisiana  ex  reL 
Nelso  V.  St.  Martins  Parish,  111  U.  S.  716;  Bamitz  v. 
Beverly,  163  U.  S.  118.  A  statute  which  does  not  sup^y 
an  alternative  remedy  equally  adequate  and  efficacious, 
impairs  the  obligation  of  a  contract  in  the  constitutional 
sense,  if  it  prevents  its  enforcement,  or  materially 
abridges  the  remedy  for  its  enforcement  which  existed 
when  it  was  made.  McGahey  v.  Virginia,  135  U.  S.  662. 
If  a  change  of  remedy  is  made  after  a  contract  has  been 
executed,  it  can  only  be  valid,  when  it  substitutes  an  ade- 
quate and  sufficient  remedy  through  which  the  contract 
may  be  enforced,  or  where  such  remedy  existed  and 
remained  unaffected  by  the  new  law.  King  v.  Missouri, 
107  U.  S.  221.  The  obligation  of  a  contract  is  impaired 
by  any  law  that  causes  a  deviation  from  its  terms  by 
accelerating  or  delaying  the  period  of  performance  it 
prescribes,  imposing  conditions  not  expressed,  or  dis- 
pensing with  the  performance  of  such  as  are  expressed, 
no  matter  how  apparently  immaterial  their  effect  upon 
the  contract  may  be.  Green  v.  Biddle,  8  Wheat.  1.  The 
remedy  provided  by  a  state  law  when  the  contract  is 
executed  can  not  be  impaired  by  subsequent  decisions  of 
courts  any  more  than  by  subsequent  statutes.  United 
States  ex  rel.  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575.  It  was 
therefore  held  that  a  provision  in  the  constitution  of 
Georgia,  that  no  court  should  have  jurisdiction  to  give 


§  296  LIMITATIONS  AND  REMEDIES  529 

judgment  on  or  enforce  any  debt  the  consideration  of 
which  was  a  slave  or  the  hire  of  the  same  was  void  as  to 
debts  contracted  prior  to  its  adoption.  White  v.  Hart, 
13  Wall.  646.  A  statute  of  Virginia  was  held  to  be  uncon- 
stitutional as  impairing  the  obligation  of  a  contract, 
which  provided  that,  in  an  action  for  the  enforcement  of 
any  contract  for  the  sale  or  hiring  of  property  made 
between  January  1, 1862,  and  April  10, 1865,  the  court  or 
jury  might  adopt  the  fair  value  of  the  proi)erty  sold,  or 
the  fair  rent  or  hire  of  the  property  hired,  as  the  meas- 
ure of  the  recovery  instead  of  that  fixed  by  the  express 
terms  of  the  contract  itself.  EflSnger  v.  Kenney,  115 
U.  S.  566. 

A  state  has  however  the  right  to  fix  the  extent  to  which 
mutual  obligations  may  be  set  off  against  each  other,  and 
the  method  of  doing  it,  without  impairing  the  obligation 
of  contracts,  provided  the  rights  of  third  parties  are  not 
affected  thereby.  Blount  v.  Windley,  95  U.  S.  173.  See 
also.  National  Surety  Co.  v.  Architectural  Decorating  Co., 
226  U.  S.  276;  Pittsburg  Steel  Co.  v.  Baltimore  Equitable 
Soc,  226  U.  S.  455.  Parties  are  not  deprived  of  vested 
rights,  and  the  obligation  of  contracts  is  not  impaired 
by  a  statute  repeating  usury  laws,  and  destroying  de- 
fenses to  existing  contracts  on  the  ground  of  usury. 
Ewell  V.  Daggs,  108  U.  S.  143.  In  Drehman  v.  Stifle, 
8  Wall.  595,  it  was  held  that  a  statute  was  not  invalid  as 
impairing  the  obligation  of  a  contract  even  when  its  effect 
was  to  take  away  the  remedy  in  a  proceeding  of  forcible 
entry  and  detainer,  where  the  ouster  was  effected  by 
military  authority,  because  that  remedy  as  provided  by 
the  law  of  Missouri,  under  which  the  merits  of  the  title 
could  not  be  inquired  into,  did  not  enter  into  the  contract 
between  lessor  and  lessee,  such  contract  providing  that 
the  former  shall  keep  the  latter  in  lawful  possession  of 
the  leased  premises  during  the  lease.  And  so  it  was  held 
in  Freeland  v.  Williams,  131  U.  S.  405,  that  the  clause  in 
the  constitution  of  West  Virginia  of  1872  providing  that 
the  property  of  a  citizen  shall  not  be  sold  on  a  judgment 

I>ae  Process — 34 


530  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  S  296 

for  an  act  done  during  the  civil  war,  did  not  violate  the 
obligation  of  a  contract  when  the  judgment  was  founded 
on  a  tort  committed  as  an  act  of  public  war ;  that  a  judg- 
ment in  an  action  of  tort  is  not  protected  by  that  pro- 
vision of  the  Federal  Constitution  forbidding  a  state  to 
pass  a  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts.  In  that 
case  the  Court  said :  *  *  Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  the  power  to  provide  such  remedies, 
although  they  may  have  interfered  with  what  were  called 
vested  rights,  seems  to  have  been  fully  conceded.  The 
cases  in  which  this  has  been  decided  in  this  court  are 
Calder  v.  Bull,  3  Dall.  386;  Satterlee  v.  Matthewson, 
2  Pet.  222 ;  Watson  v.  Mercer,  8  Pet.  88 ;  and  Freeborn  v. 
Smith,  2  Wall.  160.  In  the  latter  case,  Mr.  Justice  Grier, 
when  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  had  allowed  an 
appeal  where  the  judgment  would  have  otherwise  been 
final,  used  this  language:  *If  the  judgment  below  was 
erroneous,  the  plaintiff  in  error  had  a  moral  right  at 
least  to  have  it  set  aside,  and  the  defendant  is  only  claim- 
ing a  vested  right  in  a  wrong  judgment.'  And  he  thus 
quotes  the  language  of  Chief  Justice  Parker,  in  Foster  v. 
Essex  Bank,  16  Mass.  245 :  ^The  truth  is  there  is  no  sudi 
a  thing  as  a  vested  right  to  do  wrong ;  and  a  legislature, 
which  in  its  acts  not  expressly  authorized  by  the  consti- 
tution, limits  itself  to  correcting  mistakes,  and  to  pro- 
viding remedies  for  the  furtherance  of  justice,  can  not  be 
charged  with  violating  its  duty  or  exceeding  its  author- 
ity.* Many  other  cases  might  be  cited  in  which  it  was 
held  that  retroactive  statutes,  when  not  of  a  criminal 
character,  though  affecting  the  rights  of  parties  in  exist- 
ence, are  not  forbidden  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.'*  Thus  it  appears  that  there  is  no  deprivation  of 
due  process  of  law  when  a  universally  recognized  remedy 
is  applied  retrospectively  through  a  subsequent  enact- 
ment to  rights  not  vested.  A  law  is  however  unconstitu- 
tional when  given  a  retroactive  effect,  if  it  so  changes 
existing  remedies  as  materially  to  impair  the  rights  of 
a  party  to  the  contract.    Re  City  Bank  of  New  Orleans, 


§  296  LIMITATIONS  AND  REMEDIES  531 

3  How,  292.  And  in  Grear  v.  Biddle,  8  Wheat.  1,  it  was 
held  that  a  law  denying  to  the  owner  of  land  a  remedy  to 
recover  its  possession  when  withheld  by  a  party,  however 
innocently,  or  to  recover  the  profits  of  it,  impairs  his 
rights  in  the  property  and  is  in  violation  of  a  contract 
providing  for  the  security  of  such  rights. 


CHAPTEB  XIV 

LIFE  AND  UBBBTY  AS  PBOTECTED  BY  DUB  PBOCESS — ^PBOCEDUBE 
IN  CBIMINAL  CASES  IN  FEDERAL  OOUBTS 

§  297.  No  change  in  procednrei  either  under  federal  or 
state  laW|  must  work  a  denial  of  fundamental  rights. 
The  declaration  made  in  Backas  v.  Fort  Street  Union 
Depot  Co.,  160  U.  S.  557,  that  *' There  is  no  vested  right 
in  a  mode  of  procedure.   Each  succeeding  legislature  may 
establish  a  different  one,  provided  only  that  in  each  are 
preserved  the  essential  elements  of  protection, '  *— embod- 
ies a  basic  principle  which  underlies  all  Federal  and  state 
legislation  upon  the  subject    The  legislatures.  Federal 
and  state,  may  make  any  changes  however  radical  in 
modes  of  procedure,  provided  always  that  such  changes 
do  not  work  a  denial  of  fundamental  rights.    In  the  words 
of  the  court  in  Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175  U.  S.  175 :  *  *  The 
state  has  full  control  over  the  procedure  in  its  courts, 
both  in  civil  and  criminal  cases,  subject  only  to  the  quali- 
fication that  such  procedure  must  not  work  a  denial  of 
fundamental  rights  or  conflict  with  specific  and  applica- 
ble provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution.     Ex  parte 
Eeggel,  114  U.  S.  642;  Iowa  Central  Railway  v.  Iowa, 
160  U.  S.  389 ;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Railroad  v.  Chicago,  166 
XJ.  S.  226.*'    Neither  Congress  nor  the  state  legislature 
can  prescribe  modes  of  procedure  that  deny  due  process ; 
and  in  Hibben  v.  Smith,  191 U.  S.  310,  the  fact  was  empha- 
sized that  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment 
places  the  same  limitation  upon  the  Federal  Government 
as  that  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  upon  the  states. 
In  that  case  the  Court  said :    *  *  The  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, it  has  been  held,  legitimately  operates  to  extend  to 
the  citizens  and  residents  of  the  states  the  same  protec- 

532 


§  298  FEDERAL  CRIMINAL  PBOGEDUBE  533 

tion  against  arbitrary  state  legislation  affecting  life, 
liberty  and  property  as  is  offered  by  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment against  similar  legislation  by  Congress;  but  that 
the  Federal  courts  ought  not  to  interfere  when  what  is 
complained  of  amounts  to  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  of 
a  state  applicable  to  all  persons  in  like  circumstances  and 
conditions,  and  that  the  Federal  courts  should  not  inter- 
fere unless  there  is  some  abuse  of  law  amounting  to 
confiscation  of  property  or  a  deprivation  of  personal 
rights,  such  as  existed  in  the  case  of  Norwood  v.  Baker, 
172 U.S.  269/' 

§  298.  Due  process  clause  of  Fifth  Amendment  as  re- 
enforced  by  Amendments  Six  and  Seven.  The  Fifth 
Amendment  provides  that  **No  person  shall  be  held  to 
answer  for  a  capital  or  otherwise  infamous  crime,  unless 
on  a  presentation  or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury  except  in 
cases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia, 
when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger; 
nor  shall  any  person  be  subject  for  the  same  offence  to  be 
twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb ;  nor  shall  be  com- 
pelled in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  witness  against  him- 
self,  nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  nor  shall  private  property  be  taken 
for  public  use,  without  just  compensation."  The  Sixth 
Amendment  provides  that  *  *  In  all  criminal  prosecutions, 
the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a  speedy  and  public 
trial,  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  state  and  district 
wherein  the  crime  shall  have  been  committed,  which  dis- 
trict shall  have  been  previously  ascertained  by  law,  and 
to  be  informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation ; 
to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him;  to  have 
compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  favor, 
and  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  defense.'* 
The  Seventh  Amendment  provides  that:  **In  suits  at 
common  law,  where  the  value  in  controversy  shall  exceed 
twenty  dollars,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  pre- 
served, and  no  fact  tried  by  a  jury  shall  be  otherwise 


534  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  298 

re-examined  in  any  court  of  the  United  States,  than 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  common  law. ' '  In  Articles 
of  Amendment,  V,  VI,  and  VII  are  restated  the  guaran- 
ties of  due  process  of  law,  springing  from  chapter  39  of 
the  Great  Charter,  and  from  the  English  jury  system, 
grand  and  petit,  as  that  system  existed  at  the  time  of  the 
severance  of  the  colonies  from  the  mother  country. 
*  *  During  the  one  hundred  and  forty-two  years  that  inter- 
vened between  Cokeys  death  and  the  severance  of  the 
English  colonies  in  America  from  the  mother  country, 
what  may  be  called  the  ancient  Constitution  of  England, 
first  clearly  defined  in  Magna  Carta,  was  transformed 
into  the  modem  Constitution  through  the  Revolutions  of 
1640  and  1648.  The  reformed  and  invigorated  constitu- 
tional system  that  stands  out  after  those  revolutions  was 
a  vastly  wider  and  more  complete  fabric  of  liberty  under 
law  than  that  existing  in  Coke 's  time.  Those  revolutions 
brought  into  being  many  new  constitutional  principles, 
most  of  which  passed  into  American  law,  of  which  Coke 
never  heard.*'  Taylor,  The  Origin  and  Gbowth  of  thb 
American  Constitution,  pp.  78-79.  Subject  to  the  limi- 
tations contained  in  that  enlarged  statement,  as  embodied 
in  Articles  of  Amendment,  V,  VI,  and  VII,  Congress  must 
legislate  when  dealing  with  the  subject  of  procedure  in 
criminal  cases,  always  mindful  of  the  fact  that  no  change 
must  be  made  in  such  procedure  as  will  "work  a  denial  of 
fundamental  right  or  conflict  with  the  specific  and  appli- 
cable provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution. ' '  Promi- 
nent among  the  leading  oases  expounding  that  branch  of 
the  subject,  heretofore  reviewed  in  Part  I,  are  Hurtado  v. 
California,  110  U.  S.  528;  Lowe  v.  Kansas,  163  U.  S.  81;  j 

Twining  v.  New  Jersey,  211  U.  S.  101. 

V 

§  299.  Federal  right  to  indictment  by  grand  jury  in 
criminal  cases — ^Informations.  The  purpose  of  the  first 
clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment,  providing  that  **no  per- 
son shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital,  or  otherwise 
infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  presentment  or  indictment 


§  300  FEDERAL  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  535 

of  a  grand  jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the  land  or 
naval  forces^  or  in  the  militia^  wheu  in  actaai  service  in 
time  of  war  or  public  danger/'  was  to  peipetuate  the 
grand  jury  as  an  instrument  for  the  prosecution  of  serious 
crimes  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States.  In  Hurtado  v. 
California,  110  U.  S.  516,  the  Court  said:  '*The  saihe 
words  are  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amendment.  That 
article  makes  specific  and  express  provision  for  perpetu- 
ating the  institution  of  the  grand  jury  so  far  as  it  relates 
to  prosecutions  for  the  more  aggravated  crimes  under 
the  laws  of  the  United  States.  •  •  •  The  conclusion  is 
equally  irresistible  that  when  the  same  phrase  was  em- 
ployed in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  restrain  the 
action  of  the  states,  it  was  in  the  same  sense  and  with  no 
greater  extent ;  and  that  if  in  the  adoption  of  that  amend- 
ment it  had  been  part  of  its  purpose  to  perpetuate  the 
institution  of  the  grand  jury  in  all  the  states,  it  would 
have  embodied,  as  did  the  Fifth,  express  declarations  to 
the  effect.*'  An  infamous  crime  can  not  be  punished 
except  upon  presentment  or  indictment  by  a  grand  jury. 
Mackin  v.  United  States,  117  U.  S.  348;  United  States  v. 
De  Walt,  128  U.  S.  393.  The  provision  of  the  Fifth 
Amendment  is  jurisdictional,  and  no  Federal  court  can 
try  a  prisoner  without  indictment  or  presentment  in  such 
cases.  Re  Bain,  121  U.  S.  1 ;  Parkinson  v.  United  States, 
121  U.  S.  281 ;  Wong  Wing  v.  United  States,  163  U.  S. 
228.  For  a  definition  of  infamous  crimes,  see  Parkinson 
V.  United  States,  121  U.  S.  281 ;  Re  Wilson,  114  U.  S.  417. 
Offenses  of  a  lower  grade  may  be  prosecuted  in  the  Fed- 
eral courts  by  information.  Nebraska  ex  rel.  Wakely  v. 
Lockwood,  3  Wall.  236;  Re  Wilson,  114  U.  S.  417;  United 
States  V.  Isham,  17  Wall.  496 ;  United  States  v.  Buzzo,  18 
Wall.  125. 

§  300.  Federal  right  to  trial  by  petit  jury.  The  term 
**conMnon  law'*  as  used  in  the  Seventh  Amendment,  whicli 
provides  that  **In  suits  at  common  law,  where  the  value 
in  controversy  shall  exceed  twenty  dollars,  the  right  of 


536  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  300 

trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved,  and  no  fact  tried  by  a 
jury,  shall  be  otherwise  re-examined  in  any  court  of  the 
United  States,  than  according  to  the  rules  of  the  com- 
mon l8w/'  is  intended  to  embrace  suits  in  which  legal 
rights  are  to  be  ascertained  and  determined,  in  contra- 
distitiction  to  those  in  which  equitable  rights  alone  are 
recognized  and  equitable  remedies  administered,  or  suits 
of  a  mixed  nature,  such  as  proceedings  in  admiralty, 
where  public  and  maritime  law  are  combined.  Parsons  v. 
Bedford,  3  Pet.  433.  All  suits  not  in  the  equity  or  admir- 
alty jurisdiction  are  ** suits  at  common  law'*  in  which  the 
right  to  trial  by  jury  is  preserved.  Knickerbocker  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Comstock,  16  Wall.  258.  Under  the  prohibition  of 
the  Seventh  Amendment  Federal  courts  can  not  re-ex- 
amine facts  tried  by  a  jury  except  in  the  granting  of  a 
new  trial  by  the  court  in  which  the  original  issue  was 
tried,  or  on  the  award  of  a  venire  facias  de  novo  by  an 
appellate  court  for  some  error  of  law  which  intervened 
in  the  proceedings.  Lincoln  v.  Power,  151  U.  S.  436.  An 
act  of  Congress  can  not  give  the  power  to  change  the 
constitutional  rule  that  secures  unanimity  in  finding  a 
verdict  as  an  essential  feature  of  trial  by  jury  in  common 
law  cases.  Springville  v.  Thomas,  166  U.  S.  707.  The 
.  Federal  constitution  secures  the  right  of  trial  by  jury, 
both  in  the  civil  and  criminal  cases,  to  the  people  of  the 
District  of  Columbia.  Callan  v.  Wilson,  127  U.  S.  540; 
Capital  Traction  Co.  v.  Hof,  174  U.  S.  1.  So  far  as  it 
secures  the  right  to  trial  by  jury  the  Seventh  Amendment 
applies  to  judicial  proceedings  in  the  territories  of  the 
United  States.  Black  v.  Jackson,  177  U.  S.  349.  The 
right  of  trial  by  jury  was  not,  however,  extended  by  the 
Federal  Constitution,  of  its  own  force,  and  without  legis- 
lation, to  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  ceded  to 
the  United  States  by  Spain  and  not  incorporated  by  con- 
gressional action  into  the  United  States.  Dorr  v.  United 
States,  195  U.  S.  138. 

§  301.  Right  to  plead  guaranteed  by  Fifth  Amendment. 
In  Crain  v.  United  States,  162  U.  S.  625,  it  was  expressly 


§  301  FEDERAL  (TEIMINAL  PEOCEDURE  637 

held  that  due  process  requires  that  the  defendant  shall 
plead  or  be  ordered  to  plead,  or  in  a  proper  case  that  a 
plea  of  not  guilty  be  filed  for  him,  before  his  trial  can 
rightfully  proceed.  The  Court  said :  *  *  In  capital  or  other 
infamous  crimes  an  arraignment  has  always  been  re- 
garded as  a  matter  of  substance.  'The  arraignment  of 
the  prisoner,'  Lord  Coke  said,  4s  to  take  order  that  he 
appear  and  for  the  certainty  of  the  person  to  hold  up  his 
hand,  and  to  plead  a  sufficient  plea  to  the  indictment  or 
other  record. '  Co.  Litt.  263a.  ...  It  is  true  that  the 
constitution  does  not,  in  terms,  declare  that  a  person 
accused  of  crime  can  not  be  tried  until  it  be  demanded 
of  him  that  he  plead,  or  unless  he  pleads,  to  the  indict- 
ment. But  it  does  forbid  the  deprivation  of  liberty  with- 
out due  process  of  law ;  and  due  process  of  law  requires 
that  the  accused  plead,  or  be  ordered  to  plead,  or,  in  a 
proper  case,  that  a  plea  of  not  guilty  be  filed  for  him, 
before  his  trial  can  rightfully  proceed;  and  the  record 
of  his  conviction  should  show  distinctly  and  not  by  infer- 
ence merely  that  every  step  involved  in  due  process  of 
law  and  essential  to  a  valid  trial  was  taken  in  the  trial 
court ;  otherwise  the  judgment  will  be  erroneous. ' ' 

In  Lovato  v.  New  Mexico,  242  U.  S.  199,  it  was  held 
that  neither  due  process  of  law  nor  the  right  to  trial  by 
jury  was  denied,  contrary  to  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Amend- 
ments to  the  Federal  Constitution,  because,  after  a  demur- 
rer to  the  indictment  which  had  been  entertained  after  a 
plea  of  not  guilty  had  been  entered  and  not  withdrawn  was 
overruled,  the  jury  already  impaneled  and  sworn,  was 
dismissed,  and  the  accused  was  forthwith  arraigned,  and 
required  to  plead,  and  this  having  been  done,  and  both 
sides  again  announcing  themselves  ready  for  trial,  the 
jury  previously  impaneled  was  sworn  and  the  trial  pro- 
ceeded. The  Court  said :  *  *  Whether  or  not,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, it  wa8^  a  necessary  formality  to  dismiss  the 
jury  in  order  to  enable  the  accused  to  be  again  arraigned 
and  plead,  the  action  taken  was  clearly  within  the  bounds 
of  sound  judicial  discretion.  United  States  v.  Perez,  9 
Wheat.  579 ;  Dreyer  v.  Illinois,  187  U.  S.  71,  85,  85.    See 


538  DUE  PROCaSSS  OP  LAW  §  301 

United  States  v.  Eiley,  5  Blatchf .  204,  in  which  the  facts 
were  in  substance  identical  with  those  here  presented." 

§  302.  A  person  accrued  of  felony  necessarily  present 
during  entire  trial — Privilege  can  not  be  waived.  In 
Hopt  V.  Utah,  110  U.  S.  574,  the  Court  said :  *' We  are  of 
opinion  that  it  was  not  within  the  power  of  the  accused  or 
his  counsel  to  dispense  with  the  statutory  requirement  as 
to  his  personal  presence  at  the  trial.  .  .  .  The  public 
has  an  interest  in  his  life  and  liberty.  Neither  can  be 
lawfully  taken  except  in  the  mode  prescribed  by  law.  That 
which  the  law  makes  essential  in  proceedings  involving 
the  deprivation  of  life  and  liberty,  can  not  be  dispensed 
with  or  affected  by  the  consent  of  the  accused ;  much  less 
by  his  mere  failure,  when  on  trial  and  in  custody,  to 
object  to  unauthorized  methods.  .  .  .  the  Legislature 
has  deemed  it  essential  to  the  protection  of  one  whose  life 
is  involved  in  a  prosecution  for  felony,  that  he  shall  be 
personally  present  at  the  trial,  that  is  at  every  stage  of 
the  trial  when  his  substantial  rights  may  be  affected  by 
the  proceedings  against  him.  If  he  be  deprived  of  his 
life  or  liberty  without  being  so  present,  such  deprivation 
would  be  without  that  due  process  of  law  required  by  the 
constitution.*'  The  right  to  be  present  during  the  trial 
is  confined  however  to  presence  in  the  trial  court  and 
does  not  extend  to  an  appellate  court.  The  accused  can 
not  complain  when  such  a  court,  in  affirming  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court  below,  fixes  the  date  of  his  execution  in 
accordance  with  law,  that  such  date  was  fixed  in  his  ab- 
sence. Schwab  V.  Berggren,  143  U.  S.  442;  Fielden  v. 
Illinois,  143  U.  S.  452.  In  affirming  such  doctrine  in  Lewis 
V.  United  States,  146  U.  S.  370,  the  Court  said :  ** A  lead- 
ing principle  that  pervades  the  entire  law  of  criminal 
procedure  is  that,  after  indictment  found,  nothing  shall  be 
done  in  the  absence  of  the  prisoner.  While  this  rule  has 
at  times,  and  in  the  cases  of  misdemeanors,  been  some- 
what relaxed,  yet  in  felonies  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the 
prisoner,  either  by  himself  or  his  counsel,  to  waive  the 


§  302a         FEDERAL  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  539 

right  to  be  personally  present  during  the  trial/'  Then, 
quoting  from  Hopt  v.  Utah,  the  Courii  continued :  *  *  The 
prisoner  is  entitled  to  an  impartial  jury  composed  of  per- 
sons not  disqualified  by  statute,  and  his  life  or  liberty  may 
depend  upon  the  aid  which,  by  his  personal  presence,  he 
may  give  to  counsel  and  to  the  courts  and  triers,  in  the 
selection  of  jurors.  The  necessities  of  the  defense  may 
not  be  met  by  the  presence  of  his  counsel  only.  For  every 
purpose,  therefore,  involved  in  the  requirement  that  the 
defendant  shall  be  personally  present  at  the  trial,  where 
the  indictment  is  for  a  felony,  the  trial  commences  at  least 
from  the  time  when  the  work  of  impanelling  the  jury 
begins.''  Tn  Dowdell  v.  United  States,  221  U.  S.  331,  Mr. 
Justice  Day  said:  **In  Hopt  v,  Utah,  110  U!  S.  574,  this 
court  held  that  due  process  of  law  required  the  accused 
to  be  present  at  every  stage  of  the  trial. ' '  In  spealdng 
of  the  necessity  for  the  presence  at  every  stage  of  the 
trial  of  a  defendant  on  trial  for  felony  who  is  not  at  large 
on  bail,  the  Court  in  Diaz  v.  United  States,  223  U.  S.  442, 
said:  **In  cases  of  felony  our  courts,  with  substantial 
accord,  have  regarded  it  as  extending  to  every  stage  of  tha 
jury  and  the  reception  of  the  verdict,  and  as  being 
scarcely  less  important  to  the  accused  than  the  right  of 
trial  itself.  And  with  like  accord  they  have  regarded  an 
accused  who  is  in  custody  and  one  who  is  charged  with  a 
capital  offense  as  incapable  of  waiving  the  right ;  the  one, 
because  his  presence  or  absence  is  not  within  his  own 
control,  and  the  other  because,  in  addition  to  being  usually 
in  custody,  he  is  deemed  to  suffer  the  constraint  naturally 
incident  to  an  apprehension  of  the  awful  penalty  that 
would  follow  conviction." 

§  302ft.  Summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property 
guaranteed  by  the  Federal  Constitution.  Here  may  be 
conveniently  summarized  the  rights  of  persons  and  prop- 
erty guaranteed  by  the  Federal  Constitution :  Freedom 
of  religious  worship ;  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press ; 
right  to  petition  the  Government  for  a  redress  of  griev- 


540  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  3Q2a 

ances ;  right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble  (Amend- 
ment 1) ;  right  of  the  people  to  keep  and  bear  arms 
(Amendment  2) ;  freedom  from  quartering  of  soldiers  in 
time  of  peace  without  the  consent  of  the  owner  of  the 
premises,  or  in  time  of  war  except  in  a  manner  prescribed 
by  law  (Amendment  3) ;  immunity  from  unreasonable 
searches  and  seizures,  guaranteeing  all  citizens  security 
in  their  persons,  houses  and  effects,  no  warrant  to  issue 
but  upon  probable  cause,  supported  by  oath  or  affirma- 
tion and  particularly  describing  the  place  to  be  searched 
and  the  persons  or  things  to  be  seized  (Amendment  4) ; 
immunity  from  prosecution  for  «  capital  or  otherwise  in- 
famous  crime  unless  on  an  indictment  or  presentment  of 
a  grand  jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval 
forces  or  in  the  militia  when  in  actual  service  in  time  of 
war  or  public  danger;  freedom  from  a  second  jeopardy 
for  same  offense;  freedom  from  being  compelled  in  a 
criminal  prosecution  to  be  a  witness  against  one's  self; 
security  in  life,  liberty  and  property  unless  when  deprived 
of  the  fiame  by  due  process  of  law ;  security  of  property 
against  appropriation  by  the  Government,  unless  it  be 
for  public  use  and  with  just  compensation  (Amend- 
ment 5). 

In  criminal  prosecutions:  (a)  the  right  to  a  speedy 
and  public  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  state  and  dis- 
trict wherein  the  crime  charged  shall  have  been  commit- 
ted, which  district  must  have  been  previously  ascertained 
by  law;  (b)  notice  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  every  accu- 
sation ;  (c)  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in 
one's  favor;  (e)  assistance  of  counsel  for  one's  defense 
(Amendment  6).  Eight  of  trial  by  jury  is  guaranteed  in 
suits  at  common  law  where  the  value  in  controversy  is  in 
excess  of  twenty  dollars ;  and  no  fact  tried  by  a  jury  shall 
be  otherwise  re-examined  than  according  to  the  rules  of 
the  common  law  (Amendment  7).  Freedom  from  ex- 
cessive bail  or  fines  or  the  infliction  of  cruel  or  unusual 
punishments  ( Amendment  8 ) .  * 

1 — For  this  summary  the  author  is  indebted  to  his  son,  Hannis  Joseph 
Taylor. 


CHAPTER  XV 

LIFE  AND  UBBBTY  AS  PROTECTED  BY  DUB  PB0C5ESS — PBOCEDUBE 

IN  CBIMINAL  CASES  IN  STATE  COUBTS 

§  303.  How  far  the  states  may  modify  existing  systems 
of  procedure  in  criminal  cases.  In  the  Slaughter  House 
Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  the  Court,  after  recognizing  the  fact 
that  **  there  is  a  citizenship  of  the  United  States  and  a 
citizenship  of  a  state  which  are  distinct  from  each  other, 
and  which  depend  upon  different  characteristics  or  cir- 
cumstances in  the  individual,^*  declared  that  ** privileges 
and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States 
.  .  .  are  placed  by  this  clause  ( Section  1  of  Article 
XIV)  under  the  protection  of  the  Federal  Constitution, 
and  that  the  latter,  whatever  they  may  he,  are  not 
intended  to  have  any  additional  protection  by  this  para- 
graph of  the  amendment.  If  then  there  is  a  difference  be- 
tween the  privileges  and  immunities  belonging  to  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  as  such,  .  .  .  the  latter  must  rest 
for  their  security  and  protection  where  they  have  hereto- 
fore rested ;  for  they  are  not  embraced  in  this  paragraph 
of  the  amendment.'*  Thus  the  conclusion  was  reached 
that  the  privileges  and  immunities  *  *  which  belong  to  citi- 
zens of  the  states  as  such,  .  .  .  are  left  to  the  state 
governments  for  security  and  protection/'  It  follows 
therefore  that  the  rights  belonging  to  a  citizen  of  a  state  as 
such,  which  are  protected  against  state  action  by  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  are  em- 
braced in  a  much  narrower  circle  than  those  protected 
against  the  action  of  the  Federal  Government  by  the  Fed- 
eral Bill  of  Eights  embodied  in  the  first  eight  amend- 
ments to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Those 
amendments  only  limit  the  powers  of  the  Federal  Govem- 

541 


642  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  308 

tuent,  they  do  not  limit  the  powers  of  the  state  in  respect 
to  their  own  citizens.  In  Spies  v.  Illinois,  123  U.  S.  131, 
it  was  contended  ''that  though  originally  the  first  ten 
amendments  were  adopted  as  limitations  on  federal 
power,  yet  in  so  far  as  they  secure  and  recognize  funda- 
mental rights— common-law  rights— ^f  the  man,  they 
make  them  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  man  as  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  cannot  now  be  abridged 
by  a  state  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  In  other 
words>  while  the  ten  amendments  as  limitations  on  power 
only  apply  to  the  Federal  Government,  and  not  to  the 
states,  yet  in  so  far  as  they  declare  or  recognize  rights  of 
persons,  these  rights  are  theirs,  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  to  such  rights 
limits  state  power,  as  the  ten  amendments  had  limited 
federal  power.'*  In  overruling  that  contention  the  Court 
said :  * '  That  the  first  ten  articles  of  amendments  were  not 
intended  to  limit  the  powers  of  the  state  governments  in 
respect  to  their  own  people,  but  to  operate  on  the  Na- 
tional Government  alone,  was  decided  more  than  a  half 
century  ago,  and  that  decision  has  been  steadily  adhered 
to  since.  Barron  v.  Baltimore,  7  Pet.  243,  247 ;  Living- 
ston V.  Moore,  Id.  469,  552;  Fox  v.  Ohio,  5  How.  410, 434; 
Smith  V.  Maryland,  18  How.  71,  76 ;  Withers  v.  Buckley, 

20  How.  84,  91 ;  Pervear  v.  Commonwealth,  5  Wall.  475, 
479 ;  Twitchell  v.  Commonwealth,  7  Wall.  321,  325 ;  The 
Justices  V.  Murray,  9  Wall.  274,  278 ;  Edwards  v.  Elliott, 

21  Wall  532, 557 ;  Walker  v.  Sauvinet,  92  U.  S-  90 ;  United 
States  V.  Cruikshank,  Id.  542,  552 ;  Pearson  v.  Yewdall, 
95  U.  S.  294,  296 ;  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97, 
101 ;  Kelly  v.  Pittsburgh,  140  U.  S.  79 ;  Presser  v.  Illinois, 
106  U.  S.  252,  265.*'  It  follows  therefore  that  the  states 
may  modify  existing  systems  of  procedure  to  any  extent 
in  criminal  cases,  provided  such  modifications  do  not 
**work  a  denial  of  fundamental  rights,*'  as  such  rights 
exist  within  that  narrow  circle  which  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  defines. 


§  304  STATE  CRIMINAL  PEOCEDUKE  543 

§304.  The  struggle  to  leave  the  states  untrammeled, 
as  far  as  possible,  in  the  making  of  codes  of  criminal  pro- 
cedure. The  powerful  dissenting  opinion  delivered  in 
the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  hy  Justice  Field, 
and  concurred  in  by  Chief  Justice  Chase  and  Justices 
Bradley  and  Swayne,  was  a  manifestation  of  a  desire 
upon  the  part  of  four  great  jurists  to  give  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  a  protection 
against  state  action  of  the  ''privileges  and  immunities" 
belonging  to  citizens  of  a  state  as  such,  a  much  wider 
operation  than  that  given  it  by  the  majority  of  the  court. 
Justice  Field  said:  ''The  terms  'privileges  and  immuni- 
ties '  are  not  new  in  the  amendment ;  they  were  in  the  Con- 
stitution before  the  amendment  was  adopted.  They  are 
found  in  the  Second  Section  of  the  Fourth  article  which 
declares  that  'the  citizens  of  each  state  shall  be  entitled 
to  all  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  several 
states'  and  they  have  been  the  subject  of  frequent  con- 
sideration in  judicial  decisions.  .  .  .  What  the  clause 
in  question  did  for  the  protection  of  the  citizens  of  one 
state  against  hostile  and  discriminatng  legislation  of 
other  states,  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  does  for  the  pro- 
tection of  every  citizen  of  the  United  States  against  hostile 
and  discriminaing  legislation  against  him  in  favor  of 
others,  whether  they  reside  in  the  same  or  different  states. 
If  under  the  Fourth  Article  of  the  Constitution,  equality 
of  privileges  and  immunities  is  secured  between  citizens  of 
different  states,  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  the 
same  equality  is  secured  between  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  .  •  .  Now,  what  the  clause  in  question  does 
for  the  protection  of  the  citizens  of  one  state  against  the 
creation  of  monopolies  in  favor  of  other  states,  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  does  for  the  protection  of  every  citizen 
of  the  United  States  against  the  creation  of  any  monopoly 
whatever.''  In  the  dissenting  opinion  delivered  by  Jus- 
tice Harlan  in  Twining  v.  New  Jersey,  211  U.  S.  78,  that 
great  judge,  as  a  continuation  of  struggle  begun  by  the 
minority  in  the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  said : 


544  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  304 

'^The  eourty  in  its  consideration  of  the  relative  rights  of 
the  United  States  and  of  the  several  states,  holds,  in 
this  case,  that,  without  violating  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  a  state  can  compel  a  person  accused  of 
crime  to  testify  against  himself.  In  my  judgment, 
immunity  from  self-incriminations  is  protected  against 
hostile  state  action,  not  only  by  that  clause  in  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  declaring  that  'no  state  shall 
make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  abridge  the  privi- 
leges and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,' 
but  by  the  clause  in  the  same  amendment,  'nor 
shall  any  state  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty  or 
property,  without  due  process  of  law/  .  •  .  At  the 
time  of  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  immunity 
from  self-incrimination  was  one  of  the  privileges  of  im- 
munities belonging  to  citizens  for  the  reason  that  the 
Fifth  Amendment,  speaking  in  the  name  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  had  declared,  in  terms,  that  no  person 
*  shall  be  compelled,  in  any  criminal  case,  to  be  a  witness 
against  himself;  nor  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  prop- 
erty, without  due  process  of  law/  ...  I  can  not 
support  any  judgment  declaring  that  immunity  from  self- 
incrimination  is  not  one  of  the  privUeges  or  immunities  of 
national  citizenship,  nor  a  part  of  the  liberty  guaranteed 
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  against  hostile  state 
action.  * '  Putting  aside  the  merits  of  that  great  conten- 
tion, which  the  future  must  determine,  the  fact  remains 
that  the  law  of  the  land  to-day  is  embodied  in  that  nar- 
rower construction  of  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  given  by  the  majority  of  the  court  in 
the  Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36.  From  that  time 
the  tendency  of  the  court  has  been  to  leave  the  states 
untrammeled,  as  far  as  possible,  in  the  making  of  codes 
of  criminal  procedure.  Just  how  far  the  court  has  gone 
in  that  direction  can  only  be  illustrated  by  reference  to 
particular  cases. 

§305.  Right  of  a  state  to  abolish  grand  juries.    In 

Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516,  it  was  held  that  the 


§  305  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  545 

words  **du«  process  of  law^'  in  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment do  not  necessarily  require  an  indictment  by  a  grand 
jury  in  a  state  prosecution  for  murder.  After  discussing 
the  statement  made  by  Justice  Miller  in  Davidson  v.  New 
Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  that  **It  is  not  possible  to  hold  that 
a  party  has,  without  due  process  of  law,  been  deprived  of 
his  property,  when,  as  regards  the  issues  affecting  it,  he 
has  by  the  laws  of  the  state  a  fair  trial  in  a  court  of 
justice,  according  to  the  modes  of  proceeding  applicable 
to  such  a  case,"  Mr.  Justice  Matthews  said: 

**We  are  to  construe  this  phrase  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  by  the  usus  loquendi  of  the  Constitution 
itself.  The  same  words  are  contained  in  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment. That  article  makes  specific  and  express  provisions 
for  perpetuating  the  institution  of  the  grand  jury,  so  far 
as  relates  to  prosecutions  of  the  more  aggravated  crimes 
under  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  .  .  •  According 
to  a  recognized  canon  of  interpretation,  especially  ap- 
plicable to  formal  and  solemn  instruments  of  constitu- 
tional law,  we  are  forbidden  to  assume,  without  clear, 
reason  to  the  contrary,  that  any  part  of  this  most  impor- 
tant amendment  is  superfluous.  The  natural  and  obvious 
inference  is,  that  in  the  sense  of  the  Constitution,  *due 
process  of  law'  was  not  meant  or  intended  to  include,  ex 
vi  termini,  the  institution  and  procedure  of  a  grand  jury 
in  any  case.  The  conclusion  is  equally  irresistible,  that 
when  the  same  phrase  was  employed  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  to  restrain  the  action  of  the  states,  it  was 
used  in  the  same  sense  and  with  no  greater  extent ;  and 
that  if  in  the  adoption  of  that  amendment  it  had  been  part 
of  its  purpose  to  perpetuate  the  institution  of  the  grand 
jury  in  all  the  states,  it  would  have  embodied,  as  did  the 
Fifteenth  Amendment,  express  declarations  to  that  effect. 
Due  process  of  law  in  the  latter  refers  to  that  law  of  the 
land  which  derives  its  authority  from  the  legislative 
powers  conferred  upon  Congress  by  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  exercised  within  the  limits  therein 
prescribed,  an<J  interpreted  according  to  the  principles 

Due  Process — 35 


546  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  1 305 

of  the  common  law.  In  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  by 
parity  of  reason,  it  refers  to  that  law  of  the  land  in  each 
state,  which  derives  its  authority  from  the  inherent  and 
reserved  powers  of  the  state,  exerted  within  the  limits 
of  those  fundamental  principles  of  liberty  and  justice 
which  lie  at  the  base  of  all  our  civil  and  political  institu- 
tions, and  the  greatest  security  for  which  resides  in  the 
right  of  the  people  to  make  their  own  laws,  and  alter 
them  at  their  pleasure.  ...  It  follows  that  any  legal 
proceeding  enforced  by  public  authority,  whether  sanc- 
tioned by  age  and  custom,  or  newly  devised  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  legislative  power,  in  furtherance  of  the  general 
public  good,  which  regards  and  preserves  those  principles 
of  liberty  and  justice,  must  be  held  to  be  due  process  of 
law.'* 

§  306.  Right  of  the  highest  court  of  a  state  to  dismiss 
a  writ  of  error  in  a  criminal  case.  In  Allen  v.  Georgia, 
166  U.  S.  138,  the  prisoner  had  been  convicted  in  the  state 
»  court  of  murder,  and  sued  out  a  writ  of  error  from  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  state.  On  the  day  assigned  for  its 
hearing  it  appeared  that  he  had  escaped  from  jail  and 
was  a  fugitive  from  justice.  The  court  thereupon  ordered 
the  writ  of  error  dismissed,  unless  he  should  within  sixty 
days  surrender  himself  or  be  recaptured,  and  when  that 
time  passed  without  either  happening,  the  writ  was  dis- 
missed. He  was  afterwards  recaptured,  and  resentenced 
to  death,  whereupon  he  sued  out  a  writ  of  error  to  this 
court,  assigning  as  error  that  the  dismissal  of  his  writ 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  was  a  denial  of  due 
process  of  law.  This  contention  was  denied,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  opinion  Mr.  Justice  Brown  said : 

**  Without  attempting  to  define  exactly  in  what  due 
process  of  law  consists,  it  is  suflScient  to  say  that,  if  the 
Supreme  Court  of  a  state  has  acted  in  consonance  with 
constitutional  laws  of  a  state  and  its  own  procedure,  it 
could  only  be  in  very  exceptional  circumstances  that  this 
court  would  feel  justified  in  saying  that,  there  had  been 


§  307  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROOEDUKE  547 

a  failure  of  due  legal  process.  We  might  ourselves  have 
pursued  a  different  course  in  this  case,  but  that  is  not  the 
test.  The  plaintiff  in  error  must  have  been  deprived  of  one 
of  those  fundamental  rights,  the  observance  of  which  is 
indispensable  to  the  liberty  of  the  citizen,  to  justify  our 
interference. 

**  We  can  not  say  that  the  dismissal  of  a  writ  of  error  is 
not  justified  by'  the  abandonment  of  his  case  by  the 
plaintiff  in  the  writ.  By  escaping  from  legal  custody  he 
has,  by  the  laws  of  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  states,  committed 
a  distinct  criminal  offense ;  and  it  seems  but  a  slight  pun- 
ishment for  such  offense  to  hold  that  he  has  thereby 
abandoned  his  right  to  prosecute  a  writ  of  error,  sued  out 
to  review  his  conviction.'* 

§  307.  Right  of  a  state  to  provide  for  a  trial  by  a  struck 
jury.  In  Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175  U.  S.  172,  the  ques- 
tion was  presented  as  to  whether  a  trial  by  a  struck  jury 
constituted  due  process  of  law.  Dealing  with  this  sub- 
ject Mr.  Justice  Brewer  said : 

**The  state  has  full  control  over  the  procedure  in  its 
courts,  both  in  civil  and  criminal  cases,  subject  only  to 
the  qualification  that  such  procedure  must  not  work  a 
denial  of  fundamental  rights  or  conflict  with  specific  and 
applicable  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  Ex 
parte  Eeggel,  114  U.  S.  642 ;  Iowa  Central  Railway  v. 
Iowa,  160  U.  S.  389 ;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q,  Railroad  v.  Chicago, 
166  U.  S.  226. 

*  *  In  providing  for  a  trial  by  a  struck  jury,  empanelled 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  New  Jersey  stat- 
ute, no  fundamental  right  of  the  defendant  is  trespassed 
upon.  The  manner  of  selection  is  one  calculated  to  secure 
an  impartial  jury  and  the  purpose  of  criminal  procedure 
is  not  to  enable  the  defendant  to  select  jurors,  but  to 
secure  an  impartial  jury.  .  .  •  Due  process  and 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  are  guaranteed  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  and  this  amendment  operates  to 
restrict  the  powers  of  the  state,  and  if  trial  by  a  struck 


648  DUE  PEOCESS  OP  LAW  §  307 

jury  conflicts  with  either  of  these  specific  provisions  it 
can  not  be  sustained.  A  perfectly  satisfactory  definition 
of  due  process  may  perhaps  not  be  easily  stated.  In 
Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U,  S.  516,  supra,  Mr.  Justice 
Matthews,  after  reviewing  previous  declarations,  said: 
*It  follows  that  any  legal  proceeding  enforced  by  public 
authority,  whether  sanctioned  by  age  and  custom,  or 
newly  devised  in  the  discretion  of  the  legislative  power, 
in  furtherance  of  the  general  public  good,  which  regards 
and  preserves  these  principles  of  liberty  and  justice  must 
be  held  to  be  due  process  of  law. '  In  Leeper  v.  Texas, 
139  U.  S.  462,  Chief  Justice  Fuller  declares  'that  law 
in  its  regular  course  of  administration  through  courts  of 
justice  is  due  process,  and  when  secured  by  the  law  of 
the  state  all  constitutional  requirement  is  satisfied. '  With 
any  and  all  definitions,  trial  by  a  struck  jury  in  the  ntianner 
prescribed  must,  when  authorized  by  a  statute  valid  under 
the  constitution  of  the  state,  be  adjudged  due  process." 


§  308.  Right  of  a  state  to  authorlM  a  criminal  trial  by 
a  petit  jury  of  eight.  In  Maxwell  v.  Dow,  176  U.  S.  581, 
the  court,  following  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516, 
held  that  the  trial  of  a  person  accused  as  a  criminal  by  a 
petit  jury  of  only  eight  persons  instead  of  twelve,  and 
his  subsequent  imprisonment  after  conviction,  do  not  de- 
prive him  of  his  liberty  without  due  process  of  law. 
Whether  a  trial,  in  criminal  cases  not  capital  shall  be  by 
a  jury  composed  of  eight  instead  of  twelve  jurors,  and 
whether,  in  case  of  an  infamous  crime,  a  person  shall  be 
only  liable  to  be  tried  after  presentment  or  indictment  by 
a  grand  jury,  are  questions  properly  to  be  determined  by 
the  citizens  of  each  state  for  themselves.  The  Court  said : 
'*The  question  is,  as  we  believe,  substantially  answered 
by  the  reasoning  of  the  opinion  in  the  Hurtado  case,  supra. 
The  distinct  question  was  there  presented  whether  it  was 
due  process  of  law  to  prosecute  a  person  charged  with 
murder  by  an  information  under  the  State  Constitution 
and  law.   It  was  held  that  it  was,  and  that  the  Fourteenth 


§  308  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  549 

Amendment  did  not  prohibit  snch  a  procedure.  In  our 
opinion  the  right  to  be  exempt  from  prosecution  for  an 
infamous  crime,  except  upon  a  presentment  by  a  grand 
jury,  is  of  the  same  nature  as  the  right  to  a  trial  by  a  petit 
jury  of  the  number  fixed  by  the  common  law.  If  the  state 
have  the  power  to  abolish  the  grand  jury  and  the  conse- 
quent proceeding  by  indictment,  the  same  course  of  reas- 
oning which  establishes  that  right  will  and  does  establish 
the  right  to  alter  the  number  of  the  petit  jury  from  that 
provided  by  the  common  law.  Many  cases  upon  the  sub- 
ject since  the  Hurtado  case  was  decided  are  to  be  found 
gathered  in  Hodgson  v.  Vermont,  168  TJ.  S.  262 ;  Holden 
V.  Hardy,  169  TJ.  S.  366,  384 ;  Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175 
XJ.  S.  172 ;  Bolhi  V.  Nebraska,  176  U.  S.  83. 

**  Trial  by  jury  has  never  been  affirmed  to  be  a  necessary 
requisite  of  due  process  of  law.  In  not  one  of  the  cases 
cited  and  commented  upon  in  the  Hurtado  case  is  a  trial 
by  jury  mentioned  as  a  necessary  part  of  such  process. 
.  .  .  As  was  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Brewer,  in  deliver- 
ing the  opinion  of  the  court  in  Brown  v.  New  Jersey, 
175  XJ.  S.  172,  the  state  has  full  control  over  the  procedure 
in  its  courts,  both  in  civil  and  criminal  cases,  subject  only 
to  the  qualification  that  such  procedure  must  not  work  a 
denial  of  fundamental  rights  or  conflict  with  specific  and 
applicable  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  The 
legislation  in  question  is  not,  in  our  opinion,  open  to 
either  of  these  objections.** 

In  this  case  the  Court  also  said:  **It  is  claimed,  how- 
-ever,  that  since  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment the  effect  of  the  former  amendments  has  been 
thereby  changed  and  greatly  enlarged.  It  is  now  urged 
in  substance  that  all  the  provisions  contained  in  the  first 
ten  amendments,  so  far  as  they  secure  and  recognize  the 
fundamental  rights  of  the  individual  as  against  the  exer- 
cise of  Federal  power,  are  by  virtue  of  this  amendment 
to  be  regarded  as  privileges  and  immunities  of  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  and  therefore  the  states  can  not 
provide  for  any  procedure  in  state  courts  which  could  not 


550  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  308 

be  followed  in  a  Federal  court  because  of  the  limitations 
contained  in  those  amendments.  This  was  also  the  con- 
tention made  upon  the  argument  in  the  Spies  Case,  123 
U.  S.  151 ;  but  in  the  opinion  of  the  court  therein,  which 
was  delivered  by  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Waite,  the  question 
was  not  decided  because  it  was  held  that  the  case  did  not 
require  it.  * '  After  thus  stating  that  momentous  question 
the  court  held  that  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  had  not  had  the  effect  of  making  all 
the  provisions  contained  in  the  first  ten  amendments 
operative  in  state  courts,  on  the  ground  that  the  funda- 
mental rights  protected  by  them  are,  by  virtue  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  to  be  regarded  as  privileges  and 
immunities  of  citizens  of.  the  United  States. 

§309.  Exemption  from  compulsory  self-incrimination 
in  state  courts  not  a  violation  of  the  due  process  clause 
of  Fourteenth  Amendment.  In  Twining  v.  New  Jersey, 
211  U.  S.  78,  that  conclusion  was  reached  in  a  decision 
that  held  that  privileges  and  immunities,  although  funda- 
mental, which  do  not  arise  out  af  the  nature,  and  charac- 
ter of  the  National  Government,  or  are  not  specifically 
protected  by  the  Federal  Constitution,  are  attributes  of 
state,  and  not  of  national  citizenship ;  that  the  first  eight 
amendments  are  restrictive  only  of  national  action,  and 
that  while  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  limited  state 
action,  it  did  not  take  up  and  protect  citizens  of  the  states 
from  action  by  the  states  as  to  all  matters  emnnerated  in 
the  first  eight  amendments.  In  demonstrating  that  .com- 
pulsory self-incrimination  in  a  state  tribunal  was  not  a 
denial  of  the  due  process  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  the  court  contended  that,  viewed  historic- 
ally, an  exemption  from  such  self-incrimination  did  not 
form  a  part  of  the  **law  of  the  land''  prior  to  the  separa- 
tion of  the  colonies  from  the  mother  country,  and,  there- 
fore, was  not  one  of  the  fundamental  rights,  immunities 
and  privileges  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  Speak- 
ing through  Justice  Moody  the  court,  in   a  ncytaWe 


§  309  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  551 

opinion,  said:  **What  is  due  process  of  law  may  be 
ascertained  by  an  examination  of  those  settled  usages  and 
modes  of  proceedings  existing  in  the  common  and  statute 
law  of  England  before  the  emigration  of  our  ancestors, 
and  shown  not  to  have  been  unsuited  to  their  civil  and 
political  condition  by  having  been  acted  on  by  them  after 
the  settlement  of  this  country.  This  test  was  adopted  by 
the  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Curtis,  in  Mur- 
ray V.  Hoboken  Land  Co.,  18  How.  272,  280.    .    .    . 

The  decisions  of  this  court,  though  they  are  silent  on 
the  precise  question  before  us,  ought  to  be  searched  to 
discover  if  they  present  any  analogies  which  are  helpful 
in  its  decision.  The  essential  elements  of  due  process  of 
law,  already  established  by  them,  are  singularly  few, 
though  of  wide  application  and  deep  significance.  We  are 
not  here  confronted  with  the  effect  of  due  process  in  re- 
straining substantive  laws,  as,  for  example,  that  which 
forbids  the  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  with- 
out compensation.  We  need  notice  now  only  those  cases 
which  deal  with  the  principles  which  must  be  observed  in 
the  trial  of  criminal  and  civil  causes.  Due  process  re- 
quires that  the  court  which  assumes  to  determine  the 
rights  of  parties  shall  have  jurisdiction,  Pennoyer  v. 
Neff,  95  U.  S.  714,  733;  Scott  v.  McNeal,  154  U.  S.  34; 
Old  Wayne  Life  Association  v.  McDonough,  204  U.  S. 
8,  and  that  there  shall  be  notice  and  opportunity  for  hear-f 
ing  given  the  parties,  Hovey  v.  Elliott,  167  TJ.  S.  409; 
Boiler  V.  Holly,  176  U.  S.  398 ;  and  see  Londoner  v.  Den- 
ver, 210  U.  S.  373.  Subject  to  these  two  fundamental 
conditions,  which  seem  to  be  universally  prescribed  in  all 
systems  of  law  established  by  civilized  countries,  this 
court  has  up  to  this  time  sustained  all  state  laws,  statutory 
or  judicially  declared,  regulating  procedure,  evidence  and 
methods  of  trial,  and  held  them  to  be  consistent  with  due 
process  of  law.    •    •    • 

Among  the  most  notable  of  these  decisions  are  those 
sustaining  the  denial  of  jury  trial  both  in  civil  and  crim- 
inal cases,  the  substitution  of  informations  for  indictments 


552  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW'  §  309 

by  a  grand  jury,  the  enactment  that  the  possession  of 
policy  slips  raises  a  presumption  of  illegality,  and  the 
admission  of  the  deposition  of  an  absent  witness  in  a 
criminal  case.  The  cases  proceed  npon  the  theory  that, 
given  a  conrt  of  justice  which  has  jurisdiction,  and  acts, 
not  arbitrarily,  but  in  conformity  with  a  general  law,  upon 
evidence,  and  after  inquiry  made  with  notice  to  the  par- 
ties affected  and  opportunity  to  be  heard,  then  all  the 
requirements  of  due  process,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  pro- 
cedure in  court  and  methods  of  trial  and  character  and 
effect  of  evidence,  are  complied  with.  Thus  it  was  said 
in  Iowa  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  160  U.  S.  393:  *But  it  is 
clear  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  in  no  way  under- 
takes to  control  the  power  of  the  state  to  determine  by 
what  process  legal  rights  may  be  asserted  or  legal  obliga- 
tions be  enforced,  provided  the  method  of  procedure 
adopted  gives  reasonable  notice  and  affords  fair  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard  before  the  issues  are  decided ;  *  and  in 
Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad  Co.  v.  Schmidt,  177  TJ.  S. 
230,  236 :  *  It  is  no  longer  open  to  contention  that  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  does  not  control  mere  forms 
of  procedure  in  state  courts  or  regulate  practice  therein. 
All  its  requirements  are  complied  with,  provided  in  the 
proceedings  which  are  claimed  not  to  have  been  due  proc- 
ess of  law  the  person  condemned  has  had  suflScient  notice 
and  adequate  opportunity  has  been  afforded  him  to 
defend.'^' 

§  310.  Refusal  to  set  aside  a  verdict,  after  the  rendition 
of  which,  one  of  the  jurors  became  insane.  In  Jordan  v. 
Massachusetts,  225  XT.  S.  167,  in  which  the  accused  was 
convicted  by  a  jury  and  sentenced  to  death,  one  of  the 
jurors,  after  the  verdict,  became  insane.  The  court  then 
refused  to  set  aside  the  verdict  after  an  inquiry,  con- 
ducted in  accordance  with  the  established  procedure  of 
the  state,  had  established,  by  a  preponderance  of  evi- 
dence and  not  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  juror 


§  310  STATE  CRIMINAL  PBOCEDURE  553 

was  of  suflScient  mental  capacity  during  the  trial  to  act 
as  such.  In  sustaining  the  conclusion  of  the  court  Justice 
Lurton  said:  **That  the  procedure  in  this  was  in  con- 
formity with  the  constitution  and  law  of  Massachusetts 
is  determined  by  the  judgment  and  opinion  of  the  Supreme 
Judicial  Court.  Subject  to  the  requirement  of  due  proc- 
ess of  law,  the  states  are  under  no  restriction  as  to  the 
method  of  procedure  in  the  administration  of  pulMic 
justice.  That  the  court  had  jurisdiction  and  that  there 
was  a  full  hearing  upon  the  issue  made  by  the  suggestion 
of  the  insanity  of  the  juror  is  not  questioned.  'Subject  to 
these  two  fundamental  conditions,  which  seem  to  be  uni- 
versally prescribed  in  all  systems  of  law,  •  .  .  this 
court  has,  up  to  this  time,  sustained  all  state  laws,  statu- 
tory or  judicially  declared,  regulating  procedure,  evi- 
dence, and  methods  of  trial,  and  held  them  to  be  consistent 
with  due  process  of  law.*  Twining  v.  New  Jersey,  211 
U.  S.  78.  •  •  .  Due  process  implies  a  tribunal  both 
impartial  and  mentally  competent  to  afford  a  hearing. 
But  to  say  that  due  process  is  denied  when  a  competent 
state  court  refuses  to  set  aside  the  verdict  of  a  jury  be- 
cause the  sanity  of  one  of  its  members  was  established  by 
only  a  preponderance  of  evidence,  would  be  to  enforce 
an  exaction  unknown  to  the  precedents  of  the  past,  and 
an  interference  with  the  discretion  and  power  of  the  state 
not  justified  by  the  demands  of  justice,  nor  recognized  by 
any  definition  of  due  process. 

In  criminal  cases  due  process  of  law  is  not  denied  by  a 
state  law  which  dispenses  with  a  grand  jury  indictment 
and  permits  prosecution  upon  information,  nor  by  a  law 
which  dispenses  with  the  necessity  of  a  jury  of  twelve, 
or  unanimity  in  the  verdict.  Indeed,  the  requirement  of 
due  process  does  not  deprive  a  state  of  the  power  to 
dispense  with  jury  trial  altogether.  Hurtado  v.  Califor- 
nia, 110  U.  S.  516 ;  Maxwell  v.  Dow,  176  XT.  S.  581.  When 
the  essential  elements  of  a  court  having  jurisdiction  in 
which  an  opportunity  for  a  hearing  is  afforded  are  pres- 
ent, the  power  of  a  state  over  its  methods  of  procedure  is 


554  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LA^  §  310 

substantially  unrestricted  by  the  due  process  clause  of 
the  Constitution. ' ' 


§  311.  Due  process  not  denied  because  no  amdgmnent 
or  plea  was  had  upon  a  second  information.  In  Garland 
V.  Washington,  232  U.  S.  642,  it  was  held  that  the  due 
process  of  law  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
was  not  denied  where  there  was  a  conviction  upon  a  sec- 
ond and  amended  information  (after  a  prior  conviction 
under  the  original  information  had  been  set  aside  and  a 
new  trial  granted),  because  no  arraigimient  or  plea  was 
had  upon  the  second  information,  the  accused,  without 
kaving  made  a  specific  objection  on  that  account,  being  put 
to  trial  just  as  if  he  had  entered  a  formal  plea  of  not 
guilty.  The  Court  said :  *  *  It  is  apparent  that  the  accused 
was  tried  and  convicted  upon  an  information  charging 
an  offense  against  the  law ;  that  he  had  a  jury  trial,  with 
full  opportunity  to  be  heard,  and  that  he  was  in  fact  de- 
prived of  no  right  or  privilege  in  the  making  of  his 
defense,  unless  such  deprivation  arises  from  the  fact  that 
he  was  not  arraigned  and  required  to  plead  to  the  second 
information  before  trial.  The  object  of  arraignment 
being  to  inform  the  accused  of  the  charge  against  him 
and  obtain  an  answer  from  him,  was  fully  subserved  in 
this  case,  for  the  accused  had  taken  objections  to  the  sec- 
ond information  and  was  put  to  trial  before  a  jury  upon 
that  information  in  all  respects  as  though  he  had  entered 
a  formal  plea  of  not  guilty.  In  this  view,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Washington,  following  its  former  decisions, 
held  that  the  failure  to  enter  the  plea  deprived  the 
accused  of  no  substantial  right,  and  that  having  failed 
to  make  objection  upon  that  ground  before  trial  it  was 
waived  and  could  not  be  subsequently  taken.  This  ruling, 
it  is  contended,  deprived  the  plaintiff  in  error  of  his 
liberty  without  due  process  of  law  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution. 

**Due  process  of  law,  this  court  has  held,  does  not  re- 
quire the  state  to  adopt  any  particular  form  of  procedure, 


S  811  STATE  CRIMINAL  PEOCEDURE  555 

• 

SO  long  as  it  appears  that  the  accused  has  had  sufficient 
notice  of  the  accusation  and  an  adequate  opportunity  to 
defend  himself  in  the  prosecution.  Boger  v.  Peck,  199 
U.  S.  425,  435,  and  previous  cases  in  this  court  there 
cited.  Tried  by  this  test  it  cannot  for  a  moment  be  main- 
tained that  the  want  of  formal  arraignment  deprived  the 
accused  of  any  substantial  right  or  in  any  wise  changed 
the  course  of  trial  to  his  disadvantage.  All  requirements 
of  due  process  of  law  in  criminal  trials  in  a  state,  as  laid 
down  in  the  repeated  decisions  of  this  court,  were  fully 
met  by  the  proceedings  had  against  the  accused  in  the 
trial  court.  ...  It  is  insisted,  however,  that  this 
court  in  the  case  of  Grain  v.  United  States,  162  U.  S.  625, 
held  the  contrary.  In  that  case  the  question  was  specif- 
ically made  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  plea  before  trial,  duly 
entered  of  record.  The  learned  Justice  who  spoke  for 
the  majority  of  the  court  announced  its  conclusion  approv- 
ing a  number  of  early  cases  in  the  state  courts  which  had 
held  that  such  form  of.  arraignment  entered  of  record 
was  essential  to  a  legal  trial,  and  holding  that  in  a  Fed- 
eral court  no  valid  trial  could  be  had  without  the  requisite 
arraignment  and  plea,  and  that  such  must  be  shown  by 
the  record  of  conviction.  If  a  legal  trial  can  not  be  had 
without  a  plea  to  the  indictment,  duly  entered  of  record 
before  trial,  it  would  follow  that  such  omission  in  the 
present  case  requires  a  reversal  of  the  judgment  of  con- 
viction, because  the  prisoner  has  been  deprived  of  due 
process  of  law.'' 

Then,  after  declaring  that  **with  improved  methods  of 
procedure  and  greater  privileges  to  the  accused,  any 
reason  for  such  strict  adherence  to  the  mere  formalities 
of  trial  would  seem  to  have  passed  away,*'  the  Court  said : 
**  Holding  this  view,  notwithstanding  our  reluctance  to 
overrule  former  decisions  of  this  court,  we  now  are  con- 
strained  to  hold  that  the  technical  enforcement  of  formal 
rights  in  criminal  procedure  sustained  in  the  Grain  case 
is  no  longer  required  in  the  prosecution  of  offenses  under 
present  systems  of  law,  and  so  far  as  that  case  is  not  in 


556  DUE  PBOCESS  OP  LAW  §  3U 

accord  with,  the  views  herein  expressed^  it  is  necessarily 
overruled,*'  And  here  reference  may  be  appropriately 
made  to  the  following  cases  in  which  it  was  held  that  the 
due  process  of  law  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment was  not  involved  in  certain  decisions  by  state  courts 
as  to  the  entry  of  a  nolle  proseque  to  those  counts  in  an 
indictment  of  several  courts  upon  which  the  jury  could 
not  agree  (Cross  v.  North  Carolina,  132  U.  S.  131;  as  to 
the  failure  of  an  indictment  to  charge  a  specific  offense ; 
Caldwell  v.  Texas,  137  U.  S.  692 ;  Leeper  v.  Texas,  139 
TJ.  S.  462;  In  re  Bobertson,  156  XJ.  S.  183;  Bergemann  v. 
Backer,  157  U.  S.  655;  Kohl  v.  Lehlback,  160  U.  S.  297; 
Howard  v.  Fleming,  191  U.  S.  126) ;  as  to  a  trial  and  con- 
viction by  a  judge  de  facto  of  a  court  de  jure,  where  the 
sentence  pronounced  was  valid  (In  re  Manning,  139  TJ.  S. 
506) ;  as  to  the  existence  of  flaws  in  the  indictment  and 
their  waiver  by  the  defendant  (0*Neil  v.  Vermont,  144 
XT.  S.  323) ;  as  to  the  presence  of  an  alien  on  a  trial  jury, 
objection  not  having  been  made  at  the  proper  time  under 
the  law  of  the  state  (Kohl  v.  Lehback,  160  U.  S.  297)  ;  as  to 
the  action  of  a  state  court  in  dismissing  the  appeal  of  the 
accused  on  account  of  his  escape  from  jail  and  failure  to 
surrender  himself  within  a  time  prescribed  by  the  court 
(Allen  V.  Georgia,  166  TJ.  S.  138) ;  as  to  the  action  of  an 
appellate  court  in  dismissing  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus, 
when  the  commitment  was  not  void,  the  committing  court 
having  jurisdiction  (Tinsley  v.  Anderson,  171  TJ.  S.  101) ; 
as  to  a  decision  by  a  state  court  that  certain  acts  consti- 
tuted an  offense  indictable  at  common  law  (Howard  v. 
Fleming,  191 U.  S.  126). 

§312.  Right  of  the  accused  to  be  present  in  a  state 
court  at  every  stage  of  his  trial.  Whether  the  accused 
has  that  right,  as  a  part  of  the  due  process  of  law  guar- 
anteed by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  has  long  been  con- 
sidered an  unsettled  question.  In  his  able  work  on  "Due 
Process  of  Law,''  published  in  1906,  Professor  McGehee 
(p.  167)  says:  **We  have  no  direct  adjudication  as  to 


§  312  STATE  CEIMINAIi  PROCEDURE  557 

whether  the  right  of  pleading  or  the  right  of  the  accused 
to  be  present  at  the  trial  is  guaranteed,  as  against  the 
states,  by  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  That  author  at  p.  165  says:  *^So,  also, 
under  the  same  provision  (Fifth  Amendment),  the  right 
of  a  person  accused  of  felony  to  be  present  during  the 
whole  of  the  trial  in  the  trial  court,  is  a  substantive  right 
of  which  he  can  not  be  deprived  without  due  process  of 
law,  even  with  his  consent, '  *  citing  Lewis  v.  United  States, 
146  U,  S.  372.  In  Cooley's  Constitutional  Limitations, 
2nd  ed.,  452,  that  great  jurist  says :  **In  cases  of  felony, 
where  the  prisoner's  life  or  liberty  is  imperiled,  he  has 
the  right  to  be  present  and  must  be  present,  during  the 
whole  of  the  trial  and  until  the  final  judgment.  If  he  be 
absent,  either  in  prison  or  by  escape,  there  is  a  want  of 
jurisdiction  over  the  person,  and  the  court  cannot  pro- 
ceed  with  the  trial,  or  receive  the  verdict,  or  pronounce 
the  final  judgment/^  The  right  to  try  an  accused  person 
in  his  absence  is  peculiarly  a  Boman  law  institution, 
always  held  in  abhorence  by  the  English  common  law 
which  established  the  opposing  principle  as  an  integral 
and  necessary  part  of  the  system  of  trial  by  jury.  In  Bex 
V.  Ladsingham,  Sir  T.  Baym,  193,  it  was  said:  **  *Tis 
intended  that  no  privy  verdict  can  be  given  in  criminal 
cases  which  concern  life,  as  felony,  because  the  jury  are 
commanded  to  look  upon  the  prisoner  when  they  give  their 
verdict,  and  so  the  prisoner  is  to  be  there  present  at  the 
same  time ; ' '  and  American  authorities  emphasize  the  fact 
that,  **at  the  rendition  of  the  verdict,  the  prisoner  is 
entitled  to  have  the  jury  polled,  so  that  each  one  shall 
answer  on  Jhis  own  responsibility,  face  to  face  with  the 
prisoner,  as  to  his  guilt  or  innocence.*'  Dunn  v.  Com., 
6  Pa.  St.  384;  Temple  v.  Com.,  14  Bush  (Ky.)  769;  Nolan 
V.  State,  55  Ga.  522. 

The  Fifth  Amendment  does  not  guarantee  to  the  ac- 
cused, in  express  terms,  the  right  to  be  present  at  every 
stage  of  his  trial ;  there  is  not  a  word  in  that  amendment 
on  the  subject.    The  right  of  the  accused  to  be  present  in 


jK8  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  312 

a  Federal  court  at  every  stage  of  his  trial  is  strictly  a 
creation  of  judge-made  law;  it  is  the  result  of  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  Fifth  Amendment  given  by  the  Supreme 
Court  in  accordance  with  the  rule  laid  down  by  Chief 
Justice  Marshall  in  United  States  v.  Burr,  4  Cranch  470. 
That  great  jurist  determined  in  that  case  that  whenever 
it  becomes  necessary  to  interpret  any  part  of  our  organic 
law,  which  was  borrowed  from  the  mother  coimtry,  it. is 
to  be  assumed  that  the  f  ramers  of  American  constitutions 
took  it  with  the  meaning  attached  to  it  in  the  land  from 
which  it  was  drawn.  And  so  when  in  Hopt  v.  Utah,  110 
U.  S.  574,  the  court  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Harlan, 
undertook  to  establish  the  right  in  question  in  Federal 
courts  as  a  part  of  the  due  process  clause  of  the  Fifth 
Amendment,  it  was  said :  *  *  *The  natural  life  \  says  Black- 
stone,  ^cannot  legally  be  disposed  of  or  destroyed  by  any 
individual,  neither  by  the  person  himself  nor  by  any  other 
of  his  fellow  creatures,  merely  upon  their  own  authority.' 
1  Bl.  Com.  133.  The  public  has  an  interest  in  his  life  and 
liberty.  Neither  can  be  lawfully  taken  except  in  the  mode 
prescribed  by  law.  That  which  the  law  makes  essential 
in  proceedings  involving  the  deprivation  of  life  or  Uberty 
can  not  be  dispensed  with  or  affected  by  the  consent  of 
the  accused ;  much  less  by  his  mere  failure,  when  on  trial 
and  in  custody  to  object  to  unauthorized  methods.  The 
great  end  of  punishment  is  not  the  expiation  or  atonement 
of  the  offense  committed,  but  the  prevention  of  future 
offenses  of  the  same  kind.  4  Bl.  Com.  11.  .  .  .  If  he 
(the  accused)  be  deprived  of  his  life  or  liberty  without 
being  so  present,  such  deprivation  would  be  without  that 
due  process  of  law  required  by  the  Constitution.  *  *  While 
in  Schwab  v.  Berggren,*  143  U.  S.  442,  it  was  held  that  the 
rule  relating  to  the  presence  in  court  of  the  accused  did 
not  require  his  presence  at  the  time  of  the  affirmance  of 
his  conviction  on  appeal,  the  Court  was  careful  to  say 
(p.  448) :  **The  personal  presence  of  the  accused,  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end  of  a  trial  for  felony,  involving 
life  or  liberty,  as  well  as  at  the  time  final  judgment  is 


§  812  STATE  CEIMINAL  PROCEDURE  559 

rendered  against  him,  may  be,  and  must  be  assumed  to 
be,  vital  to  the  proper  conduct  of  his  defense,  and  can 
not  be  dispensed  with.  *  *  The  more  complete  statement  on 
that  subject  made  in  Hopt  v.  Utah,  110  U,  S.  574,  was 
then  quoted  and  approved.  In*  Lewis  v.  United  States, 
146  U.  S.  370,  it  was  again  held,  even  with  great  emphasis, 
that  in  cases  of  felony,  it  is  not  in  the  i)ower  of  the  pris- 
oner, either  by  himself  or  counsel,  to  waive  the  right  to 
be  personally  present  at  every  stage  of  his  trial ;  and  that 
the  record  must  show  affirmatively  that  he  was  so  present. 
In  Dowdell  v.  United  States,  221  U.  S.  331,  the  Court 
said:  *'In  Hopt  v.  Utah,  110  U.  S.  574,  this  court  held 
that  due  process  of  law  required  the  accused  to  be  present 
at  every  stage  of  the  trial. '  *  In  Diaz  v.  United  States, 
223  U.  S.  442,  the  Court  said:  **In  cases  of  felony  our 
courts,  with  substantial  accord,  have  regarded  it  as  ex- 
tending to  every  stage  of  the  trial,  inclusive  of  the  em- 
panelling of  the  jury  and  the  reception  of  the  verdict,  and 
as  being  scarcely  less  important  to  the  accused  than  the 
right  of  trial  itself.  And  with  like  accord  they  have  re- 
garded an  accused  who  is  in  custody  and  one  who  is 
charged  with  a  capital  offense  as  incapable  of  waiving  the 
righf  In  support  of  its  assertion  that  in  **  cases  of  fel- 
ony our  courts,  with  substantial  accord,  have  regarded 
it  as  extending  to  every  stage  of  the  trial,'*  the  Court 
then  says  that  **The  reasoning  upon  which  this  rule  of 
decision  rests  is  clearly  indicated  in  Barton  v.  State,  67 
Ga.  653,  where  it  is  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia : 
*  It  is  the  right  of  the  defendant  in  cases  of  felony,  •  .  . 
to  be  present  at  all  stages  of  the  trial,  especially  at  the 
rendition  of  the  verdict ;  and  if  he  be  in  such  custody  and 
confinement  ...  as  not  to  be  present  unless  sent  for 
and  relieved  by  the  court,  the  reception  of  the  verdict  dur-» 
ing  such  compulsory  absence  is  so  illegal  as  to  necessitate 
the  setting  it  aside  .  .  .  The  principle  thus  ruled  is 
good  sense  aAd  sound  law ;  because  he  can  not  exercise  the 
right  to  be  present  at  the  rendition  of  the  verdict  when 
in  jail,  unless  the  officer  of  the  court  brings  him  into  the 


560  DUE  PEOCBSS  OP  LAW  §  312 

court  by  its  order/*  The  law  as  thus  expounded  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  is  in  perfect  accord  with  like 
decisions,  too  numerous  for  citation,  rendered  by  the  high- 
est courts  of  Alabama,  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado, 
Connecticut,  Florida,  Georgia,  Illinois,  Kansas,  Kentucky, 
Louisiana,  Massachusetts,  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Mis* 
souri,  Nebraska,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  North  Carolina, 
Ohio,  Oklahoma,  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina,  Tennes- 
see, Texas,  Virginia,  West  Virginia  and  Wisconsin. 

In  the  original  title  deed  to  the  New  World,  represented 
by  James  I's  charter  of  April  10,  1606,  it  was  provided 
*  *  that  all  and  every  the  persons  being  our  subjects,  which 
shall  dwell  and  inhabit  within  every  or  any  of  the  said 
several  colonies  and  plantations,  and  every  of  their  chil- 
dren, which  shall  happen  to  be  bom  within  any  of  the 
limits  and  precincts  of  the  said  several  colonies  and  plan- 
tations, shall  have  and  enjoy  all  liberties,  franchises,  and 
immunities,  within  any  of  our  other  dominions,  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  as  if  they  had  been  abiding  and 
born  within  their  own  realm  of  England  or  any  other  of 
our  said  dominions.*'  Charters  and  Constitufions,  part 
II,  pp.  1891-1892.  We  know  that  long  before  that  charter 
was  issued,  long  before  the  first  English  settlements  in 
the  New  World  were  made,  the  general  right  in  question 
had  become,  by  the  law  of  the  land,  the  birth-right  of 
every  Englishman  **  abiding  and  bom  within  their  own 
realm  of  England  or  any  other  of  our  said  dominions." 
Sir  James  F.  Stephen,  in  his  description  of  the  procedure 
in  criminal  trials,  **  which  took  place  between  1554  and 
1637, '^  says:  **When  the  case  was  considered  ripe  for 
trial  the  prisoner  was  arraigned  and  the  jury  sworn, 
after  which  the  trial  began  by  the  speeches  of  the  counsel 
for  the  crown. ' '  Hist,  of  the  Crim.  Law,  I,  p.  325.  From 
* '  Coke  upon  Littleton, ' '  227f ,  whose  author  died  in  1634, 
we  learn:  **But  in  criminal  cases  of  life  or  member,  the 
jury  can  give  no  privy  verdict,  but  they  "must  give  it 
openly  in  court.*' 

From  Dominus  Rex  v.  Ladsingham,  Sir  T.  Raym.  193 


§  312  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  561 

(1671),  we  learn  that  **  'Tis  intended  that  no  privy  ver- 
dict can  be  given  in  criminal  cases  which  concern  life,  as 
felony,  because  the  jury  are  commanded  to  look  upon  the 
prisoner  when  they  give  their  verdict,  and  so  the  prisoner 
is  to  be  there  present  at  the  same  time/^    (1736-1766.) 

From  Bacon's  Abridgement,  Title  ** Verdict,''  page 
308,  we  learn  that  **It  is  in  one  book  laid  down,  that  a 
privy  verdict  cannot  be  given  in  a  case  of  life  or  member. 
1  Inst.  227. 

**In  two  other  books  it  is  laid  down,  that  a  privy  verdict 
cannot  be  given  in  a  case  of  felony ;  because  the  jury  are 
directed,  and  ought,  in  such  case,  to  look  upon  the  pris- 
oner when  they  give  their  verdict. ' '  Eaym.  193,  Eex  v. 
Ladsingham;  1  Ventr.  97. 

From  2  Hale's  Pleas  of  the  Crown  300  (1739),  we  learn 
that,  **In  a  case  of  felony  or  treason  the  verdict  must  be 
given  in  open  court,  and  no  privy  verdict  can  be  given. 
Co.  Lit.  227  b.    Co.  P.  C.  110." 

From  4  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  360  (1758),  we 
learn  that  "When  the  evidence  on  both  sides  is  closed,  and 
indeed  when  any  ^evidence  hath  been  given,  the  jury  can- 
not be  discharged  (unless  in  cases  of  evident  necessity) 
till  they  have  given  in  their  verdict ;  but  are  to  consider 
it,  and  deliver  it  in,  with  the  same  forms  as  upon  civil 
causes ;  only  they  cannot,  in  a  criminal  case  which  touches 
life  or  member,  give  a  privy  verdict.  2  Hal.  P.  C.  300. 
2Hawk.  P.  C.  439." 

From  1  Chitty  Cr.  L.  636,  we  learn:  "Of  the  verdict. 
The  verdict,  whatever  may  be  its  effect,  must,  in  all 
cases  of  felony  and  treason,  be  delivered  in  the  presence 
of  the  defendant,  in  open  court,  and  cannot  be  either 
privily  given,  or  promulgated  while  he  is  absent.  Co.  Lit. 
227  b.;  3  Inst.  110;  Sir  T.  Eaym.  193;  2  Hale  300;  Hawk, 
p.  2,  c.  47,  s.  2 ;  4  Bla.  Com.  360.  Bac.  Abr.  verdicts,  B. 
Bum,  J.  Jurors,  V.  Williams,  J.  Juries,  VH."  In  the 
light  of  these  precedents  Who  can  doubt  that  the  full- 
fledged  right  in  question  was  one  of  the  most  clearly  de- 
fined and  generally  recognized  **  privileges  and  immuni- 

Dne  Process — 36 


562  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  312 

ties**  vested,  by  the  law  of  the  land,  in  every  citizen  of 
each  of  the  original  thirteen  states  at  the  time  of  their 
severance  from  the  mother  country ;  that  in  each  of  those 
states  it  was,  at  that  time  (1776),  regarded  as  an  indis- 
pensable  element  in  due  process  of  law.  Upon  no  other 
theory  or  assumption  can  be  supported  the  line  of  deci- 
sions of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  headed 
by  Hopt  V.  Utah,  110  U.  S.  574,  in  which  it  has  been  held 
that,  by  intendment  cmd  implication  the  right  in  question 
is  imbedded  in  the  due  process  law  clause  of  the  Fifth 
Amendment,  because  in  the  English  conception  of  due 
process  as  reproduced  in  this  country  it  is  inherent.  For 
the  same  reason  it  is  equally  certain  that  it  is  inherent  in 
the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment; and  in  Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S,  310,  it  was 
solemnly  declared,  as  it  should  have  been:  **The  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  it  has  been  held,  legitimately  operates 
to  extend  to  the  citizens  and  residents  of  the  states  the 
same  protection  against  arbitrary  state  legislation  affect- 
ing life,  liberty,  and  property  as  is  offered  by  the  Fifth 
Amendment  against  similar  legislation  by  Congress." 
^Tiere  then  can  room  be  found  for  doubt  that  the  due 
process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  when  prop- 
erly construed,  protects  the  right  of  the  accused  to  be 
present  in  a  state  court  at  every  stage  of  his  trial  against 
state  action,  just  as  the  corresponding  clause  in  the  Fifth 
Amendment  protects  the  same  right  against  the  action  of 
the  Federal  Government. 

§  313.  Duty  of  an  accused  person  to  exhaust  all  of  his 
remedies  in  the  state  courts.  It  is  well  settled  that  while 
the  power  to  issue  writs  of  habeas  corpud  to  state  courts, 
which  are  proceeding  in  disregard  of  rights  secured  by 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States,  exists, 
the  practice  of  exercising  such  power  before  the  question 
has  been  raised  or  determined  in  the  state  court  is  one 
that  ought  not  to  be  encouraged.  In  Cook  v.  Hart,  146 
U.  S.  183,  the  Court  said :  **  While  the  Federal  courts  have 


§  313  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  563 

the  power  and  may  discharge  the  accused  in  advance  of 
his  trial,  if  he  is  restrained  of  his  liberty  in  violation  of 
the  Federal  Constitution  or  laws,  they  are  not  bound  to 
exercise  such  power  after  a  state  court  has  finally  acted 
upon  the  case,  but  may,  in  their  discretion,  require  the 
accused  to  sue  out  his  writ  of  error  from  the  highest  court 
of  the  state,  or  even  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States/'  See  ateo.  Ex  parte  Bozale,  117  U.  S.  241 ; 
Ex  parte  Fonda,  117  U,  S.  516;  Be  Wood,  140  U.  S. 
278 ;  Cook  v.  Hart,  146  U.  S.  183 ;  Ee  Frederich,  149  U.  S. 
70 ;  New  York  v/Eno,  155  XJ.  S.  89 ;  Whitten  v.  Tomlinson, 
160  U,  S.  231.  Under  the  principles  of  that  case  the  Fed- 
eral court  should  not  issue  the  writ  to  the  state  court 
before  the  latter  has  passed  upon  the  point  set  up.  In 
Pepke  V.  Cronan,  155  U.  S.  100,  it  was  held  that  where 
the  validity  of  a  sentence  of  a  state  court  can  be  tested 
by  the  supreme  court  of  the  state,  or  a  writ  of  error  from 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  applied  for,  the 
United  States  district  court  should  not  sustain  a  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  to  discharge  the  person  convicted.  In 
Whitten  v.  Tomlinson,  160  U.  S.  231,  it  was  held  that  a 
prisoner  in  custody  under  the  authority  of  a  state  should 
not,  except  in.  a  case  of  peculiar  urgency,  be  discharged 
by  a  court  or  judge  of  the  United  States  upon  a  writ  of 
habeas  corpus,  in  advance  of  any  proceedings  in  the  courts 
of  the  state  to  test  the  validity  of  his  arrest  and  detention. 
In  Tinsley  v.  Anderson,  171  U.  S.  101,  dismissing  a  writ 
issued  before  trial,  it  was  held  that  the  dismissal  of  a  writ 
of  habeas  corpus  by  the  highest  court  of  the  state  having 
jurisdiction  of  the  case  is  reviewable  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  on  writ  of  error,  if  it  denies 
the  prisoner  any  right  specially  set  up  and  claimed  by 
him  under  the  Constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  of  the 
United  States.  See  Fitts  v.  McGhee,  172  U.  S.  516 ;  Mar- 
kuson  V.  Boucher,  175  U.  S.  184 ;  Minnesota  v.  Brundage, 
180  U.  S.  499.  Unless  fundamental  rights  specially  se- 
cured by  the  Federal  Constitution  are  involved,  the  Fed- 
eral courts  will  not  interfere  with  the  administration  of 


564  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  313 

a  state 's  criminaHaw,  by  habeas  corpus.  Bogejrs  v.  Peck, 
199  U.  S.  425.  In  Urquhart  v.  Brown,  205  U.  S.  179,  the 
right  of  a  Federal  court  to  determine  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  state  court  in  a  criminal  case  by  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
was  recognized;  and  in  Hunter  v.  Wood,  209  U.  S.  205, 
it  was  held  that  a  railway  ticket  agent  could  be  discharged 
on  habeas  corpus  (U.  S.  Be  v.  Stat.  753)  from  imprison- 
ment under  a  conviction  in  a  state  court  for  disobeying 
certain  state  legislation,  as  such  agent  was  acting  in 
obedience  to  an  order  of  a  Federal  circuit  court,  which 
had  enjoined,  as  repugnant  to  the  Federal  Constitution, 
the  enforcement  by  the  state  corporation  commission  and 
the  attorney  general  of  state  legislation  reducing  rates. 
See  also,  Glasgow  v.  Moyer,  225  U.  S.  420;  Be  Spencer, 
228  U.  S.  652;  Frank  v.  Mangum,  237  XT.  S.  309;  Collins 
V.  Johnston,  237  U.  S.  502;  Henry  v.  Henkel,  238  U.  S. 
219. 

§314.  When  habeas  corpus  is  the  proper  remedy  to 
test  the  validity  of  a  detention  under  state  law.    In 

Shibuya  Jugiro  v.  Brush,  140  U.  S.  291,  it  was  held  that 
a  habeas  corpus  proceeding  can  not  reach  errors  conmiit- 
ted  in  a  criminal  case  by  a  state  court  of  competent  juris- 
diction, proceeding  under  statutes  that  do  not  conflict  with 
the  Federal  Constitution.  In  Minnesota  v.  Barber,  136 
U.  S.  313,  it  had  been  held  that  in  such  a  proceeding  the 
court  would  discharge  the  petitioner  when  it  ascertains 
that  the  state  statute  for  a  violation  of  which  he  was  con- 
victed was  unconstitutional.  When  a  person  is  impris- 
oned under  a  judgment  of  conviction  of  a  state  court, 
which  had  jurisdiction  to  try  the  case,  and  jurisdiction 
over  the  person  of  the  accused,  and  did  not  lose  sudi 
jurisdiction  during  the  trial.  Federal  courts  have  no  right 
to  interfere  by  habeas  corpus.  Felts  v.  Murphy,  201 U.  S. 
123.  When  a  person  has  been  convicted  of  first  degree 
murder  in  a  state  court,  Federal  courts  will  not  release 
upon  habeas  corpus  on  the  theory  that  the  court  lost  its 
jurisdiction  to  proceed  in  the  trial  because  it  charged  the 


§  314  STATE  CRIMINAIi  PROCEDURE  565 

jury  in  accordance  with  the  admission  of  counsel  for  the 
accused;  that  the  only  question  for  their  consideration 
was  the  degree  of  murder  of  which  the  prisoner  was 
guilty.  Valentina  v.  M wcer,  201  U.  S.  131.  In  Be  Chap- 
man, 156  U.  S.  211,  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Fuller  said:  **In 
the  case  before  us,  the  question  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia  has  indeed 
already  been  passed  upon  by  that  court  and  also  by  the 
court  of  appeals,  upon  a  demurrer  to  the  indictment,  but 
the  case  has  not  gone  to  final  judgment  in  either  court, 
and  what  the  result  of  a  trial  may  be  cannot  be  assumed. 
We  are  impressed  with  the  conviction  that  the  orderly 
administration  of  justice  will  be  better  subserved  by  our 
declining  to  exercise  appellate  jurisdiction  in  the  mode 
desired  until  the  conclusion  of  the  proceedings.  If  judg- 
ment goes  against  petitioner  and  is  affirmed  by  the  court 
of  appeals  and  a  writ  of  error  lies,  that  is  the  proper  and 
better  remedy  for  any  cause  of  complaint  he  may  have. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  a  writ  or  error  does  not  lie  to  this 
court,  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District  was  abso- 
lutely without  jurisdiction,  the  petitioner  may  then  seek 
his  remedy  through  application  for  a  writ  of  habeas  cor- 
pus. We  discover  no  exceptional  circumstances  which 
demand  our  interposition  in  advance  of  adjudication  by 
the  courts  of  the  district  upon  the  merits  of  the  case  be- 
fore them.*' 

In  Harlan  v.  McGourin,  218  TJ.  S.  442,  Mr.  Justice  Day 
said :  *  *  The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  rely  upon 
a  number  of  cases  which  are  said  to  warrant  the  court  in 
habeas  corpus  proceedings  in  examining  the  bill  of  excep- 
tions with  a  view  to  determining  such  matters  as  are 
herein  presented.  But  an  examination  of  these  cases  will 
show  that  where  collateral  attacks  have  been  sustained 
through  the  medium  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  the 
grounds  were  such  as  attacked'  the  validity  of  the  judg- 
ments, and  the  objections  sustained  were  such  as  rendered 
the  judgment  not  merely  erroneous,  but  void.  ...  No 
objection  is  made  to  the  constitutionality  of  the  statute  or 


566  DUB  PSOCffiSS  OP  LAW  §  314 

the  right  and  authority  of  the  court  to  consider  and  de- 
termine the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused,  and  for 
that  purpose  to  weigh  and  determine  the  effect  of  the 
testimony  offered.  The  contention  is  that  in  the  respects 
pointed  out  the  testimony  wholly  fails  to  support  the 
charge.  The  attack  is  thus  not  upon  the  jurisdiction  and 
authority  of  the  court  to  proceed  to  investigate  and  deter- 
mine the  truth  of  the  charge,  but  upon  the  sufficiency  of 
the  evidence  to  show  the  guilt  of  the  accused.  This  has 
never  been  held  to  be  within  the  province  of  a  writ  of 
habeas  corpus.  Upon  habeas  corpus  the  court  examines 
only  the  power  and  authority  of  the  court  to  act,  not  the 
correctness  of  its  conclusions. ' ' 

In  Glasgow  v.  Moyer,  225  U.  S.  420,  Mr.  Justice  Mc- 
Kenna  said,  in  part:  ** Having  remitted  him  to  a  writ  of 
error  as  a  remedy,  it  would  be  a  contradiction  of  the 
ruling,  he  not  having  availed  himself  of  the  remedy,  to 
permit  him  to  prosecute  habeas  corpus.  The  ground  of 
the  decision  was  that  there  was  an  orderly  procedure  pre- 
scribed by  law  for  him  to  pursue ;  in  other  words,  to  set 
up  his  defenses  of  fact  and  law,  whether  they  attacked  the 
indictment  for  insufficiency  or  the  validity  of  the  law 
under  which  it  was  found ;  and,  if  the  decision  was  against 
him,  test  its  correctness  through  the  proper  appellate 
tribunals.''  In  re  Spencer,  228  U.  S.  652,  it  was  held  that 
where  the  petitioners  failed  to  raise  such  questions  either 
when  they  were  brought  up  for  sentence,  or  on  appeal  to 
an  intermediate  appellate  court  or  by  their  unsuccessful 
petition  to  the  highest  tribunal  of  the  state  to  allow  an 
appeal  to  that  court.  Federal  courts  will  not  grant  relief 
by  habeas  corpus.  In  Collins  v.  Johnston,  237  U.  S.  502, 
the  Court  said:  **It  is  unnecessary  to  enlarge  upon  the 
doctrine,  thoroughly  established  and  recently  restated, 
that  in  habeas  corpus  proceedings  we  are  confined  to  the 
examination  of  fundamental  and  jurisdictional  questions 
and  that  the  writ  can  not  be  employed  a^  a  substitute  for 
a  writ  of  error.  Frank  v.  Mangum,  decided  April  19, 
1915,  237  U.S.  309.'' 


§  315  STATE  CRIMINAIi  PROCEDURE  567 

§315.  The  notable  case  of  Frank  v.  Mflngnm  That 
case  (237  U.  S.  309),  came  on  appeal  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  from  the  Federal  District 
Court  for  the  Northern  District  of  Georgia  to  review  a 
decree  of  that  court  denying  a  petition  for  a  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  in  behalf  of  a  prisoner  in  custody  under  a  convic- 
tion for  murder  in  a  superior  court  of  that  state.  From 
the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  it  appears  that  *  *  The 
points  raised  by  the  appellant  may  be  reduced  to  the 
following : 

(1)  It  is  contended  that  the  disorder  in  and  about  the 
courtroom  during  the  trial  and  up  to  and  at  the  reception 
of  the  verdict  amounted  to  mob  domination,  that  not  only 
the  jury,  but  the  presiding  judge,  succumbed  to  it,  and 
that  this  effect  wrought  a  dissolution  of  the  court,  so  that 
the  proceedings  were  coram  non  judice. 

(2)  That  Frank ^s  right  to  be  present  during  the  entire 
trial  until  and  at  the  return  of  the  verdict  was  an  essen- 
tial part  of  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  which  could  not  be 
waived  either  by  himself  or  his  counsel. 

(3)  That  his  presence  was  so  essential  to  a  proper 
hearing  that  the  reception  of  the  verdict  in  his  absence, 
and  in  the  absence  of  his  counsel,  without  his  consent  or 
authority,  was  a  departure  from  the  due  process  of  law 
guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  suflScient  to 
bring  about  a  loss  of  jurisdiction  of  the  trial  court,  and 
to  render  the  verdict  and  judgment  absolute  nullities. 

(4)  That  the  failure  of  Frank  and  his  counsel,  upon 
the  first  motion  for  a  new  trial,  to  allege  as  a  ground  of 
that  motion  the  known  fact  of  Frank  *s  absence  at  the 
reception  of  the  verdict,  or  to  raise  any  jurisdictional 
question  based  upon  it  did  not  deprive  him  of  the  right 
to  afterwards  attack  the  judgment  as  a  nullity  as  he  did 
in  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  verdict. 

(5)  And  that  the  ground  upon  which  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Georgia  rested  its  decision  affirming  the  denial 
of  the  latter  motion,  viz.,  that  the  objection  based  upon 
Frank's  absence  when  the  verdict  was  rendered  was 


568  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  315 

available  on  the  motion  for  new  trial,  and  under  proper 
practice  ought  to  have  been  then  taken,  and  because  not 
then  taken  could  not  be  relied  upon  as  a  ground  for  setting 
aside  the  verdict,  was  itself  in  conflict  with  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  because  equivalent  in  effect  to 
an  ex  post  facto  law,  since,  as  is  said,  it  departs  from  the 
practice  settled  by  previous  decisions  of  the  same  court." 

In  the  learned,  luminous,  masterful  brief  filed  by  appel- 
lant *s  counsel  it  was  contended  that  **Not  only  was  the 
appellant  deprived  of  due  process  of  law,  because  he  was, 
by  the  action  of  the  court,  kept  out  of  the  courtroom  when 
the  verdict  was  rendered,  but  the  entire  proceedings 
became  coram  non  judice,  because  of  mob  domination,  to 
which  the  presiding  judge  succumbed  and  which  in  effect 
wrought  a  dissolution  of  the  court;  that  **The  right  of 
the  prisoner  to  be  present  during  the  entire  trial,  includ- 
ing the  time  of  the  rendition  of  the  verdict,  the  polling  of 
the  jury,  and  its  discharge,  is  one  which  neither  he  nor 
his  counsel  could  waive  or  abjure  ;*'  that  **In  the  present 
case  the  Superior  Court  of  Georgia  had  jurisdiction  over 
the  appellant  after  his  indictment  and  down  to  the  later 
stages  of  his  trial.  The  verdict  and  all  subsequent  pro- 
ceedings being  nullities,  he  is  entitled  to  his  discharge 
from  the  void  judgment  and  to  be  relieved  from  the  void 
sentence  of  death.  He  does  not,  however,  contend  that  he 
can  not  be  held  for  further  trial  under  the  indictment" 

With  the  issues  of  law  thus  clearly  defined,  the  court 
held,  among  other  things,  (1)  that  only  when  the  judg- 
ment under  which  a  prisoner  is  held  is  absolutely  void  for 
want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  court  that  pronounced  it,  either 
because  such  jurisdiction  was  absent  at  the  beginning, 
or  because  it  was  lost  during  the  course  of  the  proceed- 
ings, will  a  Federal  court  interfere  by  habeas  corpus  to 
deliver  a  prisoner  in  custody  under  a  conviction  for  crime 
in  a  state  court;  (2)  that  when  such  an  application  for 
habeas  corpus  is  made  to  a  Federal  court  the  inquiry  will 
be  so  widened  as  to  embrace  not  only  the  proceedings  and 
judgment  in  the  state  court  in  which  the  trial  was  had, 


§  316  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  569 

but  the  prooeedings  in  the  appellate  court  of  the  state, 
in  order  that,  upon  a  review  of  both,  it  may  be  determined 
whether  upon  the  entire  record  there  has  been  a  depriva- 
tion of  life  or  liberty  without  due  process  of  law,  con- 
trary to  the  due  procQBS  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment; (3)  that  there  will  be  no  Federal  interference  by 
habeas  oorpus  with  the  administration  of  criminal  law, 
in  a  state  court  when  it  appears  from  the  petition  for  the 
writ  that  there  existed  at  the  trial  disorder,  hostile  mani- 
festations, and  uproar,  amounting  to  mob  domination  of 
court  and  jury,  where  such  assertions  are  but  repetitions 
of  allegations  the  accused  had  the  right  to  submit  and  did 
submit,  first  to  the  trial  court  on  motion  for  a  new  trial, 
and  afterwards  in  the  state  appellate  court  as  grounds 
for  avoiding  the  consequences  of  the  trial,  and  where  both 
courts,  having  considered  such  allegations  successively 
at  times  and  places  and  under  circumstances  wholly  apart 
from  the  atmosphere  of  the  trial,  found  the  same  to  be 
groundless  except  in  a  few  particulars,  regarded  as 
irregularities  not  harmful  to  defendant,  and  consequently 
insuflScient  in  law  to  avoid  the  verdict;  (4)  that  the  prac- 
tice recognized  in  the  criminal  procedure  of  Georgia 
under  which  a  prisoner  on  trial  for  murder  may  waive 
his  right  to  be  present  when  the  verdict  is  rendered,  and 
that  such  waiver  may  be  given  after,  as  well  as  before, 
the  event,  and  is  to  be  inferred  from  the  making  of  a 
motion  for  a  new  trial  upon  other  grounds  alone,  when 
the  facts  respecting  the  reception  of  the  verdict  are  within 
the  knowledge  of  the  accused  at  the  time  of  the  making  of 
such  motion,  is  not  a  denial  of  the  due  process  of  law 
guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 

§316.  Dissmting  opinion  of  Justices  Holmes  and 
Hughes.  Speaking  for  the  minority,  Mr.  Justice  Holmes 
said :  *  *  The  trial  began  on  July  28, 1913,  at  Atlanta,  and 
was  carried  on  in  a  court  packed  with  spectators  and  sur- 
rounded by  a  crowd  outside,  all  strongly  hostile  to  the 
petitioner.    On  Saturday,  August  23,  this  hostility  was 


570  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  316 

sufficient  to  lead  the  judge  to  confer  in  the  presence  of 
the  jury  with  the  chief  of  police  of  Atlanta  and  the  colonel 
of  the  Fifth  Georgia  Begiment^  stationed  in  that  city,  both 
of  whom  were  known  to  the  jury.  On  the  same  day,  the 
evidence  seemingly  having  been  closed,  the  public  press, 
apprehending  danger,  united  in  a  request  to  the  court  that 
the  proceedings  should  not  continue  on  that  evening. 
Thereupon  the  court  adjourned  until  Monday  morning. 
On  that  morning,  when  the  solicitor  general  entered  the 
court,  he  was  greeted  with  applause,  stamping  of  feet  and 
clapping  of  hands,  and  the  judge,  before  beginning  his 
charge,  had  a  private  conversation  with  the  petitioner's 
counsel  in  which  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  there  would 
be  ^probable  danger  of  violence'  if  there  should  be  an 
acquittal  or  a  disagreement,  and  that  it  would  be  safer  for 
not  only  the  petitioner  but  his  (tounsel  to  be  absent  from 
court  when  the  verdict  was  brought  in.  At  the  judge's 
request  they  agreed  that  the  petitioner  and  they  should  be 
absent,  and  they  kept  their  word.  When  the  verdict  was 
rendered,  and  before  more  than  one  of  the  jurymen  had 
been  polled,  there  was  such  a  roar  of  applause  that  the 
polling  could  not  go  on  until  order  was  restored.  The 
noise  outside  was  such  that  it  was  difficult  for  the  judge  to 
hear  the  answers  of  the  jurors,  although  he  was  only  10 
feet  from  them.  .  •  .  The  argument  for  the  appellee 
in  substance  is  that  the  trial  was  in  a  court  of  competent 
jurisdiction,  that  it  retains  jurisdiction  although,  in  fact, 
it  may  be  dominated  by  a  mob,  and  that  the  rulings  of  the 
state  court  as  to  the  fact  of  such  domination  cannot  be 
reviewed.  But  the  argument  seems  to  us  inconclusive. 
.  •  •  Upon  allegations  of  this  gravity  in  our  opinion  it 
ought  to  be  heard,  whatever  the  decision  of  the  state  court 
may  have  been,  and  it  did  not  need  to  set  forth  contradic- 
tory evidence,  or  matter  of  rebuttal,  or  to  explain  why  the 
motions  for  a  new  trial  and  to  set  aside  the  verdict  were 
overruled  by  the  state  court.  There  is  no  reason  to  fear 
an  impairment  of  the  authority  of  the  state  to  punish  the 
guilty.    We  do  not  think  it  impracticable  in  any  part  of 


§  316  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  571 

this  cov/ntry  to  have  trials  free  from  outside  control.  But 
to  maintain  this  immunity  it  m^ay  be  necessary  that  the 
supremacy  of  the  law  and  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
should  be  vindicated  in  a  case  like  this.  It  is  our  duty  to 
act  upon  them  now,  and  to  declare  lynch  law  a^  little  valid 
when  practised  by  a  regularly  drawn  jury  as  when  admin- 
istered by  one  elected  by  a  mob  intent  on  death.  .  .  • 
Whatever  disagreement  there  may  be  as  to  the  scope  of 
the  phrase  *  due  process  of  law,'  there  can  be  do  doubt  that 
it  embraces  the  fundamental  conception  of  a  fair  trial, 
with  opportunity  to  be  heard.  Mob  law  does  not  become 
due  process  of  law  by  securing  the  assent  of  a  terrorized 
jury.  We  are  not  speaking  of  mere  disorder,  or  mere 
irregularities  in  procedure,  but  of  a  ease  where  the 
processes  of  justice  are  actually  subverted.  .  .  .  This 
is  not  a  matter  for  polite  presumptions;  we  must  look 
facts  in  the  face.  Any  judge  who  has  sat  with  juries 
knows  that,  in  spite  of  forms,  they  are  extremely  likely 
to  be  impregnated  by  the  environing  atmosphere.  And 
when  we  find  the  judgment  of  the  expert  on  the  sport,— 
of  the  judge  whose  business  it  was  to  preserve  not  only 
form,  but  substance, — ^to  have  been  that  if  one  juryman 
yielded  to  the  reasonable  doubt  that  he  himself  later 
expressed  in  court  as  the  result  of  most  anxious  delibera- 
tion, neither  prisoner  nor  counsel  would  be  safe  from  the 
rage  of  the  crowd,  we  think  the  presumption  overwhelm- 
ing that  the  jury  responded  to  the  passions  of  the  mob.*' 
For  those  weighty  reasons  the  minority  were  *  *  of  opin- 
ion that  the  judgment  should  be  reversed.  The  only 
question  before  us  is  whether  the  petition  shows  on  its 
face  that  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  should  be  denied,  or 
whether  the  district  court  should  have  proceeded  to  try 
the  facts,  .  .  .  habeas  corpus  cuts  through  all  forms 
and  goes  to  the  very  tissue  of  the  structure.  It  comes  in 
from  the  outside,  not  insubordination  to  the  proceedings, 
and  although  every  form  may  have  been  preserved,  opens 
the  inquiry  whether  they  have  been  more  than  an  empty 
shell.    ...    In  such  a  case,  the  Federal  court  has 


572  DUB  PEOCBSS  OP  LAW  ^  §  316 

jurisdiction  to  issue  the  writ.  The  fact  that  the  state 
court  still  has  its  general  jurisdiction  and  is  otherwise  a 
competent  court  does  not  make  it  impossible  to  find  that 
ajury  has  been  subjected  to  intimidation  in  a  particular 
case.  The  loss  of  jurisdiction  is  not  general,  but  particu- 
lar, and  proceeds  from  the  control  of  a  hostile  influence. 
When  such  a  case  is  presented,  it  can  not  be  said,  in  our 
view,  that  the  state  court  decision  makes  the  matter  res 
judicatck  The  state  acts  when,  by  its  agency  it  finds  the 
prisoner  guilty  and  condemns  him.  We  have  held  in  a 
civil  case  that  it  is  no  defense  to  the  assertion  of  the 
Federal  right  in  the  Federal  court  that  the  state  has  cor- 
rective procedure  of  its  own — that  still  less  does  such 
procedure  draw  to  itself  the  final  determination  of  the 
Federal  question.  Simon  v.  Southern  B.  Co.,  236  U.  S. 
115.  We  see  no  reason  for  a  less  liberal  rule  in  a  matter 
of  life  and  death.  When  the  decision  of  the  question  of 
fact  is  so  interwoven  with  the  decision  of  the  question  of 
constitutional  right  that  the  one  necessarily  involves  the 
other,  the  Federal  court  must  examine  the  facts.  Kansas 
City  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  C.  H.  Albers  Commission  Co., 
223  U.  S.  573, 591 ;  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Conley,  March 
8,  1915  (236  U.  S.  605).  Otherwise,  the  right  will  be  a 
barren  one.  .  .  •  We  therefore  lay  the  suggestion 
that  the  supreme  court  of  the  state  has  disposed  of  the 
present  question  by  its  judgment  on  one  side,  along  with 
the  question  of  the  appellant's  right  to  be  present.  // 
the  petition  discloses  facts  that  amount  to  a  loss  of  juris- 
diction in  the  trial  court,  jurisdiction  could  not  he  restored 
hy  any  decision  above.  And  notwithstanding  the  princi- 
ple of  comity  and  convenience  (for  in  our  opinion,  it  is 
nothing  more.  United  States  v.  Sing  Tuck,  194  U.  S.  161, 
168),  that  calls  for  a  resort  to  the  local  appellate  tribunal 
before  coming  to  the  courts  of  the  United  States  for  a 
writ  of  habeas  corpus,  when,  as  here,  that  resort  has  been 
had  in  vain,  the  power  to  secure  fundamental  rights  that 
had  existed  at  every  stage  becomes  a  duty  and  must  be 
put  forth.  * ' 


§  317  STATE  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  573 

An  extended  statement  has  been  given  of  this  all-impor- 
tant case  because  the  fact  whether  or  no  the  due  process 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  is  to  survive,  as  a 
real  and  not  a  merely  theoretical  restraint  upon  the 
power  of  the  states  to  regulate  procedure  in  criminal 
cases,  must  be  settled,  during  the  next  generation,  by  the 
jurists  who  will  be  called  upon  to  determine,  in  the  light 
of  a  wider  experience,  which  of  the  two  widely  divergent 
opinions  in  the  Frank  Case,  237  U.  S.  309,  shall  finally 
prevail  as  the  constitutional  law  of  the  United  States. 

§  317.  Are  there  at  present  any  enforceable  restraints 
upon  the  powers  of  a  state  to  regulate  its  procedure  in 
criminal  cases?  That  question  is  naturally  suggested  by 
the  following  statement  made  by  the  court  in  the  Frank 
Case,  237  U.  S.  309:  **In  fact,  this  court  has  sustained 
the  states  in  establishing  a  great  variety  of  departures 
from  the  common  law  procedure  respecting  jury  trials. 
Thus  in  Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175  U.  S.  172, 176,  a  stat- 
ute providing  for  the  trial  of  murder  cases  by  struck  jury 
was  sustained,  notwithstanding  it  did  not  provide  for 
twenty  peremptory  challenges.  Simon  v.  Craft,  182  U.  S. 
427,  435,  while  not  a  criminal  case,  involved  the  property 
of  a  person  alleged  to  be  of  unsound  mind,  and  it  was 
held  that  an  Alabama  statute,  tmder  which  the  sheriff 
determined  that  Mrs.  Simon's  health  and  safety  would 
be  endangered  by  her  presence  at  the  trial  of  the  ques- 
tion of  her  sanity,  so  that  while  served  with  notice  she 
was  detained  in  custody  and  not  allowed  to  be  present  at 
the  hearing  of  the  inquisition,  did  not  deprive  her  of 
property  without  due  process  of  law.  In  Felts  v.  Murphy, 
201  TJ.  S.  123,  129,  where  the  prisoner  was  convicted  of 
the  crime  of  murder,  and  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for 
life,  although  he  did  not  hear  a  word  of  the  evidence 
given  upon  the  trial  because  of  his  almost  total  deafness, 
his  inability  to  hear  being  such  that  it  required  a  person 
to  speak  through  an  ear  trumpet  close  to  his  ear  in  order 
that  such  person  should  be  beard  by  him,  and  the  trial 


574  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  317 

court  having  failed  to  see  to  it  that  the  testimony  in  the 
case  was  repeated  to  him  through  his  ear  trumpet,  this 
Court  said  that  this  was  '  at  most  an  error,  which  did  not 
take  away  from  the  court  its  jurisdiction  over  the 
subject-matter  and  over  the  person  accused. '  In  Twining 
V.  New  Jersey,  211  U.  S.  78, 101,  111,  it  was  held  that  the 
exemption  of  a  prisoner  from  compulsory  self-incrimina- 
tion in  the  state  courts  was  not  included  in  the  guaranty 
of  due  process  of  law  contained  in  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment. In  Jordan  v.  Massachusetts,  225  U.  S.  167,  177, 
where  one  of  the  jurors  was  subject  to  reasonable  doubt 
as  to  his  sanity  and  the  state  court,  pursuant  to  the  local 
law  of  criminal  procedure,  determined  upon  a  mere  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence  that  he  was  sane,  the  convic- 
tion was  affirmed.  In  Garland  v.  Washington,  232  U.  S. 
642,  645,  it  was  held  that  the  want  of  a  formal  arraign- 
ment, treated  by  the  state  as  depriving  the  accused  of  no 
substantial  right,  as  having  been  waived,  and  thereby 
lost,  did  not  amount  to  depriving  defendant  of  his  liberty 
without  due  process  of  law.*'  Proceeding  in  the  same 
vein  the  court  might  have  said  with  still  greater  force 
that  in  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S.  516,  it  was  held 
that  a  state  has  the  right  to  abolish  grand  juries ;  that  in 
Allen  V.  Georgia,  166  U.  S.  138,  it  was  held  that  the  high- 
est court  of  a  state  had  the  right  to  dismiss  a  writ  of 
error  in  a  criminal  case  as  a  penalty,  provided  the 
accused  should  within  sixty  days  fail  to  surrender  him- 
self or  be  recaptured ;  that  in  Maxwell  v.  Dow,  176  U.  S. 
581,  it  was  held  that  a  state  has  the  right  to  authorize  a 
criminal  trial  by  a  petit  jury  of  eight. 

In  the  light  of  these  precedents  the  question  recurs: 
Are  there  at  present  any  enforceable  limitations  in  favor 
of  fundamental  rights  that  actually  restrain  the  power 
of  a  state  to  regulate  its  procedure  in  criminal  cases  t  If 
there  are  such,  they  are  enshrined  in  such  general  declara- 
tions or  definitions  as  the  following:  **It  follows  that 
any  legal  proceeding  enforced  by  public  authority, 
whether  sanctioned  by  age  and  custom,  or  newly  devised 


§  317  STATE  CRIMINAIi  PROCEDURE  575 

in  the  discretion  of  legislative  power,  in  furtherance  of 
the  general  public  good,  which  regards  and  preserves 
those  principles  of  liberty  and  justice,  must  be  held  to  be 
due  process  of  law/*  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U.  S. 
516;  **That  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  the  powers  of 
states  in  dealing  with  crime  within  their  borders  are  not 
limited,  except  that  no  state  can  deprive  particular  per- 
sons, or  classes  of  persons,  of  equal  and  impartial  justice 
under  the  law ;  that  law  in  the  regular  course  of  admin- 
istration through  courts  of  justice  is  due  process,  and 
when  secured  by  the  law  of  the  state  the  constitutional 
requirement  is  satisfied;  and  that  due  process  is  so 
secured  by  laws  operating  on  all  alike,  and  not  subjecting 
the  individual  to  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  the  powers  of 
government  unrestrained  by  the  established  principles 
of  private  right  and  distributive  justice.  Hurtado  v. 
California,  110  U.  S.  516,  535,  and  cases  cited.  * '  Leeper 
v.  Texas,  139  U.  S.  462;  **  Without  attempting  to  define 
exactly  in  what  due  process  of  law  consists,  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  say  that,  if  the  supreme  court  of  a  state  has  acted 
in  consonance  with  the  constitutional  laws  of  a  state  and 
its  own  procedure  it  could  only  be  in  very  exceptional 
circumstances  that  this  court  would  feel  justified  in  say- 
ing that  there  had  been  a  failure  of  due  legal  process. 
We  might  ourselves  have  pursued  a  different  course  in 
this  case,  but  that  is  not  the  test  The  plaintiff  in  error 
must  have  been  deprived  of  one  of  those  fundamental 
rights,  the  observance  of  which  is  indispensable  to  the 
liberty  of  the  citizen,  to  justify  our  interference.  '*  Allen 
V.  Georgia,  166  U.  S.  138;  **The  state  has  full  control 
over  the  procedure  in  its  courts,  both  in  civil  and  criminal 
cases,  subject  only  to  the  qualification  that  such  proced- 
ure must  not  work  a  denial  of'  fundamental  rights  or 
conflict  with  specific  and  applicable  provisions  of  the 
Federal  Constitution.  Ex  parte  Beggel,  114  XT.  S.  642 ; 
Iowa  Central  Railway  v.  Iowa,  160  U.  S.  389 ;  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  Railroad  v.  Chicago,  166  U.  S.  226 ;''  Brown  v. 
New  Jersey,  175  U.  S.  172;  **  Trial  by  jury  has  never 


576  DUE  PEOCBSS  OP  LAW  §  317 

been  aflSrmed  to  be  a  necessary  requisite  of  due  process 
of  law.  In  not  one  of  the  cases  cited  and  commented  upon 
in  the  Hurtado  Case  [110  U.  S.  516],  is  a  trial  by  jury 
mentioned  as  a  necessary  part  of  such  process/'  Max- 
well V.  Dow,  176  U.  S.  581;  **we  need  notice  now  only 
those  cases  which  deal  with  the  principles  which  must  be 
observed  in  the  trial  of  criminal  and  civil  causes.  Due 
process  requires  that  the  court  which  assumes  to  deter- 
mine the  rights  of  parties  shall  have  jurisdiction,  Pen- 
noyer  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714,  733;  Scott  v.  McNeal,  154 
U.  S.  34 ;  Old  Wayne  Life  Association  v.  McDonough,  204 
U.  S.  8,  and  that  there  shall  be  notice  and  opportunity 
for  hearing  given  the  parties,  Hovey  v.  Elliott,  167  U.  S. 
409 ;  EoUer  v.  Holly,  176  U.  S.  398 ;  and  see  Londoner  v. 
Denver,  210  U.  S.  373.  Subject  to  tiiese  two  fundamental 
conditions,  which  seem  to  be  universally  prescribed  in  all 
systems  of  law  established  by  civilized  countries,  this 
court  has  up  to  this  time  sustained  all  state  laws,  statu- 
tory and  judicially  declared,  regulating  procedure,  evi- 
dence and  methods  of  trial,  and  held  them  to  be  consistent 
with  due  process  of  law,'*  Twining  v.  New  Jersey,  211 
U.  S.  78;  **Li  criminal  cases  due  process  of  law  is  not 
denied  by  a  state  law  which  dispenses  with  a  grand  jury 
indictment,  and  permits  prosecution  upon  information, 
nor  by  a  law  which  dispenses  with  the  necessary  jury  of 
twelve,  or  unanimity  in  the  verdict.  Indeed  the  require- 
ment of  due  process  does  not  deprive  a  state  of  the  power 
to  dispense  with  jury  trial  altogether.  Hurtado  v.  Cali- 
fornia, 110  XT.  S.  516 ;  Maxwell  v.  Dow,  176  U.  S.  581. 
When  the  essential  elements  of  a  court  having  jurisdiction 
in  which  an  opportunity  for  a  hearing  is  offered  are  pres- 
ent, the  power  of  a  state  over  its  methods  of  procedure  is 
substantially  unrestricted  by  the  due  process  clause  of  the 
Constitution.  Due  process  of  law,  this  court  has  held,  does 
not  require  the  state  to  adopt  any  particular  form  of 
procedure,  so  long  as  it  appears  that  the  accused  has  had 
sufficient  notice  of  the  accusation  and  an  adequate  oppor- 
tunity to  defend  himself  in  the  prosecution.    Roger  v. 


§  317  STATE  CRIMINAL  PEOCEDURE  577 

Peck,  199  TT.  S.  425,  435,  and  previous  cases  in  this  court 
there  cited.  Tried  by  this  test  it  can  not  for  a  moment 
be  maintained  that  the  want  of  formal  arraignment 
deprived  the  accused  of  any  substantial  right  or  in  any 
wise  changed  the  course  of  trial  to  his  disadvantage/' 
Garland  v.  Washington,  232  U.  S.  642. 

The  question  of  questions  that  remains  for  final  settle- 
ment is  this :  Does  the  due  process  of  law  clause  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  guarantee  to  the  accused,  as 
against  state  power,  the  right  to  be  present  at  every 
stage  of  his  trial,  just  as  the  corresponding  clause  of  the 
Fifth  Amendment  guarantees  that  right,  as  against  Fed- 
eral power.  As  demonstrated  heretofore,  every  possible 
argument,  historical  and  logical,  that  can  be  urged  in 
favor  of  the  one  can  be  urged  with  equal  force  in  favor 
of  the  other.  It  should  not  be  for  a  moment  admitted 
that  what  has  been  said  as  to  fhat  vital  constitutional 
right  indirectly  in  the  case  of  Frank,  in  which  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus  was  denied,  is  conclusive  of  a  question 
which  can  never  be  finally  settled  xmtil  it  comes  up  directly 
for  solemn  argument  and  judgment,  upon  a  writ  of  error 
to  the  highest  court  of  some  state  that  has  denied  the 
right.  By  the  conclusion  then  reached  the  American 
people  will  be  informed  whether  the  due  process  of  law 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  as  a  bulwark  of 
life  and  liberty  against  state  power,  is  a  barren  theory 
of  a  living  fact. 


Due  ProeeM — 37 


CHAPTER  XVI 

LIFB  AND  UBEBTY  AS  PBOTECTED  BT  DUE  PBOCESS — ^PBOCBSD- 
INGS  FOB  CONTEMPT — ^DISBABMENT  OF  ATTOBNETS 

§318.  Power  to  punish  for  contempt  inherent  in  all 
courts.  In  Ex  parte  Terry,  128  U-  S,  289,  the  Court  said: 
**Nor  can  there  be  any  dispute  as  to  the  powers  of  a 
.circuit  court  of  the  United  States  to  punish  contempts  of 
its  authority.  In  United  States  v.  Hudson,  7  Cranch  34, 
it  was  held  that  the  Courts  of  the  United  States,  from  the 
very  nature  of  their  institutions,  possess  the  power  to 
fine  for  contempt,  imprison  for  contumacy,  enforce  the 
observance  of  order,  etc.  In  Anderson  v.  Dunn,  6  Wheat. 
204,  227,  it  was  said  that  *  courts  of  justice  are  imiversally 
acknowledged  to  be  vested,  by  their  very  creation,  with 
power  to  impose  silence,  respect  and  decorum  in  their 
presence,  and  submission  to  their  lawful  mandates. '  So, 
in  Ex  parte  Bobinson,  19  Wall.  505,  510 :  *The  power  to 
punish  for  contempts  is  inherent  in  all  courts ;  its  exist- 
ence is  essential  to  the  preservation  of  order  in  judicial 
proceedings,  and  to  the  enforcement  of  the  judgments, 
orders,  and  writs  of  the  courts,  and  consequently  to  the 
due  administration  of  justice.  The  moment  the  courts  of 
the  United  States  were  called  into  existence  and  invested 
with  jurisdiction  over  any  subject,  they  became  possessed 
of  this  power.'  Ex  parte  Bollman,  4  Cranch  75,  94; 
Story,  Const  §  1774 ;  Bac.  Abr.  Courts,  E.  And  such  is 
the  recognized  doctrine  in  reference  to  the  powers  of  the 
courts  of  several  states.  *The  summary  power  to  commit 
and  punish  for  contempts  tending  to  obstruct  or  degrade 
the  administration  of  justice,*  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Court  of  Massachusetts  well  said,  in  Cartwright's  Case, 
114  Mass.  230,  238,  4s  inherent  in  courts  of  chancery  and 

578 


§  819    CONTEMPT  PROCEEDINGS— DISBARMENT       579 

other  superior  courts  as  essential  to  the  execution  of 
their  powers  and  to  the  maintenance  of  their  authority, 
and  is  part  of  the  law  of  the  land,  within  the  meaning  of 
Magna  Carta  and  of  the  Twelfth  Article  of  our  Declarar 
tion  of  Bights. '  The  Declaration  of  Bights  here  referred 
to  was  that  which  formed  i>art  of  the  Constitution  of 
Massachusetts,  and  contained  the  prohibition,  inserted  in 
most  American  Constitutions,  against  depriving  any  per- 
son of  life,  liberty,  or  estate,  except  by  the  judgment  of 
his  peers,  or  the  law  of  the  land.  * ' 

§  319.  Proceeding  in  its  nature  criminaL  In  Bessette 
V.  W.  B.  Conkey  Co.,  194  U.  S.  324,  it  was  said  that  *^A 
contempt  proceeding  is  sui  generis.  It  is  criminal  in  its 
nature,  in  that  the  party  is  charged  with  doing  something 
forbidden,  and,  if  found  guilty,  is  punished.  Yet  it  may 
be  resorted  to  in  civil  as  well  as  criminal  actions,  and  also 
independently  of  any  civil  or  criminal  action.  .  .  . 
The  purpose  of  contempt  proceedings  is  to  uphold  the 
power  of  the  court,  and  also  to  secure  to  suitors  therein 
the  rights  by  it  awarded.  As  said  in  Be  Chiles,  22  Wall. 
157  (sub.  nom.  Texas  v.  White,  22  L.  ed.  819,  823) :  *The 
exercise  of  this  power  has  a  twofold  aspect,  namely: 
first  the  proper  punishment  of  the  guilty  party  for  his 
disrespect  to  the  court  or  its  order,  and  second,  to  compel 
performance  of  some  act  or  duty  required  of  him  by  the 
court,  which  he  refuses  to  perform.'  ...  In  Be 
Debs,  158  XJ.  S.  546,  a  case  of  habeas  corpus  brought  to 
review  an  order  of  the  circuit  court  imprisoning  for  con- 
tempt, we  said :  *  In  brief,  a  court  enforcing  obedience  to 
its  orders  by  proceedings  for  contempt  is  not  executing 
the  criminal  laws  of  the  land,  but  only  securing  to  suitors 
the  rights  which  it  has  adjudged  them  entitled  to. '  .  .  . 
The  thought  underlying  denial  by  this  court  of  the  right 
of  review  by  writ  of  error  or  appeal  has  not  been  that 
there  was  something  in  contempt  proceedings  which  ren- 
dered them  not  properly  open  to  review,  but  that  they 
were  of  a  criminal  nature,  and  no  provision  had  been 


580  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  319 

made  for  a  review  of  criminal  cajses.  That  was  true  in 
England  as  here."  In  New  Orleans  v.  New  York  Mail 
S.  S.  Co.|  20  Wall  387,  it  was  held  that  a  contempt  of 
court  is  a  criminal  offense.  See  to  the  same  effect, 
Ex  parte  Swan,  150  U.  S.  637.  In  a  oonunitment  for  con- 
tempt, the  adjudication  is  a  conviction,  and  the  commit- 
ment an  execution.  Ex  parte  Kearney,  7  Wheat  38. 
And  yet,  after  admitting  that  a  proceeding  for  contempt 
is  in  its  nature  criminal,  in  order  to  mark  the  degrees  of 
criminality,  the  line  must  be  sharply  drawn  between 
direct  contempts  committed  in  the  presence  of  the  court, 
in  which  punishment  may  be  imposed  without  hearing  or 
trial,  and  indirect  or  civil  contempts,  as  they  are  some- 
times called,  in  which  the  right  to  notice  and  hearing  is 
substantially  protected,  even  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
requiring  a  particular  method  of  proceeding. 

§  320.  What  constitntes  a  direct  contempt  committed 
in  the  presence  of  Court.  Federal  courts  have  the  power 
to  punish,  without  indictment  or  trial  by  jury,  such  con- 
tempts of  their  authority  as  are  defined  by  U.  S.  Bev. 
Stat.  §725,  Ex  parte  Terry,  128  U.  S.  289;  Ex  parte 
Savin,  131  U.  S.  267;  Ex  parte  Cuddy,  131  U.  S.  280.  A 
palpable  contempt  of  the  authority  of  the  court  occurs 
when  there  is  a  direct  disturbance,  a  breach  of  the  peace 
in  open  court  Ex  parte  Terry,  128  U.  S.  289.  The  act 
of  March  2, 1831,  limits  the  powers  of  Federal  courts  to 
punish  for  contempts,  to  misbehavior  in  the  presence  of 
or  near  the  court.  Ex  parte  Bobinson,  19  WalL  513.  In 
Ex  parte  Savin,  131  U.  S.  267,  it  was  held  that  when  a 
court  is  hi  session,  it  is  present  in  every  part  of  the  place 
dedicated  to  its  use  and  for  the  use  of  its  officers,  jurors 
and  witnesses. 

§  321.  As  the  power  to  punish  is  inherent,  trial  by  jury 
is  not  required  by  *  'due  process  of  law.' '  In  Eitenbecker 
V.  District  Court,  134  TJ.  S.  31,  the  Court  said ;  ** Whether 
an  attachment  for  a  contempt  of  court  and  the  judgment 


§  321    CONTEMPT  PROCEEDINGS— DISBAEMENT       581 

of  the  court  punishing  the  party  for  such  contempt,  is  iu 
itself  essentially  a  criminal  proceeding  or  not,  we  do  not 
find  it  necessary  to  decide.  We  simply  hold  that,  what- 
ever its  nature  may  be,  it  is  an  offense  against  i^he  court 
and  against  the  administration  of  justice,  for  which 
courts  have  always  had  the  right  to  punish  the  party  by 
summary  proceeding  and  without  trial  by  jury ;  and  that 
in  that  sense  it  is  due  process  of  law  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution.  We 
do  not  suppose  that  that  provision  of  the  Constitution 
was  ever  intended  to  interfere  with  or  abolish  the  powers 
of  the  courts  in  proceedings  for  contempts,  whether  this 
contempt  occurred  in  the  course  of  a  criminal  proceeding 
or  a  civil  suit. ' '  In  Interstate  Conmierce  Commission  v. 
Brimson,  154  U,  S,  447,  the  Court  said:  ** Another  sug- 
gestion thrown  out  in  argument  against  the  validity  of 
the  Twelfth  section  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  in 
the  particular  adverted  to,  is  that  the  defendants  are  not 
accorded  a  right  of  trial  by  jury.  If,  as  we  have  endeav- 
ored to  show,  this  proceeding  make  a  case  or  controversy 
within  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States,  the  issue 
whether  the  defendants  are  under  a  duty  to  answer  the 
questions  propounded  to  them,  and  to  produce  the  books, 
papers,  documents,  etc.,  called  for,  is  manifestly  not  one 
for  the  determination  of  a  jury.  The  issue  presented  is 
not  one  of  fact,  but  of  law  (exclusively.  In  such  a  case, 
the  defendant  is  no  more  entitled  to  a  jury  than  is  a* 
defendant  in  a  proceeding  by  mandamus  to  compel  him, 
as  an  officer,  to  perform  a  ministerial  duty.  Of  course, 
the  question  of  punishing  the  defendants  for  contempt 
could  not  arise  before  the  Commission ;  for  in  a  judicial 
sense,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  contempt  of  a  subordinate 
administrative  body.  No  question  of  contempt  could 
arise  until  the  issue  of  law,  in  the  circuit  court,  is  deter- 
mined adversely  to  the  defendants  and  they  refuse  to 
obey,  not  the  order  of  the  Commission,  but  the  final  order 
of  the  court.  And,  in  matters  of  contempt,  a  jury  is  not 
required  by  *  due  process  of  law.  *    From  the  very  nature 


582  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  321 

of  their  institution^  and  that  their  lawful  jadgments  may 
be  respected  and  enf  orced,  the  courts  of  the  United  States 
possess  the  power  to  punish  for  contempt.  And  this 
inherent  power  is  recognized  and  enforced  by  a  statute 
expressly  authorizing  such  courts  to  punish  contempts  of 
their  authority  when  manifested  by  disobedience  of  their 
lawful  writs,  process,  rules,  decrees,  or  commands.  Bev. 
Stat.  §  725 ;  1  Stat,  at  L.  83 ;  Stat,  at  L.  487 ;  United  States 
V.  Hudson,  7  Cranch  32;  Anderson  v.  Dunn,  6  Wheat 
204,  227;  Ex  parte  Robinson,  19  Wall.  505,  510;  Ex  parte 
Terry,  128  U.  S.  289,  302,  303;  Cartwright's  Case,  114 
Mass.  230,  238.  Surely  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  the 
question  of  contempt  of  the  authority  of  a  court  of  the 
United  States,  committed  by  a  disobedience  of  its  orders, 
is  triable,  of  right,  by  jury.'* 


§  322.  What  conBtitutes  an  indirect  or  dvil  contempt 

A  typical  case  of  that  character  is  Wiswall  v.  Sampson, 
14  How.  52,  in  which  it  was  held  that  any  interference 
with  property  in  possession  of  a  receiver,  or  prosecution 
of  an  action  against  the  receiver,  without  leave  of  the 
court  first  obtained,  is  a  contempt  of  court.  In  thaf  case, 
it  was  said :  *  *  When  a  receiver  has  been  appointed,  his 
possession  is  that  of  the  court,  and  any  attempt  to  dis- 
turb it,  without  leave  of  the  court  first  obtained  will  be  a 
contempt  on  the  part  of  the  person  making  it  This  was 
held  in  Angel  v.  Smith,  9  Ves.  335,  both  with  respect  to 
receivers  and  sequestrator.  When,  therefore,  a  party  is 
prejudiced  by  having  a  receiver  put  in  his  way,  the  course 
has  either  been  to  give  him  leave  to  bring  an  ejectment, 
or  to  permit  him  to  be  examined  pro  interesse  surO.  (IJ. 
&  W.  176,  Brooks  v.  Greathed;  3  Daniel's  Ch.  Pr.,  1984.) " 
See  also.  Re  Tyler,  149  U.  S.  164.  In  Be  Debs,  158  U.  S. 
564,  in  which  it  was  held  that  to  enforce  obedience  to 
orders  of  courts  through  proceedings  by  contempt  is  not 
to  execute  the  criminal  laws,  but  only  to  secure  to  suitors 
the  risrhts  which  the  court  has  adjudged  them  to  be  enti- 
tled to,  it  was  said:    **Nor  is  there  in  this  any  invasion 


§  322   CONTEMPT  PROCEEDINGS— DISBARMENT       583 

of  the  constitutional  right  of  trial  by  jury.  We  fully 
agree  with  counsel  that  4t  matters  not  what  form  the 
attempt  to  deny  constitutional  right  may  take.  It  is  vain 
and  ineffectual,  and  must  be  so  declared  by  the  courts,' 
and  we  reaffirm  the  declaration  made  for  the  court  by 
Mr.  Justice  Bradley  in  Boyd  v.  United  States,  116  U,  S. 
616,  636,  that  4t  is  the  duty  of  courts  to  be  watchful  for 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  citizen,  and  against  any 
stealthy  encroachments  thereon.  Their  motto  should  be 
obsta  prindpiis.  But  the  power  of  a  court  to  make  an 
order  carries  with  it  the  equal  power  to  punish  for  a 
disobedience  of  that  order,  and  the  inquiry  as  'to  the 
question  of  disobedience  has  been,  from  time  immemo- 
rial, the  special  function  of  the  court.  ...  To  sub- 
mit the  question  of  disobedience  to  another  tribunal,  be 
it  a  jury  or  another  court,  would  operate  to  deprive  the 
proceeding  of  half  its  efficiency. ' '  In  Consolidated  Ren- 
dering Co.  V.  Vermont,  207  U.  S.  541,  involving  a  pro- 
ceeding for  contempt,  it  was  held  that  there  was  an  oppor- 
tunity for  hearing,  that  satisfied  the  requirements  of  the 
due  process  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  under 
a  Vermont  statute,  providing  for  the  compulsory  produc- 
tion of  books  and  papers  of  a  corporation  before  a  court 
or  grand  jury,  where  the  corporation  has  adequate  oppor- 
tunity to  show  cause  before  the  court  why  it  does  not  pro- 
duce the  same.  See  also.  Wise  v.  Mills,  220  U.  S.  549 ; 
Wise  V.  Henkel,  220  U.  S.  556 ;  Wilson  v.  United  States, 
221  U.  S.  361.  In  United  States  v.  Shipp,  214  U.  S.  386, 
it  was  held  that  parties  were  guilty  of  a  contempt  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and  were  subject  to 
summary  punishment  by  it,  who  had  participated  in  the 
murder  of  a  prisoner  under  sentence  of  death  in  a  state 
court,  after  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  an  order 
of  a  Federal  circuit  court  denying  relief  by  habeas  corpus 
had  been  allowed  and  the  proceedings  stayed.  In  Be 
Merchants'  Stock  and  Grain  Co.,  223  U.  S.  639,  it  was 
held  that  a  judgment  finding  defendants  guilty  of  con- 
tempt was  punitive  instead  of  remedial,  and  reviewable 


584  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  322 

on  writ  of  error  without  awaiting  a  final  decree  in  a  snit 
in  equity,  where  the  contempt  charged  was  for  the  viola- 
tion of  an  interlocutory  injunction  previously  granted  in 
a  suit  for  the  benefit  of  complainant,  and  ordering  the 
payment  of  specific  fines,  three-fourths  of  which  were  to 
go  to  complainant  ^^as  compensation  in  part  for  the 
expenses  incurred  in  prosecuting  these  contempt  proceed- 
ings. ' '  In  Grant  v.  United  States,  227  U.  S.  74,  it  was  held 
that  as  a  judgment  fining  a  party  for  contempt  for  dis- 
obeying a  subpoena  diu)es  tecum,  ordering  the  production 
before  a  grand  jury  of  certain  books  and  papers  in  his 
possession,  constituted  a  case  of  criminal  contempt,  it 
was  reviewable  only  by  a  writ  of  error.  In  Gompers  v. 
United  States,  233  U.  S.  604,  it  was  held  that  an  appeal 
does  not  lie  for  the  review  of  a  judgment  of  fine  and 
imprisonment  imposed  in  proceedings  for  an  alleged 
criminal  contempt  of  an  injunction;  neither  does  a  writ 
of  error  lie  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
to  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  the  District  of  Columbia  to 
review  a  judgment  rendered  in  an  appeal  from  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  District  in  proceedings  to  punish 
an  alleged  criminal  contempt  of  an  injunction. 

In  the  Gompers  case  the  Court  said:  ^^It  is  urged  in 
the  first  place  that  contempts  can  not  be  crimes,  because 
although  punishable  by  imprisonment,  and  therefore,  if 
crimes,  infamous,  they  are  not  within  the  protection  of 
the  Constitution  and  the  Amendments  giving  a  right  to 
trial  by  jury,  etc.,  to  persons  charged  with  such  crimes. 
But  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  are  not  mathemat- 
ical formulas  having  their  essence  in  their  form.  They 
are  organic  living  institutions  transplanted  from  English 
soil.  Their  significance  is  vital,  not  formal;  it  is  to  be 
gathered  not  simply  by  taldng  the  words  and  a  dictionary, 
but  by  considering  their  origin  and  the  line  of  their 
growth.  Robertson  v.  Baldwin,  165  U.  S.  275,  281,  282. 
It  does  not  follow  that  contempts  of  the  class  under  con- 
sideration are  not  crimes  or  rather,  in  the  language  of 
the  statute,  offenses,  because  trial  by  jury  as  it  has  been 


§  323   CONTEMPT  PROCEEDINGS— DISBARMENT      585 

gradually  worked  out  and  fought  out  has  been  thought 
not  to  extend  to  them  as  a  matter  of  constitutional  right. 
These  contempts  are  infractions  of  the  law,  visited  with 
punishment  as  such.  If  such  acts  are  not  criminal,  we  are 
in  error  as  to  the  most  fundamental  characteristic  of 
crimes  as  that  word  has  been  understood  in  English 
speech.  So  truly  are  they  crimes  that  it  seems  to  be 
proved  that  in  the  early  law  they  were  punished  only  by 
the  usual  criminal  procedure,  3  Transactions  of  the  Boyal 
Historical  Society,  U.  S.  p.  147  (1885),  and  that,  at  least 
in  England,  it  seems  that  they  still  may  be  and  preferably 
are  tried  in  that  way.  See  7  Laws  of  England  (Hals- 
bury)  280,  subdiv.  Contempt  of  court  (604)."  It  was 
then  held  that  criminal  contempts  are  none  the  less  crimes 
within  the  meaning  of  U.  S.  Eev.  Stat.  §  1044,  prescribing 
a  limitation  of  three  years  for  criminal  prosecutions, 
because  the  constitutional  right  of  trial  by  jury  does  not 
apply  to  such  contempts.  The  Court  said:  **Even  if  the 
statute  does  not  cover  the  case  by  its  express  words,  as 
we  think  it  does,  still  in  dealing  with  the  punishment  of 
crime  a  rule  should  be  laid  down,  if  not  by  Congress,  by 
this  courf 

§  323.  Eight  to  notice  and  hearing  in  indirect  or  civil 
contempts.  While  it  clearly  appears  from  the  foregoing 
cases  that  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  does  not  extend  to 
indirect  or  civil  contempts ;  and  while  it  is  true  that,  in 
the  absence  of  statute,  no  particular  method  of  procedure 
is  required ;  it  may  be  affirmed  that  no  judgment  rendered 
against  a  defendant  in  such  a  proceeding  is  valid,  unless 
the  right  to  notice  and  hearing  has  been  substantially 
secured.  When  the  contempt  is  not  committed  in  the 
presence  of  the  court,  and  therefore  outside  of  the  pre- 
siding judge's  personal  knowledge,  the  usual  procedure 
is  a  rule  to  show  cause.  In  Ex  parte  Savin,  131 U.  S.  267, 
where  the  defendant  was  charged  with  an  attempt,  by 
forbidden  means,  to  influence  or  impede  a  witness  from 
testifying,  **an  order  was  made  that  the  appellant  be 


586  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  323 

cited  to  show  cause  before  the  District  Court,  at  a  speci- 
fied hour,  on  the  next  day,  why  he  should  not  be  adjudged 
guilty  of  contempt.  On  the  succeeding  day,  the  citation 
having  been  duly  served,  the  matter  came  on  for  hear- 
ing, the  respondent  being  represented  by  counsel.  He 
demanded  of  the  prosecution  *  service  of  interrogatories/ 
That  demand  was  refused  by  the  court,  and  to  that  ruling 
he  excepted. '  *  It  was  held  that  the  demand  for  interroga- 
tories was  properly  refused ;  and  that  the  trial  court  had 
the  right,  in  its  discretion,  to  adopt  such  methods  for  the 
determination  of  the  question,  in  harmony  with  the  rules 
and  principles  of  the  common  law,  as  obtained  in  the  trial 
of  matters  of  contempt.  See  also  to  the  same  effect, 
Ex  parte  Cuddy,  131  U.  S.  580, — a  proceeding  in  which  a 
fine  and  imprisonment  were  imposed  upon  parties  for 
contempt  in  violating  the  injunction  of  the  court, — ^it 
appearing  that  **on  the  6th  of  July  the  court  ordered  the 
issue  of  a  preliminary  injunction  as  prayed.  On  the  7th 
of  July,  the  writs  were  served  on  each  of  the  defendants 
in  each  proceeding  by  the  sheriff  of  Plymouth  County. 
On  the  24th  of  October,  complaints  were  filed,  alleging 
that  these  plaintiffs  in  error  had  violated  this  injunction 
by  selling  intoxicating  liquors  contrary  to  law  and  the 
terms  of  the  injunction  served  on  them,  and  asking  that 
they  be  required  to  show  cause  why  they  should  not  be 
punished  for  contempt  of  court.  A  rule  was  granted 
accordingly,  and  the  court  having  no  personal  knowledge 
of  the  facts  charged,  ordered  that  a  hearing  be  had  at  the 
next  term  of  the  court,  upon  affidavits ;  and  on  the  8th  of 
March,  1886,  it  being  at  a  regular  term  of  said  District 
Court,  separate  trials  were  had  upon  evidence  in  the  form 
of  affidavits,  by  the  court  without  a  jury,  upon  which  the 
plaintiffs  were  found  guilty  of  a  violation  of  the  writs  of 
injunction  issued  in  said  cause,  and  a  sentence  of  fine  and 
imprisonment,  as  already  stated,  entered  against  them." 
Mr.  Justice  Miller,  speaking  for  the  court,  said:  ''So 
that  the  proceeding  by  which  the  fine  and  imprisonment 
imposed  upon  these  parties  for  contempt  in  violating  the 


§  323    CONTEMPT  PROCEEDINGS— DISBARMENT       587 

injunction  of  the  court  regularly  issued  in  a  suit  to  which 
they  were  parties,  is  due  process  of  law  and  always  has 
been  due  process  of  law,  and  is  the  process  or  proceeding 
by  which  courts  have  from  time  immemorial  enforced  the 
execution  of  their  orders  and  decrees,  and  can  not  be  said 
to  deprive  the  parties  of  their  liberty  or  property  without 
due  process  of  law. ' ' 

A  thorough  review  of  this  subject  was  made  in  Hovey 
V.  EUiott,  167  U,  S.  409,  in  which  it  was  held,  (1)  that  due 
process  of  law  signifies  the  right  of  a  person  to  be  heard 
in  his  defense;  (2)  that  the  power  of  a  court  to  refuse  to 
one  in  contempt  the  right  to  defend  in  the  principal  case 
on  the  merits  is  not  included  in  the  power  of  a  court,  to 
deny  a  favor  to  such  an  one  while  in  contempt;  (3)  that 
a  decree  pro  canfesso  is  void  for  lack  of  due  proc- 
ess when  entered  after  striking  defendant  ^s  answer  from 
the  files  as  a  punishment  for  his  contempt  in  refusing  to 
obey  an  order  of  the  court:  In  reaching  those  conclu- 
sions the  Court  said :  ** A  denial  to  a  party  of  the  benefit 
of  a  notice  would  be  in  effect  to  deny  that  he  is  entitled 
to  notice  at  all,  and  the  sham  and  deceptive  proceeding 
had  better  be  omitted  altogether.  It  would  be  like  saying 
to  a  party,  Appear  and  you  shall  be  heard ;  and  when  he 
has  appeared,  saying,  Tour  appearance  shall  not  be 
recognized,  and  you  shall  not  be  heard.  In  the  present 
case,  the  district  court  not  only  in  effect  said  this,  but 
immediately  added  a  decree  of  condemnation,  reciting 
that  the  default  of  all  persons  had  been  duly  entered.  It 
is  difficult  to  speak  of  a  decree  thus  rendered  with  modera- 
tion ;  it  was  in  fact  a  mere  arbitrary  edict  clothed  in  the 
form  of  a  judicial  sentence.  .  .  .  The  necessary 
effect  of  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  was  to  decree  that  a  portion  of  the 
award  made  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  in  other  words  his 
property,  belonged  to  the  complainants  in  the  cause.  The 
decree  therefore  awarded  the  property  of  the  defendant 
to  the  complainant  upon  the  hypothesis  of  fact  that  by 
contract  the  defendant  had  transferred  the  right  in  or  to 


588  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  323 

this  property  to  the  complainant.  If  the  court  had  power 
to  do  this,  by  denying  the  right  to  be  heard  to  the  defend- 
ant, what  plainer  illustration  could  there  be  of  taking 
property  of  one  and  giving  it  to  another  without  hearing 
or  without  process  of  lawt  If  the  power  to  violate  the 
fundamental  constitutional  safeguards  securing  prop- 
erty exists,  and  if  they  may  be  with  impunity  set  aside 
by  courts  on  the  theory  that  they  do  not  apply  to  proceed- 
ings in  contempt,  why  will  they  not  also  apply  to  proceed- 
ings against  the  liberty  of  the  subject!  Why  should  not 
a  court  in  a  criminal  proceeding  deny  to  the  accused  all 
right  to  be  heard  on  the  theory  that  he  is  in  contempt,  and 
sentence  him  to  the  full  penalty  of  the  lawt  No  distinc- 
tion between  the  two  cases  can  be  pointed  out. ' '  Distin- 
guished in  Wilson  v.  North  Carolina,  169  U.  S.  594,  in 
which  it  was  held  that  a  suspension  by  the  governor  of  a 
railroad  commissioner,  under  an  act  of  the  North  Caro- 
lina legislature,  operating  only  until  the  next  general 
assembly  could  determine  the  question,  was  not  wanting 
in  due  process  of  law. 

§  324.  Consequence  of  a  lack  of  jurisdiction.  A  court 
can  not  punish  for  any  contempt  of  its  unauthorized  re- 
quirements. If  the  command  of  a  writ  of  mandamus  is,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  beyond  its  power,  the  writ,  or  so  much  of 
it  as  is  in  excess  of  jurisdiction  is  void.  Be  Bowland,  104 
IT.  S.  604.  When  a  proceeding  by  habeas  corpus  in  the  dis- 
trict court  to  restore  the  custody  of  a  child  to  its  parent  is 
void,  an  attempt  to  enforce  its  order  by  imprisonment  for 
contempt  is  void.  Be  Brovins,  136  U.  S.  586.  As  the  Fed- 
eral Supreme  Court  has  necessarily  the  jurisdiction  to 
decide  whether  or  no  a  case  is  properly  before  it,  want  of 
jurisdiction  in  the  Federal  circuit  court  of  a  petition  for 
habeas  corpus,  or  in  the  Supreme  Court  itself  of  the 
appeal  from  the  order  denying  the  writ,  does  not  author- 
ize persons  to  disregard  without  liability  to  process  for 
contempt,  the  order  of  the  Supreme  Court  that  **all  pro- 
oeedings  against  the  appellant  be  stayed,  and  the  custody 


§  325    CONTEMPT  PROCEEDINGS— DISBAEMENT      589 

of  said  appellant  be  retained  pending  this  appeal.'' 
When  the  War  Department  had  no  legal  authority  to 
direct  snch  action^  disobedience  of  a  decree  of  a  state 
court  enforcing  any  further  excavation  of  the  ship  canal 
connecting  Lake  Washington  with  the  tidal  waters  of 
Puget  sound  can  not  be  justified  on  the  ground  that  the 
acts  charged  as  amounting  to  a  contempt  were  done  under 
the  orders  of  the  officials  of  such  Department  claiming  to 
act  in  pursuance  of  and  in  accordance  with  acts  of  Con- 
gress.   Carlson  v.  Washington,  234  U.  S.  103. 

§  326.  Power  to  disbar  attorneys  inherent  in  all  courts. 

Just  as  the  power  to  punish  for  contempt  is  inherent  in 
all  courts,  so  the  power  to  disbar  attorneys  is  inherent  in 
all  courts.  In  Ex  parte  Burr,  9  Wheat.  529,  Marshall, 
C.  J.,  said :  **The  power  is  one  which  ought  to  be  exer- 
cised with  great  caution,  but  which  is,  we  think,  inci- 
dental to  all  courts,  and  is  necessary  for  the  preservation 
of  decorum,  and  for  the  respectability  of  the  profession.  * ' 
In  Ex  parte  Bradley,  7  WalL  364,  the  courts  after  affirm- 
ing the  right  to  punish  attorneys  guilty  of  misbehavior 
in  the  practice  of  their  profession,  held  that  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia  had  no  jurisdiction  to 
disbar  an  attorney  for  a  contempt  committed  before 
another  court  of  the  District.  Ex  parte  TUlinghast, 
4  Pet.  108.  See  also.  Ex  parte  Secombe,  19  How.  9 ;  Ran- 
dall V.  Brigham,  7  WalL  523 ;  Bradley  v.  Fisher,  13  Wall. 
335.  In  Ex  parte  Bobinson,  19  Wall.  505,  it  was  said  that 
**The  power  to  punish  for  contempts  is  inherent  in  all 
courts;  its  existence  is  essential  to  the  preservation  of 
order  in  judicial  proceedings,  and  the  enforcement  of  the 
judgments,  orders  and  writs  of  the  courts  and,  conse- 
quently to  the  due  administration  of  justice.  .  .  . 
This  power  is  possessed  by  all  courts  which  have  author- 
ity to  admit  attorneys  to  practice.  But  the  power  can 
only  be  exercised  when  there  has  been  such  conduct  on 
the  part  of  the  parties  complained  of  as  shows  them  to 
be  unfit  to  be  members  of  the  profession.    Parties  are 


590  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  325 

admitted  to  the  profession  only  upon  satisfactory  evi- 
dence that  they  possess  fair  private  character  and  suffi- 
cient legal  learning  to  conduct  causes  in  court  for  suitors. 
The  order  of  admission  is  the  judgment  of  the  court  that 
they  possess  the  requisite  qualifications  both  in  character 
and  learning.  They  beccnne  by  such  admission,  officers 
of  the  court  and,  as  said  in  Ex  parte  Garland,  4  Wall. 
378,  *They  hold  their  office  during  good  behavior,  and 
can  only  be  deprived  of  it  for  misconduct  ascertained  and 
declared  by  the  judgment  of  the  court  after  opportunity 
to  be  heard  has  been  afforded.*  " 


§  326.  An  attorney  can  not  be  denied  due  process.  Be- 
cause an  attorney  holds  his  office  during  good  behavior^ 
he  can  only  be  deprived  of  it  for  misconduct  ascertained 
and  declared  by  the  judgment  of  the  court,  after  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard  has  been  given  him.  As  was  said  in 
the  case  of  Ex  parte  Bobinson,  19  Wall.  507:  **  Before 
a  judgment  disbarring  an  attorney  is  rendered,  he  should 
have  notice  of  the  grounds  of  complaint  against  him  and 
ample  opportunity  of  explanation  and  defense.  This  is 
a  rule  of  natural  justice  and  should  be  equally  followed 
when  proceedings  are  taken  to  deprive  him  of  his  right 
to  practice  his  profession,  as  when  they  are  taken  to  reach 
his  real  or  personal  property.  And  such  has  been  the  gen- 
eral, if  not  the  uniform  practice  of  the  courts  of  this 
country  and  of  England.**  In  Ex  parte  Wall,  107  TJ.  S. 
265,  the  Court,  in  disposing  of  the  claim  that  a  summary 
proceeding  to  strike  an  attorney  from  the  role  without 
indictment  and  trial  by  jury  deprives  him  of  due  process 
of  law,  said :  ^  ^  But  when  such  a  case  is  shown  to  exist, 
the  courts  ought  not  to  hesitate,  from  sympathy  for  the 
individual,  to  protect  themselves  from  the  scandal  and 
contempt  and  the  public  from  prejudice,  by  removing 
grossly  improper  persons  from  participation  in  the 
administration  of  the  laws.  The  power  to  do  this  is  a 
rightful  one ;  and  when  exercised  in  proper  cases,  is  con- 
tended, indeed,  that  a  summary  proceeding  against  an 


§  326,  CONTEMPT  PBOCEEDINQS— DISBARMENT       591 

attorney  to  exclude  him  from  the  practice  of  his  profes- 
sion on  acconnt  of  acts  for  which  he  may  be  indicted  and 
tried  by  a  jury  is  a  violation  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  of 
the  Constitution,  which  forbids  the  depriving  of  any  per- 
son of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of 
law.  But  the  action  of  tiie  court,  in  cases  within  its 
jurisdiction,  is  due  process  of  law.  It  is  a  mistaken  idea 
that  due  process  of  law  requires  a  plenary  suit  and  a  trial 
by  jury  in  all  cases  where  property  or  personal  rights 
are  involved:  .  .  .  We  have  seenf  that,  in  the  present 
case,  due  notice  was  given  to  the  petitioner,  and  a  trial 
and  hearing  was  had  before  the  court,  in  the  manner  in 
which  proceedings  against  attorneys,  when  the  question  is 
whether  they  should  be  struck  oflf  the  roll,  are  always 
conducted. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

FIBST  INTBBPBBTATION   OF  THE  C5LAUSB 

§  327.  The  equal  protection  of  the  law  danse  a  purely 
American  invention.  Unlike  the  due  process  of  law 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  it  can  not  trace  its 
origin  back  to  Magna  Carta.  It  is  an  Americau  prohibi- 
tion  against  state  action  and  therefore  negative  in  its 
operation.  No  state  shall  *  *  deny  to  any  person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  tiie  laws.'*  In  the 
Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  the  Supreme  Court 
was  called  upon  for  the  first  time  to  give  construction  to 
the  Thirteenth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  to  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution  and  declared  that  **An  examination  of 
the  history  of  the  causes  which  led  to  the  adoption  of 
those  Amendments  and  of  the  Amendments  themselves, 
demonstrates  that  the  main  purpose  of  all  the  last  three 
amendments  was  the  freedom  of  the  African  race,  the 
security  and  perpetuation  of  that  freedom,  and  their  pro- 
tection from  the  oppressions  of  the  white  men,  who  had 
formerly  held  them  in  slavery.'* 

In  construing  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws '  clause, 
Mr.  Justice  Miller  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court 
said:  **In  the  light  of  the  history  of  these  amendments, 
and  the  pervading  purpose  of  them,  which  we  have 
already  discussed,  it  is  not  diflScult  to  give  a  meaning  to 
this  clause.  The  existence  of  laws  in  the  states  where  the 
newly  emancipated  negroes  resided,  which  discriminated 
with  gross  injustice  and  hardship  against  them  as  a  class, 
was  the  evil  to  be  remedied  by  this  clause,  and  by  it  such 
laws  are  forbidden. 

**If,  however,  the  states  did  not  conform  their  laws  to 
its  requirements,  then  by  the  Fifth  section  of  the  article 

595 


CHAPTER  XVn 

FIBST  INTEBPRETATION   OF   THE  CLAUSE 

§  327.  The  equal  protection  of  the  law  danse  a  purely 
American  invention.  Unlike  the  dne  process  of  law 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  it  can  not  trace  its 
origin  back  to  Magna  Carta.  It  is  an  American  prohibi- 
tion against  state  action  and  therefore  negative  in  its 
operation.  No  state  shall ' '  deny  to  any  person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws."  In  the 
Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  the  Supreme  Cou^t 
was  called  upon  for  the  first  time  to  give  construction  to 
the  Thirteenth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  to  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution  and  declared  that  **An  examination  of 
the  history  of  the  causes  which  led  to  the  adoption  of 
those  Amendments  and  of  the  Amendments  themselves, 
demonstrates  that  the  main  purpose  of  all  the  last  three 
amendments  was  the  freedom  of  the  African  race,  the 
security  and  perpetuation  of  that  freedom,  and  their  pro- 
tection from  the  oppressions  of  the  white  men,  who  had 
formerly  held  them  in  slavery." 

In  construing  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws'  clause, 
Mr.  Justice  Miller  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court 
said:  "In  the  light  of  the  history  of  these  amendments, 
and  the  pervading  purpose  of  them,  which  we  have 
already  discussed,  it  is  not  difficult  to  give  a  meaning  to 
this  clause.  The  existence  of  laws  in  the  states  where  the 
newly  emancipated  negroes  resided,  which  discriminated 
with  gross  injustice  and  hardship  against  them  as  a  class, 
was  the  evil  to  be  remedied  by  this  clause,  and  by  it  such 
laws  are  forbidden. 

**If,  however,  the  states  did  not  conform  their  laws  to 
its  requirements,  then  by  the  Fifth  section  of  the  article 

595 


596  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  327 

of  amendment  Congress  was  authorized  to  enforce  it  by 
suitable  legislation.  We  doubt  very  much  whether  any 
action  of  a  state  not  directed  by  way  of  discrimination 
against  the  negroes  as  a  class,  or  on  account  of  their  race, 
will  ever  be  held  to  come  within  the  purview  of  this  pro- 
vision. It  is  so  clearly  a  provision  for  that  race  and  that 
emergencyi  that  a  strong  case  would  be  necessary  for  its 
application  to  any  other.  But  as  it  is  a  state  that  is  to 
be  dealt  with,  and  not  alone  the  validity  of  its  laws,  we 
may  safely  leave  that  matter  until  Congress  shall  have 
exercised  its  power,  or  some  case  of  state  oppression,  by 
denial  of  equal  justice  in  its  courts,  shall  have  claimed  a 
decision  at  our  hands.  We  find  no  such  case  in  the  one 
before  us,  and  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  go  over  the 
argument  again,  as  it  may  have  relation  to  this  particular 
clause  of  the  amendment."  In  conformity  with  this 
interpretation  the  earlier  cases  brought  to  the  Supreme 
Court  involving  this  particular  clause  in  the  amendment 
related  to  the  colored  race,  and  to  discriminations  against 
persons  of  that  race,  respecting  their  right  to  act  as 
jurors,  and  their  right  to  be  tried  by  juries  composed  in 
part  of  persons  of  the  same  race.  These  cases  were  fol- 
lowed by  others  which  passed  upon  state  statutes  alleged 
to  discriminate  against  the  negro. 

§  328.  Denial  to  colored  persons  of  the  right  to  act  as 
jurors.  The  statute  of  West  Virginia,  which,  in  effect, 
singles  out  and  denies  to  colored  citizens  the  right  and 
privilege  of  participating  in  the  administration  of  the 
law,  as  jurors,  because  of  their  color,  though  qualified  in 
all  other  respects,  is,  practically,  a  brand  upon  them 
afiixed  by  the  law,  and  is  a  discrimination  against  that 
race  forbidden  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  It  is  a 
denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  the  race  thus 
excluded  since  the  construction  of  juries  is  a  very  essen- 
tial part  of  the  protection  which  the  trial  by  jury  is 
intended  to  secure.  The  very  idea  of  a  jury  is  a  body  of 
men  composed  of  the  peers  or  equals  of  the  person  whose 


§  329  FIRST  INTERPRETATION  597 

rights  it  is  selected  or  sammoned  to  determine;  that  is, 
of  persons  having  the  same  legal  status  in  society  as  that 
which  he  holds.  Where,  as  here,  the  state  statute  secures 
to  every  white  man  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  selected 
from  and  without  discrimination  against  his  race,  and  at 
the  same  time  permits  or  requires  such  discrimination 
against  the  colored  man  because  of  his  race,  the  latter  is 
not  equally  protected  by  law  with  the  former.  The  words 
of  the  amendment,  although  prohibitory,  contain  a  neces- 
sary implication  of  a  positive  immunity,  or  right,  most 
valuable  to  the  colored  race — ^the  right  to  exemption  from 
unfriendly  legislation  against  them  distinctively  as  col- 
ored—exemption from  discrimination,  imposed  by  public 
authority,  implying  legal  inferiority  in  civil  society,  les- 
sening the  security  of  their  rights,  and  which  are  steps 
towards  reducing  them  to  the  condition  of  a  subject  race. 
Strauder  v.  West  Virginia,  100  U.  S.  303. 

§  329.  Equal  protection  of  laws  to  colored  race— Bight 
to  mixed  juries.  Section  641  of  the  Bevised  Statutes, 
which  provides  for  the  removal  into  the  Federal  Court  of 
any  civil  suit  or  prosecution  *' commenced  in  any  state- 
court,  for  any  cause  whatsoever,  against  any  person  who 
is  denied  or  cannot  enforce  in  the  judicial  tribunals  of 
the  state,  or  in  any  part  of  the  state  where  such  suit  or 
prosecution  is  pending,  any  right  secured  to  him  by  any 
law  providing  for  the  equal  civil  rights  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States,''  etc.,  examined  in  connection  with  sec- 
tions 1977  and  1978,  and  the  Court  held,  that  the  object 
of  these  statutes,  as  of  the  Constitution  which  authorized 
them,  was  to  place  the  colored  race,  in  respect  to  civil 
rights,  upon  a  level  with  whites.  They  made  the  rights 
and  responsibilities,  civil  and  criminal,  of  the  two  races 
exactly  the  same.  The  prohibitions  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  have  reference  to  state  action  exclusively, 
and  not  to  any  action  of  private  individuals.  It  is  the 
state  which  is  prohibited  from  denying  to  any  person 
within  its  jurisdiction,  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 


598  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  329 

and,  consequently,  the  statutes  partially  enumerating 
what  civil  rights  colored  men  shall  enjoy  equally  with 
white  persons,  founded  as  they  are  upon  tiie  amendment, 
are  intended  for  protection  against  state  infringement  of 
these  rights.  Section  641  was  also  intended  for  their 
protection  against  state  action,  and  against  that  alone. 
A  state  may  act  through  different  agencies,  either  by  its 
legislative,  its  executive  or  its  judicial  authorities,  and 
prohibitions  of  the  amendment  extend  to  all  actions  of 
the  state  denying  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  whether 
it  be  action  by  one  of  these  agencies  or  by  another.  Con- 
gress, by  virtue  of  the  Fifth  section  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  may  enforce  the  prohibitions  whenever  they 
are  disregarded  by  either  the  legislative,  the  executive, 
or  the  judicial  department  of  the  state.  The  mode  of 
enforcement  is  left  to  its  discretion.  It  may  secure  the 
right,  that  is,  enforce  its  recognition,  by  removing  the 
case  from  a  state  court,  in  which  it  is  denied,  into  a 
Federal  court,  where  it  will  be  acknowledged.  But  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  is  broader  than  the  statute  which 
authorizes  the  removal.  Section  641  does  not  apply  to 
all  cases  in  which  equal  protection  of  the  laws  may  be 
denied  to  a  defendant  The  removal  authorized  by  the 
statute  is  a  removal  before  trial  or  final  hearing.  But  the 
violation  of  the  constitutional  provision,  when  made  by 
the  judicial  action  of  a  state,  may  be,  and  generally  will 
be,  after  the  trial  or  final  hearing  has  commenced.  It  is 
during  the  trial  or  final  hearing  the  defendant  is  denied 
equality  of  legal  protection,  and  not  until  then.  Nor  can 
he  know  until  then  that  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
will  not  be  extended  to  him.  Certainly  not  until  then  can 
he  affirm  that  it  has  been  denied.  To  such  a  case,  that  is, 
to  judicial  infractions  of  the  Constitutional  Amendment 
after  the  trial  has  commenced,  section  641  has  no  applica- 
bility. It  was  not  intended  to  reach  such  cases.  They 
were  left  to  the  revisory  power  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States.  Therefore,  the  denial  or  inability  to 
enforce  in  the  judicial  tribunals  of.  a  state,  rights  secured 


§  329  FIRST  INTERPRETATION  599 

to  a  defendant  by  any  law  providing  for  the  equal  civil 
rights  of  all  persons,  citizens  of  the  United  States,  of 
which  section  641  speaks,  is  primarily,  if  not  exclusively, 
a  denial  of  such  rights,  or  an  inability  to  enforce  them, 
resulting  from  the  constitution  or  laws  of  the  state,  rather 
than  a  denial  made  manifest  at  the  trial  of  the  case.  In 
other  words,  the  statute  has  reference  to  a  legislative 
denial  or  an  inability  resulting  from  it  By  express 
requirement  of  the  statute,  the  party  must  set  forth, 
under  oath,  the  facts  upon  which  he  bases  his  claim  to 
have  his  case  removed,  not  merely  his  belief  that  he  can- 
not enforce  his  rights  at  a  subsequent  stage  of  the  pro- 
ceedings. But,  in  the  absence  of  constitutional  or 
legislative  impediment,  he  cannot  swear  before  his  case 
comes  to  trial,  that  his  enjoyment  of  his  civil  rights  is 
denied  to  him. 

The  constitution  and  laws  of  Virginia  do  not  exclude 
colored  persons  from  service  on  juries.  The  petition  for 
removal  did  not  present  a  case  for  removal  under  the 
641st  section.  The  defendant  moved  in  the  state  court 
that  the  venire  be  so  modified  that  one-third  or  some  por- 
tion of  the  jury  should  be  composed  of  his  own  race.  The 
denial  of  this  motion  was  not  a  denial  of  a  right  secured 
to  him  by  any  law  providing  for  the  equal  civil  rights  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  or  by  any  statute,  or  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  A  mixed  jury  in  a  particular 
case  is  not  essential  to  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
It  is  a  right  to  which  any  colored  man  is  entitled,  that,  in 
the  selection  of  jurors  to  pass  upon  his  life,  liberty,  or 
property,  there  shall  be  no  exclusion  of  his  race,  and  no 
discrimination  against  them,  because  of  his  color.  But 
that  is  a  different  thing  from  that  which  was  claimed,  as 
of  right,  and  denied  in  the  state  court,  viz :  a  right  to  have 
the  jury  composed  in  part  of  colored  men.  When  a  subor- 
dinate officer  of  the  state,  in  violation  of  state  law,  under- 
takes to  deprive  an  accused  person  of  a  right  which  the 
statute  law  accords  to  him,  as  in  the  case  at  bar,  it  can 
hardly  be  said  that  he  is  denied,  or  cannot  enforce,  *4n 


600  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  329 

the  judicial  tribunals  of  the  state,*'  the  rights  which 
belong  to  him.  In  such  a  case  it  ought  to  be  presumed 
the  court  will  redress  the  wrong.  If  the  accused  is 
deprived  of  the  right,  the  final  and  practical  denial  will 
be  in  the  judicial  tribunal  which  tries  the  case,  after  the 
trial  has  commenced.  If,  as  in  this  case,  the  subordinate 
officer  whose  duty  it  is  to  select  jurors  fails  to  discharge 
that  duty  in  the  true  spirit  of  the  law ;  if  he  excludes  all 
colored  men  solely  because  they  are  colored;  or  if  the 
sheriff  to  whom  a  venire  is  given,  composed  of  both  white 
and  colored  citizens,  neglects  to  summon  the  colored 
jurors  only  because  they  are  colored ;  or  if  a  clerk  whose 
duty  it  is  to  take  the  twelve  names  from  the  box  rejects 
all  the  colored  jurors  for  the  same  reason,  it  can  with  no 
propriety  be  said  the  defendant's  right  is  denied  by  the 
state  and  cannot  be  enforced  in  the  judicial  tribunals. 
The  court  will  correct  the  wrong,  will  quash  the  indict- 
ment or  the  panel,  or,  if  not,  the  error  will  be  corrected 
in  a  superior  court.  Such  cases  are  not  within  the  pro- 
visions of  section  641.  Denials  of  equal  rights  in  the 
action  of  the  judicial  tribunals  of  the  state  are  left  to  the 
revisory  powers  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  Ex  parte  Commonwealth  of  Virginia,  100  U.  S. 
313. 

§330.  Exdnsion  of  juror  on  account  of  color.    The 

inhibition  contained  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  means 
that  no  agency  of  the  state,  nor  of  the  officers  or  agents 
by  whom  its  powers  are  exerted,  shall  deny  to  any  person 
within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
Whoever,  by  virtue  of  public  position  under  a  state  gov- 
ernment, deprives  another  of  property,  life  or  liberty, 
without  due  process  of  law,  or  denies  or  takes  away  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws,  violates  the  constitutional 
inhibition ;  and  as  he  acts  in  the  name  and  for  the  state, 
and  is  clothed  with  the  state's  power,  his  act  is  that  of 
the  state.  Otherwise  the  constitutional  inhibition  has  no 
meaning  and  the  state  has  clothed  one  of  its  agents  with 


§  330  FIRST  INTERPRETATION  601 

power  to  annul  or  evade  it.  The  Constitutional  Amend- 
ment was  ordained  for  a  purpose.  It  was  to  secure  equal 
rights  to  all  persons,  and  to  insure  to  all  persons  the 
enjoyment  of  such  rights.  Power  was  given  to  Congress 
to  enforce  its  provisions  by  appropriate  legislation. 
Such  legislation  must  act  upon  persons;  not  upon  the 
abstract  thing  denominated  a  state,  but  upon  the  persons 
who  are  the  agents  of  the  state  in  the  denial  of  the  rights 
which  were  intended  to  be  secured.  Such  is  the  act  of 
March  1,  1875,  and  is  fully  authorized  by  the  Constitu- 
tion. The  act  of  the  defendant,  in  selecting  jurors, 
was  a  ministerial,  not  a  judicial  act ;  and  being  charged 
with  the  performance  of  that  duty,  although  he  derived 
no  authority  from  the  state,  he  was  bound,  in  the  dis- 
charge of  his  duties,  to  obey  the  Federal  Constitution  and 
the  laws  passed  in  pursuance  thereof.  One  great  purpose 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  to  raise  the  colored 
race  from  that  condition  of  inferiority  and  servitude  in 
which  most  of  them  had  previously  stood,  into  perfect 
equality  of  civil  rights  with  all  other  ]>ersons  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  states.  It  was  intended  to  take  away 
all  possibility  of  oppression  by  law  because  of  race  or 
color.  It  is  a  limitation  of  the  power  of  the  state,  and 
an  enlargement  of  the  power  of  Congress.  It  is  said 
the  selection  of  jurors  for  her  courts  and  the  adminis- 
tration of  her  laws  belongs  to  each  state ;  that  they  are 
her  rights.  This  is  true  in  the  general  sense.  But  in 
exercising  her  rights,  a  state  cannot  disregard  the  limi- 
tations which  the  Federal  Constitution  has  applied  to  her 
power.  Her  rights  do  not  reach  to  that  extent.  Nor  can 
she  deny  to  the  General  Government  the  right  to  exercise 
all  its  granted  powers,  though  they  may  interfere  with 
the  full  enjoyment  of  rights  she  would  have  if  those 
powers  had  not  been  thus  granted.  Indeed,  every  addi- 
tion of  power  to  the  General  Government  involves  a  cor- 
responding diminution  of  the  governmental  powers  of  the 
states.  It  is  carved  out  of  them.  Ex  parte  Common- 
wealth of  Virginia  and  Coles,  100  U.  S.  339. 


602  DUE  PEOCESS  OP  LAW  §  331 

§  331.  Law  exduding  jurors  on  account  of  race  or  color. 

The  alleged  exclusion  from  the  grand  jury  that  found, 
and  from  the  petit  jury  that  was  summoned  to  try  this 
indictment,  of  persons  of  the  African  race  because  of  their 
race,  did  not  result  from  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  the 
state  as  expounded  by  its  highest  judicial  tribunal ;  and 
consequently,  the  accused  was  not  entitled  to  the  removal 
of  the  prosecution  into  the  Circuit  Court.  Such  exclusion 
however  if  made  by  the  jury  commissioners  without 
authority  derived  from  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the 
state,  was  a  violation  of  the  prisoner's  rights  under  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  which  the 
trial  court  was  bound  to  redress ;  and  the  remedy  for  any 
failure  in  that  respect  is  ultimately  in  the  Supreme  Court 
upon  writ  of  error  to  the  state  court. 

The  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  designed  primarily  to 
secure  to  the  colored  race,  thereby  invested  with  the 
rights,  privileges  and  responsibilities  of  citizenship,  the 
enjoyment  of  all  the  civil  rights  that,  under  the  law,  are 
enjoyed  by  white  persons ;  that,  while  a  state,  consistently 
with  the  purposes  for  which  that  amendment  was  adopted, 
may  establish  qualifications  for  ^'urors,  a  denial  to  citizens 
of  the  African  race,  because  of  their  color,  of  the  right 
or  privilege  accorded  to  white  persons,  of  participating 
as  jurors  in  the  administration  of  justice,  is  a  discrimi- 
nation against  the  former  inconsistent  with  the  amend- 
ment, and  within  the  power  of  Congress  by  appropriate 
legislation  to  prevent;  that  to  compel  a  colored  man  to 
submit  to  a  trial  before  a  jury  drawn  from  a  panel  from 
which  was  excluded,  because  of  their  color,  every  man 
of  his  race,  however  well  qualified  by  education  and  char- 
acter to  discharge  the  functions  of  jurors,  was  a  denial 
of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Neal  v.  Delaware, 
103  U.  S.  370. 

§  332.  Punishment  of  offense.  The  section  of  the  code 
of  Alabama  punishing  adultery  or  fornication  commit- 
ted by  a  white  person  and  a  negro  with  each  other  more 


§  333  FIEST  INTERPRETATION  603 

severely  than  the  same  offense  committed  between  per- 
sons of  the  same  race  and  color  as  punished  by  that  code, 
does  not  make  a  discrimination  against  the  colored  per- 
son in  the  punishment  designated,  which  conflicts  with 
the  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  prohibiting  a 
state  from  denying  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  statute  applies  the 
same  punishment  to  both  offenders,  the  white  and  the 
black.  The  discrimination  in  the  punishment  is  directed 
against  the  offense  designated,  and  not  against  the  person 
of  any  particular  color  or  race.  Equality  of  protection 
under  the  laws  implies  not  only  accessibility  by  each  one, 
whatever  his  race,  on  the  same  terms  with  others,  to  the 
courts  of  the  country  for  the  security  of  his  person  and 
property,  but  that  in  the  administration  of  criminal  justice 
he  shall  not  be  subjected,  for  the  same  offense,  to  any 
greater  or  different  punishment.  There  is  in  this  law  no 
discrimination  against  either  race.  Pace  v.  Alabama,  106 
U.  S.  583. 


§333.  Setting  aside  panel  of  jurors-— Discriminating^ 
against  citizens  of  African  descent.  It  was  not  error  for 
the  state  court  to  overrule  a  motion  to  set  aside  a  panel 
of  petit  jurors  made  on  the  ground  that  only  white  cit- 
izens were  selected  and  summoned,  when  it  was  not  dis- 
tinctly shown  that  the  oflScers,  who  selected  the  petit 
jurors,  excluded  qualified  citizens  of  African  descent  from 
the  panel  because  of  their  race  or  color.  A  grand  jury 
selected  and  formed  upon  the  basis  of  excluding  there- 
from, because  of  their  color,  all  citizens  of  the  African 
race,  is  prohibited  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  and 
the  laws  passed  by  Congress  for  the  enforcement  of  its 
provisions.  Where  the  statutes  of  Kentucky  excluded 
citizens  of  African  descent  from  service  on  grand  and 
petit  juries  because  of  their  race,  it  will  be  presumed  that 
prior  to  the  time  they  were  adjudged  invalid,  they  were 
followed  by  jury  commissioners.  Where  citizens  of 
African  descent  have  been  wrongfully  excluded  from  a 


604  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  333 

grand  jaryy  an  indictment  found  by  it  should  be  set  aside. 
Bush  V.  Kentucky,  107  U.  S.  110. 

§334.  State  statute  requiring  separate  accommoda- 
tions for  white  and  colored  persons  in  railway  coaches. 
A  state  statute  providing  for  separate  railway  carriages 
for  the  white  and  colored  races  by  railway  companies 
carrying  passengers  in  their  coaches  in  the  state,  and  the 
assignment  of  passengers  to  the  coaches  according  to 
their  race  by  conductors  does  not  deprive  a  colored  per- 
son of  any  rights  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of 
the  Federal  Constitution.  The  enforced  separation  of  the 
races,  as  applied  to  the  internal  commerce  of  the  state, 
neither  abridges  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  the  col- 
ored man,  deprives  him  of  his  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  nor  denies  him  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment. So  far  as  a  conflict  with  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment is  concerned,  the  case  reduces  itself  to  the  question 
whether  the  statute  of  Louisiana  is  a  reasonable  regu- 
lation,  and  with  respect  to  this  there  must  necessarily 
be  a  large  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  legislature.  In 
determining  the  question  of  reasonableness  it  is  at  lib- 
erty to  act  with  respect  to  the  established  usages,  customs, 
and  traditions  of  the  people,  and  with  a  view  to  the  pro- 
motion of  their  comfort,  and  the  preservation  of  the  pub- 
lic peace  and  good  order.  Gauged  by  this  standard,  it 
can  not  be  said  that  a  law  which  authorizes  or  even 
requires  the  separation  of  the  two  races  in  public  con- 
veyances is  unreasonable  or  more  obnoxious  to  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  than  the  act  of  Congress  requir- 
ing separate  schools  for  colored  children  in  the  District 
of  Columbia,  the  constitutionality  of  which  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  questioned,  or  the  corresponding  acts 
of  state  legislatures.  The  underlying  fallacy  of  the 
plaintiff's  argument  consists  in  the  assumption  that  the 
enforced  separation  of  the  two  races  stamps  the  colored 
race  with  the  badge  of  inferiority.    If  this  be  so,  it  is 


§  335  FIRST  INTERPRETATION  605 

not  by  reason  of  anything  f onnd  in  the  act,  but  solely 
because  the  colored  race  chooses  to  put  that  construction 
upon  it.  The  argument  also  assumes  that  social  preju- 
dice may  be  overcome  by  legislation,  and  that  equal  rights 
can  not  be  secured  to  the  negro  except  by  an  enforced  com- 
mingling of  the  two  races.  The  Supreme  Court  refused 
to  accept  this  proposition,  and  declared,  that  if  the  two 
races  are  to  meet  on  terms  of  social  equality,  it  must  be 
the  result  of  natural  aflSnity,  a  mutual  appreciation  of 
each  other's  merits  and  a  voluntary  consent  of  individ- 
uals. Legislation  is  powerless  to  eradicate  racial  instincts 
or  to  abolish  distinctions  based  upon  physical  differences, 
and  the  attempt  to  do  so  can  pnly  result  in  accentuating 
the  difficulties  of  the  situation*  If  the  civil  and  political 
rights  of  both  races  be  equal,  one  cannot  be  inferior  to 
the  othBT  civilly  or  politically.  If  one  race  be  inferior 
to  the  other  sodally,  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  cannot  put  them  upon  the  same  plane.  Plessy  v. 
Ferguson,  163  U.  S.  537. 


§  335.  Discrimination  against  colored  children.  A  de- 
cision by  a  state  court  denying  an  injunction  against  the 
maintenance,  by  a  board  of  education,  of  a  high  school  for 
white  children,  while  failing  to  maintain  one  for  colored 
children  also,  for  the  reason  that  the  funds  were  not 
sufficient  to  maintain  it  in  addition  to  needed  primary 
schools  for  colored  children,  does  not  constitute  a  denial 
of  the  equal  protection  of  the  law  or  equal  privileges  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  The  relief  asked  for  was 
an  injunction  that  would  either  impair  the  efficiency  of  the 
high  school  provided  for  the  white  children  or  compel  the 
board  to  close  it.  Such  action  would  not  give  to  colored 
children  additional  opportunities  for  the  education  fur- 
nished in  high  schools.  The  board  had  before  it  the 
question  whether  it  should  maintain  a  high  school  for 
about  60  colored  children,  or  withhold  the  benefit  of  edu- 
cation in  primary  schools  from  300  children  of  the  same 
race.    The  evidence  in  the  record  does  not  permit  the 


606  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  335 

conclusion  that  that  decision  waa  made  with  any  desire  or 
purpose  on  the  part  of  the  board  to  discriminate  against 
any  of  the  colored  school  children  of  the  county  on  account 
of  their  race.  The  state  court  did  not  deem  the  acticm  of 
the  board  of  education  in  suspending  temporarily  and 
for  economic  reasons  the  high  school  for  colored  chil- 
dren a  sufficient  reason  why  injunction  should  lie  to 
restrain  from  maintaining  an  existing  high  school  for 
white  children.  It  rejected  the  suggestion  that  the  board 
proceeded  in  bad  faith  or  had  abused  the  discretion  with 
which  it  was  invested  by  the  statute  under  which  it  pro- 
ceeded or  had  acted  in  hostility  to  the  colored  race.  Un- 
der the  circumstances  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  action 
of  the  state  court  was,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  a  denial  by  the  state  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  Gumming  v.  County  Board  of 
Education,  175  U.  S.  528. 

§  336.  Negroes  as  grand  jurors.  A  denial  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  is  made  by  a  ruling  of  a  state 
court  upon  motion  to  quash  an  indictment  because  of  the 
exclusion  of  negroes  from  the  grand  jury  lists,  by  which 
such  motion,  though  but  two  printed  octavo  pages  in 
length,  was  struck  from  the  files,  under  the  color  of  local 
practice  for  prolixity,  because  it  contained  an  allegation 
that  certain  provisions  of  the  newly  adopted  state  con- 
stitution, claimed  to  have  the  eflfect  of  disfranchising 
negroes  because  of  their  race,  worked  as  a  reason  and 
consideration  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  commissioners  for 
their  action.  It  is  a  necessary  and  well-settled  rule  that 
the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  pro- 
tect constitutional  rights  cannot  be  declined  when  it  is 
plain  that  the  fair  result  of  a  decision  is  to  deny  the 
rights.  It  is  well  known  that  the  court  will  decide  for 
itself  whether  a  contract  was  made  as  well  as  whether  the 
obligation  of  the  contract  has  been  impaired.  On  the 
same  ground  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  full  faith  and 
credit  were  denied  to  a  judgment  rendered  in  another 


§  337  PmST  INTERPRETATION  607 

state  upon  a  suggestion  of  a  want  of  jurisdiction,  without 
evidence  to  warrant  the  finding,  the  court  would  enforce 
the  constitutional  requirement.  The  result  of  the  earlier 
cases  may  be  summed  up  in  the  words  of  the  judgment 
delivered  by  Mr.  Justice  Gray :  *  *  Whenever,  by  any  action 
of  a  state,  whether  through  its  legislature,  through  its 
courts,  or  through  its  executive  or  administrative  officers, 
all  persons  of  the  African  race  are  excluded,  solely  be- 
cause of  their  race  or  color,  from  serving  as  grand  jurors 
in  the  criminal  prosecution  of  a  person  of  the  African 
race,  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  denied  to  him, 
contrary  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States."  Carter  v.  Texas,  177  U.  S. 
442 ;  Eogers  v.  Alabama,  192  XJ.  S.  226. 

§337.  Negroes  as  jurors.  A  discrimination  against 
negroes  because  of  their  race,  in  the  selection  of  grand  or 
petit  jurors,  forbidden  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  is 
not  shown  by  verified  written  motions  to  quash  respec- 
tively the  indictment  and  the  panel  of  petit  jurors,  charg- 
ing such  discrimination,  where  no  evidence  was  either 
introduced  or  offered  to  establish  the  facts  stated  in  the 
motions.  If  upon  the  hearing  of  the  motions  the  facts 
stated  therein  had  been  established  by  affirmative  proof, 
or  if  the  trial  court  had  refused  to  admit  evidence  to 
prove  them,  the  Supreme  Court  would  not  have  hesitated 
to  reverse  the  judgment.  To  exclude  all  persons  of  the 
African  race  solely  because  of  their  race  or  color,  to  serve 
as  grand  jurors  in  the  criminal  prosecution  of  a  person 
of  the  African  race,  denies  to  him  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws,  contrary  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
Although  the  accused  in  each  of  his  written  motions 
prayed  the  court  to  hear  evidence  thereon,  it  does  not 
appear  that  he  introduced  any  evidence  whatever  to  prove 
discrimination  against  his  race  because  of  their  color,  or 
made  any  actual  offer  of  evidence  in  support  of  either 
motion.  The  motions  were  not  supported  by  any  com- 
petent evidence;  consequently,  they  cannot  be  held  to 


608  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  337 

have  been  erroneously  denied.  The  absence  of  any  proof 
in  the  record  is  fatal  to  the  charge  of  the  accused  that  his 
rights  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  were  violated. 
Martin  v.  Texas,  200  U,  S.  316. 

§  338.  Right  of  women  to  practice  law  in  state  courts. 
The  right  to  practice*  law  in  the  state  courts  is  not  a 
privilege  or  immunity  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
within  the  meaning  of  the  first  section  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  The  power  of  a  state  to  prescribe  the 
qualifications  for  admission  to  the  bar  of  its  own  courts, 
is  unaffected  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  and  the 
Supreme  Court  cannot  inquire  into  the  reasonableness  or 
propriety  of  the  rules  it  may  prescribe.  Mr.  Justice 
Miller  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
said:  '^Unless  we  are  wholly  and  radically  mistaken  in 
the  principles  on  which  those  cases  (the  Slaughter  House 
Cases,  16  Wall.  36)  are  decided,  the  right  to  control  and 
regulate  the  granting  of  license  to  practice  law  in  the 
courts  of  a  state  is  one  of  those  powers  which  are  not 
transferred  for  its  protection  to  the  Federal  Government, 
and  its  exercise  is  in  no  manner  controlled  by  citizenship 
of  the  United  States  in  the  party  seeking  such  license." 
Bradwell  v.  Illinois,  16  Wall.  130. 

§  339.  The  civil  rights  cases.  Section  5  of  the  Four* 
teenth  Amendment  provides:  **The  Congress  shall  have 
power  to  enforce,  by  appropriate  legislation,  the  provi- 
sions of  this  article. ' '  The  amendment  was  submitted  to 
the  states  by  a  resolution  of  Congress  passed  June  16, 
1866,  and  was  ratified  according  to  a  proclamation  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  dated  July  28, 1868.  By  virtue  of  the 
fifth  section  of  the  amendment.  Congress,  by  act  approved 
March  1, 1875, 18  St.  L.  335,  entitled  **An  act  to  protect 
citizens  in  their  civil  and  legal  rights,''  enacted  **That 
all  persons  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  entitled  to  the  full  and  equal  enjoyment  of  the 
accommodations,  advantages,  facilities  and  privileges  of 


§  339  PmST  INTERPRETATION  609 

inns,  public  conveyances  on  land  and  water,  theatres,  and 
other  places  of  public  amusement;  subject  only  to  the 
conditions  and  limitations  established  by  law,  and  ap- 
plicable alike  to  citizens  of  every  race  and  color,  regard- 
less of  any  previous  condition  of  servitude/'  Severe 
penalties  were  provided  for  denying  the  full  and  equal 
privileges  accorded  by  the  law. 

In  the  Civil  Bights  cases  the  court  held  that  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  is  prohibitory  upon  the  states  only, 
and  the  legislation  authorized  to  be  adopted  by  Congress 
for  enforcing  it  is  not  direct  legislation  on  the  matters 
respecting  which  the  states  are  prohibited  from  making 
or  enforcing  certain  laws,  or  doing  certain  acts,  but  is 
corrective  legislation,  such  as  may  be  necessary  or  proper 
for  counteracting  and  redressing  the  effect  of  such  laws 
or  acts.  The  first  section  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
declares  that:  **No  state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law 
which  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  cit- 
izens of  the  United  States;  nor  shall  any  state  deprive 
any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process 
of  law ;  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  *  *  It  is  state  action  of  a  par- 
ticular character  that  is  prohibited.  Individual  invasion 
of  individual  rights  is  not  the  subject  matter  of  the 
amendment.  It  has  a  deeper  and  broader  scope.  It  nul- 
lifies and  makes  void  all  state  legislation,  and  state  action 
of  every  kind,  which  impairs  the  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  or  which  injures  them 
in  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law,  or 
which  denies  to  any  of  themj  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  The  last  section  of  the  amendftient  invests  Congress 
with  power  to  enforce  it  by  appropriate  legislation,  to 
adopt  appropriate  legislation  for  correcting  the  effects 
of  such  prohibited  state  laws  and  state  acts,  and  thus  to 
render  them  effectually  null,  void  and  innocuous.  This 
is  the  legislative  power  conferred  upon  Congress,  and  this 
is  the  whole  of  it.  It  does  not  invest  Congress  with  power 
to  legislate  upon  subjects  which  are  within  the  domain 

Due  Process— 39 


610  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  339 

of  state  legislation ;  but  to  provide  modes  of  relief  against 
state  legislation  or  state  action,  of  the  kind  referred  to. 
It  does  not  authorize  Congress  to  create  a  code  of  munici- 
pal law  for  the  regulation  of  private  rights ;  but  to  provide 
modes  of  redress  against  the  operation  of  state  laws,  and 
the  action  of  state  officers,  executive  or  judicial,  when 
these  are  subversive  of  the  fundamental  rights  specified 
in  the  amendment.  Positive  rights  and  privileges  are 
undoubtedly  secured  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment ;  bat 
they  are  secured  by  way  of  prohibition  against  state  laws 
and  state  proceedings  affecting  those  rights  and  priv- 
ileges, and  by  power  given  by  Congress*  to  legislate  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  such  prohibition  into  effect ;  and 
such  legislation  must,  necessarily,  be  predicated  upon  such 
supposed  state  laws  or  state  proceedings,  and  be  directed 
to  the  correction  of  their  operation  and  effect.  Until 
some  state  law  has  been  passed  or  some  state  action 
through  its  officers  or  agents  has  been  taken,  adverse  to 
the  rights  of  citizens  sought  to  be  protected  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  no  legislation  of  the  United  States 
under,  said  amendment,  nor  any  proceedings  under  such 
legislation,  can  be  called  into  activity ;  for  the  prohibitions 
of  the  amendment  are  against  state  laws  and  acts  done 
under  state  authority.    Civil  Eights  Cases,  109  U.  S-  3. 


CHAPTER  XVin 

POWBB  OP  TAXATION 

§  340.  Oonstitntionality  of  state  tax  laws.  The  right 
of  taxation  is  a  fundamental  and  essential  power  of  the 
state  without  which  it  cannot  properly  perform  its  func- 
tions. The  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  intended  as 
a  restriction  on  this  power  and  very  few  laws  impos- 
ing taxes,  when  brought  to  the  bar  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
have  been  held  invalid.  Alleged  discriminations  have 
been  upheld  on  the  ground  that  the  state  has  the  right  to 
classify  the  objects  of  taxation,  provided  the  classification 
is  not  arbitrary,  unreas'onable,  oppressive  or  capricious. 

The  Kentucky  statute  of  1882,  to  amend  the  charter  of 
the  city  of  Louisville,  so  far  as  it  authorized  the  cost  of 
the  improvements  of  streets  to  be  assessed  against  the 
owners  of  lots  and  gave  a  lien  thereon,  is  not  in  conflict 
with  section  1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  as  amounting  to  a  depriva- 
tion of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  and  a  denial 
of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Whenever  the  law 
operates  alike  upon  all  persons  and  property,  similarly 
situated,  equal  protection  cannot  be  said  to  be  denied. 
Unjust,  unequal  or  arbitrary  burdens  are  not  authorized 
to  be  imposed  by  the  terms  of  the  act,  and  opportunity  is 
given  to  every  party  interested  to  be  heard  in  opposition 
to  the  enforcement  of  the  liability  in  the  courts,  which 
are  specially  authorized  to  **make  all  corrections,  rules, 
and  orders  to  do  justice  to  all  parties  concerned.  *  *  The 
remedy  for  abuse  is  in  the  state  courts ;  for,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Mobile  Co.  v.  Kimball,  102 
U.  S.  691,  **This  court  is  not  the  harbor  in  which  the  peo- 
ple of  a  city  or  county  can  find  a  refuge  from  ill-advised, 

611 


612  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  340 

unequal,  and  oppressive  state  legislation/*    Walston  v. 
Nevin,  128  U.  S.  578. 

§341.  Tax  on  corporate  securities.  The  provision  in 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  that  no  state  shall  deny  to 
any  person  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  does  not 
prevent  a  state  from  adjusting  its  system  of  taxation  in 
all  proper  and  reasonable  ways,  nor  compel  the  states  to 
adopt  an  iron  rule  of  equal  taxation.  The  Fourteenth 
Amendment  intended  only  that  equal  protection  and  se- 
curity should  be  given  to  all  under  like  circumstances,  and 
that  no  greater  burdens  should  be  laid  upon  one  than  are 
laid  upon  others  in  the  same  calling  and  condition.  The 
method  of  assessing  the  tax  in  question,  on  the  face  value 
of  corporate  securities  in  Pennsylvania,  is  not  violative 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution.  Levy- 
ing a  tax  on  the  nominal  or  face  value  of  bonds  instead 
of  assessing  it  upon  the  actual  value,  does  not  violate  the 
provision  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  which  forbids 
a  state  to  withhold  from  any  person  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws.  There  is  no  unjust  discrimination  against 
any  persons  or  corporations.  The  presumption  is  that 
corporate  securities  are  worth  their  face  value.  Be- 
sides, the  person  holding  them  is  not  affected  by  the 
tax  unless  he  receives  his  interest  from  which  the  tax  is 
deducted.  When  the  interest  is  not  paid  he  pays  no  tax. 
A  state  may,  if  it  chooses,  exempt  certain  classes  of 
property  from  any  taxation  at  all,  such  as  churches, 
libraries  and  the  property  of  charitable  institutions.  It 
may  impose  different  specific  taxes  upon  different  trades 
and  professions,  and  may  vary  the  rates  of  excise  upon 
various  products;  it  may  tax  real  estate  and  personal 
property  in  a  different  manner;  it  may  tax  visible  prop- 
erty only,  and  not  tax  securities  for  payment  of  money;  it 
may  allow  deductions  for  indebtedness,  or  not  allow  them. 
All  such  regulations,  and  those  of  like  character,  so  long 
as  they  proceed  within  reasonable  limits  and  general 
usage,  are  within  the  discretion  of  the  state  legislature, 


§  342  POWER  OF  TAXATION  613 

or  the  people  of  the  state  in  framing  their  constitution. 
But  clear  and  hostile  discriminations  against  particular 
persons  and  classes,  especially  such  as  are  of  an  unusual 
character,  unknown  to  the  practice  of  our  governments, 
might  be  obnoxious  to  the  constitutional  prohibition.  It 
would,  however,  the  Court  said,  be  impracticable  and 
unwise  to  attempt  to  lay  down  any  general  rule  or  defini- 
tion on  the  subject,  that  would  include  all  cases.  BelPs 
Gap  Bailroad  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  134  TJ.  S.  232. 

§  342.  Tax  on  business  of  an  express  company.    The 

Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not  prevent  a  state  from 
adjusting  its  system  of  taxation  in  all  proper  and  reason- 
able ways,  nor  the  classification  of  property  for  taxation. 
The  Missouri  act  imposing  a  tax  upon  the  business  of 
express  companies  is  not  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  because  it  does  not  impose  a  like  tax  upon 
railroad  or  steamboat  companies  which  carry  express 
matter.  The  Supreme  Court  has  repeatedly  laid  down 
the  doctrine  that  diversity  of  taxation,  both  with  respect 
to  the  amount  imposed  and  the  various  species  of  prop- 
erty selected  either  for  bearing  its  burdens  or  for  being 
exempt  from  them,  is  not  inconsistent  with  a  perfect  imi- 
f  ormity  and  equality  of  taxation  in  the  proper  sense  of 
those  terms ;  and  that  a  system  which  imposes  the  same 
tax  upon  every  species  of  property,  irrespective  of  its 
nature  or  condition  or  class,  will  be  destructive  of  the 
principle  of  uniformity  and  equality  in  taxation  and  of 
a  just  adaptation  of  property  to  its  burdens.  The  act 
cannot  be  considered  as  invidiously  discriminating  against 
express  companies  in  favor  of  other  companies  that  may 
carry  express  matter  on  certain  other  conditions  or  under 
different  circumstances.  Bailroad  and  steamboat  compa- 
nies pay  taxes  on  tangible  property.  Express  companies 
have  no  tangible  property  of  any  consequence  subject  to 
taxation  under  the  general  laws.  There  is,  therefore,  no 
way  by  which  they  can  be  taxed  at  all  unless  by  a  tax  upon 
their  receipts  for  business  transacted.    This  distinction 


614  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  342 

dearly  places  express  companies  in  a  separate  class  from 
companies  owning  their  own  means  of  transportation. 
They  do  not  do  business  nnder  the  same  conditions,  or 
under  similar  circumstances,  and  in  the  nature  of  things 
belong  to  different  classes.  The  legislature  was  justified 
in  the  discrimination  it  has  seen  fit  to  impose,  and  the 
act  in  question  cannot  be  held  violative  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.   Pacific  Express  Co.  v.  Seibert,  142  U.  S.  339. 

§  343.  State  taxa4^ioii  of  express  companies'  property. 

An  express  company  is  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  by  classifying  it  with  railroad  and  telegraph 
companies  as  subject  to  the  unit  *rule  of  taxation,  which 
estimates  the  value  of  the  whole  plant,  though  situated  in 
different  states,  as  an  entirety,  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining the  value  of  the  property  in  one  state.  The  policy 
pursued  in  Ohio  is  to  classify  property  for  taxation,  when 
the  nature  of  the  property,  or  its  use,  or  the  nature  of 
the  business  engaged  in,  requires  classification,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  legislature,  in  order  to  secure  equality 
of  burden;  and  property  of  different  sorts  is  classified 
under  various  statutory  provisions  for  the  purposes  of 
assessment  and  taxation.  The  state  constitution  requires 
all  property  to  be  taxed  by  a  uniform  rule  and  according 
to  its  real  value  in  money,  and  this  law  was  upheld  by 
the  supreme  court  of  the  state.  The  constitutional  test 
was  held  to  be  complied  with,  whatever  the  mode,  if  the 
result  of  the  assessment  was  that  the  property  was  as- 
sessed at  its  true  value  in  money.  Applying  the  unit  rule 
to  express  companies  does  not  deny  to  them  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  There  is  no  attempt  to  tax  prop- 
erty having  a  situs  outside  of  the  state,  but  only  to  place 
a  just  value  on  that  within.  The  states  through  which 
the  companies  operate  ought  not  to  be  compelled  to  con- 
tent themselves  with  a  valuation  of  separate  pieces  of 
property  disconnected  from  the  plant  as  an  entirety,  to  the 
proportionate  part  of  which  they  extend  protection,  and 
to  the  dividends  of  whose  owners  their  citizens  contribute. 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Ohio  State  Auditor,  165  U.  S.  194. 


§  344  POWER  OF  TAXATION  615 

§344.  Legacy  and  inheritance  taxes.  Legacy  and 
inheritance  taxes  are  constitutional.  The  equal  protection 
of  the  laws  given  by  the  Federal  Constitution  only  re- 
quires that  the  law  shall  have  the  attribute  of  equality  of 
operation^  which  does  not  mean  indiscriminate  operation 
on  persons  merely  as  such,  but  on  persons  according  to 
their  relations.  Classes  based  on  lineal  and  collateral 
relationship  to  the  testator  or  intestate,  made  by  a  stat- 
ute taxing  inheritances,  depend  on  substantial  distinc- 
tions, and  are  not  arbitrary.  Exemptions  from  a  statute 
taxing  inheritances  do  not  render  its  operation  unequal 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  A 
collateral  inheritance  tax  which  does  not  impose  a  uni- 
form rate,  but  classifies  legacies  to  strangers  to  the  blood 
and  imposes  higher  rates  on  the  large^  sums,  is  not  in 
violation  of  the  rule  of  equality  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment to  the  Federal  Constitution. 

'^\rhat  satisfies  the  equality  of  protection  guaranteed  by 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  has  not  been  and  probably 
never  can  be  precisely  defined.  It  does  not  proHbit  legis- 
la  tion  which  is  limited,  either  in  the  objects  to  which  it 
is  directed  or  by  the  territory  within  which  it  is  to  oper- 
ate. It  only  requires  the  same  means  and  methods  to  be 
applied  impartially  to  all  the  constituents  of  each  class 
created  by  the  law,  and  that  all  persons  subjected  to  such 
legislation  shall  be  treated  alike  under  like  circumstances 
and  conditions,  both  in  the  privilege  conferred  and  the 
liabilities  imposed.  The  rule  prescribes  no  rigid  equality 
and  permits  to  the  discretion  and  wisdom  of  the  state  a 
wide  latitude  as  far  as  interference  by  the  Supreme  Court 
is  concerned.  Nor  with  the  policy  of  the  law  has  it  con- 
cern. Hardship,  impolicy,  or  injustice  of  state  laws  is 
not  necessarily  an  objection  to  their  constitutional  valid- 
ity. In  some  circumstances  the  state  may  not  tax  A  more 
than  B,  but  if  A  be  of  a  different  trade  or  profession  than 
B,  it  may.  And  in  matters  not  of  taxation,  if  A  be  a 
different  kind  of  corporation  than  B,  it  may  subject  A  to 
a  different  kind  of  responsibility  to  servants  than  B,  to 


616  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  344 

a  different  measure  of  damages  than  B,  and  it  permits 
social  legislation  in  all  of  its  varieties.    In  other  words^ 
the  state  may  distinguish,  select,  and  classify  objects  of 
legislation,  and  necessarily  this  power  must  have  a  wide 
range  of  discretion,  but  not  without  limitation.     The 
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  intended  to  compel  the 
state  to  adopt  an  iron  rule  of  equal  protection.    It  may 
exempt  certain  classes  of  property,  may  impose  different 
specific  taxes  upon  different  trades  and  professions,  and 
vary  the  rates  of  excise  upon  different  products,  so  long 
as  the  regulations  proceed  within  reasonable  limits  and 
general  usage.    The  Federal  Constitution  imposes  no  re- 
straints on  the  state  in  regard  to  unequal  taxation.    The 
rule  of  equality  permits  many  practical  inequalities.    In 
a  classification  for  governmental  purposes  there  cannot 
be  an  exact  exclusion  or  inclusion  of  persons  and  things. 
There  are  three  main  classes  in  the  Illinois  statute,  based 
on  lineal  and  collateral  relationship,  and  strangers  to  the 
blood  and  distant  relatives.     The  third  class  is  again 
divided  into  four  classes  dependent  upon  the  amount  of 
the  estate  received.     The  differences  between  the  first 
two  classes  are  substantial,  and  ^ '  bear  a  just  and  proper 
relation  to  the  attempted  classification. ' '    The  tax  is  one 
on  the  succession  and  not  on  property.   The  determination 
of  the  amount  of  the  exemptions  is  a  legislative  and  not 
a  judicial  function.    The  tax  on  legacies  to  strangers  to 
the  blood  of  the  interstate  depends  on  the  amount  of  the 
legacy.    There  are  four  classes  created,  and  manifestly 
there  is  equality  between  the  members  of  each  class. 
When  the  legacies  differ  in  substantial  extent,  if  the  rate 
increases,  the  benefit  increases  to  greater  degree.    If  there 
is  inequality  it  must  be  because  the  members  of  a  class 
are  arbitrarily  made  such  and  burdened  as  such  upon  no 
distinction  justifying  it.     This  is  claimed.     The  tax  is 
not  in  proportion  to  the  amount  but  varies  with  the 
amounts  arbitrarily  fixed.    One  who  is  given  a  legacy  of 
$10,001  by  the  deduction  of  the  tax  receives  $99.04  less 
than  one  who  is  given  a  legacy  of  $10,000.    This  is  not 


§  345  POWER  OF  TAXATION  617 

contrary  to  the  rule  of  equality  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, which  does  not  require  exact  equality  of  taxation. 
It  only  requires  that  the  law  imposing  it  shall  operate  on 
all  alike  under  the  same  >circumstances.  The  tax  is  not 
on  money,  it  is  on  the  right  to  inherit,  and  hence  a  condi- 
tion of  inheritance,  and  may  be  graded  according  to  the 
value  of  that  inheritance.  All  license  laws  and  all  specific 
taxes  have  in  them  an  element  of  inequality,  nevertheless 
they  are  universally  imposed  ancj  their  legality  has  never 
been  questioned.  Magoun  v.  Illinois  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank,  170  U.  S.  283. 

§  345.  Penalty  for  nonpayment  of  taxes.  A  penalty  of 
50  per  cent  for  nonpayment  of  taxes  by  a  telegraph  com- 
pany, doing  business  in  the  state,  which  is  imposed  by 
Indiana  act  of  March  6,  1893,  is  not  unconstitutional  as 
a  denial  to  such  company  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
law,  or  as  an  arbitrary  classification,  or  as  a  deprivation 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law.  The  necessity 
of  classifying  the  subjects  of  taxation  in  order  to  reach 
uniform  and  just  results,  as  far  as  possible,  is  not  denied ; 
nor  that  the  infliction  of  penalties  on  delinquency  is  a 
usual  and  legitimate  mode  of  compelling  the  prompt  pay- 
ment of  taxes.  The  supreme  court  of  Indiana  was  of 
opinion  that  by  reason  of  the  differences  in  the  nature  of 
these  companies  and  the  uses  to  which  their  property  was 
devoted  in  the  prosecution  of  their  business  from  other 
tax  payers  and  their  property  and  business,  the  legislature 
was  justified  in  placing  them  in  a  class  by  themselves  and 
subjecting  them  to  the  particular  method  of  effecting  col- 
lection by  means  of  penalties  and  suit  for  recovery  of 
judgment  for  the  delinquent  taxes  with  penalties  added. 
The  amount  of  the  penalty  was  a  matter  for  the  legis- 
lature to  determine  in  its  discretion.  The  Supreme  Court 
was  unable  to  discover  any  ground  for  holding  that  the 
Federal  Constitution  was  violated  by  the  law,  and  agreed 
in  the  view  which  thje  supreme  court  of  the  state  expressed 
in  the  premises.  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  State 
of  Indiana,  165  U.  S.  304. 


618  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  1 346 

§  346.  State  tax  law  as  to  banks  ooxurtitutioiiaL  Lack 
of  uniformity  in  the  result  of  a  state  tax  law  as  to  banks 
does  not  violate  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution  as  denying  to  any  person  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws, — ^at  least  when  the  inequality  comes 
from  the  election  of  certain  taxpayers  to  avail  themselves 
of  privileges  offered  to  all. 

The  lack  of  uniformity  charged  against  the  statute  con- 
sists not  in  the  terms  and  conditions  expressed  in  the 
statute^  but  only  in  the  possible  results  of  its  operation. 
Upon  all  bank  shares,  whether  state  or  national,  rest  the 
ordinary  state  tax  of  4  mills.  To  every  bank,  state  and 
national,  and  all  alike,  is  given  the  privilege  of  discharg- 
ing all  tax  obligations  by  collecting  from  its  stockholders 
and  paying  8  mills  on  the  dollar  upon  the  par  value  of  its 
stock.  If  the  bank  has  a  large  surplus,  and  its  stock  is  in 
consequence  worth  five  or  six  times  its  par  value,  naturally 
it  elects  to  collect  and  pay  the  8  mills,  and  thus  in  fact  it 
pays  at  a  less  rate  on  the  actual  value  of  the  property 
than  the  bank  without  surplus,  and  whose  stock  is  only 
worth  par.  So  it  is  possible,  under  the  operation  of  the 
law,  that  one  bank  may  pay  at  a  less  rate  upon  the  actual 
value  of  its  banking  property  than  another ;  but  the  banks 
which  do  not  make  the  election,  whether  state  or  national, 
pay  no  more  than  the  regular  tax.  The  result  of  the 
election  under  the  circumstances  is  simply  that  those 
electing  pay  less.  But  this  lack  of  uniformity  in  the  result 
furnishes  no  ground  of  complaint  under  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution. Indeed,  the  whole  argument  of  a  right  under  the 
Federal  Constitution  to  challenge  a  tax  law  on  the  ground 
of  inequality  in  the  burdens  resulting  from  the  operation 
of  the  law  is  put  at  rest  by  the  decision  in  Bell's  Gap  E. 
Co.  V.  Pennsylvania,  134  U.  S.  232,  237.  Merchants'  and 
Manufacturers'  National  Bank  v.  Pennsylvania,  167 
U.  S.  461. 

§  347.  Taxation  of  mortgagee's  interest  in  land.   The 

taxation  of  mortgaged  real  estate  by  taxing  the  mort- 


§  348  POWER  OP  TAXATION  619 

gagee's  interest  therein  to  him,  and  the  rest  to  the 
mortgagor,  is  not  a  double  taxation,  nor  does  it  make 
such  discrimination  between  mortgagors  and  mortgagees, 
nor  between  resident  and  nonresident  mortgagees,  as  to 
deny  the  latter  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The 
clear  intent  and  effect  of  the  statute  is  as  f oUowb  :  The 
personal  obligation  of  the  mortgagor  to  the  mortgagee 
is  not  taxed  at  all.  The  mortgage  and  the  debt  secured 
thereby  are  taxed,  as  real  estate,  to  the  mortgagee,  not 
beyond  their  real  cash  value,  and  only  so  far  as  they 
represent  an  interest  in  the  real  estate  mortgaged.  The 
debt  is  not  taxed  separately,  but  only  together  with  the 
mortgage;  and  is  considered  as  indebtedness  within  the 
state  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  enable  the  mortgagor 
to  deduct  the  amount  thereof  from  the  assessment  upon 
him,  in  the  same  manner  as  other  indebtedness  within 
the  state  is  deducted.  And  the  mortgagee,  as  well  as  the 
mortgagor,  is  entitled  to  have  deducted  from  his  own 
assessment  the  amount  of  his  indebtedness  within  the 
state.  The  statute,  which  is  drawn  in  question,  expressly 
forbids  any  taxation  of  the  promissory  note,  or  other 
instrument  of  writing,  which  is  the  evidence  of  the  debt 
secured  by  the  mortgage;  and,  with  equal  distinctness, 
provides  for  the  taxation  as  real  estate,  of  the  mortgage 
interest  in  the  land.  Although  the  right  which  the  mort- 
gage transfers  in  the  land  covered  thereby  is  not  the 
legal  title,  but  only  an  equitable  interest  and  by  way  of 
security  for  the  debt,  it  appears  to  be  clear  upon  prin- 
ciple, and  in  accordance  with  the  weight  of  authority, 
that  this  interest,  like  any  other  interest,  legal  or  equi- 
table, may  be  taxed  to  its  owner  (whether  resident  or 
nonresident)  in  the  state  where  the  land  is  situated,  with- 
out contravening  any  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  Savings  &  Loan  Society  v.  Multnomah 
County,  169  U.  S.  421. 

§  348.  Forfeiting  lands  for  nonpayment  of  taxes.    The 
exemption  by  the  Virginia  constitution  of  tracts  of  land 


620  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  348 

of  less  than  1,000  acres,  from  a  provision  for  forfeiture 
of  larger  tracts  by  failure  for  five  successive  years  to 
have  them  charged  on  the  land  books  with  taxes  due 
thereon,  does  not  constitute  such  a  discrimination  against 
the  owners  of  larger  tracts  as  to  deny  them  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws.  The  evil  intended  to  be  remedied  by 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  West  Virginia  was  the  per- 
sistent failure  of  those  who  owned  or  claimed  to  own 
large  tracts  of  land,  patented  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
or  early  in  the  eighteenth  century,  to  put  them  on  the 
land  books,  so  that  the  extent  and  boundaries  of  such 
tracts  could  be  easily  ascertained  by  the  officers  charged 
with  the  duty  of  assessing  and  collecting  taxes.  Where  the 
tract  was  a  small  one,  the  probability  was  that  it  was  actu- 
ally occupied  by  someone,  and  its  extent  of  boundary  could 
be  readily  ascertained  for  purposes  of  assessment  and 
taxation.  It  can  be  well  understood  why  one  policy  could 
be  properly  adopted  as  to  large  tracts  which  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  public  revenue  did  not  require  to  be  prescribed 
as  to  small  tracts.  Said  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  in  speaking 
for  the  court :  *  *  The  judiciary  should  be  very  reluctant 
to  interfere  with  the  taxing  systems  of  a  state,  and  should 
never  do  so  unless  that  which  the  state  attempts  to  do 
is  in  palpable  violation  of  the  constitutional  rights  of  the 
owners  of  property.  Under  this  view  of  our  duty,  we  are 
imwilling  to  hold  that  the  provision  referred  to  is  repug- 
nant to  the  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  forbid- 
ding a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. ' '  King 
V.  MuUins,  171  U.  S.  404. 

§  349.  Discrimination  in  taxes  as  a  denial  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws*  A  manufacturer  engaged  in  the 
business  of  refining  sugar  is  not  denied  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws  because  of  the  discrimination  made  by  the 
Louisiana  constitution  imposing  a  license  tax  upon  manu- 
facturers engaged  in  such  business,  but  exempting  from 
the  tax  those  who  refine  the  products  of  their  own  plan- 
tations.   The  act  in  question  undoubtedly  discriminates 


§  349  POWER  OP  TAXATION  621 

in  favor  of  a  certain  class  of  refiners,  but  this  discrimi- 
nation,  if  founded  upon  a  reasonable  distinction  in  prin- 
ciple, is  valid.  Of  course  if  such  discrimination  were 
purely  arbitrary,  oppressive,  or  capricious,  and  made  to 
depend  upon  differences  of  color,  race,  nativity,  religious 
opinions,  political  affiliations,  or  other  considerations 
having  no  possible  connection  with  the  duties  of  citizens 
as  taxpayers,  such  exemption  would  be  pure  favoritism, 
and  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  the 
less  favored  classes.  But  from  time  out  of  mind  it  has 
been  the  policy  of  this  government,  not  only  to  classify 
for  purposes  of  taxation,  but  to  exempt  producers  from 
the  taxation  of  the  methods  employed  by  them  to  put 
their  products  upon  the  market.  The  right  to  sell  is 
clearly  an  incident  of  the  right  to  manufacture  or  pro- 
duce, and  it  is  at  least  a  question  for  the  legislature  to 
determine  whether  anything  done  to  prepare  a  product 
most  perfectly  for  the  needs  of  the  market  shall  not  be 
treated  as  an  incident  to  its  growth  or  production.  The 
act  is  not  one  exempting  planters  who  use  their  sugar  in 
the  manufacture  of  articles  of  a  wholly  different  descrip- 
tion, such  as  confectionery,  preserves,  or  pastry,  or  such 
as  one  which  would  exempt  the  farmer  who  devoted  his 
com  or  rye  to  the  making  of  whisky,  while  other  manu- 
facturers of  these  articles  were  subjected  to  a  tax.  A 
somewhat  different  question  might  arise  in  such  case, 
since  none  of  these  articles  are  the  natural  products  of 
the  farm, — such  products  only  becoming  useful  by  being 
co-mingled  with  other  ingredients.  Refined  sugar,  how- 
ever, is  the  natural  and  ultimate  product  of  the  cane,  and 
the  various  steps  taken  to  perfect  such  product  are  but 
incidents  to  the  original  growth.  Congress  has  repeat- 
edly acted  upon  this  principle  in  its  revenue  legislation. 
See  3  Stat,  at  L.  205,  chap.  40 ;  12  Stat,  at  L.  432,  chap. 
119.  The  Supreme  Court  has  had  repeated  occasions  to 
sustain  discriminations  founded  upon  reasons  much  more 
obscure  than  this.  See  cases  cited.  The  constitution  of 
Louisiana  classifies  the  refiners  of  sugar  for  the  purposes 


624  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  351 

they  have  but  one  in  the  case  of  individuals,  can  not  be 
held  to  be  a  denial  to  the  corporations  of  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws,  so  long  as  the  real  estate  of  the  indi- 
vidual is,  in  fact,  generally  assessed  at  its  full  value.  New 
York  ex  rel.  New  York  Clearing  House  Bldg.  Co.  v. 
Barker,  179  U.  S.  279. 

§352.  Succession  taxes.  The  imposition  of  a  tax, 
under  the  New  York  inheritance-tax  law,  on  the  transfer, 
under  the  will  of  a  nonresident,  on  debts  due  the  decedent 
by  residents  of  that  state,  does  not  violate  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution.  Blackstone  v. 
Miller,  188  U.  S.  189. 


§353.  Inheritance  tax.  The  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  is  not  denied  by  the  Blinois  inheritance  tax  law  be- 
cause, under  that  statute  as  interpreted  and  enforced  by 
the  state  courts,  certain  life  estates  may  be  taxed  when 
the  remainder  is  to  lineal  descendants  of  the  decedent, 
but  not  when  the  remainder  is  to  collateral  heirs  or 
strangers  in  blood.  The  constitutionality  of  the  law  was 
passed  upon  in  Magoun  v.  Illinois  Trust  &  Savings  Bank, 
170  U.  S.  283.  The  assignment  of  error  in  this  case  is 
that  the  cfcissification  of  life  tenants  is  arbitrary  and  un- 
reasonable. As  has  been  said  classification  must  be 
based  on  some  reasonable  ground.  If  the  purpose  is 
within  the  legal  powers  of  the  legislature,  and  the  classi- 
fication made  has  relation  to  that  purpose  (excludes  no 
persons  or  objects  that  are  affected  by  the  purpose,  in- 
cludes all  that  are),  logically  speaking,  it  will  be  appro- 
priate, legally  speaking,  a  law  based  upon  it  will  have 
equality  of  operation.  Complaint  is  made  that  the  legis- 
lature has  discriminated  against  constituents  of  a  certain 
class,  and  applied  different  rules  for  the  taxation  of  life 
tenants.  Life  tenants,  regarded  simply  as  persons,  may 
be  in  legal  contemplation  the  same;  estate  for  life,  re- 
garded simply  as  estates  with  their  attributes  also  in 
legal  contemplation,  may  be  said  to  be  the  same,  but  that 


§  355  POWER  OF  TAXATION  625 

is  not  all  that  is  to  be  considered,  nor  is  it  determinative. 
Eegard  must  be  had  for  the  power  of  the  state  over  testate 
and  intestate  dispositions  of  property,  its  power  to  create 
and  limit  estates,  and,  as  resulting,  its  power  to  impose 
conditions  upon  their  transfer  or  devolution.  It  is  upon 
this  power  that  inheritance-tax  laws  are  based.  The 
power  can  be  exercised  by  distinguishing  between  the 
lineal  and  collateral  relatives  to  a  testator.  In  the  Ma- 
goun  case  the  amount  of  the  tax  depended  upon  him  who 
inamediately  received;  here  the  existence  of  the  tax  de- 
pends upon  him  who  ultimately  receives.  That  can  make 
no  difference  with  the  power  of  the  state.  No  discrimina- 
tion being  exercised  in  the  creation  of  the  class,  equality 
is  observed.  Crossing  the  lines  of  the  classes  created  bv 
the  statute,  discriminations  may  be  exhibited,  but  withik 
the  classes  there  is  equality.  Billings  v.  Illinois,  188  U.  S. 
97. 

§  354.  Income  tax  on  mining  companies.  Mining  com- 
panies and  their  stockhofders  are  not  denied  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  nor  deprived  of  their  property 
>vithout  due  process  of  law,  contrary  to  the  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, by  the  income  tax  provisions  of  the  tariff  act  of 
October  3, 1913  (38  Stat,  at  L.  166,  chap.  16)  under  which 
the  deduction  permitted  for  depreciation  arising  from 
depletion  of  ore  deposits  is  limited  to  5  per  cent  of  the 
gross  value  at  the  mine  of  the  output  during  the  year, 
while' other  individuals  and  corporations  have  the  right 
to  deduct  a  fair  and  reasonable  percentage  for  losses  and 
depreciation.  No  unconstitutional  discrimination  results 
from  the  progressive  rate  feature  of  the  income  tax,  be- 
cause the  surtax  applies  to  individual  incomes  only,  not 
to  corporate  ones.  Corporations  are  not  unconstitution- 
ally discriminated  against  because  of  the  exemption  which 
the  income  tax  provisions  makes  of  individual  incomes 
bdow  $4,000.  Stanton  v.  Baltic  Mining  Co.,  240  U.  S.  103. 

§  355.  Tax  on  cigarette  selling.  The  equal  protection 
of  the  laws  is  not  denied  a  retail  tobacco  dealer  by  the 

Dne  Process — 40 


626  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  355 

tax  imposed  on  cigarette  selling  by  the  Iowa  code,  because 
sales  by  jobbers  and  wholesalers,  in  doing  an  interstate 
business  with  customers  outside  of  the  state,  are  exempted 
from  its  provisions.  Reference  is  made  to  a  series  of  well- 
known  cases  arising  under  the  anti-trust  laws  of  the  sev- 
eral states,  to  the  e£fect  that  laws  against  combinations  in 
trade  must  be  uniform  in  their  application  as  applied  to 
all  persons  within  the  same  general  class.  These  cases, 
however,  have  but  limited  application  to  laws  imposing 
taxes,  where  the  right  of  classification  is  held  to  permit 
of  discrimination  between  different  trades  and  callings 
when  not  obviously  exercised  in  a  spirit  of  prejudice  or 
favoritism.  The  distinction  was  recognized  in  Connolly 
V.  Union  Sewer  Pipe  Co.,  184  U.  S.  540.  It  can  scarcely 
be  doubted  that  if  that  case  had  dealt  with  the  subject  of 
taxation,  a  discriminative  tax  upon  producers  of  agri- 
cultural products,  either  greater  or  less  than  that  imposed 
upon  other  manufacturers  or  producers,  might  have  been 
held  valid  without  denying  to  either  party  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws.  There  is  a  dear  distinction  in  prin- 
ciple between  persons  engaged  in  selling  cigarettes  gen- 
erally or  at  retail,  and  those  engaged  in  selling  by 
wholesale  to  customers  without  the  state.  They  are  two 
entirely  distinct  occupations.  One  sells  at  retail,  the 
other  at  wholesale ;  one  to  the  public  generally,  and  the 
other  to  a  particular  class ;  one  within  the  state,  the  other 
without.  Why  the  legislature  should  have  made  the  dis- 
tinction is  not  entirely  clear,  but  the  section  is  not*  open 
to  the  objection  of  denying  to  the  dealers  in  cigarettes 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Cook  v.  Marshall 
County,  196  U.  S.  261. 

§356.  Taxation  of  corporate  franchise.  The  Federal 
Constitution  does  not  forbid  state  taxation  of  the  fran- 
chise of  a  domestic  corporation  at  a  different  rate  than 
is  assessed  upon  the  tangible  property  in  the  state.  In- 
equality in  valuation  for  taxation  of  a  franchise,  as  com- 
pared with  other  taxable  property,  must  be  systematic 


§  367  POWER  OP  TAXATION  627 

and  intentional  in  order  to  justify  a  Federal  court  in 
enjoining  the  apportionment  and  certification  of  the  tax 
to  the  several  counties,  where  the  assessment  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  made  on  such  a  different  scale  of 
values  from  that  adopted  elsewhere  as  to  deny  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  which  was  the  only  ground  invoked  to  sus- 
tain the  Federal  jurisdiction.  Looking  first  at  the  assess- 
ment of  the  franchise,  there  is  no  such  certainty  that 
it  was  made  on  a  different  scale  of  values  from  that 
adopted  elsewhere  as  would  warrant  an  attack  upon  it 
under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  even  if  otherwise  that 
attack  could  be  maintained.  But  the  supposed  infringe- 
ment of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  is  the  only  ground  on 
which  the  railroad  company  could  come  into  the  circuit 
court,  and  if  that  ground  fails,  and  obviously  fails,  the 
Supreme  Court  would  be  very  cautious,  at  least,  in  inter- 
fering with  the  state  ^s  administration  of  its  taxes  upon 
other  considerations  which  would  not  have  given  it  juris- 
diction. Coulter  V.  Louisville  &  Nashville  E.  Co.,  196 
U.  S.  599. 

§357.  Taxation  of  street  railways.  A  street  railway 
company  is  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  by 
a  municipal  tax  on  its  business  at  the  rate  of  $100  per 
mile  or  fraction  of  a  mile  of  its  trackage  in  the  city  streets 
because  a  steam  railway,  making  an  extra  charge  for 
local  deliveries  of  freight  brought  over  its  road  from  out- 
side the  city,  is  not  subject  to  this  tax.  The  plaintiff  con- 
tends that  a  classification  which  distinguishes  between  an 
ordinary  street  railway  and  a  steam  railroad  making  an 
extra  charge  for  local  deliveries  of  freight  brought  over 
its  road  from  outside  the  city  is  contrary  to  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  and  void.  The  state  courts  held  that 
this  was  a  business  tax,  lawfully  imposed,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  did  not  stand  like  the  steam  railroad  which  is 
subject  to  taxation  by  the  state  alone.  The  difference 
between  the  two  railroads  is  obvious,  and  warrants  the 


628  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  357 

diversity  in  the  mode  of  taxation.  The  steam  railroad 
may  be  assured  to  do  the  great  and  characteristic  part  of 
its  work  outside  the  city^  while  the  plaintiff  does  its 
work  within  the  city.  If  the  former  escapes  city  taxation, 
it  does  so  only  because  its  main  business  is  not  in  the 
city,  and  the  state  reserves  it  for  itself.  Savannah^  T.  & 
I.  of  H.  E.  Co.  V.  Savannah,  198  U.  S.  392. 

§358.  Tax  on  special  franchises.  The  redaction,  on 
account  of  annual  payments  **in  the  nature  of  a  tax'*  cov- 
ered by  existing  agreements,  which  is  made  by  New  York 
laws  from  the  amount  of  the  special  franchise  tax  pro- 
vided for  by  statute,  does  not  render  the  statute  invalid 
either  as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  street 
railway  companies  who  agreed  to  pay  a  lump  sum  for 
their  franchises,  or  as  depriving  such  companies  of  their 
property  without  due  process  of  law.  The  exemption  of 
the  subsurface  street  railway  in  New  York  city  from  the 
operation  of  the  special  franchise  tax  does  not  make  that 
statute  invalid,  as  denying  the  owners  of  the  surface 
street  railways  in  that  city  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws,  or  as  depriving  them  of  their  property  without  due 
process  of  law.  It  is  insisted  that  the  special  franchise 
tax  denies  the  relator  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  in 
three  separate  and  distinct  aspects.  (1)  That  it  adds  to 
the  obligations  of  their  various  contracts  while  preserving 
all  the  burdens  of  those  contracts;  (2)  That  it  provides 
for  the  deduction  of  annual  payments  covered  by  existing 
contracts  from  the  amount  of  tax  levied,  by  reason  of 
which  deduction  those  who  agreed  to  pay  for  their  f ran- 
chises  lump  sums  or  annual  amounts  less  than  the  new 
tax  are  discriminated  against;  (3)  That  it  discriminates 
against  surface  railways  and  subjects  them  to  taxation, 
while  their  competitors,  operating  under  the  surface  of 
many  of  the  same  streets,  are  to  be  exempted.  To  which 
the  court  replied :  (1)  There  had  been  no  impairment  of 
contract  obligations,  and  the  fact  that  the  companies  for 
so  many  years  escaped  the  burden  is  their  good  fortune. 


§  359  POWER  OF  TAXATION  629 

and  in  no  manner  discharges  them  from  the  ordinary 
burdens  of  taxation  which  the  present  law  imposes. 

(2)  The  lump  sum  is  so  obviously  a  payment  for  the 
franchise  that  it  cannot  be  considered  in  any  just  sense 
as  possessing  the  nature  of  a  tax.  It  is  not  even  rental. 
It  is  like  money  paid  for  a  tract  of  land, — ^part  of  the  pur- 
chase price.  Further,  the  whole  matter  of  allowing  a 
reduction  on  account  of  that  which  is  spoken  of  as  **in 
the  nature  of  a  tax,''  is  a  matter  of  grace  on  the  part  of 
the  legislature.  The  franchises  were  held  subject  to  tax- 
ation, and  the  fact  that  the  state  has  consented  that  a 
certain  reduction  shall,  in  some  cases,  be  made,  does  not 
entitle  every  holder  of  a  franchise  to  a  like  reduction. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  Federal  Constitution  to  pre- 
vent a  state  from  granting  exemptions  from  taxation. 

(3)  There  is  a  difference  between  surface  and  subsurface 
street  railways  sufficient  to  justify  a  diversity  in  the 
mode  and  extent  of  taxation.  Citing  Savannah,  T.  &  I.  of 
H.  E.  Co.  V.  Savannah,  198  U.  S.  392.  New  York  ex  rel. 
Metropolitan  Street  E.  Co.  v.  State  Board  of  Tax  Com'rs, 
199  U.  S.  1. 

§  359.  Validity  of  state  inheritance  tax.  Brothers  and 
sisters  of  a  decedent  may  be  subjected  to  the  burden  of 
the  inheritance  tax  imposed  by  the  California  act  of  1893, 
as  amended,  without  denying  them  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
although  such  legislation  does  not  impose  any  tax  on 
such  strangers  to  the  blood  as  the  wife  or  widow  of  a  son 
or  the  husband  of  a  daughter  of  the  deceased.  The  con- 
tention that  the  act  was  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  on  this  ^ound,  reduces  itself  to  and  must 
depend  on  the  soundness  of  the  argument  that  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  compels  the  states,  in  levying  inher- 
itance taxes,  and,  a  fortiori,  in  regulating  inheritances, 
to  conform  to  blood  relationship.  That  is  to  say,  in  their 
last  analysis  all  the  arguments  depend  upon  the  proposi- 
tion that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  has  taken  away 


630  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  359 

from  the  states  the  power  to  regula;te  the  passage  of 
property  by  death  or  the  burdens  whidh  may  be  imposed 
resulting  therefrom,  because  that  amendment  confines 
the  states  absolutely,  both  as  to  the  passage  of  such  prop- 
erty and  as  to  the  burdens  imposed  thereon,  to  the  rule  of 
blood  relationship.  To  state  the  proposition  is  to  answer 
it.  A  state  may  prefer  near  relatives  by  affinity  to  col- 
lateral relatives.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not 
deprive  a  state  of  the  power  to  regulate  and  burden  the 
right  to  inherit,  but  at  the  most  can  only  be  held  to 
restrain  such  an  exercise  of  power  as  would  exclude  the 
conception  of  judgment  and  discretion,  and  which  would 
be  so  obviously  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  as  to  be  be- 
yond the  pale  of  governmental  authority.  Campbell  v. 
California,  200  U.  S.  87. 

§  360.  State  inheritance  tax.  Successions  which  have 
been  finally  closed  and  administered  upon  may  be  ex- 
empted from  the  inheritance  tax  imposed  by  the  Louis- 
iana act  of  June  28, 1904,  without  rendering  such  statute 
void  as  making  an  arbitrary  classification  which  amounts 
to  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  where  the 
highest  state  court  Inakes  the  validity  of  the  tax  depend 
upon  this  classification  by  deciding  that  the  state  can  tax 
the  property  until  it  has  passed  out  of  the  succession  of 
the  testator.  Successions  which  have  been  closed  are 
exempt  from  the  tax,  and  a  discrimination  is  claimed  to 
be  made  between  heirs  whose  rights  have  become  fixed 
and  vested  on  the  same  day.  The  classification  is  said  to 
be  purely  arbitrary.  But  the  state  supreme  court  made 
the  validity  of  the  tax  depend  on  the  very  fact  which  is 
attacked  as  an  improper  basis  of  classification.  The  court 
decided  the  property  bequeathed  was  property  the  state 
could  tax,  **  until  it  had  passed  out  of  the  succession  of 
the  testator.*'  It  was  certainly  not  improper  classifica- 
tion to  make  the  tax  depend  upon  a  fact  without  which  it 
would  have  been  invalid.  In  other  words,  those  who  are 
subject  to  be  taxed  cannot  complain  that  they  are  denied 


§  360  POWER  OF  TAXATION  631 

the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  because  those  who  can 
not  legally  be  taxed  are  not  taxed.  Cahen  v.  Brewster, 
203  U.  S.  543. 

The  Illinois  statute  excluding  foreign  corporations  from 
the  exemption  from  an  inheritance  tax  in  favor  of  prop- 
erty devised  for  educational  or  religious  uses,  does  not 
abridge  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States  or  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The 
power  of  the  state  to  classify  objects  of  legislation  and 
discriminate  between  classes  is  not  unconstitutionally  ex- 
ercised by  legislation  which  exempts  the  religious  and 
educational  institutions  of  the  state  from  an  inheritance 
tax  and  subjects  educational  and  religious  institutions  of 
other  states  to  the  tax.  Eegarding  alone  the  purposes  of 
the  institutions,  no  difference  may  be  perceived  between 
them,  but  regarding  the  spheres  of  their  exercise,  and 
benefits  derived  from  their  exercise,  a  difference  is  con- 
spicuous. This  benefit  may  have  constituted  the  induce- 
ment of  the  legislation.  The  controversies  in  this  case 
depend  upon  the  power  of  the  state  over  inheritances, 
and  the  conditions  she  may  put  upon  them  in  the  exercise 
of  that  power.  In  laying  an  inheritance  tax  the  legis- 
lature may  consider  the  relation  which  the  person  or 
corporation  given  the  right  of  succession  sustains  to  the 
deceased,  to  the  property,  or  to  the  state,  and  may  regu- 
late the  amount  of  the  tax  to  be  required  in  view  of  such 
relation,  and  in  exercising  this  power  may  lay  a  tax  on 
the  right  of  one  class  of  persons  or  corporations  to  take, 
and  may  deem  it  wise  to  impose  no  tax  upon  the  right  of 
other  classes  of  persons  or  corporations  to  take.  A  Fed- 
eral court  would  hesitate  indeed  to  put  impediments  on 
this  power  or  declare  invalid  any  classification  of  persons 
or  corporations  that  had  reasonable  regard  to  the  pur- 
poses of  the  state  and  its  legislation.  And  it  cannot  be 
said  that  if  a  state  exempt  property  bequeathed  for  char- 
itable or  educational  purposes  from  taxation  it  is  unrea- 
sonable or  arbitrary  to  require  the  charity  to  be  exercised 
or  the  education  to  be  bestowed  within  her  borders  and 


632  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  1 360 

for  her  people,  whether  exercised  through  persons  or 
corporations.  Board  of  Education  v.  Dlinois,  203  U.  S. 
553. 

§361.  Inheritance  tax.  The  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  is  not  denied  by  the  imposition  of  the  inheritance  tax 
provided  for  by  the  New  York  law  upon  certain  bequests 
of  personalty  by  a  nonresident  decedent  owning  both  real 
and  personal  property  within  the  state  because,  under 
the  statute  as  construed  by  the  state  courts,  the  tax  could 
not  be  collected  if  the  only  property  belonging  to  the 
decedent  situated  within  the  state  was  personalty. 
Under  the  statute  an  inheritance  tax  may  be  collected 
where  the  nonresident  decedent  owns  both  personal  and 
real  property  within  the  state  of  New  York,  and  not  where 
the  only  property  belonging  to  the  decedent  situate 
within  the  state  is  personalty.  But  though  the  operation 
of  the  statutes  creates  a  difference,  this,  even  if  inten- 
tional, is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  invalidate  the  tax.  The 
power  of  the  state  in  respect  to  the  matter  of  taxation  is 
very  broad,  at  least,  so  far  as  the  Federal  Constitution 
is  concerned.  It  may  exempt  certain  property  from  taxa- 
tion  while  all  other  is  subjected  thereto.  It  may  tax  one 
class  of  property  by  one  method  of  procedure  and  another 
by  a  different  method.  * '  The  right  to  make  exemptions 
is  involved  in  the  right  to  select  the  subjects  of  taxation 
and  apportion  the  public  burdens  among  them,  and  may 
consequently  be  understood  to  exist  in  the  lawmaking 
power  wherever  it  has  not  in  terms  been  taken  away.  To 
some  extent  it  must  exist  always,  for  the  selection  of  sub- 
jects of  taxation  is,  of  itself,  an  exemption  of  what  is  not 
selected. '  ^  Indeed,  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  rule 
that  mere  inequalities  or  exemptions  in  the  matter  of 
state  taxation  are  not  forbidden  by  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution.   Beers  v.  Glynn,  211  U.  S.  477. 

§362.  State  taxation    of  meat-packing  houses.    The 

equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  a  foreign  meat- 


§  363  POWEE  OF  TAXATION  633 

packing  house  by  the  tax  imposed  on  its  local  business 
under  the  North  Carolina  statute  taxing  '*  every  meat- 
packing house  doing  business  in  this  state, ' '  although  at 
the  point  where  such  local  business  is  carried  on,  persons 
selling  meat-packing  house  products,  but  not  doing  a 
meat-packing  house  business  either  in  North  Carolina  or 
elsewhere,  are  not  subjected  to  the  tax.  The  classification 
of  meat-packing  houses  cannot  be  said  to  be  an  arbitrary 
selection  or  not  to  rest  on  reasonable  grounds,  and  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  intended  to  prevent  a 
state  from  adjusting  its  system  of  taxation  in  all  proper 
and  reasonable  ways,  or,  through  the  undoubted  power 
of  classification,  to  impose  different  taxes  upon  different 
trades  and  professions.  By  the  act  under  consideration 
the  tax  is  levied  upon  every  packing  house  doing  business 
in  the  state,  which  includes  by  its  terms  both  domestic  and 
foreign  meat-packing  houses.  It  appears  that  where 
plaintiff  in  error  does  business  certain  persons  sell,  both 
by  wholesale  and  retail,  packing-house  products,  and  yet 
are  not  subjected  to  this  tax,  but  also  that  those  parties 
are  not  doing,  either  in  North  Carolina  or  elsewhere,  a 
packing-house  business.  The  statute  cannot  be  said  to 
deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  meat-packing 
houses  because  houses  packing  vegetables  and  the  like 
are  not  included  in  the  same  classification,  and  subject 
to  the  same  tax.  When  the  state  exerts  its  power  to  tax 
it  is  not  bound  to  tax  all  pursuits  or  all  property  that 
may  be  legitimately  taxed  for  governmental  purposes. 
Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  Lacy,  200  U.  S.  226. 

§363.  Discrunination  in  taxing  liquor  sellers.  The 
statutes  of  Texas  do  not  deny  to  liquor  sellers  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  because  producers  or  manufac- 
turers of  domestic  wines  are  exempt  while  such  wines  are 
in  their  hands,  from  the  tax  imposed  and  the  bond  re- 
quired by  preceding  article  regulating  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors.  So  far  as  appears  there  is  no  natural 
distinction  of  classes  among  liquor  sellers, — one  class  sell- 


634  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  363 

ing  their  own  domestic  wines  alone,  another  selling  all 
intoxicants  except  domestic  wines.  Whatever  other  ob- 
jections there  may  be  to  the  laws,  they  do  not  deny  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  by  forbidding,  without  justi- 
fication, to  one  what  they  permit  to  another  class.  One 
slight  qualification  is  necessary  to  what  has  been  said. 
There  is  granted  to  the  producers  and  manufacturers  of 
wine  from  grapes  grown  in  Texas  an  immunity  in  respect 
of  that  wine  which  is  not  granted  to  other  sellers  of  the 
same  wine.  To  that  extent,  but  to  that  extent  alone, 
favor  is  shown  to  a  class.  But  this  is  not  the  class  dis- 
crimination put  forward  and  insisted  upon.  The  attack 
is  not  mainly  upon  the  distinction  between  producers  and 
other  sellers  of  domestic  wine,  but  upon  that  between 
those  producers  and  the  sellers  of  other  wine.  The  latter 
is  not  a  true  class  distinction.  Whether  there  is  a  differ- 
ence in  the  scope  of  the  state 's  general  power  to  legislate 
and  its  power  to  tax  or  not,  the  former  does  not  need  an 
extended  defense  so  far  as  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
alone  is  concerned.    Cox  v.  Texas,  202  U.  S.  446. 

§  364.  Validity  of  stock  tranrfer  tax.  The  New  York 
law  imposing  a  tax  on  corporate  stock  is  not  invalid  under 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  as  making  an  arbitrary  dis- 
crimination in  favor  of  sales  of  other  kinds  of  personal 
property,  such  as  corporate  bonds.  This  objection  to  a 
tax  must  be  approached  iwith  the  greatest  caution.  The 
general  expressions  of  the  amendment  must  not  be  allowed 
to  upset  familiar  and  long-established  methods  and  proc- 
esses by  a  formal  elaboration  of  rules  which  its  words 
do  not  import.  Stamp  acts  necessarily  are  confined  to 
certain  classes  of  transactions,  and  to  classes  which,  con- 
sidered economically  or  from  the  legal  or  other  possible 
points  of  view,  are  not  very  different  from  other  classes 
that  escape.  Stamp  taxes  must  be  levied  upon  things 
that  can  be  conveniently  taxed.  It  is  easy  to  say  that 
justice  and  equality  cannot  be  measured  by  the  conven- 
ience of  the  taxing  power.    Yet  economists  do  not  con- 


§  366  POWER  OP  TAXATION  635 

demn  stamp  acts,  neither  does  the  Constitution.  There 
is  no  discrimination  in  separating  sales  of  stock  from 
sales  of  other  kinds  of  personal  property.  A  fortiori 
do  they  warrant  a  tas  on  sales  which  is  no^  intended  to 
discrimmate  against  or  to  discourage  them,  but  simply  to 
collect  a  revenue  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  community 
in  a  convenient  way.  New  York  ex  reL  Hatch  v.  Bear- 
don,  204  U.  S.  152. 

§  365.  Taxation  of  spirits  in  bond.  The  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws  is  not  denied  by  the  taxation  of  distilled 
spirits  in  bonded  warehouses  in  the  state,  provided  by 
the  Kentucky  statute,  under  which  the  warehouseman  is 
made  liable  to  pay  the  tax,  and  is  given  a  lien  on  the 
property  for  the  amount  paid.  It  is  contended  that  the 
power  of  the  Federal  Government  over  the  spirits  and  the 
distillery,  and  its  custody  of  them,  is  exclusive  of  the 
exercise  of  any  other  power  whatever,  and  that  such 
custody  has  the  effect  to  withdraw,  in  legal  contemplation, 
the  property  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state,  though 
it  is  actually  present  in  the  state,  making  it,  indeed,  as 
though  it  were  outside  of  the  territorial  limits  of  the  state. 
And  it  is  hence  concluded  that  plaintiff  in  error  by  the 
law  of  Kentucky  is  made  to  pay  taxes  on  property  belong- 
ing to  another  person  outside  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
state,  and  is  thus  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
The  state  however  disclaims  any  purpose  of  collecting 
the  taxes  so  long  as  the  spirits  are  in  the  custody  or 
under  the  lien  of  the  Federal  Government.  The  distinc- 
tion made  by  the  taxing  power  of  the  state  between  dis- 
tilled spirits  in  bond  and  other  property  does  not 
constitute  a  discrimination  condemned  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The  power  of  the  state  to  classify  persons 
and  property  in  its  legislation  is  well  established  and  the 
power  is  not  transcended  by  the  statute  under  review. 
Thompson  v.  Kentucky,  209  U.  S.  340. 

§366.  Taxing  wholesale  dealers  in  oils.  The  Texas 
law  imposing  an  occupation  tax  upon  wholesale  dealers 


636  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  366 

in  oils  does  not  deny  them  the  equal  protection  of  the 
lawSy  although  no  similar  tax  is  exacted  from  wholesale 
dealers  in  other  articles  of  merchandise,  such  as  sugar, 
bacon,  coal,  and  iron.  The  tax  in  question  is  conceded  to 
be  an  occupation  tax  simply.  It  was  imposed  under  the 
authority  of  the  state  constitution  providing  that  the 
legislature  may  impose  occupation  taxes.  It  is  not  ques- 
tioned that  the  state  may  classify  occupations  for  pur- 
poses of  taxation.  In  its  discretion  it  may  tax  all,  or  it 
may  tax  one  or  some,  taking  care  to  accord  to  all  in  the 
same  class  equality  of  rights.  Except  as  restrained  by 
its  own  constitution  or  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  the  state  of  Texas,  by  its  legislature,  has  full 
power  to  prescribe  any  system  of  taxation  which,  in  its 
judgment,  is  best  or  necessary  for  its  people  and  govern- 
ment; that,  so  far  as  the  power  of  the  United  States  is 
concerned,  the  state  has  the  right,  by  any  rule  it  deems 
proper,  to  classify  persons  or  businesses  for  the  purposes 
of  taxation,  subject  to  the  condition  that  such  classifica- 
tion shall  not  be  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States ;  that  the  requirements  by  the  state,  that 
all  wholesale  dealers  in  specified  articles  shall  pay  a  tax 
of  a  given  amount  on  their  occupation,  without  exacting 
a  similar  tax  on  the  occupation  of  wholesale  dealers  in 
other  articles,  cannot,  on  the  face  of  the  statute  or  by 
reason  of  any  facts  within  the  judicial  knowledge  of  the 
court,  be  held,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  to  deprive  the  taxpayer  of  his  property 
without  due  process  of  law,  or  to  deny  him  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws;  and  that  the  Federal  court  cannot 
interfere  with  the  enforcement  of  the  statute  simply 
because  it  may  disapprove  its  terms,  or  question  the 
wisdom  of  its  enactment,  or  because  it  cannot  be  sure  as 
to  the  precise  reasons  inducing  the  state  to  enact  it. 
Southwestern  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas,  217  U.  S.  114. 

§  367.  Occupation  tax.    The  Kentucky  statute  impos- 
ing a  license  or  occupation  tax  on  the  business  of  com- 


§  368  POWER  OF  TAXATION  637 

ponndingy  rectifying,  adulterating,  or  blending  distilled 
spirits,  is  not  invalid  as  denying  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws,  because  no  such  tax  is  exacted  from  either  resi- 
dent or  nonresident  distillers  who  neither  rectify,  com- 
pound, adulterate,  nor  blend  their  products,  nor  from 
rectifiers  and  blenders  of  other  states  and  countries  who 
vend  in  the  state  untaxed  Rectified  or  blended  spirits,  in 
direct  competition  with  the  spirits  of  local  rectifiers  or 
blenders.  This  is  a  license  tax  imposed  upon  the  doing 
of  a  particular  business  plainly  subject  to  the  regulating 
power  of  the  state.  The  question  involved  is  one  of  classi- 
fication of  subjects,  trades,  or  pursuits,  for  the  purpose 
of  taxation  and  concerns  the  power  of  the  state  to  exer- 
cise discretion  in  the  methods,  subjects,  and  rates  of 
taxation.  Fundamental  to  the  very  existence  of  the  gov- 
ernmental power  of  the  states  as  is  this  function  of  taxa- 
tion, it  is  nevertheless  subject  to  the  beneficent  restriction 
that  it  shall  not  be  so  exercised  as  to  deny  to  any  the 
equal  protection  of  the  law.  But  this  restriction  does  not 
compel  the  adoption  of  ' '  an  iron  rule  of  equal  taxation, ' ' 
nor  prevent  variety  in  methods  of  taxation,  or  discretion 
in  the  selection  of  subjects,  or  classification  for  purposes 
•  of  taxation  of  either  properties,  businesses,  trades,  call- 
ings, or  occupations.  A  very  wide  discretion  must  be  con- 
ceded to  the  legislative  power  of  the  state  in  the  classifi- 
cation of  trades,  callings,  businesses,  or  occupations 
which  may  be  subjected  to  special  forms  of  regulation  or 
taxation  through  an  excise  or  license  tax.  If  the  selection 
or  classification  is  neither  capricious  nor  arbitrary,  and 
rests  upon  some  reasonable  consideration  of  difference 
or  policy,  there  is  no  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
law.    Brown-Forman  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  217  U.  S.  563. 

§  368,  Forfeiture  for  nonpayment  of  taxes.  The  pro- 
visions for  the  forfeiture  of  land  titles  to  the  state  for 
failure  to  list  and  pay  taxes  thereon  for  certain  specified 
years,  made  by  Kentucky  act  of  March  15,  1906,  art.  3, 
does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  because, 


638  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  368 

in  the  application  of  such  statute  it  can  only  meet  condi- 
tions such  as  are  embraced  within  the  law  in  a  part  of  the 
counties  of  the  state.  Landowners  who  did  not  acquire 
their  title  until  after  the  delinquencies  had  occurred  can- 
not claim  to  have  been  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  by  the  application  to  them  of  the  provisions  of  said 
law,  for  the  forfeiture  of  such  lands  to  the  state,  because 
of  the  failure  of  the  owners  to  list  lands  for  taxation  and 
pay  the  taxes  thereon  for  certain  specified  years.  In  such 
cases  the  doctrine  of  innocent  purchasers  does  not  apply. 
The  Supreme  Court  has  frequently  held  that  the  state 
may  classify  the  subjects  of  taxation,  as  long  as  all  per- 
sons similarly  situated  are  treated  alike.  Michigan  G.  B. 
Co.  V.  Powers,  201  U.  S.  245.  This  law  applies  with 
equal  force  to  all  who  are  in  a  condition  to  come  within 
its  terms.  Kentucky  Union  Co.  v,  Kentucky,  219  U.  S. 
140.  I 

§  369.  Classification— Taxes — Sales  for  future  deliyery. 

The  Missouri  statute  is  not  invalid,  as  denying  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  which  singles  out  the  keeping  of 
a  place  where  corporate  stocks  and  bonds,  and  grains, 
provisions,  and  other  commodities  are  bought  and  sold, 
but  not  paid  for  or  delivered  at  the  time,  as  a  proper 
business  for  the  imposition  of  a  stamp  tax  upon  such 
sales.  There  is  no  force  in  the  objection  that  the  classifi- 
cation as  shown  by  the  statute,  is  arbitrary  and  unrea- 
sonable. The  same  methods  and  means  are  applied 
equally  to  all  of  the  same  class.  In  the  opinion  of  the 
state  supreme  court,  the  law  -clearly  embraces  every 
class,  whether  it  be  corporation,  association,  either  volun- 
tary or  otherwise,  partnership,  or  person  which  furnishes 
a  place  for  dealing  in  sales  of  stocks,  bonds,  etc,  upon 
margins  or  otherwise,  where  the  same  are  not  at  the  time 
actually  paid  for  and  delivered,  and  embraces  all  classes 
who  may  deal  in  such  places  so  furnished.  .  .  .  The 
business  which  is  treated  of  by  the  statute  is  fully  recog- 
nized as  a  business  separate  and  distinct  from  all  other 


§  370  POWEE  OP  TAXATION  639 

classes.  .  •  .  So  far  as  the  class  of  persons  to  whom 
the  law  is  made  applicable,  whether  natural  or  artificial, 
the  statute  embraces  the  entire  class,  and  is  not  subject 
to  the  objection  that  it  singles  out  a  part  of  a  legal  class 
upon  which  the  license  or  stamp  tax  is  imposed,  and 
exempts  others  of  the  same  class.  •  .  .  The  selection 
of  the  business  calling  and  the  class  pursuing  such  call- 
ing were  proper  and  appropriately  selected  by  the  legis- 
lature  of  the  state  in  dealing  with  that  subject.  Broad- 
nax  V.  Missouri,  219  U.  S.  285. 

§370.  Excise  tax  on  corporations.  There  is  such  a 
substantial  difference  between  the  carrying  on  of  business 
by  corporations  and  the  same  business  when  conducted 
by  a  private  firm  or  individual  as  would  justify— even 
were  the  principles  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the 
Federal  Constitution  applicable — ^the  excise  imposed  by 
the  act  of  August  5,  1909  (36  Sta.  at  L.  11, 112,  chap.  6, 
•  XT.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  Supp.  1909,  pp.  659,  844),  §  38,  upon 
the  carrying  on  of  business  in  a  corporate  or  quasi  cor- 
porate capacity.  The  thing  taxed  is  not  the  mere  dealing 
in  merchandise,  in  which  the  actual  transactions  may  be 
the  same,  whether  conducted  by  individuals  or  corpora- 
tions, but  the  tax  is  laid  upon  the  privileges  which  exist 
in  conducting  business  with  the  advantages  which  exist 
in  the  corporate  capacity  of  those  taxed,  and  which  are 
not  enjoyed  by  private  firms  or  individuals.  These 
advantages  are  obvious,  and  have  led  to  the  formation  of 
such  companies  in  nearly  all  branches  of  trade.  The  con- 
tinuity of  the  business,  without  interruption  by  death  or 
dissolution,  the  transfer  of  property  interests  by  the  dis- 
position of  shares  of  stock,  the  advantages  of  business 
controlled  and  managed  by  corporate  directors,  the  gen- 
eral absence  of  individual  liability,  these  and  other  things 
inhere  in  the  advantages  of  business  thus  conducted, 
which  do  not  exist  when  the  same  business  is  conducted 
by  private  individuals  or  partnerships.  It  is  this  dis- 
tinctive privilege  which  is  the  subject  of  taxation,  not  the 


640  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  370 

mere  buying  or  seUing  or  handling  of  goods,  which  may 
be  the  same,  whether  done  by  corporations  or  individ- 
uals,   riint  V-  Stone  Tracy  Co.,  220  U.  S.  107. 

§371.  Tax  on  transfers  inter  vivos.  The  New  York 
statute  authorizing  a  tax  measured  by  the  value  of  the 
property,  when  property  is  transferred  by  deed  intended 
to  take  effect  upon  the  death  of  the  grantor,  is  one  in  the 
nature  of  an  excise  tax  on  the  transfer,  and  is  not  void 
as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  guaranteed 
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  because  lacking  in  the 
elements  of  uniformity  and  equality  required  in  the 
assessment  of  property  taxes.  .  •  .  Subjecting  to  the 
tax  a  transfer  of  property  by  deed  intended  to  take  effect 
at  the  death  of  the  grantor,  without  taxing  transfers 
intended  to  take  effect  upon  the  death  of  some  person 
other  than  the  grantor,  or  upon  the  happening  of  a  cer- 
tain or  contingent  event,  does  not  involve  such  a  discrim- 
ination AS  to  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
Children  of  a  decedent,  who,  because  of  their  relationship 
are  assessed  at  the  lowest  rate  fixed  by  the  law  imposing 
a  tax  when  property  is  transferred  by  deed  intended  to 
take  effect  at  the  death  of  the  grantor,  cannot  urge  that 
such  statute  operates  to  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  because  transfers  to  collaterals  and  strangers  in 
blood  are  taxed  a  higher  rate.  There  can  be  no  arbitrary 
or  unreasonable  discrimination.  But  when  there  is  a  dif- 
ference, it  need  not  be  great  or  conspicuous  in  order  to 
warrant  classification.  So  far  as  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment is  concerned,  that  state  could  put  transfers  intended 
to  take  effect  at  the  death  of  the  grantor  in  a  class  with 
transfers  by  descent,  will,  of  gifts  in  contemplation  of 
the  death  of  the  donor,  without,  at  the  same  time,  taxing 
transfers  intended  to  take  effect  on  the  death  of  some 
person  other  than  the  grantor,  or  on  the  happening  of  a 
certain  or  contingent  event.  It  is  now  well  settled  that 
the  state  may  impose  a  graduated  tax  in  this  class  of 
cases.   Keeney  v.  New  York,  222  XT.  S.  525. 


§  373  POWER  OF  TAXATION  641 

§372.  Discrimination  in  license  tax.  The  Montana 
statute  exempting  steam  laundries  and  women  engaged 
in  the  laundry  business,  where  not  more  than  two  women 
are  employed,  from  the  license  tax  imposed  upon  the  laun- 
dry business,  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  to  a  man  operating  a  hand  laundry.  A  state  does 
not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  merely  by 
adjusting  its  revenue  laws  and  taxing  system  in  such  a 
way  as  to  favor  certain  industries  or  forms  of  industry. 
It  may  make  discriminations,  if  founded  on  distinctions 
which  cannot  be  pronounced  unreasonable  and  purely 
arbitrary.  If  a  state  sees  fit  to  encourage  steam  laun- 
dries and  discourage  hand  laundries,  that  is  its  own 
affair.  And  if,  again,  it  finds  a  ground  of  distinction  in 
sex,  that  is  not  without  precedent.  If  Montana  deems  it 
advisable  to  put  a  lighter  burden  upon  women  than  upon 
men  with  regard  to  an  employment  commonly  regarded 
as  more  appropriate  for  the  former,  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  does  not  interfere  by  creating  a  fictitious 
equality  where  there  is  a  real  difference.  The  particular 
points  at  which  that  difference  shall  be  emphasized  by 
legislation  are  largely  in  the  power  of  the  state.  Quong 
Wing  V.  Kirkendall,  223  U.  S.  59. 

§373.  Grading  municipal  license  fees  for  theaters. 

Grading  a  municipal  license  fee  for  theaters  according  to 
the  price  asked  for  the  highest  priced  seats  other  than 
box  seats,  rather  than  according  to  revenue,  is  not  so  pal- 
pably arbitrary  as  to  offend  against  the  guarantee  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  A  classification  based  on  the  distinction  the  theater 
itself  makes  is  not  artificial,  and  must  have  some  relation 
to  the  success  and  ultimate  profit  of  the  business.  There 
is  natural  relation  between  the  price  of  admission  and 
revenue,  some  advantage,  certainly,  that  determines  the 
choice.  The  distinction  obtains  in  every  large  city  of  the 
country.  The  reason  for  it  must  therefore  be  substan- 
tial ;  and  if  it  be  so  universal  in  the  practice  of  the  busi- 

Bne  ProceMh— 41 


642  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  373 

ness,  it  would  seem  not  unreasonable  if  it  be  adopted  as 
the  baais  of  governmental  action.  If  the  action  of  gov- 
ernment have  such  a  basis  it  cannot  be  declared  to  be  so 
palpably  arbitrary  as  to  be  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  .  .  .  This  is  the  test  of  its  validity. 
•  •  •  To  be  able  to  find  fault  with  a  law  is  not  to  dem- 
onstrate its  invalidity.  It  may  seem  unjust  and  oppres- 
sive, yet  be  free  from  judicial  interference.  The 
problems  of  government  are  practical  ones  and  may 
justify,  if  they  do  not  require,  rough  accommodations, — 
illogical,  it  may  be,  and  unscientific.  But  even  such  criti- 
cism should  not  be  hastily  expressed.  What  is  best  is  not 
always  discernible ;  the  wisdom  of  any  choice  may  be  dis- 
puted or  condemned.  Mere  errors  of  judgment  are  not 
subject  to  judicial  review.  It  is  only  its  palpably  arbi- 
trary exercises  which  can  be  declared  void  under  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment;  and  such  judgment  cannot  be 
pronounced  of  the  ordinance  in  controversy.  Metropolis 
Theater  Co.  v.  Chicago,  228  U.  S.  61. 


§374.  Taxation  of  deposits  in  national  banks.  The 
tax  imposed  under  a  Vermont  statute  upon  interest- 
bearing  deposits  in  national  banks  does  not  deny  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  depositors  in  such  banks, 
because  depositors  in  state  banking  institutions  are 
exempted  from  taxation  on  their  deposits  up  to  $2,000, 
such  institutions  paying  a  franchise  tax  upon  the  average 
amount  of  deposits  after  deducting  deposits  in  excess  of 
$2,000,  upon  which  the  depositors  are  taxable  locally,  nor 
because  of  the  exemptions  which  such  statute  makes  in 
favor  of  municipalities,  corporations  organized  solely  for 
charitable,  educational,  or  religious  purposes,  and  various 
corporations  otherwise  taxed,  nor  because  persons  whose 
deposits  do  not  bear  interest  in  excess  of  2  per  cent  per 
annum  are  also  exempted.  In  exercising  its  authority 
to  tax  property  within  its  jurisdiction,  the  state  is  not 
limited  to  one  method.  It  has  a  broad  range  of  discre- 
tion in  classifying  subjects  of  taxation  and  in  employing 


§  375  POWER  OF  TAXATION  643 

different  methods  for  different  sorts  of  property.  The 
Federal  statute  does  not  prescribe  a  rule  with  respect  to 
the  taxation  of  depositors'  credits  on  national  banks. 
State  taxation  of  such  property  must  not  be  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory, and  the  statute  in  question  is  not  open  to 
that  objection.  The  exemptions  in  the  statute  in  favor 
of  municipalities  and  certain  corporations  of  a  quasi- 
public  character  it  was  maidfestly  within  the  power  of 
the  state  to  allow.  Similarly,  with  respect  to  persons 
whose  deposits  did  not  bear  interest  exceeding  2  per  cent 
per  annum,  the  legislature  took  this  method  of  recog- 
nizing a  practical  difference  between  deposit  accounts  of 
the  ordinary  commercial  sort  and  those  which  partook, 
generally  speaking,  of  the  character  of  savings  accounts. 
It  cannot  be  said  that  the  classification  adopted  was 
purely  arbitrary  or  beyond  the  power  of  the  state.  Clem- 
ent National  Bank  v.  Vermont,  231  U.  S.  120. 

§  375.  Taxation  of  mineral  rights.  The  assessment  for 
taxing  purposes  of  mineral  rights  where  they  have  been 
separately  conveyed  and  are  owned  by  persons  other  than 
the  owners  of  the  surface  estates,  without  any  corre- 
sponding deduction  from  the  assessments  against  the 
surface  owners,  does  not  violate  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, as  discriminating  against  the  owners  of  the  mineral 
rights  so  assessed,  where  it  does  not  appear  that  mineral 
rights  known  to  exist  were  consciously  relieved  from 
taxation  if  they  belonged  to  the  owners  of  the  surface. 
Usually  real  estate  is  taxed  as  a  unit;  but  as  different 
elements  of  the  land  are  capable  of  being  severed  and 
separately  owned,  the  statute  may  authorize  a  separate 
assessment  against  the  owners  of  the  severed  parts. 
Accordingly,  if  the  title  has  been  severed,  land  may  be 
taxed  to  one,  timber  to  another,  or  land  to  one  and  coal  to 
another.  The  state  court  held  that  such  was  the  law  of 
Texas,  in  view  of  the  general  language  of  the  statute 
defining  real  estate  as  including  not  only  the  land  itself, 
but  the  buildings  on  the  land  and  the  minerals  under  the 


644  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  375 

land.  There  was  therefore  nothing  discriminatory  in  tax- 
ing the  owner  of  the  mineral  right  that  which  had  been 
sold  to  him,  and  separately  assessing  the  owner  of  the 
surface  with  what  remained.  If  the  latter  was  over- 
assessed  it  affords  no  defense  to  the  owner  of  the  mineral 
rights.   Downman  v.  Texas,  231  U.  S.  353. 

§  376.  Taxation  of  savings  banks.  Requiring  savings 
banks  to  include  in  the  computation  of  their  assets  for 
taxation  notes  secured  by  mortgages  upon  Minnesota  real 
estate  upon-  which  the  registration  tax  has  been  paid,  as 
is  done  by  Minnesota  Laws,  1907,  chap.  328,  which  at  the 
same  time  relieves  mortgages  upon  such  real  estate  when 
otherwise  owned  from  all  taxation  except  the  registra- 
tion tax  cannot  be  deemed  to  contravene  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  law's  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
in  view  of  the  privileges  respecting  taxation  enjoyed  by 
savings  banks  under  Minnesota  Laws,  1905,  chap.  839, 
accorded  to  no  other  person  or  corporation  subject  to 
taxation.  If  there  is  no  unconstitutional  discrimination 
against  savings  banks  it  is  imnecessary  to  inquire 
whether  the  act  discriminates  against  other  banks  and 
trust  companies.  There  were  reasonable  grounds  for  the 
discrimination  so  far  as  savings  banks  were  concerned, 
and  therefore  the  plaintiff  in  error  had  not  been  deprived 
of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Farmers  &  M.  Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Minnesota,  232  XJ.  S.  516. 

§  377.  Discrimination  against  oleomargarind  in  license 
tax.  A  license  tax  of  1  cent  per  pound  sold  for  carrying 
on  the  business  of  selling  oleomargarine  does  not  deny 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  because  it  puts  oleomar- 
garine in  a  class  by  itself,  and  discriminates  between  it 
and  butter,  although  the  tax  is  pronounced  or  assumed 
by  the  state  to  be  a  revenue  measure.  Apart  from  inter- 
ference with  commerce  among  the  states,  a  state  may 
restrict  the  manufacture  of  oleomargarine  in  a  way  in 
which  it  does  not  hamper  that  of  butter.    It  may  even 


§  379  POWiK  OF  TAXATION  645 

prohibit  the  manufacture  altogether.  It  may  express 
and  carry  out  its  policy  as  well  in  a  revenue  as  in  a  police 
law.  See  McCray  v.  United  States,  195  U.  S.  27,  62,  63. 
Hammond  Packing  Co.  y.  Montana,  233  U.  S.  331. 

§  378.  Excise  tax  imposed  on  gross  eaniings  of  rail- 
way companies.  Railway  companies  doing  business  in 
Ohio  are  not  arbitrarily  discriminated  against,  contrary 
to  the  uniformity  and  equality  provisions  of  the  state  con- 
stitution, of  the  equal  protection  of  the  law's  clause  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  by  102  Ohio  Laws,  224, 
because  it  does  not  include  all  other  public  utilities  carry- 
ing on  business  within  the  state,  or  because  those  public 
utilities  which  it  does  include  are  not  all  taxed  at  the  same 
rate.  It  cannot  be  said  that  this  classification  rests  upon 
no  reasonable  and  sufficient  basis  of  distinction.  Ohio 
River  &  W.  B.  Co.  v.  Dittey,  232  U.  S.  576. 

§379.  Discrimination  in  license  tax.  The  Alabama 
statute  exempting  merchants  selling  sewing  machines  at 
their  regularly  established  places  of  business  from  the 
license  or  occupation  tax  imposed  by  the  state  upon  the 
business  of  selling  or  delivering  sewing  machines,  does 
not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  as  making  an 
arbitrary  discrimination.  It  was  objected  to  the  statute 
that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  a  distinction,  with 
respect  to  taxing  the  occupation,  between  the  business  of 
selling  sewing  machines  from  a  regularly  established 
store,  and  the  business  of  selling  them  from  a  delivery 
wagon.  But  there  is  an  evident  difference,  in  the  mode 
of  doing  business,  between  the  local  tradesman  and  the 
itinerant  dealer,  and  the  court  was  unable  to  say  that  the 
distinction  made  between  them  for  purposes  of  taxation 
was  arbitrarily  made.  In  such  matters  the  states  neces- 
sarily enjoy  a, wide  range  of  discretion,  and  it  would 
require  a  clear  case  to  justify  the  courts  in  striking  down 
a  law  that  is  uniformly  applicable  to  all  persons  pursuing 
a  given  occupation,  on  the  ground  that  persons  engaged 


646  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  379 

in  other  occapations  more  or  less  like  it  ought  to  be  simi- 
larly taxed.  This  is  not  such  a  case.  Singer  Sewing 
Machine  Co.  v.  Brickell,  233  U.  S.  304. 

§380.  State  taxation  of  memberships  in  an  incor- 
porated chamber  of  commerce.  State  taxation  of  mem- 
berships in  an  incorporated  chamber  of  commerce  is  not 
repugnant  to  the  Federal  Constitution  as  double  taxation 
because  the  property  of  the  corporation  has  been  fully 
taxed,  since  such  memberships  are  property,  distinct 
from  the  assets  of  the  corporation.  The  taxation  of  mem- 
berships in  an  incorporated  chamber  of  commerce  does 
not  deny  the  members  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
guaranteed  by  the  Federal  Constitution,  because  of  the 
exemption  from  taxation  of  such  organizations  as  the 
''Associated  Press,  lodges,  fraternal  orders,  churches, 
etc. ' '   Bogers  v.  Hennepin  County,  239  U.  S.  621. 

§381.  Assessment  for  public  improvements.  A  mu- 
nicipal ordinance  that,  in  creating  the  taxing  district 
under  which,  under  the  city  charter,  three-fourths  of  the 
cost  of  paving  a  street  is  to  be  assessed  according  to  area, 
established  a  boundary  line  that,  after  running  for  some 
distance  on  a  line  not  100  feet  back  from  the  street, 
jumped  to  nearly  500  feet  when  it  encountered  an  undi- 
vided tract,  and  that  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  street 
was  150  or  240  feet  away,  violates  the  U.  S.  Constitution, 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  where  such  differences  were  not 
based  upon  any  consideration  of  difference  in  benefits 
conferred,  but  were  established  mechanically,  in  obedience 
to  the  criteria  that  the  charter  directed  to  be  applied. 
The  ordinance  following  the  orders  of  the  charter  is  bad 
upon  its  face  as  distributing  a  local  tax  in  grossly  unequal 
proportions,  not  because  of  special  considerations  ap- 
plicable to  the  parcels  taxed,  but  in  blind  obedience  to  a 
rule  that  requires  the  result.  And  it  cannot  be  said  that 
the  ordinance  as  a  whole  may  be  regarded  as  an  indi- 
vidual exception  under  a  rule  that  promises  justice  in  aU 


§  382  POWER  OF  TAXATION  647 

ordinary  cases.  Gast  Bealty  &  Investment  Company  v. 
Schneider  Granite  Company,  240  U.  S.  55,  Ditto,  240 
U.  S.  60. 

§  382.  Trading  stamps  and  premium  coupons,  discrimi- 
nations agfainst  not  in  violation  of  equal  protection  clause. 
There  is  such  a  difference  between  the  selling  of  goods 
accompanied  by  coupons,  profit-sharing  certificates,  or 
other  evidences  of  indebtedness  or  liability  redeemable 
in  premiums,  and  the  selling  of  goods  without  such 
inducements  to  purchasers,  that  the  imposition  upon  the 
former  business  of  an  additional  license  tax  for  each 
place  in  each  and  every  county  in  which  said  business  is 
conducted,  as  is  done  by  Florida  laws,  does  not  oflFend 
against  the  equal  protection  of  the  law 's  clause.  The  dif- 
ference between  a  business  where  coupons  are  used,  even 
regarding  their  use  as  a  means  of  advertising,  and  a 
business  where  they  are  not  used,  is  pronounced.  A  dis- 
tinction in  legislation  is  not  arbitrary,  if  any  state  of 
facts  reasonably  can  be  conceived  that  would  sustain  it, 
and  the  existence  of  that  state  of  facts  at  the  time  the 
law  was  enacted  must  be  assumed.  It  makes  no  differ- 
ence that  the  facts  may  be  disputed  or  their  effect  opposed 
by  argument  and  opinion  of  serious  strength.  It  is  not 
within  the  competency  of  the  courts  to  arbitrate  in  such 
contrariety.  The  legislature  **may  make  discriminations 
if  founded  on  distinctions  that  we  cannot  pronounce, 
unreasonable  and  purely  arbitrary.'^  Qoung  Wing  v. 
Kirkendall,  223  U.  S.  59,  62. 

The  penalties  of  $1,000  fine,  or  six  months'  imprison- 
ment, prescribed  by  the  Florida  law,  for  violation  of  its 
provisions  against  the  sale  without  payment  of  the  speci- 
fied license  fee,  of  merchandise  accompanied  by  coupons, 
profit-sharing  certificates,  or  other  evidences  of  indebt- 
edness, or  other  liability  redeemable  in  premiums,  are  not 
so  severe  as  to  intimidate  against  a  contest  of  the  validity 
of  such  statute,  and  thus  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.   East  v.  Van  Deman  &  Lewis  Co.,  240  U.  S.  342. 


648  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  382 

The  imposition  under  the  law  of  the  state  of  Washing- 
ton, of  an  annual  license  tax  of  $6,000  upon  merchants 
using  stamps,  tickets  or  coupons  redeemable  in  cash  or 
merchandise,  is  not  repugnant  to  the  equal  protection 
clause  of  the  Constitution,  as  an  attempted  arbitrary 
classification,  whether  such  stamps  are  prepared  or 
redeemed  by  the  merchant  issuing  them  or  by  a  third 
party  with  whom  the  merchant  has  a  contract  for  their 
use.  The  classification  in  this  case  was  sustained,  as  in 
numerous  other  cases  cited,  because  within  the  power  of 
the  legislature  over  the  subject-matter,  and  it  being  the 
conception  of  the  legislature  that  the  regulation  and 
restriction  were  in  the  interest  of  the  public  welfare. 
Tanner  v.  Little,  240  U.  S.  369.  Pitney  v.  Washington, 
240  U.  S.  387. 

§382a.  State  tazatioQ  of  consolidated  railway  oom- 
pany.  The  state  of  Alabama,  in  imposing  the  annual 
franchise  tax  exacted  from  domestic  corporations  upon  a 
consolidated  railway  corporation  existing  by  virtue  of  the 
consolidation  under  concurrent  acts  of  the  states  of  Ten- 
nessee, Mississippi,  and  Alabama,  of  three  independent 
and  distinct  railroad  corporations,  created  by,  and  for- 
merly operated  solely  within  the  respective  states  named, 
and  in  measuring  such  tax  by  the  entire  capital  sto(&  of 
the  consolidated  corporation  instead  of  measuring  it  by 
the  amount  of  capital  employed  in  the  state,  as  is  done 
in  the  case  of  foreign  corporations,  violated  neither  the 
due  process,  commerce,  or  equal  protection  clauses  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  where  the  Alabama  consolidation 
statute  expressly  provided  that  the  consolidated  corpora- 
tion shall  in  all  respects  be  subject  to  the  laws  of  the  state 
as  a  domestic  corporation.  The  railroads  comprising  this 
consolidation  entered  upon  it  with  the  Alabama  statute 
before  them  and  under  its  conditions,  and,  subject  to  con- 
stitutional objections  as  to  its  enforcement,  they  cannot 
be  heard  to  complain  of  the  terms  under  which  they  vol- 
untarily invoked  and  received  the  grant  of  corporate 


§  382a  POWER  OP  TAXATION  649 

existence  from  the  state  of  Alabama.  The  company  is 
not  deprived  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The 
state  imposes  the  franchise  tax  equally  npon  all  of  its 
corporations,  consolidated  or  otherwise.  The  fact  that  a 
wholly  intrastate  corporation  may  own  no  property  out- 
side of  the  state,  while  the  consolidated  company  does, 
presents  no  case  of  arbitrary  classification.  In  both  cases 
the  franchise  tax  is  based  upon  a  percentage  of  the  capital 
stock.  There  is  no  denial  of  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
because  a  state  may  impose  a  different  rate  of  taxation 
upon  a  foreign  corporation  for  the  privilege  of  doing 
business  within  the  state  than  it  applies  to  its  own  corpo- 
rations upon  the  franchise  which  the  state  grants  in 
creating  them.  Kansas  City,  M.  &  B.  B.  Co.  v.  Stiles, 
242  U.  S.  111. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

CONTBOL   OF   BAILB0AD8 

§  383.  Legislative  control  over  railroad  fare  and  rates. 

The  right  of  the  state  to  regulate  railroads,  except  so 
far  as  such  regulation  would  interfere  with  commerce 
between  the  states  and  with  foreign  countries,  has  not 
been  impaired  by  the  equal  protection  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  Because  they  are  public  service  cor- 
porations they  are  subject  to  legislative  control  and  the 
amendment  does  not  prohibit  the  states  from  singling 
out  railroad  corporations  for  the  purpose  of  imposing  on 
them  rules  and  regulations  not  applied  to  other  corporar 
tions  or  to  individuals.  The  Illinois  statute  of  1874 
to  establish  reasonable  maximum  rates  of  charges  for 
the  transportation  of  freight  and  passengers  on  the  dif- 
ferent railroads  of  the  state  is  not  void  as  being 
repugnant  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  or  to 
that  of  the  state.  The  statute  divides  the  railroads  of  the 
state  into  classes,  according  to  business,  and  establishes 
a  maximum  of  rates  for  each  of  the  classes.  It  operates 
uniformly  on  each  class,  and  this  is  all  the  Constitution 
requires.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  state  in  the  case  of 
McAunich  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Iowa  343,  in  speaking  of  legis- 
lation as  to  classes,  said:  ** These  laws  are  general  and 
uniform,  not  because  they  operate  upon  every  person  in 
the  state,  for  they  do  not,  but  because  every  person  who 
is  brought  within  the  relation  and  circumstances  provided 
for  is  affected  by  the  law.  They  are  general  and  uniform 
in  their  operation  upon  all  persons  in  the  like  situation, 
and  the  fact  of  their  being  general  and  uniform  is  not 
affected  by  the  number  of  persons  within  the  scope  of 
their  operation.'*    This  act  does  not  grant  to  any  rail- 

650 


§  384  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  651 

road  company  privileges  or  immunities  which,  upon  the 
same  terms,  do  not  equally  belong  to  every  other  railroad 
company.  Whenever  a  company  comes  into  any  class,  it 
has  all  the  ** privileges  and  immunities**  that  havel^een 
granted  by  the  statute  to  any  other  company  in  that  class. 
It  is  very  clear  that  a  uniform  rate  of  charges  for  all 
railroad  companies  in  the  state  might  operate  unjustly 
upon  some.  It  was  proper,  therefore,  to  provide  in  some 
way  for  an  adaptation  of  the  rates  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  different  roads ;  and  the  General  Assembly,  in  the 
exercise  of  its  legislative  discretion,  has  seen  fit  to  do 
this  by  a  system  of  classification.  **  Whether  this  was  the 
best  that  could  have  been  done,  *  *  said  the  Supreme  Court, 
*'is  not  for  us  to  decide.  Our  province  is  only  to  deter- 
mine whether  it  could  be  done  at  all,  and  under  any  cir- 
cumstances. If  it  could,  the  legislature  must  decide  for 
itself,  subject  to  no  control  from  us,  whether  the  common 
good  requires  that  it  should  be  done. '  *  Chicago,  B.  and 
Q.  E.  E.  Co.  V.  Cutts,  94  U.  S.  155, 183. 

§384.  City  ordinance  as  to  railroad.  A  municipal 
ordinance  prohibiting  the  use  of  the  engines  of  a  railroad 
company  on  a  certain  street  in  said  city,  does  not  impair 
the  vested  rights  of  the  company  under  its  charter,  nor 
deprive  the  company  of  its  property  without  due  process 
of  law,  nor  deny  the  company  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  Because  this  company  is  alone  named  in  the  ordi- 
nance, the  ordinance  is  not  special  only,  and,  therefore, 
invalid  where  no  other  person  or  corporation  has  the 
right  to  run  locomotives  on  said  street.  On  this  account, 
the  ordinance,  while  apparently  limited  in  its  operation, 
is  in  effect  general,  as  it  applies  to  all  who  can  do  what 
is  prohibited.  Other  railroad  companies  may  occupy 
other  streets  and  use  locomotives  there ;  but  other  streets 
may  not  be  situated  like  Broad  Street,  neither  may  there 
be  the  same  reasons  why  steam  transportation  should  be 
excluded  from  them.  All  laws  should  be  general  in  their 
operation,  but  all  places  within  the  same  city  do  not 


652  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  %  384 

necessarily  require  the  same  local  regulation.  While 
locomotives  may  with  very  great  propriety  be  excluded 
from  one  street,  or  even  from  one  part  of  a  street,  it 
would  be  sometimes  unreasonable  to  exclude  them  from 
alL  It  is  the  special  duty  of  the  city  authorities  to  make 
the  necessary  discrimination  in  this  particular.  Bich- 
mond,  F.  and  P.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Richmond,  96  U.  S.  521. 

§385.  Valuation  and  taxation  of  railroad  property. 

Under  the  constitution  of  Kentucky  there  is  nothing  to 
forbid  the  classification  of  property  for  purposes  of  taxa- 
tion, and  the  valuation  of  different  classes  by  different 
methods.  Railroad  property,  owing  to  its  inherent 
nature,  may  form  a  separate  class,  for  purposes  of  valua- 
tion and  taxation.  If  the  mode  of  valuation  is  due  process 
of  law,  its  difference  in  some  details  from  the  mode  of 
valuing  other  descriptions  and  classes  of  property  does 
not  operate  as  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  The  discrimination  against  railroad  companies  and 
their  property,  which  is  the  subject  of  complaint  as  being 
unjust  and  unconstitutional,  arises  from  the  fact  that,  in 
the  legislation  of  Kentucky  on  the  subject,  railroad  prop- 
erty, though  called  real  estate,  is  classed  by  itself  as  dis- 
tinct from  other  real  estate,  such  as  farms  and  city  lots, 
and  subjected  to  different  means  and  methods  for  ascer- 
taining their  value  for  purposes  of  taxation,  and  differing 
as  well  from  those  applied  to  the  property  of  corpora- 
tions chartered  for  other  purposes  such  as  bridge,  mining, 
street  railway,  manufacturing,  gas,  and  water  companies. 
These  latter  report  to  the  auditor  the  total  cash  value  of 
their  property,  and  pay  into  the  treasury  as  a  tax,  upon 
each  one  hundred  dollars  of  its  value,  a  sum  equal  to  th« 
tax  collected  upon  the  same  value  of  real  estate;  and 
their  reports  and  valuations  are  treated  as  complete  and 
perfect  assessments,  not  subject  to  revision  by  any  board 
or  court,  and  conclusive  upon  the  taxing  officers.  The 
constitution  of  Kentucky  does  not  require  taxes  to  be 
levied  by  a  uniform  method,  upon  all  descriptions  of  prop- 


§  386  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  653 

eiiy.  It  is  a  matter  of  legislative  discretion^  and  there  is 
nothing  to  forbid  the  classification  of  property  for  pur- 
poses of  taxation  and  the  valuation  of  different  classes 
by  different  methods.  The  rule  of  equality  only  requires 
that  the  law  shall  operate  equally  and  uniformly  upon  all 
persons  in  similar  circumstances.  The  right  to  classify 
railroad  property  as  a  separate  class  for  purposes  of 
taxation  grows  out  of  the  inherent  nature  of  the  property 
and  the  discretion  vested  by  the  constitution  of  the  state 
in  its  legislature,  and  necessarily  involves  the  rights  on 
its  party  to  devise  and  carry  into  effect  a  distinct  scheme, 
with  different  tribunals,  in  the  proceeding  to  value  it. 
The  mode  of  valuing  railroad  property  for  taxation  under 
this  statute  is  due  process  of  law,  and  that  being  the  case, 
the  details  in  which  it  differs  from  the  mode  of  valuing 
other  descriptions  and  classes  of  property  cannot  be  con- 
sidered as  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
Cincinnati,  N.  0.  and  T.  P.  B.  E.  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  115 
U.  S.  321. 

§386.  Liability  to  employee  for  negligence  of  fellow 
servant  imder  Iowa  statute.  While  an  employee  of  a 
railroad  company  was  engaged  in  the  removal  of  a  lamp 
bracket  from  a  car,  standing  upon  a  side  track,  he  was 
thrown  from  a  ladder,  and  injured  by  a  car  and  locomo- 
tive being  run  upon  a  side  track,  through  the  opening  of 
a  switch.  He  recovered  judgment  for  $15,000.  Upon  the 
trial  and  upon  a  writ  of  error  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  it  was  insisted  by  the  railroad  company 
that  the  employee  was  guilty  of  negligence  which  con- 
tributed to  his  injury,  in  not  observing  the  approaching 
engine  and  car,  and  that  the  statute  of  Iowa  permitting  a 
recovery  in  such  a  case  was  in  violation  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution,  which  provides 
that  no  state  shall  "deny  to  any  person,  within  its  juris- 
diction, the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,*'  and  that  the 
railroad  company  was  not  guilty  of  negligence.  The 
defendant  in  error  insisted  that  the  switchman,  the  fire- 


654  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  1 386 

man  npon  the  engine^  and  the  engineer  were  all  guilty  of 
negligence.  These  questions  were  presented  by  excep- 
tions to  certain  instructions  given  and  refused,  and  the 
Supreme  Court  being  equally  divided  upon  the  ques- 
tions, the  judgment  below  stood  a£Birmed.  Chicago  and 
Northwestern  B.  Co.  v.  McLaughlin,  119  U.  S.  566. 

§  387.  Liabilities  of  railroad  companies  to  employees. 

The  law  of  Kansas  making  a  railroad  company  liable  to 
an  employee  for  the  negligence  or  mismanagement  of 
other  employees  or  agents  of  the  same  company  is  not  in 
conflict  with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  in  that  it 
deprives  the  company  of  its  property  without  due  process 
of  law  and  denies  to  it  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
Legislation  which  is  special  in  its  character  is  not  obnox- 
ious to  the  last  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  if 
all  persons  subject  to  it  are  treated  alike,  under  similar 
circumstances  and  conditions,  in  respect  both  of  the  privi- 
leges conferred  and  the  liabilities  imposed.  The  objec- 
tion that  the  law  deprives  railroad  companies  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  seems  to  rest  upon  the  theory  that 
legislation  which  is  special  in  its  character  is  necessarily 
within  the  constitutional  inhibition;  but  nothing  can  be 
further  from  the  fact.  .  .  .  The  greater  part  of  all 
legislation  is  special,  either  in  the  objects  sought  to  be 
attained  by  it  or  in  the  extent  of  its  application.  When 
legislation  applies  to  particular  bodies  or  associations, 
imposing  upon  them  additional  liabilities,  it  is  not  open 
to  the  objection  that  it  denies  to  them  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws,  if  all  persons  brought  under  its  influence 
are  treated  alike  under  the  same  conditions.  The  haz- 
ardous business  of  operating  a  railway  would  seem  to  call 
for  special  legislation  with  respect  to  railroad  corpora- 
tions, having  for  its  object  the  protection  of  their  employ- 
ees as  well  as  the  safety  of  the  public  The  business  of 
other  corporations  is  not  subject  to  similar  dangers  to 
their  employees,  and  no  objections,  therefore,  can  be 
made  to  the  legislation  on  the  ground  of  its  making  an 


§  388  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  655 

nnjiist  discrimination.  It  meets  a  particular  necessity, 
and  all  railroad  corporations  are,  without  distinction, 
made  subject  to  the  same  liabilities.  Missouri  Padfic  B. 
Co.  V.  Mackey,  127  U.  S.  205 ;  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  E.  Co. 
V.  Herrick,  127  U.  S.  210. 

§388.  Liability  of  railroad  company  for  omission  to 
fence  its  road.  A  law  which  provides  that  a  railway  cor- 
poration which  neglects  to  pay  for  stock  injured  or  killed 
for  want  of  a  fence  on  the  side  of  its  road  shall  be  liable 
for  double  the  value  of  the  stock  killed  or  of  the  damages, 
is  not  in  conflict  with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  The  equal  protection 
clause  does  undoubtedly  prohibit  discriminating  and  par- 
tial legislation  by  any  state  in  favor  of  particular  persons 
as  against  others  in  like  condition.  Equality  of  protec- 
tion implies  not  merely  equal  accessibility  to  the  courts 
for  the  prevention  or  redress  of  wrongs  and  the  enforce- 
ment of  rights,  but  equal  exemption  with  others  in  like 
condition  from  charges  and  liabilities  of  every  kind.  But 
this  clause  does  not  limit,  nor  was  it  designed  to  limit,  the 
subjects  upon  which  the  police  power  of  the  state  may  be 
exerted.  The  state  can  now,  as  before,  prescribe  regula- 
tions for  the  health,  good  order  and  safety  of  society,  and 
adopt  such  measures  as  will  advance  its  interests  and 
prosperity.  To  accomplish  this  end  special  legislation 
must  be  resorted  to  in  numerous  cases,  providing  against 
accidents,  disease  and  danger  in  the  varied  forms  in 
which  they  may  come.  The  nature  and  extent  of  such 
legislation  will  necessarily  depend  upon  the  judgment  of 
the  legislature  as  to  the  security  needed  by  society. 
When  the  calling,  profession  or  business  of  parties  is 
unattended  with  danger  to  others,  little  legislation  will 
be  necessary  respecting  it.  Thus,  in  the  purchase  and 
sale  of  most  articles  of  general  use,  persons  must  be  left 
to  exercise  their  own  good  sense  and  judgment,  but  when 
the  calling  or  profession  or  business  is  attended  with 
danger,  or  requires  a  certain  degree  of  scientific  knowl- 


656  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  388 

edge  upon  which  others  must  rely^  then  legislation  prop- 
erly steps  in  to  impose  conditions  npon  its  exercise.  The 
concluding  clause  of  the  first  section  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  simply  requires  that  such  legislation  shall 
treat  alike  all  persons  brought  under  subjection  to  it 
.  .  .  The  equal  protection  of  the  law  is  idforded  when 
this  is  accomplished.  From  the  adjudications  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not  limit  the 
subjects  in  relation  to  which  the  police  power  of  the  state 
may  be  exercised  for  the  protection  of  its  citizens.  That 
this  power  should  be  applied  to  railroad  companies  i» 
reasonable  and  just.  The  statute  of  Iowa  placed  an  abso- 
lute liability  upon  them  for  injuries  to  cattle  committed 
in  the  operation  of  their  roads  by  reason  of  the  want  of 
proper  guards  against  accidents.  If,  therefore,  the  com- 
pany omits  those  means,  the  omission  may  weU  be 
regarded  as  evidence  of  such  culpable  negligence  as  to 
justify  punitive  damages  where  injury  is  committed ;  and 
if  punitive  damages  in  such  cases  may  be  given,  the  legis- 
lature may  prescribe  the  extent  to  which  juries  may  go 
in  awarding  them.  Minneapolis  and  St.  L.  By.  Co.  v. 
Beckwith,  129  U.  S.  26. 

§389.  Reasonableness  of  railroad  rates.  By  the  second 
section  of  the  act  of  the  state  of  Minnesota,  approved 
March  7,  1887,  to  regulate  common  carriers,  it  was  pro- 
vided that  all  charges  made  by  a  common  carrier  for  the 
transportation  of  passengers  or  property  shall  be  equal 
and  reasonable.  Under  this  provision,  the  carrier  has  a 
right  to  make  equal  and  reasonable  charges  for  such 
transportation.  In  the  present  case,  the  return  alleged 
that  the  rate  of  charge  fixed  by  the  Commission  provided 
by  the  law  was  not  equal  or  reasonable,  and  the  supreme 
court  held  that  the  statute  deprived  the  company  of  the 
right  to  show  that  judicially.  The  question  of  the  rea- 
sonableness of  a  rate  of  charge  for  transportation  by  a 
railroad  company,  involving  as  it  does  the  element  of 
reasonableness  both  as  regards  the  company  and  as 


§  390  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  657 

regards  the  public,  is  eminently  a  question  for  judicial 
investigation,  requiring  due  process  of  law  for  its  deter- 
mination. If  the  company  is  deprived  of  the  power  of 
charging  reasonable  rates  for  the  use  of  its  property,  and 
such  deprivation  takes  place  in  the  absence  of  an  investi- 
gation by  judicial  machinery,  it  is  deprived  of  the  lawful 
use  of  its  property,  and  thus,  in  substance  and  effect,  of 
the  property  itself,  without  due  process  of  law,  and  in 
violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  and  in 
so  far  as  it  is  thus  deprived,  while  other' persons  are  per- 
mitted to  receive  reasonable  profits  upon  their  invested 
capital,  the  company  is  deprived  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  B.  Co.  v.  Minnesota, 
134  U.  S.  418. 

§390.  Aflsessixig  railroadB  to  meet  expenses  of  state 
railroad  comnussion.  The  South  Carolina  railroad  law 
of  1882,  authorizing  assessment  and  tax  upon  railroad 
companies  to  meet  the  expenses  and  salaries  of  the  state 
railroad  commissioners,  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  Requiring  that  the  burden  of  a 
service  deemed  essential  to  the  public,  in  consequence  of 
the  existence  of  the  railroad  corporations  and  exercise 
of  privileges  obtained  at  their  request,  should  be  borne 
by  the  corporations  in  relation  to  whom  the  service  is 
rendered,  and  to  whom  it  is  useful,  is  neither  denying  to 
them  the  equal  protection  bf  the  laws  nor  making  any 
unjust  discrimination  against  them,  all  railroad  corpora- 
tions in  the  state  being  treated  alike  in  this  respect.  If 
the  tax  were  levied  to  pay  for  services  in  no  way  con- 
nected with  the  railroads,  whilst  railroad  corporations 
were  at  the  same  time  subjected  to  taxation  upon  their 
property  equally  with  other  corporations  for  such  ex- 
penses, and  other  corporations  were  not  taxed  therefor, 
there  would  be  just  ground  of  complaint  of  unlawful  dis- 
crimination against  the  railroad  corporations,  and  of 
their  not  receiving  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  But 
there  is  nothing  of  this  nature  in  the  tax  in  question. 

Due  Proeoes — 12 


658  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  390 

The  railroad  commissioners  are  charged  with  a  variety 
of  duties  in  connection  with  railroads,  the  performance 
of  which  is  of  great  importance  in  the  regulation  of  those 
instruments  of  transportation.  It  is  evident  that  their 
duties,  when  properly  discharged,  must  be  in  the  highest 
degree  beneficial  to  the  public*  That  the  state  has  the 
power  to  prescribe  the  regulations  mentioned  there  is  no 
question.  Railroads  are  the  recipients  of  special  privi- 
leges from  the  state,  to  be  exercised  in  the  interest  of  the 
public,  and  assuming  those  obligations,  their  business  is 
deemed  affected  with  a  public  use,  and  to  the  extent  of 
that  use  is  subject  to  legislative  regulation.  The  mode 
or  manner  of  regulation  is  a  matter  of  legislative  discre- 
tion.  When  exercised  through  commissioners,  their  serv- 
ices are  for  the  benefit  of  the  railroad  corporations  as  well 
as  of  the  public  Both  are  served  by  the  required  supervi- 
sion over  the  roads  and  means  of  transportation,  and 
there  seems  to  be  no  sound  reason  why  the  compensation 
of  the  commissioners  in  such  case  should  not  be  met  by  the 
corporations,  the  operations  of  whose  roads  and  the  exer- 
cise of  whose  franchises  are  supervised.  In  exacting  this 
there  is  no  encroachment  upon  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment. Eequiring  that  the  burden  of  a  service  deemed 
essential  to  the  public,  in  consequence  of  the  existence  of 
the  corporations  and  the  exercise  of  privileges  obtained 
at  their  request,  should  be  borne  by  the  corporations  in 
relation  to  whom  the  service  is  rendered,  and  to  whom  it 
is  useful,  is  neither  denying  to  the  corporations  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  nor  making  any  unjust  discrimina- 
tion against  them.  Charlotte,  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Gibbes, 
142  U.  S.  386. 

§391.  Taxation  of  railroads — ^Law  of  Oeorgia.    The 

law  of  Georgia  providing  a  system  of  taxation  of  railroad 
property  in  each  of  the  counties  of  the  state  through 
which  said  railroads  run,  and  for  other  purposes,  does 
not  violate  that  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  which  declares  that 


§  391  CONTROL  OP  RAILROADS  659 

**no  state  shall  deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.**  A  railroad  company 
has  not  any  constitutional  right  to  have  its  transitory 
property  assessed  for  taxation  in  the  county  in  which  is 
its  principal  office;  the  distribution,  among  the  several 
counties,  of  such  property,  for  taxation,  is  not  such  a  dis- 
crimination against  the  railroad  as  denies  to  it  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  The  mode  of  distribution  of  the 
unlocated  or  transitory  personal  property  of  a  railroad 
company,  for  the  purpose  of  taxation,  is  a  matter  of 
regulation  by  the  state  legislature,  which  in  no  way 
involves  a  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The 
objection  raised  against  the  statute  was  that  the  act  in 
question  discriminated  against  the  railroad  company  in 
not  taxing  its  unlocated  or  intangible  personal  property 
at  the  place  of  the  railroad  company  *s  domicil  or  princi- 
pal office,  while  the  intangible  personal  property  of  all 
other  persons  is  taxed  in  and  by  the  county  in  which  the 
owner  resides  and  has  his  domicil.  Changing  the  situs 
of  such  unlocated  property  of  a  railroad  company,  and 
distributing  it  to  the  counties  through  which  the  road 
extended,  in  no  way  violated  the  rule  of  uniformity 
or  discriminated  against  the  railroad  company.  .  .  . 
There  was  no  claim  that  the  rate  of  taxation  levied  by 
any  county  on  the  assessed  value  of  the  property  within 
its  limits  was  greater  than  on  other  property;  nor  was 
the  valuation  different  from  that  placed  upon  other  prop- 
erty. Plaintiff  in  error  had  no  constitutional  right  to 
have  its  rolling  stock,  and  other  unlocated  personal  prop- 
erty, taxed  in  the  county  where  it  had  its  principal  office, 
and  giving  such  property  a  different  situs,  by  distributing 
it  among  the  counties  through  which  the  road  extended, 
was  no  unjust  discrimination  and  violated  no  constitu- 
tional rights.  Distributing  such  property  proportion- 
ately between  the  counties  traversed  by  the  road,  it 
thereby  became  subject  to  the  same  rate  of  taxation  as 
other  property  in  the  respective  counties.  This  involved 
no  inequality,  and  no  failure  to  extend  to  the  plaintiff  in 


660  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  S  391 

error  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.    Columbus  South- 
ern R.  Co.  V.  Wright,  151  U.  S.  470. 

§392.  Requiring  railroad  companies  to  bear  entire 
expense  of  abolishing  grade  crossings.  The  inhibitions 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  upon  the  impair- 
ment of  the  obligation  of  contracts,  or  the  deprivation  of 
property  without  due  process  of  law  or  of  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws,  by  the  states,  are  not  violated  by  the 
legitimate  exercise  of  legislative  power  in  securing  the 
public  safety,  health  and  morals.  There  is  no  unjust  dis- 
crimination and  no  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  in  regulationsr  applicable  to  all  railroad  corporations 
alike ;  nor  is  there  necessarily  any  denial  nor  an  infringe- 
ment of  the  obligation  of  contracts  in  the  imposition  upon 
them  in  particular  instances  of  the  entire  expense  of  the 
performance  of  acts  required  in  the  public  interest.  The 
statute  in  question  is  directed  to  the  extinction  of  grade 
crossings  as  a  menace  to  public  safety,  and  is  therefore 
within  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state.  It 
was  argued  that  the  existing  grades  of  railroad  crossings 
were  legally  established,  in  accordance  with  the  then 
wishes  of  the  people,  but,  with  the  increase  in  population, 
crossings  formerly  safe  had  become  no  longer  so;  that 
the  highways  were  chiefly  for  the  benefit  of  the  local 
public,  and  it  was  the  duty  of  fhe  local  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  keep  them  safe ;  that  this  law  applied  to  railroad 
corporations  treatment  never  accorded  to  other  citizens 
in  allowing  the  imposition  of  the  entire  expense  of  change 
of  grade,  both  costs  and  damages,  irrespective  of  benefits, 
on  those  companies,  and  in  that  respect,  and  in  the  exemp- 
tion of  the  town  from  its  just  share  of  the  burden,  denied 
to  them  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  Supreme 
Court  of  the  state  held  that  as  railroad  crossings  are  in 
the  nature  of  nuisances,  the  legislature  had  a  right  to 
cause  them  to  be  abated,  and  to  require  either  party 
to  pay  the  whole  or  any  portion  of  the  expense.  The 
Supreme  Court  has  repeatedly  held  that  railroad  cor- 


§  393  CONTROL  OP  RAILBOADS  661 

potations  are  subject  to  legislative  control  in  all  respects 
necessary  to  protect  the  public  against  danger,  injustice, 
and  oppression ;  that  the  state  has  the  power  to  exercise 
this  control  through  boards  of  oommissioners ;  that  there 
is  no  unjust  discrimination  and  no  denial  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  in  regulations  applicable  to  all  rail- 
road corporations  alike.  New  York  &  N.  E.  E.  Co.  v. 
Town  of  Bristol,  151  U.  S.  556. 

§  393.  Remedy  for  property  injured  by  conBtruction  of 
a  railroad  A  judgment  of  a  state  court  construing  a 
provision  of  the  constitution  of  the  dtate  which  gives  a  . 
remedy  for  property  injured  by  the  conBtruction  of  a 
to  the  individual,  forbids  legislation,  in  whatever  form  it 
railroad,  as  not  extending  the  remedy  to  embrace  prop- 
erty injured  by  the  lawful  operation  of  the  railroad  does 
not  deprive  the  plaintiff  of  property  without  due  process 
of  law,  or  deny  him  the  equal  protection  of  the  law.  The 
contention  that  plaintiff  in  error  was  denied  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  is  based  on  the  allegation  that  those 
suitors  whose  property  abutted  on  Filbert  street  where 
the  elevated  road  actually  occupies  the  territory  of  the 
street,  were  allowed  by  the  state  courts  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  the  injury  thus  occasioned  to  their  property, 
while  the  plaintiff,  and  those  in  like  case,  whose  property 
abutted  on  Filbert  street  where  it  was  not  occupied  by  thQ 
railroad  structure,  which  was  erected  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  street  on  land  belonging  to  the  railroad  company, 
were  not  permitted  to  recover.  The  diversity  of  result 
in  the  two  classes  of  cases  is  supposed  to  show  that  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  was  not  afforded  to  the  unsuccess- 
ful litigants.  It  appears  that  one  Duncan,  whose  property 
abutted  on  Filbert  street,  where  that  street  was  occupied 
by  the  elevated  railroad  in  question,  was  permitted  by 
the  state  courts  to  recover  for  damages  suffered  by 
having  been  deprived  of  access  to  and  free  use  of  Filbert 
street.  The  Supreme  Court  was  unable  to  see  any  merit 
in  the  contention  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state,  in 


662  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  393 

distinguishing  between  the  case  of  those  who,  like 
Duncan,  were  shut  off  from  access  to  and  use  of  the  street 
by  the  construction  thereon  of  the  elevated  railroad,  and 
the  case  of  those  who  suffered,  not  from  the  construction 
of  the  railroad  on  the  street  on  which  their  property 
abutted,  but  from  the  injuries  consequential  on  the  opera- 
tion of  the  railroad,  as  situated  on  defendant's  own 
property,  thereby  deprived  the  plaintiff  qf  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws.  The  two  classes  of  complainants 
differed  in  the  -critical  particular  that  one  class  suffered 
direct  and  immediate  damage  from  the  construction  of 

■ 

the  railroad  in  such  a  way  as  to  exclude  them  from  the 
use  of  their  accustomed  highway,  and  the  other  class 
suffered  damages  which  were  consequential  on  the  use  by 
the  defendant  company  of  its  own  property.  The  ques- 
tion thus  raised  is  within  .the  case  of  Bowman  v.  Lewis, 
101  U.  S.  22.  Also  citing  Hayes  v.  Missouri,  120  U.  S.  68, 
and  Barbier  v.  Connolly,  113  U.  S.  27.  It  does  not  appear 
that  plaintiff  in  error  has  been  denied  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws.  Marchant  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  153 
U.  S.  380. 

§394.  Unjust  and  unreasonable  railroad  rates.    The 

fixing  and  enforcement  by  a  railroad  conmiission  of 
unjust  and  unreasonable  rates  for  transportation  by  rail- 
r.oad  companies  is  an  unconstitutional  denial  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
which,  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  no  state  can  deny 
may  be  enacted,  by  which  the  property  of  one  individual 
is  without  compensation  wrested  from  him  for  the  benefit 
of  another,  or  of  the  public.  This,  as  has  been  often 
observed,  is  a  government  of  law,  and  not  a  government 
oFmen,  and  it  must  never  be  forgotten  that  under  such  a 
government,  with  its  constitutional  limitations  and  guar- 
antees, the  forms  of  law  and  the  machinery  of  govern- 
ment, with  all  their  reach  and  power,  must  in  their  actual 
workings  stop  on  the  hither  side  of  the  unnecessary  and 
uncompensated  taking  or  destruction  of  any  private 


§  395  CONTROL  OP  RAILROADS  663 

property,  legally  acquired  and  legally  held.    Beagan  v. 
Fanners  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  154  U.  S.  362. 

§  395.  Kansas  law  as  to  liability  of  railroads  for  per- 
sonal injuries.  The  statute  of  Kansas  making  every  rail- 
road company  in  the  state  liable  for  damages  to  its 
employees  from  the  negligence  of  its  agents  or  of 
co-employees,  does  not  discriminate  against  a  railroad 
corporation  irrespective  of  the  character  of  the  employ- 
ment, in  contravention  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
when  applied  to  a  person  injured  while  he  was  engaged 
in  loading  timbers  on  a  car  for  transportation  over  such 
railroad,  although  his  general  employment  on  the  road 
was  that  of  a  bridge  carpenter.  A  carpenter,  employed 
by  a  railroad  company,  engaged  at  the  time  of  the  acci- 
dent causing  the  injury  to  him,  in  loading  timbers  on  a 
car  for  transportation  on  the  railroad,  is  an  employee, 
within  the  Kansas  statute  making  railroads  liable  for 
damages  done  to  employees  in  consequence  of  the  negli- 
gence of  other  employees.  The  validity  of  this  statute 
was  sustained  in  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Mackey,  127 
U.  S.  205,  in  which  the  court  held,  in  answer  to  the  con- 
tention that  such  a  law  was  within  the  prohibition  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  that  legislation  which  was 
special  in  its  character  was  not  necessarily  within  the 
constitutional  inhibition,  if  the  same  rule  was  applied 
under  the  same  circumstances  and  conditions;  that  the 
hazardous  character  of  the  business  of  operating  a  rail- 
road seemed  to  call  for  special  legislation  with  respect 
to  railroad  corporations,  having  for  its  object  the  protec- 
tion of  their  employees  as  well  as  the  safety  of  the  public ; 
that  the  business  of  other  corporations  was  not  subject 
to  similar  dangers  to  their  employees,  and  that  such 
legislation  could  not  be  objected  to  on  the  ground  of 
making  an  unjust  discrimination  since  it  met  a  particular 
necessity  and  all  railroad  corporations  were,  without  dis- 
tinction, made  subject  to  the  same  liabilities.  The  state 
Supreme  Court  found  upon  the  facts  that,  although  the 


664  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  395 

plaintiff's  general  employment  was  that  of  a  bridge  car- 
penter,  he  was  engaged  at  the  time  the  accident  occurred, 
not  in  building  a  bridge  but  in  loading  timbers  on  a  car 
for  transportation  over  the  line  of  defendant's  road. 
The  Court  said:  **The  mere  fact  that  the  plaintiff's 
regular  employment  was  as  a  bridge  carpenter  does  not 
affect  the  case,  nor  does  it  matter  that  the  road  was  newly 
constructed)  or  whether  it  was  in  regular  operation  or 
not.  The  injury  happened  to  the  plaintiff  while  he  was 
engaged  in  labor  directly  connected  with  the  operation 
of  the  road,  and  the  statute  applies/'  The  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  concurred  in  this  view.  Chi- 
cago, K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Pontius,  157  U.  S.  209. 

§396.  Statute  requiring  heating  of  railroad  cars  by 
stoves.  The  exclusion  of  railroads  less  than  50  miles  in 
length  from  the  operation  of  a  state  law  prohibiting 
stoves  or  furnaces  inside  of  or  suspended  from  passenger 
cars,  on  other  than  mixed  trains,  does  not  deny  to  other 
railroads  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  No  doubt  the 
main  object  of  the  statute  was  to  provide  for  the  safety 
of  passengers  traveling  on  what  are  commonly  called 
trunk  or  through  lines,  connecting  distant  or  populous 
parts  of  the  country,  and  on  which  the  perils  incident  to 
traveling  are  greater  than  on  short,  local  lines.  A  road 
only  50  miles  in  length  would  seldom  have  a  sleeping  car 
attached  to  its  trains ;  and  passengers  traveling  on  roads 
of  that  kind  do  not  have  the  apprehension  ordinarily  felt 
by  passengers  on  trains  regularly  carrying  sleeping  cars 
or  having  many  passenger  coaches,  on  account  of  the 
burning  of  cars  in  case  of  their  derailment  or  in  case  of 
collision.  In  any  event,  there  is  no  such  discrimination 
against  companies  having  more  than  50  miles  of  road  as 
to  justify  the  contention  that  there  has  been  a  denial  to 
the  companies  named  in  the  act  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws.  The  statute  is  uniform  in  its  operation  upon 
all  companies  doing  business  in  the  state  of  the  class  to 
which  it  is  made  applicable.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R. 
Co.  V.  State  of  New  York,  165  XT.  S.  628. 


§  398  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  665 

§  397.  Damages  for  runnixig  railroad  across  street.  It 
was  contended  that  a  railroad  company  was  denied  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  in  that  by  the  final  judgment 
individual  property  owners  were  awarded,  as  compensa- 
tion for  contiguous  property  appropriated  to  the  public 
use  by  the  same  proceeding,  the  value  of  their  land  taken, 
while  only  nominal  compensation  was  given  to  the  com- 
pany— ^the  value  of  the  land,  simply  as  land,  across  which 
the  street  was  opened,  not  being  taken  into  account.  The 
contention  is  without  merit.  Compensation  was  awarded 
to  individual  owners  upon  the  basis  of  the  value  of  the 
property  actually  taken,  having  regard  to  the  uses  for 
which  it  was  best  adapted  and  the  purposes  for  which  it 
was  held  and  used  and  was  likely  always  to  be  used. 
Compensation  was  awarded  to. the  railroad  company  upon 
the  basis  of  the  thing  actually  appropriated  by  the 
public — the  use  of  the  company's  right  of  way  for  a  street 
crossing,  having  regard  to  the  purposes  for  which  the 
land  in  question  was  acquired  and  held  and  was  always 
likely  to  be  held.  In  the  case  of  individual  owners, 
they  were  deprived  of  the  entire  use  and  enjoyment  of 
their  property,  while  the  railroad  company  was  left  in 
the  possession  and  use  of  its  property  for  the  purposes 
for  which  it  was  being  used  and  for  which  it  was  best 
adapted,  subject  only  to  the  right  of  the  public  to  have  a 
street  across  it.  In  this  there  was  no  denial  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  unless  it  be  that  the  public  cannot 
have  a  street  across  the  tracks  of  a  railroad  company, 
except  upon  the  condition  precedent  that  it  shall  condemn 
and  acquire  the  absolute  ownership  of  the  land,  leaving 
untouched  the  right  of  the  company  to  cross  it  with  its 
tracks.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  does  not  impose 
such  a  burden  upon  the  people  of  a  city  within  the  limits 
of  which  a  railroad  company  has  been  permitted  to  lay 
its  tracks.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  166 
U.  S.  226. 

§398.  State  law  establishing  railroad  rates — ^When 
void.    A  railroad  corporation  is  a  person  within  the 


666  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  398 

Fourteenth  Amendment  forbidding  a  state  to  deprive  any 
person  of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  or  to  deny 
any  person  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  A  state  law 
or  regulations  made  thereunder,  establishing  rates  for 
transportation  by  railroads  that  will  deprive  the  carrier 
of  just  compensation,  is  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  as  depriving  the  carrier  of  his  property 
without  due  process  of  law,  and  denying  to  it  the  equal 
protection  of  the  lews.  The  Nebraska  law  of  1893,  to 
regulate  railroads,  classifying  freights,  fixing  rates,  etc., 
is  repugnant  to  the  United  States  Constitution  and  void 
as  prohibiting  railroads  in  that  state  from  receiving  rea- 
sonable and  just  compensation,  and  depriving  them  of 
property  without  due  process  of  law  and  of  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws.  By  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  it  is 
provided  that  no  state  shall  deprive  any  person  of  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law,  nor  deny  to  any  person 
within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
What  amounts  to  deprivation  of  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  or  what  is  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws,  is  often  difficult  to  determine,  especially 
where  the  question  relates  to  the  property  of  a  quasi- 
public  corporation  and  the  extent  to  which  it  may  be  sub- 
jected to  public  control.  The  Supreme  Court  has  said 
that  while  a  state  has  power  to  fix  the  charges  by  railroad 
companies  for  the  transportation  of  persons  and  prop- 
erty within  its  own  jurisdiction,  unless  restrained  by 
valid  contract,  or  unless  what  is  done  amounts  to  a  regu- 
lation of  foreign  or  interstate  commerce,  such  power  is 
not  without  limit.  It  cannot  do  that  which  in  law 
amounts  to  a  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use 
without  just  compensation  or  without  due  process  of  law. 
In  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.  v.  Minnesota,  134  U.  S. 
418, 458,  it  was  said :  **If  the  company  is  deprived  of  the 
power  of  charging  reasonable  rates  for  the  use  of  its 
property,  and  such  deprivation  takes  place  in  the  absence 
of  an  investigation  by  judicial  machinery,  it  is  deprived 
of  the  lawful  use  of  its  property,  and  thus,  in  substance 


§  399  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  667 

and  effect,  of  the  property  itself,  without  due  process  of 
law  and  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States ;  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  thus  deprived,  while  other 
persons  are  permitted  to  receive  reasonable  profits  upon 
their  invested  capital,  the  company  is  deprived  of  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws/'  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169 
U.  S.  466. 

§  399.  State  act  as  to  railroad  compaxiies  pajring  their 
employees.  The  Arkansas  act  of  1889  requiring  railroad 
companies  to  pay  their  employees  when  discharged  their 
unpaid  wages  then  earned,  without  deduction,  or  that 
such  wages  should  continue  at  the  same  rate  until  paid, 
not  to  exceed  sixty  days,  does  not  deny  to  such  companies 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  plaintiff  in  error 
was  an  Arkansas  corporation  and  the  statute  was  upheld 
as  a  valid  exercise  of  the  power  to  amend  charters 
reserved  under  the  state  constitution.  In  respect  to  the 
provision  that  the  unpaid  wages  then  earned  at  the 
contract  rate  were  to  become  due  and  payable  on  the  ces- 
sation of  the  employment,  *' without  abatement  or  deduc- 
tion, *'  the  Court  held  that  that  did  not  **  require  the 
corporation  to  pay  the  employee  all  the  wages  to  which 
he  would  have  been  entitled  had  he  fully  performed  his 
contract  up  to  the  time  of  his  discharge,  notwithstanding 
he  had  failed  to  do  so,  and  had  damaged  the  corpora- 
tion thereby, '*  but  it  meant  *Hhat  the  unpaid  wages 
earned  at  the  contract  fate  at  the  time  of  the  discharge 
shall  be  paid  without  discount  on  account  of  the  payment 
thereof  before  the  time  they  were  payable  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  contract  of  employment*'  It  was  con- 
tended that  as  to  railroads  organized  prior  to  its  x>assage 
the  act  was  void  because  in  violation  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Corporations  are  the  creations  of  the  state, 
endowed  with  such  faculties  as  the  state  bestows  and 
subject  to  such  conditions  as  the  state  imposes,  and  if  the 
power  to  modify  their  charters  is  reserved,  that  reserva- 
tion is  a  part  of  the  contract,  and  no  change  within  the 


668  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  399 

legitimate  exercise  of  the  power  can  be  said  to  impair  its 
obligation;  and  as  this  amendment  rested  on  reasons 
deduced  from  the  peculiar  character  of  the  business  of 
the  corporations  affected  and  the  public  nature  of  their 
functions,  and  applied  to  all  alike,  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  was  not  denied.  St  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  B.  Co.  v. 
Paul,  173  U.  S.  404. 

§400.  Fires  set  by  railroad  locomotives.  The  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  which  is  guaranteed  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  does  not  forbid 
classification.  The  fact  of  inequality  produced  by  classi- 
fication does  not  determine  its  constitutionality.  The 
Kansas  statute  which  provides  that  in  an  action  against 
a  railroad  company  for  damages  by  fire  caused  by  operat- 
ing the  railroad,  the  plaintiff  need  only  establish  the  fact 
that  the  fire  complained  of  was  caused  by  operating  the 
railroad  and  the  amount  of  his  damages,  and  that  such 
proof  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  railroad,  and  that  the  plaintiff,  if  he  recover, 
shall  also  be  allowed  a  reasonable  attorney's  fee, — ^is  not 
in  conflict  with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  denying 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  such  company,  and  is 
valid.  The  purpose  of  the  statute  is  not  to  compel  the 
payment  of  debts,  but  to  secure  the  utmost  care  on  the 
part  of  railroad  companies  to  prevent  the  escape  of  fire 
from  their  moving  trains.  This  case  is  distinguished 
from  Gulf,  Colorado  &  Santa  Fe  By.  Co.  v.  Ellis,  165 
U.  S.  140,  where  a  somewhat  similar  statute  was  held 
invalid.  The  power  of  classification  has  been  upheld 
whenever  such  classification  proceeds  upon  any  differ- 
ence which  has  a  reasonable  relation  to  the  object  sought 
to  be  accomplished.  It  is  a  maxim  of  constitutional  law 
that  a  legislature  is  presumed  to  have  acted  within  con- 
stitutional limits,  upon  full  knowledge  of  the  facts,  and 
with  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  interests  of  the  people 
as  a  whole,  and  courts  will  not  lightly  hold  that  an  act 
duly  passed  by  the  legislature  was  one  in  the  enactment 


§  401  CONTROL  OP  RAILROADS  669 

of  which  it  had  transcended  its  power.  On  the  otiier 
handy  it  is  also  true  that  the  equal  protection  guaranteed 
by  the  Constitution  forbids  the  legislature  to  select  a 
person,  natural  or  artificial,  and  impose  upon  him  or  it 
burdens  and  liabilities  which  are  not  cast  upon  others 
similarly  situated.  It  cannot  pick  out  one  individual,  or 
one  corporation,  and  enact  that  whenever  he  or  it  is  sued 
the  judgment  shall  be  for  double  damages,  or  subject  to 
an  attorney  fee  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  when  no  other 
individual  or  corporation  is  subjected  to  the  same  rule. 
Neither  can  it  make  a  classification  of  individuals  or  cor- 
porations which  is  purely  arbitrary,  and  impose  upon 
such  class  special  burdens  and  liabilities.  Even  wht^re 
the  selection  is  not  obviously  unreasonable  and  arbitrary, 
if  the  discrimination  is  based  upon  matters  which  have 
no  relation  to  the  object  sought  to  be  accomplished,  the 
same  conclusion  of  unconstitutionality  is  affirmed.  The 
objection  that  this  legislation  is  special  and  unequal  can- 
not be  sustained.  The  dangerous  element  employed  and 
the  hazards  to  persons  and  property  arising  from  the  run- 
ning  of  trains  and  the  operation  of  railroads,  justify 
such  a  law.  The  fact  that  all  persons  and  corporations 
brought  under  its  influence  are  subjected  to  the  same 
duties  and  liabilities  disposes  of  the  objections  raised. 
Atehison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  R.  Co.  v.  Matthews,  174 
U.  S.  96. 

§  401.  Statute  changing  fellow  servant  rule  in  case  of 
railroad  employees.  A  statute  making  a  railroad  com- 
pany liable  to  an  employe  injured  by  the  negligent  act  of 
a  fellow  servant  is  not  unconstitutional  as  a  denial  to 
such  corporation  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  since 
there  are  peculiar  hazards  in  the  operation  of  a  railroad. 
The  state  supreme  court  held  the  act  valid  as  to  railroad 
corporations,  whether  or  not  it  might  be  sustained  as  to 
other  corporations.  Considering  the  act  as  applying  to 
railroad  corporations  only,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  in 
conflict  with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    This  was  an 


670  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  401 

Indiana  statute  and 'it  was  upheld  by  virtue  of  prior 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  sustaining  similar  stat- 
utes in  Kansas^  Ohio  and  Iowa.  See  cases  cited.  Tullis 
V.  Lake  Erie  &  Western  R.  Co.,  175  U.  S.  348. 

§402.  Exceptions  to  ordinance  regfolating  speed  of 
trains  by  dty.  The  exception  of  a  dummy  railroad  oper- 
ated by  steam,  or  of  an  electric  railroad,  f^-om  an  ordi- 
nance limiting  the  speed  of  railroads  within  a  city,  does 
not  make  an  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  classification  in 
denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  It  is  contended 
that  the  ordinance  is  in  conflict  with  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  in  that  it  denies  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  The  contention  could  not  be  sustained  if  there  were 
nothing  in  the  record  beyond  the  mere  words  of  the  ordi- 
nance, because  it  is  obvious  on  a  moment 's  reflection  that 
the  tracks  of  different  railroads  may  traverse  the  limits 
of  a  city  under  circumstances  so  essentially  dissimilar 
as  to  justify  separate  regulations.  One  may  pass  through 
crowded  and  much  traveled  streets,  while  others  may  pass 
through  remote  sections  of  the  city  where  there  is  little 
danger.  One  track  may  be  fenced  and  another  may  not. 
Under  those  circumstances  a  difference  of  regulation  as 
to  the  matter  of  speed  would  be  perfectly  legitimate,  and 
the  classification  could  not  be  considered  arbitrary  or 
unreasonable.  All  that  is  necessary  to  uphold  the  ordi- 
nance is  that  there  is  a  difference,  and  that  existing  it  is 
for  the  city  council  to  determine  whether  separate  regu- 
lations should  be  applied  between  the  two.  Given  the  fact 
of  a  difference,  it  is  a  part  of  the  legislative  power  to  de- 
termine what  difference  there  shall  be  in  the  prescribed 
regulations.    Erb  v.  Morasch,  177  U.  S.  684. 

§403.  Assessment  of  railroad  property  for  omitted 
taxes.  Railroad  companies  are  not  denied  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  by  Florida  laws  requiring  the  comp- 
troller to  assess  the  taxes  for  1879,  1880  and  1881  upon 
such  railroad  property  as  had  escaped  taxation  for  such 


§  403  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  671 

years,  without  providing  for  the  assessment  of  taxes  for 
those  years  on  other  property  not  previously  assessed 
therefor,  general  legislation  having  provided  that  rail- 
road property  should  be  assessed  by  the  comptroller  and 
real  estate  by  the  county  treasurer.  The  single  question 
for  consideration  is  whether  there  is  anything  in  the 
Federal  Constitution  which  forbids  a  state  to  reach  back- 
ward and  collect  taxes  from  certain  kinds  of  property 
which  were  not  at  the  time  collected  through  lack  of  stat- 
utory provisions  therefor,  or  in  consequence  of  a  mis- 
understanding of  the  law,  or  from  negligence  of  admin- 
istrative officials,  without  also  making  provision  for 
collecting  taxes  for  the  same  years  on  other  property. 
There  was  no  new  levy  of  taxes,  but  the  case  is  one  in 
which,  general  levies  having  been  made  for  the  years 
named,  certain  property  which  ought  to  have  paid  taxes 
under  them — and  thus  have  contributed  its  share  of  the 
expenses  of  the  state — failed  to  do  so,  and  the  effort  is  to 
compel  that  property  to  discharge  its  obligation.  The 
objection  is  not  that  the  property  ought  not  during  these 
years  to  have  paid  its  proportion  of  the  taxes,  but  that 
it  ought  not  now  to  be  compelled  to  pay  such  proportion, 
because  certain  other  property  was  similarly  situated,  and 
no  effort  is  made  to  compel  payment  from  it.  The  fault, 
it  fault  there  be,  is  one  of  omission  rather  than  of  com- 
mission. The  act  of  the  legislature  is  not  a  mandate  to 
a  single  officer,  charged  with  the  duty  of  assessing  all 
property,  to  assess  certain  property,  and  to  omit  to  assess 
the  rest ;  but  the  general  legislation  having  provided  that 
railroad  property  should  be  assessed  by  the  comptroller 
and  real  estate  by  county  assessors,  the  act  simply 
directed  the  comptroller  to  discharge  the  duties  of  assess- 
ment as  to  the  property  committed  to  his  care,  and  omit- 
ted any  direction  to  the  county  assessors.  This  omission, 
it  is  contended,  makes  the  law  unconstitutional.  In  other 
words,  the  legislature  may  not  pass  an  act  directing  one 
officer  to  discharge  his  duty  unless  it  couples  therewith  a 
direction  to  other  officers  charged  with  kindred  duty  to 


672  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  403 

perform  theirs.  If  the  state  of  Florida  had  deemed  it  for 
the  best  jinterest  of  its  people  to  encourage  the  building 
of  railroads  by  exempting  their  property  from  taxation, 
such  exemption  could  not  have  been  adjudged  in  conflict 
with  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  even  though  thereby 
the  burden  of  taxation  upon  /other  property  in  the  state 
was  largely  increased.  And,  conversely,  if  the  state  had 
subjected  railroads  to  taxation,  while  exempting  some 
other  class  of  property,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  any- 
thing in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  overthrow  its 
action.  Florida  Central  &  P.  B.  Co.  v.  Reynolds,  183 
U.  S.  471. 

§  404.  Charging  more  for  shorter  than  for  longer  haul. 

The  laws  of  Kentucky  which  prohibit  railroad  companies 
from  charging  more  for  a  shorter  than  for  a  longer  haul, 
except  by  permission  of  the  railroad  commission  in  spe- 
cial cases  after  investigation,  does  not  deny  to  them  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  evil  sought  to  be  pre- 
vented was  the  use  of  public  highways  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  prefer,  by  difference  of  rates,  one  locality  to  an- 
other ;  and  the  remedy  adopted  by  the  state  was  to  declare 
such  preferences  illegal,  and  to  prohibit  any  person,  cor- 
poration, or  common  carrier  from  resorting  to  them. 
That  remedy  included  in  its  scope  every  one,  without 
distinction,  whose  calling,  public  in  its  character,  gave 
an  opportunity  to  do  the  mischief  which  the  state  desired 
to  prevent.  The  practical  inefficiency  of  this  remedy  to 
reach  the  desired  end,  and  the  resulting  injury  to  the  wel- 
fare of  both  the  producers  and  the  consumers  of  an  article 
like  coal,  when  brought  into  competition  with  coal  brought 
from  without  the  state,  are  strongly  urged ;  but  however 
well-founded  such  objections  may  be,  they  go  to  the  wis- 
dom and  policy  of  the  enactment,  not  to  its  validity  in  a 
Federal  point  of  view.  The  people  of  Kentucky,  if  it  can 
be  shown  that  their  laws  are  defective  in  their  concep- 
tion or  operation,  have  the  remedy  in  their  own  hands. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  183  XT.  S.  503. 


§  405  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  673 

§  405.  Validity  of  order  requiring'  safety  appliances  at 
grade  crossings.  Neither  due  process  of  law  nor  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  denied  a  street  railway 
company  by  an  order  of  the  commissioner  of  railroads 
made  and  issued  under  a  Michigan  statute  requiring  such 
street  railway  company  to  pay  one-half  of  the  expense 
of  constructing  and  maintaining  safety  appliances  at  a 
grade  crossing  of  a  steam  railroad  which  was  not  built 
until  after  the  street  railway  had  been  constructed.  It 
is  contended  that  a  street  railway  company  has  a  differ- 
ent relation  to  a  street  than  that  which  a  steam  railroad 
has ;  that  the  former  *  *  acquires  a  right  to  use  the  same  in 
common  with  other  members  of  the  traveling  public,  and 
is  not  an  additional  burden  upon  the  street,  but  is  merely 
an  adaptation  of  the  highway  to  a  particular  means  of 
travel,  and  does  not  constitute  an  additional  servitude. 
A  railroad  is,  on  the  other  hand,  an  additional  servitude, 
and  if  it  is  built  across  a  highway  it  must  do  all  things 
necessary  to  render  the  highway,  for  all  its  legitimate 
uses,  as  safe  as  it  was  before  the  railroad  was  built  across 
it,  or  would  be  if  such  railroad  were  not  built  across  it  at 
all/'  Massachusetts  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston,  C.  &  F.  R.  Co., 
121  Mass.  124.  It  may  be  that  this  difference  is  recognized 
as  to  abutting  property  owners  or  crossing  railroads,  but 
it  can  not  be  recognized  as  limiting  or  affecting  the  power 
of  the  state  to  regulate  the  management  of  the  roads  in 
view  of  the  danger  of  their  operation  to  the  public. 
Whether  electricity  be  the  motive  power,  or  steam  be  the 
motive  power,  there  is  enough  danger  in  the  operation  of 
either  to  justify  regulation.  The  record  in  this  case 
shows  that  there  are  thirty-eight  daily  passenger  trains 
crossing  Clark  avenue,  and  that  the  cars  of  the  plaintiff 
in  error  pass  every  few  minutes.  It  is  manifest,  as  the 
supreme  court  of  the  state  observed,  that  the  crossing  **is 
a  place  of  unusual  danger,  not  only  to  the  passengers 
in  steam  cars,  but  also  to  the  passengers  in  the  electric 
cars,''  and  that  the  danger  is  caused  by  both.  In  sucR 
situation  the  city  is  surely  not  powerless  to  act,  nor  before 

Bue  Process— 43 


674  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  405 

acting  must  it  ascertain  the  exact  quantum  of  damage 
caused  by  each  road^  and  by  that  standard  assign  the 
cost  of  protecting  the  public.  It  is  also  objected  to  the 
order  that  it  denies  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The 
argument  to  support  this  contention  is  an  extension  of 
that  which  claims  that  the  use  of  the  street  by  the  plain- 
tiff in  error  *4s  merely  an  adaptation  of  the  highway  to 
the  particular  means  of  travel.''  And  it  is  deduced  that 
an  electric  street  railway  has  an  equality  of  rights  with 
ordinary  vehicles.  There  is  evidently  a  difference  be- 
tween ordinary  vehicles  and  cars  propelled  by  electricity, 
which  may  be  recognized  by  the  state  in  the  exercise  of 
its  police  power.  Detroit,  Ft.  W.  &  B.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Osborn, 
189  U.  S.  383. 

§406.  DiscriTniiiating  against  railway  companies.  The 
Texas  statute  imposing  upon  railway  companies  alone  the 
penalty  therein  given  to  contiguous  landowners  for  allow- 
ing Johnson  grass  or  Russian  thistle  to  mature  and  go  to 
seed,  does  not  deny  such  railway  companies  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  It  is  admitted  that  Johnson  grass 
is  a  menace  to  crops,  that  it  is  propagated  only  by  seed, 
and  that  a  general  regulation  of  it  for  the  protection  of 
farming  would  be  valid.  It  is  said  that  this  particular 
subjection  of  railway  companies  to  a  liability  not  imposed 
on  other  owners  of  land  on  which  Johnson  grass  may 
grow  is  so  arbitrary  as  to  amount  to  a  denial  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  With  regard  to  the  manner  in 
which  such  a  question  should  be  approached,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  legislature  is  the  only  judge  of  the  policy  of  a 
proposed  discrimination.  The  principle*  is  similar  to  that 
which  is  established  with  regard  to  a  decision  of  Congress 
that  certain  means  are  necessary  and  proper  to  carry 
out  one  of  its  express  powers.  M'Culloch  v.  Maryland, 
4  Wheat.  316.  When  a  state  legislature  has  declared  that, 
in  its  opinion,  policy  requires  a  certain  measure,  its  action 
should  not  be  disturbed  by  the  courts  under  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  unless  they  can  see  clearly  that  there 


§  407  CONTBOL  OF  EAILBOADS  675 

is  no  fair  reason  for  the  law  that  would  not  require  with 
equal  force  its  extension  to  others  whom  it  leaves  un- 
touched. Mr.  Justice  Holmes  in  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  court  said  they  felt  unable  to  say  that  the  law  may 
not  have  been  justified  by  local  conditions.  It  would  have 
been  more  obviously  fair  to  extend  the  regulations  at  least 
to  highways.  But  it  may  have  been  found  that  the  seed 
of  Johnson  grass  is  dropped  from  the  cars  in  such  quan- 
tities as  to  cause  special  trouble.  It  may  be  that  the 
neglected  strips  occupied  by  railroads  afford  a  ground 
where  noxious  weeds  especially  flourish,  and  that  whereas 
self-interest  leads  the  owners  of  farms  to  keep  down 
pests,  the  railroad  companies  have  done  nothing  in  a 
matter  that  concerns  their  neighbors  only.  Other  reasons 
may  be  imagined.  Great  constitutional  provisions  must 
be  administered  with  caution.  Some  play  must  be  allowed 
for  the  joints  of  the  machine,  and  it  must  be  remembered 
that  legislatures  are  ultimate  guardians  of  the  liberties 
and  welfare  of  the  people  in  quite  as  great  a  degree  as 
the  courts.   Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  May,  194  U.  S.  267. 

§407.  Legislative  abrogation  of  fellow  servant  rule. 
The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  by  con- 
struing the  proviso  excepting  cases  of  injuries  sustained 
by  railway  employees  **  while  engaged  in  the  construction 
of  a  new  road  or  any  part  thereof  not  open  to  public  travel 
or  use,''  from  the  provisions  of  the  Minnesota  statute 
abrogating  the  fellow  servant  rule,  as  only  exempting 
incomplete  railroads,  and  therefore  as  not  excepting  from 
the  operation  of  the  statute  an  accident  on  a  narrow- 
gauge  track  on  which  dump  cars  were  run  by  a  mining 
company  for  the  purpose  of  stripping  the  earth  from  the 
surface  of  its  mine.  The  state  court  held  that  the  act 
was  confined  to  the  dangers  peculiar  to  railroads,  and  did 
not  discriminate  against  railroads  merely  as  such.  It 
read  the  proviso  as  only  exempting  incomplete  roads, 
marking  the  time  when  the  statute  should  take  effect,  and 
not  as  confining  it  to  roads  intended  for  public  traveL 


676  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  407 

Some  time  must  be  fixed  when  the  law  shall  begin  to 
operate,  and  the  time  when  the  road  is  finished  is  a  nat- 
ural and  proper  time.  There  may  be  unavoidable  and 
exceptional  dangers  before  the  track  is  finished  and  while 
cars  are  being  run  over  it  for  construction  purposes,  and 
the  legislature  might  think  it  proper  that  the  servant 
should  take  the  risk  of  these  even  if  the  negligence  of  a 
fellow  servant  co-operated,  just  as  he  takes  the  risk  of 
the  known  peculiar  dangers  when  he  sets  about  repairing 
the  efifects  of  an  accident.  The  fact  that  there  may  also 
be  dangers  like  those  on  the  finished  road  does  not  prevent 
the  legislature  from  considering  the  situation  as  a  whole 
and  keeping  the  old  rule  on  practical  grounds  until  the 
exceptional  risks  come  to  an  end.  There  is  no  objection 
to  legislation  being  confined  to  a  peculiar  and  well-defined 
class  of  perils,  and  it  is  not  necessary  that  they  should 
be  perils  which  are  shared  by  the  public,  if  they  concern 
the  body  of  citizens  engaged  in  a  particular  work.  In 
concluding  the  opinion  of  the  court,  Mr.  Justice  Holmes 
said:  **The  whole  case  is  put  on  the  proviso,  and  the 
argument  with  regard  to  that  is  merely  one  of  the  many 
attempts  to  impart  an  overmathematical  nicety  to  the 
prohibitions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  *'  Minnesota 
Iron  Co.  V.  Kline,  199  U.  S.  593. 


§  408.  Imposing  expense  on  railway  company  for  drain- 
ing private  lands.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  guar- 
anteed by  the  Federal  Constitution  is  not  denied  to  a 
railway  company  by  requiring  it  to  stand  the  entire 
expense  of  removing  and  rebuilding  its  bridge  and  cul- 
vert,  made  necessary  by  the  proposed  widening  and  deep- 
ening of  the  channel  of  a  creek  by  drainage  commissioners 
acting  under  the  authority  of  the  Illinois  farm  drainage 
act,  to  effect  the  drainage  of  low  lands.  The  case  is  this : 
A  public  corporation,  charged  by  law  with  the  duty  of 
causing  a  large  body  of  lands,  principally  swamp  and 
slough  lands,  to  be  drained  and  made  capable  of  culti- 
vation, has,  under  direct  legislative  authority,  adopted 


§  409  CONTROL  OF  EAILROlDS  677 

a  reasonable  and  suitable  plan  to  accomplish  that  object. 
That  plan  requires  the  enlarging  and  deepening  of  the 
channel  of  a  natural  water  course  running  through  the 
district,  which  is  the  only  natural  outlet  or  way  of  drain- 
age of  the  lands  of  the  district, — the  best  and  only  prac- 
tical mode  by  which  the  lands  can  be  made  tillable.  But 
that  plan  cannot  be  carried  out  unless  the  timbers  and 
stones  in  the  creek — placed  there  by  the  railway  company, 
when  it  constructed  the  foundation  for  its  present  bridge 
— are  removed.  The  timber  and  stone  referred  to  cannot, 
however,  be  removed  without  destroying  the  foundations 
of  the  present  bridge  and  rendering  it  necessary  to  con- 
struct another  bridge  with  an  opening  underneath  wide 
enough  to  permit  a  channel  sufficient  to  carry  oflf  the 
waters  of  the  creek  as  increased  in  volume  under  the 
drainage  system  adopted  by  the  commissioners.  The 
object  of  the  statute  is  to  drain  large  bodies  of  land  so 
as  to  make  them  fit  for  human  habitation  and  cultivation. 
The  regulations  adopted  by  the  drainage  commissioners 
have  a  real,  direct,  and  obvious  relation  to  the  public 
objects  sought  to  be  accomplished  by  them;  and  in  no 
sense  are  they  arbitrary  or  unreasonable.  The  rights 
acquired  by  the  railway  are  subordinate  to  the  rights  of 
the  public.  The  duty  of  the  company  was  to  maintain  an 
opening  under  the  bridge  that  would  be  adequate  and 
effectual  for  such  an  increase  in  the  volume  of  water  as 
might  result  from  lawful,  reasonable  regulations  estab- 
lished by  appropriate  public  authority  from  time  to  time 
for  the  drainage  on  either  side  of  the  creek.  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  Illinois  ex  rel.  Grimwood,  200  U.  S.  561. 

§409.  Classifying  railway  mail  clerks  with  railway 
employees.  Restricting  railway  mail  clerks  and  others 
whose  employment  in  and  about  a  railroad  subjects  them 
to  greater  peril  than  passengers  in  the  strict  sense,  to 
such  right  of  action  against  the  railway  company  for 
injuries  received  in  the  course  of  their  employment  as  a 
railway  employee  would  have  under  like  circumstances, 


678  DljB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  409 

is  a  reasonable  classification  which  sustains  the  provision 
of  the  Pennsylvania  statute  making  such  classification,  as 
against  the  objection  that  such  statute  denies  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  The  court  declared  that  the  prop- 
osition that  the  statute  denied  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  because  it  ^^capriciously,  arbitrarily,  and  unnat- 
urally,'* by  the  classification  made,  deprived  railway  mail 
clerks  of  the  rights  of  passengers,  which  they  might  have 
enjoyed  if  the  statute  had  not  been  enacted,  is  without 
merit  The  classification  made  by  the  statute  does  not 
alone  embrace  railway  mail  clerks,  but  places  in  a  class 
by  themselves  such  clerks  and  others  whose  employment 
in  and  about  a  railroad  subjects  them  to  greater  peril 
than  passengers  in  the  strictest  sense.  This  general  dif- 
ference makes  it  impossible  to  say,  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  that  the  legislature  of 
Pennsylvania,  in  classifying  passengers  in  the  strict  sense 
in  one  class  and  those  who  are  subject  to  greater  risks, 
including  railway  mail  clerks,  in  another,  acted  so  arbi- 
trarily as  to  violate  the  equal  protection  clause  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  Martin  v.  Pittsburg  &  Lake 
Erie  B.  Co.,  203  U.  S.  284. 

§410.  Excessive  penalties  for  violation  of  the  pro- 
visions of  a  statute.  A  statute  providing  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  rates  for  railroad  transportation  without 
giving  the  corporation  an  opportunity  to  be  heard,  which 
fixes  penalties  for  disobedience  of  its  provisions  by  fines 
so  enormous  and  imprisonment  so  severe  as  to  intimidate 
the  corporations  and  their  officers  from  resorting  to  the 
courts  to  test  the  validity  of  the  rates,  is  unconstitutional, 
as  depriving  the  corporations  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws.  The  company  is  only  allowed  a  hearing  upon 
the  claim  of  the  unconstitutionality  of  the  acts  and  orders 
in  question,  at  the  risk,  if  mistaken,  of  being  subjected  to 
such  enormous  penalties,  resulting  in  the  possible  confis- 
cation of  its  whole  property,  that  rather  than  take  such 
risks  the  company  would  obey  the  laws,  although  such 


§  410  CONTROL  OP  RAILROADS  679 

obedience  might  also  result  in  the  end  (thongh  by  a  slower 
process)  in  snch  confiscation.  It  would  be  difficulty  if  not 
impossible  for  the  company  to  obtain  officers,  agents  or 
employees  willing  to  carry  on  its  affairs  except  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  acts  and  orders  in  question.  The  company 
itself  would  also,  in  case  of  disobedience,  be  liable  to 
the  unmense  fines  provided  for  in  violating  orders  of  the 
commission.  The  company^  in  order  to  test  the  validity 
of  the  acts,  must  find  some  agent  or  employee  to  disobey 
them  at  the  risk  stated.  The  necessary  effect  and  result 
of  such  legislation  must  be  to  preclude  a  resort  to  the 
courts  (either  state  or  Federal)  for  the  purpose  of  test- 
ing its  validity.  The  officers  and  employees  could  not  be 
expected  to  disobey  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  acts  or 
orders  at  the  risk  of  such  fines  and  penalties  being  im- 
posed upon  them,  in  case  the  court  should  decide  that  the 
law  was  valid.  The  result  would  be  a  denial  of  any  hear- 
ing to  the  company.  In  the  case  of  the  establishment  of 
certain  rates  without  any  hearing,  the  validity  of  such 
rates  necessarily  depends  upon  whether  they  are  high 
enough  to  permit  some  return  upon  the  investment,  and 
an  inquiry  as  to  that  fact  is  a  proper  subject  of  judicial 
investigation.  If  it  turns  out  that  the  rates  are  too  low 
for  that  purpose,  then  they  are  illegal.  To  impose  upon 
a  party  interested  the  burden  of  obtaining  a  judicial 
decision  of  such  a  question  (no  prior  hearing  having  ever 
been  given)  only  upon  the  condition  that,  if  unsuccessful, 
he  must  suffer  imprisonment  and  pay  fines,  as  provided 
in  these  acts,  is,  in  effect,  to  close  up  all  approaches  to  the 
courts,  and  thus  prevent  any  hearing  upon  the  question 
whether  the  rates  as  provided  by  the  acts  are  not  too  low, 
and  therefore  invalid.  Laws  imposing  enormous  fines 
and  possible  imprisonment  as  a  result  of  an  unsuccessful 
effort  to  test  the  validity  of  the  laws  themselves,  are  un- 
constitutional on  their  face,  without  regard  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  insufficiency  of  such  rates.  Ex  parte  Young, 
209  U.  S.  123. 


680  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  411 


§  411.  Classification  of  railway  employees.  The  Indi- 
ana statute  modifying  the  fellow  servant  rule  as  to  rail- 
way employees,  does  not  offend  against  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
because  construed  as  applying  to  all  employees  doing 
work  essential  to  enable  the  carrying  on  of  railway  oper- 
ations, and  not  as  limited  to  those  engaged  in  or  about 
the  movement  of  trains,  but  such  general  classification 
of  railway  employees  is  a  proper  exercise  of  the  police 
power.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  intended 
to  and  does  not  strip  the  states  of  the  power  to  exercise 
their  lawful  police  authority.  The  equal  protection  of  the 
law  clause  does  not  restrain  the  normal  exercise  of  gov- 
ernmental power,  but  only  abuse  in  the  exertion  of  sucb 
authority,  therefore  that  clause  is  not  offended  against 
simply  because,  as  the  result  of  the  exercise  of  the  power 
to  classify,  some  inequality  may  be  occasioned.  A  wide 
scope  of  legislative  discretion  may  be  exerted  in  classi- 
fying without  conflicting  with  the  constitutional  provision. 
It  was  competent  for  the  law-making  power  of  a  state, 
without  offending  against  the  equal  protection  clause,  to 
classify  railroad  employees  because  of  the  hazard  attached 
to  their  vocation,  and  a  statute  doing  this  need  not  be 
confined  to  employees  who  were  engaged  in  and  about  the 
mere  movement  of  trains,  but  could  also  validly  include 
other  employees  doing  work  essential  to  be  done  to  enable 
the  carrying  on  of  railroad  operations.  Louisville  &  N. 
B.  Co.  V.  Melton,  218  U.  S.  36. 

§412.  Statute   creating  presumption  of  negligence. 

The  Mississippi  Code  abrogating  the  fellow  servant  rule 
as  to  railway  employees  does  not  offend  against  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
because  construed  as  applying  to  the  foreman  of  a  section 
crew  charged  with  keeping  the  track  in  repair.  Neither 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  nor  due  process  of  law 
is  denied  by  the  provision  of  the  same  law  under  which, 
in  actions  against  railway  companies  for  damages  done 


§  413  CONTROL  OP  RAILEOADS  681 

to  persons  or  property,  proof  of  injury  inflicted  by  the 
running  of  the  locomotives  or  cars  is  made  prima  facie 
evidence  of  negligence.  It  was  contended  that  although 
a  classification  of  railway  employees  may  be  justified  from 
general  considerations  based  upon  the  hazardous  charac- 
ter of  the  occupation,  such  classification  becomes  arbi- 
trary and  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  law  the 
moment  it  is  found  to  embrace  employees  not  exposed  to 
hazards  peculiar  to  railway  operation.  This  contention 
was  held  without  merit.  The  case  in  hand  illustrates  the 
fact  that  such  employees,  though  not  directly  engaged  in 
the  management  of  trains,  are  nevertheless  within  the 
general  line  of  hazard  inherent  in  the  railway  business. 
The  deceased  was  the  foreman  of  a  section  crew.  His 
business  was  to  keep  the  track  in  repair.  He  stood  by  the 
side  of  the  track  to  let  a  train  pass  by;  a  derailment 
occurred,  and  a  car  fell  upon  him  and  crushed  out  his 
life.  The  only  legal  effect  of  the  presumption  of  liability 
created  by  the  statute  is  to  cast  upon  the  railroad  com- 
pany the  duty  of  producing  some  evidence  to  the  contrary. 
When  that  is  done  the  inference  is  at  an  end,  and  the 
question  of  negligence  is  one  for  the  jury,  upon  all  of  the 
evidence.  The  statute  does  not  therefore  deny  the  equal 
protection  of  the  law,  because  it  creates  a  presumption  of 
liability,  since  its  operation  is  only  to  supply  an  inference 
of  liability  in  the  absence  of  other  evidence  contradict- 
ing such  inference.  If  a  legislative  provision  not  unrea- 
sonable in  itself,  prescribing  a  rule  of  evidence,  in  either 
criminal  or  civil  cases,  does  not  shut  out  from  the  party 
affected  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  submit  to  the  jury  in 
his  defense  all  of  the  facts  bearing  upon  the  issue,  there 
is  no  ground  for  holding  that  due  process  of  law  has  been 
denied  him,  or  the  equal  protection  of  the  law.  Mobile, 
J.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Tumipseed,  219  U.  S.  35. 

§  413.  Requiring  full  train  crew.  The  Arkansas  stat- 
ute excluding  railroads  less  than  50  miles  in  length  from 
the  operation  of  the  law  prescribing  a  minimum  of  three 


682  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  1 413 

brakemen  for  freight  trains  of  more  than  twenty-five 
cars,  does  not  deny  to  other  railroads  the  eqnal  protection 
of  the  laws.  The  main  object  of  the  statute  was  to  pro- 
vide for  the  safety  of  passengers  travelling  on  so-called 
trunk  lines,  connecting  distant  or  populous  parts  of  the 
country,  and  on  which  the  perils  of  travelling  are  greater 
than  on  short,  local  lines.  As  suggested  in  argument,  a 
road  only  50  miles  in  length  would  seldom  have  a  sleeping 
car  attached  to  its  trains;  and  passengers  travelling 
on  roads  of  that  kind  do  not  have  the  apprehension  ordi- 
narily felt  by  passengers  on  trains  regularly  carrying 
sleeping  cars  or  having  many  passenger  coaches,  on  ac- 
count of  the  burning  of  cars  in  case  of  their  derailment 
or  in  case  of  collision.  There  is  no  such  discrimination 
a^inst  companies  having  more  than  50  miles  of  road 
as  to  justify  the  contention  that  there  has  been  a  denial 
to  the  companies  named  in  the  act  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws.  The  statute  is  uniform  in  its  operation  upon 
all  railroad  companies  doing  business  in  the  state  of  the 
class  to  which  it  is  made  applicable.  The  state  was  under 
an  obligation  to  establish  such  regulations  as  were  neces- 
sary or  reasonable  for  the  safety  of  all  engaged  in  busi- 
ness or  domiciled  within  its  limits.  Beyond  doubt, 
passengers  on  interstate  carriers  while  within  Arkansas 
are  as  fully  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  valid  local  lawi 
enacted  for  the  public  safety  as  are  citizens  of  the  stat<» 
Local  statutes  directed  to  such  an  end  have  their  source 
in  the  power  of  the  state,  never  surrendered,  of  caring 
for  the  public  safety  of  all  within  its  jurisdiction;  and 
the  validity  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
of  such  statutes  is  not  to  be  questioned  in  a  Federal  court 
unless  they  are  clearly  inconsistent  with  some  power 
granted  to  the  general  government,  or  with  some  right 
secured  by  that  instrument,  or  unless  they  are  purely 
arbitrary  in  their  nature.  Under  the  evidence,  there  is 
admittedly  some  room  for  controversy  as  to  whether  the 
statute  is  or  was  necessary ;  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  it 
is  so  unreasonable  as  to  justify  the  court  in  adjudging 


§  415  CONTROL  OP  RAILROADS  683 

that  it  is  merely  an  arbitrary  exercise  of  power,  and  not 
germane  to  the  objects  which  evidently  the  state  legis- 
lature had  in  view.  It  is  a  means  employed  by  the  state 
to  accomplish  an  object  which  it  is  entitled  to  accomplish, 
and  such  means,  even  if  deemed  unwise,  are  not  to  be  con- 
demned or  disregarded  by  the  courts,  if  they  have  a  real 
relation  to  that  object.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ar- 
kansas, 219  U.  S.  453. 


§  414.  Requiring  full  switching  crew— Excessive  pen- 

The  exemptions  in  favor  of  railways  less  than 
100  miles  in  length,  made  by  a  state  statute  forbidding 
railway  companies  with  yards  or  terminals  in  cities  of 
the  state  to  conduct  switching  operations  across  public 
crossings  in  cities  of  the  first  or  second  class,  with  a 
switching  crew  of  less  than  one  engineer,  a  fireman,  a 
foreman,  and  three  helpers,  does  not  render  the  statute 
repugnant  to  the  Fourtenth  Amendment  as  denying  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  a  railway  company  coming 
within  its  provisions,  although  certain  terminid  compa- 
nies which  do  switching  for  connecting  trunk  lines,  being 
less  than  100  miles  in  length,  are  not  covered  by  the  stat- 
ute, and  one  of  such  companies  may  do  switching  over 
some  of  the  same  crossings  that  the  railway  company  in 
question  does.  The  distinction  seems  arbitrary  if  regard 
is  had  only  to  its  letter,  but  there  may  have  been  con- 
siderations which  determined  it,  and  the  record  does  not 
show  the  contrary.  It  is  impossible  for  legislation  to  be 
all-comprehensive,  and  there  may  be  practical  groupings 
of  objects  which  will  as  a  whole  fairly  present  a  class  of 
itself,  although  there  may  be  exceptions  in  which  the  evil 
aimed  at  is  deemed  not  so  flagrant.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Arkansas,  240  U.  S.  518. 


§415.  Classification  of  railway  employees — ^Railway 
relief.  An  unconstitutional  discrimination  is  not  made 
by  amending  Iowa  Code,  §  2071,  which  defined  the  liabil- 
ity of  railway  corporations  for  injuries  resulting  from 


684  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  415 

negligence  or  mismanagement  in  the  nse  and  operation 
of  their  railways,  so  that  a  railway  company,  when  sued 
on  such  liability,  may  not  raise  the  defense  that  a  recovery 
is  barred  by  the  acceptance  of  benefits  under  a  contract 
of  membership  in  its  relief  department,  although  this  pro- 
vision of  the  amendatory  act  applies  only  to  those  em- 
ployees who  were  embraced  within  the  provisions  of  the 
original  statute,  and  to  the  enforcement  of  the  particular 
liabilities  which  that  statute  defined,  and  the  benefits  of 
such  statute  were  confined  to  those  engaged  in  the  haz- 
ardous business  of  operating  railroads.  The  limitation  to 
a  particular  class  of  employees  of  railroad  corporations 
is  based  upon  the  decisions  of  the  state  court  that  the 
benefits  of  the  original  statute  were  confined  to  those  who 
were  engaged  in  the  hazardous  business  of  operating  rail- 
roads. This  is  claimed  to  be  an  invalid  discrimination, 
and  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  It  was, 
however,  entirely  competent  for  the  legislature,  in  enact- 
ing  the  prohibition,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  en- 
forcement of  the  liability  it  had  defined,  to  limit  it  to 
those  cases  in  which  the  liability  arose.  As  the  purpose 
of  the  amendment  was  to  supplement  the  original  statute, 
the  classification  was  properly  the  same.  With  respect 
to  subsequent  transactions,  the  amendment  must  be  re- 
garded as  having  the  same  validity  as  it  would  have  had 
if  it  had  formed  a  part  of  th^  earlier  enactment.  No 
criticism  on  the  ground  of  discrimination  can  successfully 
be  addressed  to  the  amendatory  act  which  would  not  like- 
wise impeach  the  statute  in  its  earlier  form.  The  pro- 
priety of  the  classification  of  the  original  statute  has  been 
considered  and  upheld  by  the  Supreme  Court.  Chicago, 
B.  &  Q.  B.  Co.  V.  McGuire,  219  U.  S.  549. 

§  416.  Abolishing  fellow  servant  rule.  The  Arkansas 
statute  abolishing  the  fellow  servant  rule  as  to  corpora- 
tions operating  railroads  within  the  state  does  not  den^ 
such  a  corporation  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  be- 
cause the  statute  does  not  apply  to  individual  employers. 


§  417  CONTROL  OP  RAILROADS  685 

Whether  the  distinction  merely  between  corporations  and 
partnerships  and  individuals,  is  competent  for  a  legis- 
lature to  make,  under  its  power  of  classifying  objects,  the 
Supreme  Court  said  it  was  not  called  upon  to  decide.  The 
distinction  made  by  the  statute  is  broader.  The  distinc- 
tion (among  others)  it  makes  is  between  railroads  oper- 
ating in  the  state  and  individuals,  and  such  distinction 
has  been  maintained  as  not  offending  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States.  Aluminum  Co.  v.  Ramsey,  222  U.  S. 
251. 

§417.  Federal  employers'  liability  act.  The  imposi- 
tion of  the  liability  created  by  the  employers '  liability  act 
of  April  22,  1908,  upon  interstate  carriers  by  railroad 
only,  and  for  the  benefit  of  all  their  employees  engaged 
in  interstate  commerce,  although  some  are  not  subjected 
to  the  peculiar  hazards  incident  to  the  operation  of  trains, 
or  to  hazards  that  differ  from  those  to  which  other  em- 
ployees in  such  commerce  not  within  the  act  are  exposed, 
does  not  invalidate  the  statute  under  the  due-process-of- 
law  clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution, on  the  ground  that  it  makes  an  arbitrary  and 
unreasonable  classification,— even  assuming  that  that 
clause  is  equivalent  to  the  provision  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  securing  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
Even  if  it  be  assumed  that  the  due-process-of-law  clause 
of  the  Fifth  Amendment  is  equivalent  to  the  *  *  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws ' '  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
it  does  not  take  from  Congress  the  power  to  classify,  nor 
does  it  condemn  exertions  of  that  power  merely  because 
they  occasion  some  inequalities.  On  the  contrary,  it  ad- 
mits of  the  exercise  of  a  wide  discretion  in  classifying 
according  to  general,  rather  than  minute  distinctions, 
and  condemns  what  is  done  only  when  it  is  without  any 
reasonable  basis,  and  therefore  is  purely  arbitrary. 
Tested  by  these  standards,  this  classification  is  not  objec- 
tionable. Like  classifications  of  railroad  carriers  and 
employees  for  like  purposes,  when  assailed  under  the 


686  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  417 

equal  protection  clause,  have  been  sustained  by  repeated 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Mondou  v.  New  York, 
N,  H.  &  H.  B,  Co.,  223  U.  S.  1. 

§418.  Comparative  n^ligence  in  injuries  to  railway 
employees.  Bailway  companies  are  not  denied  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  nor  are  their  privileges  and  immu- 
nities as  citizens  of  the  United  States  abridged,  by  the 
Nebraska  statute  under  which  the  contributory  negligence 
of'  a  railway  employee  injured  while  engaged  in  train 
service  will  not  bar  a  recovery  from  the  company,  where 
his  negligence  was  slight,  and  that  of  the  company  gross 
in  comparison,  the  damages  being  diminished  in  propor- 
tion to  the  amount  of  negligence  attributable  to  the 
injured  employee.  The  Supreme  Court  has  repeatedly 
upheld  the  power  of  a  state  to  impose  upon  a  railway 
company  liability  to  an  employee  engaged  in  train  service 
for  an  injury  inflicted  through  the  negligence  of  another 
employee  in  the  same  service.  Obviously,  the  same  rea- 
sons which  justified  a  departure  from  the  common-law 
rule  in  respect  to  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant  also 
justify  a  similar  departure  in  regard  to  the  effect  of  con- 
tributory negligence  as  applied  to  railway  employees. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Caatle,  224  U.  S.  541. 

§419.  Modifying  fellow  servant  rule.  The  Indiana 
statute  modifying  the  fellow  servant  rule  as  to  railway 
employees,  cannot  be  deemed  to  contravene  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
because  on  its  face  it  applies  to  any  railway  employee, 
where,  as  construed  by  the  highest  court  of  the  state,  it 
cannot  be  invoked  by  any  class  of  railway  employees  not 
engaged  in  some  branch  of  service  where  they  are  sub- 
jected to  the  hazards  incident  to  the  movement  of  trains 
or  engines.  In  repeated  decisions  the  Indiana  supreme 
court  has  construed  the  act  as  one  which  cannot  be  invoked 
by  any  class  of  railroad  employees  not  engaged  in  some 
branch  of  service  where  they  are  subjected  to  the  hazards 


§  420  CONTROL  OF  EAILEOADS  687 

incident  to  the  movement  of  trains  or  engines,  and  held 
that,  as  thus  limited,  the  act  is  valid.  As  thus  construed 
and  upheld  by  the  highest  court  of  Indiana,  the  act  does 
not  contravene  the  equal  protection  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  But  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  inti- 
mate that  the  act,  if  construed  as  applicable  to  all 
employees  of  a  railroad  company,  would  be  in  contraven- 
tion of  that  clause.  Chicago,  L  &  L.  B.  Co.  v.  Hackett, 
228  U.  S.  559. 

§420.  Classification  of  railroads  for  rate  regulation. 

The  West  Virginia  statute  exempting  any  railroad  in  the 
state  under  50  miles  in  length,  and  not  a  part  of,  or  under 
the  control,  management,  or  operation  of,  any  other  rail- 
road over  50  miles  in  length,  operated  wholly  or  in  part 
in  the  state,  from  the  operation  of  the  law  fixing  the  maxi- 
mum fare  for  passengers  on  railroads  at  2  cents  per  mile, 
does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  where  as 
construed  by  the  state  courts,  a  railway  under  50  miles 
in  length,  controlled  by  a  railway  of  greater  length,  will 
be  taken  out  of  the  exception  only  when  connected  and 
operated  with  the  longer  line.  The  exception  in  favor  of 
electric  lines  and  street  railways,  in  the  same  statute,  does 
not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  It  cannot  be- 
said  that  the  classification  of  the  act  is  unreasonable  or 
arbitrary.  The  principles  covering  the  decision  of  a  ques- 
tion of  this  sort  have  been  frequently  stated.  The  exemp- 
tion of  *' electric  lines  and  street  railways*'  rests  upon 
reasonable  and  familiar  distinctions,  long  recognized  as 
proper  in  railroad  legislation.  The  suggestion  that  own- 
ership or  control  of  one  railroad  by  another,  when  they 
are  not  connected  and  operated  together,  nor  susceptible 
of  such  connection  and  operation,  makes  them  one  within 
the  meaning  of  the  act,  is  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  beyond 
the  scope  thereof.  Such  an  interpretation  is  not  within 
its  reason  or  purpose,  and  therefore  not  within  its  mean- 
ing. The  legislature  must  be  regarded  as  having  passed 
the  act,  in  view  of  existing  conditions  and  methods  of  rail- 


688  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  420 

road  operation,  and  with  the  intent  that  it  should  operate 
in  harmony  with  the  spirit  and  general  principles  of  exist- 
ing railroad  rate  legislation,  except  in  so  far  as  the  con- 
trary is  expressed  in  terms  or  by  necessary  implication. 
Intent  to  change  the  settled  policy  of  the  state  as  embodied 
in  the  act  of  1873,  concerning  the  Aitity  of  a  railroad  for 
the  purposes  of  the  act,  must  rest  upon  something  more, 
in  an  amendatory  act,  than  mere  inference,  surmise,  or 
unnecessary  implication.  Chesapeake  &  O.  B.  Co-  v. 
Conley,  230  U.  S.  513. 

§  421.  Judicial  review  of  rate  regulation.  The  failure 
of  the  Kentucky  act  of  March  10,  1900,  to  provide  for 
any  appeal  to  any  court  from  the  final  order  of  the  state 
railroad  commission  fixing  maximum  freight  rates  under 
the  authority  of  that  statute,  or  for  a  judicial  review 
of  the  reasonableness  of  the  prescribed  rates  before 
they  become  effective,  does  not  invalidate  such  statute 
as  operating  to  deprive  the  carrier  of  his  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law,  or  to  deny  to  it  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws,  contrary  to  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, where  the  statute  does  not — ^unless  by  its  separable 
penal  provisions — deny  the  carrier  the  right  of  access  to 
the  courts  for  the  purpose  of  determining  any  matter 
which  would  be  the  appropriate  subject  of  judicial 
inquiry.  If  the  commission  establishes  rates  which  are  so 
low  as  to  be  confiscatory  an  appropriate  mode  of  obtain- 
ing relief  is  by  bill  in  equity  to  restrain  the  enforcement 
of  the  order.  Presumably  the  courts  of  the  state,  as  well 
as  the  Federal  courts,  would  be  open  to  the  carrier  for 
this  purpose.  If  it  were  assumed  that  the  severity  of  the 
penalties  attached  to  disobedience  of  the  order  would  be 
open  to  objection  as  operating  to  deprive  the  carrier  of 
a  fair  opportunity  to  contest  the  validity  of  the  commis- 
sion's action,  still,  the  penal  provisions  would  be  sep- 
arable, and  the  force  of  the  remaining  portion  of  the 
statute  would  not  be  impaired.  Louisville  &  Nashville 
E.  Co.  V.  Garrett,  231  U.  S.  298. 


§  424  CONTROL  OP  RAILROADS  689 


§  422.  Requiring  carrier  to  accept  reshipments  in  cars 
of  other  carrier.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  guar- 
anteed by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  is  not  denied  to  a 
railway  carrier  by  an  order  of  a  state  railroad  conmiission 
requiring  it  to  accept  without  unloading  and  reloading 
into  its  own  cars  reshipments  of  coal  in  carload  lots  when 
tendered  in  the  cars  of  other  railway  companies.  The 
requirement  was  a  reasonable  one.  It  cannot  be  said  that 
the  carrier  had  a  constitutional  right  to  burden  trade  by 
insisting  that  the  commodities  should  be  unloaded  and 
reloaded  in  its  own  equipment.  Upon  this  point  the  case 
of  Wisconsin,  M.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobson,  179  U.  S.  287, 
is  decisive.  There  is  no  essential  difference,  so  far  as  the 
power  of  the  state  is  concerned  between  the  order  in  this 
case  and  one  compelling  the  carrier  to  make  track  con- 
nections, and  to  receive  cars  from  connecting  roads,  in 
order  that  reasonably  adequate  facilities  for  traflSc  may 
be  provided.  See  cases  cited.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 
Co.  V.  Iowa,  233  U.  S.  334. 

§423.  Requiring  electric  headlights  on  locomotives. 

The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  cannot  be  said  to  be  infringed  by  the  provi- 
sions of  Georgia  Pub.  Laws,  1908,  pp.  50,  51,  requiring 
railway  locomotives  running  on  the  main  line  to  be 
equipped  with  electric  headlights,  merely  because  the  act 
may  not  apply  to  receivers  operating  railways,  in  view 
of  the  temporary  and  special  character  of  receivers  ^  man- 
agement. The  exceptions  in  favor  of  tram  roads,  mill 
roads,  and  roads  engaged  principally  in  lumber  or  log- 
ging transportation  do  not  render  the  statute  repugnant 
to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  As  to  these  it  is  impos- 
sible to  say  that  the  differences  with  respect  to  operation 
and  traffic  conditions  do  not  present  a  reasonable  basis 
for  classification.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.  v.  Georgia, 
234  U.  S.  280. 


§424.  Excessive    penalties.    A    state    statute    under 
which  enormous  penalties  are  imposed  upon  a  railway 

Due  Process — 44 


690  DUE  PEOCESS  OP  LAW  §  424 

company  for  violating  lawful  administrative  orders  of  the 
state  railroad  commission  is  void  under  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  although  such  orders  are  made  after  full 
hearing  before  the  commission,  if  access  to  the  courts 
to  test  the  constitutional  validity  of  the  commission's 
orders  is  denied,  or  if  the  right  of  review  actually  given 
is  one  of  which  the  carrier  may  avail  itself  only  at  the 
risk  of  having  to  pay  such  penalties  if  the  order  is  f  oxmd 
to  be  valid.  Under  the  Constitution  penalties  cannot  be 
collected  if  they  operate  to  deter  an  interested  party  from 
testing  the  validity  of  legislative  rates  or  orders  legisla- 
tive in  their  nature.  Their  legality  is  not  apparent  on  the 
face  of  such  orders,  but  depends  upon  a  showing  of  extrin- 
sic facts.  A  statute,  therefore,  which  imposes  heavy  pen- 
alties for  violation  of  conmiands  on  an  unascertained 
quality  is,  in  its  nature,  somewhat  akin  to  an  ex  post  facto 
law,  since  it  punishes  for  an  act  done  when  the  legality 
of  the  conmiand  has  not  been  authoritatively  determined. 
Liability  to  a  penalty  for  violation  of  such  orders,  before 
their  validity  has  been  determined,  would  put  the  party 
affected  in  a  position  where  he  himself  must,  at  his  own 
risk,  pass  upon  the  question.  He  must  either  obey  what 
may  finally  be  held  to  be  a  void  order,  or  disobey  what 
may  ultimately  be  held  to  be  a  lawful  order.  If  a  statute 
could  constitutionally  impose  heavy  penalties  for  viola- 
tion of  commands  of  such  disputable  and  imcertain  legal- 
ity, the  result  inevitably  would  be  that  the  carrier  would 
yield  to  void  orders,  rather  than  risk  the  enormous  cumu- 
lative of  confiscatory  punishment  that  might  be  un- 
posed,  if  they  should  thereafter  be  declared  to  be  valid. 
Where  provision  is  made  for  judicial  review  of  such 
administrative  orders,  the  only  question  left  for  determi- 
nation is,  whether,  in  the  view  of  such  right,  a  heavy 
penalty  can  be  collected  for  the  violation  of  an  order  not 
known  to  be  valid  at  the  date  of  the  disobedience  sought 
to  be  punished.  There  seems  to  be  no  room  to  doubt  the 
power  of  the  state  to  impose  a  punishment  heavy  enough 
to  secure  obedience  to  such  orders  after  they  have  been 


§  425  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  691 

found  to  be  lawful;  nor  to  impose  a  penalty  for  acts  of 
disobedience,  committed  after  the  carrier  had  ample  op- 
portunity to  test  the  validity  of  administrative  orders  and 
failed  to  do  so.  Where  after  reasonable  notice  of  the 
making  of  an  administrative  order,  the  carrier  failed  to 
resort  to  the  safe,  adequate,  and  available  remedy  by 
which  it  could  test  in  the  courts  the  validity  of  such  order, 
and  preferred  to  make  its  defense  by  attacking  the  valid- 
ity of  the  order  when  sued  for  the  penalty,  which  may  be 
any  amount,  up  to  $5,000  a  day,  it  is  subject  to  the 
penalty  when  that  defense  proved  to  be  unsuccessful, 
without  being  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution.  Wadley  Southern  Ey.  Co.  v.  Georgia, 
235  U.  S.  651. 

§425.  Taxation  of  foreign  railway  company.  There 
is  no  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  or  of  due 
process  of  law,  in  the  imposition  upon  a  foreign  railway 
company,  imder  Arkansas  Laws  1899,  No.  112,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  general  property  tax  on  the  property  of  foreign 
corporations  within  the  state,  of  an  annual  franchise  tax 
for  the  privilege  of  transacting  intrastate  business  in 
corporate  form,  fixed  solely  by  reference  to  the  property 
of  the  corporation  that  is  within  the  state  and  used  in 
business  within  the  state,  and  excluding  any  imposition 
upon,  or  interference  with,  interstate  commerce,  where 
the  classification  of  corporations  adopted  by  that  statute 
is  not  unreasonable,  and  corporations  of  the  class  to  which 
the  company  belongs  are  not  discriminated  against  in 
favor  of  domestic  corporations.  The  tax  is  not  in  any 
wise  based  upon  the  receipts  of  the  railroad  company 
from  interstate  commerce,  either  taken  alone  or  in  con- 
nection with  the  receipts  from  its  intrastate  business. 
The  tax  is  measured  by  reference  to  property  situated 
wholly  within  the  confines  of  the  state.  The  state  may 
in  addition  to  the  imposition  of  an  ordinary  property  tax 
upon  an  instrumentality  of  interstate  or  international 


692  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  425 

commerce,  impose  a  franchise  tax  ascertained  by  refer- 
ence to  the  property  of  the  corporation  within  the  state, 
including  that  employed  in  interstate  commerce,  if 
amounting  to  no  more  than  would  be  legitimate  as  an 
ordinary  tax  upon  the  property,  valued  with  reference 
to  the  use  in  which  it  is  employed.  Nothing  in  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  imposes  any  ironclad  rule  upon  the 
states  with  respect  to  their  internal  taxation,  or  prevents 
them  from  imposing  double  taxation,  or  any  other  form 
of  unequal  taxation,  so  long  as  the  inequality  is  not  based 
upon  arbitrary  distinctions.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Arkansas  ex  rel.  Norwood,  235  U.  S.  350. 

§  426.  Discrimination  between  carrier  and  shipper  as 
to  attorneys'  fees  in  demurrage  cases  makes  law  invalid. 

The  Kansas  ** reciprocal*'  or  ** mutual  demurrage*'  stat- 
ute provided  that  a  railway  company  failing  to  furnish 
cars  upon  proper  application  to  shippers  of  freight  is 
liable  to  the  shipper  for  all  actual  damage  suffered,  for 
a  penalty  of  five  dollars  per  day  for  each  car  not  so  sup- 
plied, and  for  a  reasonable  attorney  fee.  Shippers  who 
fail  to  load  cars  within  forty-eight  hours  after  they  are 
placed  at  their  disposal  are  subject  to  a  like  penalty  of 
five  dollars  a  day  for  each  car  not  used  and  for  the  actual 
damages  the  railroad  company  may  sustain  by  reason  of 
the  failure  of  the  shipper  to  use  said  cars,  but  are  not 
made  liable  for  attorney  fees.  Such  legislation  is  prop- 
erly to  be  regarded  as  a  police  regulation,  but  a  police 
regulation  is  like  any  other  law  subject  to  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
to  the  Federal  Constitution.  The  constitutional  guaranty 
entitles  all  persons  and  corporations  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  state  to  the  protection  of  equal  laws,  in  this  as 
in  other  departments  of  legislation.  It  does  not  prevent 
classification  but  does  require  that  classification  shall  be 
reasonable  not  arbitrary  and  that  it  shall  rest  upon  dis- 
tinctions having  a  fair  and  substantial  relation  to  the 
object  sought  to  be  accomplished  by  the  legislation.   The 


§  427  CONTEOL  OF  EAILROADS  693 

statute  clearly  recognizes  that  either  party  may  be 
obliged  to  sue  the  other  in  order  to  recover  the  penalty 
for  damages,  or  both.  No  reason  is  suggested  and  none 
occurs  to  the  court,  the  opinion  reads,  why  the  railroad 
company,  when  plaintiff  in  such  an  action,  will  not  require 
the  services  of  an  attorney  as  well  as  the  shipper  when 
he  is  plaintiff.  There  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  the 
cause  of  action  that  renders  the  burden  of  preparation 
more  onerous,  as  a  rule,  to  the  shipper  when  he  is  plain- 
tiff than  to  the  company  when  it  is  plaintiff.  There  is 
nothing  discernible,  therefore,  in  the  purposes  of  the 
legislation — ^which  are  to  require  the  prompt  furnishing 
of  cars  for  use,  and  the  prompt  use  of  cars  when  fur- 
nished, and  to  redress  a  disregard  of  either  of  these  re- 
quirements by  suit  when  necessary— to  give  ground  for 
a  distinction  granting  attorney's  fees  to  the  shipper  when 
he  sues,  and  denying  attorney's  fees  to  the  company 
when  it  sues.  The  statute  while  recognizing  the  existence 
of  a  special  burden  in  the  litigation  which  may  grow  out 
of  the  statute  allows  compensation  for  it  in  favor  of  one 
class  of  litigants  but  does  not  allow  like  compensation  to 
the  other  class  when  subject  to  the  like  burden.  This  is 
a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  guaranteed 
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  P. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Vosburg,  238  U.  S.  56. 

§427.  Requiring  railroads  to  provide  drainage  for 
water  contrary  to  common  law  rule.  The  state  of  Mis- 
souri enacted  a  law  making  it  the  duty  of  railroads  in  the 
state  to  cause  to  be  constructed  and  maintained  suitable 
openings  across  and  through  the  right  of  way  and  road- 
bed of  such  railroad,  and  suitable  ditches  and  drains  along 
each  side  of  the  roadbed  of  such  railroad,  to  connect  with 
ditches,  drains,  or  water  courses,  so  as  to  afford  sufl5cient 
outlet  to  drain  and  carry  off  the  water,  including  surface 
water,  along  such  railroad,  whenever  the  draining  of  such 
water  has  been  obstructed  or  rendered  necessary  by  the 
construction  of  such  railroad.    A  penalty  was  provided 


694  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  427 

for  the  violation  of  the  statute.  The  commoa  law  mle 
prevails  in  the  state  that  surface  water  is  a  common  enemy 
against  which  every  landowner  may  protect  himself  as 
best  he  may.  The  Federal  Supreme  Court  rejected  the 
contention  that  the  statute  denied  the  plaintiff  in  error 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  as  quite  unsubstantial 
Bailroad  embankments^  the  opinion  reads,  stretching  un- 
broken across  tracts  of  land  that  are  liable  to  injury  from 
surface  waters,  differ  so  materially  from  other  artificial 
constructions  and  improvements  to  which  the  doctrine  of 
the  ^^ common  enemy*'  applies,  that  there  is  very  plainly 
a  substantial  ground  for  classification  with  respect  to  the 
object  of  the  legislation.  The  statute  applies  alike  to  cor- 
porations, companies,  and  persons  owning  or  operating 
railroads  that  are  so  constructed  as  to  obstruct  the  flow 
of  drainage  and  surface  waters,  and  the  statute  was  held 
unexceptionable  in  that  regard.  Chicago  &  Alton  Bail- 
road  Co.  V.  Tranbarger,  238  U.  S.  67. 

§  427a.  Requiring  railway  company  to  remove  noxiou 
weeds.  The  requirement  of  Indiana  Act  of  March  6, 1889, 
that  railway  companies  cut  down  and  destroy  noxious 
weeds  **on  lands  occupied  by  them,''  under  penalty  of 
$25,  recoverable  by  **any  person  feeling  himself 
aggrieved''  by  the  company's  neglect  or  refusal,  will  not 
be  held  to  offend  against  the  equal  protection  of  the  law 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Federal 
Constitution,  where  the  statute  has  as  yet  been  given  no 
broader  construction  by  the  state  courts  than  one  which 
permits  a  single  recovery  by  a  contiguous  landowner  be- 
cause of  a  railway  company's  failure  to  cut  and  destroy 
weeds  on  its  right  of  way.  The  court  refused  to  antici- 
pate a  construction  of  the  statute  not  yet  given,  and  which 
may  never  be  given,  and  on  that  anticipation  hold  the 
statute  invalid,  and  re-expressed  the  propriety  of  waiting, 
when  a  state  statute  is  attacked  for  unconstitutionality, 
until  the  state  court  has  given  it  a  construction  which  may 
justify  the  attack.   The  validity  of  the  statute  was  upheld 


§  427a  CONTROL  OF  RAILROADS  695 

under  the  doctrine  of  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  May, 
194  U.  S.  267,  The  court  expressed  no  opinion  concern- 
ing the  consequences  if  a  broader  construction  should  be 
accepted  by  the  state  court.  Chicago,  T.  H.  &  S.  E.  R. 
Co.  V.  Anderson,  242  U.  S.  283. 


CHAPTER  XX 

CONTBOL  OF  DOMBSTIC  ANV  FOBEIQN  COBPOBATIONS 

§428.  State  control  of  corporations.  Domestic  cor- 
porations are  the  creatures  of  the  state;  and  the  state 
has  the  clear  right  to  regulate  its  own  creations.  The 
power  of  classification  upheld  by  the  Supreme  Court  ad- 
mits of  discriminations  between  domestic  corporations 
and  also  between  foreign  corporations.  Foreign  corpora- 
tions are  admitted  to  a  state  on  such  conditions  as  each 
state  may  prescribe,  provided  always  that  such  discrimi- 
nation does  not  interfere  with  any  transaction  by  such 
corporations  of  interstate  or  foreign  conmierce.  The 
Illinois  statutes  of  1869  and  1874,  in  regard  to  insurance 
companies,  do  not  impair  the  obligation  of  any  contract 
which  the  Chicago  Life  Insurance  Company  had  with  the 
state,  nor  deny  it  the  equal  protection  of  the  law,  nor 
deprive  it  of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  nor 
impair  the  obligation  of  the  contracts  which  the  company 
has  made  with  its  creditors  and  policy  holders.  The  act 
of  1869  does  not  contain  any  regulation  respecting  the 
affairs  of  any  corporation  of  Illinois  which  is  not  reason- 
able in  its  character,  or  which  is  not  promotive  of  the 
interests  of  all  concerned  in  its  management  It  only 
guards  against  mismanagement  and  misconduct;  its  re- 
quirements constitute  reasonable  regulations  of  the  busi- 
ness of  such  local  corporations;  it  does  not  impair  the 
obligation  of  any  contract  which  the  company  has  with 
the  state ;  the  conditions  imposed  upon  the  rights  of  the 
company  to  continue  the  issuing  of  policies  are  neither 
arbitrary  nor  oppressive.  The  same  general  observa- 
tions apply  to  the  act  of  1874,  which,  recognizing  the 
contract  right  of  the  company  to  carry  on  business  as  a 

696 


§  429    DOMESTIC  AND  POEEIQN  CORPORATIONS      697 

c(t)rporation,  does  not,  by  a  legislative  decree  merely, 
based  upon  the  ex  parte  representations  of  public  officers, 
assume  to  withdraw  that  right.  There  is  no  denial  of  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws,  nor  any  deprivation  of  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law ;  for  that  statute  author- 
izes a  public  officer  to  bring  the  company  before  a  judicial 
tribunal,  which,  after  full  opportunity  for  defense,  may 
determine  whether  it  is  insolvent,  or  its  condition  such  as 
to  render  its  continuance  in  business  hazardous  to  the 
insured  or  to  the  public,  or  whether  it  has  exceeded  its 
corporate  powers,  or  violated  the  rules,  restrictions  or 
conditions  prescribed  by  law;  grounds  which,  if  estab- 
lished, constitute  sufficient  reason  why  the  corporate 
franchises  and  privileges  granted  by  the  state  should  no 
longer  be  enjoyed,  Chicago  Life  Insurance  Co.  v.  Needles, 
113  U.  S.  574. 

§  429.  Statute  applicable  to  fire  insurance  only.  A  fire 
insurance  company  is  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  by  a  statute  applicable  to  fire  insurance  only, 
which  makes  the  entire  amount  of  the  insurance  payable 
in  case  of  total  loss,  except  as  reduced  by  depreciation 
of  the  property  after  it  was  insured.  Mr.  Justice  Mc- 
Kenna  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court  said :  *  *  It 
is  not  necessary  to  state  the  reasoning  upon  which  classi- 
fication by  legislation  is  based  or  justified.  This  court 
has  had  many  occasions  to  do  so,  and  only  lately  reviewed 
the  subject  in  Magoun  v.  Illinois  Trust  &  Savings  Bank, 
170  XJ.  S.  283.  We  said  in  that  case  that  *  the  state  may 
distinguish,  select  and  classify  objects  of  legislation,  and 
necessarily  the  power  must  have  a  wide  range  of  discre- 
tion.* And  this  because  of  the  functions  of  legislation 
and  the  purposes  to  which  it  is  addressed.  Classification 
for  such  purposes  is  not  invalid  because  not  depending  on 
scientific  or  marked  differences  in  things  or  persons  or 
in  their  relations.  It  suffices  if  it  is  practical,  and  is  not 
reviewable  unless  palpably  arbitrary.  The  classification 
of  the  Missouri  statute  is  certainly  not  arbitrary.    We 


698  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  429 

see  many  differences  between  fire  insurance  and  other 
insurance^  both  to  the  insurer  and  the  insured, — differ- 
ences in  the  elements  insured  against  and  the  possible 
relation  of  the  parties  to  them,  producing  consequences 
which  may  justify,  if  not  demand,  different  legislative 
treatment  Of  course  it  is  not  for  us  to  debate  the  policy 
of  any  particular  treatment ;  and  the  freedom  of  discre- 
tion which  we  have  said  the  state  has  is  exhibited  by 
analogous,  if  not  exact,  examples  to  the  Missouri  statute 
in  Missouri  P.  Railway  Co.  v.  Mackey,  127  U-  S-  205,  and 
in  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Railway  v.  Beckwith,  129  U.  S. 
26. '^   Orient  Insurance  Co.  v.  Daggs,  172  U.  S.  557. 

§  430.  Statute  as  to  effect  of  false  answers  by  applicant 
for  life  insurance.  The  power  of  the  legislature  to  define 
the  public  policy  of  the  state  in  respect  to  life  insurance, 
and  to  impose  conditions  on  the  transaction  of  business 
by  life  insurance  companies  within  the  state,  is  exercised 
without  violation  of  the  Federal  Constitution  by  the  Ohio 
statutes  providing  that  an  answer  by  an  applicant  shall 
not  bar  recovery  on  the  policy  unless  clearly  proved  to 
be  wilfully  false  and  fraudulently  made  and  also  mate- 
rial, and  that  it  induced  the  company  to  issue  the  policT', 
and  that  the  agent  of  the  insurer  had  no  knowledge  of 
the  falsity  or  fraud  of  such  answer.  It  was  for  the  legis- 
lature of  Ohio  to  define  the  public  policy  of  that  state  in 
respect  of  life  insurance,  and  to  impose  such  conditions 
on  the  transaction  of  business  by  life  insurance  compa- 
nies within  the  state  as  was  deemed  best.  Mr.  Chief 
Justice  Fuller,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
said:  '*We  do  not  perceive  any  arbitrary  classification 
or  unlawful  discrimination  in  this  legislation,  but,  at  all 
events,  we  cannot  say  that  the  Federal  Constitution  has 
been  violated  in  the  exercise  in  this  regard  by  the  state  of 
its  undoubted  power  over  corporations. ' '  John  Hancock 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Warren,  181 U.  S.  73. 

§431.  State  regulation  of  foreign  corporations.  A  for- 
eign corporation  engaged  in  booking  theatrical  companies 


§  432    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      699 

and  vaudeville  acts  for  theatre  owners  in  consideration  of 
a  weekly  booking  fee  and  a  commission  on  the  actors' 
salaries  may,  consistently  with  the  equal  protection  clause 
of  the  Federal  Constitution,  be  required  to  file  a  copy  of 
its  charter  with  the  secretary  of  state,  conformably  to  a 
local  statute,  as  a  condition  precedent  to  its  right  to  sue 
upon  a  contract  made  in  its  conduct  of  such  business. 
Interstate  Amusement  Co.  v.  Albert,  239  U.  S.  560. 

§432.  State  anti-trust  laws.  A  discrimination  in  favor 
of  agricultural  products  or  live  stock  in  the  hands  of  the 
producer  or  raiser,  made  by  the  Illinois  trust  act  exempt- 
ing them  from  the  provisions  which  prohibit  a  recovery 
of  the  price  of  articles  sold  by  any  trust  or  combination 
formed  in  restraint  of  trade  or  competition  in  violation  of 
that  act,  renders  it  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, in  respect  to  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  What 
may  be  regarded  as  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  is  a  question  not  always  easily  determined,  as  the 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  of  the  highest  courts 
of  the  states  will  show.  It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  show 
that  a  state  enactment,  having  its  source  in  a  power  not 
controverted,  infringes  rights  protected  by  the  national 
Constitution.  No  rule  can  be  formulated  that  will  cover 
every  case.  Upon  this  general  question  the  Supreme 
Court  has  said  that  the  guaranty  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws  means  '*that  no  person  or  class  of  persons 
shall  be  denied  the  same  protection  of  the  laws  which  is 
enjoyed  by  other  persons  or  other  classes  in  the  same 
place  and  under  like  circumstances.  These  principles  ap- 
plied to  this  case  condemn  the  statute  of  Illinois.  Under 
that  statute  all  except  producers  of  agricultural  com- 
modities and  producers  of  live  stock,  who  combine  their 
capital,  skill  or  acts,  for  any  of  the  purposes  named  in 
the  act  may  be  punished  as  criminals,  while  agriculturists 
and  live-stock  raisers  in  respect  of  their  products  or  live 
stock  in  hand,  are  exempted  from  the  operation  of  the 
statute,  and  may  combine  and  do  that  which,  if  done  by 


700  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  432 

others  would  be  a  crime  against  the  state  notwithstand- 
ing all  are  in  the  same  general  class^  that  is,  they  are  all 
alike  engaged  in  domestic  trade  which  is  of  right  open  to 
ally  subject  to  such  regulations,  applicable  alike  to  all  in 
like  conditions,  as  the  state  may  legally  prescribe.  To 
declare  that  some  of  the  persons  engaged  in  domestic 
trade  or  commerce  shall  be  deemed  criminals  if  they 
violate  the  regulations  prescribed  by  the  state  for  the 
purpose  of  protecting  the  public  against  illegal  combina- 
tions formed  to  destroy  competition  and  to  control  prices, 
and  that  others  of  the  same  class  shall  not  be  bound  to 
regard  these  regulations,  but  may  combine  their  capital, 
skill  or  acts  to  destroy  competition  and  to  control  prices 
for  their  special  benefit  is  so  manifestly  a  denial  of  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  that  the  act  is  clearly  repug- 
nant to  the  Constitution.  Connolly  v.  Union  Sewer  Pipe 
Co.,  184  U.  S.  540, 

§  433.  Discrimination  against  dealers  in  articles  mann- 
factured  from  produce  of  another  state.  The  Tennessee 
merchant  tax  imposed  on  a  corporation  dealing  only  in 
goods  manufactured  from  the  produce  of  other  states, 
makes  no  unconstitutional  discrimination,  because  of  the 
provision  of  the  state  constitution  that  **no  article  manu- 
factured of  the  produce  of  this  state  shall  be  taxed  other- 
wise than  to  pay  inspection  fees, ' '  where  the  highest  court 
of  the  state  has  held  that  this  provision  refers  only  to  a 
direct  levy  of  taxation  upon  articles  manufactured  from 
the  produce  of  the  state  and  that  the  merchants '  tax  ap- 
plies equally  to  all  merchants.  The  argument  is  made 
that  under  the  facts  found  by  the  court  below  it  was  erro- 
neously held  that  the  steel  company  because  of  the  busi- 
ness it  carried  on  in  the  state  of  Tennessee  was  a  merchant 
within  the  statutes,  and  the  power  to  review  this  question, 
it  is  insisted,  should  be  exercised  because  the  question  is 
Federal  in  its  nature.  The  contention  is  without  merit. 
As  the  levy  of  the  merchants'  tax  violated  no  Federal 
right,  the  mere  determination  of  who  were  merchants 


§  434    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      701 

within  the  state  involved  no  Federal  qnestion.  The  con- 
struction of  the  state  law  being  conclusive  and  embracing 
all  persons  doing  a  like  business  with  the  steel  company, 
it  follows  that  there  was  no  discrimination.  American 
Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  Speed,  192  U.  S.  500. 

§  434.  Validity  of  Texas  anti-trust  law.  The  construc- 
tion given  by  the  state  courts  to  the  Texas  act  of  May 
25, 1899,  as  removing  the  discriminatory  features  of  prior 
anti-trust  laws,  is  conclusive  on  the  Federal  Supreme 
Court  in  determining,  on  writ  of  error  to  the  state  court, 
whether  such  statute  denies  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  A  foreign  corporation  whose  license  to  do  business 
in  the  state  is  sought  to  be  forfeited  by  a  suit  brought 
under  the  anti-trust  laws  of  the  state  cannot  claim  to  be 
denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  where  the  dis- 
criminatory features  of  the  prior  anti-trust  laws  have 
been  removed  by  a  subsequent  act,  although  they  may  still 
remain  in  the  revised  statutes  of  the  state  and  in  the  penal 
code,  under  which  certain  excepted  classes  are  exempted 
from  indictment  and  punishment,  while  the  corporation 
may  be  subject  to  both.  The  contention  of  the  corpora- 
tion is  that  the  statutes  of  the  state  discriminate  against 
it;  in  other  words,  deny  it  the  equal  protection  of  the 
law,  by  forbidding  it  from  doing  what  they  permit  others 
to  do  in  similar  circumstances, — ^punish  its  acts  and  ex- 
empt from  punishment  the  same  acts  when  done  by  others. 
The  courts  of  the  state  are  the  tribunals  appointed  to 
administer  the  statutes  and  interpret  them,  in  other 
words,  declare  the  meaning  of  the  statutes,  and  if  in 
declaring  it  they  make  the  statutes  discriminatory,  then 
may  the  statutes  become  unconstitutional.  The  state 
court  held  that  the  subaequent  act  did  not  continue  the 
unconstitutional  provisions  of  prior  acts,  merely  because 
it  was  declared  to  be  cumulative,  and  the  law  was  held 
constitutional  because  it  did  not  contain  the  discriminat- 
ing features  of  the  prior  laws.  Under  the  laws  of  Texas, 
therefore,  combinations  of  the  kind  described  in  the  van- 


702  DDE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  434 

0U8  anti-trast  laws,  whether  by  agricaltnrists  or  organized 
laborers  or  others,  are  forbidden  and  penalized,  and  the 
oil  company  is  not  discriminated  against.  It  is  claimed 
that  the  inequalities  of  prior  anti-trust  acts  still  remain 
in  the  revised  statutes  of  the  state  and  in  the  penal  code. 
The  case  at  bar  however  is  not  a  criminal  prosecution. 
It  involves  only  the  anti-trust  laws  and  their  prohibitions 
and  penalties,  and  in  them,  by  the  last  enactment,  there 
is  no  inequality  of  operation.  National  Cotton  Oil  Go. 
v.  Texas,  197  U.  S.  115. 

§435.  Appointing  state  auditor  to  accept  service  on 
corporation.  The  West  Virginia  statute  requiring  every 
foreign  and  nonresident  domestic  corporation  to  appoint 
the  state  auditor  to  accept  service  of  process,  and  exact- 
ing an  annual  fee  of  $10  for  his  services,  does  not  deny  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  a  domestic  corporation 
whose  principal  office  and  works  are  outside  the  state. 
The  state  had  the  clear  right  to  regulate  its  own  creations^ 
and  a  fortiori,  foreign  corporations  permitted  to  trans- 
act business  within  its  borders.  In  this  instance  it  put 
all  nonresident  domestic  corporations,  which  elected  to 
have  their  places  of  business  and  works  outside  of  the 
state,  and  all  foreign  corporations  coming  into  the  state, 
on  the  same  footing  in  respect  of  the  service  of  process, 
and  the  law  operated  on  all  these  alike.  Such  a  classifi- 
cation was  reasonable  and  not  open  to  constitutional 
objection.  The  requirement  of  the  payment  of  $10  to 
the  auditor  for  the  use  of  the  state  does  not  amount  to  a 
taking  of  property  without  due  process,  and  is  not  an 
unjust  discrimination.  St  Mary's  Franco-American 
Petroleum  Co.  v.  West  Virginia,  203  U.  S.  183. 

§436.  Unequal  assessment  of  franchises  and  other 
property  of  certain  corporations.  Assessing  the  fran- 
chises and  other  property  of  certain  corporations  at  a 
different  rate  and  by  a  different  method  from  that  em- 
ployed for  other  corporations  of  the  same  class  for  the 


§  437     DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      703 

same  year,  which  results  in  enormous  disparity  and  dis- 
criminatioUy  denies  the  due  process  of  law  and  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  protected  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  against  impairment  by  a  state.  A  state  board 
of  equalization,  when  making  an  assessment  pursuant  to 
the  supposed  command  of  a  writ  of  mandamus  represents 
the  state, — ^there  being  no  method  of  reviewing  its  decision 
except  by  judicial  proceedings  for  relief  from  the  assess- 
ment, and  is  subject  to  the  limitations  of  the  amendment. 
The  provisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  are  not 
confined  to  the  action  of  the  state  through  legislature,  or 
through  the  executive  or  judicial  authority.  Those  pro- 
visions relate  to  and  cover  all  the  instrumentalities  by 
which  the  state  acts.  It  is  made  entirely  clear  that  the 
board  of  equalization  did  not  equalize  the  assessments 
in  the  cases  of  these  corporations,  the  effect  of  which  was 
that  they  were  levied  upon  a  different  principle  or  fol- 
lowed a  different  method  from  that  adopted  in  the  case 
of  other  like  corporations  whose  property  the  board  had 
assessed  for  the  same  year.  This  was  the  action  of  the 
state  through  the  board.  The  most  important  function 
of  the  board,  that  of  equalizing  assessments,  in  order  to 
carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  constitution  of  the  state 
in  levying  a  tax  by  valuation  *  *  so  that  every  person  shall 
pay  a  tax  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  his,  her,  or  its 
property, ''  was  iil  this  instance  omitted  and  ignored. 
This  action  resulted  in  an  illegal  discrimination  which, 
under  these  facts,  was  the  action  of  the  state  through  the 
board.   Eaymond  v.  Chicago  Edison  Co.,  207  U.  S.  20. 

§  437.  Requiring  corporations  alone  to  produce  books 
and  papers.  The  Vermont  statute  under  which  corpora- 
tions alone  may  be  compelled  to  produce  before  a  court  or 
grand  jury  material  books  and  papers  in  their  custody  or 
control  does  not  deny  to  them  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  secured  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  There  is  no 
improper  classification  in  this  regard.  It  is  stated  by  the 
state  court  that  prior  to  the  passage  of  this  act  there  was 


704  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  437 

no  adequate  provision  for  compelling  the  production  of 
books  and  papers  by  a  corporation,  and  it  was  held  that 
the  statute  was  designed  for  requiring  the  corporation 
itself,  as  the  responsible  owner  and  custodian,  to  pro- 
duce the  documentary  evidence  mentioned  therein,  with- 
out the  necessity  of  calling  upon  bookkeepers,  managers, 
or  other  servants  who  may,  or  may  not,  in  fact,  have 
custody  or  control  thereof  at  the  time  notice  to  produce 
is  given,  and  to  place  upon  the  corporation  the  responsi- 
bility of  seeing  that  such  evidence  called  for,  if  in  its 
control,  is  produced.  There  is  ample  justification  for  the 
classification  made  by  the  statute.  Consolidated  Bender- 
ing  Co.  V.  Vermont,  207  U.  S.  541. 

§438.  State  regulation  of  telegraph  companies.    The 

equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  telegraph  com- 
panies  and  the  persons  with  whom  it  does  business  by  a 
state  statute  under  which,  as  construed  by  the  state 
courts,  a  telegraph  company  can  not  limit  its  liability  for 
its  negligent  failure  to  deliver  a  telegram  addressed  to 
a  person  in  another  state,  although  express  companies 
and  other  common  carriers  may,  by  contract,  limit  their 
liability  in  this  respect.  The  power  of  the  state  to  regu- 
late public  service  corporations,  both  as  to  power  and 
the  extent  of  the  power,  is  well  established.  The  claim  of 
unjust  discrimination  is  answered  by  Orient  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Daggs,  172  U.  S.  557.  Western;  Union  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
Commercial  Milling  Co.,  218  U.  S.  406. 

§  439.  Local  assessments  on  state  tide  lands.  Lessees 
of  state  tide  lands  are  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  contrary  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  by  state 
statutes  authorizing  the  assessment  of  such  leaseholds 
for  local  improvements  specially  benefiting  them,  and  the 
inclusion  of  them  within  local  improvement  districts.  In 
private  contracts  in  the  absence  of  a  covenant  or  condi- 
tion to  the  contrary,  it  is  an  implied  covenant  in  every 
lease  that  the  lessor  shall  pay  all  taxes  and  assessments 


§  440    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      705 

levied  on  the  leased  land  during  the  term.  In  ordinary 
cases  the  whole  property  is  taxed,  and  which  party  shall 
bear  the  burden  is  not  a  matter  of  public  concern.  But 
when  the  state  makes  the  lease,  the  supposed  obligation 
would  be  an  obligation  not  to  tax, — ^a  restriction  of  public 
import  not  lightly  to  be  imposed.  It  is  urged  that  to  deny 
the  state's  obligation  discriminates  unconstitutionally 
against  this  class  of  lessees,  since  all  others  are  free  from 
the  burden.  Whether  landlord  or  tenant  shall  pay  a  tax 
is  a  matter  of  private  arrangement,  and  the  practice  one 
way  or  the  other  has  no  bearing  on  the  matter.  The 
argument  from  inequality  really  works  the  other  way.  If 
these  leaseholds  are  not  taxable,  they  are  a  favored  class 
of  property;  for  ordinarily  leaseholds  are  taxed  even  if 
they  are  lumped  and  included  in  the  value  of  the  fee. 
When  an  interest  in  land,  whether  freehold  or  for  years, 
is  severed  from  the  public  domain  and  put  into  private 
hands,  the  natural  implication  is  that  it  goes  there  with 
the  ordinary  incidents  of  privajte  property,  and  therefore 
IB  subject  to  being  taxed.  Trimble  v.  Seattle,  231 
U.  S.  683. 

§440.  Exempting  farmers'  mntnal  insurance  compa- 
nies from  statute  regulating  fire  insurance  rates.  The 
Kansas  statute  regulating  fire  insurance  rates  exempting 
farmers'  mutual  insurance  companies  organized  and 
doing  business  under  the  laws  of  the  state,  and  insuring 
only  farm  property,  does  not  render  such  statute  invalid 
as  to  other  insurance  companies,  as  denying  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  A  discrimination  is  valid  if  not 
arbitrary,  and  arbitrary  in  the  legislative  sense,  that  is, 
outside  of  that  wide  discretion  which  a  legislature  may 
exercise.  A  legislative  classification  may  rest  on  narrow 
distinctions.  Legislation  is  addressed  to  evils  as  they 
may  appear,  and  even  degrees  of  evil  may  determine  its 
exercise.  Ozan  Lumber  Co.  v.  Union  Co.  Nat'l  Bank,  202 
U.  S.  623.  There  are  certainly  differences  between  stock 
companies  and  mutual  companies,  and  a  recognition  of 

Due  Procewi — 45 


706  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  440 

the  differences  cannot  be  said  to  be  outside  of  the  con- 
stitutional power  of  the  legislature.  Orient  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Daggs,  172  U.  S.  557.  German  Alliance  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lewis, 
233  U.  S.  389. 

§  441.  Forfeitiure  of  charter  of  corporation  for  failure 
to  file  affidavit  of  innocence  not  required  of  individuals. 
The  charter  of  a  Missouri  corporation  was  forfeited  by 
the  supreme  court  of  the  state  for  failure  of  its  officers  to 
file  with  the  proper  state  officer  the  affidavit  prescribed 
by  a  statute  of  the  state  setting  forth  the  nonparticipa- 
tion  of  the  corporation  in  any  pool,  trust,  agreement, 
combination,  etc.,  under  penalty  of  forfeiture  of  the  char- 
ter, or  certificate  of  incorporation,  even  though  the  com- 
pany may  never  have  entered  into  any  such  pool,  trust, 
conspiracy  or  combination.  It  was  insisted  on  behalf  of 
the  corporation  that  to  require  an  affidavit  of  innocence 
by  the  managing  officers  of  corporations  is  an  unjust  dis- 
crimination against  them,  and  hence  repugnant  to  the 
equal  protection  provision,  because  individuals,  partner- 
ships, and  associations  of  individuals,  although  equally 
within  the  statute  against  monopolies  are  not  required  to 
make  similar  exculpatory  affidavits.  The  question,  the 
court  states,  is  whether,  for  the  purpose  of  such  a  dis- 
closure as  is  required  by  the  law  in  question,  corporations 
may  be  placed  in  one  class  and  individuals  in  another. 
The  answer  is  declared  to  be  not  at  all  difficult.  Corpora- 
tions may  not  arbitrarily  be  selected  in  order  to  be  sub- 
jected to  a  burden  to  which  individuals  would  as  appro- 
priately be  subject.  Classification  must  be  reasonable; 
that  is  to  say,  it  must  be  based  upon  some  real  and  sub- 
stantial distinction  having  a  just  relation  to  the  legisla- 
tive object  in  view.  When  questions  arise  of  alleged  con- 
flict with  constitutional  requirements,  every  reasonable 
intendment  is  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  the  legislation 
under  attack.  Corporations,  unlike  individuals,  derive 
their  very  right  to  exist  from  the  laws  of  the  state ;  they 
have  perpetual  succession ;  and  they  act  only  by  agents, 


§  442    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      707 

and  often  under  circumstances  where  the  agency  is  not 
manifest  The  legislature  may  reasonably  have  con- 
cluded that^  for  these  and  other  reasons,  corporations  are 
peculiarly  apt  instruments  for  establishing  and  effectuat- 
ing those  trusts  and  combinations  against  which  the  pro- 
hibition of  the  statute  is  directed,  that  their  business 
affiliations  are  not  so  easily  discovered  and  traced  as 
those  of  individuals,  and  that  there  was  therefore  a 
peculiar  necessity  and  fitness  in  annually  requiring  from 
each  corporation  a  solemn  assurance  of  its  nonparticipa- 
tion  in  the  prohibited  practices.  The  act  is,  in  this 
respect,  fairly  within  the  wide  range  of  discretion  that 
the  states  enjoy  in  the  matter  of  classification.  Mal- 
linckrodt  Chemical  Works  v.  Missouri  ex  rel  Jones,  238 
U.  S.  41. 

§  442.  License  tax  on  foreign  corporation.  The  Penn- 
sylvania revenue  act  of  1879  is  not  in  conflict  with  the 
clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution  vesting  in  Congress 
the  power  to  regulate  commerce;  nor  with  the  clause 
declaring  that  the  citizens  of  each  state  are  entitled  to 
the  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several 
states;  nor  with  the  clause  in  Ihe  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment declaring  that  no  state  shall  deny  to  any  person 
within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
The  inhibition  of  the  amendment,  that  no  state  shall 
deprive  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  was  designed  to  prevent  any  per- 
son or  class  of  persons  from  being  singled  out  as  a  special 
subject  for  discriminating  and  hostile  legislation.  Under 
the  designation  of  persons  there  is  no  doubt  that  a  pri- 
vate corporation  is  included.  The  equal  protection  of  the 
law  which  these  bodies  may  claim  is  only  such  as  is 
accorded  to  similar  associations  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  state.  The  plaintiff  in  error  is  not  a  corporation 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  Pennsylvania.  The  office  it 
hires  is  within  such  jurisdiction,  and  on  condition  that  it 
pays  the  required  license  tax  it  can  claim  the  same  pro- 


708  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  442 

tection  in  the  use  of  the  office  that  any  other  corporation 
having  a  similar  office  may  daim.  It  would  then  have  the 
equal  protection  of  the  law  so  far  as  it  had  anything 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state,  and  the  constitutional 
amendment  requires  nothing  more.  The  state  is  not  pro- 
hibited from  discriminating  in  the  privileges  it  may 
grant  to  foreign  corporations  as  a  condition  of  their 
doing  business  or  hiring  offices  within  its  limits,  provided 
always  such  discrimination  does  not  interfere  with  any 
transaction  by  such  corporations  of  interstate  or  foreign 
commerce.  It  is  not  every  corporation,  lawful  in  the  state 
of  its  creation,  that  other  states  may  be  willing  to  admit 
within  their  jurisdiction  or  consent  that  it  have  offices  in 
them.  And  even  where  the  business  of  a  foreign  corpora- 
tion is  not  unlawful  in  other  states  the  latter  may  wish 
to  limit  the  number  of  such  corporations,  or  to  subject 
their  business  to  such  control  as  would  be  in  accordance 
with  the  policy  of  governing  domestic  corporations  of  a 
similar  character.  The  states  may,  therefore,  require  for 
the  admission  within  their  limits  of  the  corporations  of 
other  states,  or  of  any  number  of  them,  such  conditions 
as  they  may  choose,  without  acting  in  conflict  with  the 
concluding  provision  of  the  first  section  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Pembina  Con.  Silver  Mining,  etc,  Co.  v. 
Pennsylvania,  125  U.  S.  181. 

§  443.  State  restrictions  on  foreign  oorporationB.  Sec- 
tion 1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution, 
declaring  that  no  state  shall  ^Meny  to  any  person  within 
its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,*^  does 
not  prohibit  a  state  from  imposing  such  conditions  upon 
foreign  corporations  as  it  may  choose,  as  a  condition  of 
their  admission  within  its  limits.''  See  also,  Philadel- 
phia F.  Ass'n  V.  New  York,  119  U.  S.  110.  Norfolk  & 
Western  R:  Co.  v.  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania,  136 
U.  S.  114. 

§  444.  Tax  on  capital  of  a  corporation.  The  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  is  not  denied  to  a  foreign  corporation 


§  445    DOMESTIC  AND  POBEIGN  CORPORATIONS      709 

« 

which  manufactures  goods  in  other  states  and  sends  them 
into  the  state  for  sale,  by  a  tax  on  the  amount  of  capital 
employed  by  it  within  the  state,  because  of  an  exemption 
of  corporations  which  are  wholly  engaged  in  manuf  actur- 
ing  within  the  state,  when  the  statute  makes  no  discrim- 
ination between  foreign  and  domestic  corporations.  It 
is  contended  that  all  corporations  which  manufacture 
their  goods  wholly  in  other  states  and  send  them  for  sale 
in  New  York  are  discriminated  against  in  favor  of  such 
corporations,  whether  foreign  or  domestic,  as  manuf ac 
ture  their  goods  within  the  state  of  New  York.  If  the 
object  of  the  law  was  to  impose  a  tax  upon  products  of 
other  states  while  exempting  similar  domestic  goods  from 
taxation,  there  might  be  room  to  contend  that  such  a  dis- 
tinction was  constitutionally  objectionable  as  tending  to 
affect  or  regulate  commerce  between  the  states.  But, 
obviously,  such  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  legislation. 
.  .  .  The  tax  is  prescribed  as  well  for  New  York  cor- 
porations as  for  those  of  other  states.  The  exemption  in 
favor  of  manufacturing  or  mining  corporations  wholly 
engaged  in  carrying  on  manufacture  or  mining  ores 
within  the  state  is  not  restricted  to  New  York  corpora- 
tions, but  includes  corporations  of  other  states  as  well, 
when  wholly  engaged  in  manufacturing  within  the  state. 
So  it  is  apparent  that  there  is  no  purpose  disclosed  in  the 
statute  either*  to  distinguish  between  New  York  corpora- 
tions and  those  of  other  states  to  the  detriment  of  the 
latter,  or  to  subject  property  out  of  the  state  to  taxation. 
People  ex  rel.  Parke,  Davis  &  Co.  v.  Roberts,  171 
U.  S.  658. 

§445.  Oorporation,  when  not  within  jurisdiction  of 
state.  A  corporation  not  created  by  the  laws  of  a  state, 
nor  doing  business  in  that  state  under  conditions  that 
subject  it  to  process  from  the  courts  of  that  state,  is  not 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  that  state,  within  the  meaning 
of  the  constitutional  provision  that  no  state  *  *  shall  deny 
to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection 


710  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  %445 

of  the  laws.''  The  Tennessee  statute  of  March  19, 1877, 
80  far  as  it  subordinates  the  daims  of  private  business 
corporations  of  other  states,  who  are  creditors  of  a  cor- 
poration doing  business  in  that  state  under  that  statute, 
to  the  claims  against  the  latter  corporation  of  creditors 
residing  in  Tennessee,  is  not  a  '^denial  of  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws,^'  secured  by  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment to  the  Federal  Constitution  to  persons  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  state.  A  Virginia  corporation  no( 
doing  business  in  Tennessee  was  denied  the  right  to  par- 
ticipate upon  terms  of  equality  with  Tennessee  creditors 
in  the  distribution  of  particular  assets  of  another  foreign 
corporation  doing  business  in  that  state.  It  is  clear  the 
Virginia  corporation  cannot  rely  upon  the  clause  declar- 
ing that  no  state  shall  *'deny  to  any  person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.^'  That  pro- 
hibition manifestly  relates  only  to  the  denial  by  the  state 
of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  persons  **  within  its 
jurisdiction. ''  The  prohibition  against  the  deprivation 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law  is  not  qualified  by 
the  words  **  within  its  jurisdiction, '^  while  those  words 
are  found  in  the  succeeding  clause  relating  to  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  The  Supreme  Court  declared  it 
could  not  assume  that  those  words  were  inserted  without 
any  object,  nor  was  it  at  liberty  to  eliminate  them  from 
the  Constitution  and  to  interpret  the  daifte  in  question 
as  if  they  were  not  found  in  that  instrument  It  is  safe 
to  say  that  a  corporation  not  created  by  Tennessee,  nor 
doing  business  there  under  conditions  that  subjected  it 
to  process  issuing  from  the  courts  of  Tennessee  at  the 
instance  of  suitors,  is  not,  under  the  above  clause  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  that 
state.  The  Virginia  corporation  does  not  appear  to  have 
been  doing  business  in  Tennessee  under  any  statute  that 
would  bring  it  directly  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts 
of  the  state.  Nor  did  it  come  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
Tennessee,  within  the  meaning  of  the  amendment,  simply 
by  presenting  its  claim  in  the  state  court  and  thereby 


§  446    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      711 

becoming  a  party  to  the  cause.  Under  any  other  inter- 
pretation the  Fourteenth  Amendment  would  be  given  a 
scope  not  contemplated  by  its  f  ramers  or  by  the  people, 
nor  justified  by  its  language.  The  court  held  that  the 
statute,  80  far  as  it  subordinates  the  claims  of  private 
business  corporations  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
state  of  Tennessee  (although  such  private  corporations 
may  be  creditors  of  a  corporation  doing  business  in  tiie 
state  under  the  authority  of  that  statute),  to  the  claims 
against  the  latter  corporation  of  creditors  residing  in 
Tennessee,  is  not  a  denial  of  the  **  equal  protection  of  the 
laws ' '  secured  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  persons 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state,  however  unjust  such 
a  regulation  may  be  deemed.  Blake  v.  McClung,  172 
U.  S.  239. 

§  446.  Right  to  attach  nonresident's  property.  A  ter- 
ritorial statute  permitting  attachment  against  a  non- 
resident without  a  bond,  while  requiring  the  bond  for 
attachment  against  a  resident  does  not  constitute  a  denial 
to  the  nonresident  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  or 
of  due  process  of  law.  The  elementary  proposition  is  not 
denied  that  for  the  purposes  of  the  remedy  by  attach- 
ment, the  legislative  authority  of  a  state  or  territory 
may  classify  residents  in  one  class  and  nonresidents  in 
another,  but  it  is  insisted  that  where  nonresidents  **are 
not  capable  of  separate  identification  from  residents  by 
any  facts  or  circumstances  other  than  that  they  are  non- 
residents— that  is,  when  the  fact  of  nonresidence  is  their 
only  distinguishing  feature — ^that  laws  of  a  state  or  terri- 
tory cannot  treat  them  to  their  prejudice  upon  that  fact 
as  a  basis  of  classification. ' '  When  the  exception,  thus 
stated,  is  put  in  juxtaposition  with  the  concession  that 
there  is  such  a  difference  between  the  residents  of  a  state 
or  territory  and  nonresidents  as  to  justify  their  being 
placed  into  distinct  classes  for  the  purpose  of  the  process 
of  attachment,  it  becomes  at  once  clear  that  the  excep- 
tion to  the  rule,  which  the  argument  attempts  to  make,  is 


712  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  446 

but  a  denial,  by  indirection^  of  the  legislative  power  to 
classify  which  it  is  avowed  the  exception  does  not  ques- 
tion. The  argument  in  substance  is  that  where  a  bond  is 
required  as  a.  prerequisite  to  the  issue  of  an  attachment 
against  a  resident,  an  unlawful  discrimination  is  pro- 
duced by  permitting  process  of  attachment  against  a  non- 
resident without  giving  a  like  bond.  But  the  difference 
between  exacting  a  bond  in  the  one  case  and  not  in  the 
other  is  nothing  like  as  great  as  that  which  arises  from 
allowing  process  of  attachment  against  a  nonresident  and 
not  permitting  such  process  against  a  resident  in  any 
case.  That  the  distinction  between  a  resident  and  a  non- 
resident is  so  broad  as  to  authorize  a  classification,  in 
accordance  with  the  suggestion  just  made,  is  conceded, 
and  if  it  were  not,  is  obvious.  The  power  to  grant  the 
remedy  in  the  one  case  and  to  deny  it  in  the  other,  of 
necessity  embraces  the  right  to  impose  upon  the  one  a 
condition  not  required  in  the  other.  Central  Loan  & 
Trust  Co.  V.  Campbell  Commission  Co.,  173  U.  S.  84. 

§  447.  Discrimination  against  nonresident  creditors  of 
foreign  corporations.  A  preference  in  favor  of  resident 
creditors  of  a  foreign  corporation  over  a  nonresident 
mortgagee  whose  mortgage  is  not  registered  when  their 
debts  are  created,  when  such  preference  is  not  given 
them  over  a  resident  mortgagee,  constitutes  an  illegal 
discrimination  against  the  nonresident.  The  fact  that 
there  are  no  resident  mortgagees  in  a  particular  case  does 
not  make  the  question  of  discrimination  between  non- 
resident and  resident  by  a  statute  a  merely  abstract  or 
moot  question,  so  as  to  preclude  a  decision  against  the 
validity  of  the  statute,  if  it  makes  a  discrimination 
against  nonresident  mortgagees  with  respect  to  sharing 
in  the  distribution  of  the  assets  of  an  insolvent  foreign 
corporation.  A  nonresident  mortgagee  is  not  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  state  merely  because  he  has  a  mort- 
gage on  property  therein,  so  as  to  be  deprived  of  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  in  violation  of  the  Four- 


§  448    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      713 

teenth  Amendment  by  denying  him  the  right  to  partici- 
pate on  terms  of  equality  in  the  distribution  of  the  assets 
of  an  insolvent  foreign  corporation.  The  contest  was 
between  creditors  of  a  Virginia  corporation  doing  busi- 
ness at  the  time  of  its  insolvency  in  the  state  of  Tennes- 
see, who  are  nonresidents  of  the  state,  both  those  who  are 
unsecured,  as  well  as  those  who  are  secured  by  mort- 
gages  upon  the  property  of  the  company  in  that  state, 
and  creditors  of  the  company  who  are  residents  of  the 
state.  A  nonresident  unsecured  creditor  has  the  right  to 
share  in  the  distribution  of  the  assets  of  the  insolvent 
foreign  corporation  upon  the  same  level  as  like  creditors 
of  the  company  who  are  residents  of  the  state  of  Ten- 
nessee, and  the  decree  below  denied  him  that  right  in  vio- 
lation of  the  guarantee  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.    Sully  v.  American  National  Bank,  178  U.  S.  289. 


§  448.  Taxation  of  nonresident  stockholders.  No  un- 
constitutional discrimination  against  nonresident  stock- 
holders in  domestic  corporations  is  made  by  the  Con- 
necticut public  act  providing  for  the  assessment  of  such 
stock  at  its  market  value,  with  no  deduction  on  account 
of  real  estate  held  by  the  corporation,  although  provision 
for  such  deduction  in  assessing  resident  stockholders  is 
made  by  a  statute  of  the  state,  since  nonresident  stock- 
holders pay  no  local  taxes,  but  simply  contribute  so  much 
to  the  general  expenses  of  the  state,  while  the  resident 
stockholders  pay  no  tax  to  the  state,  but  only  to  the 
municipality  in  which  they  reside.  The  stock  of  the  non- 
resident stockholder  is  assessed  at  its  market  value,  with- 
out any  deduction  on  account  of  real  estate  held  by  the 
corporation.  The  stock  of  the  resident  stockholder  is 
assessed  at  its  market  value,  less  the  proportionate  value 
of  all  real  estate  held  by  the  corporation  upon  which  it 
has  already  paid  a  tax.  As  thus  stated  there  would 
appear  to  be  a  wrongful  discrimination,  and  that  the  non- 
resident stockholder  was  subjected  to  a  larger  burden  of 
taxation  than  the  resident  stockholder,  by  reason  of  the 


714  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  448 

direct  command  of  the  statute  to  include  the  real  estate 
in  the  valuation  in  the  one  case  and  to  exclude  it  in  the 
other.  But  this  apparent  discrimination  against  the  non- 
resident disappears  when  the  system  of  taxation  prevail- 
ing in  Connecticut  is  considered.  The  state  dealing  with 
the  question  of  the  taxation  of  the  shares  of  stock  in  a 
local  corporation,  found  two  classes ;  one,  shares  held  by 
residents,  and  the  other,  those  held  by  nonresidents.  It 
was  believed  that  a  resident  in  a  city  or  town,  enjoying 
all  the  benefits  of  local  government,  should  be  taxed  for 
the  expenses  of  that  government  upon  all  the  property  he 
possessed,  whether  that  property  consisted  in  part  or  in 
whole  of  shares  of  stock.  On  the  other  hand,  the  non- 
resident, enjoying  little  or  none  of  the  benefits  of  local 
government,  was  exempted  from  taxation  on  account  of 
the  expenses  of  such  local  government.  At  the  same  time 
it  was  not  right  that  he  should  escape  all  contributions  to 
the  support  of  the  state  which  created  and  protected  the 
corporation  and  the  property  of  all  its  stockholders,  and 
so  a  tax  was  cast  upon  the  nonresident  for  the  expenses 
of  the  state.  The  resident  is  not  called  upon  to  pay  any 
of  the  expenses  of  the  state,  but  only  his  proportional 
share  of  those  of  the  municipality.  The  nonresident  is 
called  upon  to  pay  no  share  of  the  expenses  of  the  munici- 
pality, but  only  to  contribute  to  the  support  of  the  state. 
.  .  .  The  legislature  aimed  to  apportion  fairly  the 
burden  of  taxes  between  the  resident  and  the  nonresident 
stockholder.  It  is  enough  that  the  state  has  secured  a 
reasonably  fair  distribution  of  burdens,  and  that  no  inten- 
tional discrimination  has  been  made  against  nonresidents. 
The  Supreme  Court  has  frequently  held  that  mere 
inequality  in  the  results  of  a  state  tax  is  not  sufficient  to 
invalidate  it.  Absolute  equality  in  taxation  can  never  be 
attained.  Travelers'  Insurance  Co.  v.  Connecticut,  185 
U.  S.  364. 

§449.  Taxation  of  stock  of  foreign  railroads.    The 

equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  by  the  pro- 


§  449    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      715 

visions  of  the  Alabama  statute  for  the  taxation  of  rail- 
road stock,  because  of  the  exemption  of  stock  in  domestic 
railroads  and  in  others  that  list  substantially  all  their 
property  for  taxation.  The  argument  for  the  plaintiff  in 
error  is  that  if  foreign  stock  is  treated  for  purposes  of 
taxation  as  present  by  fiction  in  the  domicil,  it  must  be 
treated  as  present  al^o  for  purposes  of  protection;  that 
the  tax  is  a  tax  on  values,  and  that  net  values  of  similar 
articles  must  be  treated  alike.  It  would  seem  more  logical 
to  go  further  and  deny  the  right  to  tax  on  fiction  at  all, 
and  therefore  deny  the  right  to  tax  foreign  stocks.  The 
argument  does  not  go  to  that  extent,  and,  limited  as  it  is, 
the  proposition  that  the  plaintiff  in  error  is  denied  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  wholly  without  force. 
A  state  may  tax  stock  in  some  domestic  corporations  and 
leave  stock  in  others  untaxed  on  the  ground  that  it  taxes 
the  property  and  franchises  of  the  latter  to  an  amount 
that  imposes  indirectly  a  proportional  burden  on  the 
stock.  When  it  comes  to  corporations  formed  and  having 
their  property  and  business  elsewhere,  the  state  must  tax 
the  stock  held  within  the  state  if  it  is  to  tax  anything, 
assuming  the  right  to  tax  stock  in  foreign  corporations 
to  be  conceded.  If  it  does  tax  that  stock  it  may  take  into 
account  that  the  property  and  franchise  of  the  corpora- 
tion are  untaxed,  on  the  same  ground  that  it  might  do  the 
same  thing  with  a  domestic  corporation.  The  real  griev- 
ance in  a  case  like  this  is  that,  more  than  probably,  they 
are  taxed  elsewhere.  With  that  the  state  of  Alabama  is 
not  concerned.  No  doubt  it  would  be  a  great  advantage 
to  the  country  and  to  the  individual  states  if  principles 
of  taxation  could  be  agreed  upon  which  did  not  conflict 
with  each  other,  and  a  common  scheme  could  be  adopted 
by  which  taxation  of  substantially  the  same  property  in 
two  jurisdictions  could  be  avoided.  But  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  does  not  go  so  far.  If  property  is 
untaxed  by  the  laws  of  the  state  of  Alabama  then  for  the 
purposes  of  its  laws  the  property  is  not  taxed  at  all. 
Stock,  the  property  of  the  plaintiff  in  error,  is  taxed 


716  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  449 

beeanse  it  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state.  There 
is  no  inconsistency  in  the  state 's  recognizing  at  the  same 
time  that  the  property  of  the  corporation,  that  which 
gives  the  plaintiff's  stock  its  valne,  is  taxed  or  untaxed, 
as  the  case  may  be.  There  is  no  inconsistency  in  recog- 
nizing that  it  is  untaxed  because  it  cannot  be  reached. 
Shares  of  stock  may  be  within  a  state,  and  the  property 
of  the  corporation  outside  it.  A  large  latitude  is  allowed 
to  the  state  for  classification  upon  any  reasonable  basis. 
Kidd  V.  Alabama,  188  U.  S.  730. 

§460.  State  taxation  of  local  managers  of  foreign 
packing  houses.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not 
denied  a  managing  agent  of  a  nonresident  meat-packing 
house  by  the  imposition,  under  a  GFeorgia  statute  of  a 
license  tax  on  the  domestic  business  conducted  by  him, 
since  such  act  applies  to  managing  agents  of  both  domes- 
tic and  foreign  houses.  There  is  no  discrimination  in 
favor  of  the  agents  of  domestic  houses,  and,  while  it  may 
be  suspected  that  the  act  was  primarily  intended  to  apply 
to  agents  of  ultra  state  houses,  there  is  no  discrimination 
upon  the  face  of  the  act,  and  none,  so  far  as  the  record 
shows,  upon  its  practical  administration.  As  has  been 
frequently  held,  the  state  has  the  right  to  classify  occupa- 
tions and  to  impose  different  taxes  upon  different  occupa- 
tions. Such  has  been  constantly  the  practice  of  Congress 
under  the  internal  revenue  law.  What  the  necessity  is 
for  such  tax,  and  upon  what  occupations  it  shall  be 
imposed,  as  well  as  the  amount  of  the  imposition,  are 
exclusively  within  the  control  of  the  state  legislature. 
Sa  long  as  there  is  no  discrimination  against  citizens  of 
other  states,  the  amount  and  the  necessity  of  the  tax  are 
not  open  to  criticism  in  the  Federal  Supreme  Court 
Kehrer  v.  Stewart,  197  U.  S.  60. 


§  451.  Excluding  foreign  corporation.  The  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  is  not  denied  by  a  state  statute,  passed 
in  the  exercise  of  its  power  over  foreign  corporations, 


§  452    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS     717 

incorporating  a  local  benevolent  society  with  the  same 
name  as  that  of  a  voluntary  state  association  whose  char- 
ter had  been  withdrawn  by  the  foreign  corporation  that 
issued  ity  and  conferring  upon  such  society  thk  exclusive 
right  of  granting  subcharters  in  the  state.  No  doubt  a 
law  specially  directed  against  a  foreign  corporation  might 
be  unconstitutional^  for  instance,  as  depriving  it  of  its 
property  without  due  process  of  law.  But  when  the 
so-called  property  consists  merely  in  the  value  that  there 
might  be  in  extending  its  business  or  membership  into  a 
state,  that  property,  it  hardly  needs  to  be  said,  depends 
upon  the  consent  of  the  state  to  let  the  corporation  come 
into  the  state.  A  state  has  the  right  to  exclude  a  for- 
eign corporation  and  to  forbid  its  constituting  branches 
within  its  limits.  ...  As  it  had  the  right  before  the 
corporation  got  in,  so  it  had  the  right  to  turn  it  out  after 
it  got  in.  ...  It  follows  that  the  state  could  impose 
the  more  limited  restriction  that  simply  forbade  the 
granting  of  charters  to  subordinate  branches.  It  is  con- 
tended that  the  restrictions  upon  the  foreign  corporation 
which  flow  from  the  charter  granted  to  the  domestic  cor- 
poration amount  to  the  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  to  a  person  within  its  jurisdiction.  But  the 
power  of  the  state  as  to  foreign  corporations  does  not 
depend  upon  their  being  outside  of  its  jurisdiction.  .  •  • 
Those  within  the  jurisdiction,  in  such  sense  as  they  can 
ever  be  said  to  be  within  it,  do  not  acquire  a  right  not  to 
be  turned  out  except  by  general  laws.  A  single  corpora- 
tion might  be  expelled  by  a  special  act,  and  equally  could 
be  restricted  in  the  same  way.  National  Council  v.  State 
Council,  203  U.  S.  151. 

§452.  Notice  to  nonresidents— Validity  of  tax  sales. 

Nonresident  owners  of  land  within  the  levee  district  cre- 
ated by  the  Arkansas  act  of  February  15,  1893,  are  not 
denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  or  the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  because 
§  11  of  that  act,  as  amended  in  1895,  while  requiring  per- 


718  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  452 

sonal  service  of  smmnons  upon  resident  owners  or  occu- 
pants for  at  least  twenty  days  before  rendering  a  decree 
of  sale  for  unpaid  levee  taxes,  provides  for  constructive 
service  hf  publication  upon  nonresident  owners  of  only 
four  weeks.  The  court  held  there  was  no  doubt  of  the 
power  of  the  state  so  to  discriminate.  Personal  service 
upon  nonresidents  is  not  always  within  the  state 's  power. 
Its  process  is  limited  by  its  boundaries.  Constructive 
service  is  at  times  a  necessary  recourse.  The  land  stands 
accountable  to  the  demands  of  the  state,  and  the  owners 
are  charged  with  the  laws  affecting  it  and  the  manner  by 
which  those  demands  may  be  enforced.  This  accounta- 
bility of  the  land  and  the  knowledge  the  owners  must  be 
presumed  to  have  had  of  the  laws  affecting  it  is  an  answer 
to  the  contention  of  the  insufficiency  of  service.  .  .  . 
Certainly  it  was  not  so  insufficient  that  it  can  be  said  that 
a  difference  in  the  time  allowed  for  such  service  was  not 
the  equivalent  of  that  allowed  to  resident  owners.  Bal- 
lard V.  Hunter,  204  U.  S.  241. 

§453.  Discrimination  between  residents  and  nonresi- 
dents. The  distinction  between  resident  and  nonresident 
owners  of  abutting  property  in  the  act  of  May  19,  1896, 
creating  a  drainage  system  for  the  District  of  Columbia, 
in  that  the  coercion  of  the  law  as  to  making  connections 
with  a  sewer  is  by  criminal  punishment  in  the  case  of  resi- 
dents, whereas,  against  nonresident  owners,  the  District 
does  the  work  in  case  of  their  neglect,  and  assesses  the 
cost  against  the  property  as  a  tax,  does  not  invalidate  the 
statute  for  discrimination,  even  assuming  that  Congress 
is  forbidden  to  enact  discriminating  legislation.  Whether 
Congress  is  expressly  or  impliedly  prohibited  to  dis- 
criminate in  its  legislation,  the  prohibition  cannot  be 
stricter  or  more  extensive  than  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment is  upon  the  states.  It  has  been  repeatedly  decided 
that  the  amendment  does  not  take  from  the  states  the 
power  of  classification,  and  that  such  classification  need 
not  be  either  logically  appropriate  or  scientifically  acca- 


§  453    DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      719 

rate.    The  problems  which  are  met  in  the  government  of 
human  beings  are  different  from  those  involved  in  the 
examination  of  the  objects  of  the  physical  world,  and 
assigning  them  to  their  proper  associates.    A  wide  range 
of  discretion,  therefore,  is  necessary  in  legislation  to 
make  it  practical,  and  the  courts  cannot  be  made  a  refuge 
from  ill-advised,  unjust,  or  oppressive  laws.    The  act  in 
controversy  makes  a  distinction  in  its  provisions  between 
resident  and  nonresident  lot  owners,  but  this  is  a  proper 
basis  for  classification.    Eegarded  abstractly  as  lot  own- 
ers, no  legal  difference  may  be  observed  between  resi- 
dents and  nonresidents;  but,  regarded  in  their  relation 
to  their  respective  lots  under  regulating  laws,  the  limita- 
tions upon  jurisdiction,  and  the  power  to  reach  one  and 
not  the  other,  important  differences  immediately  appear. 
The  law  treats  all  resident  owners  alike  and  all  non- 
residents alike.    It  is  contended  that  nonresident  lot  own- 
ers are  not  treated  the  same  as  resident  owners  in  like 
situation,  because  against  resident  owners  the  coercion 
of  the  law  is  by  criminal  punishment,  while  against  non- 
resident owners  the  remedy  is  by  civil  proceedings.    The 
District  does   the   work  that  the   nonresident  owners 
neglect,  and  charges  the  expense  thereof  on  their  prop- 
erty.   This  is  a  distinction,  a  discrimination,  it  may  be 
called,  but  it  has  even  more  justification  than  that  sus- 
tained in  Field  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  194  U.  S. 
618.    The  statute  under  consideration  in  the  case  at  bar 
enjoins  a  duty  on  both  resident  and  nonresident  lot  own- 
ers,— ^a  duty  necessary  to  be  followed  to  preserve  the 
health  of  the  city.     There  is  a  difference  only  in  the 
manner  of  enforcing  it, — a  difference  arising  from  the 
different  situation  of  the  lot  owners,  and  therefore  com- 
petent for  Congress  to  regard  in  its  legislation.    In  other 
words,  under  the  circumstances  presented  by  the  record, 
the  distinction  between  residents  and  nonresidents  is  a 
proper  basis  for  classification.    It  might  not  be  under 
other  circumstances.     District  of  Columbia  v.  Brooke, 
214  U.  S.  138. 


720  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  454 

§454.  Taxing  shares  of  foreign  corporations.    The 

Indiana  statute  taxing  shares  of  foreign  corporations 
when  owned  by  inhabitants  of  the  state  does  not  deny  the 
owner  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  because,  in  the 
case  of  domestic  corporations,  it  is  the  property,  and  not 
the  shares,  which  is  taxed.  This  case  is  practically  dis- 
posed of  by  Kidd  v.  Alabama,  188  U.  S.  730,  where  the 
real  matter  of  complaint,  that  the  property  of  the  cor- 
poration presumably  is  taxed  in  Tennessee,  is  answered. 
•  .  •  Objection  is  made  that  the  statute  works  a  dis- 
crimination against  stock  in  corporations  of  otiher  states, 
contrary  to  principles  often  recognized.  The  most 
serious  aspect  of  this  objection  is  that  the  statutes  of 
Indiana  do  not  make  allowance  if  a  foreign  corporation 
has  property  taxed  within  the  state.  The  plaintiffs  in 
error  did  not  show  that  this  was  their  case,  and  therefore 
they  could  not  complain  on  that  ground.  The  principle 
of  substantial  equality  of  taxation  is  not  violated  in  tiiis 
case.   Darnell  v.  Indiana,  226  U.  S.  390. 

§  455.  Excise  tax  on  foreign  corporations.  A  foreign 
corporation  which  has  paid  all  the  local  taxes  theretofortf 
assessed  against  it,  and  has  a  leasehold  for  storerooms  in 
the  state,  is  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  by 
the  exaction  under  the  authority  of  Massachusetts  Pub. 
Stat.  1909,  chap.  490,  of  an  excise  tax  upon  the  privilege 
of  doing  business  within  the  state,  although  domestic  cor- 
porations may  be  favored  under  the  statute.  This  case 
is  distinguished  from  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Greene,  216 
U.  S.  400,  in  that  there  was  no  acquisition  of  permanent 
property  such  as  was  shown  in  the  Greene  case.  There 
is  no  question  of  the  continued  authority  of  the  state  to 
tax  a  foreign  corporation  for  the  privilege  of  doing  busi- 
ness within  its  borders,  which  authority  the  state  pos- 
sesses so  long  as  it  does  not  violate  rights  secured  by  the 
Federal  Constitution.  Even  if  domestic  corporations  are 
favored  the  statute  is  not  invalid  for  no  limitation  upon 
the  power  of  a  state  to  exdude  foreign  corporations 


§  456     DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      721 

requires  identical  taxes  in  all  cases  upon  domestic  and 
foreign  corporations.  Baltic  Mining  Co.  v.  Massachu- 
setts, 231  U.  S.  68. 

§456.  Franchise  tax  on  foreign  corporation.  A  for- 
eign railway  corporation  which  has  come  into  the  state 
in  compliance  with  its  laws,  and  has  therein  acquired 
property  of  a  fixed  and  permanent  nature,  upon  which  it 
has  paid  all  taxes  levied  by  the  state,  is  a  person  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  state,  and  as  such,  is  protected  by 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  against  the  imposition,  under  1  Alabama 
Code  1907,  §§  2391-2400,  of  an  additional  franchise  tax 
for  the  privilege  of  doing  business  within  the  state,  where 
no  such  tax  is  imposed  upon  domestic  corporations  car- 
rying on  a  precisely  similar  business.  The  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws  means  subjection  to  equal  laws,  applying 
alike  to  all  in  the  same  situation.  That  a  corporation  is  a 
person,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, is  no  longer  open  to  discussion.  It  was  argued  on 
behalf  of  the  state  that  the  imposition  of  special  taxes 
upon  foreign  corporations  for  the  privilege  of  doing  busi- 
ness within  the  state  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  tax  com- 
plained of,  because  such  tax  imposed  is  different,  in  that 
the  one  imposed  on  the  domestic  corporation  is  for  the 
privilege  of  being  a  corporation,  whereas  the  one  on  the 
foreign  corporation  is  for  the  privilege  of  such  corpora- 
tion to  do  business  within  the  state.  While  reasonable 
classification  is  permitted,  without  doing  violence  to  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws,  such  classification  must  be 
based  upon  some  real  and  substantial  distinction,  bearing 
a  reasonable  and  just  relation  to  the  things  in  respect  to 
which  such  classification  is  imposed;  and  classification 
cannot  be  arbitrarily  made  without  any  substantial  basis. 
Arbitrary  selection  cannot  be  justified  by  calling  it  classi- 
fication. Both  domestic  and  foreign  railway  corporations 
do  the  same  business  in  character  and  kind,  and  under  fhe 
statute  in  question  a  foreign  corporation  may  be  taxed 

Due  Proceas— 46 


722  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  456 

many  thousands  of  dollars  for  the  privilege  of  doing, 
within  the  state,  exactly  the  same  business  as  the  domes- 
tic corporation  is  permitted  to  do  by  a  tax  upon  its  privi- 
lege, amounting  to  only  a  few  hundred  dollars.  To  tax 
the  foreign  corporation  for  carrying  on  business  luider 
the  circumstances  shown,  by  a  different  and  much  more 
onerous  rule  than  is  used  in  taxing  domestic  corporations 
for  the  same  privilege,  is  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws  and  does  violence  to  the  Federal  Constitution. 
Southern  Ey.  Co.  v.  Greene,  216  U.  S.  400. 

§457.  Excluding  foreign  insurance  company.  A  for- 
eign life  insurance  company  which  has  less  than  one- 
fourth  of  its  reserve  on  South  Carolina  policies  invested 
in  South  Carolina  securities,  and  has  not  indicated  any 
purpose  or  intention  of  acquiring  more  of  such  securities, 
is  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  contrary  to 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution, 
because  the  state  insurance  commissioner,  in  the  exercise 
of  his  discretion  under  South  Carolina  act  March  8, 1910, 
§  13,  to  determine  which  applicants  for  tiie  privilege  of 
doing  business  in  the  state  shall  deposit  an  approved  bond 
and  which  shall  deposit  approved  securities,  has  refused 
to  accept  the  bond  of  a  surety  company  tendered  with  the 
insurance  company  *s  application  for  a  license,  unless  it 
shall  invest  at  least  one-fourth  of  its  reserve  on  South 
Carolina  policies  in  South  Carolina  securities,  although 
he  may  have  accepted  a  surety  company 's  bond  tendered 
with  the  application  of  another  foreign  life  insurance 
company  which  had  not  invested  in  South  Carolina  securi- 
ties that  percentage  of  its  reserve  on  South  Carolina 
policies,  where  the  latter  company  had  real  estate  mort- 
gage loans  in  the  state  duly  approved  and  awaiting  invest- 
ment, considerably  in  excess  of  that  amount.  It  is  within 
the  power  of  a  state,  so  long  as  it  does  not  impose  on  a 
foreign  life  insurance  company  as  a  condition  of  doing 
business  within  the  state  any  deprivation  of  rights 
socured  to  it  under  the  Federal  Constitution,  to  determine 


§  457     DOMESTIC  AND  FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS      723 

for  itself  the  conditions  under  which  such  foreign  cor- 
poration could  do  business  within  the  state.  This  deci- 
sion has  often  been  affirmed  by  the  decisions  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  and  the  insurance  company,  being  within 
that  class  of  corporations  not  doing  an  interstate  busi- 
ness, the  state  might,  in  the  exercise  of  its  lawful  author- 
ity, exclude  it  from  doing  business  within  the  state,  so 
long  as  no  rights  conferred  by  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  the  United  States  were  destroyed  or  abridged.  The 
equal  protection  of  the  laws,  as  the  Supreme  Court  has 
frequently  decided,  means  subjection  to  equal  laws  apply- 
ing alike  to  all  in  the  same  situation,  or,  as  expressed  by 
Mr.  Justice  Field,  speaking  for  the  court  in  Barbier  v. 
Connolly,  113  U.  S.  27,  31,  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
means  **that  there  shall  be  no  arbitrary  deprivation  of 
life  or  liberty,  or  arbitrary  spoliation  of  property,  but 
that  equal  protection  and  security  should  be  given  to  all 
under  like  circumstances,  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  per- 
sonal and  civil  rights.  .  .  .  That  no  greater  burdens 
should  be  laid  upon  any  one  than  are  laid  upon  others  in 
the  same  calling  and  condition.  * '  What  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  law  requires  is  equality  of  burdens  upon  those 
in  like  situation  or  condition.  It  has  always  been  held 
consistent  with  this  general  requirement  to  permit  the 
states  to  classify  the  subjects  of  legislation,  and  make  dif- 
ferences of  regulation  where  substantial  differences  of 
condition  exist.  The  company  whose  application  was 
accepted  had  made  large  loans  within  the  state  which 
would  not  only  bring  property  into  the  state,  which  might 
be  reached  through  the  local  courts,  but  would  evidence 
a  purpose  in  the  company  to  remain  in  the  state  in  a  per- 
manent way, — a  fact  which  was  entitled  to  significance  in 
determining  the  matter  of  licensing  the  company  to  do 
business.  The  only  question  which  concerned  the  court 
was  whether  this  conduct  of  the  state  authority  was  so 
arbitrary  and  discriminatory  in  its  character  as  to 
amount  to  a  deprivation  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 


724  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  457 

The  actios  of  the  state  insurance  commissioner  was  held 
to  have  heen  hased  upon  real  and  substantial  differences, 
and  was  not  that  merely  arbitrary  classification  which 
the  Supreme  Court  has  condemned  because  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  South  Carolina  ex  reL  Phoenix 
Mutual  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McMaster,  237  U.  S.  63. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

r 

THE  POWEB  OF   CLASSIFICATION 

§458.  Discrimination  between  agricultural  and  other 
lands  in  statute  of  annexation  to  city.  The  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws  means  the  protection  of  equal  laws,  but 
this  equality  of  protection  is  not  violated  by  classifica- 
tion provided  equal  protection  is  afforded  the  members 
of  each  class.  The  power  of  the  state  to  classify  the 
objects  of  legislation  is  very  broad.  It  is  a  matter  of 
legislative  discretion,  and  such  classification  will  be 
upheld  if  it  bears  a  reasonable  relation  to  a  proper  object 
sought  to  be  accomplished,  even  if  it  may  appear  unwise 
or  unjust.  The  courts  will  not  interfere  with  such  classi- 
fication unless  the  distinctions  made  are  clearly  arbitrary. 
A  discrimination  between  agricultural  lands  and  other 
lands  in  respect  to  the  right  of  a  city  to  annex  them  is  not 
in  violation  of  constitutional  guarantees  of  due  process  of 
law  and  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  as  it  is  within  the 
power  of  the  state  to  classify  objects  of  legislation.  This 
is  necessarily  a  broad  power,  and  one  which  the  Supreme 
Court  has  so  many  times  defined  and  illustrated  the  limits 
upon  it,  that  further  definition  would  seem  impossible, 
and  any  new  instance  of  its  application  not  without  exact 
or  analogous  example  in  some  decided  case.  The  rule  of 
the  Constitution  leaves  to  the  discretion  and  wisdom  of 
the  state  a  wide  latitude  as  far  as  interference  by  the 
Supreme  Court  is  concerned.  It  is  not  a  substitute  for 
municipal  law ;  it  does  not  invest  power  in  that  court  to 
correct  the  impolicy  and  injustice  of  state  laws,  and  the 
equality  it  prescribes  is  not  for  persons  merely  as  such, 
but  according  to  their  relations.  In  some  circumstances 
it  may  not  tax  A  more  than  B,  but  if  A  be  of  a  different 

725 


726  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  458 

trade  or  profession  than  B,  it  may.  And  in  matters  not 
of  taxation,  if  A  be  a  different  kind  of  corporation  than 
B,  it  may  subject  A  to  a  different  rule  of  responsibility  to 
servants  than  B.  In  the  case  at  bar  the  distinction  is 
between  tracts  of  agricultural  lands  in  a  certain  relation 
to  cities  and  lands  used  for  other  purposes  in  such  rela- 
tion. The  distinction  is  justified  by  the  principle  of  the 
cases  decided.  That  principle  leaves  to  the  state  the 
adaptation  of  its  laws  to  its  conditions.  Within  the  lati- 
tude which  local  government  must  be  allowed  the  distinc- 
tion here  made  is  not  arbitrary,  and  infringes  no  provi- 
sion of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Clark  v. 
Kansas  City,  176  U.  S.  114. 

§459.  Eegistration  law  diBcriminating  between  citi- 
zens. A  registration  law  applicable  to  cities  having  more 
than  300,000  inhabitants  being  held  valid  by  the  highest 
court  of  the  state  of  Missouri,  under  the  state  constitu- 
tion, does  not  deny  to  citizens  residing  in  the  only  city 
of  the  state  which  has  a  population  of  300,000  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  although  it  may  be  thought  to  be 
less  effectual  in  protecting  the  right  of  voting  than  the 
statute  applicable  to  other  cities.  The  law  in  question 
was  applicable  only  to  the  city  of  St.  Louis,  and  the  con- 
tention that  it  denied  to  the  citizens  of  that  city  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  must  in  the  last  analysis  rest  upon 
the  assumption  that  under  the  constitution  of  Missouri 
but  one  registration  law  can  be  enacted  applicable  to 
cities  having  a  population  in  excess  of  100,000  inhabi- 
tants, whatever  the  maximum  number  of  inhabitants  may 
be,  and,  that  as  a  natural  consequence  the  citizens  of 
St.  Louis  cannot  be  classified  separately.  The  answer  is 
that  the  law  in  question  has  been  declared  to  be  valid 
under  the  constitution  of  the  state.  The  general  right  to 
vote  in  the  state  of  Missouri  is  primarily  derived  from 
the  state,  and  the  elective  franchise,  if  one  of  the  funda- 
mental privileges  and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of 
St.  Louis,  as  citizens  of  Missouri  and  of  the  United  States, 


§  460  POWER  OF  CLASSIFICATION  727 

is  clearly  such  franchise  '*as  regulated  and  established 
by  the  laws  or  constitution  of  the  state  in  which  it  is  to  be 
exercised/'  The  power  to  classify  cities  with  reference 
to  their  population  having  been  exercised  in  conformity 
with  the  constitution  of  the  state,  the  circumstance  that 
the  registration  law  in  force  in  the  city  of  St.  Louis  was 
made  to  differ  in  essential  particulars  from  that  which 
regulates  the  conduct  of  elections  in  other  cities  in  the 
state  of  Missouri  does  not  in  itself  deny  to  the  citizens  of 
St.  Louis  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Nor  did  the 
exercise  by  the  general  assembly  of  Missouri  of  the  dis- 
cretion vested  in  it  by  law  give  rise  to  a  violation  of 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  Mason  v.  Missouri  ex  rel.  McCaffery, 
179  U.  S.  328. 

§  460.  Classification  of  elevators  and  warehouses.    The 

classification  of  elevators  and  warehouses  on  a  railroad 
right  of  way  or  depot  ground  and  other  lands  used  in 
connection  with  the  railway  at  stations  and  sidings  other 
than  at  terminal  points,  as  required  by  the  Minnesota 
laws  requiring  a  license  for  such  elevators  and  ware- 
houses, does  not  deny  to  the  proprietors  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws  because  a  license  is  not  required  for  eleva- 
tors and  warehouses  differently  situated.  As  the  statute 
applies  to  all  of  the  class  defined  in  the  1st  section,  it  is 
not  invalid  by  reason  of  its  nonapplication  to  those  who 
own  or  operate  elevators  not  situated  on  the  right  of  way 
of  a  railroad.  The  right  of  way  of  a  railroad  is  so  closely 
connected  with  the  operation  of  the  railroad  company 
that  its  use  may  be  so  regulated  by  the  state  as  to  promote 
the  ends  for  which  the  corporation  was  created,  and  thus 
subserve  the  interests  of  the  general  public  without  inter- 
fering unreasonably  with  the  company 's  management  of 
its  property.  If  in  the  judgment  of  the  state  it  was  neces- 
sary for  the  public  interests,  or  beneficial  to  the  public, 
that  elevators  and  warehouses  of  the  kinds  described 
should  be  operated  only  under  a  license  and  under  such 


728  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  460 

regulations  as  may  be  rightfully  prescribed,  it  would  be 
going  very  far  to  hold  that  such  a  classification  was  so 
unreasonable  as  to  justify  the  court  in  adjudging  that  the 
requirement  of  a  license  was  void  as  denying  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  No  such  judgment  could  be  prop- 
erly rendered  unless  the  classification  was  merely  arbi- 
trary or  was  devoid  of  those  elements  that  are  inherent 
in  the  distinction  implied  in  classification.  It  does  not 
appear  that  the  requirement  of  a  license  was  not  based 
upon  some  reasonable  ground, — some  difference  that 
bears  a  proper  relation  to  the  classification  made  by  the 
statute.  The  statute  is  not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States.  W.  W.  Cargill  Co.  v.  Minnesota  ex 
rel.  Railroad  &  W.  Com.,  180.  U.  S.  452. 

§  461.  Classification  of  merchants.  An  ordinance  im- 
posing a  license  tax  upon  the  merchants  of  a  city,  by 
which  they  are  divided  into  classes  according  to  the 
amount  of  their  sales,  each  class  including  all  wh(^e  sales 
range  between  a  certain  minimum  and  maximum  amount, 
does  not  violate  the  equality  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  although  the  result  is  to  make  persons  in 
different  classes  pay  different  rates,  and  to  make  persons 
in  the  same  class  pay  at  a  different  ratio  if  the  amounts 
of  their  sales  differ.  Classification  by  amount  came  up 
for  consideration  in  Magoun  v.  Illinois  Trust  &  Savings 
Bank,  170  U.  S.  283,  and  was  sustained.  That  case 
involved  the  power  of  a  state  to  tax  inheritances,  and  to 
grade  the  taxes  by  the  amount  of  the  legacy.  The  law  of 
Illinois  was  charged  with  inequality  of  operation  because 
of  the  classes  it  created.  It  was  asserted,  as  in  the  case 
at  bar,  that  the  classes  were  formed  upon  arbitrary  dif- 
ferences, and  the  provisions  which  fixed  the  tax  upon 
legacies  to  strangers  to  the  blood  of  the  intestate  were 
vigorously  assailed.  Manifestly,  there  was  inequality 
between  the  members  of  different  classes,  and  that  was 
conceded  in  the  opinion,  but  as  manifestly  there  was 
equality  between  the  members  of  each  class,  and  that 


§  462  POWER  OF  CLASSIFICATION  729 

equality  was  held  to  satisfy  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  and  the  reason- 
ing by  which  that  conclusion  was  supported  is  applicable 
to  the  case  at  bar.  Plaintiff  in  error  contended  that  the 
tax  in  the  case  at  bar  was  a  tax  on  property,  not  on  the 
privilege  to  do  business,  because  the  final  incidence  of 
the  tax  is  on  the  merchant,  and  is  paid  by  him.  But  every 
tax  has  its  final  incidence  on  some  individual.  That 
effect,  therefore,  cannot  be  urged  to  destroy  well-recog- 
nized distinctions.  The  tax  is  a  tax  on  the  privilege  of 
doing  business,  regulated  by  the  amount  of  the  sales,  and 
is  not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
Clark  V.  Titusville,  184  U.  S.  329. 

§  462.  Discrimination  against  nonproducing  vendors  of 
milk.  Nonproducing  vendors  of  milk  are  not  denied  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  guaranteed  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  because  they  are  not  given  the  privi- 
lege accorded  to  producing  vendors  of  exempting  them- 
selves from  actions  or  penalties  for  violations  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  New  York  agricultural  law  to  prevent  the 
sale  of  adulterated  milk  by  showing  that  the  milk  sold  or 
offered  for  sale  by  them  is  in  the  same  condition  as  when 
it  left  the  herd  of  the  producer.  It  has  been  decided  many 
times  that  a  state  may  classify  persons  and  objects  for 
the  purposes  of  legislation.  The  purpose  of  the  law  is  to 
secure  to  the  population,  adult  and  infant,  milk  attaining 
a  certain  standard  of  purity  and  strength.  All  other  milk 
is  declared  to  be  **  unclean,  impure,  unhealthy,  adulter- 
ated, or  unwholesome. ' '  Not  only  the  final  purpose  of 
the  law  must  be  considered,  but  the  means  of  its  adminis- 
tration,— ^the  ways  it  may  be  defeated.  .  .  .  Legisla- 
tion to  be  pr^tical  and  eflScient,  must  regard  this  special 
purpose  as  well  as  the  ultimate  purpose.  .  .  .  The 
ultimate  purpose  is  that  wholesome  milk  shall  reach  the 
consumer,  and  it  is  the  conception  of  the  law  that  milk 
below  a  certain  strength  is  not  wholesome,  but  a  differ- 
ence is  made  between  milk  naturally  deficient  and  milk 


730  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  462 

made  so  by  dilution.  To  prevent  tampering  between  the 
producer  and  consumer  the  law  is  framed  and  its  penal- 
ties adjusted.  As  the  standard  established  can  be  proved 
in  the  hands  of  a  producing  vendor,  he  is  exempt  from  the 
penalty ;  as  it  cannot  certainly  be  proved  in  the  hands  of 
other  vendors  so  as  to  prevent  evasions  of  the  law,  such 
vendors  are  not  exempt.  ...  In  the  one  case  the 
source  of  the  milk  can  be  known  and  the  tests  of  the  stat- 
ute applied;  in  the  other  case  this  would  be  impossible, 
except  in  few  instances.  It  does  not  appear  that  any  par- 
ticular hardship  results.  St,  John  v.  New  York,  201 
U.  S.  633. 

§  463.  Eequiring  labels  on  mixed  paints  to  show  ingre- 
dients. The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  to 
manufacturers  and  sellers  of  mixed  paints  containing 
other  ingredients  than  pure  linseed  oil,  pure  carbonate 
of  lead,  oxid  of  zinc,  turpentine,  Japan  dryer,  and  pure 
colors,  by  a  state  statute  which  makes  the  manufacture 
and  sale  of  such  paints  a  misdemeanor  unless  the  label 
shows  the  constituent  ingredients  and  the  quantity,  and 
amount  of  each,  because  the  manufacture  and  sale  of 
mixed  paints  containing  only  the  ingredients  specified  in 
the  statute,  and,  possibly,  of  all  paste  paints,  are  free 
from  such  consequence  of  condition.  The  statute  was 
passed  to  prevent  the  adulteration  of  articles  or  to  pro- 
vide for  the  publication  of  their  ingredients.  That  both 
purposes  are  within  the  competency  of  the  state  can 
hardly  be  denied.  The  Supreme  Court  has  declared  many 
times,  and  illustrated  the  declaration,  that  classification 
must  have  relation  to  the  purpose  of  the  legislature.  But 
logical  appropriateness  of  the  inclusion  or  exclusion  of 
objects  or  persons  is  not  required.  A  classification  may 
not  be  merely  arbitrary,  but  necessarily  there  must  be 
great  freedom  of  discretion,  even  though  it  result  in  '411- 
advised,  unequal,  and  oppressive  legislation. '*  Mobile 
Co.  V.  Kimball,  102  U.  S.  691.  And  this  necessarily  on 
account  of  the  complex  problems  which  are  presented  to 


§  464  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  731 

the  government.  Evils  must  be  met  as  they  arise  and 
according  to  the  manner  in  which  they  arise.  The  right 
remedy  may  not  always  be  apparent.  Any  interference, 
indeed,  may  be  asserted  to  be  evil,  may  result  in  evil. 
Exact  wisdom  and  nice  adaptation  of  remedies  are  not 
required  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  nor  the  crude- 
ness  nor  the  impolicy  nor  even  the  injustice  of  state  laws 
redressed  by  it.  Legislation  which  regulates  business 
may  well  make  distinctions  depend  upon  the  degrees  of 
evil  without  being  arbitrary  or  unreasonable.  Legis- 
latures have  the  constitutional  power  to  make  unwise 
classifications.  The  legislature  of  North  Dakota  may 
have  met  the  evils  which  exist  as  best  it  could,  and  there 
is  a  strong  presumption  that  it  did.  It  would  be  limiting 
the  power  of  the  state  too  much  to  say  that  a  judgment 
exercised  under  such  circumstances  must  be  condemned 
as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Heath  & 
MUligan  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Worst,  207  U.  S.  338. 

§  464.  Classification  of  coal  mines  by  number  of  men 
employed.  The  Arkansas  statute  exempting  coal  mines 
not  employing  ten  or  more  men  from  its  operation,  under 
which  miners  employed  at  quantity  rates  are  prevented 
from  contracting  for  wages  upon  the  basis  of  screened 
coal  instead  of  the  weight  of  the  coal  as  originally  pro- 
duced in  the  mine,  does  not  render  such  statute  invalid 
under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  denying  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  This  case  is  closely  analogous  to 
one  that  was  before  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of 
Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Illinois,  185  U.  S.  203,  wherein 
an  inspection  law  of  the  state  was  argued  to  be  clearly 
unconstitutional  by  reason  of  its  limitation  to  mines 
where  more  than  five  men  are  employed  at  any  one  time, 
and  in  that  case,  as  in  this,  it  was  contended  that  the 
classification  was  arbitrary,  and  unreasonable, — that 
there  was  no  just  reason  for  the  discrimination.  The 
court  held  that  was  a  species  of  classification  which  the 
legislature  is  at  liberty  to  adopt;  provided  it  be  not 


732  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §464 

wholly  arbitrary  or  nnreasonabley  and  that  there  was 
clearly  reasonable  foundation  for  the  discrimination 
exercised.  So  in  this  case,  there  is  no  attempt  at  imjnst 
or  unreasonable  discrimination.  The  law  is  alike  applica- 
ble to  all  mines  in  the  state  employing  more  than  ten  men 
under  ground.  It  may  be  presumed  to  practically  regu- 
late the  industry  when  conducted  on  any  considerable 
scale.  It  cannot  be  said  there  was  no  reason  for  exempt- 
ing from  its  provisions  mines  so  small  as  to  be  in  the 
experimental  or  formative  state,  and  affecting  but  few 
men,  and  not  requiring  regulation  in.  the  interest  of  the 
public  health,  safety,  or  welfare.  .  .  .  The  law  is  not 
so  palpably  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  rights 
involved  as  to  require  a  reversal  of  the  judgment  of  the 
supreme  court  of  the  state,  which  afltaned  its  validity. 
McLean  v.  Arkansas,  211  U.  S.  539. 

§465.  Olassification  between  corporations  and  indi- 
viduals— ^Oompulsory  production  of  testimony.  The  pos- 
sible invalidity  as  to  individuals  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Arkansas  statute  penalizing  the  doing  of  business  within 
the  state  by  members  of  a  trust  or  combination  to  control 
prices,  does  not  render  such  J>rovisions  invalid  as  to  cor- 
porations, as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
The  remedy  given  by  the  Arkansas  anti-trust  act  to 
secure  the  attendance  of  witnesses  before  a  conmiission, 
and  the  production  of  books  and  papers  in  a  proceeding 
under  that  act,  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  because  it  applies  only  to  books  and  papers  outside 
the  state,  or  because,  properly  construed,  it  may  be  con- 
fined to  corporations  and  joint  stock  associations,  and  not 
extended  to  individuals.  The  interpretation  which  the 
court  below  gave  to  the  statute  was  that  it  did  not  purport 
to  forbid  or  aflSx  penalties  to  acts  done  beyond  the  state, 
but  that  it  simply  forbade  a  corporation  from  continuing 
to  do  business  within  the  state  after  it  had  done,  either 
within  or  outside  of  the  state,  the  acts  complained  of. 
As  the  state  possessed  the  plenary  power  to  exclude  a 


.S  465  POWER  OF  CLASSIFICATION  733 

foreign  corporation  from  doing  business  within  its 
borders^  it  follows  that,  if  the  state  exerted  such  unques- 
tioned power  from  a  consideration  of  acts  done  in  an- 
other jurisdiction,  the  motive  for  the  exertion  of  the 
lawful  power  did  not  operate  to  destroy  the  right  to  call 
the  power  into  play.  This  being  true,  it  follows  that,  as 
the  power  of  the  state  to  prevent  a  foreign  corporation 
from  continuing  to  do  business  is  but  the  correlative  of  its 
authority  to  prevent  such  corporation  from  coming  into 
the  state,  unless,  by  the  act  of  admission,  some  contract 
right  in  favor  of  the  corporation  arose,  it  follows  that 
the  prohibition  is  against  continuing  to  do  business  in  the 
state  because  of  acts  done  beyond  the  state  was  none 
the  less  a  valid  exertion  of  power  as  to  a  subject  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  state.  While  the  acts  done  out  of  the 
state  may  have  been  the  originating  cause  for  refusing 
admission  to  come  into  the  state,  or  to  revoke  such  per- 
mission previously  given,  that  fact  is  immaterial  in  this 
inquiry,  since  the  power  and  not  the  motive  is  the  test  to 
be  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  con- 
stitutionality of  the  legislative  action.  Although  it  be 
conceded  that  the  provisions  of  the  statute  cannot,  con- 
sistently with  constitutional  limitations,  be  applied  to 
individuals,  such  concession  would  not  cause  the  act  to 
amount  to  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
The  difference  between  the  extent  of  the  power  which  the 
state  may  exert  over  the  doing  of  business  within  the 
state  by  an  individual  and  that  which  it  can  exercise  as 
to  corporations  furnishes  a  distinction  authorizing  a 
classification  between  the  two.  The  contention  that  the 
section  of  the  statute  requiring  the  production  of  books 
and  papers  outside  of  the  state  denies  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws  is  not  open,  since  it  has  been  conclusively 
settled  that,  without  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws,  regulations  may  be  based  upon  the  fact  that  per- 
sons or  property  dealt  with  are  not  within  the  territorial 
jurisdiction  of  the  regulating  authority.  Even  if,  as  con- 
tended, the  remedy  given  by  the  act  for  the  production  of 


734  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  465 

books  and  papers  and  the  examination  of  witnesses  is 
confined  to  corporations  and  joint  stock  companies,  and 
does  not  extend  to  individuals,  that  fact  is  not  a  denial  of 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  wider  scope  of  the 
power  which  the  state  possesses  over  corporations  and 
joint  stock  associations  in  and  of  itself  affords  a  ground 
for  the  classification  adopted.  It  rests  upon  the  visitorial 
power  which  the  state  has  the  right  to  exercise  over  a 
corporation  subject  to  its  control.  Hammond  Packing 
Co.  V.  Arkansas,  212  U.  S.  322. 

§466.  Discrimination  in  building  regulations.    The 

Massachusetts  statutes  do  not  deny  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws  to  an  owner  of  property  in  the  residential 
section  of  Boston  by  the  discrimination  or  classification 
made  between  the  commercial  and  residential  sections  of 
that  city  by  limiting  the  height  of  buildings  in  the  com- 
mercial district  to  125  feet,  and  in  the  residential  district 
to  from  80  to  100  feet.    The  statutes  have  been  passed 
under  the  exercise  of  the  so-called  police  power,  and  they 
must  have  some  fair  tendency  to  accomplish,  or  aid  in  the 
accomplishment  of,  some  purpose  for  which  the  legis- 
lature may  use  the  power.   If  the  statutes  are  not  of  that 
kind,  then  their  passage  cannot  be  justified  under  that 
power.    If  the  means  employed,  pursuant  to  the  statute, 
have  no  real,  substantial  relation  to  a  public  object  which 
government  can  accomplish,  if  the  statutes  are  arbitrary 
and  unreasonable,  and  beyond  the  necessities  of  the  case, 
the  courts  will  declare  their  invalidity.    In  delivering  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  Mr.  Justice  Peckham  said:  **This 
court,  in  cases  of  this  kind,  feels  the  greatest  relnc- 
tance  in  interfering  with  the  well-considered  judgments 
of  the  courts  of  a  state  whose  people  are  to  be  aflFected  by 
the  operation  of  the  law.    The  highest  court  of  the  state 
in  which  statutes  of  the  kind  under  consideration  are 
passed  is  more  familiar  with  the  particular  causes  which 
led  to  their  passage  (although  they  may  be  of  a  public 
nature)  and  with  the  general  situation  surrounding  the 


§  467  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  735 

subject-matter  of  the  legislation  than  this  court  can  pos- 
sibly be.  We  do  not,  of  course,  intend  to  say  that,  under 
such  circumstances  the  judgment  of  the  state  court  upon 
the  question  will  be  regarded  as  conclusive,  but  simply 
that  it  is  entitled  to  the  very  greatest  respect,  and  will 
only  be  interfered  with,  in  cases  of  this  kind,  where  the 
decision  is,  in  our  judgment,  plainly  wrong.  In  this  case 
the  supreme  judicial  court  of  the  state  holds  the  legisla- 
tion valid,  and  that  there  is  a  fair  reason  for  the  dis- 
crimination between  the  height  of  buildings  in  the  resi- 
dential as  compared  with  the  commercial  districts.  That 
court  has  also  held  that  regulations  in  regard  to  the 
height  of  buildings,  and  in  regard  to  their  mode  of  con- 
struction in  cities,  made  by  legislative  enactments  for  the 
safety,  comfort,  or  convenience  of  the  people,  and  for  the 
benefit  of  property  owners  generally,  are  valid.  We  con- 
cur in  that  view,  assuming,  of  course,  that  the  height  and 
conditions  provided  for  can  be  plainly  seen  to  be  not 
unreasonable  or  inappropriate.'*  Welch  v.  Swasey,  214 
U.  S.  91. 


§  467.  Registration  of  physicians.  The  Maryland  code 
providing  for  the  registration  of  physicians,  exempt- 
ing those  physicians  who  were  then  practicing  in  the 
state,  and  had  so  practiced  prior  to  January  1,  1908,  and 
could  prove  by  affidavit  that  within  one  year  of  said  date 
they  had  treated  at  least  twelve  persons  in  their  profes- 
sional capacity,  is  not  such  an  unreasonable  and  arbi- 
trary classification  as  renders  the  statute  invalid,  as  deny- 
ing the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  but  is  within  the 
discretion  vested  in  the  legislature  in  exercising  the 
police  power.  Resident  physicians  or  assistant  physi- 
cians at  hospitals,  and  students  on  hospital  or  dispensary 
duty  or  in  the  office  of  physicians,  physicians  and  sur- 
geons from  other  states,  or  residing  on  the  borders  of  a 
neighboring  state,  Army  and  Navy  surgeons,  chiropo- 
dists, midwives,  and  masseurs,  could  be  exempted  from 
the  provisions  of  that  article  for  the  registration  of 


736  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  467 

physicians,  without  rendering  the  statute  invalid  as  deny- 
ing the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  A  consideration  of 
the  exceptions  to  the  law  makes  it  manifest  that  they  are 
not  without  reason.  Before  a  law  of  this  kind  can  be 
declared  violative  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  an 
unreasonable  classification  of  the  subjects  of  such  legis- 
lation because  of  the  omission  of  certain  classes,  the  court 
must  be  able  to  say  that  there  is  ''no  fair  reason  for  the 
law  that  would  not  require  with  equal  force  its  extension 
to  others  whom  it  leaves  untouched/'  The  selection  of 
the  exempted  classes  was  within 'the  legislative  power, 
subject  only  to  the  restriction  that  it  be  not  arbitrary  or 
oppressive,  and  apply  equally  to  all  persons  similarly 
situated.  The  conduct  of  hospitals  may  be  regulated  by 
such  laws  or  municipal  regulations  as  might  not  reach 
the  general  practitioner  of  medicine.  The  Supreme  Court 
said  it  could  not  say  that  these  exceptions  were  so  wholly 
arbitrary  and  have  such  slight  relation  to  the  objects  to 
be  attained  by  the  law  as  to  require  the  courts  to  strike 
them  down  as  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  Watson 
v.  Maryland,  218  U.  S.  173. 

§468.  Exempting  banks  and  trust  companies  and  bona 
fide  mortgages  from  state  usury  law.  The  Connecticut 
statute  exempting  banks  and  trust  companies  and  bona 
fide  mortgages  from  the  operation  of  the  law  prohibiting 
the  exaction  of  more  than  15  per  cent  interest  on  loans, 
or  accepting  a  note  for  a  greater  amount  than  that  actu- 
ally loaned,  with  intent  to  evade  this  provision,  does  not 
render  such  statute  repugnant  to  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  but  such 
classification  has  a  reasonable  basis.  The  general  assem- 
bly, in  respect  to  the  matter  of  usury,  had  the  right  to 
deal  with  different  classes  of  money  lenders  or  money 
borrowers  in  a  different  way,  provided  there  was  appar- 
ently nothing  unreasonable  in  creating  such  distinctions, 
and  all  the  members  of  each  class  were  treated  in  the 


§  470  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  737 

same  manner.  The  classification  complained  of  has  a  rea  - 
sonable  basis,  and  the  exemption  of  national  banks,  etc., 
was  not  a  mere  arbitrary  selection.  Hunter  v.  Mutual 
Eeserve  Ins.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  573. 

§  469.  Greating  bank  depositors'  guaranty  fund.  An 
unconstitutional  discrimination  does  not  result  from  the 
preference  of  ordinary  depositors  over  other  creditors, 
given  by  a  state  statute  creating  a  bank  depositors '  guar- 
anty fund  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  full  repayment 
of  deposits  in  case  of  the  insolvency  of  any  bank  contrib- 
uting to  the  fund.  This  is  the  Kansas  bank  depositors' 
guaranty  law  and  the  case  of  Noble  State  Bank  v.  Haskell, 
219  U.  S.  104,  is  decisive  except  so  far  as  the  Kansas  law 
shows  certain  minor  differences  from  that  of  Oklahoma. 
The  most  important  of  these  is  that  contribution  to  the 
fund  is  not  absolutely  required.  But  if  the  law  might 
compel  the  contribution  it  may  try  to  bring  about  the 
same  result  by  the  creation  of  motives  less  compulsory 
than  command  and  of  disadvantages  in  holding  aloof  less 
peremptory  than  an  inunediate  stop.  Assaria  State  Bank 
V.  DoUey,  219  U.  S.  121. 


§  470.  Licensing  private  bankers.  The  possibility  that 
the  comptroller  may  refuse  a  license  to  a  private  banker 
upon  his  arbitrary  whim  does  not  invalidate,  as  denying 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  the  requirement  of  the 
New  York  statute  that  a  license  from  that  oflScial  be 
obtained  by  individuals  or  partnerships  desiring  to 
engage  in  that  business.  ...  No  unconstitutional 
discrimination  is  made  by  exempting  those  private  bank- 
ers in  whose  business  the  average  amount  of  each  sum 
received  is  not  less  than  $500,  and  those  who  give  a  bond 
in  a  specified  sum,  from  the  requirement  of  the  statute 
that  a  license  from  the  comptroller  be  obtained  by  indi- 
viduals or  partnerships  desiring  to  engage  in  the  busi- 
ness of  receiving  deposits  of  money  for  safekeeping,  or 
for  the  purpose  of  transmission  to  another,  or  for  any 

Due  ProcesB — 47 


N 


738  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  {  470 

other  purpose.  One  form  at  least,  of  the  business  aimed 
at^  and  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  that  carried  on  by  plaintiff, 
is  a  branch  of  the  banking  business.  Furthermore,  it  is 
a  business  largely  done  with  poor  and  ignorant  inmii- 
grants,  especially  on  their  first  arrival  here,  .  .  . 
Experience  has  shown  that  the  protection  of  such  depos- 
itors against  fraud,  which  is  the  purpose  running  through 
the  statute,  i»  especially  needed  by  at  least  that  class  of 
them  with  whom  the  persons  hit  by  the  statute  largely 
deal.  Noble  State  Bank  v.  Haskell,  219  U.  S.  104,  estab- 
lishes that  the  state  may  regulate  the  banking  business, 
and  may  take  strong  measures  to  render  it  secure.  It 
also  establishes  that  the  plaintiff  has  no  such  constitu- 
tional right  to  carry  it  on  at  will  as  to  raise  him  above 
state  laws  not  manifestly  unfit  to  accomplish  the  sup- 
posed end,  greatly  in  excess  of  the  need,  or  arbitrary  and 
capricious  in  discrimination.  The  quasi-paternal  rela- 
tions shown  to  exist  between  those  following  the  plain- 
tiff's calling  and  the  newly  arrived  immigrants  justifies 
a  supervision  more  paternal  than  is  needed  in  ordinary 
affairs.  Whether  the  court  thinks  them  wise  or  not,  such 
laws  are  within  the  scope  of  discretion  which  belongs  to 
legislatures,  and  which  it  is  usual  for  them  to  exert 
Engel  V.  O'MaUey,  219  U.  S.  128. 

§471.  Penaliiring  insurance  company  connected  with 
tariff  association.  An  insurance  company  connected 
with  a  tariff  association  which  fixes  rates  is  not  denied 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  by  the  Alabama  law 
under  which  the  insured  or  beneficiary  in  a  policy  issued 
by  such  company  may  recover,  in  addition  to  the  actual 
loss  or  damage,  25  i)er  cent  of  the  amount  of  such  actnai 
loss  or  damage,  since  such  statute  places  upon  an  equality 
ia  every  respect  all  insurers  which,  at  the  time  of  issuing 
the  insurance  or  subsequently,  and  before  trial,  were  in 
any  way  connected  with  any  other  persons,  associations, 
or  corporations  which  acted  together  in  fixing  insurance 
rates.    The  statute  applies  only  to  associations  or  cor- 


§  472  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  739 

porations  that  unite  in  fixing  the  rates  of  insurance  to  be 
charged  by  each  constituent  member  of  the  combination. 
Looking  at  the  evil  to  be  remedied,  that  was  such  a  classi- 
fication as  the  state  could  legally  make.  It  is  neither 
imreasonable  nor  arbitrary  within  the  rule  that  a  dassifi* 
cation  must  rest  upon  some  difference  indicating  *  *  a  rea- 
sonable and  just  relation  to  the  act  in  respect  of  which 
the  classification  is  proposed. ' '  The  legislature  naturally 
directed  its  enactment  against  insurance  companies  or 
corporations  which,  before  or  at  the  time  of  trial,  were 
found  to  be  members  of  an  insurance  tariff  association 
that  fixed  rates.  All  insurance  companies,  persons  or 
corporations  engaged  in  the  business  of  insurance,  which 
acted  together  in  fixing  rates,  are  placed  by  the  statute 
upon  an  equality  in  every  respect,  and  therefore  it  can- 
not rightfully  be  contended  that  the  plaintiff  in  error  is 
denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Statutes  that 
apply  equally  to  all  of  the  same  class  and  under  like  con- 
ditions cannot  be  held  to  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws ;  for,  as  the  Supreme  Court  has  held,  **the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  is  a  pledge  of  the  protection  of  equal 
laws"  to  all  under  like  circumstances.  German  Alliance 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Hale,  219  u!  S.  307. 


§  472.  Prohibiting  waste  of  mineral  waters.  The  sub- 
stantial difference  in  point  of  harmful  result,  which,  so 
far  as  the  case  as  made  shows,  may  exist,  affords  a  rea- 
sonable basis,  under  the  equal-protection-of-the-laws 
clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  for  the  exemption  of 
pumping  from  wells  not  penetrating  the  rock,  and  such 
pumping  as  is  done  for  other  purposes  than  collecting 
and  vending,  as  a  separate  commodity,  the  carbonic  acid 
gas  contained  in  mineral  waters,  from  the  operations  of 
the  provisions  of  the  New  York  Laws,  1908,  chap.  429, 
prohibiting  the  pumping  or  artificially  drawing  of  un- 
natural quantities  of  mineral  waters  from  a  common 
underground  source  of  supply,  and  wasting  them  to  the 
injury  and  impairment  of  other  proprietors.     Making 


740  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  472 

the  engaging  in  pnmping  mineral  waters  from  wells 
bored  or  drilled  into  the  rock  for  the  purpose  of  collecting 
and  vending  as  a  separate  commodity  the  carbonic  acid 
gas  contained  therein  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  com- 
mon underground  source  of  supply  and  of  injury  to  other 
proprietors,  as  is  done  by  the  same  statute,  forbidding 
the  pumping  of  the  waters  imder  such  conditions,  does 
not  render  the  statute  invalid,  as  infringing  upon  the 
guarantees  in  the  Federal  Constitution  of  due  process  of 
law  and  the  equal  protection  of  the  law.  The  contention 
that  a  classification  is  arbitrary,  and  consequently  denies 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  those  whom  it  affects, 
must  be  tested  by  the  following  rules,  as  shown  by  re- 
peated decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court:  1.  The  equal- 
protection  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not 
take  from  the  state  the  power  to  classify  in  the  adoption 
of  police  laws,  but  admits  of  the  exercise  of  a  wide  scope 
of  discretion  in  that  regard,  and  avoids  what  is  done  only 
when  it  is  without  any  reasonable  basis,  and  therefore  is 
purely  arbitrary.  2.  A  classification  having  some  reason- 
able basis  does  not  offend  against  that  clause  merely 
because  it  is  not  made  with  mathematical  nicety,  or  be- 
cause in  practice  it  results  in  some  inequality.  3.  When 
the  classification  in  such  a  law  is  called  in  question,  if  any 
state  of  facts  reasonably  can  be  conceived  that  would  sus- 
tain it,  the  existence  of  that  state  of  facts  at  the  time 
the  law  was  enacted  must  be  assumed.  4.  One  who 
assails  the  classification  in  such  a  law  must  carry  the 
burden  of  showing  that  it  does  not  rest  upon  any  reason- 
able basis,  but  is  essentially  arbitrary.  Lindsley  v.  Nat- 
ural Carbonic  Gas  Co.,  220  U.  S.  61. 


§  473.  Advertising  wagons  on  city  streets.  The  eqnal 
protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  to  a  stage  coach  com- 
pany by  a  municipal  ordinance  prohibiting  the  use  of 
advertising  trucks,  vans  or  wagons  in  the  city  streets, 
because  *  *  ordinary  business  wagons ' '  when  *  *  engaged  in 
the  usual  business  or  regular  work  of  the  owner,  and  not 


§  474  POWEE  OP  CLASSIFICATION  741 

used  merely  or  mainly  for  advertising, ' '  are  expressly 
permitted  to  exhibit  * '  business  notices,  * '  nor  because  ad- 
vertising is  allowed  on  the  stairs  of  the  elevated  railways 
and  on  elevated  structures.  It  is  argued  that  the  ordi- 
nance **thus  creates  a  favored  subclass  of  vehicles  which 
are  permitted  to  display  advertisements. '  *  The  state,  and 
the  city  acting  with  the  authority  of  the  state,  have  the 
power  to  classify  the  objects  of  legislation.  The  distinc- 
tion between  business  wagons  and  those  used  for  adver- 
tising purposes  has  a  proper  relation  to  the  purposes  of 
the  ordinance,  and  is  not  an  illegal  discrimination.  The 
same  comment  may  be  made  as  to  the  charge  that  the 
ordinance  discriminates  between  two  classes  of  passenger 
carriers  having  charter  rights  to  use  the  streets.  It  is 
also  within  the  power  of  classification  which  the  city  pos- 
sesses to  allow  advertising  on  the  stairways  of  the  ele- 
vated railways  and  on  elevated  structures.  Fifth  Ave. 
Coach  Co.  V.  New  York,  221  U.  S.  467. 

§474.  Unclaimed  savings  bank  deposits.  Savings 
banks  are  not  unconstitutionally  discriminated  against  by 
making  applicable  to  them  alone  the  provisions  of  the 
Massachusetts  law  that  deposits  that  have  remained  inac- 
tive and  unclaimed  for  thirty  years,  where  the  claimant 
is  unknown  or  the  depositor  cannot  be  found,  shall  be 
paid  to  the  treasurer  and  receiver  general,  to  be  held  by 
him  as  trustee  for  the  true  owner  or  his  legal  repre- 
sentatives. There  is  nothing  unreasonable  or  discrim- 
inatory in  making  the  act  applicable  only  to  abandoned 
deposits  in  a  savings  bank.  The  classification  is  reason- 
able. Deposits  in  savings  banks  are  made  in  expectation 
that  they  may  remain  much  longer  uncalled  for  than  is 
usual  in  deposits  in  other  banks.  This  fact  makes  sav- 
ings deposits  all  the  more  likely  to  be  forgotten  and 
abandoned.  And  as  the  depositors  are  often  wage  earn- 
ers, moving  from  place  to  place,  there  are  special  reasons 
for  intervening  to  protect  their  interest  in  this  class  of 
property  in  banks  as  to  which  the  state's  supervisory 


742  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  474 

power  is  constantly  exercisecL  Provident  Institation  for 
Savings  v.  Malone,  221 U.  S.  660. 

§475.  Begulatixig  asaigninents  of  f utare  eaningB.    The 

Massachusetts  statute  exempting  national  banks,  and 
banks  under  the  supervision  of  the  bank  commissioner, 
and  certain  loan  companies,  from  the  provisions  of  tiie 
law  making  invalid  against  the  employer  assignments  of, 
or  orders  f or^  wages  to  be  earned  in  the  future,  unless 
recorded,  accepted  in  writing  by  the  emptoyer,  and  accom- 
panied by  the  written  consent  of  the  wife  of  the  employee, 
does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  an 
assignee  not  falling  within  one  of  the  excepted  classes. 
Classification  need  not  be  scientific  nor  logically  appro- 
priate,  and  if  not  palpably  arbitrary,  and  is  uniform 
within  the  class,  it  is  within  such  discretion.  The  legisla- 
tion imder  review  was  directed  at  certain  evils  which  had 
arisen,  and  the  legislature,  qpnsidering  them  and  from 
whence  they  arose,  might  have  thought  or  discerned  that 
they  could  not  or  would  not  arise  from  a  greater  freedom 
to  the  institutions  mentioned  than  to  individuals.  This 
was  the  view  that  the  supreme  judicial  court  took.  The 
court  said  that  the  legislature  might  have  decided  that 
the  dangers  which  the  statute  was  intended  to  prevent 
would  not  exist  in  any  considerable  degree  in  loans  made 
by  institutions  which  were  under  the  supervision  of  the 
bank  commissioners,  and  **  believed  rightly  that  the  busi- 
ness done  by  them  would  not  need  regulation  in  the  inter- 
est of  employees  or  employers.*'  But  even  if  some 
degree  of  evil  which  the  statute  was  intended  to  prevent 
could  be  ascribed  to  loans  made  by  the  exempted  institu- 
tions, their  exemption  would  not  make  the  law  unconsti- 
tutional. Legislation  may  recognize  degrees  of  evil 
without  being  arbitrary,  unreasonable,  or  in  conflict  with 
the  equal-protection  provisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment.   Mutual  Loan  Co.  v.  Martell,  222  U.  S.  225. 


§  476.  Municipal  liability  for  damage  by  mob.   A  city 

is  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  by  the  Sli- 


§  477  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  743 

nois  statute  imposio^  upon  it  a  liability  for  damage  to 
property  within  its  linaits,  caused  by  a  mob  or  riot,  be- 
cause when  property  damaged  under  like  circumstances 
is  situated  in  a  village  or  other  incorporated  town,  the 
liability  is  imposed  upon  the  county  instead  of  upon  such 
village  or  town.  The  classification  is  not  an  unreasonable 
one.  A  city  is  presumptively  the  more  populous  and  bet- 
ter organized  community.  As  such  it  may  well  be  singled 
out  and  made  exclusively  responsible  for  the  consequence 
of  riots  and  mobs  to  property  therein.  The  county,  which 
includes  the  city  and  other  incorporated  subdivisions,  is, 
not  unreasonably,  made  liable  to  all  sufferers  whose  prop- 
erty is  not  within  the  limits  of  a  city.  The  power  of  the 
state  to  impose  liabUity  for  damage  and  injury  to  prop- 
erty  from  riots  and  mobs  includes  the  power  to  make  a 
classification  of  the  subordinate  municipalities  upon  which 
the  responsibility  may  be  imposed.  It  is  a  matter  for  the 
exercise  of  legislative  discretion,  and  equal  protection  of 
the  law  is  not  denied  where  the  classification  is  not  so 
unreasonable  and  extravagant  as  to  be  a  mere  arbitrary 
mandate.    Chicago  v.  Sturges,  222  U.  S-  313. 

§  477.  Regulating  cancellation  of  land  contracts.  The 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  to  the  vendor 
in  an  executory  contract  made  and  to  be  performed  within 
the  state  for  the  sale  of  land  in  another  state  by  applying, 
in  an  action  against  him  for  damages  for  his  refusal  to 
perform,  the  provisions  of  the  Minnesota  statute  that  a 
vendor  in  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land  shall  have  no 
right  to  cancel,  terminate,  or  declare  a  forfeiture  of  the 
contract  except  upon  thirty  days'  written  notice  to  the 
vendee,  who  shall  have  that  time  in  which  to  perform, 
since  the  vendor  is  not  treated  differently  from  any  other 
seller  of  land  in  his  situation.  The  contract  is  controlled 
by  the  law  of  the  state  where  the  contract  was  made  and 
not  by  the  law  of  the  state  where  the  land  was  situated. 
Discrimination  is  not  made  out  by  saying  that  resident 
owners  of  Minnesota  land  are  given  a  right  to  foreclose 


744  DXJE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  477 

their  contracts,  and  that  residents  of  Minnesota  owning 
land  in  other  states  are  not  given  the  same  right,  even  if 
this  were  true.  The  plaintiff  in  error  is  not  treated  differ- 
ently from  any  other  seller  of  land  in  his  situation.  That 
is  the  test  of  the  application  of  the  equal  protection  clause 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Selover,  Bates 
&  Co,  v,  Walsh,  226  U.  S.  112. 

§  478.  Discrimination  in  fee  for  auction  license.    The 

discrimination  between  the  district  of  Honolulu  and  other 
districts  in  the  amount  of  the  fee  imposed  by  the  Ha- 
waiian statute,  for  a  license  to  make  sales  at  auction, 
which  is  $600  in  the  district  of  Honolulu,  and  $15  for  each 
other  taxation  district,  is  not  so  arbitrary  or  unreason- 
able as  to  render  the  statute  unconstitutional,  as  denying 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  It  was  the  province  of 
the  legislature  to  decide  upon  the  amount  of  the  fees 
which  should  be  charged.  It  must  be  assumed  that  in 
so  deciding  it  took  into  account  varying  conditions  in  the 
respective  localities;  as,  for  example,  in  the  amount  of 
business  transacted  and  in  the  corresponding  value  of 
such  licenses.  The  court  could  not  say  that  the  differ- 
ence was  unreasonable  or  that  the  statute  was  unequal  or 
arbitrarv  in  its  operation.  Toyota  v.  Hawaii,  226  U.  S. 
184. 

§479.  Prohibiting  unfair  competition.  The  South 
Dakota  statute  punishing  the  selling  of  goods  at  a  lower 
rate  in  one  place  than  in  another,  for  the  purpose  of 
destroying  the  competition  of  any  regular  established 
dealer  in  such  commodity,  or  to  prevent  the  competition 
of  any  person  who  in  good  faith,  intends  and  attempts 
to  become  such  dealer,  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws  because  it  affects  only  those  selling'  goods  in 
two  or  more  places  in  the  state,  nor  because  the  protec- 
tion of  the  statute  is  not  extended  to  those  making  only 
a  transitory  incursion  into  the  business.  The  Fourteenth 
Amendment  does  not  prohibit  legislation  special  in  char- 


§  480  POWEE  OP  CLASSIFICATION  745 

acter.  It  does  not  prevent  a  state  from  carrying  out  a 
policy  that  cannot  be  pronounced  purely  arbitrary,  by 
taxation  or  by  penal  laws.  If  a  class  is  deemed  to  present 
a  conspicuous  example  of  what  the  legislature  seeks  to 
prevent,  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  allows  it  to  be  dealt 
with,  although  otherwise  and  merely  logically  not  dis- 
tinguishable from  others  not  embraced  in  the  law.  Mr. 
Justice  Holmes  in  announcing  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
said:  **We  must  assume  that  the  legislature  of  South 
Dakota  considered  that  people  selling  in  two  places  made 
the  prohibited  use  of  their  opportunities,  and  that  such 
use  was  harmful,  although  the  usual  efforts  of  competi- 
tors were  desired.  It  might  have  been  argued  to  the 
legislature  with  more  force  than  it  can  be  to  us  that 
recoupment  in  one  place  of  losses  in  another  is  merely 
an  instance  of  financial  ability  to  compete.  If  the  legis- 
lature thought  that  that  particular  manifestation  of  abil- 
ity usually  came  from  great  corporations  whose  power  it 
deemed  excessive  and  for  that  reason  did  more  harm  than 
good  in  their  state,  and  that  there  was  no  other  case  of 
frequent  occurrence  where  the  same  could  be  said,  we 
cannot  review  their  economics  or  their  facts.  That  the 
law  embodies  a  widespread  conviction  appears  from  the 
decisions  in  other  states,"  quoting  Nebraska,  Minnesota 
and  Iowa  cases.  Central  Lumber  Co.  v.  South  Dakota, 
226  U.  S.  157. 

§480.  Municipal  license  tax  based  on  classification. 
There  is  no  want  of  due  process  of  law,  nor  any  denial  of 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  in  the  scheme  of  a 
municipal  ordinance  for  licensing  occupations,  which  de- 
fines the  occupations  to  be  subjected  to  the  tax,  and  pre- 
scribes a  maximum  and  minimum  limitation  as  to  the 
amount  of  the  tax,  dependent  upon  the  classification  into 
thirteen  classes,  which  is  primarily  to  be  made  by  the 
finance  committee  of  the  common  council  after  notice  and 
hearing,  an  appeal  to  the  full  council  from  the  final  action 
of  the  committee  being  permissible.    There  is  no  reason 


746  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  480 

under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  why  the  state  may  not 
delegate  to  either  the  council  of  the  city  or  to  a  board 
appointed  for  that  purpose  the  power  to  divide  such  occu- 
pations or  privileges  into  classes  or  subclasses,  and  pre- 
scribe the  tax  to  be  paid  by  the  members  of  eadi  such 
class.  In  order  to  render  the  classification  illegal,  the 
party  assailing  it  must  show  that  the  business  discrimi- 
nated against  is  precisely  the  same  as  that  included  in 
the  class  which  is  alleged  to  be  favored.  The  plaintiff 
elected  not  to  avail  himself  of  the  remedy  and  right  to 
be  heard  given  by  the  ordinance.  Under  such  circum- 
stances he  is  not  warranted  in  resorting  to  the  extraordi- 
nary jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  arrest  an 
administrative  error  susceptible  to  correction  by  an  ap- 
peal to  the  council.    Bradley  v.  Richmond,  227  U.  S.  477. 


§  481.  Municipal  waterworks  competition.    The  prop- 
erty of  a  private  waterworks  company  is  not  taken  con- 
trary to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  by  the  municipal 
construction  of  a  competing  plant,  where  there  is  no  con- 
tract immunity  from  such  competition,  although  the 
waterworks  company  may  be  forbidden  by  the  local  law  to 
divert  its  property  to  other  uses,  and  will  be  called  upon 
to  pay  taxes  to  help  its  rival  to  success.    If,  when  the 
plaintiff  built,  the  constitution  of  the  state  authorized 
cities  to  build  waterworks  as  well  after  works  had  been 
built  there  by  private  persons  as  before,  the  plaintiff  took 
the  risk  of  what  might  happen.    An  appeal  to  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  to  protect  property  from  a  congenital 
defect  must  be  in  vain.    There  is  no  pretense  that  there 
is  any  express  promise  to  private  adventurers  that  they 
shall  not  encounter  subsequent  municipal  competition. 
So  strictly  are  private  persons  confined  to  the  letter  of 
their  express  grant  that  a  contract  by  a  city  not  to  grant 
to  any  person  or  corporation  the  same  privileges  that  it 
had  given  to  the  plaintiff  was  held  not  to  preclude  the  city 
itself  from  building  waterworks  of  its  own.    As  there  is 
no  contract  the  plaintiff  stands  legally  in  the  same  posi- 


§  483  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  747 

tion  as  if  the  constitution  had  given  express  warning  of 
what  the  city  might  do.  It  is  left  to  depend  upon  the 
sense  of  justice  that  the  city  may  show.  Madera  Water- 
works V.  Madera,  228  U.  S.  454. 


§  482.  Forbidding  sale  of  food  preservatives  contain- 
ing boric  add.  The  sale  of  food  preservatives  contain- 
ing boric  acid  may  be  forbidden,  as  is  done'  by  the 
Illinois  statute,  as  construed  by  the  state  courts,  without 
denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  question 
is  whether  the  classification  made  by  the  legislature  can 
be  said  to  be  without  any  reasonable  basis.  The  legis- 
lature is  entitled  to  estimate  degrees  of  evil,  and  to  adjust 
its  legislation  according  to  the  exigency  found  to  exist. 
Applying  familiar  principle,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the 
legislature  exceeded  the  bounds  of  reasonable  discretion 
in  classification  when  it  enacted  the  prohibition  in  ques- 
tion relating  to  foods  and  compounds  sold  as  food  pre- 
servatives.   Price  V.  Illinois,  238  IT.  S.  446. 

§  483.  Classification  of  telephone  companies  for  taxa- 
tion. The  Michigan  statute  exempting  the  property  of 
telephone  companies  whose  gross  receipts  for  the  year 
do  not  exceed  $500  from  an  ad  valorem  tax,  does  not 
render  the  statute  invalid  as  denying  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws,  where,  under  the  classification  made  by  the 
statute,  the  companies  taxed  are  mainly  those  organized 
for  profit,  while  the  untaxed  enterprises  are  mainly  not 
profit  making,  but  mutual  or  co-operative.  The  power  of 
classification  for  the  purposes  of  taxation  is  a  vital  prin- 
ciple, giving  to  government  freedom  to  meet  its  exigen- 
cies, not  binding  its  action"  by  rigid  formulas,  but 
apportioning  its  burdens,  and  permitting  it  to  make  those 
**  discriminations  which  the  best  interests  of  society  re- 
quire.** The  statute  is  not  arbitrary,  it  has  a  reasonable 
basis  resting  on  a  real  distinction.  It  is  not  a  dis- 
tinction based  on  mere  size  only,  nor  upon  the  mere 
amount  of  business  done.    There  is  a  difference  in  the 


748  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  483 

dois^  of  the  business  and  its  results;  a  difference  in 
the  relation  to  the  public.  The  non-taxed  companies 
are  subsidiary  to  the  taxed  companies, — ^patrons  in  a 
sense  of  the  taxed  companies.  The  use  of  the  untaxed 
property  is  predominately  private,  while  the  use  of  the 
taxed  property  is  correspondingly  public;  the  exempt 
property  is  used  for  the  personal  convenience  of  the 
owners,  while  the  taxed  property  represents  commercial 
investment  for  profit-making  purposes.  The  property 
exempted  is  only  a  trifling  portion  of  the  whole,  the 
cost  of  assessing  and  collecting  in  this  class  would  be 
disproportionate  to  the  amount  which  would  be  realized, 
the  untaxed  property  is  in  the  incipient  or  development 
stage,  while  the  taxed  property  is  in  the  fully  developed 
form.  All  were  differences  which  could  appeal  to  the 
legislature  and  determine  a  difference  of  treatment.  The 
basis  of  classification  was  that  of  earnings.  That  some 
small  portion  of  the  co-operative  companies  will  be  taxed 
and  some  small  portion  of  the  profit-making  companies 
will  be  exempt  does  not  impeach  the  basis  of  classification. 
Citizens'  Telephone  Co.  v.  Fuller,  229  U.  S.  322. 

§484.  State  anti-trust  laws.  The  Missouri  anti-tmst 
laws  against  combinations  to  lessen  competition  and  regu- 
late prices  confining  to  manufacturers  and  vendors  of 
articles  the  prohibitions  of  the  statute,  while  permitting 
such  combinations  among  purchasers,  does  not  render 
the  legislation  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Ex- 
cluding combinations  of  wage  earners  from  statutory 
prohibitions  against  combinations  to  lessen  competition 
and  regulate  prices,  as  construed  by  the  state  courts 
of  Missouri,  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws.  The  statute  was  attacked  as  unconstitutional 
because  it  was  claimed  to  arbitrarily  discriminate  between 
persons  making  or  selling  products  and  commodities  and 
persons  selling  labor  and  service  of  all  kinds,  between 
the  makers  and  sellers  of  products  and  commodities  and 


§  485  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  749 

the  purchasers  thereof.  Both  objections  invoke  a  consid- 
eration of  the  power  of  classification  which  may  be  ex- 
erted in  the  legislation  of  the  state.  That  power  has  very 
broad  range.  A  classification  is  not  invalid  because  of 
simple  inequality,  it  may  depend  upon  degrees  of  evil 
without  being  arbitrary  or  unreasonable.  Whether  the 
Missouri  statute  should  have  set  its  condenmation  on 
restraints  generally,  prohibiting  combined  action  for  any 
purpose  and  to  everybody,  or  confined  it  as  the  statute 
does  to  manufacturers  and  vendors  of  articles,  and  per- 
mitting it  to  the  purchasers  of  such  articles ;  prohibiting 
it  to  sellers  of  commodities  and  permitting  it  to  sellers 
of  services,  was  a  matter  of  legislative  judgment ;  and  it 
cannot  be  said  that  the  distinctions  made  are  palpably 
arbitrary,  which  is  the  condition  of  judicial  review.  The 
question  presented  is  the  power  of  the  legislature,  not 
the  policy  of  the  exercise  of  the  power.  To  be  able  to  find 
fault  witii  such  policy,  is  not  to  establish  the  invalidity  of 
the  law  based  upon  it  International  Harvester  Co.  of 
America  v.  Missouri,  ex  rel.  Atty.  Gen.,  234  TJ.  S.  199. 

§  485.  Redemption  of  store  orders  in  money.  A  stat- 
ute forbidding  persons,  firms  or  corporations  engaged  in 
mining  and  manufacturing  to  issue  orders  for  the  pay- 
ment of  labor  not  purporting  to  be  payable  in  money,  as 
is  done  in  Virginia  act  of  February  13,  1888,  amending 
and  re-enacting  Laws  1887,  chap.  391,  §  3,  is  not  invalid  as 
class  legislation  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
While  there  are  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  degree 
and  kind  of  discrimination  permitted  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  it  is  established  by  repeated  decisions  that 
a  statute  aimed  at  what  is  deemed  an  evil,  and  hitting  it 
presumably  where  experience  shows  it  to  be  most  felt,  is 
not  to  be  upset  by  thinking  up  and  enumerating  other 
instances  to  which  it  might  have  been  applied  equally  well. 
The  suggestion  that  others  besides  mining  and  manufac- 
turing companies  may  keep  shops  and  pay  their  work- 
men with  orders  on  themselves  for  merchandise  is  not 


7S0  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §485 

enough  to  overthrow  a  law  that  muBt  be  preBtimed  to  be 
deemed  by  the  legislature  coextensive  with  the  practical 
need.  Keokee  Consolidated  Coke  Co.  v.  Taylor,  334  U.  S. 
224. 

§  486.  Abolishing  Oreek  letter  fraternities  in  state  nni- 
versities.  The  state  of  Mississippi  enacted  a  law 
abolishing  Greek  letter  fraternities  and  societies  and 
prohibiting  their  existence  in  the  State  University  and 
in  all  other  educational  institutions  supported  in  whole 
or  in  part  by  the  state.  Provision  was  made  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  statute  by  the  trustees  and  faculties 
of  the  institutions  by  rules  and  punishments^  and  for  the 
removal  of  any  trustee  or  member  of  a  faculty  for  failure 
or  refusal  to  enforce  the  law.  The  board  of  trustees  of 
the  State  University  adopted  an  order  which  recited  that 
the  board  desired  it  to  be  understood  that  the  statute  was 
**not  to  be  construed  to  apply  to  students  already  entered, 
and  who  conducted  themselves  with  that  decorum  always 
expected  of  Southern  gentlemen.*'  This  order  was  as- 
sailed as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  because 
a  discrimination  between  those  who  were,  at  the  time  the 
statute  was  enacted,  students  in  the  university,  and  those 
who  were  not  on  that  date  members  of  the  student  body, 
and  who  might  desire  to  be  admitted  as  such.  To  this 
suggestion  the  court  replied  that  it  is  an  obvious  principle 
of  construction,  and  sometimes  of  justice,  that  laws  are 
not  to  be  construed  retrospectively.  The  trustees  of  the 
State  University  regarded  and  followed  that  principle 
and  did  not  apply  the  law  to  students  already  in  the 
tmiversity,  admonishing  them  however  that  their  honor 
would  be  regarded  as  pledged  not  to  abuse  the  right  or 
the  indulgence.  The  distinction,  whether  based  on  a 
right  or  an  indulgence,  and  whether  required  by  the  stat- 
ute or  accorded  by  the  trustees,  was  held  to  be  an  obvious 
and  rational  one  and  not  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  law. 

The  statute  was  also  assailed  as  an  obstruction  to  the 


§  487  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  751 

• 

pursuit  of  happiness,  a  deprivation  of  property  and  prop- 
erty rights,  and  of  the  privileges  and  immunities  guar- 
anteed by  the  Constitution  of  fhe  United  States.  These 
objections  are  all  subject  to  one  test; — ^namely,  whether 
the  right  to  attend  the  state  university  is  an  absolute  or 
conditional  right,  whether  the  public  educational  institu- 
tions of  the  state  are  so  far  under  the  control  of  the 
legislature  that  it  may  impose  what  the  supreme  court  of 
the  state  calls  ** disciplinary  regulations/'  The  supreme 
court  of  the  state  held  that  the  legislature  was  in  control 
of  the  colleges  and  universities  of  the  state  with  the  right 
to  legislate  for  their  welfare  and  to  enact  measures  for 
their  discipline  and  when  the  legislature  had  done  that  it 
was  not  subject  to  any  control  by  the  courts.  The  condi- 
tion upon  which  the  state  offered  free  instruction  in  its 
university  that  its  students  renounce  affiliation  with  a 
society  which  the  state  considers  inimical  to  discipline 
finds  no  prohibition  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
Waugh  V.  Board  of  Trustees,  237  U.  S.  589. 

§487.  Requiring  washhouses  for  coal  miners.  Neither 
due  process  of  law  nor  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
is  denied  by  the  provisions  of  the  Indiana  statute  requir- 
ing the  owners  and  operators  of  coal  mines,  collieries,  or 
other  places  where  laborers  employed  are  surrounded  by, 
or  affected  by,  similar  conditions  as  employees  in  coal 
mines,  to  provide  suitable  washhouses  or  washrooms  for 
their  employees  upon  the  request  in  writing  of  twenty  or 
more  of  such  employees,  or  in  case  there  are  not  so  many 
employed,  upon  the  written  request  of  one-third  of  the 
employees ;  but  such  statute  is  a  proper  exercise  of  the 
police  power  in  the  interest  of  the  public  health.  The 
legislature  having  the  power,  in  the  interest  of  the  public 
health,  to  regulate  the  conditions  upon  which  coal  mining 
may  be  conducted,  it  cannot  be  limited  by  moments  of 
time  and  differences  of  situation,  by  the  distinction  be- 
tween what  a  legislature  may  require  for  the  safety  and 
protection  of  a  miner  while  actually  in  service  below 


752  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  487 

ground,  and  that  which  may  be  required  when  he  has 
ceased  or  has  not  commenced  his  labors.  The  legislative 
judgment  may  be  determined  by  all  of  the  conditions  and 
their  influence.  The  conditions  to  which  a  miner  parses 
or  returns  from  are  very  different  from  those  which  an 
employee  in  work  above  ground  passes  to  or  returns 
from,  and  the  conditions  of  actual  service  in  the  cases 
are  very  different,  and  it  cannot  be  judicially  said  that  a 
judgment  which  makes  such  differences  a  basis  of  classi- 
fication is  arbitrarily  exercised ;  certainly  in  view  of  the 
wide  discretion  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
has  recognized,  and  necessarily  has  recognized  in  legis- 
lation to  classify  its  objects.  It  is,  however,  further  ob- 
jected that  the  law  discriminates  because  it  may  be  applied 
to  one  mine,  and  not  to  another,  all  other  conditions  being 
the  same  but  the  desire  of  the  miners,— indeed,  discrimi- 
nates upon  a  distinction  more  arbitrary  than  that,  upon 
the  desire  of  twenty  in  one  mine  as  against  a  lesser  num- 
ber, nineteen,  it  may  be,  in  another.  The  objection  is  the 
usual  ground  of  attack  upon  a  distinction  based  on  degree 
and  where  the  distinction  depends  upon  a  difference  in 
numbers,  and  is  answered  in  McLean  v.  Arkansas,  211 
U.  S.  539.  Nor  was  the  law  open  to  objection  because  it 
could  not  be  put  in  operation  by  any  power  which  the 
state  government  possessed,  but  was  enforceable  only 
upon  the  demand  or  election  of  a  limited  number  of  em- 
ployees in  the  coal  mining  business.  The  choice  of  man- 
ner was,  under  the  circumstances,  for  the  legislature  to 
determine,  and  its  choice  was  legal.  Booth  v.  Indiana, 
237  U.  S.  391. 

§  488.  Discrimination  between  county  and  city  in  dis- 
position of  tax  penalties.  No  substantial  Federal  ques- 
tion which  will  support  a  writ  of  error  from  the  Federal 
Supreme  Court  to  a  state  court  is  presented  by  the  con- 
tention that  taxpayers  of  a  county,  who  reside  outside 
of  cities  of  the  first  class,  are  deprived  of  their  property 
wrthout  due  process  of  law  and  are  denied  the  equal  pro- 


§  489  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  753 

tection  of  the  laws  by  state  legislation  under  which,  as 
construed  by  the  state  court,  a  county  must  reimburse  a 
city  of  the  first  class  within  such  county  for  the  amount 
by  which  the  taxes  collected  for  the  city  are  reduced  by 
rebates  granted  for  prompt  payment,  and  at  the  same 
time  must  pay  over  to  the  city  the  amount  collected  as 
penalties  for  delay  in  the  payment  of  taxes  levied  by  the 
city,  while  in  the  cases  of  taxes  levied  by  cities  of  the  sec- 
ond and  third  class  and  by  townships  and  school  districts 
the  rebates  are  charged  to  the  county  and  the  penalties 
credited  to  it.  It  is  manifest  that  the  statute  assailed  was 
enacted  by  the  state  in  regulation  of  its  municipalities, 
and  the  power  to  do  this  is  very  broad.  Counties,  cities 
and  towns  exist  only  for  the  convenient  administration 
of  the  government,  and  are  instruments  of  the  state,  cre- 
ated to  carry  out  its  will.  This  power  of  creation  and 
control  may  be  exercised  in  many  ways  and  may  give 
rise  to  actual  or  asserted  inequalities.  It  has  been  exer- 
cised to  enlarge  or  contract  the  boundaries  of  municipal 
corporations,  invest  them  with  special  powers,  divide  and 
apportion  their  property.  It  would  be  difficult  to  define 
the  restrictions  upon  this  power  of  control  and  keep  it 
efficient.  This  Kansas  statute  does  not  transcend  the 
limitations.    Stewart  v.  Kansas  City,  239  U.  S.  14. 

§  489.  Discrimination  against  aliens.  The  discrimina- 
tion against  aliens  lawfully  resident  in  the  state,  which 
is  produced  by  the  provisions  of  Arizona  act  of  Decem- 
ber 14,  1914,  that  every  employer  of  more  than  five 
workers  at  any  one  time,  *  *  regardless  of  kind  or  class  of 
work  or  sex  of  workers  shall  employ  not  less  than  80  per 
cent  qualified  electors  or  native-bom  citizens  of  the  United 
States  or  some  sub-division  thereof,'*  renders  the  stat- 
ute invalid  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  as  denying 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  and  such  statute  cannot 
be  justified  as  an  exercise  of  the  i>ower  of  the  state  to 
make  reasonable  classifications  in  legislating  to  promote 
the  health,  safety,  morals,  and  welfare  of  those  within 

Due  Process — 48 


754  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  489 

its  jurisdiction.  The  equal  protection  claase  of  the 
amendment  is  universal  in  its  application,  to  all  persons 
within  the  territorial  jurisdiction,  without  regard  to  race, 
color  or  nationality ;  ^ '  and  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
is  a  pledge  of  the  protection  of  equal  laws/'  The  dis- 
crimination defined  by  the  act  does  not  pertain  to  the 
regulation  or  distribution  of  the  public  domain,  or  of 
the  conunon  property  or  resources  of  the  people  of  the 
state,  the  enjoyment  of  which  may  be  limited  to  its  cit- 
izens as  against  both  aliens  and  the  citizens  of  other 
states.  A  statute  was  upheld  restricting  to  the  citizens 
of  Virginia  the  right  to  plant  oysters  in  one  of  its  rivers 
upon  the  ground  that  the  regulation  related  to  the  com- 
mon property  of  the  citizens  of  the  state.  An  analogous 
principle  was  involved  in  a  Pennsylvania  case  where  the 
discrimination  against  aliens  upheld  by  the  court  had  for 
its  object  the  protection  of  wild  game  within  the  state, 
with  respect  to  which  it  was  said  that  the  state  could 
exercise  its  preserving  power  for  the  benefit  of  its  own 
citizen  if  it  pleased.  The  case  is  not  within  these  deci- 
sions, or  within  those  relating  to  the  devolution  of  real 
property,  neither  is  the  act  limited  to  persons  who  are 
engaged  on  public  work  or  receive  the  benefits  of  public 
money.  The  discrimination  involved  is  imposed  upon  the 
conduct  of  ordinary  private  enterprise.  It  covers  the 
entire  field  of  industry  with  the  exception  of  enterprises 
that  are  relatively  very  small.  The  purpose  of  the  act  is 
frankly  revealed  in  its  title,  and  is  aimed  at  the  employ- 
ment of  aliens,  as  such.  The  power  of  the  state  to  make 
reasonable  classifications  does  not  go  so  far  as  to  make 
it  possible  for  the  state  to  deny  to  lawful  inhabitants, 
because  of  their  race  or  nationality,  the  ordinary  means 
of  earning  a  livelihood.  The  right  to  work  for  a  living 
in  the  common  occupations  of  the  conmiunity  is  of  the 
very  essence  of  the  personal  freedom  and  opportunity 
that  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  amendment  to  secure.  The 
act  is  in  hostility  to  the  exclusive  Federal  authority  to 
admit  or  exclude  aliens.    Denying  to  aliens  the  oppor- 


§  490  POWEB  OP  CLASSIFICATION  755 

timity  of  earning  a  livelihood  when  lawfully  admitted  to 
the  state  would  be  equivalent  to  denying  them  entrance 
and  abode,  for  in  ordinary  cases  they  cannot  live  where 
they  cannot  work.  It  is  no  defense  that  by  the  act  the 
employer  in  any  line  of  business  who  employs  more  than 
five  workers  may  employ  aliens  to  the  extent  of  20  per 
cent  of  his  employees.  If  the  20  per  cent  restriction  is 
maintainable,  the  state  undoubtedly  has  the  power,  if  it 
sees  fit,  to  make  the  percentage  less.  It  has  been  fre- 
quently held  that  the  legislature  may  recognize  degrees 
of  evil  and  adapt  its  legislation  accordingly;  but  under- 
lying the  classification  is  the  authority  to  deal  with  that 
at  which  the  legislation  is  aimed.  No  special  public  inter- 
est with  respect  to  any  particular  business  is  shown  that 
could  possibly  be  deemed  to  support  the  enactment,  for, 
as  has  been  said,  it  relates  to  every  sort.  The  discrimi- 
nation is  against  aliens  as  such  in  competition  with  cit- 
izens in  the  described  range  of  enterprises,  and  clearly 
falls  under  the  condemnation  of  the  fundamental  law. 
Truax  v.  Eaich,  239  U.  S.  33. 

§  490.  Discrimination  against  foreign  labor  on  public 
works.  Property  is  not  taken  without  due  process  of 
law,  nor  is  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  denied,  con- 
trary to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  by  the  provisions  of 
the  New  York  law  that  only  citizens  of  the  United  States 
may  be  employed  in  the  construction  of  public  works  by 
or  for  the  state  or  a  municipality,  and  that  in  such  em- 
ployment citizens  of  New  York  state  must  be  given  pref- 
erence. 

The  case  was  decided  on  the  principle  laid  down  in 
Atkin  V.  Kansas,  191  TJ.  S.  207,  where  it  was  held  that 
**it  belongs  to  the  state,  as  the  guardian  of  its  people,  and 
having  control  of  its  affairs,  to  prescribe  the  conditions 
upon  which  it  will  permit  public  work  to  be  done  in  its 
behalf,  or  on  behalf  of  its  municipalities."  Heim  v. 
McCall,  239  TJ.  S.  175 ;  Crane  v.  New  York,  239  TJ.  S.  195. 


756  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  491 

§491.  Begulatiiig  ixmkeeper's  duty  in  case  of  fire.    The 

Nebraska  statute  singling  out  hotels  having  more  than 
fifty  rooms  as  proper  subjects  for  regulations  respecting 
the  duty  of  hotel  keepers  towards  guests  and  inmates  in 
case  of  fire,  and  not  applying  to  keepers  of  hotels  having 
a  less  number  of  rooms,  does  not  discriminate  against 
the  former  and  is  not  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
See  the  cases  cited.   Miller  v.  Strahl,  239  U.  S.  426. 


§492.  Forbidding  brickmaking  in  designated  area. 

Prohibiting  by  municipal  ordinance  the  manufacture  of 
brick  within  a  designated  area  cannot  be  said  to  deny  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  the  owner  of  a  brickyard 
within  the  prohibited  district,  where  the  record  does  not 
show  that  brickyards  in  other  localities  within  the  munici- 
pality where  the  same  conditions  exist  are  not  regulated 
or  prohibited,  or  that  other  objectionable  businesses  are 
permitted  within  the  same  district.  The  petitioner  makes 
his  attack  upon  the  law  depend  upon  disputable  consider- 
ations of  classification  and  upon  a  comparison  of  condi- 
tions of  which  there  is  no  means  of  judicial  determination, 
and  upon  which,  nevertheless,  the  court  was  asked  to 
reverse  legislative  action  exercised  upon  matters  of  which 
the  city  has  control.  There  is  no  allegation  or  proof  of 
other  objectionable  businesses  being  permitted  within  the 
district,  and  a  speculation  of  their  establishment  or  con- 
duct at  some  future  time  is  too  remote.  It  may  be  that 
brickyards  in  other  localities  within  the  city  where  the 
same  conditions  exist  are  not  regulated  or  prohibited,  but 
it  does  not  follow  that  they  will  not  be.  That  petitioner's 
business  was  the  first  in  time  to  be  prohibited  does  not 
make  its  prohibition  unlawful.  Mr.  Justice  McKenna  in 
delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court  said :  *  *  It  may  be  that 
something  else  than  prohibition  may  have  satisfied  the 
conditions.  Of  this,  however,  we  have  no  means  of  deter- 
mining, and  besides,  we  cannot  declare  invalid  the  exer- 
tion of  a  power  which  the  city  undoubtedly  has  because  of 


§494  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  757 

a  charge  that  it  does  not  exactly  accommodate  the  con- 
ditionSy  or  that  some  other  exercise  would  have  been  better 
or  less  harsh.  We  must  accord  good  faith  to  the  city  in 
the  absence  of  a  clear  showing  to  the  contrary  and  an 
honest  exercise  of  judgment  upon  the  circumstances  which 
induced  its  action. '  *  Hadacheck  v.  Sebastian,  239  U.  S. 
394. 

§493.  Workmen's  compensation  act.  The  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  is  not  denied  by  construing  the  Wash- 
ington workmen's  compensation  act  (Wash.  Laws  1911, 
chap.  74),  as  taking  away  any  existing  right,  under  Eem- 
ington  &  Ballinger's  Code,  §§  183,  194,  to  maintain  an 
a^i^tion  for  the  wrongful  act  of  an  employee,  not  only  as 
against  the  employer,  but  as  against  any  third  person  by 
whose  negligence  the  death  may  have  been  caused,  where 
the  employee  sustained  the  fatal  injury  while  engaged 
about  his  ordinary  duties  at  his  employer's  plant.  North- 
ern Pacific  Eailway  Company  v.  Meese,  239  U.  S.  614. 

§  494.  Abating  smoke  nuisance.  So  far  as  the  Federal 
Constitution  is  concerned,  a  state  may,  by  itself  or  through 
authorized  municipalities,  declare  the  emission  of  dense 
smoke  in  cities  or  populous  neighborhoods  to  be  a  nuisance 
and  subject  to  restraint  as  such,  and  the  harshness  of 
such  legislation  or  its  effect  upon  business  interests,  short 
of  a  merely  arbitrary  enactment,  are  not  valid  constitn- 
tional  objections,  nor  is  there  any  valid  Federal  consti- 
tutional objection  in  the  fact  that  the  regulation  may 
require  the  discontinuance  of  the  use  of  property,  or 
subject  the  occupant  to  large  expenses  in  complying  with 
the  terms  of  the  law  or  ordinance.  The  ordinance  is  not 
open  to  attack  because  of  arbitrary  classification.  It  ap- 
plies equally  to  all  coming  within  its  terms,  and  the  fact 
that  other  businesses  might  have  been  included  does  not 
make  such  arbitrary  classification  as  annuls  the  legisla- 
tion. Nor  does  it  make  classification  illegal  because  cer- 
tain cities  are  included  and  others  omitted  in  the  statute. 
Northwestern  Laundry  v.  Des  Moines,  239  TJ.  S.  486. 


I 

758  DUE  PEOCESS  OF  LAW  5  495 

§496.  Begnlating  net  weight  of  packages  of  lard. 

Sii]gling  out  lard  from  other  food  products,  as  is  done  by 
the  prohibition  of  North  Dakota  Laws  1911,  page  355, 
against  the  sale  of  lard  otherwise  than  in  bulk  unless  put 
up  in  1,  3  or  5-pound  packages,  net  weight,  or  some  mul- 
tiple of  these  numbers,  does  not  make  the  statute  repug- 
nant to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  denying  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  Plaintiff  in  error  claims  that  the 
law  *  *  arbitrarily  and  without  reasonable  ground  therefor 
singles  out  lard  from  all  food  products''  which  are  sold 
in  packages,  such  as  'Sprints  of  butter,  packages  of  coffee, 
boxes  of  crackers,  and  the  endless  number  of  other  prod- 
ucts sold  in  package  form  are  not  included^  and  no  natural 
and  reasonable  ground  for  excluding  them  and  in  singling 
out  lard  has  been  suggested."  The  range  of  discretion 
that  a  state  possesses  in  classifying  objects  of  legislation 
has  been  fully  discussed.  The  power  may  be  determined 
by  degrees  of  evil,  or  exercised  in  cases  where  detriment 
is  specially  experienced.  The  law  of  Dakota  does  not 
exceed  this  power.  Armour  &  Co.  v.  North  Dakota,  240 
U.  S.  510. 

§496.  Olascdflcation  denying  equal  protection  of  the 
laws,  because  arbitrary  and  creating  presumption  of 
guilt.  Defining  the  business  of  sugar  refining  as  that  of 
**any  concern  that  buys  and  refines  raw  or  other  sugar 
exclusively,  or  that  refines  raw  or  other  sugar  from 
sugar  taken  in  toll,  or  that  buys  or  refines  more  raw  or 
other  sugar  than  the  aggregate  of  the  sugar  produced  by 
it  from  cane  grown  and  purchased  by  it,"  as  is  done  by 
§  15  of  Louisiana  Acts  1915,  No.  10,  which  subjects  to 
drastic  regulation  the  business  of  sugar  refining,  renders 
the  statute  repugnant  to  the  equal  protection  clause  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  as  producing  a  classification 
which,  if  it  does  not  confine  itself  to  one  particular  con- 
cern, is  at  least  arbitrary  beyond  possible  justice. 

A  state  cannot,  consistently  with  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  create, 


§  496  POWER  OP  CLASSIFICATION  759 

as  is  attempted  by  Louisiana  Acts  1915,  No.  10,  a  pre- 
sumption of  participation  in  a  forbidden  monopoly  or 
combination  from  the  systematic  payment  in  Louisiana  by 
a  person  engaged  in  sugar  refining  within  the  state  of  a 
less  price  for  sugar  than  he  pays  in  any  other  state,  nor 
a  presumption  that  the  closing  or  keeping  idle  of  a  sugar 
refinery  for  more  than  one  year  was  for  the  purpose  of 
violating  that  statute  or  the  laws  against  monopolies. 

The  statute  bristles  with  severities  that  touch  the  plain- 
tiff alone,  and  raises  many  questions  that  would  have  to 
be  answered  before  it  could  be  sustained.  It  is  a  classifi- 
cation which,  if  it  does  not  confine  itself  to  the  plaintiff, 
at  least  is  arbitrary  beyond  possible  justice,  and  creates 
presumptions  and  special  powers  against  it  that  can  have 
no  foundation  except  the  intent  to  destroy.  As  to  the 
classification,  if  a  powerful  rival  of  the  plaintiff  should 
do  no  refining  within  the  state,  it  might  systematically 
pay  a  less  price  for  sugar  in  Louisiana  than  it  paid  else- 
where with  none  of  the  consequences  attached  to  doing  so 
in  the  plaintiff  *s  case.  So  of  any  one  who  purchases  but 
does  not  refine.  So  of  any  concern  that  does  not  buy  and 
refine  more  sugar  *  *  than  the  aggregate  of  the  sugar  pro- 
duced by  it  from  cane  grown  and  purchased  by  it,*^  as 
easily  might  happen  with  a  combination  of  planters.  The 
legislature  may  go  a  good  way  in  raising  presumptions 
or  in  changing  the  burden  of  proof,  but  there  are  limits. 
The  presumption  created  here  has  no  relation  in  experi- 
ence to  general  facts.  It  has  no  foundation  except  with 
tacit  reference  to  the  plaintiff.  But  it  is  not  within  the 
province  of  a  legislature  to  declare  an  individual  guilty 
or  presumptively  guilty  of  a  crime.  McFarland  v.  Amer- 
ican Sugar  Eefining  Co.,  241  U.  S.  79. 


CHAPTER  XXTT 

THE  POLICE  POWEB 

§497.  Police  power  of  state — ^Public  laundries  and 
washhouses.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  clause 
was  not  intended  to  limit  nor  does  it  limit  the  police  power 
of  the  state.  The  state  has  the  right  to  legislate  for  the 
health  and  general  welfare  of  the  people,  and  snch  legis- 
lation will  be  upheld  unless  arbitrary  and  unreasonable. 
No  general  definition  of  the  police  power  has  been  at- 
tempted by  the  Supreme  Court,  each  case  being  decided 
on  its  own  state  of  facts,  but  the  power  of  the  state  over 
the  health,  welfare,  safety  and  general  good  of  its  citizens 
finds  no  restriction  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The 
ordinance  of  the  city  and  county  of  San  Francisco,  pro- 
hibiting the  carrying  on  of  public  laundries  and  wash 
houses  within  certain  prescribed  limits  of  the  city  and 
county,  from  ten  o'clock  at  night  until  six  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  is  purely  a  police  regulation,  within  the  compe- 
tency of  any  municipality,  possessed  of  the  ordinary 
powers,  to  make.  A  federal  tribunal  cannot  supervise 
such  regulations ;  any  correction  of  the  action  of  munici- 
pal bodies  in  such  matters  can  come  only  from  state  legis- 
lation or  state  tribunals.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment  of 
the  United  States  Constitution  is  not  designed  to  inter- 
fere with  the  power  of  the  state,  sometimes  termed  its 
** police  power,''  to  prescribe  regulations  to  promote  the 
health,  peace,  morals,  education  and  good  order  of  the 
people.  It  may  be  a  necessary  measure  of  precaution  in 
a  city  composed  largely  of  wooden  buildings  like  San, 
Francisco,  that  occupations,  in  which  fires  are  constantly 
required,  should  cease  after  certain  hours  at  night  until 
the  following  morning ;  and  of  the  necessity  of  such  regu- 

760 


§  497  POLICE  POWER  761 

lations  the  municipal  bodies  are  the  exclusive  judges. 
The  same  authority  which  directs  the  cessation  of  labor 
must  necessarily  prescribe  the  limits  within  which  it  shall 
be  enforced.  There  is  no  invidious  discrimination  against 
anyone  within  the  prescribed  limits  by  such  regulations. 
There  is  none  in  the  regulation  under  consideration.  The 
specification  of  the  limits  within  which  the  business  can 
not  be  carried  on  without  the  certificates  of  the  health 
oflScer  and  board  of  fire  wardens  is  merely  a  designation 
of  the  portion  of  the  city  in  which  the  precautionary 
measures  against  fire  and  to  secure  proper  drainage  must 
be  taken  for  the  public  health  and  safety.  It  is  not  legis- 
lation discriminating  against  anyone.  All  persons  en- 
gaged in  the  same  business  within  it  are  treated  alike; 
are  subject  to  the  same  restrictions  and  are  entitled  to  the 
same  privileges  under  similar  conditions.  That  is  the 
plain  intent  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  that  equal 
protection  and  security  should  be  given  to  all  under  like 
circumstances  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  personal  and  civil 
rights ;  that  all  persons  should  be  equally  entitled  to  pur- 
sue their  happiness  and  acquire  and  enjoy  property; 
that  they  should  have  like  access  to  the  courts  of  the  coun- 
try for  the  protection  of  their  persons  and  property,  the 
prevention  and  redress  of  wrongs,  and  the  enforcements 
of  contracts ;  that  no  impediment  should  be  interposed  to 
the  pursuits  of  anyone  except  as  applied  to  the  same  pur- 
suits by  others  under  like  circumstances ;  that  no  greater 
burdens  should  be  laid  upon  one  than  are  laid  upon  others 
in  the  same  calling  and  condition,  and  that  in  the  admin- 
istration of  criminal  justice  no  different  or  higher  pun- 
ishment should  be  imposed  upon  one  than  such  as  is 
prescribed  to  all  for  like  offenses.  Class  legislation,  dis- 
criminating against  some  and  favoring  others  is  prohib- 
ited; but  legislation  which,  in  carrying  out  a  public 
purpose,  is  limited  in  its  application,  if  within  the  sphere 
of  its  operation  it  affects  alike  all  persons  similarly  situ- 
ated, is  not  within  the  amendment.  Barbier  v.  Connolly, 
113  U.  S.  27. 


762  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  498 

§498.  Oity  ordinances  as  to  public  lauulrieSi  when 
valid.    The  ordinance  of  the  city  and  county  of  San  Fran- 
cisco which  declares  that  no  person  owning  or  employed 
in  a  public  laundry  or  public  wash  house  within  the  pre- 
scribed limitSi  shall  wash  or  iron  clothes  between  the 
hours  of  ten  in  the  evening  and  six  in  the  morning,  or 
upon  any  portion  of  Sunday,  is  not  void  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  not  within  the  police  power  of  the  city  and 
county.    Such  section  is  not  void  on  the  ground  that 
it  discriminates  between  those  engaged  in  the  laundry 
business  and  those  engaged  in  other  classes  of  business, 
or  between  the  different  classes  of  persons  engaged  in  the 
laundry  business.   There  is  no  force  in  the  objection,  that 
an  unwarrantable  discrimination  is  made  against  persons 
engaged  in  the  laundry  business,  because  persons  in  other 
kinds  of  business  are  not  required  to  cease  from  their 
labors  during  the  same  hours  at  night.    There  may  be 
no  risks  attached  to  the  business  of  others,  certainly  not 
as  great  as  where  fires  are  constantly  required  to  carry 
them  on.    The  specific  regulations  for  one  kind  of  busi- 
ness, which  may  be  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the 
public,  can  never  be  the  just  ground  of  complaint  because 
like  restrictions  are  not  imposed  upon  other  business  of 
a  different  kind.    The  discriminations  which  are  open  to 
objection  are  those  where  persons  engaged  in  the  same 
business  are  subjected  to  different  restrictions,  or  are 
held  entitled  to  different  privileges  under  the  same  con- 
ditions.   It  is  only  then,  that  the  discrimination  can  be 
said  to  impair  the  equal  right  which  all  can  claim  in  the 
enforcement  of  the  law.    Objection  was  also  made  that 
the  ordinance  discriminated  between  different  classes  en- 
gaged in  the  laundry  business  itself.    The  branches  of 
the  laundry  which  are  outside  of  the  prohibition  of  the 
ordinance,  are  outside  because  there  is  not  the  danger 
from  them  that  would  arise  from  the  continuous  fires 
required  in  washing ;  and  it  is  not  discriminating  legisla- 
tion in  any  invidious  sense,  that  branches  of  the  same 
business  from  which  danger  is  apprehended  are  prohib- 


S  499  POLICE  POWER  763 

ited  during  certain  hours  of  the  night,  whilst  other 
branches  involving  no  such  danger  are  permitted.  Hing 
V.  Crowley,  113  U.  S.  703. 

§499.  Drainage  law  of  New  Jersey  not  imconstita- 
tional.  The  statute  of  New  Jersey  providing  for  the 
drainage  of  any  tract  of  low  or  marshy  land  within  the 
state,  upon  proceedings  instituted  by  at  least  five  owners 
of  separate  lots  of  land  included  in  the  tract,  and  not 
objected  to  by  the  owners  of  the  greater  part  of  the  tract, 
and  for  the  assessment  by  commissioners,  after  notice  and 
hearing,  of  the  expenses  upon  all  the  owners,  does  not 
deprive  them  of  their  property  without  due  process  of  the 
laws,  nor  deny  to  them  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Gen- 
eral laws  authorizing  the  drainage  of  tracts  of  swamp  and 
low  lands,  by  commissioners  appointed  upon  proceedings 
instituted  by  some  of  the  owners  of  the  lands,  and  the 
assessment  of  the  whole  expense  of  the  work  upon  all  the 
lands  within  the  tract  in  question,  have  long  existed  in 
the  state  of  New  Jersey,  and  have  been  sustained  and 
acted  on  by  her  courts  as  a  just  and  constitutional  exer- 
cise of  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  establish  regulations 
by  which  adjoining  lands,  held  by  various  owners  in  sev- 
eralty, and  in  the  improvement  of  which  all  have  a  com- 
mon interest,  but  which,  by  reason  of  the  peculiar  natural 
condition  of  the  whole  tract,  cannot  be  improved  or 
enjoyed  by  any  of  theni  without  the  concurrence  of  all, 
may  be  reclaimed  and  made  useful  to  all  at  their  joint 
expense.  As  the  statute  is  applicable  to  dll  lands  of  the 
same  kind,  and  as  no  person  can  be  assessed  under  it  for 
the  expense  of  drainage  without  notice  and  opportunity 
to  be  heard,  the  plaintiffs  in  error  have  neither  been  de- 
nied the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  nor  been  deprived 
of  their  property  without  due  process  of  law,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States.  Wurts  v.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S. 
606. 


764  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  500 

§  500.  Regulation  of  laundry  business.  The  order  of 
the  city  and  county  of  San  Francisco,  providing  that  it 
should  be  unlawful  for  any  person  to  engage  in  the  laun- 
dry business  within  the  corporate  limits  '*  without  having 
first  obtained  the  consent  of  the  board  of  supervisors, 
except  the  same  be  located  in  a  building  constructed 
either  of  brick  or  stone/*  does  not  prescribe  a  rule  and 
conditions  for  the  regulation  of  the  use  of  laundry  prop- 
erty, to  which  all  similarly  situated  may  conform;  but  it 
confers  a  naked  arbitrary  power  upon  the  board  to  give 
or  withhold  consent,  and  makes  all  engaged  in  the  busi- 
ness the  tenants  at  will  as  to  their  means  of  living,  under 
the  board  of  supervisors.  Though  a  law  be  fair  on  its 
face  and  impartial  in  appearance,  yet,  if  it  is  administered 
by  public  authority  with  an  evil  eye  and  an  unequal  hand, 
so  as  practically  to  make  illegal  discriminations  between 
persons  in  similar  circumstances,  material  to  their  rights, 
the  denial  of  equal  justice  is  still  within  the  prohibiten  of 
the  Constitution.  The  power  given  to  the  board  of  super- 
visors is  not  confided  to  their  discretion  in  the  legal  sense 
of  that  term,  but  is  granted  to  their  mere  will.  It  is  purely 
arbitrary,  and  acknowledges  neither  guidance  nor  re- 
straint. The  ordinance  drawn  in  question  in  these  cases 
is  of  a  very  different  character  from  those  upheld  in 
Barbier  v.  Connolly,  113  U.  S.  27,  and  in  Soon  Hing  v. 
Crowley,  113  U.  S.  703.  It  divides  the  owners  or  occu- 
piers of  wooden  buildings  into  two  classes,  not  having 
respect  to  their  personal  character  and  qualifications  for 
the  business,  nor  the  situation  and  nature  and  adaptation 
of  the  buildings  themselves,  but  merely  by  an  arbitrary 
line,  on  one  side  of  which  are  those  who  are  permitted  to 
pursue  their  industry  by  the  mere  will  and  consent  of 
the  supervisors,  and  on  the  other  those  from  whom  that 
consent  is  withheld,  at  their  mere  will  and  pleasure.  The 
cases  present  the  ordinance  in  actual  operation,  and  the 
facts  shown  establish  an  administration  directed  so  ex- 
clusively against  a  particular  class  of  persons  as  to  war- 
rant and  require  the  conclusion  that  whatever  may  have 


§  501  POLICE  POWER  765 

been  the  intent  of  the  ordinances  as  adopted,  they  are 
applied  by  the  pnblic  authorities  charged  with  their  ad- 
ministration, and  thus  representing  the  state  itself,  with 
a  mind  so  unequal  and  oppressive  as  to  amount  to  a  prac- 
tical denial  by  the  state  of  that  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  which  is  secured  to  the  petitioners,  as  to  all  other 
persons,  by  the  broad  and  benign  provisions  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment.  In  these  cases  no  reason  whatever, 
except  the  will  of  the  supervisors,  is  assigned  why  the 
petitioners  should  not  be  permitted  to  carry  on,  in  the 
accustomed  manner,  their  harmless  and  useful  occupa- 
tion, on  which  they  depend  for  a  livelihood.  The  only 
persons  thus  discriminated  against  are  Chinese  subjects. 
The  fact  of  this  discrimination  is  admitted.  No  reason 
for  it  is  shown,  and  the  conclusion  cannot  be  resisted,  that 
no  reason  for  it  exists  except  hostility  to  the  race  and 
nationality  to  which  the  petitioners  belong,  and  which  in 
the  eye  of  the  law  is  not  justified.  The  discrimination  is 
therefore  illegal,  and  the  public  administration  which  en- 
forces it  is  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  and 
a  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Consti- 
tution.   Yick  Wo  V.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356. 

§  501.  Oleomargarine  law.  A  statute  which  is  a  legiti- 
mate exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state,  for  the 
protection  of  the  health  of  the  people,  and  for  the  preven- 
tion of  fraud,  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.  That  amendment  was  not  designed  to  inter- 
fere with  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  by  the  states. 
Whether  the  manufacture  of  oleomargarine,  or  imitation 
butter,  involves  such  danger  to  the  public  health  as  to 
require  its  entire  suppression,  rather  than  its  regulation 
in  such  manner  as  to  permit  the  manufacture  and  sale  of 
articles  of  that  class  that  do  not  contain  noxious  ingredi- 
ents, is  a  question  of  fact  and  of  public  policy,  which 
belongs  to  the  legislative  department  to  determine.  The 
legislative  determination  of  such  question  is  conclusive 
upon  the  courts,  unless  it  appears  upon  the  face  of  the 


766  DUB  PROCESS  OP  DAW  §  501 

statute,  or  from  facts  of  which  the  courts  must  take  judi- 
cial cognizaucey  that  the  statute  infringes  rights  secured 
hy  the  fundamental  law.  Although  legislation  on  this  sub^ 
ject  may  be  unwise^  or  unnecessarily  oppressive  to  those 
manufacturing  or  selling  wholesome  oleomargarine  as  an 
article  of  food,  yet  the  courts  cannot  .interfere  without 
usurping  powers  committed  to  another  department  of 
government ;  the  appeal  must  be  to  the  legislature  or  to 
the  ballot  box,  not  to  the  judiciary.  The  objection  that 
the  statute  is  repugnant  to  the  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  forbidding  the  denial  by  the  state  to  any 
person  within  its  jurisdiction  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  is  untenable.  The  statute  places  under  the  same 
restrictions,  and  subjects  to  like  penalties  and  burdens, 
all  who  manufacture,  or  sell,  or  offer  for  sale,  or  keep  in 
possession  to  sell,  the  articles  embraced  by  its  prohibi- 
tions; thus  recognizing  and  preserving  the  principle  of 
equality  among  those  engaged  in  the  same  business.  This 
case,  in  its  important  aspects,  is  governed  by  the  prin- 
ciples announced  in  Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123  IT.  S.  623. 
Powell  V.  Pennsylvania,  127  U.  S.  678. 

§  502.  Wlien  servitude  attaches  to  lands.  Where  by 
the  state  law  lands  bordering  upon  a  navigable  river  are 
subject  to  a  servitude  in  favor  of  the  public,  whereby 
such  portions  thereof  as  are  necessary  for  the  purpose 
of  making  levees  may  be  taken  without  compensation, 
such  servitude  attaches  to  lands  whose  titles  are  derived 
from  the  United  States.  The  subject-matter  of  such 
rights  and  regulations  falls  within  the  control  of  the 
states ;  and  the  provisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
of  the  United  States  Constitution  are  satisfied  if,  in  such 
cases,  the  state  law,  with  its  benefits  and  its  obligations, 
is  impartially  administered.  A  citizen  of  another  state, 
who,  as  respects  his  property  in  a  state,  has  received  the 
same  measure  of  right  as  that  awarded  to  its  citizens,  has 
not  been  deprived  of  his  property  without  due  process  of 
law,  or  been  deprived  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 


§  503  POLICE  POWEB  767 

The  ground  upon  which  the  state  le^latnre  and  judicial 
authorities  base  their  action  is  found  in  the  doctrine  ex- 
isting in  the  territory  of  Louisiana  before  its  purchase  by 
the  United  States  and  continuing  to  the  present  time,  that 
lands  abutting  on  the  rivers  and  bayous  are  subject  to  a 
servitude  in  favor  of  the  public,  whereby  such  portions 
thereof  as  are  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  making  and 
repairing  public  levees  may  be  taken,  in  pursuance  of 
law,  without  compensation*  This  doctrine  is  said  to  have 
been  derived  from  the  Code  Napoleon,  articles  649  and 
650.  The  servitude  is  also  explicitly  expressed  in  the 
civil  code  of  the  state.  The  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  hold  that  lands  situate  within  a  state,  but  whose 
title  is  derived  from  the  United  States,  are  subject  to  the 
same  local  regulations  admitted  to  be  applicable  to  lands 
held  by  grant  from  the  state.  This  disposes  of  the  prop- 
osition that  the  provisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
extend  to  and  override  public  rights,  existing  in  the  form 
of  servitudes  or  easements,  held  by  the  courts  of  a  state 
to  be  valid  under  the  constitution  and  laws  of  such  state. 
Eldridge  v.  Trezevant,  160  U.  S.  452. 

§503.  Utah  statute  as  to  damages  by  cattle.  The  Utah 
statute  which  makes  any  person  who  drives  a  herd  of 
cattle,  sheep,  goats,  or  swine  over  a  public  highway  con- 
structed on  a  hillside,  liable  for  all  damages  done  by  such 
animals  in  destroying  the  banks  or  rolliug  rocks  into  or 
upon  such  highway,  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  nor  deprive  of  property  without  due  process  of 
law.  Such  statute  simply  creates  a  conclusive  presump- 
tion of  negligence  from  a  particular  state  of  facts,  which 
is  within  the  province  of  the  legislature.  A  statute  gen- 
eral in  its  application  to  all  persons  under  like  circum- 
stances, and  not  an  arbitrary  exercise  of  power,  does  not 
deny  to  the  defendant  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws ; 
nor,  if  it  provides  for  the  ascertainment  of  liability  by 
judicial  proceedings,  does  it  deprive  him  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law.   The  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 


768  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  503 

Amendment  referred  to  was  undoubtedly  intended  to 
prohibit  an  arbitrary  deprivation  of  life  or  liberty  or 
arbitrary  spoliation  of  property.  But  it  does  not  Umit, 
nor  was  it  designed  to  limit,  the  subjects  upon  which  the 
police  power  of  a  state  may  be  lawfully  exerted.  Em- 
braced within  the  police  power  of  a  state  are  the  estab- 
lishment, maintenance,  and  control  of  public  highways. 
The  legislation  in  question  would  clearly  seem,  therefore, 
to  come  within  the  narrowest  definition  of  the  police 
power,  and  be  properly  classed  as  a  reasonable  regulation 
incident  to  the  right  to  establish  and  maintain  such  high- 
ways. The  statute  is  analogous  in  principle  to  the  one 
upheld  in  St  Louis  &  S.  F.  E.  Co.  v.  Mathews,  165  U.  S.  1. 
The  statute  was  manifestly  not  designed  to  impose  a  lia- 
bility upon  the  owners  of  herds  for  damage  occasioned 
by  the  mere  passage  of  a  drove  of  animals  over  a  hillside 
road.  If  these  herds  were  kept  in  the  road,  the  banks 
would  not  be  caved  or  rocks  rolled  into  the  traveled 
way.  The  damage  contemplated  must  therefore  be  occa- 
sioned by  animals  going  outside  the  beaten  roadway.  In 
effect,  the  legislature  declared  that  the  passage  of  droves 
or  herds  of  animals  over  a  hillside  highway  was  so  likely, 
if  great  precautions  were  not  observed,  to  result  in  dam- 
age to  the  road,  that  where  this  damage  followed  such 
driving,  there  ought  to  be  no  controversy  over  the  exist- 
ence or  nonexistence  of  negligence,  but  that  there  should 
be  an  absolute  legal  presumption  to  that  effect  resultmg 
from  the  fact  of  having  driven  the  herd.  It  was  obviously 
the  province  of  the  state  legislature  to  provide  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  legal  presumption  to  be  deduced  from  a 
given  state  of  facts,  and  the  creation  by  law  of  such  pre- 
sumptions is  after  all  but  an  illustration  of  the  power  to 
classify.    Jones  v.  Brim,  165  U.  S.  180. 

§  504.  Requiring  five  towns  to  maintain  a  bridge  and 
highway.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied 
because  five  towns  are  put  into  a  class  by  themselves, 
organized  into  a  single  municipal  corporation,  and  sep- 


§  605  POLICE  POWER  769 

arated  from  other  towns  in  the  state  by  being  subjected 
to  different  control  in  respect  to  highways.  The  conten- 
tion of  plaintiff  in  error  overlooks  the  fact  that  the  regu- 
lation of  municipal  corporations  is  a  matter  peculiarly 
within  the  domain  of  state  control ;  that  the  state  is  not 
compelled  by  the  Federal  Constitution  to  grant  to  all  its 
municipal  corporations  the  same  territorial  extent,  or 
the  same  duties  and  powers.  A  municipal  corporation  is, 
so  far  as  its  purely  municipal  relations  are  concerned, 
simply  an  agency  of  the  state  for  conducting  the  affairs 
of  government,  and  as  such  it  is  subject  to  the  control  of 
the  legislature.  That  body  may  place  one  part  of  the 
state  under  one  municipal  organization  and  another  part 
of  the  state  under  another  organization  of  an  entirely 
different  character.  These  are  matters  of  a  purely  local 
nature,  in  respect  to  which  the  Federal  Constitution  does 
not  limit  the  power  of  the  state.  **  Whether  territory 
shall  be  governed  for  local  purposes  by  a  county,  a  city, 
or  a  township  organization  is  one  of  the  most  usual  and 
ordinary  subjects  of  state  legislation.'*  Kelly  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, 104  XJ.  S.  78, 81.  Williams  v.  Eggleston,  170  U.  S. 
304. 

§  505.  Ordinance  as  to  license  for  sale  of  cigarettes. 
An  ordinance  giving  the  mayor  power  to  determine 
whether  a  person  applying  for  a  license  to  sell  cigarettes 
has  good  character  and  reputation  and  is  a  suitable  per- 
son to  be  intrusted  with  their  sale,  but  requiring  him  to 
grant  a  license  to  every  person  fulfilling  these  conditions, 
does  not  vest  in  him  any  arbitrary  power  to  grant  or 
refuse  a  license,  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  either  in  regard  to  the  clause 
requiring  due  process  of  law,  or  in  that  requiring  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  Plaintiff  in  error  claims  that  he 
has  been  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  because 
in  other  kinds  of  business,  where  licenses  are  granted  to 
persons  engaged  in  any  trade  or  occupation,  no  member 
thereof  is  ^'singled  out  and  subjected  to  the  absolute 

Dne  Proee8»— 49 


770  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  505 

supervision  of  an  irresponsible  magistrate  while  his 
neighbor  is  protected  in  his  right  by  the  customary  safe- 
guards of  the  law. ' '  The  case  principally  relied  upon  by 
the  plaintiff  in  error,  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356, 
does  not  support  his  contention.  The  ordinance  in  ques- 
tion does  not  grant  to  the  mayor  arbitrary  power  such  as 
is  described  in  the  foregoing  laundry  case.  The  license 
is  to  be  issued  if  the  mayor  is  satisfied  that  the  person 
applying  is  of  good  character  and  reputation  and  a  suit- 
able person  to  be  intrusted  with  the  sale  of  cigarettes. 
The  mayor  is  bound  to  grant  a  license  to  every  person 
fulfilling  these  conditions,  and  thus  the  fact  of  fitness  is 
submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  officer,  and  it  calls  for 
the  exercise  of  a  discretion  of  a  judicial  nature  by  him. 
It  is  for  the  state  to  say  whether  selling  cigarettes  is  the 
kind  of  business  which  ought  to  be  licensed,  and  an  ordi- 
nance providing  reasonable  conditions  upon  the  perform- 
ance of  which  a  license  may  be  granted  to  deal  in  and  sell 
cigarettes,  does  not  violate  any  provision  of  the  Federal 
Constitution.    Gundling  v.  Chicago,  177  U.  S.  183. 

§506.  Validity  of  state  statute  restricting  sale  and 
manufacture  of  oleomargarine.  The  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  is  not  denied  an  Ohio  corporation  engaged  in  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of  oleomargarine  within  the  state 
of  Ohio,  by  the  statutes  of  that  state  forbidding  the 
manufacture  or  sale  of  any  oleomargarine  which  con- 
tains any  coloring  matter,  although  by  the  Ohio  statutes 
harmless  coloring  may  be  used  in  butter.  The  proposition 
is  that,  as  by  the  Ohio  statutes  harmless  coloring  matter 
is  permitted  to  be  used  in  butter,  the  effect  of  prohibiting 
the  use  of  such  harmless  ingredients  in  oleomargarine  is 
to  deny  the  manufacturer  of  oleomargarine  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  and  to  take  from  him  his  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  The  supreme  court  of  the 
state,  however,  having  before  it  the  evidence  introduced 
upon  the  issues  of  fact  made  in  the  pleadings,  held  that 
oleomargarine  was  an  article  which  might  be  easily  man- 


§  507  POLICE  POWER  771 

ufactured  so  as  to  be  hurtful,  and  thus  result  in  fraud 
upon  and  injury  to  the  public,  and  that  the  prohibition  of 
the  use  of  coloring  matter  in  oleomargarine  was  a  reason- 
able police  regulation  tending  to  insure  the  public  against 
fraud  and  injury.  The  purpose  of  the  legislature  in  per- 
mitting the  use  of  harmless  coloring  matter  in  butter,  and 
requiring  that  oleomargarine  be  sold  in  its  natural  state, 
was  declared  not  to  be  for  the  purpose  of  discriminating 
in  favor  of  butter,  but  to  provide  a  ready  means  by  which 
the  public  might  know  that  an  article  offered  for  sale  was 
butter,  and  not  oleomargarine.  It  cannot  be  said,  as  a 
mere  matter  of  judicial  inference,  that  such  regulations 
for  such  purpose  were  a  mere  arbitrary  interference  with 
rights  of  property,  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws,  or  that  they  amounted  to  a  taking  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  It  follows  that  the  legislature 
of  Ohio  had  the  lawful  power  to  enact  the  regulations. 
Capital  City  Dairy  Co.  v.  Ohio  ex  rel.  Attorney  General, 
183  U.  S.  238. 

§  507.  Validity  of  mining  inspection  law.  The  classi- 
fication of  coal  mines  which  is  made  by  the  Illinois  laws, 
by  which  coal  mines  where  not  more  than  five  men  are 
employed  at  any  one  time  are  exempted  from  the  opera- 
tion of  the  act  providing  for  the  appointment  of  state 
mine  inspectors,  whose  fees  should  be  paid  by  the  owners 
of  the  mines,  iij  not  arbitrary  or  unreasonable.  The  dis- 
cretion confided  to  the  state  mine  inspectors  by  the  act, 
to  determine  the  number  of  times  each  mine  shall  be 
inspected,  and  to  regulate  the  charges  therefor,  does  not 
make  the  act  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
where  it  requires  that  at  least  four  inspections  annually 
shall  be  made  by  each  inspector  of  each  mine  in  his  dis- 
trict, and  that  his  fees  shall  be  dependent  upon  the  length 
of  time  consumed  and  the  expenses  necessarily  incurred, 
and  for  each  inspection  shall  not  be  less  than  $6  nor  more 
than  $10,  and  provides  a  regular  salary  for  each  inspector, 
which  is  neither  increased  nor  diminished  by  the  num- 


772  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  507 

ber  of  inspections  or  the  amount  paid  therefor.  It  is 
quite  evident  that  a  mine  which  is  operated  by  only  &ve 
men  could  hardly  have  passed  the  experimental  stage,  or 
that  precautions  necessary  in  the  operation  of  coal  mines 
of  ordinary  magnitude  would  be  required  in  such  cases. 
There  was  clearly  reasonable  foundation  for  a  discrimi- 
nation here.  In  enacting  a  law  with  regard  to  the  inspec- 
tion of  mines  the  court  saw  no  objection  in  case  the 
legislature  finds  it  impractical  to  classify  the  mines  for 
the  purposes  of  inspection,  to  commit  that  power  to  a 
body  of  experts  who  are  not  only  experienced  in  the  oper- 
ation of  mines,  but  are  acquainted  with  the  details  neces- 
sary to  be  known  to  make  a  reasonable  classification, 
although  it  may  affect  the  amount  of  fees  to  be  paid  by 
the  mine  owners.  With  regard  to  the  inspection  fees,  not 
less  than  $6  nor  more  than  $10,  for  each  inspection,  Mr. 
Justice  Brown,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
said:  ''It  appears,  then,  first,  that  the  state  inspector 
receives  a  regular  salary,  neither  increased  nor  dimin- 
ished by  the  number  of  inspections  or  the  amount  paid 
for  each  inspection;  and,  second,  that  he  receives  such 
salary  directly  from  the  bureau  of  labor  statistics,  and 
not  from  the  fees  paid  to  him  therefor.  As  his  compen- 
sation is  dependent  neither  upon  the  number  of  his  visits 
nor  upon  the  amount  of  his  fees,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
he  would  gain  by  multiplying  one  or  magnifying  the 
other.  We  know  of  no  reason  why  the  legislature  should 
deprive  itself  of  the  best  determinable  evidence  of  the 
facts  it  seeks  to  make  determinative  of  these  two  ques- 
tions.   Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Illinois,  185  tJ.  S.  203. 

§508.  Live-stock  quarantine.  The  privileges  and 
immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  states  are  not  denied 
by  the  provisions  of  the  Colorado  statute  for  the  protec- 
tion of  domestic  cattle  against  the  communication  of  dis- 
ease by  cattle  from  other  states,  where  the  statute  is 
equally  applicable  to  citizens  of  all  states.  No  discrimi- 
nation is  shown.    No  privileges  are  granted  to  citizens  of 


§  509  POLICE  POWER  773 

Colorado  that  are  denied  to  citizens  of  other  states.  Cit- 
ing Kimmish  v.  Ball,  129  U.  S.  217, 222.  Eeid  v.  Colorado, 
187  U.  S.  137. 

§  509.  Sale  of  stocks  on  margiiL  The  California  state 
constitution  avoiding  all  contracts  for  the  sale  of  shares 
of  corporate  stock  on  margin,  does  not  deny  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  because  this  provision  strikes  at 
some,  and  not  all,  objects  of  possible  speculation.  The 
state  constitution  provides:  '*A11  contracts  for  the  sales 
of  shares  of  the  capital  stock  of  any  corporation  or  asso- 
ciation, on  margin,  or  to  be  delivered  at  a  future  day,  shall 
be  void.'*  There  was  some  suggestion  that  these  words 
might  be  narrowed  by  construction  to  contracts  not  con- 
templating  a  bona  fide  acquisition  of  the  stock,  but 
intended  to  cover  only  a  wager  or  contemplated  settle- 
ment of  differences,  but  the  state  supreme  court  did  not 
uphold  th6  law  on  that  basis.  The  objection  urged  against 
the  provision  in  its  literal  sense  is  that  this  prohibition 
of  all  sales  on  margin  bears  no  reasonable  relation  to  the 
evil  sought  to  be  cured,  and  therefore  falls  within  the 
first  section  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  guarante^ing 
the  liberty  of  contract  and  that  it  unjustifiably  discrimi- 
nates against  property  of  that  class  while  other  familiar 
objects  of  speculation,  such  as  cotton  or  grain,  are  not 
touched,  thus  depriving  persons  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws.  Even  if  the  provision  should  seem  not  to 
have  been  justified  by  the  circumstances  locally  existing 
in  California  at  the  time  when  it  was  passed,  it  is  shown 
by  its  adoption  to  have  expressed  a  deep-seated  conviction 
on  the  part  of  the  people  concerned  as  to  what  that  policy 
required.  Such  a  deep-seated  conviction  is  entitled  to 
great  respect.  If  the  state  thinks  that  an  admitted  evil 
cannot  be  prevented  except  by  prohibiting  a  calling  or 
transaction  not  in  itself  necessarily  objectionable,  the 
courts  cannot  interfere,  unless,  in  looking  at  the  substance 
of  the  matter,  they  can  see  that  it  *  4s  a  clear,  unmistak- 
able infringement  of  rights  secured  by  the  fundamental 


774  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  509 

law.  *  *  It  cannot  be  said  that  there  might  not  be  condi- 
tions of  public  delirium  in  which  at  least  a  temporary 
prohibition  of  sales  on  margins  would  be  a  salutary  thing. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  purchases  on  margin  may  be  and 
frequently  are  used  as  a  means  of  gambling  for  a  great 
gain  or  a  loss  of  all  one  has.  It  is  said  that  in  California, 
when  the  constitution  was  adopted,  the  whole  people  were 
buying  mining  stocks  in  this  way  with  the  result  of 
infinite  disaster.  Inserting  the  provision  in  the  constitu- 
tion showed  the  conviction  of  the  people  at  large  that 
prohibition  was  a  proper  means  of  stopping  the  evU. 
With  regard  to  the  objection  that  this  provision  strikes 
at  only  some,  not  all,  of  the  objects  of  possible  specula- 
tion, it  is  enough  to  say,  remarked  Mr.  Justice  Holmes 
in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  that  probably  in 
California  the  evil  sought  to  be  stopped  was  confined  hi 
the  main  to  stocks  in  corporations.  California  is  a  min- 
ing state,  and  mines  offer  the  most  striking  temptation  to 
people  in  a  hurry  to  get  rich.  Mines  generally  are  repre- 
sented by  stocks.  If  stopping  the  purchase  and  sale  of 
stocks  on  margin  would  stop  the  gambling  which  it  was 
desired  to  prevent,  it  was  proper  for  the  people  of  Cali- 
fornia to  go  no  farther  in  what  they  forbade.  The 
circumstances  disclose  a  reasonable  ground  for  the  clas- 
sification, and  treating  stocks  of  corporations  as  a  class 
subject  to  special  restrictions  was  not  unjust  discrimina- 
tion or  the  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
Otis  &  Gassman  v.  Parker,  187  U.  S.  606.    ^ 

§  510.  Eight-hour  law.  The  Kansas  statute  making  it 
a  criminal  offense  for  a  contractor  for  a  public  work  or 
his  employees  to  permit  or  require  an  employee  to  per- 
form labor  upon  the  work  in  excess  of  eight  hours  each 
day,  does  not  deny  to  him  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  The  entire  argument  against  the  law  attaches  too 
little  consequence  to  the  relation  existing  between  a  state 
and  its  municipal  corporations.  Such  corporations  are 
the  creatures — ^mere  political  subdivisions — of  the  state, 


§  511  POLICE  POWER  775 

for  the  purpose  of  exercising  a  part  of  its  powers.  They 
may  exert  only  such  powers  as  are  expressly  granted  to 
them,  or  such  as  may  be  necessarily  implied  from  those 
granted.  What  they  lawfully  do  of  a  public  character  is 
done  under  the  sanction  of  the  state.  They  are,  in  every 
essential  sense,  only  auxiliaries  of  the  state  for  the  pur- 
poses of  local  government.  They  may  be  created  or 
destroyed.  They  are  mere  tenants  at  will  of  the  legis- 
lature. The  work  was  of  a  public  and  not  of  a  private 
character.  It  belongs  to  the  state,  as  the  guardian  and 
trustee  for  its  people,  and  having  control  of  its  affairs, 
to  prescribe  the  conditions  upon  which  it  will  permit  pub- 
lic work  to  be  done  on  its  behalf,  or  on  behalf  of  its 
municipalities.  No  court  has  authority  to  review  its 
action  in  that  respect.  Regulations  on  this  subject  sug- 
gest only  considerations  of  public  policy.  And  with  such 
considerations  the  courts  have  no  concern.  The  rule  of 
conduct  prescribed  by  the  statute  applies  alike  to  all 
who  contract  to  do  work  on  behalf  either  of  the  state  or 
of  its  municipal  subdivisions,  and  alike  to  all  employed 
to  perform  labor  on  such  work,  and  does  not  deny  to  de- 
fendant or  his  employee  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
Atkin  V.  Kansas,  191  U.  S.  207. 

§511.  Oompnlsory  vaccinatioxi.  Lack  of  any  excep- 
tion in  favor  of  adults  certified  by  a  registered  physician 
to  be  unfit  subjects  for  vaccination  does  not  render  invalid 
the  Massachusetts  statutes  authorizing  compulsory  vacci- 
nation by  local  boards  of  health,  as  denying  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  although  an  exception  in  favor  of 
children  in  like  condition  is  made  by  the  act,  since  the 
statute  is  equally  applicable  to  all  adults.  There  are  obvi- 
ously reasons  why  regulations  may  be  appropriate  for 
adults  which  could  not  be  safely  applied  to  persons  of 
tender  years.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  expe- 
diency of  this  statute,  it  cannot  be  afl5rmed  to  be,  beyond 
question,  in  palpable  conflict  with  the  constitution.  Nor, 
in  view  of  the  methods  employed  to  stamp  out  the  disease 


776  DUB  PBOCESS  OP  LAW  §  5U 

of  smallpox,  can  anyone  confidently  assert  that  the  means 
employed  by  the  state  to  that  end  have  no  real  or  substan- 
tial relation  to  the  protection  of  the  public  health  and  the 
public  safety.  Such  an  assertion  would  not  be  consistent 
with  the  experience  of  this  and  other  countries  whose 
authorities  have  dealt  with  the  disease  of  smallpox.  And 
the  principle  of  vaccination  as  a  means  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  smallpox  has  been  enforced  in  many  states  by 
statutes  making  vaccination  a  condition  of  their  right  to 
enter  or  remain  in  public  schools.  Jacobson  v.  Massar 
chusetts,  197  U.  S.  11. 

§  512.  Hmiicipal  ordinance  against  visiting  barricaded 
gambling  rooms.  Discrimination  against  Chinese  per- 
sons in  the  administration  of  a  municipal  ordinance  mak- 
ing it  unlawful  either  to  exhibit  gambling  implements  in 
a  barred  or  barricaded  house  or  room  or  to  visit  such  a 
house  or  room  where  gambling  instruments  are  exhibited 
is  not  sufSciently  shown  to  enable  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  to  declare  such  ordinance  void,  as  deny- 
ing the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  in  reviewing  the 
refusal  of  a  state  court  to  grant  habeas  corpus  to  one 
convicted  of  a  violation  of  the  ordinance,  by  a  stipulation 
between  the  parties,  recited  in  the  order  discharging  the 
writ,  that  the  facts  are  as  set  forth  in  the  petition,  where 
such  petition  merely  avers  that  the  ordinance  is  enforced 
^'solely  and  exclusively  against  persons  of  the  Chinese 
race,  and  not  otherwise,"  and  contains  no  allegation  that 
the  conditions  and  practices  against  which  the  ordinance 
is  directed  do  not  exist  exclusively  among  the  Chinese, 
or  that  there  are  other  offenders,  as  to  whom  it  is  not 
enforced.  There  is  a  misunderstanding  among  counsel 
as  to  what  was  intended  by  the  stipulation.  Counsel  for 
defendant  in  error  contends  it  was  not  intended  to  admit 
a  discrimination  in  the  administration  of  the  law,  but  to 
submit  the  case  on  such  facts  as  would  test  and  cause  a 
review  of  Be  Ah  Cheung,  136  CaL  678,  69  Pac.  492.  This 
seems  to  be  supported  by  the  order  of  the  court  taken  as 


1 514  POLICE  POWBB  777 

a  whole.  The  case  at  bar  is  concerned  with  gambling,  to 
suppress  which  is  recognized  as  a  proper  exercise  of 
governmental  authority,  and  one  which  would  have  no 
incentive  in  race  or  class  prejudice  or  administration, in 
race  or  class  discrimination.  The  case  does  not  come 
within  the  ruUng  in  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  373. 
No  latitude  of  intention  should  be  indulged  in  a  case  like 
this.  There  should  be  certainty  to  every  inteni  The  law 
is  attacked  on  the  ground  that  it  is  made  discriminatory 
by  the  manner  of  its  administration.  This  is  a  matter  of 
proof,  and  the  proof  is  not  satisfactory.  Ah  Sin  v.  Witt- 
man,  198  U.  S.  500. 

§513.  Municipal  regulation  of  milk  business.  Singling 
out  the  milk  business  in  the  city  of  New  York  as  a  proper 
subject  for  regulation  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws,  where  all  milk  dealers  in  the  city  are  equally 
affected  by  such  regulation.  It  is  primarily  for  the  state 
to  select  the  kinds  of  business  which  shall  be  the  subject 
of  regulation,  and  if  the  business  affected  is  one  which 
may  be  properly  the  subject  of  such  legislation,  it  is  no 
valid  objection  that  similar  regulations  are  not  imposed 
upon  other  businesses  of  a  different  kind.  New  York 
ex  rel.  Lieberman  v.  Van  De  Carr,  199  U.  S.  552. 


§  514.  Laws  to  prevent  dealing  in  futures.  The  North 
Carolina  statute  enacted  to  prevent  dealing  in  futures, 
which  makes  an  exemption  in  favor  of  those  engaged  in 
the  business  of  manufacturing  or  wholesale  merchan- 
dising, does  not  make  that  act  void,  as  repugnant  to  the 
equal  protection  of  the  law  clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  where  the  section  in  question  is  interpreted 
by  the  highest  state  court  simply  as  a  declaration  that  the 
courts  shall  not  so  construe  the  act  as  to  prevent  persons 
thus  engaged  from  buying  and  selling  for  future  delivery 
the  necessary  commodities  required  in  their  ordinary 
business,  and  not  as  relieving  them  from  the  operation  of 
the  provisions  of  the  1st  section  of  that  act  prohibiting 


778  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  S  514 

the  carrying  on  of  a  '* bucket  shop*'  business,  or  from  the 
prohibitions  of  the  state  law  concerning  the  making  of 
gambling  contracts  for  future  delivery.  The  alleged 
repugnancy  of  the  law  to  the  equality  clause  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment  is  sought  to  be  sustained  upon  two 
grounds :  first,  because  those  engaged  in  manufacturing 
or  wholesale  merchandising  are  permitted  to  commit 
without  offense  acts  which  the  law  makes  criminal  when 
done  by  any  other  person ;  and  secondly,  because,  even  if 
the  section  does  not  effect  such  a  result,  it  nevertheless 
operates  to  produce  an  unlawful  inequality,  since  it  cre- 
ates a  prima  facie  presumptioja  of  guUt  from  the  proof  of 
certain  acts  as  against  all  persons  but  those  engaged  in 
manufacturing  and  wholesale  merchandising.  As  to  the 
first  proposition  the  state  supreme  court  expressly  held 
the  statute  did  not  create  such  discrimination.  The  stat- 
ute does  not  prevent  all  purchases  or  sales  for  future 
delivery,  but  only  such  dealings  as  are  in  the  nature  of 
gambling  or  wagering  contracts.  As  to  the  second  propo- 
sition, it  is  not  open  on  this  record.  The  state  courts 
held  that  a  state  might  under  the  police  power,  without 
violating  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  create  presump- 
tions of  guilt  as  to  some  classes  of  persons  which  would 
not  be  applicable  to  the  same  acts  when  done  by  other 
classes.  The  defendant  was  indicted  for  carrying  on  a 
*' bucket  shop*'  business.  The  legislature  had  unques- 
tionable power  to  make  such  business  indictable.  If  part 
of  the  law  were  void,  because  not  applying  to  all  pur- 
chases upon  ''margin,**  this  would  in  no  wise  invalidate 
that  part  of  the  statute  which  forbids  carrying  on  the 
business  of  running  a ' '  bucket  shop.  *  *  Gatewood  v.  North 
Carolina,  203  U.  S.  531. 

§  515.  Restrictions  on  sheep  grazing.  The  Idaho  stat- 
ute under  which  damages  may  be  recovered  from  one  who 
permits  his  sheep  to  graze  on  the  public  domain  within 
two  miles  of  a  dwelling  house,  is  not  an  arbitrary  and 
unreasonable  discrimination  against  the  sheep  industry, 


§  516  POLICE  POWER  779 

prohibited  by  the  guaranty  in  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  police 
power  of  the  state  is  not  confined  to  the  suppression  of 
what  is  offensive,  disorderly  or  unsanitary.  It  extends 
to  so  dealing  with  the  conditions  which  exist  in  the  state 
as  to  bring  out  of  them  the  greatest  welfare  of  its  people. 
The  statute  complained  of  was  a  deliberate  enactment, 
made  necessary  by  and  addressed  to  the  conditions  which 
existed.  It  was  not  the  purpose  oi*  effect  of  the  statute 
to  make  discriminations  between  sheep  owners  and  own- 
ers  of  other  kinds  of  stock,  but  to  secure  equality  of 
enjoyment  and  use  of  the  public  domain  to  settlers  and 
cattle  owners  with  sheep  owners.  To  hold  the  statute 
imconstitutional  would,  it  was  said,  make  of  the  lands  of 
the  state  ' '  one  immense  sheep  pasture. "  It  is  a  matter 
of  common  observation  and  experience  that  sheep  eat 
the  herbage  closer  to  the  ground  than  cattle  or  horses 
do,  and  their  hoofs  being  sharp,  they  devastate  and  kill 
the  growing  vegetation  wherever  they  graze  for  any  con- 
siderable time.  The  industry  of  raising  cattle  in  the  state 
had  been  largely  destroyed  by  large  bands  of  sheep. 
Cattle  will  not  graze  nor  thrive  upon  lands  where  sheep 
are  grazed  to  any  great  extent.  The  conditions  which 
existed  in  the  state  vindicate  the  statute  from  the  accusa- 
tion of  being  an  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  discrimina- 
tion against  the  sheep  industry.  Bacon  v.  Waller,  204 
U.  S.  311. 


§  516.  Regulating  admission  to  places  of  public  amuse- 
ment. The  lessee  in  possession  of  a  race  course  is  not 
denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  by  a  state  Statute 
under  which  it  is  compelled  to  recognize  its  own  tickets 
of  admission  in  the  hands  of  persons  who  are  not,  at  the 
time,  under  the  influence  of  liquor,  or  boisterous  in  con- 
duct, or  of  lewd  and  immoral  character,  where  the  statute 
is  applicable  alike  to  all  persons,  corporations, .  or  asso- 
ciations conducting  places  of  public  amusement  or  enter- 
tainment.   The  contention  that  the  statute  is  unconstitu- 


780  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  516 

tional  as  denyii)^  to  the  defendant  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  is  without  merit,  for  the  statute  is  applicable 
alike  to  alL  The  statute  is  only  a  regulation  of  places  of 
public  entertainment  and  amusement  upon  terms  of  equal 
and  exact  justice  to  everyone  holding  a  ticket  It  is  only 
a  regulation^  as  applied  to  the  plaintiff  in  error,  com- 
pelling it  to  perform  its  own  contract  as  evidenced  by 
tickets  of  admission  and  sold  to  parties  wishing  to  attend 
its  race  course.  •  .  .  It  is  neither  an  arbitrary  exer- 
tion of  the  state 's  inherited  or  governmental  power,  nor 
a  violation  of  any  right  secured  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  Western  Turf  Association  v.  Qreenberg, 
204  U.  S.  359. 

§517.  State  protection  of  the  national  flag.  The  excep- 
tion in  favor  of  newspapers,  periodicals,  books,  pam- 
phlets, etc.,  on  which  shall  be  printed  representations 
of  the  national  flag,  disconnected  from  any  advertising, 
which  is  made  by  Nebraska  act  of  July  3, 1903,  prohibit- 
ing the  use  of  representations  of  the  national  flag  for 
advertising  articles  of  merchandise,  does  not  make  such 
statute  repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  as 
denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  These  excep- 
tions, it  is  insisted,  make  an  arbitrary  classification  of 
persons,  which,  in  legal  effect,  denies  to  one  class  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  ...  It  is  well  settled 
that,  when  prescribing  a  rule  of  conduct  for  persons  or 
corporations,  a  state  may,  consistently  with  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  make  a  classification  among  its  people 
based  ''upon  some  reasonable  ground, — some  difference 
which  bears  a  just  and  proper  relation  to  the  attempted 
classification,  and  is  not  a  mere  arbitrary  selection.''  No 
one  can  be  said  to  have  the  right,  secured  by  the  Consti- 
tution, to  use  the  country's  flag  merely  for  purposes  of 
advertising  articles  of  merchandise.  If  everyone  was 
entitled  to  use  it  for  such  purposes,  tfien,  perhaps,  the 
state  could  not  discriminate  among  those  who  so  used  it 
It  is  for  the  state  to  say  how  far  it  would  go  by  way  of 


§  518  POLICE  POWER  781 

legislation  for  the  protection  of  the  flag  against  improper 
use, — taking  care,  in  such  legislation,  not  to  make  undue 
discrimination  against  a  part  of  its  people.  All  are  alike 
forbidden  to  use  the  flag  as  an  advertisement.  It  is  easy 
to  see  how  a  representation  of  the  flag  may  be  wholly  dis- 
connected from  an  advertisement,  and  be  used  upon  a 
newspaper,  periodical,  book,  etc.,  in  such  way  as  not  to 
arouse  a  feeling  of  indignation  nor  offend  the  sentiments 
and  feelings  of  those  who  reverence  it  The  classification 
made  by  the  state  cannot  be  regarded  as  unreasonable  or 
arbitrary,  or  as  bringing  the  statute  under  condemna- 
tion as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  It  can- 
not be  said  the  statute  has  no  reasonable  connection  with 
the  common  good  and  was  not  promotive  of  the  peace, 
order,  and  well-being  of  the  people.  Halter  v.  Nebraska, 
205  U.  S.  34. 

§518.  Lnposing  responsibility  on  mine  owners  for 
defaults  of  certain  employees.  The  selection  of  mine 
owners  as  a  class  upon  which  to  impose  responsibility  for 
the  defaults  of  certain  employees  who  are  required  by  the 
Illinois  mining  act  of  April  18,  1899,  to  be  selected  from 
those  holding  licenses  issued  by  the  state  mining  boards 
created  by  that  act,  does  not  render  such  legislation 
repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  as  denying  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  object  of  the  act  is  to 
protect  the  health  and  persons  of  men  employed  in  the 
mines  of  the  state  while  they  are  in  the  mines.  The  act 
requires  the  exerdse  of  greater  precaution  and  care  on 
the  part  of  the  mine  owner  for  the  safety  of  the  miners 
than  was  required  by  the  common  law.  To  hold  that  he 
may  shift  his  liability  to  an  employee  who  holds  the  cer- 
tificate of  the  state  mining  board  is  to  lessen  his  responsi- 
bility and  defeat  in  great  part  the  beneficent  purposes  of 
the  act.  To  hold  him  liable  for  a  wilful  violation  of  the 
act,  or  a  wilful  failure  to  comply  with  its  provisions  on 
the  part  of  his  exandner  or  manager,  is  to  give  force  and 
effect  to  the  statute  according  to  the  intent  of  its  makers, 


782  DUE  PSOCESS  OF  LAW  §  518 

and  to  prolong  the  lives  and  promote  the  safety  and  well- 
being  of  the  miners.  Duties  are  imposed  upon  the  mine 
owner,  customarily  performed  for  him  by  certain  employ- 
ees,— duties  which  substantially  relate  to  the  famishing 
of  a  reasonably  safe  place  for  the  worionen,  .  •  .  The 
subject  was  one  peculiarly  within  the  police  power  of  the 
state.  Even  although  the  liability  imposed  upon  the  mine 
owner  to  respond  in  damages  for  the  wilful  failure  of  the 
mine  manager  and  mine  examiner  to  comply  with  the 
requirements  of  the  statute  was  not  in  harmony  with  the 
principles  of  the  common  law  applicable  to  the  relation 
of  master  and  servant,  it  being  competent  for  the  state 
to  change  and  modify  those  principles  in  accord  with  its 
conceptions  of  public  policy,  it  cannot  be  inferred  that  the 
selection  of  mine  owners  as  a  class  upon  which  to  impose 
the  liability  in  question  was  purely  arbitrary  and  with- 
out reason.  This  view  adequately  disposes  of  the  conten- 
tion that,  by  the  statute,  the  mine  owner  was  denied  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Wilmington  Star  Mining 
Co.  V.  Fulton,  205  U.  S.  60. 

§  519.  State  regulation  of  the  sale  of  patented  articles. 
The  Arkansas  statute  exempting  merchants  and  dealers 
who  sell  patented  things  in  the  usual  course  of  business 
from  the  requirement  that  a  negotiable  instrument  taken 
in  payment  of  a  patented  article  show  on  its  face  for 
what  it  was  given  or  be  void,  does  not  render  such  statute 
repugnant  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  as  denying  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  validity  of  this  statute 
of  Arkansas  was  afiSrmed  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  Woods 
V.  Carl,  203  U.  S.  358,  and  the  validity  of  statutes  of  a 
somewhat  similar  nature  was  affirmed  in  Allen  v.  Biley, 
203  U.  S.  347.  It  was  sought  to  avoid  the  authority  of 
the  decision  of  the  court  on  the  statute  by  asserting  that 
nothing  was  therein  decided  except  the  validity  of  the 
Ist  section  of  the  act,  and  that  the  validity  of  the  act  when 
considered  in  connection  with  the  4th  section  was  not 
argued  or  decided.    The  4th  section  reads  as  follows: 


§  519  POLICE  POWER  783 

**This  act  shall  not  apply  to  merchants  and  dealers  who 
sell  patented  things  in  the  usual  course  of  business. ' '  The 
exception  contained  in  this  section  does  not  render  the 
statute  invalid.  The  plain  purpose  of  the  whole  statute 
is  to  create  and  enforce  a  proper  police  regulation.  Its 
passage  showed  that  the  legislature  was  of  opinion  that 
fraud  and  imposition  were  frequent  in  the  sale  of  prop- 
erty of-  this  nature,  except  in  the  cases  mentioned  in  §  4, 
and  that  the  temptations  to  false  representations  in 
regard  to  the  virtues  and  value  of  the  article  sold  were 
also  frequently  yielded  to.  When  the  sale  of  the  article 
was  effected  by  such  representations,  and  a  note  given 
for  the  amount  of  the  sale,  a  transfer  of  the  note  to  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  before  its  maturity  pre- 
vented the  vendee  from  showing  the  fraud  by  which  the 
sale  had  been  accomplished.  In  order  to  reach  such  a 
transaction  and  to  permit  the  vendee  to  show  the  fraud, 
the  statute  was  passed.  It  was  doubtless  thought  that 
merchants  and  dealers,  as  mentioned  in  the  statute,  while 
dealing  with  the  patented  things  in  the  manner  stated, 
would  not  be  so  likely  to  make  representations  or  engage 
in  a  fraud  to  effect  a  sale,  as  those  covered  by  the  statute. 
The  various  itinerant  venders  of  patented  articles,  whose 
fluency  of  speech  and  carelessness  regarding  the  truth  of 
their  representations  might  almost  be  said  to  have  become 
proverbial,  were,  of  course^  in  the  mind  of  the  legislature, 
and  were  included  in  this  legislation.  Cases  may  be  imag- 
ined where  this  general  classification  separating  mer- 
chants and  dealers  from  the  rest  of  the  people  might  be 
regarded  as  not  suflSciently  comprehensive.  It  is  because 
such  imaginary  and  unforeseen  cases  are  so  rare  and 
exceptional  as  to  have  been  overlooked  that  the  general 
classification  ought  not  to  be  rendered  invalid.  In  such 
case  there  is  really  no  substantial  denial  of  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  within  the  meaning  of  the  amendment. 
A  legislature  ought  not  to  be  required  to  provide  for 
every  imaginable  and  exceptional  case  at  the  risk  of  hav- 
ing its  legislation  declared  void,  so  long  as  there  is  no 


784  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  519 

substantial  and  fair  ground  to  say  that  the  statute  makes 
an  unreasonable  and  unfounded  general  classification^ 
and  thereby  denies  to  any  person  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws.  In  a  classification  for  govenunental  purposes 
there  cannot  be  an  exact  exclusion  or  inclusion  of  persons 
and  things.  Ozan  Lumber  Co.  v.  Union  County  National 
Bank,  207  U.  S.  25L 

§  520.  Prohibiting  diverting  water  beyond  state.    The 
New  Jersey  statute  imder  which  a  riparian  owner  mar 
be  prevented  from  diverting  the  waters  of  a  stream  of  the 
state  into  any  other  state,  for  use  therein,  denies  neither 
due  process  of  law  nor  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
It  is  recognized  that  the  state,  as  quasi-sovereign  and 
representing  the  interests  of  the  pubUc,  has  a  standing  in 
court  to  protect  the  atmosphere,  the  water,  and  the  for- 
ests within  its  territory,  irrespective  of  the  assent  or 
dissent  of  the  private  owners  of  the  land  most  inmiedi- 
ately  concerned.    Few  public  interests  are  more  obvious, 
indisputable,  and  independent  of  particular  theory  than 
the  interest  of  the  public  of  a  state  to  maintain  the  rivers 
that  are  wholly  within  it  substantially  imdiminished, 
except  by  such  drafts  upon  them  as  the  guardian  of  the 
public  welfare  may  permit  for  the  purpose  of  turning 
them  to  a  more  perfect  use.    .    .    .    The  private  prop- 
erty of  riparian  owners  cannot  have  deeper  roots  than 
the  public  interest.    It  is  quite  beyond  any  rational  view 
of  riparian  rights,  that  an  agreement,  of  no  matter  what 
private  owners,  could  sanction  the  diversion  of  an  impor- 
tant stream  outside  the  boundaries  of  the  state  in  which 
it  flows.    The  private  right  to  appropriate  is  subject  not 
only  to  the  rights  of  the  lower  owners,  but  to  the  initial 
limitation  that  it  may  not  substantially  diminish  one  of 
the  great  foundations  of  public  welfare  and  health.  What 
the  state  has  it  may  keep  and  give  no  one  a  reason  for  its 
will.    Hudson  County  Water  Co.  v.  McCarter,  209  U.  S. 
349. 


§  521  POLICE  POWER  785 

§  52L  Regulating  sales  in  bulk.  The  Connecticut  stat- 
ute avoiding  as  against  creditors,  sales  by  retail  dealers 
of  their  entire  stock  at  a  single  transaction,  and  not  in 
the  regular  course  of  business,  unless  notice  of  the  inten- 
tion to  make  such  sale  be  recorded  seven  days  before  its 
consummation,  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws,  but  is  a  valid  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the 
state.  A  state  has  the  right  under  the  police  power  to 
regulate  the  manner  of  disposing  of  a  stock  in  trade  out- 
side of  the  regular  course  of  business,  by  methods  which 
if  uncontrolled  are  often  resorted  to  for  the  consumma- 
tion of  fraud,  to  the  injury  of  innocent  creditors.  A 
retail  dealer  who  owes  no  debts  may  lawfully  sell  his 
entire  stock  without  giving  the  required  notice.  One  who 
is  indebted  may  make  a  valid  sale  without  such  notice,  by 
paying  his  debts,  even  after  the  sale  is  made.  Insolvent 
and  fraudulent  vendors  are  those  who  will  be  chiefly 
affected  by  the  act,  and  it  is  for  the  protection  of  credi- 
tors against  sales  by  them  of  their  entire  stock  at  a  single 
transaction,  and  not  in  the  regular  course  of  business,  that 
its  provisions  are  aimed.  It  is  of  course  possible  that  an 
honest  and  solvent  retail  dealer  might,  in  consequence  of 
the  required  notice  before  the  sale,  lose  an  opportunity  of 
selling  his  business,  or  suffer  some  loss  from  the  delay  of 
a  sale,  occasioned  by  the  giving  of  such  notice.  But  a 
*  *  possible  application  to  extreme  cases ' '  is  not  the  test  of 
the  reasonableness  of  public  rules  and  regulations. 
Because  the  conditions  apply  only  to  retail  dealers,  it  is 
urged  that  the  necessary  effect  of  the  statute  is,  as  to  such 
dealers,  to  give  rise  to  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws.  The  contention  is  without  merit.  The  court 
below,  in  its  opinion,  pointed  out  that  the  statute  did  not 
cause  sales  which  were  made  without  compliance  with  its 
requirements  to  be  absolutely  void,  but  made  them  simply 
voidable,  at  the  instance  of  those  who  were  creditors  at 
the  time  the  sales  were  made.  The  unsoundness  of  the 
contention  is  additionally  shown  by  the  number  of  cases 
in  state  courts  of  last  resort,  sustaining  statutes  of  a 

Due  Process — ^50 


786  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  521 

similar  nature.  Twenty  states^  as  well  as  the  Federal 
government  in  the  District  of  Columbia^  have  similar 
statutes,  some  with  more  stringent  provisions,  and  all 
aimed  at  the  suppression  of  an  evil  that  is  thus  shown  to 
be  almost  universal.  As  the  statute  makes  a  classificar 
tion  based  upon  a  reasonable  distinction,  and  one  which 
has  been  generally  applied  in  the  exertion  of  the  police 
power  over  the  subject,  there  is  no  foundation  for  the 
proposition  that  the  result  of  the  enforcement  of  the  stat- 
ute will  be  to  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
Lemieux  v.  Young,  211  U.  S.  489. 


§522.  Prahibiting  drumming  on  carriers'  premise. 

The  Arkansas  act  could  single  out  hotels,  lodging  houses, 
eating  houses,  bath  houses,  physicians,  masseurs,  sur- 
geons, or  other  medical  practitioners,  as  the  business  and 
professions  to  which  should  be  made  applicable  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute  forbidding  the  drunumng  or  solicita- 
tion of  business  or  patronage  on  railway  trains  and  prem- 
ises of  common  carriers,  without  making  such  statute 
invalid,  as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  the 
business  and  professions  mentioned.  The  state  supreme 
court  in  passing  on  the  case  said :  ' '  The  legislature,  in 
framing  this  statute,  met  a  condition  which  existed,  and 
not  an  imaginary  or  improbable  one.  The  class  of  drum- 
mers or  solicitors  mentioned  in  the  act  are  doubtless  the 
only  ones  who  ply  their  vocation  to  any  extent  on  railroad 
trains.  It  is  rare  that  the  commercial  drunmier  finds 
opportunity  to  meet  customers  and  solicit  trade  on  trains, 
therefore  the  lawmakers  deemed  it  unnecessary  to  legis- 
late against  an  occasional  act  of  that  kind."  Williams 
V.  Arkansas,  217  U.  S.  79. 

§523.  Regulating  sale  of  explosives.  The  exception  in 
favor  of  existing  contracts,  contained  in  the  Kansas  stat- 
ute making  it  criminal  to  sell  or  deliver  black  powder  for 
use  in  any  coal  mines  in  the  state  except  in  original  sealed 
packages  containing  12  ^^  pounds  of  powder,  does  not 


§  525  POLICE  POWBB  787 

make  such  statute  repugnant  to  the  Federal  Constitution, 
as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  statute  is  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  coal 
mining  operations,  and  if  it  may  be  said  that  whatever 
danger  can  come  from  packages  of  powder  will  come 
from  them  regardless  of  the  date  of  the  contract  under 
which  they  may  be  delivered,  there  are  nevertheless  other 
considerations  to  be  taken  into  account.  The  statute  is 
criminal.  A  retrospective  operation  of  it  was  to  be 
avoided, — ^might,  indeed,  be  illegal  At  any  rate,  it  was 
a  matter  properly  to  be  considered  by  the  legislature  in 
distinguishing  between  contracts  made  before  the  pas- 
sage of  the  law  and  those  made  after  its  passage.  The 
former  might  not  be  numerous,  their  evil  would  be  tempo- 
rary ;  and  certainly  legislation  which  makes  acts  criminal 
which  are  done  after  they  are  forbidden,  and  assigns  no 
penalties  to  acts  done  in  pursuance  of  obligations  legally 
incurred,  is  not  arbitrary  classification,  and  a  classifica- 
tion which  is  not  arbitrary  is  not  repugnant  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States.  Williams  v.  Walsh,  222 
U.  S.  415. 


§524  Prohibiting  billiard  or  pool  rooms.  A  municipal 
ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping  of  billiard  or  pool 
table3  for  hire  or  publia  use  does  not  deny  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  because  hotel  keepers  are  permitted  to 
maintain  a  billiard  or  pool  room  in  which  their  regular 
and  registered  guests  may  play.  Ordinances  prohibiting 
the  keeping  of  billiard  halls  have  many  times  been  sus- 
tained by  the  courts.  If  there  is  no  reasonable  basis  for 
making  a  distinction,  as  is  here  done,  between  hotels  with 
twenty-five  rooms,  and  those  with  twenty-four  rooms  or 
less,  the  plaintiff  in  error  was  not  in  a  position  to  com- 
plain, because  not  being  the  owner  of  a  hotel  of  the 
smaller  sort,  he  did  not  suffer  from  the  alleged  dis- 
crimination.   Murphy  v.  California,  225  U.  S.  623. 

§  525.  Regulation  of  junk  dealers.  A  New  York  stat- 
ute does  not  deny  to  junk  dealers  the  equal  protection  of 


788  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  525 

the  laws,  which  law  as  construed  by  the  highest  court  of 
the  state,  makes  it  a  criminal  offense  for  a  dealer  in  or 
collector  of  junk,  metals,  or  secondhand  materials,  to  buy 
or  receive  any  stolen  wire,  cable,  copper,  lead,  solder, 
iron  or  brass  used  by  or  belonging  to  a  railroad,  tele- 
phone, telegraph,  gas,  or  electric  light  company,  without 
making  diligent  inquiry  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
whether  the  person  selling  or  delivering  it  has  a  legal 
right  to  do  so.  The  argument  that  the  classification  in 
this  case  is  arbitrary,  because  pladng  junk  dealers  in  a 
class  by  themselves,  needs  no  answer  beyond  a  reference 
to  the  well-known  fact,  alluded  to  by  the  New  York  court 
of  appeals  in  its  opinion,  that  junk  dealers  provide  an 
important  market  for  stolen  merchandise  of  the  kinds 
mentioned,  and  that  because  of  their  experience  they  are 
peculiarly  fitted  to  detect  whether  property  offered  is 
stolen.  The  state  court  said  as  follows:  ''The  legisla- 
ture is  presumed  to  have  been  familiar  with  current  his- 
tory and  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  which  show  that 
property  of  a  certain  kind,  such  as  copper,  brass,  iron, 
etc.,  is  frequently  stolen  from  railroad,  telegraph,  and 
similar  corporations,  which  cannot  adequately  protect  it 
because  it  is  scattered  through  the  country  along  exten- 
sive lines  of  transportation  or  communication,  and  which 
is  exposed  to  view  and  caption  by  the  evil-minded,  who 
find  their  best  market  in  the  shops  of  certain  junk 
dealers. ''  This  expression  is  sufficient  defense  to  any 
criticism  based  upon  alleged  illogical  and  arbitrary  dis- 
tinctions against  junk  dealers.  Rosenthal  v.  New  York, 
226  U.  S.  260. 

§526.  Requiring  connection  with  sewer  vytstem.    An 

ordinance  adopted  under  legislative  authority  by  an 
inland  town  containing  less  than  6,000  inhabitants,  by 
which  the  owners  of  property  abutting  upon  any  street 
along  which  sewer  mains  had  been  laid  were  required  to 
install  water  closets  in  their  houses,  and  connect  the  same 
with  the  main  sewer  pipe  within  thirty  days  of  the  pas- 


§  527  POLICE  POWER  789 

sage  of  the  ordinance,  under  penalty  of  fine  and  imprison- 
ment for  noncompjiiancey  is  a  valid  exercise  of  the  police 
power,  and  does  not,  although*  affording  no  notice  or 
opportunity  to  be  heard,  deny  either  due  process  of  law 
or  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  It  is  the  commonest 
exercise  of  the  police  power  of  a  state  or  city  to  provide 
for  a  system  of  sewers,  and  to  compel  property  owners 
to  connect  therewith.  And  this  duty  may  be  enforced  by 
criminal  penalties.  It  may  be  that  an  arbitrary  exercise 
of  the  power  could  be  restrained,  but  it  would  have  to  be 
palpably  so  to  justify  a  court  with  interfering  with  so 
salutary  a  power  and  one  so  necessary  to  the  public 
health.   Hutchinson  v.  Valdosta,  227  U.  S.  303. 

§527.  Milk  ordinance  requiring  tuberculin  test  for 
dairy  cattle.  Milk  drawn  from  cows  outside  the  city  is 
not  unconstitutionally  discriminated  against  by  a  munici- 
pal ordinance  prohibiting  its  shipment  into  the  city  unless 
the  cows  shall  first  have  been  subjected  to  the  tuberculin 
test  and  an  ofScial  certificate  of  their  freedom  from 
tuberculosis  or  other  contagious  diseases  filed  with  the 
health  ofiScer,  while  the  regulations  relative  to  cows 
within  the  city  forbid  the  sale  of  milk  from  sick  or  dis- 
eased cows,  and  contemplate  inspection  by  the  health 
ofiScer,  and  the  application  by  him  of  any  known  test  to 
determine  whether  the  animal  inspected  is  afflicted  with 
tuberculosis,  and  the  removal  by  him  of  any  diseased 
animal  to  a  place  where  it  will  not  spread  infection. 
Inspection  and  care,  therefore,  can  be  applied  to  the  ani- 
mals within  the  city,  and  also  to  the  milk  drawn  from 
such  animals.  It  cannot  be  applied  to  animals  kept  Out- 
side of  the  city.  It  could  only  be  applied  to  the  milk 
drawn  from  such  animals,  which  would  be  practically 
impossible.  This  is  a  sufficient  basis  for  separate  legis- 
lation relating  to  milk  shipped  into  the  city.  The  differ- 
ent situations  of  the  animals  require  different  regula- 
tions. The  requirements  are  not  unreasonable ;  they  are 
properly  adaptive  to  the  conditions.    They  are  not  dis- 


790  DUE  PBOCESS  OP  LAW  §  527 

criminatory ;  they  have  proper  relation  to  the  pnrpose  to 
be  accomplished.  That  purpose  and  the  necessity  for  it 
cannot  be  questioned  in  the  court  of  last  resort.  Adams  v. 
Milwaukee,  228  U.  S.  572. 

§528.  Ooardinj^  open  shafts.  The  Illinois  statute 
requiring  the  indosure  by  a  substantial  barrier  of  shafts 
or  openings  in  the  floors  of  a  building  in  the  course  of 
construction  through  which  is  operated  an  elevator  or 
hoist  for  the  purpose  of  lifting  materials  to  be  used  in 
such  construction,  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  because  the  act  does  not  require  other  unen- 
closed openings  in  the  buildings  or  outside  hoists  to  be 
guarded,  nor  because  it  distinguishes  in  §  6  between  build- 
ings in  cities  and  buildings  in  villages,  and  makes  a  dis- 
tinction in  §  §  2  and  3  between  houses  used  exclusively  for 
private  residences  and  other  structures  as  to  the  strength 
of  the  supports  for  joists.  It  was  contended  that  danger 
was  the  test,  and  the  classification  of  the  statute,  not 
having  relation  to  its  purpose,  was  arbitrary.  There 
may  be  degrees  of  danger  and  a  difference  in  degree  may 
justify  classification.  The  question  is  one  for  the  legis- 
lature to  decide,  informed,  no  doubt,  by  experience,  of 
conditions,  and  fortified  by  presumptions  of  legality,  and 
confirmed,  besides,  by  the  opinion  of  the  supreme  court 
of  the  state.  The  legislation  cannot  be  judged  by  abstract 
or  theoretical  comparisons.  .  .  .  It  must  be  presumed 
that  it  was  induced  by  actual  experience.  The  legislative 
judgment  even  if  disputable  or  crude  is  not  subject  to 
judicial  review.  The  crudities  or  even  injustice  of  state 
laws  are  not  redressed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
The  law  may  not  be  the  best  that  can  be  drawn,  and  might 
have  been  more  complete  if  it  had  gone  further,  but  plain- 
tiff in  error  is  not  discriminated  against.  All  in  its  situa- 
tion are  treated  alike.  What  the  statute  enjoins,  it 
enjoins  not  only  of  plaintiff  in  error,  but  of  all  similarly 
situated.  What  it  does  not  enjoin,  plaintiff  in  error  can- 
not complain  of.    The  distinction  made  by  other  sections 


§  530  POLICE  POWER  791 

are  within  the  power  of  classification  which  the  legisla- 
ture possesses.  Chicago  Dock  &  Canal  Co.  v.  Fraley, 
228  U.  S.  680. 

§  529.  Regulating  entries  in  coal  mines.  The  Indiana 
statute  singling  out  bituminous  coal  mines  and  omitting 
block  coal  mines  when  requiring  entries  to  be  made  of 
not  less  than  a  prescribed  width  does  not  deny  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
requires  laws  of  like  application  to  all  similarly  situated ; 
but  in  selecting  some  classes  and  leaving  out  others  the 
legislature,  while  it  keeps  within  this  principle,  is,  and 
may  be,  allowed  wide  discretion.  ...  It  is  the  prov- 
ince of  the  legislature  to  make  the  laws,  and  of  the  courts 
to  enforce  them.  The  legislature  is  permitted  to  make  a 
reasonable  classification,  and  before  a  court  can  inter- 
fere with  the  exercise  of  its  judgment,  it  must  be  able  to 
say  * '  that  there  is  no  fair  reason  for  the  law  that  would 
not  require  with  equal  force  its  extension  to  others  whom 
it  leaves  untouched.  * '  There  is  a  great  difference  in  the 
production  and  number  of  mines  between  what  are  called 
the  block  veins  of  coal  and  the  bituminous  veins  of  coal 
existing  in  the  state,  and  also  the  different  depths  at 
which  coal  is  mined  in  the  strata  of  block  and  bituminous 
coal.  Eeviewing  all  these  differences,  with  the  relative 
output,  relative  number  of  mines  and  persons  employed, 
the  courts  were  unable  to  say  that  the  application  of.  the 
law  to  bituminous  coal  mines  and  the  omission  of  block 
coal  mines  was  such  arbitrary  discrimination  as  to  render 
the  act  unconstitutional.  The  supreme  court  of  the  state 
said,  *'to  doubt  its  constitutionality  is  to  resolve  in  favor 
of  its  constitutionality.  * '  Barrett  v.  Indiana,  229  U.  S.  26. 

§530.  Municipal  water  supply.  A  charter  amend- 
ment dealing  with  the  municipal  construction,  acquisi- 
tion, maintenance,  and  operation  of  a  water  plant,  with 
special  reference  to  the  acquisition  of  the  existing  pri- 
vately owned  waterworks  system,  does  not  deny  the  equal 


792  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  530 

protection  of  the  laws  to  the  waterworks  company  whose 
franchise  has  expired,  because  it  leaves  all  other  public 
utilities  to  be  dealt  with  under  general  charter  provisions 
and  cuts  off  all  opportunity  to  obtain  future  franchises  to 
occupy  and  use  the  city  streets  for  the  purpose  of  supply- 
ing water  to  the  city  and  its  inhabitants^  while  leaving  full 
opportunity  to  obtain  such  franchises  for  other  purposes, 
such  as  supplying  light,  heat,  power,  transportation,  or 
telephone  service.  The  equal  protection  clause  is  directed 
against  arbitrary  discrimination ;  that  is,  such  as  is  with- 
out any  reasonable  basis.  It  does  not  prevent  a  city  from 
applying  the  scheme  of  municipal  ownership  and  main- 
tenance to  one  public  utility  without  applying  it  to  all; 
nor  does  it  prevent  a  city,  owning  and  maintaining  a 
municipal  water  plant,  from  refusing  to  grant  franchises 
which  will  bring  privately  owned  plants  into  competition 
with  its  own.  There  is  nothing  unequal  in  this  in  the 
sense  of  that  clause.  Denver  v.  New  York  Trust  Co., 
229  U.  S.  123. 

§  631.  Employment  of  minors  in  hasardous  occnpationB. 

The  Dlinois  statute  prohibiting  the  employment  of  chil- 
dren under  the  age  of  sixteen  years  in  hazardous  occupa- 
tions, does  not  contravene  the  guaranty  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The 
classification  established  by  the  statute  was  clearly  within 
the  legislative  power.  Sturges  &  Bum  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Bean- 
champ,  231  U.  S.  320. 


§532.  Prohibiting  possession  of  firearms  by  alien.    The 

legislative  assumption  that  unnaturalized  foreign-bom 
residents  are  peculiarly  a  source  of  danger  to  wild  life 
cannot  be  said  to  be  so  unwarranted  as  to  invalidate, 
as  denying  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  the  provisions 
of  Pennsylvania  Laws  1909,  No.  261,  p.  466,  prohibiting 
the  killing  of  any  wild  bird  or  animal  by  any  such  foreign- 
born  person  except  in  defense  of  person  or  property,  and 
**to  that  end**  making  it  unlawful  for  any  such  person  to 


§  533  POLICE  POWER  793 

own  or  be  possessed  of  a  shotgun  or  rifle.  If  the  lawful 
object  of  the  statute,  the  protection  of  wild  life,  warrants 
the  discrimination  against  the  alien,  the  means  adopted 
for  making  it  effective  also  might  be  adopted.  The  pos- 
session of  rifles  and  shotguns  is  not  necessary  for  other 
purposes  not  within  the  statute.  It  is  so  peculiarly  appro- 
priated to  the  forbidden  use  that  if  such  a  use  may  be 
denied  to  this  class,  the  possession  of  the  instruments 
desired  chiefly  for  that  end  also  may  be.  The  prohibition 
does  not  extend  to  weapons  such  as  pistols  that  may  be 
supposed  to  be  needed  occasionally  for  self-defense.  The 
discrimination  undoubtedly  presents  a  more  diflScult  ques- 
tion. A  state  may  classify  with  reference  to  the  evil  to 
be  prevented,  and  if  the  class  discriminated  against  is  or 
reasonably  might  be  considered  to  define  those  from 
whom  the  evil  mainly  is  to  be  feared,  it  properly  may  be 
picked  out.  A  lack  of  abstract  synunetry  does  not  mat- 
ter. The  question  is  a  practical  one,  dependent  upon 
experience.  It  is  not  enough  to  invalidate  the  law  that 
others  may  do  the  same  thing  and  go  unpunished,  if,  as  a 
ipatter  of  fact,  it  is  found  that  the  danger  is  character- 
istic of  the  class  named.  That  is  a  question  of  local  expe- 
rience, and  a  reviewing  court  should  be  very  slow  to 
declare  that  the  state  legislature  was  wrong  in  its  facts. 
The  Supreme  Court  declared  it  had  no  such  knowledge 
of  local  conditions  as  to  be  able  to  say  that  it  was  mani- 
festly wrong.    Patsone  v.  Pennsylvania,  232  U.  S.  134. 

§533.  Prohibiting  sales  by  itinerant  vendors.  The 
Louisiana  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  by  itinerant  ven- 
dors of  **any  drug,  nostrum,  ointment,  or  application  of 
any  kind  intended  for  the  treatment  of  disease  or  injury,'* 
does  not  violate  the  equal  protection  or  due  process  of 
law  clauses  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  although  the 
sale  of  such  articles  by  other  persons  is  permitted.  That 
the  state  had  authority  to  pass  such  statute  is  made  mani- 
fest by  the  previous  ruling  in  Emert  v.  Missouri,  156  U.  S. 
296,  and  the  authorities  there  cited.   The  power  which  the 


794  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  533 

state  government  possessed  to  classify  and  regulate  itin- 
erant vendors  or  peddlers,  exerted  in  the  statute  here  con- 
sideredy  is  cumulatively  sustained  and  made,  if  possible, 
more  obviously  lawful  by  the  fact  that  the  regulation  in 
question  deals  with  the  selling  by  itinerant  vendors  or 
peddlers  of  drugs  or  medicinal  compounds, — objects 
plainly  within  the  power  of  government  to  regulate. 
Baocus  V.  Louisiana,  232  TJ.  S.  334. 

§  634.  Prescription.  The  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
is  not  denied  by  confining  to  Spanish  and  Mexican  grants 
the  provisions  of  New  Mexico  Comp.  Laws,  1865,  chap.  73, 
§  1  Comp.  Laws,  1897,  §  2937,  under  which  ten  years'  pos- 
session of  land  under  a  deed  purporting  to  convey  a  fee 
simple  gives  title  in  fee  to  the  quantity  of  land  specified 
in  the  deed  if,  during  the  ten  years,  no  claim  by  suit  in 
law  or  equity,  effectually  prosecuted,  shall  have  been  set 
up.  There  very  well  may  have  been  grounds  for  the  dis- 
crimination in  favor  of  Spanish  and  Mexican  grants  in  the 
history  of  those  grants  and  the  greater  probability  of  an 
attempt  to  revive  stale  claims,  as  is  explained  by  the 
supreme  court  of  New  Mexico.  Montoya  v.  Gonzales, 
232  U.  S.  375. 

§  535.  Regulation  of  livery  stables.  A  municipal  ordi- 
nance passed  under  authority  delegated  by  the  legisla- 
ture is  a  state  law  within  the  meaning  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution; and  any  enactment,  from  whatever  source 
originating,  to  which  the  state  gives  the  force  of  law,  is 
a  statute  of  the  state  within  the  meaning  of  the  Judicial 
Code,  §  237,  which  confers  jurisdiction  upon  the  Supreme 
Court.  It  is  clearly  within  the  police  power  of  the  state 
to  regulate  livery  stables,  and  to  that  end  to  declare  that 
in  particular  circumstances  and  in  particular  localities  a 
livery  stable  shall  be  deemed  a  nuisance  in  fact  and  in 
law,  provided  this  power  is  not  exerted  arbitrarily,  or 
with  unjust  discrimination,  so  as  to  infringe  upon  rights 
guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    The  general 


§  536  POLICE  POWEB  795 

subject  of  the  regulation  of  livery  stables,  with  respect 
to  their  location  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are  to  be 
conducted  in  a  thickly  populated  city,  is  well  within  the 
range  of  the  power  of  the  state  to  legislate  for  the  health 
and  general  welfare  of  the  people.  While  such  regula- 
tions are  subject  to  judicial  scrutiny,  yet  a  considerable 
latitude  of  discretion  must  be  accorded  to  the  lawmaking 
power;  and  so  long  as  the  regulation  in  question  is  not 
shown  to  be  clearly  unreasonable  and  arbitrary,  and 
operates  uniformly  upon  all  persons  similarly  situated  in 
the  particular  district,  the  district  itself  not  appearing  to 
have  been  arbitrarily  selected,  it  cannot  be  judicially 
declared  that  there  is  a  deprivation  of  property  without 
due  process  of  law,  or  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment.   Beinman  v.  Little  Bock,  237  U.  S.  171. 

§  536.  Workmen's  compensation  law.  Employers  hav- 
ing five  or  more  employees  are  not  denied  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  because  their  failure  to  comply  with 
the  terms  of  the  Ohio  workmen's  compensation  act 
(1  Page  &  Adams  Anno.  Gen,  Code  (Ohio)  §§1464 
et  seq.)  by  paying  into  a  state  insurance  fund,  thereby 
created,  the  premiums  required  by  that  act,  deprives  them 
in  negligence  suits  of  the  defenses  of  contributory 
negligence,  assumed  risk,  and  the  negligence  of  fellow 
servants,  while  those  employing  four  or  less  employees 
are  still  privileged  to  make  either  or  all  of  these  defenses. 
The  main  argument  against  the  law  was  based  on  the 
alleged  discrimination  between  establishments  employing 
five  and  those  employing  a  less  number  of  employees. 
The  Supreme  Court  has  many  times  affirmed  the  general 
proposition  that  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  in  the  equal  protection  clause  to  take  from 
the  state  the  right  and  power  to  classify  the  subjects  of 
legislation.  It  is  only  when  such  attempted  classification 
is  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  that  the  court  can  declare 
it  beyond  the  legislative  authority.    Lindsley  v.  Natural 


796  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  536 

Carbonic  Gas  Co.,  220  U.  S.  61,  78.  That  a  law  may  work 
hardship  and  ineqnality  is  not  enough.  Many  valid  laws, 
from  the  generality  of  their  application,  necessarily  do 
that,  and  the  legislature  must  be  allowed  a  wide  field  of 
choice  in  determining  the  subject-matter  of  its  laws,  what 
shall  come  within  them,  and  what  shall  be  excluded. 
Classification  of  industries  with  reference  to  police  regu- 
lations have  been  sustained  in  the  Supreme  Court.  Con- 
solidated Coal  Co.  V.  Illinois,  185  U.  S.  203.  In  that  case 
an  inspection  law  of  the  state  was  sustained  which  applied 
only  to  coal  mines  employing  five  or  more  men  at  one 
time.  This  case  was  cited  with  approval  in  McLean  v. 
Arkansas,  211  U.  S.  539,  where  a  law  regulating  the  pay- 
ment of  wages  in  coal  mines  in  Arkansas  was  sustained 
though  made  applicable  only  in  mines  where  not  less  than 
ten  miners  were  employed.  The  state  has  the  right  to 
pass  police  regulations  based  upon  differences  in  num- 
bers, and  the  judgment  of  the  state,  fixing  the  dividing 
line,  if  fairly  and  reasonably  exercised,  makes  the  law. 
The  classification  in  this  case  was  not  of  that  arbitrary 
and  unreasonable  nature  which  denied  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws.   Jeffry  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Blagg,  235  U.  S.  571. 

§  537.  Eight-hour  law  for  women  employed  in  hotels. 

A  California  statute  including  hotels  among  the  specified 
establishments  in  which  women  must  not  be  employed 
more  than  eight  hours  in  one  day,  or  forty-eight  hours  in 
one  week,  does  not  render  the  statute  invalid  as  dis- 
criminatory, although  the  classification  may,  to  some 
extent,  be  based  upon  the  nature  of  the  employer's  busi- 
ness, rather  than  the  character  of  the  employee's  work. 
Exempting  women  employed  in  harvesting,  curing,  can- 
ning, or  drying  any  variety  of  perishable  fruit  or  vegeta- 
ble, from  the  operation  of  the  same  statute  does  not 
render  the  statute  invalid  as  unreasonably  disciimina- 
tory.  The  state  may  forbid  women  employed  in  hotels 
from  working  more  than  eight  hours  in  one  day,  or  forty- 
eight  hours  in  one  week,  without  imposing  a  similar 


S  637  POLICE  POWEB  797 

restriction  upon  those  employed  in  boarding  honses,  lodg- 
ing houses,  etCy  or  upon  such  classes  of  women  employees 
as  stenographers,  clerks,  and  assistants  employed  by 
the  professional  classes,  and  domestic  servants.  The 
Supreme  Court  had  upheld  state  laws  limiting  the  work- 
ing hours  of  women  in  certain  establishments  to  ten  hours 
a  day,  or  fifty-four  hours  a  week,  and  declared  it  was 
manifestly  impossible  in  this  case  to  say  that  the  statute 
of  California  providing  for  an  eight  hour  day,  or  a  maxi- 
mum forty-eight  hours  a  week  took  the  case  out  of  the 
domain  of  legislative  discretion.  Not  that  the  limitation 
of  the  hours  of  labor  for  women  might  not  be  pushed  to 
a  wholly  indefensible  extreme,  but  there  was  no  ground 
for  the  conclusion  here  that  the  limit  of  the  reasonable 
exertion  of  protective  authority  had  been  overstepped. 
As  to  the  objections  to  the  act  urged  upon  the  ground  of 
unreasonable  discrimination,  the  legislature  is  not 
debarred  from  classifying  according  to  general  considera- 
tions and  with  regard  to  prevailing  conditions;  other- 
wise, there  could  be  no  legislative  power  to  classify.  It 
is  always  possible  by  analysis  to  discover  inequalities  as 
to  some  persons  or  things  embraced  within  any  specified 
class.  A  classification  based  simply  on  a  general  descrip- 
tion would  bring  within  the  class  widely  differing  indi- 
vidual instances.  The  legislature  may  take  these  differ- 
ences into  account  and  make  practical  groupings  which 
will  fairly  present  a  separate  class.  Such  groupings  may 
be  made  with  respect  to  the  general  nature  of  the  busi- 
ness in  which  the  work  is  performed,  where  the  distinc- 
tion based  on  the  nature  of  the  business  is  not  an  unrea- 
sonable one.  The  court  was  not  able  to  perceive  any 
reason  why  the  state's  power  to  limit  hours  of  labor 
might  be  upheld  with  respect  to  women  in  a  millinery 
establishment,  and  denied  as  to  chambermaid  in  a  hotel. 
The  objections  to  the  exemptions  of  the  statute  ignore  the 
well-established  principle  that  the  legislature  is  not 
bound,  in  order  to  support  the  constitutional  validity  of 
its  regulation,  to  extend  it  to  all  cases  which  it  might 


798  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  537 

possibly  reach.  If  the  law  hits  an  evil  where  it  is  most 
felt,  it  is  not  to  be  overthrown  because  there  are  other 
instances  to  which  it  mi^ht  have  been  applied.  Miller  v. 
WUson,  236  U.  S.  373. 


§538.  Classification  of  women  employees — ^Honn  of 
labor.    The  state  may  forbid  women  employed  in  hos- 
pitals to  work  more  than  eight  hours  in  one  day,  or  forty- 
eight  hours  in  one  week,  without  imposing  a  similar 
restriction  upon  women  employed  in  similar  employments 
elsewhere.   Exempting  graduate  nurses  in  hospitals  from 
the  operation  of  a  statute  forbidding  the  employment  of 
women  in  certain  specified  establishments  for  more  than 
eight  hours  in  one  day,  or  forty-eight  hours  in  one  week, 
does  not  render  the  statute  invalid  as  unreasonably  dis- 
criminatory, although  such  prohibition  applies  to  student 
nurses  in  hospital  training  schools,  to  experienced  nurses, 
to  graduate  women  pharmacists  and  other  hospital  em- 
ployees,  such  as  matrons,   seamstresses,  bookkeepers, 
office  assistants,  and  those  engaged  in  household  work.  It 
may  be  that  the  difference  in  qualifications  between  a 
graduate  nurse  and  an  ** experienced  nurse*'  is  a  differ- 
ence of  technical  education  only,  but  that  difference  exists 
and  is  not  to  be  brushed  aside.    It  is  one  of  which  the 
legislature  could  take  cognizance.    Not  only  so,  but  as 
such  nurses  act  as  overseers  of  wards  or  assistants  to 
surgeons  and  physicians,  it  would  be  manifestly  proper 
for  the  legislature  to  recognize  an  exigency  with  respect 
to  their  employment  making  it  advisable  to  take  them  out 
of  the  general  prohibition.    With  regard  to  the  graduate 
pharmacist,  while  she  had  "Been  graduated  from  a  course 
of  training  for  her  chosen  vocation,  it  is  a  different  voca- 
tion.   The  work  is  not  the  same.    There  is  no  relation  to 
the  supervision  of  the  wards,  and  putting  mere  matters 
of  expediency  aside,  there  is  no  basis  for  concluding  that 
the  legislature  was  without  power  to  treat  the  difference 
as  a  ground  of  classification.    Bosley  v.  McLaughlin,  236 
U.  S.  385. 


§  539  POLICE  POWER  799 

§  639.  Control  of  liquor  traffic.  An  ordinance  of  the 
city  and  county  of  San  Francisco,  which  regulates  the 
issuing  of  a  license  to  sell  liquors  and  wines  in  quantities 
less  than  one  quart,  and  which  provides  that  any  one  sell- 
ing without  a  license  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor, 
does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  nor 
abridge  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  a  citizen,  con- 
trary to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States.  Plaintiff  in  error  relied  on  Yick 
Wo  V.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356,  but  that  case  was  essen- 
tially different  from  this  case,  the  ordinance  there  held 
invalid  vesting  uncontrolled  discretion  in  the  board  of 
supervisors  with  reference  to  a  business  harmless  in  itself 
and  useful  to  the  community ;  and  the  discretion  appear- 
ing to  have  been  exercised  for  the  express  purpose  of 
depriving  the  petitioner  of  a  privilege  that  was  extended 
to  others.  In  the  present  case  the  business  is  not  one  that 
any  person  is  permitted  to  carry  on  without  a  license,  but 
one  that  may  be  entirely  prohibited  or  subjected  to  such 
restrictions  as  the  governing  authority  of  the  city  may 
prescribe.  Discretionary  authority  was  given  the  police 
commissioners  to  issue  or  refuse  a  license,  and  their 
refusal  to  grant  is  not  a  matter  of  judicial  review,  as  it 
violates  no  principle  of  Federal  law,  it  appearing  that 
such  discretion  was  not  exercised  arbitrarily.  Crowley  v. 
Christensen,  137  U.  S.  86. 

The  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not  designed  to  inter- 
fere with  the  power  of  the  state  to  protect  the  lives,  lib- 
erty, and  property  of  its  citizens,  and  to  protect  their 
health,  morals,  education,  and  good  order.  It  was  not 
intended  to  compel  the  state  to  adopt  an  iron  rule  of 
equality  as  to  taxation,  nor  to  prevent  the  classification 
of  property  for  taxation  at  different  rates,  nor  to  pro- 
hibit legislation  in  that  regard,  special,  whether  in  the 
extent  to  which  it  operates  or  the  objects  sought  to  be 
obtained  by  it.  It  is  enough  that  there  is  no  discrimina- 
tion in  favor  of  one  as  against  another  of  the  same  class. 
When  a  state  statute  affects  all  persons  in  the  state 


800  DUE  PBOCESS  OP  LAW  §  539 

engaged  in  the  sale  of  liquors  in  exactly  the  same  manner 
and  degree,  it  is  not  in  violation  of  the  United  States 
Constitution.  Whether  considered  as  imposing  restric- 
tions upon  the  sale  in  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  of 
the  state,  or  as  levying  taxes  upon  occupations  under 
authority  of  the  legislature  in  that  behalf,  petitioner  was 
not  arbitrarily  deprived  of  his  property  nor  denied  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Repeated  decisions  of  the 
Supreme  Court  have  determined  that  such  legislation  is 
not  in  violation  of  the  Constitution.  Giozza  v.  Tieman, 
148  U.  S.  657. 

The  exemption  of  sales  of  intoxicating  liquors  by  the 
manufacturer  at  the  manufactory  in  quantities  of  1  gallon 
or  more,  which  is  made  by  the  Ohio  law,  known  as  the 
Dow  law,  being  applicable  to  such  sales  made  at  any 
manufactory  in  the  state,  without  regard  to  the  residence, 
citizenship,  or  domicile  of  the  person,  copartnership  or 
corporation  which  owns  the  plant,  does  not  constitute  an 
illegal  discrimination  against  a  foreign  corporation  which 
has  its  manufactory  in  another  state.  The  exemption  is 
not  confined  to  Ohio  corporations  or  copartnerships,  but 
extends  as  well  to  foreign  corporations  whose  place  of 
manufacturing  is  within  the  state  of  Ohio;  and,  likewise, 
the  tax  is  imposed  on  Ohio  corporations  which  manufac- 
ture goods  in  other  states,  and  establish  places  for  their 
sales  within  the  state  of  Ohio,  or  which,  manufacturing 
within  the  state,  establish  places  within  the  state  distinct 
from  the  manufactory,  where  their  liquors  are  sold  and 
delivered.  There  appears  no  intention  on  the  part  of  the 
state  legislature  to  make  a  hostile  discrimination  against 
foreign  corporations.  It  was  for  the  legislature  to  deter- 
mine the  form  of  the  liquor  traffic  that  required  to  be 
regulated  as  a  source  of  evil.  It  in  a  measure  drew  a  line 
between  a  distillery  and  a  brewery  on  one  hand  and  a 
saloon  on  the  other.  There  is  nothing  unreal  in  the  dis- 
tinction. The  judgment  and  opinion  of  the  court  in  effect 
held,  though  there  was  no  specific  reference  thereto,  that 
the  statute  complained  of  did  not  deny  the  equal  proteo- 


§  539  POLICE  POWER  801  * 

tion  of  the  laws.    Eeymann  Brewing  Co.  v.  Brister,  179 
U.  S.  445. 

The  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion is  not  violated  in  the  provisions  of  the  Texas  local 
option  law,  which  makes  a  majority  vote  which  make  the 
prohibition  of  the  liquor  traflSc  in  a  county  or  precinct  a 
bar  to  the  resubmission  of  the  question  to  the  voters  of 
any  political  subdivision  thereof  until  after  prohibition 
has  been  defeated  at  a  subsequent  election  in  the  entire 
county  or  precinct,  while  the  failure  to  carry  prohibition 
in  a  county  ifi  no  bar  to  the  immediate  resubmission  of  the 
question  to  the  voters  of  its  political  subdivisions,  and  the 
corresponding  failure  in  town  or  city  is  no  bar  to  the 
immediate  resubmission  of  the  question  to  the  voters  of 
the  larger  territory.  The  statute  discriminates  in  favor 
of  those  who  vote  for  prohibition;  and  the  argument  is 
that  since  the  legislature  was  not  authorized  to  pass  a  pro- 
hibitory law,  but  was  required  to  leave  the  question  to  a 
local  vote,  it  necessarily  created  a  pure  democracy  to  that 
extent,  and  therefore  could  not  interfere  with  the  equal- 
ity of  the  voters  in  their  right  to  propose  or  carry  a  law. 
Mr.  Justice  Holmes  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court 
said:  **Many  questions  would  have  to  be  answered 
before  so  speculative  a  piece  of  ratiocination  could  be 
followed.  But  we  think  it  may  be  dealt  with  in  short 
space,  so  far  as  is  necessary  to  decide  this  case."  The 
question  is  that  of  the  power  of  the  state  as  a  whole. 
The  state  has  the  power  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicat- 
ing liquors  altogether,  if  it  sees  fit  (Mugler  v.  Kansas, 
123  U.  S.  623),  and  that  being  so  it  has  power  to  prohibit 
it  conditionally.  It  does  not  infringe  the  Constitution  by 
giving  those  in  favor  of  the  sale  a  chance  which  it  might 
have  denied.  The  state  has  absolute  power  over  the  sub- 
ject. It  does  not  abridge  that  power  by  adopting  the  form 
of  reference  to  a  local  vote.  ...  It  may  favor  pro- 
hibition to  just  such  degree  as  it  chooses,  and  to  that  end 
may  let  in  a  local  vote  upon  the  subject  as  much  or  as 
little  as  it  may  please.    There  is  no  such  overmastering 

Due  Proceas — ^51 


802  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  539 

consideration  of  expediency  attaching  everywhere  and 
always  to  the  form  of  voting,  still  less  is  there  any  such 
principle  to  be  drawn  from  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
as  requires  the  two  sides  of  a  vote  on  prohibition  to  be 
treated  with  equal  favor  by  the  state,  the  subject-matter 
of  the  vote  being  wholly  within  the  state's  control 
Bippey  v,  Texas,  193  U.  S.  504. 

A  state  local  option  law  does  not  deny  a  retail  liquor 
dealer  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  because  it  excepts 
from  its  operation  druggists,  manufacturers,  persons 
who  give  away  liquors  in  their  private  dwellings,  and 
railway  corporations  dispensing  liquors  in  dining  and 
buffet  cars  under  state  license.  The  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  is  not  denied  by  a  state  local  option  law  under 
which  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors  may  be  made  a 
crime  in  certain  territory  and  permitted  elsewhere.  An 
objection  that  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  denied 
to  alleged  violators  of  a  state  local  option  law  because 
the  selection  of  the  jurors  for  the  trial  of  such  offenses 
is  not  restricted,  as  in  other  cases,  to  the  district  in  which 
they  are  committed,  cannot  be  raised  in  advance  of  the 
trial.  The  exceptions  to  the  statute  constitute  the 
inequalities  upon  whidi  plaintiff  in  error  attacks  the  law. 
He  is  not  one  of  the  excepted  classes.  He  is  a  retail 
dealer  in  liquor.  If,  between  his  occupation  and  the 
excepted  occupation,  there  is  such  difference  as  to  justify 
a  difference  of  legislation,  necessarily  he  cannot  com- 
plain ;  and  the  Supreme  Court  thought  there  was  a  mani- 
fest difference.  It  was  further  urged  that  to  make  an 
act  a  crime  in  certain  territory  and  permit  it  outside  of 
such  territory  is  to  deny  to  the  citizens  of  the  state  the 
equal  operation  of  the  criminal  laws ;  and  this  he  charges 
against,  and  makes  a  ground  of  objection  to,  the  Ohio 
statute.  This  objection  goes  to  the  power  of  the  state  to 
pass  a  local  option  law;  which  is  not  an  open  question. 
The  Supreme  Court  held  in  Cronin  v.  Adams,  192  TJ.  S. 
108,  affirming  prior  cases,  that  the  sale  of  liquor  by  retail 
may  be  absolutely  prohibited  by  a  state.    That  being  so 


§  540  POLICE  POWER  803 

the  power  to  prohibit  it  conditionally  was  asserted,  and 
the  local  option  law  of  the  state  of  Texas  was  sustained. 
Rippey  V,  Texas,  193  U.  S.  504.  Plaintiff  objects  to  the 
method  of  selection  of  jurors,  provided  by  the  law.  He 
had,  however,  not  yet  been  tried,  and  he  cannot  complain 
on  this  score  until  he  is  made  to  suffer.  Ohio  ex  rel. 
Lloyd  V.  DoUison,  194  U.  S.  445. 

The  Michigan  local  option  law  permitting  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors  by  druggists  for  medicinal,  art,  scien- 
tific, and  mechanical  purposes,  while  forbidding  its  sale 
by  merchants,  does  not  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  The  contention  that  this  is  an  unlawful  discrimina- 
tion is  answered  by  Kidd  v.  Pearson,  128  U.  S.  1 ;  Rippey 
V.  Texas,  193  U.  S.  504 ;  Ohio  ex  rel.  Lloyd  v.  Dollison, 
194  U.  S.  447.  Those  cases  show  that  the  state  may  pro- 
hibit the  sale  of  liquor  absolutely  or  conditionally;  may 
prohibit  the  sale  as  a  beverage,  and  permit  the  sale  for 
medicinal  and  like  purposes ;  that  it  may  prohibit  the  sale 
by  merchants  and  permit  the  sale  by  licensed  druggists. 
Eberle  v.  Michigan,  232  U.  S.  700. 

§  5^.  Imposing  attorneys'  fees  and  penalties.  A  state 
statute  imposing  an  attorney  *s  fee  not  to  exceed  $10,  in 
addition  to  costs,  upon  raUroad  corporations  omitting  to 
pay  certain  claims  within  a  certain  time  after  presenta- 
tion,  which  applies  to  no  other  corporations  or  individuals 
is  unconstitutional  as  denying  to  them  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws.  Corporations  are  citizens  within  the 
provisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment;  and  a  state 
has  no  more  power  to  deny  to  them  the  equal  protection 
of  the  law  than  it  has  to  individual  citizens.  Classifica- 
tion to  relieve  a  law  from  the  charge  of  a  denial  of  equal 
protection  cannot  be  made  arbitrarily,  but  must  be  based 
upon  some  difference  which  bears  a  proper  and  just  rela- 
tion to  the  attempted  classification.  The  single  question 
involved  is  the  constitutionality  of  the  act  allowing  attor- 
neys* fees.  Only  against  railroad  companies  is  such 
exaction  made,  and  only  in  certain  cases.    Considering 


804  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  540 

the  statute  as  a  whole,  it  is  simply  one  imposing  a  penalty 
upon  railroad  corporations  for  a  failure  to  pay  certain 
detiS.  No  individuals  are  thus  punished,  and  no  other 
corporations.  They  are  not  treated  as  other  debtors,  or 
equally  with  other  debtors.  They  do  not  stand  equal 
before  the  law.  They  do  not  receive  its  equal  protection. 
There  might  be  no  impropriety  in  giving  to  every  sno- 
cessf ul  suitor  attorneys '  fees,  but  before  a  distinction  is 
made  between  debtors  and  one  be  punished  for  a  failure 
to  pay  his  debts,  while  another  is  permitted  to  become  in 
like  manner  delinquent  without  any  punishment,  there 
must  be  some  difference  in  the  obligation  to  i>ay,  some 
reason  why  the  duty  of  payment  is  more  imperative  in 
the  one  instance  than  in  the  other.  The  penalty  is  not 
imposed  on  all  corporations,  but  only  upon  railroads. 
Any  classification  of  such  corporations  for  the  imposi- 
tion of  special  duties  peculiar  to  the  business  in  which 
they  are  engaged,  is  a  just  classification,  and  not  one 
within  the  prohibition  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
All  the  cases  sustaining  such  classification  proceed  upon 
the  theory  of  a  special  duty  resting  upon  railroad  cor- 
porations  by  reason  of  the  business  in  which  they  are 
engaged.  It  is  all  done  in  the  exercise  of  the  police  power 
of  the  state.  But  a  mere  statute  to  compel  the  payment 
of  indebtedness  does  not  come  within  the  scope  of  police 
regulations.  The  hazardous  business  of  railroading  car- 
ries with  it  no  special  necessity  for  the  prompt  payment 
of  debts.  Neither  can  the  statute  be  sustained  as  a  proper 
means  of  enforcing  the  payment  of  small  debts  and  pre- 
venting any  unnecessary  litigation  in  respect  to  them, 
because  it  does  not  impose  the  penalty  in  all  cases  where 
the  amount  in  controversy  is  within  the  limit  named  m 
the  statute.  The  statute  arbitrarily  singles  out  one  class 
of  debtors  and  punishes  it  for  a  failure  to  perform  duties 
which  are  equally  obligatory  upon  all  debtors.  Arbitrary 
selection  can  never  be  justified  by  calling  it  classification. 
The  equal  protection  demanded  by  the  Fourteenth 
A^mendment  forbids  this.    In  all  cases  it  must  be  made  to 


§  540  POLICE  POWER  805 

appear  not  only  that  a  classification  has  been  made  bat 
that  it  is  one  based  upon  some  reasonable  ground — ^some 
difference  which  bears  a  just  and  proper  relation  to  the 
attempted  classification — ^and  is  not  a  mere  arbitrary- 
selection.  Tested  by  these  principles  the  statute  in  con- 
troversy cannot  be  sustained.  Gulf,  Colorado  &  Santa 
Fe  R.  Co.  V.  Ellis,  165  U.  S.  150. 

The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  to  life 
or  health  insurance  companies  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Texas  statute  imposing  on  such  companies,  upon  failing 
to  pay  a  loss  within  the  time  specified  in  the  policy,  after 
demand  therefor,  a  liability  to  the  holder  of  the  policy, 
in  addition  to  the  amount  of  the  loss,  of  12  per  cent  dam- 
ages and  reasonable  attorneys'  fees,  although  such  obli- 
gation is  not  imposed  upon  other  classes  of  insurance 
companies  or  associations,  such  as  fire,  marine  and  inland 
insurance  companies,  and  on  mutual  benefit  and  relief 
organizations  doing  business  through  lodges  and  mutual 
relief  benevolent  associations.  The  contention  is  that  the 
classification  is  so  arbitrary,  so  destitute  of  reasonable 
basis,  as  to  be  obnoxious  to  constitutional  objecjtion.  It, 
is  apparent  that  this  particular  liability  amounted  to  one 
of  the  conditions  on  which  life  and  health  insurance  com- 
panies were  permitted  to  do  business  in  Texas,  and  the 
power  of  the  state  in  the  matter  of  the  imposition  of  con- 
ditions on  its  own  and  foreign  corporations  has  been 
repeatedly  recognized  by  the  Supreme  Court.  Even  if 
this  condition  did  not  apply  the  statute  is  not  open  to 
constitutional  objection.  Citing  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.  V.  Matthews,  174  U.  S.  96.  The  ground  for  placing 
life  and  health  insurance  companies  in  a  different  class 
from  fire,  marine  and  inland  insurance  companies  is 
obvious,  and  putting  them  in  a  different  class  from  mutual 
benefit  and  relief  associations  doing  business  through 
lodges,  and  benevolent  associations  of  the  character  men- 
tioned in  the  Texas  statutes,  is  not  an  arbitrary  classifi- 
cation, but  rests  on  sufficient  reason.  The  legislature  evi- 
dently intended  to  distinguish  between  life  and  health 


806  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  540 

insurance  companies  engaged  in  business  for  profit  (and 
it  is  not  necessary  to  refine  as  to  the  distribution  of  such 
profits)  and  lodges  and  associations  of  a  mutual  benefit 
or  benevolent  character,  having  in  mind  also  the  neces- 
sity of  the  prompt  payment  of  the  insurance  money  in 
very  many  cases,  in  order  to  provide  the  means  of  living 
of  which  the  beneficiaries  had  been  deprived  by  the  death 
of  the  insured.  Fidelity  Mutual  Life  Association  v.  Met- 
tier,  185  U.  S.  308. 

The  Texas  statute  authorizing  the  recovery  of  damages 
and  attorneys'  fees  for  failure  by  life  and  health  insur- 
ance companies  to  pay  losses  is  not  repugnant  to  the 
guaranty  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  made  by 
the  Federal  Constitution.  Plaintiff  in  error  urges  the 
unconstitutionality  of  the  Texas  statute  in  such  cases  not- 
withstanding the  decision  of  the  court  in  Fidelity  Mut. 
L.  Ass  *n  V.  Mettler,  185  U.  S.  308.  It  is  insisted,  however, 
that  to  justify  a  recovery  of  the  statutory  damages 
demand  of  payment  of  the  policy  before  suit  was  neces- 
sary, notwithstanding  the  denial  of  liability  by  the  com- 
,pany.  This  contention  was  sustained  by  the  Texas  court, 
but  it  was  held  that  demand  could  be  made  after  suit  and 
set  up  by  an  amended  petition  as  an  original  suit.  The 
Supreme  Court  adopted  this  construction  of  the  state 
statute.    Iowa  Life  Insurance  Co.  v.  Lewis,  187  U.  S.  335. 

The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  insur- 
ance companies  by  the  provisions  of  the  Nebraska  statute 
allowing  a  reasonable  attorney's  fee  to  plaintiff  in  case 
of  the  unsuccessful  defense  by  an  insurance  company  of  a 
suit  on  a  policy  of  insurance  covering  real  property  which 
has  been  totally  destroyed  by  the  causes  insured  against. 
The  statute  is  assailed  as  repugnant  to  the  equality  clause 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  because  it  arbitrarily  sub- 
jects insurance  companies  to  the  liability  for  attorneys' 
fees  when  other  defendants  in  other  classes  of  cases  are 
not  so  subjected ;  that  it  imposes  no  such  burden  on  the 
plaintiff  when  the  suit  is  successfully  defended;  and, 
because   the   statute   arbitrarily  distinguishes   between 


§  540  POLICE  POWER  807 

insurance  policies  on  real  property  and  policies  on  other 
kinds  of  property.  Each  and  all  of  these  objections  must 
rest  on  the  assumption  that  contracts  of  insurance, 
generically  considered,  do  not  possess  such  distinctive 
attributes  as  to  justify  their  classification  separate  from 
other  contracts,  and  that  contracts  of  insurance,  as 
between  themselves,  may  not  be  classified  separately 
depending  upon  the  nature  of  the  insurance,  the  char- 
acter of  the  property  covered,  and  the  extent  of  the  loss 
which  may  have  supervened.  But  the  unsoundness  of 
these  propositions  is  settled  by  the  previous  adjudications 
of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Orient  Insurance  Co.  v.  Daggs, 
172  TJ.  S.  557;  John  Hancock  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Warren,  181  TJ.  S.  73 ;  Fidelity  Mutual  Life  Association 
V.  Mettler,  185  TJ.  S.  308.  In  all  three  of  these  cases  it 
was  held  that  insurance  companies  were  so  distinct  as  to 
justify  legislative  classification  apart  from  other  con- 
tracts or  to  authorize  a  classification  of  insurance  con- 
tracts so  as  to  subject  one  character  of  such  contracts 
when  put  in  one  dass  to  one  rule  and  other  varieties  of 
such  contracts  when  placed  in  another  class  to  a  differ- 
ent rule.  The  only  claimed  distinction  between  the  cases 
previously  decided  and  the  present  one  is  that  in  this  case 
the  classification  is  made  to  depend,  not  alone  upon  the 
general  character  of  the  contract,  but  upon  the  kind  of 
property  insured  and  the  extent  of  the  loss.  But  as  the 
rule  settled  by  the  previous  cases  is  that  contracts  of 
insurance  from  their  very  nature  are  susceptible  of  clas- 
sification, not  only  apart  from  other  contracts,  but  from 
each  other,  it  must  follow,  as  the  lesser  is  included  in  the 
greater,  that  the  character  of  the  property  insured  and 
the  extent  of  the  loss  afford  reasons  for  subclassification. 
It  is  argued,  however,  that  no  reason  could  have  existed 
for  classifying  losses  on  real  estate  separately  from  losses 
on  other  property.  The  distinction  between  real  and  per- 
sonal property  has  in  all  systems  of  law  constantly  given 
rise  to  different  regulations  concerning  such  property. 
The  difference  of  relation  between  the  parties  in  case  of 


808  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  540 

a  total  loss  and  of  a  partial  loss,  needs  but  to  be  suggested. 
In  the  one  case  there  is  ground  for  a  reasonable  differ- 
ence of  opinion  in  adjusting  the  payment  under  the  policy. 
In  the  other  the  amount  being  fixed,  the  question  of  legal 
liability  under  the  policy  would  be,  as  a  rule,  the  only 
matter  for  consideration.  It  is  obvious  that  the  total 
destruction  of  real  estate  covered  by  insurance  neces- 
sarily concerns  the  homes  of  many  of  the  people  of  the 
state.  If,  in  regulating  and  classifying  insurance  con- 
tracts, the  legislature  took  the  foregoing  considerations 
into  view  and  provided  for  them,  it  cannot  be  said  that  in 
doing  so  it  acted  arbitrarily  and  wholly  without  reason. 
Farmers*  and  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dobney,  189  U.  S. 
301. 

§  541.  Attorneys'  fees  to  successful  plaintiff  in  man- 
damus proceedings.  Damages  for  attorneys'  fees  for 
services  rendered  to  the  successful  plaintiff  in  mandamus 
proceedings  may  be  awarded  under  the  authority  of  Kan- 
sas General  Statute,  1909,  §  6319,  without  denying  to  the 
defendant  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  although  no 
reciprocal  right  in  case  of  success  is  given  to  defendant, 
and  no  such  right  is  given  to  litigants  generally.  It  is 
not  open  to  controversy  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
was  not  intended  to  deprive  the  states  of  their  power  to 
establish  and  regulate  judicial  proceedings,  and  that  its 
provisions  therefore  only  restrain  acts  which  so  transcend 
the  limits  of  classification  as  to  cause  them  to  conflict  with 
the  fundamental  conceptions  of  just  and  equal  legislation. 
It  cannot  be  said  that  there  is  not  such  a  distinction  be- 
tween the  extraordinary  proceeding  by  mandamus  and 
the  ordinary  judicial  proceedings  as  affords  a  ground  for 
legislating  differently  concerning  the  two.  A  distinction 
must  obtain  between  that  which  is  ordinary  and  usual 
and  that  which  is  extraordinary  and  unusual,  between  the 
duty  to  perform  a  ministerial  act  concerning  which  there 
is  room  neither  for  the  e^f erdse  of  judgment  nor  discre- 
tion, and  the  right,  on  the  other  hand,  to  bring  into  play 


§  542  POLICE  POWER  809 

judgment  and  discretion  as  prerequisites  to  the  perform- 
ance of  an  act  of  a  different  character,  and  the  distinction 
which  justifies  the  classification  made  by  the  statute  also 
answers  the  argument  that  the  equal  protection  clause 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  is  violated  because  the 
allowance  of  attorneys '  fees  was  not  reciprocal.  Missouri 
Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Larabee,  234  U.  S.  459. 


§542.  Certain  penalties  imposed  on  common  carriers 
for  failure  to  settle  claims.  Common  carriers  are  not 
denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  guaranteed  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  by  the  provisions  of  the  South 
Carolina  statute  requiring  them  to  adjust  and  pay  every 
claim  for  loss  and  damage  to  an  intrastate  shipment 
within  forty  days  after  the  filing  of  a  claim,  under  penalty 
of  $50  for  each  failure  or  refusal,  where  there  can  be  no 
award  of  a  penalty  under  the  statute  unless  there  is  a 
recovery  of  the  full  amount  claimed.  The  power  of  classi- 
fication is  conceded,  but  this  will  not  uphold  one  that  is 
purely  arbitrary.  There  must  be  some  substantial  foun- 
dation and  basis  therefor.  It  is  asserted  that  this  is 
merely  legislation  to  compel  carriers  to  pay  their  debts 
within  a  given  time,  by  an  unreasonable  penalty  for  any 
delay,  while  no  one  else  is  so  punished,  and  that  there  is 
no  excuse  for  such  distinction.  While  the  principles  upon 
which  classifications  may  rightfully  be  made  are  clear  and 
easily  stated,  yet  the  application  of  those  principles  to  the 
different  cases  is  often  attended  with  much  difficulty. 
This  is  not  an  act  leveled  against  corporations  alone,  but 
includes  all  common  carriers.  The  classification  is  based 
solely  upon  the  nature  of  the  business,  that  being  of  a 
public  character.  The  matter  to  be  adjusted  is  one  pecu- 
liarly within  the  knowledge  of  the  carrier.  It  receives 
the  goods  and  has  them  in  its  custody  until  the  car- 
riage is  completed.  It  knows  what  is  received  and  what 
is  delivered.  It  knows  what  injury  was  done  during 
the  shipment,  and  how  it  was  done.  It  may  be  stated  as 
a  general  rule  that  an  act  which  puts  in  one  class  all 


810  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  542 

engaged  in  business  of  a  spedal  and  public  character, 
requires  of  them  the  performance  of  a  duty  which  they 
can  do  better  and  more  quickly  than  others,  and  imposes 
a  not  exorbitant  penalty  for  a  failure  to  perform  that 
duty  within  a  reasonable  time,  cannot  be  adjudged  uncon- 
stitutional as  a  purely  arbitrary  classification.  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Brewer,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court  in  this 
case,  said :  ' '  While  in  this  case  the  penalty  may  be  large 
as  compared  with  the  value  of  the  shipment,  yet  it  must 
be  remembered  that  small  shipments  are  the  ones  which 
especially  need  the  protection  of  penal  statutes  like  this. 
If  a  large  amount  is  in  controversy,  the  claimant  can 
afford  to  litigate.  But  he  cannot  well  do  so  when  there  is 
but  a  trifle  of  a  dollar  or  two  in  dispute,  and  yet  justice 
requires  that  his  claim  be  adjusted  and  paid  with  reason- 
able promptness.  Further,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  purpose  of  this  legislation  is  not  primarily  to  enforce 
the  collection  of  debts,  but  to  compel  the  performance  of 
duties  which  the  carrier  assumes  when  it  enters  upon  the 
discharge  of  its  public  function.  We  know  there  are 
limits  beyond  which  penalties  may  not  go  even  in  cases 
where  classification  is  legitimate ;  but  we  are  not  prepared 
to  hold  that  the  amount  of  penalty  imposed  is  so  great, 
or  the  length  of  time  within  which  the  adjustment  and 
payment  are  to  be  made  is  so  short,  that  the  act  impos- 
ing the  penalty  and  fixing  the  time  is  beyond  the  power 
of  the  state.  *'  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  v.  Seegers,  207 
U.  S.  73. 

The  Mississippi  statute  imposing  a  penalty  of  $25  for 
the  failure  to  settle  a  daim  for  damages  to  an  intrastate 
shipment  betwen  two  points  on  the  carrier's  line  within 
sixty  days  from  the  giving  of  notice  of  the  daim,  where, 
upon  the  trial,  the  actual  damages  were  assessed  at  the 
sum  stated  in  the  notice,  denies  the  carrier  neither  due 
process  of  law  nor  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  As 
applied  by  the  state  court  the  statute  is  repugnant  neither 
to  the  due  process  of  law  nor  equal  protection  clause  of 
the  constitution,  but  on  the  contrary,  merely  provides  a 


§  542  POLICE  POWER  8H 

reasonable  incentive  for  the  prompt  settlement  without 
snity  of  just  demands  of  a  class  admitting  of  special 
legislative  treatment.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  E.  Co.  v.  Jackson 
Vinegar  Co.,  226  U.  S.  217. 

The  Arkansas  statute  singling  out  railway  companies 
and  subjecting  them  to  the  payment  of  double  damages 
and  attorneys '  fees  in  case  of  their  refusal  to  pay  for  the 
killing  of  live  stock  within  thirty  days  after  the  owner 's 
demand,  when  litigants  in  general  are  subject  to  the  same 
burden,  does  not  deprive  the  railway  companies  of  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  This  case  is  distinguished 
from  St.  Louis,  L  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Wynne,  224  U.  S.  354, 
in  that  here  the  prior  demand  was  fully  established  in 
the  suit  following  the  refusal  to  pay.  The  question  was 
determined  in  Seaboard  Air  Line  B.  Co.  v.  Seegers,  207 
U.  S.  73,  and  Yazoo  &  M.  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson  Vinegar 
Co.,  226  U.  S.  217,  sustaining  South  Carolina  and  Missis- 
sippi statutes.  Kansas  City  Southern  B.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
233  U.  S.  325. 

There  is  no  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws, 
contrary  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  in  the  provisions 
of  Texas  Laws,  1909,  p.  93,  for  the  allowance  of  a  reason- 
able attorney's  fee  of  not  over  $20  to  the  successful  plain- 
tiff in  a  suit  in  which  an  attorney  is  actually  employed 
upon  a  claim  not  exceeding  $200,  against  *  *  any  person  or 
corporation  doing  business  in  this  state,  for  personal 
services  rendered,  or  for  labor  done,  or  for  material 
furnished,  or  for  overcharges  on  freight  or  express,  or 
for  any  claim  for  lost  or  damaged  freight,  or  for  stock 
killed  or  injured  by  such  person  or  corporation,  its  agents 
or  employees,*'  where  such  claim  is  not  paid  within  thirty 
days  after  demand,  and  the  recovery  is  for  the  full  amount 
claimed,  since  this  statute  makes  no  classification  of 
debtors,  and  the  kind  of  claims  included  cover  a  wide 
range,  and  do  not  appear  to  have  been  grouped  for  the 
purpose  of  bearing  against  any  class  or  classes  of  citizens 
or  corporations.  This  is  a  police  regulation  designed  to 
promote  the  prompt  payment  of  small  but  well-founded 


812  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  542 

daimsi  and  to  discourage  unnecessary  litigation  in  respect 
to  them,  and  being  of  general  application  is  not  repugnant 
to  either  the  *' equal  protection *'  or  the  **due  process" 
clauses  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  The  mere  fact 
that  by  the  statute  attorney  fees  are  allowed  to  successful 
plaintiffs  only,  does  not  involve  a  denial  of  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws,  if  the  classification  is  otherwise  reason- 
able. Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ey.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Cade,  233 
U.  S.  642;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  By.  Co.  v.  Harris,  234  U.  S. 
412. 

§  643.  Excessiye  penalties.  A  penalty  of  from  $300  to 
$600,  imposed  by  the  so-called  Ohio  **run  of  mine,**  or 
** anti-screen**  law  (104  Ohio  Laws,  181),  under  which 
coal  miners,  whose  compensation  is  fixed  on  the  basis  of 
ton  or  other  weight,  must  be  paid  according  to  the  total 
of  all  the  coal  contained  in  the  mine  car  in  which  it  has 
been  removed  from  the  mine,  provided  that  no  greater 
percentage  of  dirt  and  impurities  shaU  be  contained 
therein  than  that  ascertained  to  be  unavoidable  by  the, 
state  industrial  commission,  whose  orders  are  subject  to 
review,  is  not  so  great  as  to  render  the  statute  open  to 
the  objection  that  it  denies  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  by  preventing  a  resort  to  the  courts 
to  test  the  constitutionality  of  the  law.  Rail  &  River  Coal 
Co.  V.  Yaple,  236  U.  S.  338. 

§  544.  Statute  regulating  charges.  The  New  York  act 
of  1888,  as  to  elevators,  is  constitutional,  as  an  exercise 
of  the  police  power  of  the  state;  it  is  not  a  regulation 
of  interstate  commerce,  and  does  not  deprive  the  elevator 
owners  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  law 
regulated  the  fees  for  elevating  and  discharging  grain 
by  elevators.  It  was  contended  that  the  statute  violates 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  because  it  takes  from  the 
elevator  owners  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  in  that 
it  applies  only  to  places  which  have  130,000  population  or 


§  544  POUCE  POWER  813 

more,  and  does  not  apply  to  places  which  have  less  than 
130,000,  and  thus  operates  against  elevator  owners  in 
the  larger  cities  of  the  state.  The  law  operates  equally 
on  all  elevator  owners  in  places  having  130,000  population 
or  more ;  and  they  are  not  deprived  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment  Budd  V.  State  of  New  York,  143  U.  S,  517. 

The  law  of  North  Dakota  regulating  grain  warehouses 
and  the  weighing  and  handling  of  grain,  is  not  unconstitu- 
tional because  it  is  applicable  to  the  entire  state,  which 
is  agricultural  and  is  not  restricted  to  large  cities.  The 
legislature  of  North  Dakota,  in  regulating  by  a  general 
law,  the  business  and  charges  of  public  warehousemen 
engaged  in  elevating  and  storing  grain  for  profit,  does 
not  deny  to  plaintiff  in  error  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  nor  deprive  him  of  his  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  It  was  contended  that  the  findings  in  Munn  v. 
niinois,  94  U.  S.  113,  and  in  Budd  v.  New  York,  143  U.  S. 
617,  were  based  upon  facts  so  different  from  this  case  as 
to  call  for  an  opposite  conclusion  of  law.  The  operation 
of  the  Illinois  and  New  York  statutes  is  restricted  to  the 
city  of  Chicago  in  the  one  case,  and  to  the  cities  of  Buf- 
falo, New  York  and  Brooklyn  in  the  other,  while  the  North 
Dakota  statute  is  applicable  to  the  territory  of  the  entire 
state,  but  such  considerations  are  obviously  addressed  to 
the  legislative  discretion.  They  are  matters  for  those  who 
make  and  not  for  those  who  interpret  the  laws.  When  it 
is  once  admitted,  as  it  was  admitted  in  this  case,  that  it 
is  competent  for  the  legislative  power  to  control  the  busi- 
ness of  elevating  and  storing  grain,  whether  carried  on 
by  individuals  or  associations,  in  cities  of  one  size  and  in 
some  circumstances,  it  follows  that  such  power  may  be 
legally  exerted  over  the  same  business  when  carried  on 
in  smaller  cities  and  in  other  circumstances.  That  might 
not  be  wise  legislation  which  provided  the  same  regula- 
tions in  every  case,  but  it  is  not  for  the  court  to  revise 
the  wisdom  or  expediency  of  the  law.  Brass  v.  State  of 
North  Dakota,  153  U.  S.  391. 


814  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  544 

A  turnpike  company  is  not  deprived  of  the  eqnal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  merely  because  it  is  not  allowed  to 
charge  as  high  rates  as  are  allowed  to  other  companies 
differently  located,  but  it  can  only  demand  the  right  to 
receive  such  compensation  as  will  be  just  both  to  itself 
and  to  the  public  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
The  circumstances  of  each  turnpike  company  must  deter- 
mine the  rates  of  toll  to  be  properly  allowed  for  its  use. 
Justice  to  the  public  and  to  stockholders  may  require,  in 
respect  of  one  road^  rates  different  from  those  prescribed 
for  other  roads.  Bates  on  one  r(^d  may  be  reasonable 
and  just  to  all  concerned,  while  the  same  rates  would  be 
exorbitant  on  another  road.  The  utmost  that  any  corpo- 
ration, operating  a  public  highway,  can  rightfully  demand 
at  the  hands  of  the  legislature  when  exerting  its  general 
powers  is  that  it  receives  what,  under  all  the  circtun- 
stances,  is  such  compensation  for  the  use  of  its  property 
as  will  be  just  both  to  it  and  to  the  public  If  the  rates 
prescribed  for  the  defendant  in  this  case  were  manifestly 
much  lower — ^taking  them  as  a  whole — that  the  legislature 
has,  by  general  law,  prescribed  for  other  corporations 
whose  circumstances  and  location  are  not  unlike  those 
of  the  defendant,  a  different  question  would  be  presented. 
No  question  of  that  kind  is  properly  presented  by  the 
pleadings,  and  there  is  no  ground  for  holding  that  the  act 
in  question  denies  to  the  defendant  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws.  Covington  &  L.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Sandford, 
164  U.  S.  578. 

§  545.  Statute  limiting  charges  of  stock-yards  compa- 
nies. A  stock-yards  company  is  denied  the  equal  protec- 
tion of  the  laws  by  the  Kansas  statute  which  limits  the 
amount  of  the  charges  to  be  made  by  that  corporation, 
without  limiting  the  charges  to  be  made  by  other  similar 
corporations  doing  a  smaller  amount  of  business,  and 
without  any  reference  to  the  character  or  value  of  the 
services  rendered,  although  the  statute  is  general  in  its 
terms  and  is  made  applicable  to  any  corporation  doing 


S  545  POMCB  POWER  815 

business  of  a  certain  amonnt,  and  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  hj  virtue  of  the  great  amount  of  business  done 
by- the  corporation  affected  by  the  statute  it  may  make  a 
reasonable  income,  since  the  statute  makes  a  direct  and 
positive  discrimination  between  persons  engaged  in  the 
same  class  of  business,  and  bases  it  simply  upon  the  quan- 
tity of  business  which  each  may  do.  Tested  by  the  rule 
laid  down  in  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113,  the  state  has 
the  power  to  make  reasonable  regulation  of  the  charges 
rendered  by  the  stock-yards  company.  While  not  a  com- 
mon carrier,  nor  yet  engaged  in  any  distinctly  public 
employment,,  it  is  doing  a  work  in  which  the  public  has 
an  interest,  and  therefore  must  be  considered  #ts  subject 
to  governmental  regulation.  The  question  is  to  what  ex- 
tent may  this  regulation  go,  and  is  it  the  same  in  both 
these  classes  of  cases.  After  citing  a  number  of  cases, 
the  Court  concluded:  ^^As  to  those  individuals  and  cor- 
porations who  have  devoted  their  property  to  a  use  in 
which  the  public  has  an  interest,  although  not  engaged 
in  a  work  of  a  confessedly  public  character,  there  has 
been  no  further  ruling  than  that  the  state  may  prescribe 
and  enforce  reasonable  charges.  What  shall  be  the  test 
of  reasonableness  in  those  charges  is  absolutely  undis- 
closed. *'  But  such  regulations  shall  not  operate  to  de- 
prive one  of  the  ordinary  privileges  of  others  engaged  in 
mercantile  business.  The  state's  regulations  of  his 
charges  is  not  to  be  measured  by  the  aggregate  of  his 
profits,  determined  by  the  volume  of  business,  but  by 
the  question  whether  any  particular  charge  to  an  indi- 
vidual dealing  with  him  is,  considering  the  service  ren- 
dered, an  unreasonable  exaction.  Not  what  he  makes  out 
of  his  volume  of  business,  but  whether  in  each  particular 
transaction  the  charge  is  an  unreasonable  exaction  for 
the  services  rendered.  The  legislature  may  not  deny  him 
reasonable  compensation  for  each  service  rendered,  and 
may  not  interfere  simply  because  out  of  the  multitude  of 
his  transactions  the  amount  of  his  profits  is  large.  The 
question  is  always,  not.  What  does  he  make  as  the  aggre- 


816  DUE  PROCESS  OP  LATV  §  545 

gate  of  his  profits  1  but,  What  is  the  value  of  the  services 
which  he  renders  to  the  one  seeking  and  receiving  such 
services?  The  statute  provides  cumulative  penalties  for 
violation  of  its  terms  which  become  so  enormous  that  a 
single  day's  violation  of  the  statute  might  exhaust  the 
entire  value  of  the  property  of  the  company  in  satisfac- 
tion of  the  penalties  incurred.  In  this  situation  of  the 
case,  the  Court  said,  we  are  brought  face  to  face  with  a 
question  which  legislation  of  other  states  is  presenting. 
Do  the  laws  secure  to  an  individual  an  equal  protection 
when  he  is  allowed  to  come  into  court  and  make  his  claim 
or  defense  subject  to  the  condition  that,  upon  a  failure 
to  make  good  that  claim  or  dejFense,  the  penalty  for  such 
failure  either  appropriates  all  his  property,  or  subjects 
him  to  extravagant  and  unreasonable  loss.  Clearly  such 
a  law  is  tantamount  to  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws.  Notwithstanding  the  legislative  right  of  classi- 
fication of  industries  and  occupations,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  guaranteed, 
and  that  such  equal  protection  is  denied  when  upon  one 
of  two  parties  engaged  in  the  same  kind  of  business  and 
under  the  same  conditions  burdens  are  cast  which  are  not 
cast  upon  the  other.  If  once  the  door  is  opened  to  the 
affirmance  of  the  proposition  that  a  state  may  regulate 
one  who  does  much  business,  while  not  regulating  another 
who  does  the  same  but  less  business,  then  all  significance 
in  the  guaranty  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is 
lost.  This  statute  is  a  positive  and  direct  discrimination 
between  persons  engaged  in  the  same  class  of  business, 
and  based  simply  upon  the  quantity  of  business  which  each 
may  do.  If  such  legislation  does  not  deny  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  laws  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  what  legislation 
would.  Cotting  v.  Kansas  City  Stock  Yard  Co.  et  al.,  183 
U.  S.  79. 

§546.  Municipal  regulation  of  teleph(me  rates.  Mu- 
nicipal regulation  of  the  rates  which  a  telephone  company 
may  charge,  on  a  lower  scale  than  those  prescribed  for  i 


§  546s  POLICE  POWER  817 

competitor,  does  not  necessarily  deny  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws,  since  such  competitor  may  bring  its  patrons 
into  communication  with  a  larger  number  of  persons, 
dwelling  in  a  more  widely-extended  territory,  and  may 
render  much  more  valuable  service.  Appellant  contends 
that  it  was  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  be- 
cause, contemporaneously  with  the  fixing  of  rates  for  it, 
different  rates  were  fixed  for  another  telephone  company 
doing  business  within  the  city.  Whether  the  rates  pre- 
scribed  by  the  ordinance  discriminated  against  the  com- 
plainant and  deprived  it  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws,  is  not  made  clear.  Whether  the  two  companies  oper- 
ated in  the  same  territory,  or  afforded  equal  facilities  for 
communication,  or  rendered  the  same  services,  does  not 
appear.  For  aught  that  appears  a  just  ground  for  classi- 
fication may  have  existed.  Every  presumption  should  be 
indulged  in  favor  of  the  constitutionality  of  the  legisla- 
tion. It  is  a  well-settled  rule  of  constitutional  exposition 
that,  if  a  statute  may  or  may  not  be,  according  to  circum- 
stances, within  the  limits  of  constitutional  authority,  the 
existence  of  the  circumstances  necessary  to  support  it  will 
be  presumed.  Home  Teleph.  &  Teleg.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles, 
211 U.  S.  265. 

§  546a.  Regulating  private  detectives.  Municipal  ordi- 
nances which  subject  the  business  of  a  private  detective 
or  detective  agency  to  police  supervision,  and  provide 
that  no  person  shall  carry  on  such  business  without  first 
being  recommended  by  the  board  of  police  commissioners 
and  taking  the  oath  of  a  city  detective  and  giving  a  bond, 
do  not  offend  against  the  due  process  of  law  and  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  clauses  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment. This  case  is  easily  within  the  principle  of  the  police 
power  of  the  state.  It  would  be  very  commonplace  to  say 
that  the  exercise  of  police  is  one  of  the  necessary  activi- 
ties of  government,  and  all  that  pertains  to  it  may  be  sub- 
jected to  surveillance  as  a  precaution  against  perversion. 
This  ordinance  does  no  more.    It  provides  in  effect  that 

Due  Process — 52 


818  DUB  PROCESS  OP  LAW  §  546a 

all  who  engage  in  the  business  of  a  private  detective  or 
detective  agency  shall  have  the  sanction  of  the  state,  have 
the  stamp  of  the  state  as  to  fitness  and  character,  take  an 
oath  to  the  state  for  faithful  execution  of  its  dnties,  and 
give  a  bond  for  their  sanction.  This  the  state  may  do 
against  its  own  citizens  and  may  do  against  a  citizen  of 
any  other  state.   Lehon  v.  Atlanta,  242  U.  S.  53. 

§5461).  R^fulating  percentage  of  butter  fat  in  ice 
cream.  State  statutes  which  prohibit  the  sale  as  ^4ce 
cream"  of  a  product  containing  less  than  a  fixed  percent- 
age of  butter  fat  do  not  take  property  without  due  process 
of  law  nor  deny  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws — ^the  par- 
ticular percentages  fixed  not  being  so  exacting  as  to  be  in 
themselves  unreasonable, — although  the  ice  cream  of  com- 
merce is  not  iced  or  frozen  cream,  but  is  a  frozen  confec- 
tion, varying  in  composition,  and  under  some  formulas 
may  be  made  without  either  cream  or  milk.  The  legisla- 
ture may  well  have  found  in  these  facts  persuasive  evi- 
dence that  the  public  welfare  required  the  prohibition 
enacted.  The  facts  show  that,  in  the  absence  of  legisla- 
tive regulation,  the  ordinary  purchaser  at  retail  does  not 
and  cannot  know  exactly  wh^t  he  is  getting  when  he  pur- 
chases ice  cream.  He  presumably  believes  that  cream  or 
at  least  rich  milk  is  among  the  important  ingredients ;  and 
he  may  make  his  purchase  with  a  knowledge  that  butter 
fat  is  the  principal  food  value  in  cream  or  milk.  Laws 
designed  to  prevent  persons  from  being  misled  in  respect 
to  the  weight,  measurement,  quality,  or  ingredients  of  an 
article  of  general  consumption  are  a  common  exercise  of 
the  police  power.  The  legislature  defines  the  standard 
article  or  fixes  some  of  its  characteristics ;  and  it  may  con- 
clude that  fraud  or  mistake  can  be  effectively  prevented 
only  by  prohibiting  the  sale  of  the  article  under  the  trade- 
name, if  it  fails  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  standard 
set.  Laws  prohibiting  the  sale  of  milk  or  cream  contain- 
ing less  than  fixed  percentages  of  butter  fat  present  a 
familiar  instance  of  such  legislation.   The  Supreme  Court 


§  546c  POLICE  POWER  819 

has  frequently  sustained  the  validity  of  similar  prohibi- 
tions. Hutchinson  Ice  Cream  Co.  v.  Iowa,  Crowl  v.  Penn- 
sylvania, 242  U.  S.  153. 

§546c.  State  regulation  of  motor  vehicles.  Nonresi- 
dent automobile  owners  are  not  denied  rights  under  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  be- 
cause the  New  Jersey  Automobile  Law  (N.  J.  Laws  1908, 
p.  613)  in  addition  to  providing  for  the  registration  of 
automobiles  aiid  the  licensing  of  drivers,  requires  a  non- 
resident owner  to  appoint  the  secretary  of  state  as  his 
agent  upon  whom  process  may  be  served  **in  any  action 
or  legal  proceeding  caused  by  the  operation  of  his  regis- 
tered motor  vehicle  within  this  state  against  such 
owner.  *'  The  absence  from  the  law  of  any  reciprocal  pro- 
vision by  which  nonresidents  whose  cars  are  duly  regis- 
tered in  their  home  state  are  given  for  a  limited  period 
free  use  of  the  highways  in  return  for  similar  privileges 
granted  to  residents  of  New  Jersey,  does  not  involve  an 
unconstitutional  discrimination  against  nonresidents 
where  the  annual  fees  prescribed  are  not  so  large  as  to  be 
unreasonable,  and  wh^e  any  resident  owner  would  be 
subjected  to  the  full  annual  charge  for  the  use  of  the  high- 
ways for  any  period,  however  brief.  The  fact  that  the 
fees  collected  under  the  law  exceed  the  amount  required 
to  defray  the  expense  of  maintaining  the  regulation  and 
inspection  department,  which  excess,  under  the  law,  is  to 
be  applied  to  the  maintenance  of  improved  highways, 
does  not  render  the  law  invalid  as  to  nonresidents,  as  vio- 
lating the  provisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
Kane  v.  New  Jersey,  242  U.  S.  160. 


CHAPTER  XXm 

PBOCEDUBE  IN  STATE  COUBTS 

§  547.  Different  courts  in  the  same  state.  The  power 
of  the  state  over  procedure  in  its  own  courts  was  not 
intended  to  be  restricted  or  interfered  with  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  and  the  Supreme  Court  has  uniformly 
so  declared  when  the  question  has  been  presented  to  it 
The  equality  clause  prohibiting  any  state  from  denjring 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  contemplates  the  protec- 
tion of  persons  against  unjust  discrimination  by  a  state ; 
it  has  no  reference  to  territorial  or  municipal  arrange- 
ments made  for  different  portions  of  state.  It  was  not 
intended  to  prevent  a  state  from  arranging  and  parcel- 
ing out  the  jurisdiction  of  its  several  courts  as  it  sees  fit, 
either  as  to  territorial  limits,  subject-matter  or  amount, 
or  the  finality  of  their  several  judgments  or  decrees. 
Each  state  has  full  power  to  make  political  subdivisions 
of  its  territory  for  municipal  purposes  and  to  regulate 
their  government,  including  the  constitution  of  courts, 
and  the  extent  of  their  jurisdiction.  A  state  may,  if  it 
pleases,  establish  one  system  of  law  in  one  portion  of  its 
territory,  and  another  system  in  another;  provided, 
always,  that  it  does  not  encroach  ui>on  the  proper  juris- 
diction of  the  United  States,  and  does  not  abridge  the 
privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
nor  deprive  any  person  of  his  rights  without  due  process 
of  law,  nor  deny  to  any  person  within  its  jurisdiction  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  in  the  same  district.  By  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  Missouri,  a  court  called  the  Si 
Louis  Court  of  Appeals  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  cer- 
tain cases,  of  all  appeals  from  the  drcuit  courts  in  St. 
Louis  and  some  adjoining  counties;  and  the  Supreme 

820  ' 


§  548  PEOCEbURE  IN  STATE  COURTS  821 

Court  has  jnrisdiotion  of  appeals  in  like  cases  from  the 
circuit  courts  of  the  remaining  counties  of  the  state.  This 
adjustment  of  appellate  jurisdiction  is  not  forbidden  by 
anything  contained  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  The 
last  restriction,  as  to  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  is 
not  violated  by  any  diversity  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
several  courts  as  to  subject-matter,  amount  or  finality  of 
decision,  if  all  persons  within  the  territorial  limits  of 
their  respective  jurisdictions  have  an  equal  right,  in  like 
cases  and  under  like  circumstances,  to  resort  to  them  for 
redress.  It  means  that  no  person  onslass  of  persons  shall 
be  denied  the  same  protection  of  the  laws  which  is  enjoyed 
by  other  persons  or  other  classes  in  the  same  place  or 
linder  like  circumstances.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment 
does  not  profess  to  secure  to  all  persons  in  the  United 
States  the  benefit  of  the  same  laws  and  the  same  remedies. 
Each  state  prescribes  its  own  modes  of  judicial  proceed- 
ing. If  diversities  of  laws  and  judicial  proceedings  may 
exist  in  the  several  states  without  violating  the  equality 
clause  of  the  Fourteenth. Amendment,  there  is  no  valid 
reason  why  there  may  not  be  such  diversities  in  different 
parts  of  the  same  state.   Bowman  v.  Lewis.  101  U.  S.  22. 

§548.  Tax  titles.  The  grantee  in  a  tax  deed  cannot 
claim  to  have  been  denied  due  process  of  law  or  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  by  the  Michigan  statute  requiring 
the  giving  of  notice  to  the  original  owners  in  order  to  cut 
off  the  right  of  redemption,  on  the  theory  that,  by  the 
proceedings  under  the  tax  laws,  the  state  acquired  an  ab- 
solute title,  whidi  it  conveyed  by  the  tax  deed,  and  that  the 
statute  operated  to  devest  such  title  and  transfer  it  to 
another,  where  the  highest  state  court  holds  that,  what- 
ever title  the  state  held,  it  sold  only  an  interest  which  was 
subject  to  redemption.  It  is  contended  that,  by  the  pro- 
ceedings under  the  tax  laws,  the  state  acquired  the  abso- 
lute title  to  the  lands,  and  conveyed  that  title  to  plaintiff 
in  error,  and  that  the  aim  of  the  statute  is  to  devest  such 
title  and  transfer  it  to  another;  and  therefore  it  is  further 


822  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  548 

cont^ided  that  property  is  taken  without  dne  process  o! 
law,  and  that  the  laws  are  nneqnal  in  their  operation.  If 
the  title  was  taken  subject  to  redemption,  it  cannot  be 
said  to  be  devested  without  due  process  of  law  if  redemp- 
tion was  exercised  according  to  law.  And  how  redemption 
should  be  exercised,  and  how  it  could  be  cut  off  depended 
upon  the  provisions  of  the  statute ;  and  therefore  the  best 
answer  to  the  assumption  of  the  plaintiff  in  error,  that 
he  acquired  an  indefeasible  title,  is  the  answer  given  by 
the  supreme  court  of  the  state,  whose  province  it  is  to 
pronounce  the  meaning  of  the  statutes  of  the  state  without 
question  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 
That  court  said,  that  whatever  the  title  which  the  state 
held,  it  sold  an  interest  in  the  lands  which  were  liable  to 
be  devested.  Busch  v.  Duncan  Land  &  Mining  Co.,  211 
U.  S.  526. 

§549.  Number  of  peremptory  challenges  in  criminal 
oases.  The  Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not  prohibit 
legislation  which  is  limited  in  the  objects  to  which  it  is 
directed,  or  by  the  territory  within  which  it  is  to  operate. 
It  merely  requires  that  all  persons  subjected  to  such  legis- 
lation shall  be  treated  alike,  under  like  circumstances  and 
conditions,  both  in  the  privileges  conferred  and  in  the 
liabilities  imposed.  The  power  of  the  legislature  of  a 
state  to  prescribe  the  number  of  peremptory  challenges  in 
criminal  cases  is  limited  only  by  the  necessity  of  having 
an  impartial  jury.  The  number  of  such  challenges  is  a 
matter  of  legislative  discretion,  and  may  vary  according 
to  the  condition  of  different  communities  and  the  difBcul- 
ties  in  each  of  securing  intelligent  and  impartial  jurors. 
The  accused  is  entitled  to  an  impartial  jury,  and  if  such 
a  jury  is  obtained  from  those  who  remain,  his  constitu- 
tional right  is  maintained.  The  provision  of  the  revised 
statutes  of  Missouri  allowing  the  state,  in  capital  cases, 
fifteen  peremptory  challenges  in  cities  of  over  100,000 
inhabitants,  instead  of  eight  as  in  other  parts  of  the  state, 
is  a  valid  exercise  of  legislative  discretion.    To  prescribe 


§  550     PROCEDURE  IN  STATE  COURTS       823 

whatever  will  tend  to  secure  the  impartiality  of  jurors 
in  criminal  cases  is  not  only  within  the  competency  of  the 
legislature,  but  is  among  its  highest  duties.  Such  impar- 
tiality requires  not  only  freedom  from  any  bias  against 
the  accused,  but  also  from  any  prejudice  against  the 
prosecution.  Between  him  and  the  state  the  scales  are 
to  be  evenly  held.  Experience  has  shown  that  one  of  the 
most  effective  means  to  free  the  jury  box  from  men  unfit 
to  be  there  is  the  exercise  of  the  peremptory  challenge. 
The  nmnber  of  such  challenges  must  necessarily  depend 
upon  the  discretion  of  the  legislature  and  is  limited  only 
by  the  necessity  of  having  an  impartial  jury.  In  the  large 
cities  there  is  such  a  mixed  i)opulation;  there  is  such  a 
tendency  of  the  criminal  classes  to  resort  to  them,  and 
such  an  unfortunate  disposition  on  the  part  of  business 
men  to  escape  from  jury  duty,  that  it  requires  special  care 
on  the  part  of  the  government  to  secure  there  competent 
and  impartial  jurors.  To  that  end  it  may  be  a  wise  pro- 
ceeding on  the  part  of  the  legislature  to  enlarge  the  num- 
ber of  peremptory  challenges  in  criminal  cases  tried  in 
those  cities.  The  accused  cannot  complain  if  he  is  still 
tried  by  an  impartial  jury.  He  can  demand  nothing  more. 
Allowing  the  state  15  peremptory  challenges  in  capital 
cases  tried  in  cities  containing  a  population  of  over  100,- 
000  inhabitants  is  simply  providing  against  the  difficulty 
of  securing,  in  such  cases,  an  impartial  jury  in  cities  of 
that  size,  which  does  not  exist  in  other  portions  of  the 
state.  So  far  from  defeating,  it  may  furnish  the  neces- 
sary means  of  giving  that  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to 
all  persons,  which  the  amendment  declares  shall  not  be 
denied  to  any  one  within  its  jurisdiction.  Hayes  v.  Mis- 
souri, 120  U.  S.  68. 

§550.  Laws  operating  on  all  alike.  By  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  the  powers  of  states  in  dealing  with  crime 
within  their  borders  are  not  limited,  except  that  no  state 
can  deprive  particular  persons,  or  classes  of  persons,  of 
equal  and  impartial  justice  under  the  law.    Mr.  Chief 


824  DUE  PBOOESS  OF  LAW  §  550 

Justice  Fuller,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said : 
**  We  find  nothing  special,  partial  or  arbitrary  or  in  viola- 
tion of  fundamental  principles  in  the  criminal  laws  of 
the  state  of  Texas  involved,  and  we  perceive  no  ground 
for  holding  that  the  proceedings  complained  of,  which 
were  had  in  the  ordinary  administration  of  those  laws, 
amounted  to  a  denial  by  the  state  of  due  process  of  law 
to  these  parties,  or  of  some  right  secured  to  them  by  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Leeper  v.  Texas,  139 
U.  S.  462. 

§  651.  Error  in  charge  to  jury.  A  substantial  error  in 
the  charge  to  the  jury  in  a  criminal  case  in  a  state  court 
does  not  deprive  the  prisoner  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  or  of  due  process  or  abridge  his  immunities, 
within  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  A  writ  of  error  to 
review  the  judgment  of  the  highest  tribunal,  of  a  state 
cannot  be  maintained  in  the  absence  of  a  federal  question 
giving  jurisdiction.  It  was  not  within  the  province  of 
the  Supreme  Court  to  pass  upon  any  of  the  questions 
sought  to  be  presented,  as  they  fall  entirely  within  the 
scope  of  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  the  state.  Davis  v. 
Texas,  139  U.  S.  651. 

§  552.  Refusal  to  amend  record  in  criminal  case.    The 

refusal  of  the  supreme  court  of  Illinois  to  amend  the 
record  in  a  criminal  case  so  as  to  show  that  the  accused 
was  not  present  in  person  or  by  counsel  in  that  court,  at 
the  time  it  affirmed  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court,  and 
fixed  the  day  for  carrying  that  judgment  into  execution, 
was  not  a  denial  to  him  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  The  law  of  Illinois  as  declared  by  its  highest  court, 
that  amendments  of  the  record  of  a  court,  in  derogation  of 
its  final  judgment,  are  not  permitted  after  the  term  at 
which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  is  applicable  to  all 
persons  within  the  juriscjiction  of  the  state,  and  its  en- 
forcement against  the  plaintiff  in  error  is  not  a  denial 
to  him  by  the  state  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws* 


§  553      PROCEDURE  IN  STATE  COURTS       825 

The  supreme  court  of  Illinois  held  that  under  the  prac- 
tice in  that  state  a  motion  to  amend  a  final  judgment,  in 
derogation  of  that  judgment,  made  at  a  term  subsequent 
to  that  at  which  final  judgment  was  rendered,  and  after 
the  case  had  passed  beyond  the  power  of  the  state  court 
to  stay,  by  its  order,  the  execution  of  the  judgment,  clearly 
comes  too  late.  Had  the  plaintiffs  in  error  and  their 
counsel  been  actually  present  in  court  when  the  judgment 
of  affirmance  was  entered,  the  law  allowed  them  to  then 
say  or  do  nothing  which  by  any  possibility  could  have 
benefited  plaintiffs  in  error.  They  were,  after  judgment 
was  entered,  entitled  only  to  move  for  a  rehearing,  and 
this  could  only  be  done  on  printed  petition;  but  thirty 
days  were  allowed  in  which  to  prepare  it.  .  No  right  se- 
cured to  the  plaintiff  in  error  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  was  violated  by  the  refusal  of  the  supreme 
court  of  Illinois  to  allow  the  proposed  amendment  of  its 
record.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  takes, 
as  is  its  duty,  the  law  of  Illinois  to  be  as  declared  by  its 
highest  court,  that  amendments  of  the  record  of  a  court, 
in  derogation  of  its  final  judgment,  are  not  permitted  in 
that  state  after  the  expiration  of  the  term  at  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered.  That  law  is  applicable  to  all 
persons  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state,  and  its  en- 
forcement against  the  plaintiff  in  error  cannot,  therefore, 
be  said  to  be  a  denial  to  him  by  the  state  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws.  Fielden  v.  State  of  Illinois,  143 
U.S.  452. 

§  553.  Power  of  state  to  make  classifications.  Because 
to  the  ordinary  taxpayer  there  is  allowed  not  merely  one 
hearing  before  the  county  officials,  but  also  a  right  of  ap- 
peal with  a  second  hearing  before  the  state  board,  while 
only  the  one  hearing  before  the  latter  board  is  given  to 
railroad  companies  in  respect  to  their  property,  the  latter 
are  not  therefore  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
The  power  of  a  state  to  make  classifications  in  judicial 
or  administrative  proceedings  carries  with  it  the  right  to 


826  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  553 

make  such  a  classification  as  will  give  to  parties  belonging 
to  one  class  two  hearings  before  their  rights  are  finally 
determined,  and  to  parties  belonging  to  a  different  class 
only  a  single  hearing.  Pittsburgh,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  B.  Co. 
V.  Backus,  154  U.  S.  421. 

§654.  Sufficiency  of  indictment.  Where  the  state  court 
has  decided  that  the  state  statute  making  an  indictment 
for  murder  sufficient  which  charges  that  the  defendant  wil- 
fully, feloniously  and  of  his  malice  aforethought  killed 
and  murdered,  without  charging  the  manner  or  means  by 
which  the  death  was  caused,  does  not  add  to  nor  change 
the  crime,  as  defined  at  common  law,  and  that  a  conviction 
thereunder  violates  no  right  or  privilege  of  the  accused, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  will  not  hold  that 
the  statute  denies  to  accused  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  or  due  process  of  law  as  prescribed  by  the  Federal 
Constitution.  Whether  the  indictment  sufficiently  charged 
the  crime  of  murder  in  the  first  degree  was  for  the  state 
courts  to  determine.  In  view  of  the  decisions  in  Graves 
V.  State,  45  N.  J.  L.  203,  347,  358,  46  Am.  Bep.  778,  and 
Davis  V.  Utah  Territory,  151  U.  S.  262,  266  declaring  the 
meaning  and  scope  of  the  statutes  under  which  the  ac- 
cused was  prosecuted,  it  cannot  be  held  that  he  was  pro- 
ceeded against  under  an  indictment  based  upon  statutes 
denying  to  him  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  or  that 
were  inconsistent  with  due  process  of  law,  as  prescribed 
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Bergemann  v.  Backer, 
157  U.  S.  655. 

§555.  Severer  punishment  for  subsequent  offenses.    A 

person  by  being  punished  more  severely  for  the  second 
offense  is  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  A 
state  may  provide  that  persons  who  have  before  been 
convicted  of  crime  may  suffer  severer  punishment  for 
subsequent  offenses  than  for  a  first  offense  against  a  law. 
Similar  provisions  have  been  contained  in  state  statutes 
for  many  years  and  they  have  been  xmif ormly  sustained 


§  556      PROCEDURE  IN  STATE  COURTS       827 

by  the  courts.  The  increased  severity  of  the  punishment 
for  the  subsequent  offense  is  not  a  punishment  for  the 
same  offense  for  the  second  time,  but  a  severer  punish- 
ment for  the  subsequant  offense,  to  deter  those  so  inclined 
from  the  further  commission  of  crime.  The  general 
doctrine  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  in  respect  to  the 
administration  of  criminal  justice,  requires  that  no  differ- 
ent or  higher  punishment  shall  be  imposed  on  one  than  is 
imposed  on  all  for  like  offenses,  but  it  was  not  designed  to 
interfere  with  the  power  of  the  state  to  protect  the  lives, 
liberty,  or  property  of  its  citizens,  nor  with  the  exercise 
of  that  i)ower  in  administering  the  process  provided  by 
the  law  of  the  state.  And  the  state  may  undoubtedly  pro- 
vide that  persons  who  have  before  been  convicted  of  crime 
may  suffer  severer  punishment  for  subsequent  offenses 
than  for  a  first  offense  against  the  law,  and  that  a  differ- 
ent punishment  for  the  same  offense  may  be  inflicted 
under  particular  circumstances,  provided  it  is  dealt  out 
to  all  alike  who  are  similarly  situated.  Moore  v.  State 
of  Missouri,  159  XJ.  S.  673. 

§556.  Denial  of  right  of  review— Alien  juror.  The 
denial  by  a  state  court  of  the  right  to  review  in  an  appel- 
late court  in  a  criminal  case  constitutes  no  violation  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  That  one  of  the  jurors 
in  a  criminal  case  was  an  alien,  although  cause  of  chal- 
lenge, is  not  a  denial  of  due  process  of  law  or  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  to  the  person  convicted.  The  laws 
of  New  Jersey  require  that  jurors  in  a  criminal  case  shall 
be  citizens  of  the  state,  but  that  no  exception  to  any  such 
juror  on  account  of  his  citizenship,  or  any  other  legal 
disability,  shall  be  allowed  after  he  has  been  sworn  or 
affirmed.  The  record  does  not  show  whether  the  question 
of  the  alleged  disability  of  the  juror  was  or  was  not  raised 
in  the  state  court.  The  plaintiff  in  error  claimed  that  if 
an  alien  sat  upon  the  jury  the  common  law  right  of  trial 
by  jury  had  been  invaded.  The  Supreme  Court  declared 
that  this  contention  in  itself  could  not  be  sustained  as 


828  DUB  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  556 

involving  an  infraction  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  Whether  the  point  had  been  properly  brought  to 
the  attention  of  the  state  courts^  or  not,  it  did  not  appear, 
in  any  view,  that  petitioner  had  beeij  denied  due  process  of 
law  or  that  protection  of  the  laws  accorded  to  all  others 
similarly  situated.    Kohl  v.  Lehlback,  160  TJ.  S.  293. 

§  667.  Adjudging  a  prosecutor  to  be  liable  for  costs. 
Equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  to  any  person 
by  a  statute  which  is  applicable  to  all  persons  under  like 
circumstances,  and  does  not  subject  the  individual  to  an 
arbitrary  exercise  of  power.  A  state  statute  providing 
that  a  prosecutor  shall  be  liable  for  the  costs  and  subject 
to  imprisonment  in  default  of  their  payment,  when  the 
jury  finds  that  he  instituted  a  prosecution  without  prob- 
able  cause  and  from  nmlicious  motives,  applicable  to  aU 
persons  under  like  circumstances,  does  not  subject  the 
individual  to  an  arbitrary  exercise  of  power,  and  does  not 
deny  him  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Lowe  v.  State 
of  Kansas,  163  TJ.  S.  81. 

§  568.  Payment  before  possession  in  condemnation  pro- 
ceedings. When  the  state  courts  have  construed  a  state 
statute  as  prescribing  one  form  of  procedure,  their  subse- 
quent adjudication  that  such  construction  is  wrong,  and 
that  the  statute  really  provides  a  different  mode  of  pro- 
cedure, can  not  be  set  aside  in  the  Federal  courts  as  an  un- 
just discrimination,  or  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws.  The  omission  to  give  further  instructions  to  a 
jury,  which  were  not  asked,  is  not  a  denial  of  due  process 
of  law  or  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  There  is  no 
vested  right  in  a  mode  of  procedure.  Each  succeeding  leg- 
islature may  establish  a  different  one,  providing  only  that 
in  each  is  preserved  the  essential  elements  of  protection. 
The  fact  that  one  construction  has  been  placed  upon  a  stat- 
ute by  the  highest  court  of  the  state  does  not  make  that 
construction  beyond  change.  If  the  courts  made  a  different 
ruling,  still,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  propriety 


§  560  PBOCEDXJRB  IN  STATE  COUETS  829 

of  STich  a  change  of  construction,  there  is  in  it  nothing  to 
justify  the  Supreme  Court  in  reversing  the  judgment  of 
the  state  court,  and  denying  the  correctness  or  validity 
of  the  last  ruling.  If  tiie  last  ruling  was  held  by  the 
supreme  court  of  the  state  warranted  by  the  statutes,  it 
does  not  appear  that  any  right  possessed  under  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  has  been  violated.  Where 
the  courts  of  the  state  have  construed  a  statute  as  pre- 
scribing one  form  of  procedure,  and  parties  have  acted 
under  that  construction,  and  then  subsequently  the  same 
court  has  held  that  the  statute  was  theretofore  miscon- 
strued and  really  provided  a  different  mode  of  procedure, 
this  laat  adjudication  cannot  be  set  aside  in  the  Federal 
courts  on  the  ground  of  an  unjust  discrimination  or  a 
denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  A.  Bachus,  Jr. 
&  Sons  V.  Fort  Street  Union  Depot  Co.,  169  U.  S.  557. 

§  559.  When  equal  protection  of  the  laws  not  denied. 
Equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  by  a  law  or 
course  of  procedure  which  would  have  been  applied  to  any 
other  person  in  the  state  under  similar  circumstances  and 
conditions.  The  right  to  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
was  certainly  not  denied,  for  it  is  apparent  that  the  same 
law  or  course  of  procedure  which  was  applied  to  the 
plaintiff  would  have  been  applied  to  any  other  person  in 
the  state,  under  similar  circumstances  and  conditions; 
and  there  was  nothing  in  the  record  on  which  to  base  an 
inference  to  the  contrary.  Tinsley  v.  Anderson,  171 U.  S. 
101. 

§  560.  Abridging  the  right  of  trial  by  jury.  The  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  by  a  state  statute 
abridging  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  in  the  courts  of  a 
city,  without  making  a  similar  provision  for  the  counties 
of  the  state.  One  contention  was  that  the  constitution  of 
Maryland  abridged  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  in  the  courts 
of  Baltimore  city  without  making  a  similar  provision  for 
the  counties  of  the  state,  and  that  this  denies  to  litigants 


830  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  560 

of  the  city  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  This  was 
held  not  tenable,  citing  Missouri  v.  Lewis,  101  U.  S*  22 ; 
Hayes  v.  Missouri,  120  U.  S.  68.  Ghappell  Chemical  & 
Fertilizer  Co.  v.  Sulphur  Mines  Co.,  172  U.  S.  474. 

§  661.  Oonstitntionality  of  struck  jury  law.  A  statute 
allowing  an  accused  person  only  five  peremptory  dral- 
lenges  in  a  case  where  a  struck  jury  has  been  ordered, 
while  twenty  peremptory  challenges  are  allowed  in  a 
trial  before  an  ordinary  jury,  does  not  constitute  a  denial 
of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  where  the  same  num- 
ber of  challenges  is  permitted  in  all  cases  in  which  a  struck 
jury  is  ordered.  The  state  has  full  control  over  the  pro- 
ceedings in  its  courts,  both  in  civil  and  criminal  cases, 
subject  only  to  the  qualification  that  such  procedure  must 
not  work  a  denial  of  fundamental  rights,  or  conflict  with 
specific  and  applicable  provisions  of  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution. The  state  is  not  tied  down  by  any  provision  of 
the  Federal  Constitution  to  the  practice  and  procedure 
which  existed  at  the  common  law.  Subject  to  the  limita- 
tions heretofore  named  it  may  avail  itself  of  the  wisdom 
gathered  by  the  experience  of  the  century  to  make  such 
changes  as  may  be  necessary.  A  state  may  make  different 
arrangements  for  trials  under  different  circumstances  of 
even  the  same  class  of  offenses.  Citing  Missouri  v.  Lewis, 
101  U.  S.  22,  and  Hayes  v.  Missouri,  120  U.  S.  68.  It  is 
true  that  here  there  is  no  territorial  distribution,  but 
in  all  cases  in  which  a  struck  jury  is  ordered,  the  same 
number  of  challenges  is  permitted,  as  similarly  in  all 
cases  in  which  the  trial  is  by  an  ordinary  jury.  Either 
party,  state  or  defendant,  may  apply  for  a  struck  jury, 
and  the  matter  is  one  which  is  determined  by  the  court  in 
the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretion.  There  is  no  mere 
arbitrary  power  in  this  respect,  any  more  than  in  the 
granting  or  refusing  of  a  continuance.  That  in  any  given 
case  the  discretion  of  the  court  in  awarding  a  trial  by  a 
struck  jury  was  improperly  exercised  may  perhaps  pre- 
sent a  matter  for  consideration  or  appeal,  but  it  amounts 
to  nothing  more.    Brown  v.  New  Jersey,  175  U.  S.  172. 


§  564      PROCEDURE  IN  STATE  COURTS       831 

§562.  Additioiial  pimishment  on  third  conviction.  The 
equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  hy  a  statute 
imposing  a  heavier  penalty  upon  a  person  convicted  of  a 
felony  if  he  has  twice  before  been  sentenced  for  crime  to 
three  years '  imprisonment  or  more.  It  is  within  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  legislature  of  the  state  to  treat  former 
imprisonment  in  another  state  as  having  the  like  effect 
as  imprisonment  in  Massachusetts,  to  show  that  the  man 
is  an  habitual  criminal.  The  allegation  of  previous  con- 
victions is  not  a  distinct  charge  of  crime,  but  is  necessary 
to  bring  the  case  within  the  statute,  and  goes  to  the  pun- 
ishment only.  The  statute,  imposing  a  punishment  on 
none  but  future  crimes,  is  not  ex  post  facto.  It  affects 
alike  all  persons  similarly  situated,  and  therefore  does 
not  deprive  any  one  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws. 
McDonald  v.  Massachusetts,  180  TJ.  S.  311. 

§  563.  Oriminal  law— Appeal  by  state.  The  allowance 
of  an  appeal  to  the  state  from  the  coijrt  of  one  district, 
but  not  from  another  district  of  the  state  in  the  case  of  the 
grant  of  a  new  trial  to  an  accused  person,  is  not  a  denial 
of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  guaranteed  by  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment.  The  state  has  control  of  its 
own  legislation  as  to  the  cases  in  which  it  will  permit  ap- 
peals in  its  own  behalf  in  its  courts.  Citing  Missouri  v. 
Lewis,  101  XT.  S.  23,  and  subsequent  ca^ses.  Mallett  v. 
North  Carolina,  181  TJ.  S.  589. 

§  564.  Difference  in  term  of  sentence  for  imprisonment. 
The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  to  two  or 
three  persons  convicted  of  conspiracy  to  defraud,  because 
their  sentence  was  for  ten  years  imprisonment,  while  that 
of  their  codef endant  was  for  but  seven  years.  The  deci- 
sion in  the  opinion  of  the  highest  state  court,  in  reviewing 
conviction  of  crime,  of  questions  respecting  due  process 
of  law,  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  and  cruel  and 
unusual  punishment,  will  not  confer  jurisdiction  on  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  TTnited  States  of  a  writ  of  error  to 


832  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  564 

the  state  court,  in  the  absence  of  any  claim  to  protection 
under  the  Federal  Constitution  made  therein.  Doubtless 
there  were  sufficient  reasons  for  giving  to  one  of  the  con- 
spirators a  less  term  than  the  others.  ^^At  any  rate/' 
said  the  Supreme  Court,  '^  there  is  no  such  inequality 
as  will  justify  us  in  setting  aside  the  judgment  against  the 
two.''    Howard  V.  Fleming,  191  U.  S.  126. 

§  565.  Presumption  of  guilt  from  possession  of  gam- 
bling paraphemaliBr— Effect  of  exception  in  favor  of 
public  oflScem.  Due  process  of  law  is  not  denied  by  the 
provision  of  the  New  York  penal  code,  which  makes  pos- 
session of  the  record  of  chances  or  slips  in  the  game  of 
policy,  or  the  possession  of  any  paper,  print,  or  writing 
commonly  used  in  playing  or  promoting  that  game  prima 
facie  evidence  of  ^^  possession  thereof  knowingly"  in  vio- 
lation of  the  section  making  the  knowing  possession 
thereof  a  crime.  The  exception  of  public  officers  from 
the  terms  of  said  provision  does  not  render  the  section 
unconstitutional,  since  this  provision  manifestly  is  for 
the  purpose  of  excluding  the  presumption  raised  by  pos- 
session, where  such  docmnents  are  seized  and  are  in  the 
custody  of  officers  of  the  law.  This  was  the  construction 
given  to  the  act  by  the  New  York  courts,  and  is  the  only 
one  consistent  with  its  purposes.  Adams  v.  New  York, 
192  U.  S.  585. 

§  566.  Ohange  of  venue  for  local  prejudice.  The  pro- 
vision made  by  the  Ohio  revised  statutes  for  a  change  of 
venue  for  local  prejudice,  where  the  opposite  party  is  a 
corporation  with  more  than  fifty  stockholders,  having 
its  principal  office  or  transacting  its  principal  business  in 
the  county  in  which  the  action  is  pending,  without  con- 
ferring an  equivalent  right  on  the  corporation,  does  not 
violate  the  constitutional  guaranty  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws,  where  in  both  forums  equality  of  law  governs 
and  equality  of  administration  prevails.  The  proposition 
to  which  the  case  reduces  itself  is  this :  That  although  the 


§  567  PROCEDURE  IN  STATE  COURTS  833 

protection  of  equal  laws  equally  administered  has  been 
enjoyed,  nevertheless  there  has  been  a  denial  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  within  the  purview  of  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  only  because  the  state  has  allowed 
one  person  to  seek  one  forum  and  has  not  allowed  another 
person,  asserted  to  be  in  the  same  class,  to  seek  the  same 
forum,  although  as  to  both  persons  the  law  has  afforded 
a  forum  in  which  the  same  and  equal  laws  are  applicable 
and  administered.  But  it  is  fundamental  rights  which 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  safeguards,  and  not  the  mere 
forum  which  the  state  may  see  proper  to  designate  for 
the  enforcement  aud  protection  of  such  rights.  Given, 
therefore,  a  condition  where  fundamental  rights  are 
equally  protected  and  preserved,  it  is  impossible  to  say 
that  the  rights  which  are  thus  protected  and  preserved 
have  been  denied  because  the  state  has  deemed  best  to 
provide  for  a  trial  in  one  forum  or  another.  It  is  not, 
under  any  view,  the  mere  tribunal  into  which  a  person 
is  authorized  to  proceed  by  a  state  which  determines 
whether  the  equal  protection  of  the  law  has  been  afforded, 
but  whether  in  the  tribunals  which  the  state  has  provided 
equal  laws  prevail.  Cincinnati  Street  B.  Co.  v.  Snell, 
193  U.  S.  30. 

§567.  Local  regulations  for  the  selection  of  jurors. 

Litigants  and  persons  accused  of  crime  in  Wayne  county, 
Michigan,  are  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws 
by  the  statute,  under  which  the  jury  lists  are  made  up 
and  returned  by  a  board  of  jury  commissioners  appointed 
by  the  governor  with  the  consent  of  the  senate,  and  may 
include  persons  whose  names  do  not  appear  on  the  assess- 
ment roll,  while,  by  the  general  laws  of  the  state,  the 
officers  authorized  to  make  and  return  the  jury  lists  are 
elected  by  the  people  in  their  several  townships  and  in 
city  wards,  and  the  jurors  must  be  of  those  who  are 
assessed  on  the  assessment  roll.  The  names  of  persons 
to  be  returned  for  the  Wayne  county  jury  lists  need  not 
appear  on  the  assessment  rolls.    This  difference  between 

Due  Procesa— 53 


834  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  §  567 

the  general  law  relating  to  jury  trials  and  the  special  law 
relating  to  Wayne  county,  it  is  said,  constitutes  a  discrim- 
ination against  the  people  of  that  county,  and  amounts  to 
a  denial  to  them  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  This 
view  is  fully  met  and  shown  not  to  be  sound  by  tiie  judg- 
ment in  Missouri  v.  Lewis  (Bowman  v.  Lewis),  101  U*  S. 
22,  31.    Gardner  v.  Michigan,  199  U.  S.  325. 

§668.  Error  of  trial  oonrt  in  disdiarging  a  juror.  The 
decision  of  the  Kentucky  court  of  appeals  that  a  reversal 
of  a  conviction  for  the  error,  if  any,  committed  by  the 
trial  court  in  discharging  a  juror,  was  precluded  by  the 
Kentucky  criminal  code,  §  281,  does  not  deny  the  accused 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  secured  by  the  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  if  such  was  the  construction  given 
that  section  by  prior  cases,  and  no  discriminating  appli- 
cation against  him  was  made.  The  court,  in  its  construc- 
tion' of  §  281,  followed  the  construction  established  by 
prior  cases,  and  did  not  make  a  discriminating  applica- 
tion of  that  section  against  plaintiff.  He  was,  therefore, 
not  deprived  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  Howard 
V.  Kentucky,  200  U.  S.  164. 

§569.  Indeterminate  sentence  act.  A  person  sentenced 
under  the  Michigan  indeterminate  sentence  act  after  hav- 
ing been  twice  before  convicted  of  felony  is  not  impris- 
oned without  due  process  of  law  nor  denied  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws  because  he  is  deprived  by  that  act 
of  the  privilege  therein  accorded  to  other  convicts  at  the 
end  of  the  minimum  term  of  the  sentence  to  make  applica- 
tion for  parole,  although  the  statute  gives  no  hearing 
upon  the  question  of  prior  conviction.  The  Fourteenth 
Amendment  was  not  intended  to,  and  does  not,  limit  the 
powers  of  a  state  in  dealing  with  crime  committed  within 
its  own  borders  or  with  the  punishment  thereof,  although 
no  state  can  deprive  particular  persons  or  classes  of  per- 
sons of  equal  and  impartial  justice  under  the  law.  The 
act  in  question  provides  for  the  granting  of  a  favor  to 


i  570  PROCEDXJRB  IN  STATE  COURTS  835 

persons  convicted  of  crime  who  are  confined  in  a  state 
prison.  The  state  may  attach  such  conditions  to  the  ap- 
plication for  or  to  the  granting  of  the  favor  as  it  may 
deem  proper,  or  it  may  in  its  discretion,  exclude  such 
classes  of  persons  from  participation  in  the  favor  as  may 
to  it  seem  fit.  If  the  state  choose  to  grant  this  privilege 
to  make  application  to  the  governor  for  a  discharge  upon 
parole  in  the  case  of  one  class  of  criminals  and  deny  it  to 
others,  such,  for  instance,  as  those  who  have  twice  been 
convicted  of  a  felony,  it  is  a  question  of  state  policy  ex- 
clusively for  the  state  to  decide,  as  is  also  the  procedure 
to  ascertain  the  fact,  as  well  as  the  kind  or  amount  of  evi- 
dence upon  which  to  base  its  determination.  It  is  not 
bound  to  give  the  convict  a  hearing  upon  the  question  of 
prior  conviction,  and  a  failure  to  give  it  violates  no  pro- 
vision of  the  Federal  Constitution.  Ughbanks  v.  Arm- 
strong, 208  IT.  S.  481. 

* 

§570.  Discrimination  in  matter  of  grand  jury.  A  per- 
son indicted  for  a  crime  committed  after  the  grand  jury 
was  impaneled  is  not  denied  the  equar  protection  of  the 
laws  because  he  is  precluded  from  raising  the  objection 
that  two  of  the  grand  jurors  were  over  the  age  of  65 
years  fixed  by  the  New  Jersey  laws  1876,  "p.  360,  under 
which  objections  on  that  ground  must  be  made  before  the 
jury  is  sworn,  where  the  object  sought  to  be  attained  by 
the  statute,  according  to  the  view  adopted  by  the  state 
court,  was  to  make  the  grand  jury  a  more  efficient  instru- 
ment of  justice,  and  not  to  benefit  any  particular  defend- 
ant or  class  of  defendants.  It  was  contended  that  this 
provision,  as  applied  by  the  courts  of  the  state,  separates 
criminals  into  classes;  to  wit,  those  who  are  accused 
before  the  finding  of  the  indictment,  and  those  who  are 
accused  afterwards;  giving  to  the  first  a  privilege  of 
challenge  which  is  denied  to  the  second ;  and  that  there  is 
no  substantial  reason  for  the  classification.  The  purpose 
of  the  statute  was  the  furtherance  of  the  due  and  efficient 
administration  of  justice  for  the  protection  of  those 


836  DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW  §  570 

against  whom  crimes  might  be  committed,  as  well  as  those 
who  might  be  charged  with  the  commission  of  such  crimes. 
The  object  sought  to  be  attained  by  the  disabilities  ex- 
pressed by  the  statute  was  to  secure  an  efficient  and 
representative  body  of  citizens  to  take  part  in  the  due 
administration  of  the  law  for  the  benefit  of  all  who  were 
entitled  to  its  protection,  and  not  specially  or  even 
primarily  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  were  charged  with 
its  violation.  In  view  of  the  purpose  of  the  statute  is 
the  classification  justified,  are  the  persons  constituting 
the  classes  in  different  relations  to  the  purpose  of  the  law. 
It  is  obvious  that  they  are,  and  the  law  neither  offers  nor 
withholds  substantial  rights.  It  constitutes  one  of  its 
instrumentalities  of  persons  having  certain  qualifications 
which  cannot  affect  essentially  the  charge  against,  or  the 
defense  of,  any  defendant*  It  is  the  conception  of  the 
state  that  a  grand  jury  so  constituted  would  be  more 
efficient  in  the  administration  of  justice  than  one  not  so 
constituted,  but  that  there  would  be  counteracting  disad- 
vantages if  the  right  of  challenge  should  be  extended 
beyond  the  date  of  the  impanelment  of  the  jury.  It  was 
competent  for  the  state  to  so  provide.  Lang  v.  New  Jer- 
sey, 209  U.  S.  467. 

§571.  Difference  o7  procedure  against  corporations. 

Corporations  are  not  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws  because  corporate  violators  of  the  Tennessee  anti- 
trust act  of  March  16, 1903,  may  be  proceeded  against  by 
bill  in  equity  on  relation  of  the  attorney  general,  while 
natural  persons  offending  against  its  provisions  cannot 
be  tried  without  a  preliminary  investigation  by  a  grand 
jury,  and  indictment  or  presentment,  and  a  trial  by  jury, 
with  the  right  to  an  acquittal  unless  their  guilt  is  estab- 
lished beyond  a  reasonable  doubt;  and  to  the  benefit  of 
a  statute  of  limitations  of  one  year.  The  law  of  Tennes- 
see sees  fit  to  seek  to  prevent  a  certain  kind  of  conduct 
To  prevent  it  the  threat  of  fine  and  imprisonment  is  likely 
to  be  efficient  for  men,  while  the  latter  is  impossible  and 


§  573  PROCEDURE  IN  STATE  COXJRTS  837 

the  former  less  serious  to  corporations.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  threat  of  extinction  or  ouster  is  not  monstrouSi 
and  yet  is  likely  to  achieve  the  result  with  corporations, 
while  it  would  be  extravagant  as  applied  to  meiL  Hence, 
this  difference  is  justifiable.  Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Tennes- 
see ex  rel.  Gates,  217  U.  S.  413. 

§  572.  Appeal  by  government  in  criminal  case.  Con- 
gress could,  by  the  act  of  March  2,  1907,  authorize  the 
government  to  bring  up  a  criminal  case  from  a  Federal 
Circuit  Court  to  the  Supreme  Court  when  a  demurrer  to 
an  indictment  has  been  sustained,  although  the  same  priv- 
ilege is  denied  the  accused  when  the  indictment  is  sus- 
tained,— even  assuming  that  the  United  States  is  bound 
to  afford  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  to  persons  within 
its  jurisdiction.  The  Supreme  Court  has  decided  that  the 
right  of  appeal  is  not  essential  to  due  process  of  law. 
Even  if  the  explicit  clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
forbidding  a  state  to  deny  to  any  person  within  its  juris- 
diction the  equal  protection  of  its  laws,  can  be  said  to 
apply  to  the  United  States,  it  can  have  no  broader  mean- 
ing when  so  applied,  than  when  applied  to  the  states. 
Even  assuming  that  Congress  may  not  discriminate  in 
its  legislation,  it  certainly  has  the  power  of  classification, 
and  the  act  in  question  is  well  within  such  power.  United 
States  V.  Heinze,  218  U.  S.  532. 

§  573.  Classification  of  prisoners  committing  assaults. 
Singling  out  convicts  serving  life  sentences  in  a  state 
prison  as  proper  subjects  for  the  imposition  of  the  death 
penalty,  as  is  done  by  the  California  penal  code,  in  case 
they  shall,  with  malice  aforethought,  commit  an  assault 
upon  the  person  of  another  with  a  deadly  weapon  or 
instrument,  or  by  any  means  of  force  likely  to  produce 
great  bodily  injury  does  not  deny  such  life  prisoners  the 
equal  protection  of  the  laws.  The  contention  is  to  be 
tested  by  considering  whether  there  is  a  basis  for  the 
classification  made  by  the  statute.    The  classification  of 


838  DUB  PBOCESS  OP  LAW  §  573 

the  statute  in  question  is  not  arbitrary,  but  is  based  upon 
valid  reasons  and  distinctions.  ^^The  ^life-termers,'  as 
has  been  said,  while  within  the  prison  walls,  constitute  a 
class  by  themselves, — ^a  class  recognized  as  such  by 
penologists  the  world  over.  Their  situation  is  legalljr 
different.  Their  civic  death  is  perpetual.''  Manifestly 
there  could  be  no  extension  of  the  term  of  imprisonment 
as  a  punishment  for  crimes  they  might  commit,  and  what- 
ever other  punishment  should  be  imposed  was  for  the 
legislature  to  determine.  The  power  of  classification 
which  the  lawmaking  power  possesses  has  been  illustrated 
by  many  cases.  They  demonstrate  that  the  legislature  of 
California  did  not  transcend  its  power  in  the  enactment 
of  this  statute.    Finley  v.  California,  222  U.  S.  28. 

§574.  Quo  warranto.  A  foreign  corporation  ousted 
and  fined  $50,000  in  civil  quo  warranto  proceedings  in 
the  highest  court  of  a  state,  for  misuser  of  its  license  to 
do  business  in  the  state,  cannot  claim  to  have  been  denied 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  because  corporations 
prosecuted  in  the  inferior  state  courts  for  identicaUy  the 
same  acts,  in  violation  of  the  state  anti-trust  acl^  are 
entitled  to  a  trial  by  jury,  and,  if  convicted,  can  be  ousted 
of  their  franchises  and  subjected  to  a  fine  not  exceeding 
$100  per  day  during  the  time  the  combination  continued 
in  effect.  Proceedings  by  information  in  the  nature  of 
quo  warranto  differ  in  form  and  consequence  from  a 
prosecution  by  indictment  for  violation  of  a  criminal  stat- 
ute. In  the  one,  the  state  proceeds  for  a  violation  of  the 
company's  private  contract;  in  the  other,  it  prosecutes 
for  a  violation  of  public  law.  The  corporation  may  be 
deprived  of  its  franchise  for  nonuser, — ^a  mere  failure 
to  act  It  may  also  be  deprived  of  its  charter  for  that 
which,  though  innocent  in  itself,  is  beyond  the  power  con- 
ferred upon  it  as  an  artificial  person.  If,  however,  the 
act  of  misuser  is  not  only  ultra  vires  but  criminal,  there 
is  no  merger  of  the  civil  liability  in  the  criminal  offense. 
Separate  proceedings  may  be  instituted,— one  to  secure 


§  575      PEOCEDUBB  IN  STATE  COURTS       839 

the  civil  judgment,  and  the  other  to  enforce  the  criminal 
law.  Both  eases  may  involve  a  consideration  of  the  same 
facts ;  and  evidence  warranting  a  judgment  of  ouster  may 
be  sufficient  to  sustain  a  convictiDn  for  crime.  A  judg- 
ment may  in  one  case  sometimes  be  a  bar  to  the  other;  but 
neither  remedy  is  exclusive.  The  double  liability,  in  dvil 
and  criminal  proceedings,  finds  its  counterpart  in  many 
instances ;  as,  for  example,  where  an  attorney  is  disbarred 
or  ousted  of  his  right  to  practice  in  the  court  because  of 
conduct  for  which  he  may  likewise  be  prosecuted  and 
fined.  Plaintiffs  in  error  cannot  complain  that  they  were 
denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  law,  because  in  the  civil 
proceeding  tiiey  were  not  tried  in  the  manner,  and  sub- 
jected to  the  judgment,  appropriate  in^  criminal  cases. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Missouri  ex  rel.  Hadley,  224  U.  S.  270. 

§  575.  Punishing  habitual  criminals.  Bringing  a  con- 
vict after  judgment  before  the  court  of  another  county  in 
a  separate  proceeding  instituted  conformably  to  West 
Virginia  statute,  chap.  165,  §  §  1-5,  by  information  charg- 
ing him  with  prior  convictions  which  were  not  alleged  in 
the  indictment  on  which  he  was  last  tried  and  convicted, 
and,  on  the  finding  of  the  jury  that  he  was  the  former 
convict,  sentencing  him  to  the  additional  punishment 
which  chap.  152,  §  §  23,  24,  in  such  cases  prescribes,  does 
not  deny  him  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  because  of 
the  difiference  in  procedure  between  the  case  where  the 
fact  of  former  conviction  is  alleged  in  the  indictment  and 
determined  by  the  jury  on  the  trial  of  the  charge  of 
crime,  and  the  case  where  it  is  charged  in  the  informa- 
tion, and  determined  by  a  jury  in  a  proceeding  thereby 
instituted.  The  statute  in  question  applies  to  all  those 
**  convicted  of  an  offense,  and  sentenced  to  confinement 
therefor  in  the  penitentiary,"  who  previously  have  been 
sentenced  to  a  like  punishment.  The  fact  of  such  sen- 
tence, indicating  the  gravity  of  the  offense,  affords  a 
reasonable  basis  for  classification.  Those  who  have  been 
so  sentenced  once  before,  and  those  so  sentenced  twice 


840  DUB  PBOCESS  OP  LAW  §  575 

before,  are  subjected,  respectively,  to  the  same  measure 
of  increased  punishment,  but  in  all  cases  before  the  in- 
creased punishment  can  be  inflicted,  there  must  be  a 
conviction  on  the  new  charge ;  the  former  conviction  must 
be  shown,  and  there  must  be  a  finding  by  a  jury,  if  the 
fact  is  contested,  of  the  identity  of  the  defendant  with 
the  former  convict.  The  distinction,  upon  which  the 
denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  based,  has 
regard  simply  to  the  difference  in  procedure  between  the 
case  where  the  fact  of  former  conviction  is  alleged  in 
the  indictment,  and  determined  by  the  jury  on  the  trial  of 
the  charge  of  the  second  offense,  and  the  case  where  the 
fact  of  the  former  conviction  is  perhaps  subsequently 
discovered,  and  is  charged  in  an  information  and  deter- 
mined  by  a  jury  in  a  proceeding  thereby  specially  insti- 
tuted for  that  purpose.  This  cannot  be  said  to  give  rise 
to  a  substantial  difference  in  right,  or  to  any  inequality 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision. 
Graham  v.  West  Virginia,  224  U.  S.  616. 

§576.  Attachment  of  property  of  nonresident.  The 
attachment,  conformably  to  local  law,  at  the  instance  of 
a  foreign  creditor,  of  bonds  of  a  foreign  corporation,  for 
the  debt  of  their  nonresident  owner,  does  not  deny  such 
owner  either  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  or  the  due 
process  of  law  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, where  such  bonds  had  been  deposited  with  a  cus- 
todian in  the  state,  under  the  directions  of  the  state  court, 
in  the  exercise  of  admittedly  lawful  powers,  and  could  not 
be  removed  therefrom  without  obtaining  the  authority  of 
thp  state  court, — an  authority  which  was  unaffected  by 
the  fact  that  the  bonds  were  registered  in  the  names  of 
the  attachment  debtor  ^s  minor  children,  since  they  were 
so  registered  solely  because  of  the  previous  action  of  the 
state  court.  De  Beam  v.  Safe  Deposit  &  T.  Co.,  233 
U.  S.  24. 


§577.  Bight  to  preliminary  examination  in  criminal 
prosecutions  in  Blanila.    Denying  to  an  inhabitant  of 


§  578      PROCEDURE  IN  STATE  COURTS       841 

Manila  the  right  to  a  preliminary  examination  which  is 
accorded  to  all  other  persons  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  as 
is  done  by  the  provision  of  the  Philippine  Conmiission  act 
No.  612,  §  2,  that  in  cases  triable  only  in  the  court  of  first 
instance  in  the  city  of  Manila,  the  accused  shall  not  be 
entitled  as  of  right  to  a  preliminary  examination  in  any 
case  where  the  prosecuting  attorney,  after  a  due  investi- 
gation of  the  facts,  shall  have  presented  an  information 
against  him  in  proper  form,  does  not  contravene  the  pro- 
hibition of  the  Philippine  bill  of  rights  (act  July  1, 1902, 
§  5),  against  the  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws.  It  was  long  ago  decided  that  the  guaranty  of  the 
equal  protection  does  not  require  territorial  uniformity. 
Ocampo  V.  United  States,  234  U.  S.  91. 

§  578.  Raising  federal  question  on  second  trial.    The 

protection  of  the  due  process  of  law  and  the  equal  pro- 
tection of  the  law  clauses  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
first  invoked  by  the  tender  of  amended  answers  after 
the  case  had  been  remanded  to  the  trial  court  by  the  high- 
est state  court  for  a  new  trial,  is  not  denied  by  the  aflSrm- 
ance  in  the  highest  state  court  on  a  second  appeal  of  the 
ruling  of  the  trial  court,  refusing  to  permit  the  filing  of 
such  amended  answers,  where  the  highest  state  court  in 
effect  held  that  the  facts  upon  which  the  Federal  rights 
were  based  had  been  concluded  by  the  former  decision, 
which  was  the  law  of  the  case,  and  that  to  permit  a  re- 
litigation of  tfiese  facts  because  the  result  reached  was 
alleged  to  violate  constitutional  provisions  would  reopen 
that  which  the  court  held  had  been  settled  by  the  decision 
on  the  first  appeal,  in  which  no  infraction  of  Federal 
right  was  duly  set  up  as  required  to  lay  the  foundation 
for  review.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Higdon,  234  U.  S. 
592. 

The  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  not  denied  to  a  per- 
son sentenced  to  fourteen  years'  imprisonment  for  the 
crime  of  perjury,  under  the  authority  of  the  Califomia 
penal  code,  which  makes  perjury  punishable  by  imprison- 


842  DUE  PBOCESS  OF  LAW  {  578 

ment  in  the  state  prison  for  not  less  than  one  nor  more 
than  fourteen  years,  although  five  years'  imprisonm^t 
may  be  the  average  maximum  penalty  for  other  felonies 
denounced  by  the  California  laws,  some  of  whioh  may  be 
of  greater  gravity  and  of  more  injurious  consequences 
than  perjury.  To  establish  appropriate  penalties  for  the 
commission  of  crime  and  to  confer  upon  judicial  tribunals 
a  discretion  respecting  the  punishment  to  be  inflicted  in 
particular  cases,  within  limits  fixed  by  the  law  maldiig 
power,  are  functions  peculiarly  belonging  to  the  several 
states ;  and  there  is  nothing  to  support  the  contention  that 
the  sentence  imposed  in  this  case  violates  the  provisions 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  either  in  depriving  appel- 
lant of  his  liberty  without  due  process  of  law,  or  in  deny- 
ing to  him  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  say,  says  the  opinion,  that  the  comparative 
gravity  of  criminal  ofiFenses,  and  whether  their  conse- 
quences are  more  or  less  injurious,  are  matters  for  the 
state  itself  to  determine.  Collins  v.  Johnston,  237  U.  S. 
502. 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


{BXrSBBNOBS  ABS  TO  PAOXS] 


A.  Backofl  Jr.  ft  Sons  ▼.  Fort 

Street  Uidon  Depot  Ck>.,   169 

U.  S.  557  391,  829 

Abilene  Nat.  Bank  ▼.  DoUey,  228 

U.  S.  1  473 

Ableman  ▼.  Booth,  21  How.  523      75 
Adair  ▼.  United  States,  208  U.  S. 

161     150,  185,  493,  496,  497,  512 
Adams  ▼.  Milwaukee,  228  U.  S. 

572  402,  431,  790 

Adams  v.  New  York,  192  U.  S. 

585  131,  160,  306,  832 

Adams  Express  Go.  v.  Ohio  State 

Auditor,  165  U.  S.  194      341,  614 
Ah  Cheung,  In  re,  136  Gal.  678, 

69  Pae.  492  776 

Ah  Sin  y.  Wittman,  198  U.  S.  500 

428,  494,  777 
Aikens  v.  Wisconsin,  195  tJ.  S. 

194  495 

Alexander,  The,  60  Fed.  914        404 
Allen  ▼.  Georgia,  166  U.  S.  138 

473,  546,  556,  575 
Allen  V.  Pullman's  Palace  Gar 

Co.,  191  U.  S.  171  341 

Allen  ▼.  Biley,  203  U.  S.  347        782 
Allge^er  v.  Louisiana,  165  XT.  S. 

578     488,  492,  494,  496,  497,  511 
Aluminum  Go.  v.  Bamsey,  222  U. 

S.  251  685 

Alvre^    y     Sanchez    ▼.    United 

States,  216  U.  S.  167  466 

American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canter,  1 

Pet.  511  119 

American  Land  Co.  v.  Zeiss,  219 

U.  S.  47  402,  472 


American    lithographic    Co.    ▼. 

Werckmeister,  221  U.  S.  603      167 
American    Befrigerator    Transit 

Co.  ▼.  Hall,  174  U.  8.  70  345 

American    School    of    Magnetic 

Healing  ▼.  McAnnultj,  187  U. 

S.  94  135 

American   Steel  ft  Wire  C6.  ▼. 

Speed,  192  U.  S.  500  701 

American  Sugar  Befining  Co.  ▼. 

Louisiana,  179  U.  S.  89  622 

Anderson  v.  Dunn,  6  Wheat.  204 

578,  582 
Anderson  v.  Forty-two  Broadway 

Co.,  239  U.  S.  69  180 

Angel  y.  Smith,  9  Yes.  335  582 

Angle  y.  Chicago,  St*  Paul,  etc., 

Bailway,  151  U.  S.  1  41,  261 

Appleby  y.  Builalo,  221  U.  8. 

524  391 

Arizona  &  New  Mexico  By.  y. 

Clark,  235  U.  S.  669  318 

Armour  Packing  Co.  y.  Lacy,  200 

U.  S.  226  633 

Armour  Packing  Co.   y.   United 

States,  209  U.  S.  56  510 

Armour  &  Co.  y.  North  Dakota, 

240  U.  S.  510  432,  758 

Amett  y.  Beade,  220  U.  S.  311     455 
Arrowsmith  y.   Harmoning,   118 

U.  S.  194  263 

Ashley  y.  Byan,  153  U.  S.  436      434 
Assaria  State  Bank  v.  Dolley,  219 

U.  S.  121  402,  737 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  B.  Co.  y. 

Denver  &  N.  O.  B.  Co.,  110 

U.  S.  667  410 


843 


844 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


I 

Atehison,  T.  ft  8.  F.  R.  Go.  ▼. 

Matthews,  174  U.  8.  96     605,  669 
AtehiBon,  T»  ft  8.  F.  B.  Co.  ▼. 

VoBbnrg,  238  U.  8.  56  693 

Atherton  ▼.  Atherton,  181  U.  8. 

155  326,  327,  330,  332 

Atkin  y.  Kanus,  191  U.  6.  207 

755,  775 
Atlunson  v.  Dunlap,  50  Me.  Ill  524 
Atlantie   Coast  Line  B.  Co.  ▼. 

Georgia,  234  U.  8.  280  689 

Atlantie  Coaat  line  B.   Co.   v. 

Bivenide  Mills,  219  U.  S.  1^6 

160,  161,  500,  504 
Atlantie  ft  P.  Tel.  Co.  ▼.  Pliiladel- 

phia,  190  U.  8.  160  341 

Attorney    General    v.    WilliamSy 

174  Mass.  476  379 

Anffmordt  ▼.  Hedden,  137  U.  8. 

310  870 

Auld  V.  Buteher,  2  Kan.  135        520 
Aultman,  etc.,  Maeh.  Co.  ▼.  Fish, 

120  lU.  App.  314  522 

B 

BaeeoB  ▼.  Looisianay  282  XT.  8. 

334  794 

Backus  ▼.  Fort  Street  Union 
Depot  Co.,  169  U.  8.  557 

216,  218,  220,  458,  532 
Bacon  ▼.  Hooker,  17t  Mass.  335  348 
Bacon  v.  Walker,  204  U.  8.  311 

420,  779 
Bagg  's  Appeal,  43  Pa.  St.  512  524 
Bagg's  Case,  11  Coke  99a,  100 

17,  251 
Bain,  In  re,  121  U.  8.  1  535 

Ball  v.  Anderson,  196  Pa.  8t.  86   523 
Ballard  ▼.  Hunter,  204  U.  8.  241 

291,  718 
Baltic  Min.  Co.  v.  Massachusetts, 

231  U.  8.  68  480,  721 

Baltimore  ft  O.  B.  Co.  ▼.  Hos- 

tetter,  240  U.  8.  620  314 

Baltimore  ft  O.  B.  Co.  ▼.  Inter- 
state Commerce  Comnussioni 
221  U.  8.  612  504 


AKI  TO  PAOIS] 

Baltimore  ft  8.  B.  Co.  v.  Nesbit, 

10  How.  395  452,  522 

Bank  of  Columbia  ▼.   Okelj,  4 

Wheat  235  276,  280,  297,  526 
Bank  of  Commerce  v.  New  York 

City,  2  Black  732  340 

Bannon  v.  United  States,  156  U. 

8.  464  78 

Barber  v.  Barber,  21  How.  582  327 
Barbier  ▼.  Connolly,  113  U.  8.  27 

39,  263,  281,  398,  662,  723,  761 
Bamita   ▼.   Beverly,  163   U.   & 

118  528 

Barrett   ▼.   Barrett^   120   N.   C 

127  457 

Barrett   v.   Holmes,   102    U.    8. 

651  519 

Barrett  ▼.  Indiana,  229  U.  8.  26 

402,  479,  791 
Barrington  ▼.  Missouri,  205  U.  8. 

483  154,  165 

Barron  ▼.  Baltimore,  7  Pet.  243 

25,  56,  60,  99, 154, 165,  452,  542 
Bartameyer    v.    Iowa,    18   Wait 

129  257 

Barton  v.  Morris,  15  Ohio  408  457 
Barton  ▼.  SUte,  67  Ga.  653  559 
Bates  ft  G.  Co.  v.  Payne,  194  U. 

8.  106  135,  205 

Bauman  v.  Boss,  167  U.  8.  548 
88,  106,  162,  210,  220, 

221,  291,  355,  357,  375,  378,  467 
Bayard  y.  Singleton,  1  N.  C.  42  18 
Beavers  y.  Henkel,  194  U.  8.  73  133 
Bedford  y.  United  States,  192  U. 

8.  217  127,  215 

Bedford  Quarries  B.  Co.  y.  Chi- 
cago, I.  ft  L.  B.  Co.,  175  Ind. 

303  476 

Beers  y.  Glynn,  211  U.  8.  477  632 
Bell  y.  Bell,  181  U.  8. 175  325,  326 
Bell's   Gap   B.   Co.   y.   Pennayl- 

yania,  134  U.  S.  232  280,  285, 

305,  352,  367,  368,  374,  613,  618 
Bellingham  Bay  ft  B.  C.  B.  Co. 

▼.  New  Whatcom,  172  U.  8.  314 

287,  292,  366 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


845 


[BinEBENCIS 

Bdoit  ▼.  Morgan^  7  Wall.  624     452 
Beltzhoover  ▼.  UeweU,  11  GiL  & 

J.  212  521 

Bergemann  v.  Backer,  157  U.  S. 

655  556,  826 

Bemheimer  ▼.  Converse,  206  U.  8. 

516  313 

Beny    ▼.    Donovan,    188    Mass. 

353  514 

Beny  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.,  B.  Co., 

52  Kan.  759  522 

Bessette  v.  People,  193  HI.  334     494 
Bessette  v.  W.  B.  Conkey  Co.,  194 

U.  S.  324  579 

Bicknell  v.  Comstoek,  113  U.  8. 

152  524 

Billings  V.  Hall,  7  Cal.  1  521 

Billings   V.    Illinois,    188    U.    8. 

97  625 

Billings  V.  United  8tates,  232  U. 

8. 261  171 

Bissell  ▼.  Jeffersonville,  24  How. 

296  452 

Black  V.  Jackson,  177  U.  8.  349 

124,  536 
Blackford    v.    Pother,    1    Black 

36  521 

Blackstone  v.  Miller,  188  U.  8. 

189  ,  348,  349,  624 

Blake  v.  McClung,  172  U.  8.  239 

313,  711 
Blinn  v.  Nelson,  222  XT.  8.  1  471 
Blonnt    V.    Windley,    95    U.    8. 

173  529 

Blnm  V.  Nelson,  222  U.  8.  1         313 
Blnmenthal    v.    8haw,    77    Fed.   ' 

954  514 

Board  of  Education  v.  Illinois, 

203  U.  8.  553  632 

Bolleb   V.   Brimfield,   120   U.   8. 

759  457 

Bollman,  Ex  parte,  4  Cranch  75, 

94  578 

Bolln  V.  Nebraska,  176  U.  8.  83    549 
Bonham's  Case,  8  Coke  114  16 

Bonham's  Case,  8  Coke  118a        249 


ABX  TO  PAGXS] 

Bonnemot    v.    Gill,    167    Mass. 

338  323 

Booth  V.  Illinois,  184  U.  8.  425 

427,  428,  494,  508,  518 
Booth  V.  Indiana,  237  U.  8.  391  752 
Booth    V.    Woodborg,    32    Conn. 

128  356 

Bosley  v.  McLaughlin,  236  U.  8. 

385  517,  798 

Boston  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts, 

97  U.  8.  25  405 

Boston  Chamber  of  Commerce  v. 

Boston,  217  tJ.  8.  189  389 

Bothwell  V.  Bingham  County,  237 

U.  8.  642  342 

Bowen  v.  Phillips,  55  Ind.  226  522 
Bowman  v.  Lewis,  101  U.  8.  22 

41,  262,  272,  662,  821 
Bowman    v.    Middleton,    1    Bay 

252  18,  447 

Bown  V.  Walling,  204  U.  8.  320  420 
Boyd  V.  United  8tates,  116  U.  8. 

616  79,  583 

BraceviUe  Coal  Co.  v.  People,  147 

HI.  66  491 

Bradley,  Ex  parte,  7  Wall.  364  589 
Bradley  v.  Fisher,  13  Wall.  335  589 
Bradley  v.  Lightcap,  195  U.  8. 

1  453 

Bradley  v.  Richmond,  227  U.  8. 

477  746 

Bradwell    v.    Illinois,    16    WalL 

130  608 

Brand  v.  Union  Elevated  B.  Co., 

238  U.  8.  586  393 

Brantley  v.  Georgia,  217  U.  8. 

284  158 

Brass  v.  8tate  of  North  Dakota, 

153  U.  8.  391  813 

Brass  v.  8toe8er,  153  U.  8.  391  409 
Breese  v.  United  States,  226  U. 

8.  1  164 

Brennan  v.   United  Hatters,  73 

N.  J.  L.  729  514 

Bridges  v.  GAiBn,  33  Ga.  113  347 
Brinton  v.  8eevers,  12  Iowa  389   457 


846 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


[REmSNOIS  A&l  TO  PAGXS] 


Briseoe  ▼.  Bodolpli,  221  U.  a  547 

161,  292,  334,  467 
Broftdnu  ▼.  IQMOori,  219  U.  B. 

285  504,  639 

Bromon  ▼.  Einsl^,  1  How.  311  527 
Bronaon  ▼.  Bodflt,  7  WaU.  229 

71,  72 
BrooUyn  ▼.  Stns  L.  Ins.  Co.,  99 

U.  8.  362  319 

Brooks  ▼.  GTMthod,  1  J.  *  W. 

176  582 

BroTinf,  In  f,  136  U.  8.  586  588 
Brown,  In  re,  185  U.  8.  662  473 
Brown  v.  Obm  'rs,  50  Miss.  468  273 
Brown   v.   HonfUm,  114   U.   8. 

622  345 

Brown  ▼.  MazylMid,  12  Wheat. 

419  344 

Brawn  ▼.  New  Jereej,  175  U.  8. 
17»  61,  90,  154,  165, 

459,  532,  547,  549,  573,  575,  830 
Bnfim  ▼.  Walker,  161  U.  8.  591 

61,  96,  145 
Brown-Pormaii  Co.  ▼.  Kentnekj, 

217  U.  a  563  637 

Bnuhaber  ▼.  Union  PaeUe  B.  B. 

Co.,  240  U.  a  1  181 

Buekner  ▼.  Finley,  2  Pet.  586  332 
Budd  V.  8tate  of  New  York,  143 

U.  a  517  813 

Budd  '■  Case,  117  N.  T.  27  409 

Burr,  Ex  parte,  9  Wheat  529  589 
Burr's   Case,   4   Craneh   App^z 

470  21 

Barton,  In  re,  29  Fed.  639  525 

Bush  ▼•   Eentoekj,  107   U.   8. 

110  604 

Bushnell  V.  Lsland,  164  XT.  8. 

684  135 

Butchers'  Union,  ete.,  C6.  ▼.  Cres- 
cent Citj,  ote^  Co.,  HI  U.  a 
746  491 

Buttfleld  ▼.  Stranahaa,  192  U.  8. 
470  128,  290,  458 


Cachute  ▼.  State,  50  ICss.  169       165 
Cahen   ▼.    Brewster,   203   U.   8. 

543  6.n 

Cain  v.  Com.  Pub.  Co.,  232  U.  a 

134  318 

Calder  ▼.  BuU,  3  DaU.  386 

208,  453,  522,  530 
CaldweU  v.  Texas,  137  U.  a  692 

280,  297,  556 
Caledonian  Coal  Co.  ▼.  Baker,  196 

U.  8.  432  320 

California  Reduction  Co.  v.  Sani- 
tary Beduetion  Works,  199  U. 

a  306  400,  407 

Callan  y.  Wilson,  127  U.  8.  540 

24Q,  500,  536 
Calvin's  Case,  7  Op.  Bep.  1 

118,  232 
Camfield  ▼.  United  States,  167  U. 

a  618  440 

Campbell  v.  CaUfomU,  200  U.  8. 

87  630 

Campbell  ▼.  Holt,  115  U.  8.  620 

403,  524 
Canal  Appraisers  v.  People,  ^7 

Wend.  604  75,  214 

Capital  City  Dairy  Co.  v.  Ohio, 

183  U.  a  238  771 

Capital  Traction  Co.  ▼.  Hof,  174 

U.  a  1  124,  240,  536 

Carlson  ▼.  Washington,  234  U.  8. 

103  589 

Carpenter    v.    PennsylTania,    17 

How.  463  452 

Carpenter  ▼•  Teadon,  158  Fed. 

766  424 

Carroll  ▼.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.,  109 

U.  8.  401      172,  243,  495,  507,  511 
Carson  ▼.  Sewer  Com'rs,  182  U. 

a  398  292 

Carter  ▼.  Texas,  177  U.  8.  442      607 
Cartwright's  Case,  114  Mass.  230 

578,  582 
Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  181  U. 
a  396  360,  489 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


847 


[BIFIBINOIB 

GasteUo  y.  MeConnico,  168  U.  S. 

674  262 

Oentral  Bank  v.  Solomon,  20  Ga. 

408  620 

Central    Loan   &    Tnut   Go.   ▼. 

Campbell  Commiafiion  Co.,  173 

U.  8.  84  712 

Central    Lmnber    Co.    ▼•    South 

Dakota,  226  U.  S.  157 

402,  506,  511,  745 
Central   of   Georgia   B.    Co.   ▼. 

Wright,  207  U.  S.  127 

290,  294,  296 
Chadwick  ▼.   Kelly,   187   U.   S. 

540  358,  361 

Chae  Chan  Ping  y.  United  States, 

130  U.  S.  581  92,  137,  234 

Ghaloner  y.  Sherman,  242  U.  S. 

455  288 

Chapman,  In  re,  156  U.  S.  211     565 
Chapman  y.  Goodnow,  12^  U.  S. 

540  265 

Chapman  y.  State,  104  Cal.  690    522 
Chappell  y.  United  States,  160  U. 

a  499  211,  212,  220 

Chappell   Chemical   ft  Fertilizer 

Co.  y.  Sulphur  Mines  Co.,  172 

U.  S.  474  830 

Charles  Biyer  Bridge  y.  Warren 

Bridge,  11  Pet  420 

208,  451,  521,  522 
Charlotte^    C.    &   A.    B.    Co.    y. 

Gibbes,  142  U.  S.  386         355,  658 
Cheely  y.  Clayton,  110  U.  8.  701 

327,  332 
Cheeyer  y.  Wilson,  9  WalL  108 

326,  327 
Cherokee    Nation    y.     Southern 

Kansas  B.  Co.,  135  U.  S.  641 

208,  212,  216,  218,  221 
Chesapeake  ft  O.  B.  Co.  y.  Conlej, 

230  U.  S.  513  688 

Chestnut  y.  Shane,  16  Ohio  599     457 
Chicago  y.  Sturgee,  222  U.  S.  313 

469,  743 
Chicago,  B.  ft  N.  R  Co.  y.  Porter, 

43  Minn.  527  476 


AXE  TO  PAGIS] 

Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  y.  Bab- 
cock,  204  U.  S.  685  341 

Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  y.  Chi- 
cago, 166  U.  8.  226 

90,  139,  880, 
384,  391,  467,  532,  547,  575,  665 

Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  y.  Cram, 
228  U.  S.  70  402 

Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  y.  Catts, 
94  U.  8.  155  651 

Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  y.  Illi- 
nois, 200  U.  8.  561 

148,  387,  419,  467,  677 

Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  y.  Mc- 
Guire,  219  U.  S.  549         437, 
502,  504,  506,  508,  516,  517,  684 

Chicago,    B.    ft    Q.    B.    Co.    y. 
Nebraska,  170  U.  8.  57     291,  403 

Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B.  Co.  y.  People, 
212  m.  103  388 

Chicago  Dock  ft  Canal  Co.  y. 
Fraley,  228  U.  8.  680  791 

Chicago,  I.  ft  L.  B.  Co.  y.  Hackett, 
228  U.  S.  559  687 

Chicago,  E.  ft  W.  B.  Co.  y.  Pon- 
tius, 157  U.  8.  209  664 

Chicago  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Needles, 
113  U.  S.  574  697 

Chicago,  M.  ft  St.  P.  B.  Co.  y. 
Iowa,  233  U.  8.  334  689 

Chicago,  M.  ft  St.  P.  B.  Cd.  y. 
Kennedy,  232  U.  8.  628  477 

Chicago,  M.  ft  St  P.  B.  Co.  y. 
Minneapolis,  232  U.  8.  430 

393,  477 

Chicago,  M.  ft  St  P.  B.  Co.  y. 
Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  418 

290,  411,  413,  474,  657,  666  , 

Chicago,  M.  ft  St.  P.  B.  Co.  y. 
Polt,  232  U.  8.  165  477 

Chicago,  M.  ft  St.  P.  B.  Co.  y. 
Wisconsin,  238  U.  8.  491  482 

Chicago  B.  Co.  y.  Iowa,  4  U.  8. 
155  306 

Chicago,  B.  I.  ft  P.  B.  Co.  y. 
Arkansas,  219  U.  8.  453     439,  683 


848 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


I 

Chieftgo,  T.  H.  ft  S.  E.  B.  Ck>.  ▼. 

AnderaoDy  242  U.  8.  283  695 

dhicago  ft   A.   B.  Co.   y.  Tran- 

barger,  238  U.  8.  67 

180,  458,  694 
Chicago  ft  G.  T.  B.  Co.  v.  Well- 

man,  143  U.  8.  339  412 

Chicago  ft  N.  W.  B.  Co.  ▼.  Mc- 
Laughlin, 119  U.  8.  566  654 

Chicago  ft  N.  W.  B.  Co.  y.  More- 
houae,  112  Wis.  1  393 

Chicago,  etc,  B.  Co.  y.  Chicago, 
166  XT.  8.  238  378 

Chicago,  etc.,'B.  Co.  y.  Dey,  35 
Fed.  866  414 

Chicago,  etc.,  B.  Co.  y.  Minne- 
sota, 134  U.  8.  418  415 

Chicago,  etc.,  B.  Co.  y.  Wellman, 
143  U.  8.  339  412 

CUles,  In  re,  22  WalL  157  579 

Chin  Bak  Kan  y.  United  States, 
186  U.  8.  193  137,  234,  236 

Chin  Yow  y.  United  States,  208 
U.  8.  8  168 

Chinese  Exclusion  Case,  139  U. 
8.  581,  600  112 

Chipley  y.  Atkinson,  23  Fla.  206    514 

Choate  y.  Trapp,  224  U.  8.  665 

181,  403,  455 
Choctaw  ft  Gulf  B.  R  y.  Harrison, 

235  U.  8.  298  357 

Christmas    y.    Bussell,    5    Wall. 

290  333 

Chj  Lung  y.  Freeman,  92  U.  8. 

275  257 

Cincinnati,   I.    ft  W.   B.   Co.   y. 

ConnersyiUe,  218  U.  8.  336  466 
Cincinnati,  N.  O.  ft  T.  P.  B.  Co. 

y.    Interstate   Com.   Commiss., 

162  U.  8.  184  411 

(^dnnati,  N.  O.  ft  T.  P.  B.  Co. 

y.  Kentucky,  115  U.  8.  321  653 
Cincinnati  Packet  Co.  y.  Bay,  200 

U.  8.  179  347 

Cincinnati  Street  B.  Co.  y.  Snell, 

193  U.  8.  30  833 


ABB  TO  PA0I8] 

Citizens'    Say.    ft   L.    Aas^   ▼. 

Topeka,  20  WalL  655 

352,  354,  383 
Citizens'  Telephone  Co.  y.  Foller, 

229  U.  8.  322  748 

City  Bank  of  New  Orleans,  In  re, 

3  How.  292  530 

Ciyil  Bights  Cases,  109  U.  S.  3 

242,  267,  610 
Clark  y.  Kansas  City,  176  U.  & 

114  726 

Clark  y.  Nash,  198  U.  8.  361 

385,  390,  392,  426,  463 
Clark   y.    TitosyiUe,   184    U.    8. 

329  729 

Clark  y.  Wells,  203  U.  &.  164        320 
Clement  Nat.  Bank  ▼.  Vermont, 

231  U.  a  120  290,  295,  643 

Cleyeland,  C,  C.  ft  St  L.  B.  Co. 

y.  Porter,  210  U.  8.  177 

s  195,  392 

Cliquot's    Champagne,    3    WalL 

114  94 

Coates    y.    New    York,    7    Cow. 

585  424 

Coe  y.  Armour  Fertilizer  Works, 

237  U.  8.  413  295 

Coe  y.  Errol,  116  U.  8.  517  345 

CoffeyyiUe  Vitrified  Brick  ft  Tile 

Co.  y.  Perry,  69  Kan.  297  513 
Cole  y.  LaGrange,  113  U.  8.  1  211 
Collector  y.  Day,  11  WalL  113  340 
Colling    y.    Kansas    City    Stock 

Yards  Co.,  183  U.  8.  79  414 

CoUins  y.   Johnston,  237   U.   8. 

502  564,  566,  842 

Columbia  Heights  Bealty  Co.  y. 

Budolph,  217  U.  S.  547  162,  467 
Columbus    Southern    B.    Co.    y. 

Wright,  151  U.  8.  470  660 

Commercial  Mut.  Accident  Co.  y. 

Dayis,  213  U.  8.  245  317 

Commercial  ft  B.  Bank  y.  Sto- 

comb,  14  Pet.  60  316 

Com.  y.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53      397,  400 
Com.  y.  Baltimore  ft  O.  B.  Co., 

145  U.  8.  263  410 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


849 


[RiriBENOIS 

Com.  ▼.  Gaton,  4  Gall  (Va.)  5 

18,  255,  339,  446 
Com.  y.  Dana,  2  Met.  329  132 

Com.  y.  Gaming  Implements,  119 

Mass.  332  404 

Com.    y.    McArthor,    152    Mass. 

522  430 

Com.   y.   MeCaffertj,  145  Mass. 

384  426 

Com.  of  Virginia,  Ex  parte,  100 

U.  B.  313  600 

Com.   of  Virginia  ft   Coles,   Ex 

parte,  100  U.  S.  339  601 

Connecticut  Mutual  Life  Insur- 
ance Co.  y.  Spratley,  172  U. 

8.  602  343 

Connolly  y.  Union  Sewer  Pipe  Co., 

184  U.  S.  540  626,  700 
Consolidated  Coal  Co.  y.  Illinois, 

185  U.  8.  203  731,  772,  796 
Consolidated    Bendering    Co.    y. 

Vermont,  207  U.  8.  541     583,  704 
Cook  y.  Hart,  146  U.  8.  183 

562,  563 
Cook  y.  Marshall  County,  196  U. 

8.  261  626 


Cook  y.  Moffat,  5  How.  315 


;27 


Cook  y.  Wood,  1  McCord  L.  139     521 
Cooper  y.  Bejnolds,  10  Wall.  308 

314,  317,  319 
Cooper  y.  The  Wandworth  Board 

of  Works,  14  C.  B.  N.  8.  180     294 
Coosa  Biyer  8.  Co.  y.  Barclay, 

30  Ala.  120  521 

Copin  y.  Adamson,  L.  B.,  9  Ex. 

345  311 

Coppage  y.  Kansas,  236  U.  8. 1 

402,  435,  512,  514,  517 
Corfield  y.  Coryell,  Fed.  Gas.  No. 

3,230  36 

Cornell  Steamboat  Co.  y.  8ohmer, 

235  U.  8.  549  341,  342,  346 

Corry  y.   Baltimore,   196  U.   8. 

466  348 

Getting   y.    Kansas    City    Stock 

Yards  Co.,  183  U.  8.  79 

414,  416,  816 

Due  Process — 54 


ABX  TO  PA<ns] 

Coulter  y.  Louisyille  &  Nashville 

B.  Co.,  196  U.  8.  599  627 

Counselman  y.  Hitchcock,  142  U. 

8.  547  84,  96,  145 

Courch  y.  Jeffries,  4  Burr.  2460  445 
Covington  &  L.  Turnpike  Boad 

Co.  y.  Sandford,  164  U.  8.  578 

241,  412,  413,  814 
Cox  y.  Berry,  13  Ga.  306  521 

Cox  y.  Texas,  202  U.  8.  446  634 

Grain  y.  United  States,  162  U.  8. 

625  536,  655 

Crandall  y.  Nevada,  6  Wall.  35 

38,  230 
Crane  v.  New  York,  239  U.  8. 

195  755 

Crawford  v.  State,  Minor  (Ala.) 

143  523 

Creighton  v.  Kerr,  20  Wall.  8  317 
Creighton  v.  Pragg,  21  Gal.  115  476 
Cronin  y.  Adams,  192  U.  8.  108  802 
Crooks  y.  Crooks,  4  Grant  Gh.  (U. 

C.)  615  522 

Cross  y.  North  Carolina,  132  U. 

8.  131  556 

Grossman  v.  Luman,  192  IT.   8. 

189  431 

Growl  y.  Pennsylvania,  242  U.  8. 

153  819 

Crowley  v.  Christensen,  137  U.  8. 

86  799 

Croxall  v.  Shererd,  5  WalL  289  524 
Grozier  v.  Fried.  Krupp  Aktien- 

gesellschaft,  224  U.  8.  290        221 
Cuddy,  Ex  parte,  131  IT.  8.  280 

580,  586 
Culbeth  y.  Downing,  121  N.  G. 

205  520 

Gumming   v.    County    Board    of 

Education,  175  IT.  8.  528  606 

Gummings  v.   Missouri,  4  Wall. 

277, 323  303 

Cunnius  v.  Beading  School  Dist., 

198  U.  8.  458  289,  323,  402 

Curtiss  v.  Georgetown  ft  A.  Turn- 
pike Co.,  6  Granch  233        88,  220 
Cutts  v.  Hardee,  38  Ga.  350         521 


850 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


Duif  orth  ▼.  QeorgU,  75  Oa.  614    164 
D'Arey   ▼.    Ketchum,    11    How. 

165  308,  332 

DArnell   v.   Indiana,   226  U.   S. 

390  720 

Dartmouth  College  Oaae,  4  Wheat. 

518  58,  60,  275,  284,  300 

Dartmouth  College  ▼.  Woodward, 

4  Wheat  518  452 

Davidson  ▼.  New  Orleans,  06  U. 

8.  97  9, 15, 

19,  24,  42,  49,  50,  185,  249, 

272,  285,  303,  357,  368,  369, 

375,  376,  382,  386,  462,  542,  545 
Davis  ▼.  Mills,  194  U.  8.  451 

520,  524,  526 
Davis  ▼.  Texas,  139  U.  S.  651  824 
Davis  ▼.  Utah  Territory,  151 U.  8. 

262  826 

Dayton  Coal  ft  I.  Co.  ▼.  Barton, 

183  U.  8.  23  510 

De  Beam  ▼.  Safe  Deposit  k  T. 

Co.,  233  U.  8.  24  840 

Debs,  In  re,  158  U.  8.  564     579,  582 
DeCamp  v.  Hibemia  Undergronnd 

R.  Co.,  47  N.  J.  L.  43  476 

Delaware,   L.   ft   W.   B.   Co.   v. 

Pennsylvania,  198  U.  8.  341 

342,  487 
Delaware,  L.   ft   W.   B.   Co.   v. 

Pnblie  UtiUties,  85  N.  J.  L. 

28  483 

Delaware,  L.   ft  W.   B.   Co.  v. 

United  States,  231  U.  8.  363  170 
De  Lima  v.  BidweU,  182  U.  8. 1  120 
Dennj  v.  Bennett,  128  U.  8.  489  451 
Denver  v.  New  York  Trust  Co., 

229  U.  8.  123  792 

Detroit  v.  Osborne,  135  U.  8.  492 

354,  383 
Detroit  v.  Parker,  181  U.  8.  399 

292,  360 
Detroit,  Ft  W.  ft  B.  I.  B.  Co.  v. 

Osbom,  189  U.  8.  383  674 


1 

Dewey  v.  Des  Moines,  173  U  8. 

193  341,  369 

Diamond  Match  Co.  ▼•  Ontonagon, 

188  U.  8.  82  346 

Dias  V.  United  Stotes,  233  U.  a 

442  539,  559 

Diekerson  ▼.  Colgrove,  100  U.  8. 

583  524 

Dietrich  V.  Murdoch,  42  Mo.  279  476 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Brooke, 

214  U.  &  138       292,  430,  465,  719 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Lynch- 
burg Invest  Corporationi  236 

U.  a  692  221 

Dizen  v.  Winnipeg  Electric  St. 

B.  Co.,  11  Manitoba  528  523 

Dobbins  v.  Los  Angeles,  195  U*  8. 

223  518 

Dodge  V.  Brady,  240  U.  a  122  182 
Dodge  V.  Osbom,  240  U.  a  118  182 
Dollar    Sav.    Bank    v.    United 

Stotes,  19  WalL  240  367 

Donald  v.  Chicago,  B.  ft  Q.  B. 

Co.,  93  Iowa  284  603 

Doran   v.   Kennedy,  237   U.   a 

362  335 

Dorman  v.  State,  34  Ala.  216  376 
Dorr  V.  United  States,  195  U.  a 

138  125,  536 

Dow  V.   Beidehnan,   125   U.   a 

680  306 

Dowdell  V.  United  States,  221  U. 

8.  325  127,  539,  559 

Downes  v.  Bidwell,  182  U.  a  244 

120,  238 
Downman  v.   Texas,  231   U.  8. 

353  644 

Dred  Scott  Csse,  19  How.  393 

25,  26,  28,  29,  30,  227,  228 
Drehman  v.  Stifle,  8  Wall.  508 

452,  529 
Dreyer  v.  Illinois,  187  U.  8.  71 

109,  298,  538 
Duncan  v.  Missouri,  152  U.  a 

377  38 

Dunn  V.  Com.,  6  Pa.  St.  384        557 
Dynes  v.  Hoover,  20  How.  65         56 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


851 


[BSriBlNOIS  ABX  TO  PAQIS] 


£ 


Earnshaw  ▼.  United  States,  146 

U.  S.  60  371 

Eberle  ▼.   Miehigan,  232  U.  8. 

700  803 

EeksteiiL  ▼.   Bhoemery  3   Meart. 

15  521 

Edwards  ▼.  EDiott,  21  WalL  532 

61,  542 
Edwards  v.  Keaney,  96  U.  S. 

595  521 

EiBnger  ▼.  Kennej,  115  U.   S. 

566  529 

Egan  ▼.  Hart,  165  U.  8.  188        403 
Eight-Hour-Law  Case   (Wilson) 

y.  New  ft  Ferris,  Beceivers,      182 
Eitenbecker  ▼.  District  Court,  134 

U.  8.  81  580 

Ekia  ▼.  United  States,  142  U.  8. 

651  92,  205 

Eldridge  ▼.  TreseTant,  160  U.  S. 

452  148,  767 

Elgin  ▼•  Eaton,  83  HL  535 

390,  475 
Elk  ▼.  Wilkins,  112  U.  8.  94  231 
Elliot  ▼.  Piersol,  1  Pet.  328  333 
Embree   v.    Kansas    City   Bead 

Bist,  240  U.  8.  242  461 

Emert   v.   Missouri,   156   U.    8. 

296  793 

Empire  Twp.  ▼.  Darlington,  101 

U.  S.  87  319 

Engel  ▼.  CMalley,  219  U.  8.  128 

402,  738 
English  ▼.  Bichardson,  224  U.  8. 

680  403,  455 

Ensign  ▼.  Pennqrlyania,  227  U. 

8.  592  165 

Entiek  ▼.  Carrington,  19  How.  St. 

Tr.  1029  79 

Equitable  life  Society  y.  Penn- 

sylvania,  238  U.  8.  143 

342,  343,  357 
Erb  v.  Morasch,  177  U.  8.  684  670 
Erie  B.  Co.  ▼.  Williams,  233  U. 

8.  685  517 


Erskine  v.  Glidden,  Me.  [1886], 

3  Atl.  651  522 

Escanaba  Co.  v.  Chicago,  107  U. 

8.  678  209 

-Ettor  v.  Tacoma,  228  U.  8.  148 

292,  390,  404,  475 
Eubank  v.  Bichmond,  226  U.  8. 

137  402,  437 

Ewell  ▼.  DaggSy  108  U.  8.  143 

452,  529 
Ewing  ▼.  City  of  Leavenworth, 
226  U.  8.  464  347 


F 


Fallbrook     Irrigation    Dist.     ▼. 

Bradley,  164  U.  8.  112 

216,  291,  295,  353, 

355,  357,  375,  382,  386,  392,  452 
Fargo  V.  Hart,  193  U.  8.  490  342 
Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Ins.  Co. 

y.  Dobney,  189  U.  8.  301  808 

Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Sayings 

Bank  ▼.  Minnesota,  232  U.  8. 

516  644 

Farrell   v.    West   Chicago   Park 

Commissioners,  181  U.  8.  404  360 
Fay  ▼.  Crozier,  £17  U.  8.  455  304 
Fayerweather  y.  Bitch,  195  U.  S. 

276  139 

Felts  y.  Murphy,  201  U.  8.  123 

147,  564,  573 
Fertiliser  Co.  y.  Sulphur  Mines 

Co.,  172  U.  8.  474  830 

Fidelity  Mutual  Life  Association 

y.  Mettler,  185  U.  8.  308  806,  807 
Field  y.  Barber  Asphalt  Paying 

Co.,  194  U.  8.  618  719 

Fielden  y.  State  of  Illinois,  143 

U.  8.  452  538,  825 

Fifth  Aye.  Coach  Co.  y.  City  of 

New  York,  221  U.  8.  467 

426,  741 
Finch  ▼,  York  County,  19  Neb. 

50  •  347 

Finley  ▼.  California,  222  U.  8. 

28  838 


862 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


[ 

Fiaeher  y.  Bt  Looia,  104  U.  8. 

370  ,  400 

Fisher  t.  MeOirr,  1  Qraj  26  404 
Piskd,  £z  parte,  113  U.  8.  713  94 
Fitts  T.  McGhee,  172  U.  8.  516  663 
Fitzhngh     t.     Fitzhn^i    6     B. 

Hon.  4  522 

Fleming  t.  Page,  9  How.  603  237 
Fletcher  t.  Peek,  6  Graneh  87 

208,  255,  454 
Flint  T.  Stone,  Tracj  Co.,  220 

U.  8.  107  171,  343,  640 

Florida  Central  4k  P.  B.  Co.  t. 

Beynolda,  183  XT.  8.  471  672 

Fok  Tung  To  y.  United  8Utet, 

185  n.  8.  296  137,  234 

Fonda,  Ex  parte,  117  U.  8.  516  563 
Fong  Tne  Ting  y.  U.  8.,  149  U. 

8.  698  92, 115, 137, 142, 168,  234 
Foppino    y.    8peed,   199   U.    8. 

501  494 

Forbell  t.  New  Yotk^  i64  N.  Y. 

522  468 

Ft.  Leayenworth  B.  Co.  t.  Lowe, 

114  n.  8.  525  211 

Foster  y.  Essex  Bank,  16  Mass. 

245  530 

Fox  y.  Ohio,  6  How.  410 

56,  61,  542 
Frank's  Case,  237  U.  8.  309  573 
Frank  y.  Mangum,  237  IT.  8.  309 

564,  566,  567 
Frederieh,  In  re,  149  V,  8.  70  563 
Freeborn  y.  Smith,  2  Wall.  160  530 
Freeland  y.  Williams,  131  U.  8. 

405  280,  529 

Freeman  y.  Alderson,  119  U.  8. 

185  320 

French  y.  Barber  Asphalt  Pay. 

Co.,  181  n.  8.  324  357,  360,  489 
Frey  y.  Kirk,  4  GU.  &  J.  509  521 
Frisbie  y.  United  States,  157  U. 

S.  160  164 

Frisbie  y.  Wmtney,  9  Wall.  187  454 
Fuller  y.  Grand  Bapids,  40  Mich. 

395  523 


AEB  TO  PAOK] 

Fnllerton    y.    Bank    of    United 
States,  1  Pet  604  519 


G.  k  C.   Merriam  Ob.  y.  Saal- 

field,  241  U.  8.  22  314 

Gallup  y.  Schmidt,  183  U.  8.  301, 

307  870 

Galyeston,  H.  4k  8.  A.  R  Co.  t. 

Texas,  210  U.  8.  217        357,  480 
Galyeston,  H.  4k  8.  A.  B.  Oo.  y. 

Wallace,  223  U.  a  481  161 

Gardner  y.  Michigan,  199  U.  8. 

325  407,  834 

Gardner  t.   Kewborg,   2   Johns. 

Ch.  162  56,  207,  210 

Garfield  y.  United  States,  211  U. 

8. 249  472 

Garland,  Ex  parte,  4  Wall.  378     590 
Garland  y.  Washington,  232  U. 

&  642  554,  574,  577 

Garrison  t.  New  York,  21  Wall 

196  378 

Gast  Bealtj  4k  Inyestment  Co.  y. 

Schneider  Granite  Co.,  240  U. 

8.  55  461,  488,  647 

Gatewood  t.  North  Carolina,  203 

U.  8.  531  778 

Gayieres  y.  United  States,  220  U. 

8.  338  127 

Geer  y.  Connecticut,  161  U.  8. 

531  405 

Georgia  y.  Tennessee  Copper  Co., 

206  U.  S.  230  428 

Georgia  Bailroad  &  Banking  Co. 

y.  Smith,  128  U.  8.  174  411 

German  ABiance  Ins.  Co.  y.  Hale, 

219  U.  S.  307  739 

German    Alliance    Ins.    Co.    y. 

Lewis,  233  U.  8.  389 

402,  409,  706 
Gibbons  y.  Ogden^  9  Wheat.  1  184 
Gibson  y.  United  States,  166  U. 

8.  269  127,  147,  214,  387 

Gilbert  y.  Aekerman,  159  N.  T. 

118  520 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


853 


[BSnCEINOIS 

GiDespid  y.  People,  188  HI.  176     513 
Gilman  ▼.  Contra  Costa  County, 

6  Cal.  676  522 

Gilman  ▼.  Philadelphia,  3  WaU. 

713  420 

Gilmore  ▼.  Shnter,  1  Vent  330, 

2   Show.   16,   2   Ley.   227,   T. 

Jones  108,  2  MocL  310  445 

Giozsa  y.  Tiernan,  148  U.  8.  657 

281,  305,  800 
Glasgow  y.  Mojer,  225  U.  8.  420 

564,  566 
Glidden  y.  Harrington,  189  U.  8. 

255  366 

Godfrey  y.  Terry,  97  U.  8.  171    315 
Goldey  y.  Morning  News,  156  XT. 

8.  518  318 

Gompers  y.  United  States,  233  IJ. 

8.  604  584 

Goodrich  y.  Detroit,  184  IT.  8. 

432  292 

Gordner   y.   Stephens,   1   Heisk. 

280  524 

Gorman  y.  McArdle,  67  Hun  484, 

22  N.  Y.  Supp.  479  476 

Grade  y.  Palmer,  8  Wheat.  699    316 
Grafton  ▼.  United  States,  206  U. 

8.  333  126 

Graham  y.  West  Virginia,  224  U. 

8.  616  840 

Grand  Trunk  By.  Co.  of  Canada 

y.  Michigan  Bailroad  Commis- 
sion, 231  U.<6.  457 

176,  179,  393,  477 
Grannis  y.  Ordean,  234  U.  8.  385 

314,  316,  319 
Grant  y.  United  States,  227  U. 

8.  74  163,  584 

Granily  y.  Ewing,  3  How.  707  528 
Grayes  y.  State,  45  N.  J.  L.  203  826 
Grear  y.  Biddle,  8  Wheat.  1  531 
Great  Northern  B^  Co.  y.  Min- 
nesota, 238  U.  8.  340  484 
Great  Western  Tel.  Co.  v.  Purdy, 

162  U.  8.  329  520 

Green  y.  Biddle,  8  Wheat.  1 

451,  528 


TO  PAGI8] 

Greene  y.  Briggs,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 

5,764,  1  Curtis  311  64 

Greene  y.  Henkd,  183  U.  8.  249  134 
Greenleaf  Lumber  Co.  y.  Gktfrison, 

237  U.  8.  851      177,  209,  211,  216 
Greer  y.  Connecticut,  161  U.  8. 

519  422, 479 

Grenada  Lumber  Co.  y.  Missis- 
sippi, 217  U.  8.  433  499 
Grey  y.  Mobile  Trade  Co.,  55  Ala. 

388  476 

Grifin  y.  McEenzie,  7  Ga.  163  521 
Griffin  y.  Mizon,  38  Miss.  424  362 
Griffith  y.  Frazier,  8  Cranch  9  333 
Gritts  y.  Fisher,  224  U.  8.  640 

403,455 
Gross  y.   United  States  Mortg. 

Co.,  108  U.  8.  477  458 

Groyer  &  B.  Sewing  Mach.  Co.  y. 

Badcliffe,  137  U.  8.  287  319 

Gulf,  C.  &  8.  F.  B.  Co.  y.  Ellis, 

165  U.  8.  150  668,  805 

Gundling  y.  Chicago,  177  U.  8. 

183  494,  770 

Gwin  y.  Brown,  21  App.  Cas.  (D. 

C.)  295  520 


Hadacheck  y.  Los  Angeles,  239 

U.  8.  394  437,  757 

Haddock  y.  Haddock,  201  U.  8. 

562  320,  329,  330 

Hagar  y.  Bedamation  Dist.  No. 

108,  111  U  8.  701 

280,  291,  354,  355,  357, 

365,  366,  368,  369,  375,  383,  472 
Hairston  y.  Danyille  &  W.  B.  Co., 

208  U.  8.  598  476 

Hale  y.  Henkd,  201  U.  8.  43  144 
Hall  y.  Be  Cuir,  95  U.  8.  487  409 
Hallinger  y.  Dayis,  146  U.  8. 

314  260 

Halter  y.  Nebraska,  205  U.  8.  34  781 
Hamilton  y.  Brown,  161  U.  8.  256 

289,  333 


864 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


[ 

HamiUon  QaaUght  4k  C6kiB  Go.  y. 

Hamilton,  146  U.  &  258  474 

HamiltOB  Mfg.  Oo.  t.  Maanehu- 

■etto,  6  WaU.  632  341 

Hammond  Paddng  Go.  t.  Arkan* 

•aa,  212  U.  8.  322  734 

Hammond  Packing  Go.  t.  Hon- 

tanay  233  V.  8.  331  518,  645 

Hanl^  T.  Donogl»i6y  116  U. 

8.  4  332 

Hannibal   4k   8t   J.   B.    Go.    t. 

Hnaen,  95  U.  8.  470  420 

Hanorer  Nat  Bank  y.  Mojaea, 

186  n.  &  181  107,  289 

Harknaaa  t.  Hyde,  98  U.  &  476 

317,  318 
Harlan  y.  MeGoorin,  218  V.  8. 

442  164, 565 

Harrington  y.  Berkahire,  22  Pick. 

263  391,  475 

Harria  y.   Hardeman,   14   How. 

334  314 

HasaeU  y.  Wileox,  130  n.  8.  493  313 
Haatlnga  y.  Hang,  85  Mich.  87  404 
Hayiaton  y.  Danyille  ft  W.  B.  Go., 

208  U.  &  598  393 

Hawaii  y.  Mankiehi,  190  U.  8. 

197  116,  122 

Hawkins  y.  Barney,  5  Pet  458  521 
Hawthorn  y.   Natural  Garbonie 

Qas.  Go.,  194  N.  Y.  326  468 

Hayes  y.  Ifiasonri,  120  U.  8.  68 

662,  823,  830 

Head  y.  Amoskeag  M.  Go.,  113 

n.  &  26  214 

Health  Bept  y.  Trinity  Ghvreh, 

145  N.  Y.  32  400 

Healy  y.  New  Haven,  49  Gonn. 

394  390, 476 

Healy  Lumber  Go.  y.  Morris,  33 

Wash.  490  379 

Heath  ft  Milligan  Mfg.  Go.  y. 

Worst,  207  U.  8.  338  731 

Heike  y.  United  8tates,  227  U.  8. 

131  166 

Hoim  ▼.  McGall,  239  XT.  8.  175    755 


All  TO  PAflIB] 

Heine   y.  Levee   Gommiasiotners, 

19  WalL  655,  660  373 

Helena  Waterworks  Go.  y.  Helena, 

195  U.  &  383  474 

Henderson  y.  Mayor,  etc,  of  New 

York,  92  U.  8.  259  257 

Henderson  Bridge  Go.  y.  Hender- 
son, 173  XT.  8.  592  356,  384 
Hendrick  y.  Maryland,  235  XT.  8. 

610  341 

Henry  y.  Henkel,  238  XT.  8.  219  564 
Hepburn  y.  Griswold,  8  WaU.  603 

n,  73 
Herbert  y.  Bieknell,  263  XT.  a  70 

173,  314,  316,  319 
Herbert  y.  Grawford,  228  XT.  8. 

204  334 

Heyman  y.  Hays,  236  XT.  8.  178 

341,  342 
Hibben  y.  8mith,  191  XT.  8.  310 

35,  242,  258,  291,  361,  532,  562 
Hill  y.  Merchants'  Mut.  Lu.  Go., 

134  XT.  8.  515  519,  527 

HUton  y.  Guyot,  159  U.  8.  113 

313,  318,  333 
Hilton  y.  Merrit,  110  U.  8.  97  370 
Hing  y.  Barbier  y.  Gonnolly,  113 

U.  8.  27  764 

Hing  y.  Growlej,  113  U.  8.  703  763 
Hoden  y.  James,  11  Mass.  396  524 
Hodge  y.  Muscatine  Gounty,  196 

U.  8.  2ff6  367,  370 

Hodgson  y.  Vennont,*168  XT.  8. 

262  549 

Hoke  y.  Henderson,  4  Bev.  N.  G. 

15  64 

Holbrook  y.  Finney,  4  Mass.  568 

457 
Holcome  y.  Tracy,  2  Minn.  241  521 
Holden  y.  Hardy,  169  XT.  8.  366 

262,  266,  282,  402,  497,  549 
HollingBworth  y  Barbour,  4  Pet. 

466  314 

Holly  Biyer  Qoal  Go.  y.  Howell, 

36  W.  Va.  486  362 

Holmes  y.  Hunt,  122  Mass.  505   94 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


855 


[BXriBBNOXS 

Holmes  y.  Walton,  9  N.  J.  L.  44 

18,  446 
Holt  y.  United  States,  218  U.  S. 

245  159 

Home  Ins.  Co.  y.  New  York,  134 

U.  8.  594  305 

Home  Telephone  ft  Telegraph  Co. 

y.  Los  Angeles,  211  XT.  S.  265 

290,  295,  817 
Hooker  y.  Los  Angeles,  188  U.  8. 

314  288,  385 

Hooker  y.  New  Hayen  k  North- 
ampton Co.,  14  Conn.  146    75,  214 
Hope  y.  Johnscm,  2  Yerg.  123       521 
Hopt  y.  Utah,  110  U.  8.  574 

538,  539,  558,  559,  562 
Hot  Springs  B.  Co.  y.  Williamson, 

136  U.  8.  121  218 

Houek  y.  Little  Biyer  Drainage 

Dist.,  239  U.  8.  254  461,  488,  489 
House  y.  Mayes,  219  U.  8.  270  503 
Hoyey  y.  Elliott,  167  U.  8.  409 

101,  296,  313,  472,  551,  576,  587 
Howard  y.  Fleming,  191  U.  8.  126 

556,  832 
Howard  y.  Eentnckj,  200  U.  8. 

164  834 

Hudson  County  Water  Co.  y.  Mc- 

Carter,  209  U.  8.  349  421,  784 
Hnlbert  y.  Clark,  128  N.  Y.  298  525 
Huling  y.  Kaw  Valley  R.  &  Im- 

proyement  Co.,  130  U.  8.  559 

219,  365 
Hunt  y.  Hunt,  97  U.  8.  444  450 
Hunter  y.  Mutual  Beserye  Life 

Ins.  Co.,  218  U.  8.  573  320,  737 
Hunter  y.  Wood,  209  U.  8.  205  564 
Huntington  y.  Atbull,  146  U.  8. 

657  287 

Hurtado  y.  California,  110  U.  8. 

516 

12,  15,  19,  22,  25,  37,  43,  127, 

202,  243,  245,  253,  269,  271, 

273,  277,  282,  297,  458,  534, 

535,  544,  548,  553,  574,  575,  576 
Hutchinson  lee  Cream  Co.  y. 

Iowa,  242  U.  8.  153     431,  819 


ABX  TO  PAOIS] 

Hutchinson  y.  Valdosta,  227  U.  8. 
303  402,  430,  789 


Indianapolis,  etc.,  B^  Co.  y.  Eer^ 
eheyal,  16  Ind.  84  523 

International  Harvester  Co.  y. 
Missouri,  234  U.  8.  199 

437,  510,  749 

Interstate  Amusement  Co.  y.  Al- 
bert, 239  U.  8.  560  699 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
y.  Brimson,  154  U.  8.  447         581 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
y.  Illinois  C  B.  Co.,  215  U.  8. 
452  291,  498 

Interstate  ConsoL  8t.  B^  Co.  y. 
Massachusetts,  207  U.  8.  79      84 

Iowa  C.  B.  Co.  y.  Iowa,  160  U.  8. 
389  90, 263, 

288,  313,  472,  532,  547,  552,  575 

Iowa  Life  Ins.  Co.  y.  Lewis,  187 
U.  8.  335  806 


Jackson  y.  United  States,  230  U. 

8.  1  215 

Jacob  y.  Boberts,  223  U.  8.  261 
^  314,  315,  319 

Jacobs,  In  re,  98  N.  Y.  98     491,  494 
Jacobson  y.   Massachusetts,   197 

U.  8.  11       156,  402,  431,  449,  776 
Japanese  Immigrant  Case   (Ya- 

mataya  y.  Fisher),  189  U.  8. 

86  114,  137,  204,  234,  235 

Jeffry  Mfg.  Co.  y.  Blagg,  235  U. 

8.  571  796 

Johannessen  y.  United  States,  225 

U.  8.  227  334 

John  Hancock  Mutual  Life  Ins. 

Co.  y.  Warren,  181  U.  8.  73 

698,  807 
Johnson  y.  Chicago  k  P.  Eleyator 

Co.,  119  U.  8.  388         289 
Johnson  y.  Sayre,  158  U.  8. 109  95 


856 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


[ 

Jones  T.  Andrews,  10  WalL  327    317 
Jones  T.   Brim,  165  U.  8.   180 

441,768 
Jones  T.  Jones,  18  AUl  248  525 
Jones'  Heirs  t.  Peny,  10  Yerg. 

59  64 

Joplin     y.    Southwest    Missouri 

Ught  Co.,  191  U.  a  150,  156 

474 
Jordan  ▼.  Lewis,  14  East  306  132 
Jordan  y.  Maasaehusetts,  225  U. 

8.  167  652,  674 

Justices  y.  Murray,  The,  9  Wall. 

2,74, 278  542 


Kane  y.  New  Jers^,  242  U.  S. 

160  819 

Kansas  y.  Colorado,  185  U.  S. 

125  422 

Kansas  City  M.  ft  B.  B.  Go.  y. 

StUes,  242  U.  S.  Ill        343,  649 
Kansas  City  S.  B.  Co.  y.  Ander- 
son, 233  U.  8.  325  477,  811 
Kansas  City  8.  B.  Co.  y.  C.  H. 

Albers  Commission  Co.,  223  TJ. 

8.  573  572 

Kauifman  y.  Woolers,  138  U.  8. 

285  290 

Kaukauna  Water  Power  Co.  y. 

Green   Bay   &   M.   Canal   Co., 

142  U.  8.  254  87,  221 

Kearney,  Ex  parte,  7  Wheat  38    580 
Keek  y.  United  States,  172  U.  8. 

446  233 

Keeney  y.  New  York,  222  XT.  8. 

525  640 

Kehrer   y.   Stewart,   197   XT.   8. 

60  518,  716 

Keizo  y.  Henry,  211  U.  8.  146    164 
Kelly  y.  Pittsburgh,  104  U.  8. 

78  452,  542,  769 

Kelly  y.  Bhoades,  188  U.  8.  1     346 
Kemmler,  In  re,  136  IT.  8.  436 

38,  260,  269,  281,  380 


ABM  TO  FAOXS] 

Kendall  y.  United  States,  12  Pet 

524  299 

Kennard  y.  Iiouiaiana,  92  U.  8. 

480  272,  278 

Kennebee,  ete.,  B.  Co.  y.   Port- 
land, ete.,  B.  Co.,  59  Me.  9        522 
Kent  y.  Gray,  38  N.  H.  576         523 
Kentucky   Bailroad    Tax    Cases, 

115  U.  8.  321  293,  305,  369 

Kentucky  Union  Co.  y.  Kentucky, 

219  U.  8.  140 

290^  313,  364,  472,  523,  638 
Keokee  Consolidated  Co^e  Co.  y. 

Taylor,  234  U.  8.  224        509,  750 
Kepner  y.  United  States,  195  U. 

8.  100  125,  126 

Keprer  y.  Stewart,  197  U.  8.  60  341 
Kidd   y.  Alabama,   188  U.   8. 

730  716,  720 

Kidd  y.  Pearson,  128  U.  8.  1 

404,  494,  803 
Kidd,  Dater  &  Price  Co.  y.  Mus- 

selman  Grocer  Co.,  217  U.  8. 

461  402,  424 

Kilboum  y.  Thompson,  103  U.  8. 

168  299 

Kimmish  y.  Ball,  129  U.  8.  217  773 
Kincaid's    Appeal,    66    Pa.    St 

411  424 

King  y.  Cross,  175  U.  8.  396  322 
King  y.  Missonri,  107  U.  8.  221  528 
King  y.  Mullins,  171  U.  8.  404 

362,  363,  620 
King  y.  Portland,  184  U.  8.  61 

358,  361,  384 
King  y.  West  Virginia,  216  U. 

8.  92  363,  364 

Kirtland  y.  Hotchkiss,  100  U.  8. 

491  261 

Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.  y.  Com- 

stock,  16  Wall.  258  536 

Knight  y.  Lee,  [1893]  1  Q.  B.  41, 

62  L.  J.  Q.  B.  28  523 

KnowHon  y.  Moore,   178   U.  8. 

41  171 

Knox  y.  Summers,  3  Craneh  496  316 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


857 


t 

Knoxville  Iron  Co.  y.  Harbison, 
183  U.  S.  13  498,  510 

Kohl  y.  Lehback,  160  U.  S.  297 

556,  828 

Kohl  y.  United  States,  91  U.  S. 
367        75,  207,  211,  212,  220,  378 

Kryder  y.  Wilson,  242  U.  S.  171  292 

Knehn  y.  Paroni,  20  Ney.  203       522 


Lacey,  Ex  parte,  108  Gal.  326    400 
LaeUand  y.  North   Missouri  B. 

B.  Co.,  31  Mo.  180  75,  214 

Lafayette  Ins.  Co.  t.  French,  18 

How.  404  308 

Laing  y.  Bigney,  160  U.  S.  531      327 
Lake  Shore  ft  M.  S.  B.  Co.  y. 

Ohio,  173  U.  S.  285  402,  420 

Lake  Shore  A  M.  8.  B.  Co.  y. 

Smith,  173  U.  8.  687 

412,  414,  483,  484 
Lam  y.  Powder  Biyer  Liye   Stoek 

Co.,  132  Fed.  434  520 

Landes  y.  Brant,  10  How.  348      318 
Lang  y.  New  Jersey,  209  U.  S. 

467  836 

Lange,  Ex  parte,  18  Wall^  175    110 
Lankford  y.  Platte  Iron  Works 

Co.,  235  U.  S.  461  433 

Larkm  y.  Long,  [1915]  A.  C. 

814  515 

Laurel    Hill    Cemetery    t.    San 

Francisco,  216  U.  S.  358 

402,  423,  431 
Laurg  y.  Bigney,  160  U.  S.  531  290 
Lawton  y.  Steele,  152  IJ.  S.  133 

398,  479,  518 
Leagnd  ▼.  Texas,  184  U.  8.  156 

452,  458,  459 
Leepor  t.  Texas,  139  U.  S.  462 

263,  269, 

297,  305,  381,  548,  556,  575,  824 
LefflngweU  y.   Warren,  2  Black 

599  354,  383,  524 

Legal    Tender   Cases,   12    Wall. 

457  73 


AXE  TO  PAOIS] 

Legatt  y.  Tollenrey,  14  East  302  132 
Lehigh  Valley  B.  B.  y.  Pennsyl- 

yania,  145  U.  8.  192  347 

Lehon  t.  Atlaiftay  242  U.  8.  53 

438,  818 
Leigh  T.  Green,  193  XT.  8.  79  289 
Leloup  y.  Port  of  Mobile,  127  U. 

8.  640  341 

Lem  Moon  Sing  y.  United  States, 

158  U.  8.  538 

115,  137,  143,  204,  234,  236 
Lemieux   y.   Young,   211   U.   S. 

489  424,  508,  786 

Lent  y.  TiUson,  140  U.  8.  316  366 
Leyasser  y.  Washburn,  11  Gratt. 

572  362 

Levy  y.  Fits^atrick,  15  Pet.  167  315 
Lewis  ▼.  Luckett,  221  U.  8.  554  323 
Lewis  T.  United  States,  146  U.  8. 

370  538,  557,  559 

Lewis  y.  Webb,  3  Me.  326  524 

L  'Hote  y.  New  Orleans,  177  U.  8. 

587  402,  494 

License  Cases,  5  How.  504  399 

Lincoln  y.  Power,  151  U.  8.  436  536 
Lindsley  y.  Natural  Carbonic  Gas 

Co.,  220  U.  S.  61 

467,  505,  507,  740,  795 
Ling  Su  Fan  y.  United  States, 

218  U.  8.  302  402,  422 

Linhan,  In  re,  72  Cal.  114  400 

Liyerpool  ft  L.  &  G.  Ins.  Co.  y. 

Board  of  Assessors,  221  U.  8. 

346  349 

Liyingston  y.  Moore,  7  Pet.  469 

299,  542 
Loan  Ass'n  y.  Topeka,  20  WaU. 

655  273 

Lx>chner  y.  New  York,  198  U.  8. 

45  402,  421,  493,  494,  496 

Logan  y.  United  States,  144  U. 

S.  263  38,  110 

London 's  Case,  8  Coke  125a  16,  251 
London  Guarantee  ft  Accident  Co. 

y.  Horn,  101  HI.  App.  355      514 
Londoner  y.  Denyer,  210  U.  8. 

373  292,  294,  551,  576 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


I 

LoM    Wolf    T.    Hiiebeoek,    187 

U.  B.  663  111 

Long  Island  Wnter  Snpplj  Co.  y. 

BrooklTn,  166  U.  8.  685 

88,  219,  220 
LottgyMT  T.  Toolnn,  209  U.  8. 

414  290,  293,  313 

liOon  Hong  t.  Crowl^,  113  U.  8. 

703  494 

Lomuui  T.  Benton,  8  Ifieh.  18  104 
Lottorj  Omo,  188  U.  a  321  184,494 
Louitinnn  t.  Jnmoly  107  U.  8. 

750  451, 628 

Loaisimnn  t.  New  Orleans,  102 

U.  8.  203  628 

Louisiana  t.  Pittsborg,  106  U.  8. 

301  528 

Loaisiana  t.  8t.  Ifartins  Parish, 

111  U.  8.  716  528 

Loaisiana  Citixens'  Bank  t.  DeT- 

noodt,  26  La.  Ann.  628  523 

Looisville  k  Jefferson  Ferry  Go. 

y.  Kentucky,  188  U.  8.  385 

342,  487 
Lonisyille  4k  N.  B.  Go.  y.  Barber 

Asphalt  Pay.  Go.,  197  U.  8. 

430  357,  489 

Lonisyille  ft  N.  B.  Go.  y.  Garrett, 

231  U.  8.  298  688 

Lonisyille  k  N.  B.  Go.  y.  Higdon, 

234  U.  8.  592  841 

Lonisyille  ft  N.  B.  Go.  y.  Ken- 
tucky, 161  U.  8.  677         399,  434 
LouisyiHe  ft  N.  B.  Go.  y.  Ken* 

tacky,  183  U.  8.  503 

175,  306,  415,  672 
Lonisyille  ft  N.  B.  Go.  y.  Melton, 

218  V.  8.  36  680 
Louisyille  ft  N.  B.  Go.  y.  Mottley, 

219  U.  8.  467  501 
Lonisyille  ft  N.  B.  Go.  y.  8chmidt, 

177  U.  8.  230  288,  289,  290,  552 
LouisVilte  ft  N.  B.  Go.  y.  8cott, 

133  Ky.  724  501 

Loois^lle  ft  N.  B.  Gb.  y.  8tock 

Yards,  212  U.  8.  132  176,  296 


AMM  TO  PAOBB] 

Lonisyille  ft  N.  B.  Go.  y.  Cnited 

8tates,  238  U.  8.  1  179 

Loyato  y.  New  Mezieo,  242  U.  8. 

199  537 

Loye  y.  Beeorder's  Gonrt  Judge, 

128  Mich.  545  400 

Loyejoy  y.  United  8tates,  128  U. 

8.   171  86 

Loyell  y.  Arnold,  2  Leigh  16      S23 
Low  Wah  8aey  y.  Backns,  225  U. 

8.  460,  468  168 

Lowe  y.  Kansas,  163  U.  8.  81 

13,  44,  534 
Lowe  y.  State  of  Kansas^  163 

U.  8.  81  828 

Lucke  y.  Clothing  Gutters,  77  Md. 

396  514 

Lumley  y.  Gye,  (1853)  2  E.  ft  B. 

216  515 

Lynah  Gase,  188  U.  8.  446  215 

Lynde  y.  Lynde,  181  U.  8.  183 

289,  326,  327 


McAllister  y.  Henkel,  201  U.  a 

90  145 

McAunich  y.  B.  B.  Go.,  20  Iowa 

343  650 

McGandlish    y.    Gom.,    76    Va. 

1002  404 

McGardle,  Ex  parte,  6  Wall.  318  69 
McGardle,  Ex  parte,  7  WalL  506  70 
McGanghey  y.  Lyall,  224  U.  8. 

558  313 

MeGlnre  y.  Maitland,  24  W.  Va. 

561  368 

MoGray  y.  United  States,  195  U. 

8.  27  140,  171,  172,  518,  645 
McGulloeh  y.  Maryland,  4  Wheat 

421  312,  340,  352,  371,  674 

McCuUough  y.  Virginia,  172  U.  8. 

102  519 

McDonald  y.  Massachusetts,  180 

U.  8.  311  831 

McEhnoyle  y.  Cohen,  13  Pet  312, 

324  332 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


859 


[BXnBBBMCIS 

McFaddin  t.  Evans-Snjder-Bnel 

Co.,  185  U.  8.  605  457 

MeFarland   ▼.    American   Sugar 

Befining  Co.,  241  U.  8.  79      579 
McGaliej  ▼.  Virginia,  135  U.  8. 

662  521,  528 

McGoyem  y.  New  York,  229  IT. 

S.  363  292,  391,  392 

Mackin  t.  United  States,  117  TJ. 

S.  348  78,  535 

McLean  ▼.  Arkansaa,  211  TJ.  8. 

539 

430,  436,  497,  516,  732,  752,  796 
MacLeod  ▼.  United  States,  229 

U.  8.  416  127 

McMiUen  y.  Anderson,  95  U.  8. 

37  357,  362,  368,  370 

MacNichol  v.  Spence,  83  Me.  87  520 
Madden  y.  Lancaster  County,  65 

Fed.  188  520 

Madera  Waterworks  y.  Madera, 

228  U.  8.  454  473,  747 

Magoun  y.  Illinois  Trust  &  Say- 
ings Bank,  170  U.  8.  283 

607,  617,  624,  697,  728 
Magruder  y.  Brury,   235  U.  8. 

106  334 

Maine  y.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  B.  Co., 

109  Iowa  260  503 

Mallett  y.  North  Carolina,  181 

U.  8.  589  831 

Mallinekrodt  Chemical  Works  y. 

Missouri,  238  U.  8.  41  707 

Maniganlt  y.  Springs,  199  U.  8. 

473  215,  386,  399 

Manning,  In  re,  139  U.  8.  506    556 
Marbury  y.  Madison,  1  Cranch 

137  255 

Marchant  y.  Pennsylyania  B.  Co., 

153  U.  8.  380  662 

Markuson  y.  Boucher,  175  U.  8. 

184  563 

Marshall  y.  McDaniel,  12  Bush 

378  362 

Marshall  Field  k  Co.  y.  Clark, 

143  U.  8.  643  130 


ABX  TO  PAcris] 

Martin  y.  District  of  Columbia, 
205  U.  8.  135  162,  467,  489 

Martin  y.  Martin,  36  Ala.  560      524 

Mairtin   y.   Pittsburg  A    L.   £. 
B.  Co.,  203  U.  8.  284        458,  678 

Martin  y.  Texas,  200  U.  8.  316    608 

Martin  y.  Waddell's  Lessee,  16 
Pet.  410  252,  338,  396 

Marye  y.  Baltimore  k  Ohio  B.  B. 
Co.,  127  U.  8.  123  346 

Mason  y.  Eldred,  6  Wall.  231      314 

Mason  y.  Missouri,  179  U*  8. 
328  727 

Massachusetts  C.  B.  Co.  y.  Bos- 
ton, C.  4k  F.  B.  Co.,  121  Mass. 
124  673 

Mattingly  y.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 97  U.  S.  687,  692        357,  875 

Maxwell  y.  Dow,  176  U.  8.  581 

23,  247,  548,  553,  574,  676 

Mechanical  App.  Co.  y.  Castleoian, 
215  U.  8.  437  318 

Memphis  y.  United  States,  97  U. 
8.  293  627 

Mercelis  y.  Wilson,  236  U.  8. 
579  319 

Merchants'  Bank  y.  Pennsyl- 
yania,  167  U.  8.  461  366 

Merchants'  Stock  ft  Grain  Co., 
In  re,  223  U.  8.  639  583 

Merchants'  ft  Manufacturers' 
National  Bank  y.  Pennsylyania, 
167  U.  S.  461  618 

Meriwether  y.  Garrett,  102  U.  8. 
472  373,  376 

Metropolis  Theater  Co.  y.  Chi- 
cago, 228  U.  8.  61  642 

Mexican  C.  B.  Co.  y.  Pinkney, 
149  U.  S.  194  314,  317 

Michigan  C.  R  Co.  y.  Powers, 
201  U.  S.  246  638 

Michigan  Ins.  Co.  y.  Eldred,  130 
U.  8.  693  619 

Michigan  Trust  Co.  y.  Ferrj,  228 
U.  8.  346  314,  323 

Miedreich  y.  Lauenstein,  232  U. 
8.  236  314,  315,  319 


860 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


[BimSNCBB 

ICiller  T.  New  York,  15  WalL 

498  483 
Miller  t.  Btrahl,  239  U.  8.  426 

437,  756 
Miller    ▼.    Union    Mill    Co.,    45 

WaBh.  199  476 

MiUer  y.  United  SUtee,  11  WalL 

268  73 

Miller  t.  Wileon,  236  U.  S.  373 

516,  798 
MiHigan,  Ex  parte,  4  WalL  2 

56,  57,  65 
Mills  y.  Durjee,  7  Graneh  481  318 
Milwaukee  Elec.  B.  ft  L.  Ck>.  y. 

Railroad  Ckunmieaion,  238  U.  8. 

174  419 

Minneapolis  E.  B.  y.  Minnesota, 

134   U.    8.  467  413 

Minneapolis  ft  8t.  L.  B.  Co.  y. 

Beekwitfa,  129  U.  8.  26 

240,  656,  698 
Minneapolis  ft  8t.  L.  B.  Go.  y. 

Herrick,  127  U.  8.  210      502,  655 
Minneapolis  ft  8t.  L.  B.  Go.  y. 

Minnesota,  193  U.  8.  53  402 

Minnesota  t.  Barber,  136  U.  8. 

313  564 

Minnesota  y.  Brondage,  180  U.  8. 

499  563 
Minnesota  Iron  Go.  y.  Kline,  199 

U.  8.  593  676 

Minot  y.  Philadelphia,  W.  ft  B. 

B.  B.  Go.,  18  Wall.  206  374 

Mississippi  ft  Bom  Biyer  Boom 

Go.  y.  Patterson,  98  U.  8.  403 

215,  216,  221 
Missouri  y.  Lewis   (Bowman  y. 

Lewis),  101  U.  8.  22 

247,  830,  831,  834 
Missouri,   K   ft   T.    B.    Go.    y. 

Harris,  234  U.  8.  412      478,  812 
Missouri,  K.  ft  T.  B.  Go.  y.  May, 

194  U.  8.  267  675,  695 

Missouri,  K.  ft  T.  Bj.   Go.  of 

Texas  y.  Gade,  233  U.  8.  642    812 
Missouri  P.  B.  Go.  y.  Castle,  224 

U.  8.  541  402,  686 


ABB  TO  PAOBS] 

Missouri  P.  B.  Co.  y.  Larabee, 

234  U.  8.  459  808 

Missouri  P.  B.   Go.   y.  Mackey, 

127  U.  8.  205 

502,  507,  655,  663,  698 
Missouri  P.  B.  Go.  y.  Nebraska,  164 

U.  8.  403  484 

Missouri  P.  B.  Go.  y.  Tucker,  230 

U.  8.  340  474 

Mitchell   y.   Harmony,   13   How. 

115  56 

Mobile   County  y.  Kimball,  102 

U.  8.  691  354,  357,  611,  730 

Mobile,  J.   ft   K.   G.   B.  Co.   y. 

Tumipseed,  219  U.  8.  35         681 
Mobile  Transp.  Co.  y.  Mobile,  187 

U.  8.  479  456 

Mobile  ft  O.  R  Co.  y.  Tennessee, 

153  U.  8.  486  287,  349,  374 

Mondou  y.  New  York,  N.  H.  ft 

H.  B.  Co.,  223  U.  8.  1       504,  686 
Monongahela     Bridge     Co.     y. 

United  8tates,  216  U.  8.  177 

215,  291 
Monongahela  Nay.  Co.  y.  United 

8tates,  148  U.  8.  312 

90,  136,  171,  184,  210,  217 
Montana  Go.  y.  8t.  Louis  Min., 

etc.,  Co.,  152  U.  8.  160  214 

Montoya  y.  Gomsales,  232  U.  8. 

375  173,  481,  525,  794 

Moore  y.  Illinois,  14  How.  13        56 
Moore  y.  8tate  of  Missouri,  159 

U.  8.  673  827 

Moran,  In  re,  203  U.  8.  96  145 

Moran    y.    Dunphy,    177    Mass. 

485  514 

Morf  ord  y.  Muger,  8  Iowa  82    355 
Morgan's     8team8hip     Co.     y. 

Board  of  Health,  118  U.  B. 

467  409 

Morgan's     8team8hip     Go.     y. 

Louisiana,  118  U.  8.  455         402 
Morley  y.  Lake  8hore  ft  M.  8. 

B.  Co.,  146  U.  8.  162      403,  468 
Mugler   y.    Kansas,    123    U.   a 

623  404,  406,  508,  766,  801 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


861 


[BIIVBBNOBB 

MuDer  y.  Oregon^  208  U.  S.  412 

402,  421,  509 
Monger  v.   EansaB,   123   U.   S. 

623  494 

Mmm  Case,  16  Am.  Law  Beg. 

N.  8.  539  408 

Mmm  y.  Illinois,  94  U.  8.  113 

407,  409,  448,  452,  458,  813,  815 
Murphy  y.  California,  225  U.  8. 

623  402,  427,  429,  518,  787 

Murphy  y.  Charleston,  96  U.  8. 

432  451 

Jlurray  y.  Hoboken  Land  ft  Im- 

proyement  Co.,  18  How.  272 

9,  24,  43,  56,  62,  64,  115,  135, 
,     187,  193,  202,  203,  204,  205, 

206,  243,  272,  277,  278,  371,  551 
Murray  y.  Wilson  Distilling  Co., 

212  U.  8.  578  434 

Mutual  Loan  Co.  y.  Martell,  222 

U.  8.  225  431,  742 

Myers  y.  Moran,  113  N.  Y.  App. 

Diy.  427  522 

Myles  8alt  Co.  y.  Iberia  &  8t. 

Mary  Drainage  Disl,  239  U. 

8.  478  460,  488 

Myles  Salt  Co.  y.  Schneider  Gran- 
ite Co.,  240  V.  8.  55  461 


N 


Nash  y.  Fletcher,  44  Miss.  609  520 
Nash  y.  United  States,  229  U.  8. 

373  437 

National  Cotton  Oil  Co.  y.  Texas, 

197  n.  &  115  494,  702 

National  Council  y.  State  Council, 

203  U.  8.  151  717 

Na:tional  Exch.   Bank  y.  Wiley, 

195  U.  8.  257  289,  313,  317 

National    Safe    Deposit    Co.    y. 

Stead,  232  U.  8.  58  480 

Nafional  Surety  Co.  y.  Architec- 
tural Decorating  Co.,  226  U. 

8.  276  529 

Naught  y.  Oneal,  Breese   (HI.) 

36  524 


ARK  TO  PAOIS] 

Neal  y.  Delaware,  103  U.  8.  370 

257,  293,  602 
Nebraska  y.  Lockwood,  3  WalL 

236  535 

Neilson   y.   Kilgore,   145   U.   8. 

487  456 

Nelson  y.  United  States,  201  U. 

8.  92  145 

Nesmith  y.  Sheldon,  7  How.  812 

354,  382 
New  Orleans  y.  Duncan,  2  La. 

Ann.  186  373 

New    Orleans    y.    New    Orleans 

Water  Works  Co.,  142  U.  8. 

79  403 

New  Orleans  y.  New  York  Mail 

8.  8.  Co.,  20  WalL  387  580 

New  Orleans  y.  Stempel,  175  U. 

8.  309  349 

New  Orleans  City  &  L.  B^  Co. 

y.   New  Orleans,   143   U.   8. 

192  350    ' 

New    Orleans    Gaslight    Co.    y. 

Drainage  Commission,  197  U. 

8.  453       .  148,  431,  467 

New    Orleans    Gaslight    Co.    y. 

Louisiana  Light  A  Heat  Prod. 

ft  Mfg.  Co.,  115  U.  8.  650        219 
New  Orleans  Water  Works  Co. 

y.  New  Orleans,  164  U.  8.  471 

313,  333 
New  York  y.  Barker,  179  U.  8. 

279  624 

New  York   v.   Eno,   155   U.   8. 

89  563 

New  York  y.  Hesterberg,  211  U. 

8.  31  402,  428,  479 

New  York  y.  Beardon,  204  U. 

8.  152  635 

New  York  y.  Sage,  239  U.  8.  57  391 
New   York    y.   State   Board   of 

Tax    Commissioners,    199    U. 

8.  1  350,  629 

New  York  ▼.  Van  De  Carr,  199 

U.  8.  552  777 

New  York  L.  Ins.  Co.  y.  Dun- 
%  levy,  241  U.  8.  518  914 


f^ 


862 


TABLE  OF  GASES 


I 

New  York  L.  Ins.  Go.  t.  Head, 

234  U.  8.  149  511 

New  York,  N.  H.  ft  H.  B.  Co.  y. 

Offleld,  77  Gonn.  419  463 

New  York,  N.  H.  ft  H.  B.  Go.  ▼. 

Bute  of  New  York,  165  U.  8. 

628  664 

New  York  ft  N.   E.  B.   Co.  ▼. 

Bristol,  151  U.  8.  556  467,  661 
Niagmra  Falls,  eto.,  B.  Co.,  108 

N.  Y.  376  217 

Nielsen,  In  re,  131  U.  S.  176      131 
Nishimnra  Ekiu  ▼.  United  States, 

142  U.  8.  651,  659 

115,  137,  142,  234 
Noble  Bute  Bank  t.  Haskell,  219 

U.  8.  104 

389,  402,  425,  434,  737,  738 
Nolan  y.  State,  55  Oa.  522  577 

Norfolk  ft  W.  B.  Co.  y.  Common- 
wealth   of   Pennsylyania,    136 

U.  8.  114  708 

Norfolk  ft  W.  B.  Co.  y.  Oonley, 

236  U.  8.  605  572 

Norfolk  ft  W.  B.  Co.  y.  Dixie 

Tobacco  Co.,  228  U.  8.  593  160 
Norris  y.  Tripp,  111  Iowa  115  520 
North  American  Cold  Storage  Co. 

y.  Chicago,  211  V.  8. 306  290, 295 
Northern  P.  B.  Co.  y.  Dakota, 

236  U.  8.  585  485 

Northern  P.  R  Co.  v.  Ely,  197  U. 

8.  1    '  •  524 

Northern   P.   B.    Co.   y.    Meese, 

239  V.  8.  614  757 

Northern    P.    R   Co.   y.    North 

Dakota,  216  U.  8.  579  417 

Northern   P.    B.    Co.    v.    North 

Dakota,  236  XT.  8.  585  419,  484 
Northern  P.  B.  Co.  v.  Smith,  171 

U.  8.  270  216 

Northern  P.  B.  Co.  y.  Townsend, 

190  U.  8.  267  217 

Northern  Transp.  Co.  y.  Chicago, 

99  XT.  8.  635  148,  214,  467 

Northwestern  Fertilising  Co.  y. 

Hyde  Park,  97  U.  S.  659        406 


AU  TO  PAflBS] 

Northwestern  Lanndry  y.  Des 
Moines,  239  U.  8.  486      438,  757 

Norwood  y.  Baker,  172  U.  8.  269 

105,  106,  107, 
355,  358,  360,  361,  375,  378,  533 

Notnuui  y.  Crooks,  10  U.  G.  Q. 
B.  105 


Ocampo  y.  United  States,  234  U. 

S.  91  127,  841 

Oceanic     Steam     Nay.     Co.     y. 

Stranahan,  214  U.  &  320 

156,  295 
Ochoa  y.  Hemandes,  230  V.  8. 

139  168,  238,  283,  291,  472 

Offield  y.  New  York,  N.  H.  ft  H. 

B.  Co.,  203  V.  8.  372      392,  463 
Ogden   y.   Sannders,   12  Wheat. 

213  94 

Ohio  y.  Dollison,  194  IT.  8.  445    803 
Ohio  Biyer  ft  W.  R  Co.  y.  Dittey, 

232  U.  8.  576  480,  645 

CEeefe  y.  United  States,  240 

U.  8.  294  419 

Old  Wayne  Mut.  L.  Ass'n  y.  Me- 

Donongh,  204  U.  8.  8 

289,  313,  551,  576 
Olsen  y.  Smith,'  195  U.  8.  333  468 
Omaha  y.  Omaha  Water  Co.,  218 

U.  8.  180  433 

O  'Neil  y.  Northern  Colorado  Irrig. 

Co.,  242  U.  S.  20  458 

CNeil  y.  Vermont,  144   U.  E 

323  61,  556 

O'Neill  y.   Learner,   239   U.   a 

244  460 

Ontario  Land  Co.  y.  Yordy,  212 

U.  a  152  290,  313 

CBeilly  de  Gamara  y.  Brooke, 

209  U.  a  45  466 

Orient  Ins.  Co.  y.  Board  of  As- 
sessors, 221  U.  8.  358  349 
Orient  Ins.  Co.  y.  Daggs,  172  ^U. 

8.  557  507,  698,  704,  706,  W, 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


863 


[BinBBNOBB 

Orifl^  T.  Hedden,  165  U.  8.  228   370 
Ormaa  t.  GiyBtal  Biver  B.  Co., 

5  Oolo.  Ai^p.  493  523 

Orr  ▼.  Gilman,  183  U.  8.  278    380 
Osborn  v.  Bank  of  United  8tat68y 

9  Wheat  738  299 

Osborne  ▼.  lindstrom,  9  N.  D.  1  520 
OtiB  T.  Parker,  187  U.  8.  606 

128,  494,  518,  774 
Ozan  Lumber  Co.  y.  Union  Go. 

Natl  Bank,  202  U.  8.  623       705 
Ozan    Lnmber    Go.    ▼.     Union 

County  National  Bank,  207  U. 

8.  251  784 


Paee    ▼.    Alabama,    106    U.    8. 

583  603 

Paeiile  Exp.  Co.  ▼.  8eibert,  142 

U.  8.  339  305,  614 

Paeiiic  Mail  8.  8.  Co.  t.  Joliife, 

2  WalL  450  476 

Padiie  Whaling  Co.  t.  Smith  ft 

States,  187  U.  8.  447  182 

Palmer  ▼.  MeMahon,  133  U.  8. 

669  370,  373 

Parish  y.  Coast  Cedar  Co.,  133 

N.  C.  478  362 

Parish  y.  Edgar,  15  WUl  532      524 
Parkinson  y.  United  States,  121 

U.  8.  281  535 

Parsons  y.  Bedford,  3  Pet  433    536 
Parsons  y.  District  of  Columbia, 

170  U.  8.  45 

88,  106,  292,  357,  361 
Passayant  y.  United  States,  148 

U.  8.  214  290,  370,  371 

Patsone  y.  Penns^lyania,  232  U. 

8.  138  479,  793 

Paul  y.  Virginia,  8  WaU.  181      321 
Paulsen  y.  Portland,  149  U.  8. 

30  291,  357,  365,  366,  370 

Peabodj  y.  United  States,  231  U. 

8.  530  215 

Pearsall  y.   Great  Northern  B. 

Co.,  161  U.  S.  673  454 


ABX  TO  PAOSS] 

Pearson  y.  YewdaD,  95  U.  8.  294, 

296  542 

Pellow  y.  Boberts,  13  How.  472, 

476  94 

Pembina  ConsoL  Silyer  Min.,  etc., 

Co.  y.  Penivylyania,  125  U.  8. 

181  708 

Penhallow  y.  Doane,  3  DalL  54  316 
Pennie  y.  Beis,  132  U.  a  464 

403,  456 
Pennoyer  y.  Neif,  95  U.  8.  714 
41,  279,  282,  309,  311,  312, 

313,  319,  320,  326,  486,  551,  576 
Pennsylyania  y.  Wheeling  ft  B. 

Bridge  Co.,  18  How.  421  299 

Pennsylyania  Co.  y.  U.  8.,  236 

U.  S.  318  175,  179 

Pennsylyania  Lumbennen's  Mu- 
tual Fire  Ins.  Co.  y.  Meyer, 

197  U.  8.  407,  415  343 

Pennsylyania  B.   Co.   y.   Miller, 

132  U.  8.  75  214,  458 

People  y.  Adams,  176  N.  T.  351  132 
People  y.  Beattie,  96  N.  Y.  App. 

Diy.  383  494 

People  y.  Blackwell,  27  CaL  65  165 
People  y.  Broo^yn,  4  N.  Y.  419  373 
People  y.  Pitch,  148  N.  Y.  78  373 
People  y.  Hays,  4  Gal.  127  523 

People  y.  Marcus,  185  N.  Y.  257  513 
People  y.  Marx,  99  N.  Y.  377  491 
People   y.    New   York   Carbonie 

Acid  Qas  Co.,  196  N.  Yl  421  468 
People  y.  Otis,  90  N.  Y.  48  490 
People  y.  Boberts,  171  U.  S.  658  709 
People  y.  Wagner,  86  Mich.  594  430 
People  y.  Westchester  County,  4 

Barb.  64  391,  475 

Peoria   Oas   ft    Electrie   Co^   y. 

Peoria,  200  U.  8.  48  416 

Pepke  y.  Cronan,  155  U.  S.  100  563 
Pereles  y.   Watertown,   19   Fed. 

Gas.  No.  10,980,  6  Biss.  79  520 
Perkins    y.    Pendleton,    90    Me. 

166  514 

Perry  y.  Turner,  55  Mo.  418      520 


864 


TABLE  OF  OASES 


[ 

Pervear  t.  Com.,  5  WalL  475 

61,  542 
Peterson   y.   Delaware,   9   Kiilp 

552  520 

Philadelphia  Go.  t.  Stimson,  223 

U.  8.  e05  177,  178 

Philadelphia  Fire  Abs'il  ▼•  New 

York,  119  U.  S.  110  241,  708 

Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  B.  Oo.  t. 

Trumble,  10  WalL  367  314 

Phoenix  F.  4k  M.  Ins.  Go.  t.  Ten- 
nessee, 161  U.  8.  174  350 
Phoenix  R  Co.  ▼.  Landis,  231  U. 

8.  578  174 

Pitnej  T.  Washington,  240  U.  8. 

387  648 

Pittsbnrg  Steel  Co.  t.  Baltimore 

Equitable  8oe.,  226  U.  8.  456    629 
Pittsburgh,  C,  C.  ft  St.  L.  B. 

Co.  T.  Backus,  154  U.  8.  421 

290,  205,  826 

Pittsburgh,  C,  C.  ft  St.  L.  B. 

Co.  T.  MitcheD,  91  N.  E.  735    501 
Pittsburgh  Coal  Co.  t.  Bates,  156 

U.  8.  577  345 

Pittsburgh,  etc.,  B.  ▼.  Board  of 

PubUc  Works,  172  U.  8.  32 

182,  370 

Planters  Bank  t.  Sharp,  6  How. 

301  527 

Plessj  y.  Ferguson,  163  U.  8. 

637  605 

Plummer  y.  Northern  Pae.  R  Co., 

152  Fed.  206  523 

Plymouth   Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsyl- 

yania,  232  U.  S.  631    314,  402,  432 
Poindezter  y.  Greenhow,  114  U. 

8.  270  454 

Polk  y.  Mutual  Beserye  Fund  L. 

Ass'n,  207  U.  8.  310  464 

Pollock  y.  Farmers'  Loan,  etc., 

Co.,  157  U.  8.  429  340 

Postal  Telegraph  Co.  y.  Charles- 
ton, 153  U.  8.  692  518 
Pound  y.  Turck,  97  U.  8.  459 

209,  420 


«0  PAOIBl 

Powell  y.  PennflylyBsiay  127  U.  a 

678  401,  766 

Prentis   y.   Atlantic  Coast  Line 

Co.,  211  U.  8.  210  417 

Pressor  y.  Illinois,  116  U.  a  252 

37,  269,  542 
Preston    ▼.    Looisyille,    84    Ky. 

118  520 

Price  y.  Illinois,  238  U.  a  446    747 
Priest    y.    Board    Trustees   Las 

Vegas,  232  U.  S.  604      315,  324 
Proyidence  Bank  y.  Billings,  4 

Pet  514  350 

Proyident  Institution  for  Safings 

T.  Jersey  City,  113  U.  8.  506  ' 

358,  494 
Proyident  Institution  for  Sayings 

y.  Malone,  221  U.  8.  660 

469,  742 
Proyident    Sayings   Life   Assur- 
ance Society  y.  Kentucky,  239 

XT.  a  103  487 

Public  Clearing  House  y.  Coyne, 

194  U.  S.  497  134,  204,  291 

Pullman  Co.  y.  Knott,  235  XT.  8. 

23  341,  343 

Pullman's    Palace    Car    Co.    y. 

Pennsylyania,  141  U.  8.  18 

341,  342,  346,  348 
Pumpelly   y.   Oreen  Bay  ft  M. 

Canal  Co.,  13  WalL  166 

74,  128,  210,  213,  217 
Purity  Extract  ft  Tonic  Co.  y. 

Lynch,  226  U.  8.  192 

402,  428,  431,  479 


Quarles,  In  re,  158  IT.  a  532  38 
Quincy   y.    Kennard,   151    Mass. 

563  400 

Quinn  y.  Leathon,  (1901)  70  L. 

J.  P.  C.  76  515 

Quong  Wing  y.  Kirkendall,  223 

U.  8.  59  507,  641,  647 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


865 


[BEFSBINOBS 


B 


Bail  ft  BiTer  Coal  Go.  ▼.  Taple, 

236  U.  8.  338  436,  516,  812 

Bailroad  Go.  t.  Colleetor,  100  U. 

8.  595  341 

Bailroad  Conunission  Cases,  116 

U.  8.  307  411 

Bailroad  Tax  Cases,  8  Bkwj.  238    48 
Bailroad  Commission  y.  Cumber- 
land   Telephone   ft   Telegraph 

Co.,  212  U.  8.  414  417 

Bainej  v.  United  8tate8,  232  XT. 

&.  310  173,  404 

Baleigh,   etc.,  B.   Co.   v.   Davis, 

2  Dey.  ft  B.  L.  451  209 

Bandall  y.  Brigham,  7  Wall.  523  589 
Bandall  y.  Krieger,  23  Wall.  137 

455,  456,  458 
Bassmussen  y.  United  States,  197 

U.  8.  516  123 

Bast  y.  Van  Deman  ft  Lewis,  240 

U.  8.  342  440,  517,  647 

Bathbone   y.    Bradford,    1    Ala. 

312  521 

Bavertj    y.    Fridge,    3    McLean 

230  457 

Bawlins  y.  Georgia,  201  U.   8. 

638  146 

Baymond  y.  Chicago  Edison  Co., 

207  U.  8.  20  703 

Beagan    y.    Farmers'    Loan    ft 

Trust  Co.,  154  U.  8.  362 

401,  412,  414,  415,  663 
Beayes  y.  Ainsworth,  219  U.  8. 

296  291 

Bees  y.  Watertown,  19  Wall.  107, 

113  295,   375 

Beetz  y.  Michigan,  188  U.  8.  505 

282,  290,  401 
Beggel,  Ex  parte,  114  U.  8.  642 

90,  532,  547,  575 
Begina  y.  Bjle,  9  M.  ft  W.  227  194 
Beid  y.  Colorado,  187  U.  8.  137  773 
Beinman  y.  Little  Bock,  237  U.  8. 

171  795 

Beitler  v.  Harris,  223  U.  8.  437    292 

Due  Process — 55 . 


AKS  TO  PAGXS] 

Benegar  y.  United  States,  97  C. 

C.  A.  172,  172  Fed.  646  165 

Bex  y.  Collingridge,  3  Price  280  197 
Bex  y.  Hopper,  (1816)   3  Price 

40  197 

Bex  y.  Homblower,  11  Price  29  194 
Bex     y.     Ladsingham,     8ir     T. 

Baym,  193  557,  560,  561 

Bex  y.  Lambton,  5  Price  421  197 
Bex  y.  Bandell,  5  Price  376  197 
Beymann  Brewing  Co.  y.  Brister, 

179  U.  8.  445  801 

Bhode  Island  y.   Massachusetts, 

12  Pet  657  316 

Bichards  y.  Washington  Termi- 
nal Co.,  233  U.  8.  546      215,  292 
Bichmond  y.  Southern  Bell  Tel- 

^h.  ft  Teleg.  Co.,  174  U.  8. 

761  218 

Bichmond,   F.   ft    P.    B.   Co.    y. 

Louisa  B.  Co.,  13  How.  71  219 
Bichmond,  F.  ft  P.  B.  Co.  y.  Bich- 
mond, 96  U.  8.  521  357,  652 
Bideout  y.  Knox,  148  Mass.  368  440 
Bidgewaj  y.  West,  60  Ind.  371  404 
Biley  y.   Massachusetts,  232  U. 

S.  671  509 

Bippej  y.  Texas,  193  U.  8.  504 

802,  803 
Biyerside  Mills  y.  Menefee,  237 

U.  8.  189  334 

Biyerside   ft   Dan   Biyer   Cotton 

Mills  y.  Menefee,  237  U.  8.  180 

319,  485 
Bobertson,  In  re,  156  U.  8. 183  556 
Bobertson  y.  Baldwin,  165  U.  8. 

275,  281,  282  584 

Bobinson,  Ex  parte,  19  Wall.  505 

578,  580,  582,  589,  590 
Bobinson  y.  State,  33  Ark.  180  165 
Bogers  y.  Alabama,   192  U.   8. 

226  607 

Bogers  y.  Hennepin  County,  239 

U.  8.  621  646 

Bogers  y.  Peck,  199  U.  8.  425 

555,  564,  576 


866 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


[HEFZRKMCES 

Boiler  y.  Holly,  176  U.  S.  398 

287,  296,  322,  472,  551,  576 
Rose  ▼.  Himelj,  4  Cranch  241  333 
Bosenthal  t.  New  York,  226  U. 

S.  260  507,  788 

Ross  ▼.  Stewart,  227  IT.  S.  530  290 
BothsehUd  y.  Knight,  184  U.  S. 

334  289,  322 

Rouge  y.  Ronge,  114  Miac.  (N. 

T.)  421  522 

Rowe  y.  Granite  Bridge  Oo.,  21 

Pick.  344  75,  214 

Rowland,  In  re,  104  U.  S.  604  588 
Rozale,  Ex  parte,  117  U.  8.  241  563 
RuBch  y.  Dunean  Land  ft  Mining 

Co.,  211  U.  8.  526  822 

Ryan  y.  Brown,  18  Mich.  195  104 
Byder  y.  Wilson,  41  N.  J.  L.  9      524 


8 


St.  Clair  y.  Cox,  106  U.  8.  350 

320,  486 

St  John  y.  New  York,  201  U.  8. 
633  730 

St  Joseph  Township  y.  Bogers, 
16  Wall.  663  4o2,  457 

St.  Louis,  I.  M.  ft  8.  B.  Co.  y. 
Arkansas,  240  U.  8.  518  683 

8t.  Louis,  I.  M.  ft  8.  B.  Co.  y. 
Paul,  173  U.  8.  404  494,  668 

St  Louis,  I.  M.  ft  8.  B.  Co.  y. 
Petty,  57  Ark.  359  478 

St.  Louis,  L  M.  ft  8.  B.  Co.  y. 
Wynne,  224  U.   8.  354 

470>  477,  811 

St.  Louis  S.  W.  B.  Co.  y.  Ar- 
kansas, 235  U.  8.  350  692 

St.  Louis  ft  Iron  Mountain  By.  y. 
Arkansas,  240  U.  S.  518  439 

St.  Louis  ft  8.  F.  B.  Co.  y.  Mc- 
Bride,  141  U.  8.  127  316,  317 

St.  Louis  ft  8.  T.  B.  Co.  y.  Mat- 
thews, 165  U.  8.  1  440,  768 

St.  Louis,  etc.,  B.  Co.  y.  Gill,  156  ** 
U.  8.  649  412,  413,  415 


ARK  TO  PAOXS] 

St.  Mary's  Franco- American  Pe- 
troleum Co.  7.  West  Virginia, 
203  U.  8.  183  289,  702 

Saloy  y.  Woods,  40  La.  Ann.  585  52G 

San  Diego  Land  ft  Town  Co.  y. 
Jasper,  189  U.  8.  439  418 

San  Diego  Land  ft  Town  Co.  y. 
National  City,  174  TJ.  S.  739 

290,  412,  413,  414 

San  Mateo  County  C^ase,  116  U. 
8.  13»  32 

Santa  Clara  Go.  y.  Southern 
Pacific  Bailroad,  118  XT.  & 
394  240 

Santiago  y.  Nogneras,  214  U.  S. 
260  315 

Satterlee  y.  Matthewson,  2  Pet 
380  451,  458,  530 

Satterlee  y.  Matthewson,  16  Serg. 
ft  B.  169  521 

Sauer  v.  New  York,  206  U.  8.  536 

458,  462 

Savannah  y.  Hancock,  9^  Mo.  54  379 

Savannah,  T.  ft  I.  of  H.  B.  Co.  y. 
Savannah,  198  IT.  S.  392   628,  629 

Savin,  Ex  parte,  131  IT.  S.  267 

580,  585 

Savings  ft  Loan  Society  y.  Mult- 
nomah County,  169  U.  8.  421 

348,  619 

Sayward  y.  Denny,  158  U.  S. 
180  305 

Schniedinger  y.  Chicago,  226  TJ. 
8.  578 

402,  429,  432,  437,  505,  516 

Schooner  Exchange  v.  McFaddon,* 
7  Cranch  136  30S 

Schwab  y.  Berggren,  143  IT.  6. 
442  538,  558 

Scott  y.  McNeal,  154  U.  8.  34 

41, 
282,  286,  313,  320,  333,  551,  576 

Scranton  y.  Wheeler,   179  U.  S. 

141       103,  148,  179,  209,  215,  387 
fieaboard  Air  Line  By.  y.  Florida, 

203  U.  8.  261  417 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


867 


[betesenges 

Seaboard   Air   Line   B7.   Go.  v. 

Seegers,  207  U.  S.  73 

471,  810,  811 
Searl  v.  Lake  Ooiinty  School  Diet. 

N.  2, 133  U.  S.  553  211,  218,  378 
Sears  ▼.  Oottrell,  5  Mich.  251  304 
Sears  ▼.  Mahoney,  66  Fed.  860  523 
Seattle   ▼.   Kelleher,   195   U.   S. 

351  358,  361 

Secombe,  Ex  parte,  19  How.  9  589 
Secombe  v.  Milwaukee  &  St.  P. 

B.  Co.,  23  Wall.  108  88,  220 

Security  Trust  Co.  v.  Lexington, 

203  U.  S.  323  296 

Seibert  ▼.  Lewis,  122  U.  S.  284  527 
Selig  V.  Hamilton,  234  XJ.  S.  653  314 
Selover,  Bates  &  Co.  v.  Walsh, 

226  U.  S.  112  744 

Seven  Cases  ▼.  U.  S.,  239  U.  S. 

510  181 

Sharon  v.  Tucker,  144  U.  S.  533 

524,  525 
Shelby  v.  Guy,  11  Wheat.  361 

354,  382 
Shelton  v.  Piatt,  139  TJ.  S.  591  182 
Shelton  ▼.  Tiffin,  6  How.  163  315 
Shelvin-Carpenter  Co.  v.  Minne- 
sota, 218  U.  S.  57  402 
Shepard   v.   Barron,   194   U.    S. 

553  138 

Sherman  ▼.  Smith,  1  Black  587  425 
Shibuya  Jugiro  v.  Brush,  140  XJ. 

S.  291  564 

Shields  v.  Ohio,  95  U.  S.  324  482 
Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1  148 
Shoemaker  v.  United  States,  147 

TJ.  S.  282 

87,  88,  211,  213,  216,  220,  375 
Shriver  v.  Lynn,  2  How.  43  433 

Shumate  ▼.  Herman,  181  U.  S. 

402  360 

Sim's  Lessee  ▼.  Irvine,  3  DaU. 

425  454 

Simmons  v.  U.  S.,  142  U.  S.  148  85 
Simon  v.  Craft,  182  TJ.  S.  427 

288,  289,  313,  573 


ARE  TO  PAGES] 

Simon  v.  Southern  B.  Co.,  236  TJ. 
S.  115         316,  319,  321,  334,  572 

Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  TJ.  S. 
352  418 

Singer  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v. 
Brickell,  233  U.  S.  304  646 

Sinking  Fund  Cases,  99  TJ.  S.  700 

409,  483 

Sinnickson  v.  Johnson,  17  N.  J. 
L.  129  210 

Sistare  v.  Sistare,  218  TJ.  S.  1      330 

Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall. 
36      31,  33,  34,  36,  37,  38,  47, 
228,  231,  244,  259,  267,  380, 
448,  492,  541,  543,  544,  595,  608 

Smart  v.  Baugh,  3  J.  J.  Mar- 
shall's Ey.  B.  364  525 

Smeltzer  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  P.  B. 
Co.,  158  Fed.  649  501 

Smith,  In  re,  104  Iowa  199  368 

Smith  ▼.  Cleveland,  17  Wis.  556     520 

Smith  V.  Hitchcock,  226  TJ.  S. 
53  295 

Smith  V.  Maryland,  18  How.  71 

61,  542 

Smith  V.  Texas,  233  TJ.  S.  630       508 

Smyth  ▼.  Ames,  169  TJ.  S.  466 

241,  412,  413,  414,  667 

Society  for  Propagation  of  Gos- 
pel V.  Wheeler,  22  Fed.  Gas. 
No.  13,  2  Gall  105  520 

Sohier  v.  Trinity  Church,  109 
Mass.  1,  21  424 

Sohn  V.  Waterson,  17  Wall.  596 

520,  521 

Soliah  V.  Heskin,  222  TJ.  S.  522 

292,  313,  470 

Somersett's  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr. 
79  26 

Soon  Hing  v.  Crowley,  113  TJ.  S. 
703  257,  263,  764 

Soper  y.  Lawrence  Bros.  Co.,  201 
TJ.  S.  359  472,  526 

South  Carolina  v.  Georgia,  93  TJ. 
S.  4  148 

South  Carolina  v.  McMaster,  237 
U.  S.  63  484,  724 


868 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


[ 

South  Carolina  ▼.  United  States, 

199  U.  S.  437  143 

South  Wales  Miners'  Federation 

V.  Glamorgan  Goal  Ck>.,  [1905] 

A.  G.  239  515 

Southern  P.  B.  Go.  ▼.  Board  of 

Bailroad  Com  'rs,  78  Fed.  261   414 
Southern  B.  Go.  y.  Greene,  216 

U.  S.  400  507,  720,  722 

Southwestern  Oil  Co.  ▼.   Texas, 

217  U.  S.  114  636 

Spencer,  In  re,  228  U.  S.  652 

564,  566 
Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  « 

345  292, 

355,  366,  361,  365,  370,  373,  375 
Spies  V.  Illinois,  123  U.  S.  131 

61,  81,  154,  165,  542,  550 
Spokane  Falls  ft  N.  B.  Co.  ▼. 

Zeigler,  167  U.  S.  65  219 

Spreehler  ▼.   Wakeley,   11   Wis. 

432  624 

Springer  v.  United  Statesi  102  IT. 

S.  586  371 

Springville  v.  Thomas,  166  U.  S. 

707  124,  536 

Standard  Oil  Co.  ▼.  Missouri,  224 

U.  S.  270  839 

Standard  Oil  Co.  v.   Tennessee, 

217  U.  S.  413  837 

Standard  Oil  Co.  ▼.  United  States, 

221  U.  S.  1  319 

Standard   Sanitary  Mfg.   Co.  v. 

United  States,  226  U.  S.  20, 

49  610 

Stanislaus  County  v.  San  Joaquin 

ft  K.  Biver  Canal  ft  Irrig.  Co., 

192  U.  S.  201  483 

Stanton  ▼.  Baltic  Mining  Co.,  240 

U.  S.  103  625 

State  ▼.  Bordeaux,  93  N.  C.  560  165 
State  y.  Burke,  2  Gill  (Md.)  79  522 
State    y.    Campbell,    64    N.    H. 

402  400 

State  y.  Ooppage,  87  Kan.  752  435 
State  y.  Daniels,  118  Minn.  155  513 
State  y.  Gaines,  86  N.  C.  632        165 


AKX  TO  PAOBS] 

State   ▼.   Goodwin,   33   W.   Va. 

179  510 

State  y.  Julow,  129  Mo.  163  513 
State   y.   Kreutzberg,    114   Wis. 

530  513 

State  ▼.  kaine,  16  Wis.  398  522 
State  ▼.  Newark,  27  N.  J.  L.  185  457 
State  y.  Newark,  37  N.  J.  L.  415  358 
State  y.  Parkhurst,  9  N.  J.  L. 

444  446 

State  y.  Pitnej,  80  Wash.  699  440 
State    y.    Bailroad    Commission, 

140  Wis.  157  482 

State  y.  Stewart,  59  Vt  273  490 

State  Bank  y.  Cooper,  2  Yerg. 

599  64 

State  Bank  y.  Snoop,  16  How. 

369  349 

State  Bailroad  Tax  Cases,  92  U. 

S.  575  293,  305,  348,  373 

State  Tax  on  Foreign-held  Bonds 

Case,  15  Wall.  300 

341,  347,  348,  370 
State  Trust  Co.  y.  Kansas  Citj 

P.  ft  G.  B.  Co.,  115  Fed.  367     476 
Stearns  y.  Minnesota,  179  U.  S. 

223  482 

Stephens  y.  Marshall,  3  Pinnej 

(Wis.)  203  476 

Steyens   y.   Prop,    of   Middlesex 

Can.,  12  Mass.  466  75,  214 

Stewart  y.  Kansas  City,  239  U. 

S.  14  753 

Stine  y.  Bennett,  13  Minn^  153  522 
Stockton  y.  Baltimore  ft  N.  Y.  B. 

Co.,  32  Fed.  Bep.  9  208 

Stoddard  y.  Owings,  42  8.  C.  88  520 
Stone  y.  Farmers '  Loan  ft  T.  Co., 

116  U.  8.  335  409 

Stone  y.  Mississippi,  101  U.  8. 

814  406,  450,  494 

Stone  y.  Southern  Illinois  ft  M 

Bridge  Co.,  206  U.  8.  267  219 

Stoutenburgh  y.  H^nnick,  129  U. 

S.  141  89 

Strauder  y.  West  Virginia,  100 

U.  8.  303  597 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


869 


.    [BIFEBXNCBS 

StrauBs  V.  Fozworth,  231  U.  S. 

162  314 

Street  ▼.  United  States,  133  XJ.  S. 

299  457 

Streitwolf  v.  Streitwolf ,  181  U.  8. 

179  325 

Strickley  v.  Highland  B07  Gold 

Min.  Co.,  200  U.  8.  527 

389,  390,  392,  426,  463 
Stuart  ▼.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.  183, 

188  292,  295 

Sturges  ▼.  Growninfield,  4  Wheat. 

122  450 

Sturges    &    Burn    Mfg.    Co.    v. 

Beauchamp,  231  U.  S.  320 

314,  792 
Sully  V.  American  National  Bank, 

178  U.  S.  289  713 

Summons  v.  United  States,  142 

U.  S.  148  110 

Swan,  Ex  parte,  150  U.  S.  637       580 
Swartz   y.   Lawrence,    12   Phila. 

181  522 

Sweet  y.  Bechel,  159  U.  S.  380 

136,  218 
Sweringen  y.  United  States,  161 

U.  S.  446  233 


Talton  y.  Mayes,  163  U.  S.  376       99 
Tang  Ton  y.  Edsell,  223  U.  S. 

673  168 

Tanner  y.  Little,  240  U.  S.  369 

440,  648 
Tappan  y.  Merchants  Nat.  Bank, 

19  Wall.  490  348 

Taylor  y.  Porter,  4  Hill  146  64 

Temple  y.  Com.^  14  Bush  (Ky.) 

769  557 

Tennessee  y.  Sneed,  96  U.  S.  69     527 
Tennessee  y.  Whiteworth,  117  U. 

S.  129  342 

Terry,  Ex  parte,  128  U.  S.  289 

334,  578,  580,  582 
Terry  y.  Anderson,  95  U.  S.  628 

472,  473,  519 


ABE  TO  PAGES] 

Texas  y.  White,  22  L.  ed.  819, 

823  579 

Texas  &  P.  B.  Co.  y.  Beesley,  56 

Tex.  Ciy.  App.  245  n446 

Texas  &  P.  B.  Co.  y.  Interstate 

Com.  Commiss.,  162  U.  S.  197   410 
Thames    &   Mersey   Ins.    Co.    y. 

United  States,  237  U.  S.  19        340 
Thompson  y.  Kentucky,  209  U.  S. 

340  635 

Thompson  y.  Lee  County,  3  Wall. 

327  457 

Thompson  y.  Perrine,  103  U.  S. 

806  457 

Thompson  y.  Thompson,  226  U.  S. 

551  330,  334 

Thompson  y.  United  States,  155 

U.  S.  274  111 

Thompson   y.    Utah,    170   U.    8. 

343  124 

Thompson  y.  Whitman,  18  Wall. 

457  333 

Thorington  y.  Montgomery,  147 

U.  8.  490  89 

Thorpe  v.  Butland  B.  B.,  27  Vt. 

150  397,  400 

Tiaco  y.  Forbes,  228  U.  8.  549      127 
Tide  Water  Co.  y.  Coster,  18  N. 

J.  Eq.  518  358 

Tiger  y.  Western  Inyestment  Co., 

221  U.  8.  286  181 

Tillinghast,    Ex    parte,    4    Pet. 

108  589 

Tinsley  y.  Anderson,  171  U.  8. 

101  556,  563,  829 

Toltec  Banch  Co.  y.  Cook,  191  U. 

8.  532  524,  526 

Tonawanda  y.  Lyon,  181  U.  8. 

389  360,  361 

Townsend  y.  Jemison,  9  How.  407 

519,  523 
Toyota   y.    Hawaii,    226    U.    8. 

184  744 

Trayelers'  Insurance  Co.  y.  Con- 
necticut, 185  U.  8.  364  714 
Treat  y.  White,  181  U.  8.  264       141 
Trevett  y.  Weeden,  18 


870 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


[EKmXNCKS 

Trimble  ▼.  Seattle^   231   XJ.   8. 

683  705 

Trono  ▼.  United  States,  199  U. 

8.  621  126 

Truax  ▼.  Baich,  239  U.  8.  33 

514,  755 
Tucker  ▼.  Fergoeon,  22  Wall.  527 

350,  374 
TuUia  ▼.  Lake  Erie  ft  Western 

R  Co.,  175  U.  8.  348  670 

Tomer  ▼.  New  York,  168  U.  8. 

90  472,  473,  521 

Turner  ▼.  Sawyer,  150  U.  8.  578  315 
Turpin  ▼•  Lemon,  187  U.  8.  51 

365,  368 
Twining  t.  New  Jersey,  211  U.  8. 

78  10, 13,  23,  38, 

44,  61,  153, 165, 172,  203,  243, 

247,  534,  543,  550,  553,  574,  576 
Twitchell  ▼.  Com.,  7  WalL  321  542 
Twitehell     ▼.     Pennsylvania,     7 

Wall.  325  61 

Tyler,  In  re,  149  U.  8. 164  582 

Tyler  ▼.  Befrees,  11  Wall.  331     333 


Ughbanks  ▼.  Armstrong,  208  U. 

8. 481  835 

Ulmer  ▼.  Lime  Bock  B.  Co.,  98 

Me.  579  476 

Union    Bridge    Co.    t.    United 

States,  204  U.  8.  364 

147,  171,  179,  215 
Union  Lime  Co.  ▼.  Chicago  A  N. 

W.  B.  Co.,  233  U.  8.  211    392,  476 
Union  Befrigerator  Transit  Co. 

▼.  Kentucky,  199  U.  8.  194 

342,  487 
United  States  t.  Alexander,  148 

U.  S.  187  214 

United  States  v.  Atchison,  T.  & 

8.  F.  B.  Co.,  234  U.  8.  476 

174,  418 
United  States  v.  Baltimore  Elec- 
tric Bailroad  Co.,  17  WalL  322  340 
United  States  y.  Baugh,  4  Hughes 

501  77 


iJA  TO  PAOBS] 

United  States  ▼.  Bennett,  232  U. 

8.  299  173 

United  States  v.  Block,  4  Sawy. 

211  77 

United  States  ▼.  Burr,  4  Craneh 

470  553 

United  States  ▼.  Butler,  1  Hughes 

457,  461,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  14        164 
United  States  ▼.  Buzzo,  18  WalL 

125  535 

United  States  v.   Chandler-Dun- 

bar  Co.,  229  U.  8.  53 

177,  178,  179,  526 
United  States  ▼.  Cruikshank,  92 

U.  8.  542  38,  39, 

61,   259,  267,  269,   380,  381,  542 
United  States  ▼.  Delaware  ft  H. 

Co.,  213  U.  a  366  155,  170 

United  States  v.  De  Walt,  128  U. 

8.  393  535 

United  States  v.  Erie  B.  Co.,  106 

U.  8.  327  347 

United     States     ▼.     Field,     21 

Blatchf .  330  77 

United  States  v.  Fisher,  222  U. 

8.  204  292,  472 

United  Statee  v.  Gettysburg  Elec- 
tric B.  Co.,  160  U.  8.  668  211,  213 
United  States  ▼.   Heinszen,  206 

U.  8.  370  149,  290 

United  States  v.  Heinze,  218  U. 

8. 532  837 

United     States     ▼.     Hudson,    7 

Craneh  32  578,  582 

United  States  ▼.  Hvoelef,  237  U. 

8.   1  340 

United  States  v.  Isham,  17  Wall. 

496  535 

United    States    ▼.   Joint   Traffic 

Ass'n,  171  U.  8.  505  184 

United  States  y.  Jones,  109  U. 

8.  513    88,  208,  216,  217,  220,  221 
United  States  v.  Ju  Toy,  198  U. 

S.  253  142,  204,  235,  237 

United  States  ▼.  Lane,  232  U.  a 

598  291 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


871 


[BXnBBXKOXS 

United  States  y.  Lee,  106  U.  8. 

196  206 

United  States  v.  Ljnah,  188  U.  S. 

445  113,  128,  214 

United  States  v.  McEee,  4  DilL 

1,  9  Fed.  C^.  No.  15  164 

United  States  v.  Marigold,  9  How. 

560  62 

United  States  v.  Maxwell,  3  Dill. 

275  77 

United  States  ▼.  Merchants  &  M, 

TrafBc  Ass  'n,  242  U.  8.  178  419 
United  States  v.  Miller,  3  Hughes 

553  77 

United  States  v.  Morse,  218  U.  S. 

493  334 

United    States    v.   Muscatine,    8 

WaU.  575  528 

United  States  ▼.  New  Orleans,  98 

U.  S.  381  376 

United  States  v.  Perez,  9  Wheat. 

579  56,  109,  110,  538 

United  States  v.  Philadelphia  & 

B.  B.  Co.,  123  U.  S.  113  86,  367 
United  States  ▼.  Bichart,  188  U. 

S.  438  340 

United  States  ▼.  Bilej,  5  Blatchf . 

204  538 

United  States  v.  Bussell,  13  Wall. 

623  136 

United  States  ▼.  St.  Louis  Termi- 
nal, 234  U.  S.  383  176 
United   States  v.   Sampemac,   1 

Hampst.  118  521 

United  States  ▼.  Shepard,  1  Abb. 

U.  S.  431  77 

United  States  v.  Shipp,  214  U. 

S.  386  583 

United  States  v.  Sing  Tuck,  194 

U.  S.  161 

137,  142,  143,  234,  235,  237,  572 
United  States  v.  Terminal  B.  B. 

Ass'n,  224  U.  S.  383  176 

United  States  y.  Waddell,  112  U. 

S.  76  38 

United  States  y.  Walker,  109  U. 

S.  258  264,  333 


ABB  TO  PAGES] 

United  States  y.  Williams,  194 
U.  S.  279  136,  168,  233 

Tnited  States  y.  Wong  Kim  Ark, 
169  U.  S.  649  34,  231,  233 

United  States  y.  Yates,  6  Fed. 
861  77 

United  States  y.  Zueker,  161  U. 
S.  481  168 

United  States  Exp.  Go.  y.  Min- 
nesota, 223  U.  S.  335  480 

Urquhart  y.  Brown,  205  U.  8. 
179  564 


Yalentina  y.  Mercer,  201  U.  S. 

131  565 

Van  Allen  y.  Assessors,  3  WalL 

590  340 

Yandalia  Bailroad  Co.  y.  Public 

Service  Commission,  242  U.  S. 

255  292 

Van  Home  y.  Dorranee,  2  Dall. 

304  304 

Van  Bensselaer  y.   Keamej,  11 

How.  297  354,  382 

Van  Bocklin  y.  Tennessee,  117  U. 

8.  151  340 

Van  Zandt  y.  Waddel,  2  Terg. 

260  64 

Vicksburg  &  M.  B.  Co.  y.  Putnam, 

118  U.  8.  545  86 

Virginia,  Ex  parte,  100  U.  8.  339 

257,  269 
Virginia  y.  Biyes,  100  U.  8. 313  269 
Voight  y.  Detroit,  184  U.  8.  115 

292,  361,  370 

W 

Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  B.  Co.  y. 

Illinois,  118  U.  8.  564  409 

Wadley    Southern    By.    Co.    y. 

Georgia,  235  U.  8.  651  691 

Wagner  y.  Leser,  239  U.  8.  207 

459,  461 
Waite  v.  Santa  Cruz,  184  U.  8. 

302  305 


872 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


[BXFIBINCXS 

Walden  t.  Craig,  14  Pet.  147        315 
Walker  ▼.  Bauvinet,  92  U.  8.  90 

37,  272,  542 
WaU,  Ex  parte,  107  TJ.  8.  265 

279,  590 

Walston  V.  Nevin,  128  U.  8.  578 

357,  612 

Ward  ▼.  Kelta,  12  Wend.  137        521 
Ward  V.  Maryland,  12  WaU.  418  340 

Washer  v.  BuIUtt  Co.,  110  U.  8. 

564  355 

Waahington  ▼.  Fairehild,  224  U. 

8.  510  290,  484 

Washington-Virginia  B.  Co.  ▼. 
Beal  Estate  Trust  *Co.,  238  IT. 
8.  185  316 

Water    Power    Cases,    148    Wis. 

124  482 

Waters-Pierce  Oil  Co.  t.  Deselms, 

212  U.  8.  159  402 

Waters-Pierce  Oil  Co.  t.  Texas, 

212  U.  8.  86  402 

Watkins  y.  Holman,  16  Pet.  25     299 
Watson  T.  Maryland,  218  XJ.  8. 

173  290,  736 

Watson  ▼.  Mercer,  8  Pet  88 

451,  452,  522,  530 
Wangh  ▼.  Board  of  Trustees,  237 

U.  8.  589  486,  751 

Wayman  v.  8outhard,  10  Wheat. 

1  299 

Webber  v.  Pere  Marquette  Boom 

Co.,  2  Mich,  636  104 

Webster    ▼.    Cooper,    14    How. 

488  354,  382 

Webster  v.  Pargo,  181  U.  8.  394 

162,  360,  467 
Weightman  ▼.  Clark,  103  TJ.  8. 

256  468 

Weister  v.  Hade,  52  Penn.  474     521 
Welch  V.  8wa8ey,  214  U.  8.  91 

402,  464,  735 
Wells   ▼.   8ayannah,   181   U.   8. 

531  X  350 

West  V.  Louisiana,  194  U.  8.  263  459 


AXX  TO  PAOXS] 

West  Chicago  8treet  B.  Co.  t. 

Illinois,   201  U.  8.  506 

148,  265,  389 
West  Biver  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix, 

6  How.  507  56,  211,  219 

Western  Life  Indemnity  Co.  ▼. 

Bupp,  235  U.  8.  261  314 

Western     Turf     Association     t. 

Greenberg,  204  TJ.  8.  359  780 

Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  ▼.  At- 
torney-General, 125  TJ.  8.  530   342 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  ▼.  Com- 
mercial Milling  Co.,  218  U.  8. 

406  500,  704 

Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania B.  Co.,  195  U.  8.  570   219 
Western  Union  TeL  Co.  ▼.  State 

of  Indiana,  165  U.  8.  304        617 
Westervelt  v.   Gregg,  12  N.  T. 

202  476 

Weston  ▼.  Charleston,  2  Pet.  466  340 
Wetmore  v.  Karricl^  205  U.  & 

141  264,  288,  313 

Weyerhaueser  v.  Minnesota,  176 

U.  8.  650  292 

Wheeler  v.  Jackson,  137  U.  8. 

245  473 

Wheeler  ▼.  New  York,  N.  H-  & 

H.  B.  Co.,  178  U.  8.  321  384 

Wheeler  ▼.  United  States,  226  U. 

8. 478  164 

White  V.  Hart,  13  WalL  646         529 
Whitfield  ▼.  Aetna  L.  Ins.  Co., 

205  U.  8.  489  420 

Whitten  y.  Tomlinson,  160  U.  8. 

231  563 

Wight  V.   Davidson,   181   U.  8. 

371  104,  138,  162,  360,  467 

WOd  V.  SarpeU,  10  Gratt.  405     362 
Wildes   V.   Attorney-General   for 

Trinidad,  3  Moore,  P.  C.  200    197 
Wilkinson  ▼.  Leland,  2  Pet.  627 

211,  457 
Willard   v.   Presburg,    14   WalL 

676  356 

Williams  v.  Arkansas,  217  U.  8. 
79  786 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


873 


[BKFXRENOES  ARB  *rO  PAGES] 


Winiams  y.  Eggleston,  170  XT.  S. 

304  291,  374,  769 

Williams  v.  Pear,  179  U.  S.  270     622 
Williams  v.  JohnBon,  239  U.  S. 

414  181 
WiUiams  v.  Paine,  169  U.  S.  79  452 
Williams  ▼.   Parker,   188  IT.   8. 

491  379 

Williams  v.  Port  Chester,  72  N. 

T.  App.  Div.   505,  76  N.  T. 

Supp.  631  520 

Williams  ▼.  Talladega,  226  U.  8. 

404,  416  480 

Williams   ▼.   Walsh,   222   U.    S. 

415  787 
Williamson    v.    Berry,    8    How. 

495  333 

Willoughbj  ▼•  Chicago,  235  U.  S. 

45  357,  361,  404,  455 

Wilmington  Star  Mining  Co.  ▼. 

Fulton,  205  U.  S.  60  782 

Wilmington  &  W.  B.  Co.  ▼.  Als- 

brook,  146  TJ.  S.  279  350 

Wilson,  Ex  parte,  114  TJ.  S.  417 

62,  76,  77,  78 
Wilson  V.  Iseminger,  185  XT.  8. 

55  473 

Wilson   V.    Lambert,   168   tJ.   8. 

611  88,  211,  356 

Wilson    V.    N6W   &   Penis,    Re- 
ceivers, 182 
Wilson  y.  North  Carolina,  169  U. 

8.  594  588 

Wilson  y.  8eligman,  144  U.  8.  41 

314,  320 
Wilson  y.  Standerfer,  184  IT.  8. 

399  288 

Wilson  y.  United  States,  221  U. 

8.  361  162,  164,  583 

Wilson  Cypress  Co.  y.  Del  Poyo, 

236  U.  8.  635  342 

Wily  y.  Sinkler,  179  U.  8.  58  38 

Windsor  y.  McVeigh,  93  U.  8. 

274  264,  312,  321,  333 

Winn,  In  re,  213  U.  8.  458         317 


Winnebago,  The,  205  .TJ.  8.  354  423 
Winston  y.  Winston,  189  TJ.  8. 

507  325 

Wisconsin  Central  Bailroad  Co.  y. 

Price  County,  133  U.  8.  496     340 
Wisconsin,   M.   &  P.   B.   Co.   y. 

Jacobson,  179  TJ.  8.  287  689 

Wise  y.  Henkel,  220  TJ.  8.  556  583 
Wise  y.  Mills,  220  U.  8.  549  583 
Wiswall   y.    Sampson,    14   How. 

52  582 

Withers  y.  Buckley,  20  How.  84 

64,  542 
W.  W.  Cargill  Co.  y.  Minnesota 

(ex  rel.  Bailroad  A  W.  Com.), 

180  TJ.  8.  452  728 
Wong  Wing  v.  TJnited  States,  163 

TJ.  8.  228 

97,  137,  168,  234,  240,  635 
Wood,  In  re,  140  U.  8.  278  663 

Wood  V.  Chesborough,  228  TJ.  S. 

672  265 

Woodman   y.    Pulton,   47    Miss. 

682  524 

Woods  y.  Carl,  203  TJ.  8.  358  782 
Wormley  v.  District  of  Columbia, 

181  U.  8.  402  360 
Wright  V.  Central  of  Georgia  By., 

236  TJ.  8.  674  342 

Wright  y.  Louisyille  &  Nashville 

R  B.,  236  U.  8.  690  343 

Wright  v.  Minnesota  Mut.  L.  Ins. 

Co.,  193  TJ.  8.  657  464 

Wurts   y.   Hoagland,   114  TJ.   8. 

606  357,  763 

Wynehamer  v.  The  People,  13  N. 

T.  378  274 


Yarbrough,  Ex  parte,  110  TJ.  8. 
651  38 

Yazoo  &  M.  Yal.  B.  Co.  y.  Jack- 
son Vinegar  Co.,  226  TJ.  8. 
217  478,  811 


874 


TABLE  OP  CASES 


[bxvbmnoes 

Yazoo    ft    M.    VaL    IBL    Go.    ▼. 

Tbomas,  132  U.  8.  174  350 

Tesler  v.  Harbor  Lone  Gommifl- 

Bioners,  146  U.  S.  646  86 

Tick  Wo  ▼.  HopkinBi  118  IT.  8. 

356  48,  92,  240,  256, 

263,  401,  449,  765,  770,  777,  799 
Yo«t  ▼.  Dallas  Goon^,  236  U.  8. 

60  357 


ABS  TO  PAOXS] 

Young,  Ex  parte,  209  U.  8.  123 

417,  474,  679 
Young's  Gase  v.  Virginia,  101  Ya. 
853  491 


Zakonaite   ▼•    Wolf,   226   U.   8. 
272  167 


INDEX 


[BIRRINCXS  iJA  TO  PAGIS] 


ABTJTTINO  OWNEBS, 

building  restrictions^  nnconstitiitional  exercise  of  police  power,  427. 
sewerSy  compelling  abutting  owners  to  connect  property  with  sewer, 
discrimination  between  residents  and  nonresidents,  validity  of 
statute,  718. 
due  process  not  denied,  vested  rights,  465. 
state  taxation,  power  to  tax,  legislature  may  act  directly  or  may 
delegate  functions,  356. 
taking  property  for  public  use,  compensation  required  by  Due 
Process  Clause,  358. 
vested  rights,  consequential  damages,  claim  of  abutting  owners  to 
compensation,  protection  by  due  process,  475. 

ACCOUNTS, 

due  process  of  law,  definition,  case  involving  distress  warrant  issued 
to  recover  balance  due  account,  62. 

ACTIONS  AND  DEFENSES, 

limitation  statutes,  exemption  from  suit  as  vested  right,  ending  of 
statutory  period  of  limitations,  523. 
nature,  due  process  not  denied  by  passage  of  limitation  statute, 
contracts  not  impaired,  519. 
police  power,  life  insurance,  exclusion  of  suicide  as  defense  in  action 

on  policy,  420. 
state  regulations  of  foreign  corporations,  theaters,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  698. 

ADJOINING  LAND  OWNERS, 

police  power,  statute  regulating  barrier  pillars  between  adjoining 
coal  properties,  due  process  not  denied,  432. 

ADMIRALTY, 

jury.  Federal  right  to  trial  by  petit  jury,  535. 

875 


876  INDEX 

[URRINCIS  AEX  TO  PAOIS] 

ADULTERATION, 

Federal  eoiutitatioiiy  Fifth  Amendmenti  Due  Process  ClauMy  eon- 
stitntionality  of  oleomargarine  tax,  140. 
regulation  of  foreign  eommeree,  limitation  of  power  by  Doe 
Proeesi  Claaae,  128. 
food,  prohibition  of  sale  of  preserTatives  containing  boric  acid,  eqoil 

protection  not  denied,  747. 
milky  sale  of  adnlterated  milk,  discrimination  against  nonprodncing 

▼endoTi,  equal  protection  not  denied,  729. 
paint,  statute  requiring  labels  on  mixed  paints  to  show  ingredients, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  730. 

ADULTEBT, 

punishment  of  o^Tenses,  discrimination.  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law 
Clause,  602. 

ADVEB8E  POSSESSION, 

limitation  statutes,  due  process  not  denied  bj  limitation  acts,  525. 

exemption  from  suit  as  vested  right,  ending  of  statutory  period 
of  limitations,  523. 
statute  declaring  ten  years'  possession  to  give  title,  due  process  not 
denied,  481. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  794. 

ADVERTISEMENTS, 

contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  license  tax  on  merchants  using  profit 
sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps,  freedom  not  infringed,  517. 
national  flag,  state  protection,  equal  protection  not  denied,  780. 
vehicles,  prohibition  of  advertising  wagons  on  eitj  streets,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  740. 
due  process  not  denied,  426. 

AGENTS, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  nonresident  persons,  318. 

nonresident  corporations,  319. 
taxation,  license  tax  on  emigrant  agents,  equal  protection  of  the  law, 

622. 
vested  rights,  foreign  corporations,  money  judgment  rendered  upon 
service  on  resident  director,  denial  of  due  process,  485. 

AORICULTURE, 

corporations,  state  anti-trust  laws,  discrimination  in  favor  of  agricul* 
tural  products,  equal  protection  denied,  699. 

ALIENS, 

constitution  of  parent  state,  right  of  colonists  to  participate  in,  116. 


INDEX  877 

[bsfbbincss  are  to  pages] 

ALIENS — continued. 

criminal  law,  appeal,  denial  of  right  of  review,  alien  juror,  due  process 
and  equal  protection  not  denied,  827. 
no  arraignment  or  plea  on  second  information,  alien  on  jury, 
due  process  not  denied,  554. 
Deportation  Act  of  1903  excluding  diseased  aliens.  Due  Process  Clause, 
156. 
alien  practicing  prostitution  after  entry,  167. 
application  of  Due  Process  Clause,  deportation  after  entry,  Japa- 
nese Immigrant  Case,  114. 
right  of  sovereign  to  deport  foreigners  already  domiciled.  Fifth 
Amendment,  construction,  92. 
Due  Process  Clause,  Chinese  exclusion  cases,  conclusiveness  of  decision 
of  executive  officer,  142. 
denial  of  due  process  to  aliens,  Chinese  exclusion,  97. 
Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments,  identical  construction,  243. 
limitation  on  power  to  exclude  alien  anarchists,  136. 
removal  of  restrictions  as  to  aUotments,  property  of  Indians  not 

taken,  181. 
rights  of  aliens,  resident  and  nonresident,  233. 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  257. 
employment,  discrimination  against  aliens,  equal  protection  denied,  753. 
public   improvements,   discrimination   against   foreign   labor,   due 
process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  755. 
firearms,  prohibition  of  possession  of,  equal  protection  not  denied,  792. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  purpose.  Congress  as  protecting  and  enforcing 
body,  266. 
scope  of  section,  definition  of  citizenship,  228. 
game,   prohibition   of  killing   of  birds   or  animals  by  unnaturalized 

foreign-bom  residents,  due  process  not  denied,  479. 
Indians,  Creek  freedmen  entitied  to  due  process,  vested  rights,  472. 
interstate  citizenship,  creation  by  Articles  of  Confederation,  225. 

development  by  second  Federal  constitution,  225. 
laundries,  regulation  of  business,  ordinances,  classification,  equal  pro- 
tection denied,  764. 
municipal    corporations,    ordinances,    prohibiting    visiting    barricaded 

gambling  rooms,  equal  protection  not  denied,  776. 
national  citizenship,  chapter  V,  225. 

absence  of,  emphasis  by  Dred  Scott  Case,  25. 

creation  by  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  Federal  constitution,  29. 

definition  in  Slaughter  House  Cases,  228. 

existence,  inquiry  in  Dred  Scott  Case,  227. 

protection  against  state  action,  244. 

protection  of  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  Federal  constitution,  35. 

question  of  birth,  definition  of  citizenship,  231. 


878  INDEX 

[RXrXEINCXS  ARE  TO  PAQXS] 

ALIENS — continued. 

taxation,  license  tax   on   emi^ant   agents,  equal   proteetion  of  the 

law,  622. 
witnesses,    self-incrimination,    exemption   not    fundamental   n^t   of 
national  citizenship,  153. 

AMUSEMENTS, 

see  Thxatkbs  and  Shows. 

ANIMALS, 

damages  by  cattle,  statute  imposing  liability,  equal  protection  and  due 

process  not  denied,  767. 
police  power,  fixing  of  certain  absolute  liabilities,  due  process  not 
denied,  440. 
ordinance  as  to  milk,  tuberculin  test,  due  process  not  denied,  431. 
quarantine,  prevention  of  disease,  equal  protection  not  denied,  772. 
railroads,  double  liability  and  attorney's  fee,  imposed  for  killing  of 
live  stock,  due  process  denied,  470. 

double  damages  for  refusal  to  pay  daim^  equal  protection  not 

denied,  811. 
exaction  without  denial  of  due  process,  477. 
fences,  liability  of  railroad  for  omission  to  fence  railroad,  double 
damages,  equal  protection  not  denied,  655. 
sheep,  restrictions  on  sheep  grazing,  equal  protection  not  denied,  778. 
stock-yards  companies,  statute  limiting  charges,  equal  protection  denied, 

814. 
taxation  of  tangible  personal  property,  344. 

APPEAL  AND  ERROR, 

criminal  law,  allowance  of  appeal  by  government,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  837. 
aUowance  of  appeal  from  certain  courts  by  state,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  831. 
denial  of  right  of  review,  alien  juror,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  827. 
dismissal  of  writ  of  error,  power  of  highest  court  of  state,  546. 
preliminary  examination,  right  to,  prosecution  in  Manila,  841. 
punishment,  difference  in  term  of  sentence  for  imprisonment,  eoual 

protection  not  denied,  831. 
record,  refusal  of  Supreme  Court  to  amend  record,  equal  protection 
not. denied,  824. 
Due  Process  Clause,  Fifth  Amendment,  relation  to  res  judicata,  139. 
taking  private  property.  Federal   supervision,  necessity  of  clear 
'  statement  of  case  in  trial  court,  385. 
instructions,  substantial  error  in  charga  to  jury,  due  process  and  equal 
protection  not  denied,  824. 


INDEX  879 

[BETEBENCES  ABE  TO  PAGES] 

APPEAL  AND  ERROR— continued. 

jurisdiction,  different  courts  in  same  state,  power  of  state  to  establish^ 

Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not  restrict,  820. 
jury,  discharge,  error  of  trial  court,  equal  protection  not  denied,  834. 
writ  or  error,  contempt,  what  constitutes,  indirect  or  civil  contempt, 
582. 
criminal  law,  habeas  corpus  as  proper  remedy  to  test  Taliditj  of 
detention  under  state  law,  564. 
remedies   in   state   courts,   duty   of   accused   to   exhaust   all 
remedies,  562. 
due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  notice,  286. 

APPEARANCE, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  of  process 
hy  appearance,  316. 

ARREST, 

Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  case  involving 
military  commission,  69. 
construction  in  case  involving  military  trial  and  service,  triumph 

of  legality,  65. 
indictment  as  evidence  of  probable  cause,  133. 
Magna  Carta,  guaranties  given  to  nation,  chapter  39  of  charter,  4. 
later  versions  of  the  Great  Charter,  6. 
rebirth  of  the  Great  Charter  in  1628,  7. 

ARTICLES  OF  CONFEDERATION, 

interstate  citizenship  created  by  Articles  of  Confederation,  225. 
development  by  second  Federal  constitution,  225. 

ASSAULT, 

convicts,  classification  of  prisoners  committing  assaults,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  837. 
slaves,  absence  of  national  citizenship,  emphasis  by  Dred  Scott  Case,  25. 

ASSIGNMENTS, 

master  and  servant,  assignments  of  future  earnings,  regulations,  exemp- 
tion of  banks,  equal  protection  not  denied,  742. 

ASSOCIATIONS, 

vested  rights,  reorganization  of  co-operative  association  without  con- 
sent of  members,  power  of  state,  464. 

ATTACHMENT, 

property  of  nonresidents,  bonds  attached,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  840. 
statute  not  requiring  bond  for  attachment,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  711. 


880  INDEX 

[kiveexncss  aax  to  pages] 

ATTORNEYS, 

criminal  law,  presence  of  accused  at  trial  and  rendition  of  verdieti 

habeas  corpus,  567,  569. 
disbarment,  attorney  cannot  be  denied  due  processj^  590. 
power  to  disbar  inherent  in  all  courts,  589. 
protection  of  life  and  liberty  by  due  process,  contempt  proceed- 
ings, disbarment  of  attorneys,  chapter  XVI,  578. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  nonresident  persons,  318. 

notice,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  sendee  of  process  by  appearance, 
316. 
women,  right  to  practice  law  in  state  courts,  Equal  Protection  of  the 
Law  Clause,  608. 

AUCTIONS, 

licenses,  discrimination  in  fee,  equal  protection  not  denied,  744. 

AUTOMOBILES, 

state  regulation,  service  of  process  on  nonresidents,  Talidity  of  statute, 
819. 

B 

BAKERIES, 

contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  definition,  regulation  of  employees,  496. 
freedom    subject    to    sovereign   powers    of    state,    regulation   of 
employees,  493. 
police  power,  limitation  on  hours  of  labor  for  women,  due  process  not 
infringed,  421. 

BANKRUPTCY, 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  denial  of  due  process,  Bank- 
ruptcy Act  of  1898  not  invalid,  107. 

BANKS, 

assets  of  safe  deposit  companies,  vested  rights,  prohibition  of  removal, 

due  process  not  denied,  480. 
depositors'  guaranty  fimd,  constitutional  exercise  of  police  power  as 
to  depositors'  fund,  433. 
creation  as  valid  exercise  of  police  power,  425. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  737. 

public  use,  ascertainment  by  ultimate  and  not  by  proximate 
effect,  389. 
deposits  in  savings  banks  unclaimed,  state  control,  bank  not  deprived 
of  due  process,  469. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  741. 
license  to  private  bankers,  right  to  refuse,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
737. 


INDEX  881 

[BXrEBEKGES  AKE  TO  PAGES] 

BANK8— continued. 

master  and  servant,  assignments  of  future  earnings,  regulaUons,  exemp- 
tion of  banks,  equal  protection  not  denied,  742. 
taxation,  deposits  in  national  banks,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
642. 
savings  banks,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  644. 
fltate  taxation,  exemptions,  strict  construction  of  exemptions,  349. 
law  as  to  banks,  equal  protection,  constitutionality  of  statute, 

618. 
limitations  on  taxing  power,  nature  and  extent,  exemption  of 

governmental  agencies,  339. 
personal  property,  taxation  of  intangible  personal  property, 

347. 
purpose,  taxation  must  be  for  public  purpose,  352. 
usury,  exemption  of  banks,  trust  companies  and  bona  fide  mortgages, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  736. 

BILL  OP  RIGHTS, 
see  Magna  Carta. 

Amendment  to  Federal  constitution,  first  eight  articles,  19. 
vested  rights,  formula  in  Declaration  of  Independence,  life,  liberty  and 

pursuit  of  happiness,  448. 
witnesses,  self-incrimination,  exemption  in  bills  of  rights  and  state 

constitutions,  10. 

BILUABDS, 

see  Pool  BooiiS. 

BILLS  AND  NOTES, 

state  taxation,  personal  property,  nonresidents,  taxation  of  intangible 

personal  property,  347. 
warrant  of  attorney,  due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  notice,  289. 

BILLS  OF  LADING, 
see  Gabbiibs. 

BOARDS  OF  TRADE, 

contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  state  regulations  of  boards  of  trade, 
freedom  not  interfered  with,  503. 

BONDS, 

attachment,   property   of   nonresidents,   statute   not   requiring   bond, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  711. 
foreign  corporations,  exclusion  of  insurance  company,  power  of  state, 

noncompliance  with  conditions,  equal  protection  not  denied,  722. 
insurance,  requirements  as  to  investments  in  state  by  foreign  companies, 

due  process  not  denied,  484. 

Due  Process — 56 


882  INDEX 

[rktersnces  are  to  paobs] 

BONDS — continued. 

taxation,  corporate  securities,  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  612. 
liquor  sellers,  discrimination,  equal  protection  not  denied,  633. 
personal  property,  taxation  of  intangible  personal  property,  347. 
purpose,  taxation  must  be  for  public  purpose,  352, 
spirits  in  bond,  equal  protection  not  denied,  635. 

BREAD, 
see  Food. 

BRICK  YARDS, 

police  power,  ordinance  prohibiting  brick  yards  in  certain  portions  of 
city,  due  process  not  denied,  437. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  756. 

BRIDGES, 

alteration  in  bridges  over  waterways,  limitation  on  power  of  Secre- 
tary of  War,  Due  Process  Clause,  Fifth  Amendment,  147. 

classification  of  municipal  corporations,  requiring  certain  towns  to 
maintain  bridge  and  highway,  equal  protection  not  denied,  768. 

eminent  domain,  taking  private  property,  kind  of  property  which  maj 
be  taken,  218. 

vested  rights,  railroad  property  burdened  by  construction  of  bridge 
over  highway,  due  process  not  denied,  466. 

BROKERS, 

contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  state  regulations  of  boards  of  trade, 
freedom  not  interfered  with,  503. 

BUILDING  RESTRICTIONS, 

discrimination  in  regulations,  equal  protection  not  denied,  734. 

elevators,  statute  requiring  barriers  of  shafts,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  790. 

eminent  domain,  due  process,  duty  of  state  to  guarantee  protection 
to  life,  liberty  and  property,  379. 

laundries,  regulation  of  business,  ordinances,  classification,  equal  pro- 
tection denied,  764. 

municipal  corporations,  prohibition  of  brickmaking  in  designated  area, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  756. 

police  power,  unconstitutional  exercise  of  police  power,  427. 

vested  rights,  property  classifications,  power  of  state,  discrimination, 
464. 

BUSINESS, 

see  PROPERTT. 

BUTTER, 
see  Food. 


INDEX  883 

[RBFE££NGES  are  TO  PAGES] 
C 

CANCELLATION  OP  INSTRUMENTS, 

contracts  for  sale  of  land,  statute  regulating  cancellation,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  743. 

CAEMACK  AMENDMENT, 
see  Interstate  Commsbge. 

CABRIEBS, 

bills  of  lading,  interstate  commerce,  Carmack  Amendment  of  1906  does 

not  deny  due  process,  160. 
commissions  regulating  carriers,  due  process,  fundamental  requisites, 

notice,  290. 
connecting  carriers,  shipments,  requiring  carrier  to  accept  reshipments 

in  cars  of  other  carriers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  689. 
contracts,   freedom   of  contract,  guaranty   of   Fifth   Amendment,  no 
denial  by  Carmack  Amendment  of  1906  to  Interstate  Commerce 
Act,  500. 
demurrage  cases,   discrimination  between  carrier  and  shipper  as  to 

attorneys'  fees,  statute  rendered  invalid,  692. 
employees,  Eight-Hour-Law  Case,  validity  of  statute,  182. 
Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  of  1908,  freedom  of  contract  not 

interfered  with,  504. 
Hepburn  Act  of  1906,  commodities  clause,  Due  Process  Clause,  155. 

prohibition  in  Hepburn  Act  of  transportation  from  market  to  mine, 
Due  Process  Clause,  170. 
interstate  commerce.  Act  of  1887  as  amended  by  Act  of  1910  held 
valid,  174. 
limitation  upon  power   of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  com- 
merce, relative  rights  of  employer  and  employee,  150. 
order   to   extend   facilities   to   connecting   carriers.   Due   Process 
Clause,  179. 
passengers,  heating  of  railroad  cars,  statute  excluding  certain  railways, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  664. 
separate  accommodations  for  white  and  colored  persons  in  railway 
coaches,  statute  requiring,  equal  protection,  604. 
civil  rights  cases,  608. 
payment  of  claims,  imposition  of  penalties  for  failure  to  pay,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  809. 
statute  imposing  attorneys'  fees  and  penalties  for  failure  to  pay, 
equal  protection  denied,  803. 
police  power.  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  and  common  law,  410. 

property  or  business  of  public  interest,  407. 
rates,  classification  of  railways  for  regulation,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  687. 
excessive  penalties,  due  process  denied  by  imposition,  474. 
oqual  protection  denied,  678. 


884  INDEX 

[EBIVBXNOIS  ABl  TO  PAGIS] 

OABRIEBS— continued, 
rates — continued. 

judicial  review  of  regulationB,  statute  failing  to  provide  for,  due 

proeeas  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  688. 
legislative  control,  railway  fare  and  rates,  effect  of  Equal  Pro- 
tection Clause,  050. 
prohibiting  charging  more  for  shorter  than  for  longer  haul,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  672. 
reasonableness  of  rates,  delegation  of  legislative  power,  411. 
denial  of  due  process  and  equal  protection,  656. 
due  process,  recent  eases,  416. 
elements  involved,  413* 
statute  establishing  rates,  inTalidity,  denial  of  due  process  and 

equal  protection,  665. 
unjust  and  unreasonable  rates,  fixing  by  commission,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  662. 
vested  rights,  maximum  intrastate  rates,  confiscation  and  denial 
of  due  process,  484. 
sleeping  cars,  prohibition  of  letting  down  of  unoccupied  upper  berth, 

due  process  denied,  483. 
soliciting  of  business  on  carriers'  premises,  prohibition  of,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  786. 
spur  track  for  public  use,  initial  cost  maj  be  imposed  upon  single 

industry,  due  process  not  denied,  476. 
taxation,  state  taxation  of  express  companies^  property,  equal  pro- 
tection, 614. 
terminal  facilities,  interstate  commerce,  order  to  receive  and  transport 
freighti  Due  Process  Clause,  175. 

CEMETERIES, 

police  power,  prohibition  of  burial  within  city  limits,  due  process  not 
denied,  423. 

CHAMBER  OP  COMMERCE, 

taxation,   membership  in   incorporated   chamber    of  commerce,   equal 
protection  not  denied,  646. 

CHATTEL  MORTGAGES, 

limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroacti^^e  laws,  vested  rights,  522. 

CHINESE  EXCLUSION, 
see  Alikns. 

CIGARETTES, 
see  TOBAOOO. 

CITIZENSHIP, 
see  Alixns. 


INDEX  885 

[bxfesxnobs  are  to  pagbs] 

CIVIL  RIGHTS, 

carriers,   statute   requiring   separate   accommodations   for   white  and 

colored  persons  in  railway  coaches,  equal  protection,  604. 
Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause  purely  American  invention,  595. 
jury,  effect  of  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  colored  persons, 
right  to  mixed  juries,  597. 
denial  to  colored  persons  of  right  to  act  as  jurors,  596. 
discrimination  against  citizens  of  African  descent,  setting  aside 

jury  panel,  603. 
exclusion  of  juror  on  account  of  color,  600. 
grand  jury,  negroes  as  grand  jurors,  606. 
negroes  as  jurors,  discrimination,  607. 
statutes  excluding  jurors  on  account  of  race  or  color,  602. 
punishment  of  offenses,  discrimination.  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law 

Clause,  602. 
schools,  discrimination  against  colored  children.  Equal  Protection  of 
the  Law  Clause,  605. 

COIN, 

see  MoNZT. 

COLLEGES  AND  ACADEMIES, 
see  Schools. 

COMBINATIONS  AND  MONOPOLIES, 

anti-trust   laws,   statute   permitting   combinations   among   purchasers, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  748. 
contracts,    freedom    of    contract,    condemnation    of    trade    agreement 
between  retail  lumber  dealers,  freedom  not  abridged,  499. 
•  punishment  of  selling  of  goods  at  lower  rate  in  one  place  than 
in  another,  freedom  not  abridged,  506. 
right  of  state  to  regulate  combinations  and  monopolies,  494. 
statute  against  combinations,  freedom  not  limited,  510. 
corporations,  classification  between  corporations  and  individuals,  com- 
pulsory production  of  testimony,  equal  protection  not  denied,  732. 
forfeiture  of  charter,  failure  to  file   af&davit  of  innocence  not 
required  of  individuals,  anti-trust  law,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  706. 
procedure  against  corporations,  difference  in  mode  of  procedure, 

anti-trust  law,  equal  protection  not  denied,  836. 
state  anti-trust  laws,  discrimination,  equal  protection  denied,  699. 
validity,  removal  of  discriminatory  features,  701. 
equal  protection,  arbitrary  classification,  creation  of  presumption  of 

guilt,  equal  protection  denied,  758. 
foreign  corporations,  quo  warranto  proceedings  to  oust,  violation  of 
anti-trust  laws,  equal  protection  not  denied,  838. 


886  INDEX 

[HXnUNOBS  ABX  TO  PAOIS] 

OOBIBINATION  AND  MONOPOLIES---eoiiti]iaed. 

interstate  eommeree,  order  to  reeeiye  and  transport  freight,  Dae 
Process  dattse,  175. 

police  power,  property  or  business  of  public  interest,  407. 

witnesses,  self-incrimination,  immunity  based  on  Act  of  1903,  Anti- 
Trust  Act,  166. 

OOMITT, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  judgments,  collateral  attack  on  judgments, 
332. 
nonresident  persons,  318. 

OOMMEBCE, 

see  iNTnSTATB  Oomioebos. 

COMMON  LAW, 

jury,  Federal  right  to  trial  by  petit  jury,  535. 

Magna  Carta,  chapter  39  in  American  law,  wider  scope  of  chapter,  15. 
police  power,  Interstate  Commerce  Act  and  common  law,  410. 
railways,  statute  requiring  railroads  to  provide  drainage  contrary  to 
common  law  rule,  equal  protection  not  denied,  693. 

COBiPENSATION, 

see  Eminbnt  Doicaik,  Worxmsn's  Coicpknsation  Act. 

COMPETITION, 

see  COMBINATIONB  AND  MONOPOLIXB,  SALBS, 

CONFISCATION, 
see  PaoPKRTT. 

CONFLICT  OF  LAWS, 

contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  insurance,  nonforfeiture  proTisions  of 

statute,  loan  agreement  inyalidated,  freedom  denied,  511. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  divorce  proceedings,  not  in  rem  or  in  per- 
sonam, 323. 

CONSPIRACY, 

contracts,    freedom    of   contract,    condemnation    of    trade   agreement 

between  retail  lumber  dealers,  freedom  not  abridged,  499. 
limitation  upon  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  commerce, 

relative  rights  of  employer  and  employee,  Due  Process  Clause, 

150. 
punishment,  difference  in  term  of  sentence  for  imprisonment,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  831. 


INDEX  887 

[SErERENCES  ARE  TO  FAGES] 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW, 

see  Dub  Peocess  or  Law,  Equal  Pboteotion  or  the  Law,  Magna 

Gabta. 
see  also  specific  topies,  sncli  as  Aliens,  Contracts,  Criminal  Law, 
Eminent  Domain,  Game,  Interstate  Commerce,  Police  Power, 
Property,  Taxation,  etc. 
Amendments  to  Federal  constitution,  first  eight  articles,  19. 
limitations  on  Federal  power,  60,  82. 
text  of  Fifth  Amendment,  55. 
constitutional  limitations  an  American  invention,  taxation,  338. 
construction,  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments,  Due  Process  Clause, 
identical  construction,  243. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Gause,  protection  of  national 
citizenship  against  state  action,  244. 
limitation  statutes,  constitutional  limitation  of  reasonableness,  520. 

CONTEMPT, 

chapter  XVI,  578. 

attorneys,  disbarment  of,  power  to  disbar  inherent  in  all  courts,  589. 
direct  contempt  conmiitted  in  presence  of  court,  what  constitutes,  580. 
indirect  or  civil  contempt,  what  constitutes,  582. 
proceedings  criminal  in  nature,  579. 
punishment,  consequences  of  lack  of  jurisdiction,  588. 
power  to  punish  inherent  in  all  courts,  578. 
right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  585. 
trial  by  jury  not  required  by  Due  Process  Clause  since  power  to 
punish  is  inherent,  580. 
witnesses,  self-incrimination,  privilege  invoked  by  officer  of  corpora- 
tion, 162. 

CONTRACTS, 

freedom  of  contract,  chapter  XII,  490. 

condemnation  of  trade  agreement  between  retail  lumber  dealers, 
freedom  not  abridged,  499. 

crime  for  person  to  act  as  railway  conductor  without  certain  qual- 
ifications, freedom  not  abridged,  508. 

definition,  496. 

Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  of  1908,  freedom  not  interfered 
with,  504. 

guaranty  of  Fifth  Amendment,  no  denial  by  Carmack  Amend- 
ment of  1^06  to  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  500. 

insurance,  nonforfeiture  provisions  of  statute,  loan  agreement  in- 
validated, freedom  denied,  511. 

licenses  tax  on  merchants  using  profit  sharing  coupons  and  trad- 
ing stamps,  freedom  not  infringed,  517. 

master  and  servant,  employment  at  will  of  parties  not  employ- 
ment at  will  of  others,  514. 


888  INDEX 

[bxfesxncxs  abs  to  fagis] 

CX)NTBACT8— continued. 

freedom  of  contract — continued. 

freedom  not  infringed  bj  statutes  regulating  employment  of 

women^  516. 
imposition  bjr  employer  of  certain  conditions  on  employee  as 

crime,  freedom  denied,  512. 
prohibition  of  issuance  of  irredeemable  orders,  in  payment  of 

labor,  freedom  not  infringed,  509. 
Ten-Hour  Law,  forbidding  employment  of  children  or  women, 
freedom  not  infringed,  509. 
mines,  freedom  not  infringed  by  ''run-of-mine,''  or  ''anti-screen" 
law,  as  to  compensation  of  miners,  516. 
state  law  preventing  miners  from  contracting  for  wages  on 
certain  basis,  freedom  not  infringed,  497. 
ordinance  regulating  size  of  loaves  of  bread,  freedom  not  inter- 
fered with,  505. 
punishment  of  selling  of  goods  at  lower  rate  in  one  place  than 

in  another,  freedom  not  abridged,  506. 
purchase  of  certain  materials  by  junk  dealers  as  crime,  freedom 

not  abridged,  507. 
regulation    of   distribution    of   railroad    coal   cars,    freedom    not 

destroyed,  498. 
right  of  state  to  regulate  combinations  and  monopolies,  494. 
state  regulations  of  boards  of  trade,  freedom  not  interfered  with, 

503. 
statute  against  combinations,  freedom  not  limited,  510. 
statute  defining  liability  of  railways  for  injuries,  freedom  not 

infringed,  502. 
subject  to  sovereign  powers  of  state,  493. 
impairment  of  contracts,  vested  rights,  chapter  XI,  443. 

allowance  of  passage  of  retrospective  state  legislation,  necessity 

of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  452. 
clause  limited  to  vested  rights  that  arise  out  of  it,  450. 
corporations,  state  control  of  corporations,  696. 
limitation  statutes,  constitutional  limitation  of  reasonableness,  520. 
nature,  due  process  not  denied  by  passage,  contracts  not  im- 
paired, 519. 
right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested  rights,  521. 
remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  legislature,  qualifications, 

527. 
state  law  prohibited,  449.  ' 

taxation,  railroads,  imposition  of  entire  cost  of  abolishing  grade 
crossings,  validity,  660. 
tax   on   special  .franchises,   equal   protection   not   denied   to 
street  raUway  companies,  628. 


INDEX  889 

[bxfebznoxs  abb  to  paoxs] 

CX)NTBACTS— continued. 

impairment  of  contracts— eontinued. 

vested  rights,  formula  in  Declaration  of  Independence,  life,  liberty  • 
and  pursuit  of  happiness,  448. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,   effect  of,  prohibition   of  arbitrary 
interference  with  rights,  452. 
'' liberty, '^  definition  in  Federal  law,  491. 

definition  in  state  law,  490. 
police  power,  Interstate  Conmierce  Act,  and  common  law,  410. 
limitations,  enjoyment  of  property  limited,  405. 
statute  inflicting  penalties  on  employer  where  certain  conditions 
are  imposed  on  employee,  denial  of  due  process,  435. 
railways,  wages  of  employees,  statute  as  to  time  of  payment,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  667. 
state  tide  lands,  assessment  of  leaseholds  for  local  improvements,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  704. 
taxation  of  intangible  personal  property,  347. 

telegraph  companies,  state  regulations,  prohibiting  limiting  of,  liability 
for  negligence,  equal  protection  not  denied,  704. 

COBPOBATIONS, 

actions,  change  of  venue,  local  prejudice,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

832. 
anti-trust  laws,  discrimination,  equal  protection  denied,  699. 

validity,  removal  of  discriminatory  features,  701. 
charter,  forfeiture  of  charter,  failure  to  file  affidavit  of  innocence  not 
required   of   individuals,   anti-trust   law,   equal   protection   not 
denied,  706. 
vested  rights,  alteration  of  charters  without  taking  property  of 
corporation,  due  process  not  denied,  482. 
classification  between  corporations  and  individuals,  compulsory  pro- 
duction of  testimony,  equal  protection  not  denied,  732. 
statute  applicable  to  fire  insurance  companies  only,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  697. 
consolidation,  annual  franchise  tax  on  consolidated  railway  company, 

statute  not  invalid,  648. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  nonresident  corporations,  319. 
equal  protection,  control  of  foreign  and  domestic  corporations,  chap- 
ter XX,  696. 
evidence,  statute  requiring  corporations  alone  to  produce  books  and 

papers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  703. 
Federal  constitution.  Fourteenth  Amendment,  corporation  as  person 

within  the  meaning  of  Section  1,  240. 
foreign  corporations,  see  title,  Fobxion  Corporations. 
insurance,  see  title,  Insuraxcx. 

master  and  servant,  wages,  prohibition  of  orders  for  payment  of  labor 
not  redeemable  in  money,  equal  protection  not  denied,  749. 


890  INDEX 

[ftSnBXNOBS  AKS  TO  PAGES] 

OOBPOBATIONS-Hsontinaed. 

names,  exclusion  of  foreign  company  having  same  name  as  domestifi 

company,  equal  proteetion  not  denied,  716. 
nonresidents,  state  taxation  of  intangible  personal  property,  347. 
officers,    Federal   eonstitatioUf   Fifth   Amendment,    self-incrimination, 

privilege  invoked  bj  officer  of  corporation,  162. 
procedure  against  corporations,  difference  in  mode  of  procedure,  anti- 
trust law,  equal  protection  not  denied,  836. 
process,  statute  appointing  state  auditor  to  accept  service  of  process, 

equal  proteetion  not  denied,  702. 
railways,  wages  of  employees,  statute  as  to  time  of  payment,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  667. 
state  control  of  corporations,  696. 

stocks,  sale  on  margin,  statute  prohibiting,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
773. 
taxation,  classification,  sales  for  future  delivery,  equal  proteetion 
not  denied,  638. 
taxation,  annual  franchise  tax  on  eonsolidated  railway  corjwration, 
statute  imposing,  due  process  not  denied,  343. 
Corporation  Tax  Act  limiting  deductions  held  not  invalid,  due 

process,  180. 
deposits  in  national  banks,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  642. 
discrimination  against  dealers,  articles  manufactured  from  prod- 
uce of  another  state,  not  discrimination,  700. 
equal  protection  of  the  law,  tax  on  corporations,  623. 
excise  tax  on  corporations,  nature,  639. 
franchises,  tax  on,  equal  protection,  626. 

unequal  assessment  of  franchises  and  other  property,  denial 
of  due  process  and  equal  protection,  702. 
income  tax  on  mining  companies,  equal  proteetion  and  due  process 

not  denied,  625. 
legacy  and  inheritance  taxes,  equal  protection,  615. 
membership  in  incorporated  chamber  of  commerce,  equal  proteetion 

not  denied,  646. 
nonresident  stockholders,  equal  protection  not  denied,  713. 
property  situated  in  several  states,  power  of  state  to  tax,  342. 
securities,  tax  on.  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  612. 
stock  transfer  tax,  validity,  634. 
vested  rights,  condemnation  of  outstanding  shares  of  owner  of  stock 
without  denial  of  due  process,  463. 
insurance,  requirements  as  to  investments  in  state  by  foreign 

companies,  due  process  not  denied,  484. 
reorganization  of  co-operative  association  without  consent  of  mem- 
bers, power  of  state,  464. 


INDEX  891 

[bxfkbinces  akx  to  pagks] 

COSTS, 

insurance,  payment  of  claims,  statute  imposing  attorneys'  fees  and 

penalties,  failure  to  pay,  equal  protection  denied,  805. 
malicious  prosecution,   statute   rendering  prosecutor   liable  for   costs, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  828. 
mandamus,  allowance  of  attorneys'  fees  to  successful  plaintiff,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  808. 
railroads,  payment  of  claims,  statute  imposing  attorneys'  fees  and 
penalties,  failure  to  pay,  equal  protection  denied,  803. 
demurrage  cases,  discrimination  between  carrier  and  shipper  as 

to  attorneys '  fees,  statute  rendered  invalid,  692. 
double  liability  and  attorney's  fee  imposed  for  killing  of  live 
stock,  due  process  denied,  470. 
exaction  without  denial  of  due  process,  477. 

COUNTERFEITING, 

former  jeopardy.  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction, 
offense  of  counterfeiting  involved,  61. 

COUNTIES, 

jury,  selection,  local  regulations,  equal  protection  not  denied,  833. 
taxation,  penalties,   discrimination   between   county   and   city  in   dis- 
position of  penalties,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied, 
752. 

COUETS, 

attorneys,  disbarment,  power  to  disbar  inherent  in  all  courts,  589. 
contempt,  direct  contempt  committed  in  presence  of  court,  wliat  con- 
stitutes, 580. 
indirect  or  civil  contempt,  what  constitutes,  582. 
proceedings  criminal  in  nature,  579. 
punishment,  consequences  of  lack  of  jurisdiction,  588. 
power  to  punish  inherent  in  all  courts,  578. 
trial  by  jury  not  required  by  Due  Process  Clause  since  power 
to  punish  is  inherent,  580. 
criminal  law,  appeal  by  state,  allowance  of  appeal  from  certain  courts, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  831. 
rights   of   accused,   presence   at   trial   and   rendition   of   verdict, 
habeas  corpus,  567,  569. 
decisions,  Federal  constitution.  Fourteenth  Amendment,  due  process, 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  264. 
different  courts  in  same  state,  power  of  state  to  establish,  Fourteenth 

Amendment  does  not  restrict,  820. 
due  process,  construction  by  state  courts  to  be  considered^  382. 
fundamental  requisites,  notice,  286. 


892  INDEX 

[EmftBNCKS  ABS  TO  PAOIS] 

OOUBTS— continued. 

due  procesa — continued. 

jurifldietlon,  necessity  of  competent  tribunal  and  notice,  312. 
nonresident  corporationS|  jurisdiction,  319. 
nonresident  persons,  jurisdiction,  318. 
service  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judgment,  314. 
etate   taxation.   Federal   supervision,   right   to    review,    necessity 

that  taxation  be  spoliation,  384. 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  257. 
taking  private  property.  Federal  supervision,  necessity  of  dear 
statement  of  ease  ia  trial  eourt,  385. 
eminent  domain,  compensation  for  taking  property,  question  a  judicial 
one,  necessity  of  eompetent  tribunal,  219. 
procedure,  decision  of  state  eourt  as  to  different  procedure,  pay- 
ment of  eompeneation,  equal  protection  not  denied,  828. 
Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  limitation  to  judicial  as  well 
as  legislative  power  of  Federal  government,  101. 
Fourteenth    Amendment,    purpose.    Congress    as    protecting    and 
enforcing  body,  268. 
Federal  courts,  life  and  liberty  as  protected  by  due  process,  procedure 
in  criminal  cases  in  Federal  courts,  chapter  XIY,  532. 
procedure  in  criminal  cases  in  state  courts,  chapter  XV,  541. 
right  to  review  state  action,  380. 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  263. 
Federal  power  of  eminent  domain,  review,  377. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure,  change  under  either  Federal  or  state 

law  must  not  deny  fundamental  rights,  532. 
procedure  in  state  courts,  equal  protection,  chapter  XXIII,  820. 
railways,  rates,  judicial  review  of  regulations,  statute  failing  to  pro- 
vide for,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  688. 
remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  legislature,  qualifications,  527. 
session,  what  constitutes,  580. 

state  courts,  criminal  law,  habeas  corpus  as  proper  remedy  to  test 
validity  of  detention  under  state  law,  564. 
procedure,  exemption  from  self-incrimination  in  state  courts, 

due  process  not  denied,  550. 
remedies  in  state  courts,  duty  of  accused  to  exhaust  all  rem- 
edies, 562. 
trial,  right  of  accused  to  be  present  in  state  court,  556. 
Supreme  Court,  criminal  law,   appeals,   dismissal  of   writ   of  error, 
power  of  highest  court  of  state,  546. 
vested  rights,  contracts,  impairment  of  obligation,  contract  clause 
limited  to  vested  rights  that  arise  out  of  it,  450. 
venue,  change  of  venue,  local  prejudice,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

832. 
witnesses, .  immunity  of  witnesses,  under  Interstate  Commerce  Act  of 
1893,  application  to  state  and  Federal  courts,  96. 


INDEX  893 

[RiraUBNGXS  AKX  TO  PAGXS] 

CRIMINAL  LAW, 

appeals,   allowance   of   appeal   to   gOYemmenty   equal   protection   not 
denied,  837. 
allowance  of  appeal  to  state  from  certain  courts,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  831. 
denial  of  right  of  review,  alien  juror,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  827. 
dismissal  of  writ  of  error,  power  of  highest  court  of  state,  546. 
record,  refusal  of  supreme  court  to  amend  record,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  824. 
assault,  classification  of  prisoners  committing  assaults^  equal  protection 

not  denied,  837. 
contempt,  proceedings  criminal  in  nature,  579. 

punishment,  trial  bj  jury  not  required  bj  Due  Process  Clause, 

since  power  to  punish  is  inherent,  580. 
right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  obstruction 

of  justice,  585. 
what  constitutes,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  582. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  crime  for  person  to  act  as  railway 
conductor  without  certain  qualifications,  freedom  not  abridged, 
508. 
master  and  servant,  imposition  by  employer  of  certain  conditions 
on  employee  as  crime,  freedom  denied,  512. 
corporations,  procedure  against  corporations,   difference  in   mode   of 
procedure,  anti-trust  law,  equal  protection  not  denied,  836. 
purchase  of  certain  materials  by  junk  dealers  as  crime,  freedom 
not  abridged,  507. 
due  process,  extension  to  Philippine  Islands,  Fifth  Amendment,  125. 
fundamental  requisites,  generality  and  equality  of  laws,  297. 
guaranty  in  American  law,  256. 

jurisdiction,  divorce  proceedings,  not  in  rem  or  in  personam,  323. 
limitation  upon  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  com- 
merce, relative  rights  of  employer  and  employee,  150. 
rights  of  aliens,  resident  and  nonresident,  233. 
Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  colored  race,  right  to  mixed  juries, 
597. 
punishment  of  offenses,  discrimination,  602. 
evidence,  admission  of  evidence  illegally  obtained,  due  process,  131. 
indictment  as  evidence  of  probable  cause.  Federal  constitution. 
Fifth  Amendment,  133. 
Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  application  to  courts  of  Cher- 
okee Nation,  constitution  does  not  apply,  99. 
construction  of  Fifth  Amendment,  indictment  for  infamous  crime, 
76. 
persons  subject  to  military  law,  95. 
questions  of  state  procedure  not  embraced,  89. 
right  of  judge  to  discharge  jury  during  trial,  right  to  express 
opinion  on  facts,  85. 


894  INDEX 

[REFERKNCSS  ABl  TO  PAOIS] 

CRIMINAL  LAW— continued. 

Federal  eonstitution — continued. 

Fifth   and    Sixth    Amendments,   jury    of   twelve   men,   right   of 

trial  bj,  incorporation  of  Alaska  with  United  States,  123. 
limitation  of  Fifth  Amendment  to  judicial  as  well  as  legislative 
power  of  Federal  government,  101. 
Federal  procedure,  right  to  plead,  guaranty  by  Fifth  Amendment,  due 
process,  536. 
summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guaranties  of  Federal 
constitution,  539. 
former  jeopardy  plea,   defenses,  Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, 158. 
Titth.  Amendment,  construction,  offense  of  counterfeiting  involved, 
61. 
grand  jury,  abolition,  power  of  state,  544. 

selection,  discrimination,  equal  protection  not  denied,  835. 
habeas  corpus  as  proper  remedy  to  test  validity  of  detention  under 

state  law,  564. 
indictment,    attorneys,    disbarment,    attorney    cannot    be    denied    due 
process,  590. 
conviction    without    indictment,    prisoner    compelled    to    testify 

against  himself.  Fifth  Amendment,  145. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  protection  of  national 

citizenship  against  state  action,  244. 
indictment  by  grand  jury  in  body  not  required,  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, 164. 
no  arraignment  or  plea  on  second  information,  due  process  not 

denied,  554. 
procedure,  powers  of  state,  query  as  to  existence  of  restraints 

upon  powers,  573. 
sufficiency  of  indictment  for  murder,  manner  of  death  not  alleged, 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  826. 
instructions,  substantial  error  in  charge  to  jury,  due  process  and  equal 

protection  not  denied,  824. 
junk  dealers,  regulation,  prohibition  of  purchase  of  certain  articles, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  787. 
jurisdiction  to  review  judgment  of  highest  court  of  state  in  criminal 
case,  first  ten  amendments  as  limitations  upon  Federal  govern- 
ment, 82. 
jury,  discharge,  error  of  trial  court,  equal  protection  not  denied,  834. 
petit  jury.  Federal  right  to  trial  by,  535. 
petit  jury  of  eight,  right  of  state  to  authorize,  548. 
selection,  local  regulations,  equal  protection  not  denied,  833. 
statute  as  to  number  of  peremptory  challenges,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  822. 
struck  jury  law,  validity,  830. 
trial  by  struck  jury,  right  of  state  to  provide,  due  process,  547. 


INDEX  895 

[RiraUBNdS  AKX  TO  PAGIS] 

CRIMINAL  LAW— continued. 

life  and  liberty  as  protected  by  due  process,  procedure  in  criminal 
cases  in  Federal  courts,  chapter  XIV,  532. 
procedure  in  criminal  cases  in  state  courts,  chapter  XV,  541. 
limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested  rights,  522. 
municipal    corporations,    ordinances,    prohibiting    visiting    barricaded 

gambling  rooms,  equal  protection  not  denied,  776. 
preliminary  examination,  right  to,  prosecution  in  Manila,  841. 
presence  of  accused  at  trial,  necessity,  accusation  of  felony,  privilege 
not  to  be  waived,  538. 
rights  of  accused,  trial  and  rendition  of  verdict,  habeas  corpus, 
567,  569. 
presumptions,   equal   protection,   arbitrary   classification,    creation   of 
presumption  of  guilt,  equal  protection  denied,  758. 
gambling,  presumption  of  guilt  from  possession  of  gambling  par- 
aphernalia, exception  in  favor  of  public  officers,  due  proc- 
ess not  denied,  832. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure.  Due  Process  Clause  of  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, re-enforced  by  Sixth  and  Seventh  Amendments,  533. 
exemption  from  self-incrimination  in  state  courts,  due  process  not 

denied,  550. 
indictment  by  grand  jury,  Federal  right  to  indictment,  informa- 
tion, 534. 
modification  of  procedure,  power  of  state,  541. 

struggle  to  leave  power  of  states  untrammeled,  543. 
powers  of  state,  query  as  to  existence  of  restraints  upon  powers, 
573. 
punishment,  additional  punishment  on  third  conviction,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  831. 
difference  in  term  of  sentence  for  imprisonment,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  831. 
extent,  power   of  court,   due  process  and  equal  protection  not 

denied,  841. 
habitual  criminals,  equal  protection  not  denied,  839. 
imposition  of  more   severe  punishment   for   subsequent   offenses, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  826. 
Indeterminate  Sentence  Act,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not 
denied,  834. 
remedies  in  state  courts,  duty  of  accused  to  exhaust  all  remedies,  562. 
searches  and  seizures,  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  kinship 

with  Fourth  Amendment,  79. 
sewers,  compelling  abutting  owners  to  connect  property  with  sewer, 
discrimination  between  residents  and  nonresidents,  validity  of 
statute,  718. 
statutes  operating  on  all  alike,  equal  protection  necessary,  823. 


896  INDEX 

[edveinoks  au  to  pagis] 

GRIMIKAL  LAW-— eontinued. 

statutes,  validitjr,  Federal  constitatioii,  Fourteenth  Amendment,  pur- 
pose, Congress  as  protecting  and  enforcing  bodj,  260. 
trial,  right  of  accused  to  be  present  in  state  court,  556. 
verdict,  refusal  to  set  aside  verdict,  insanity  of  juror,  552. 
witnesses,  immunity  of  witnesses  under  Interstate  Commerce  Act  of 
1893,  application  to  state  and  Federal  courts,  96. 
self-incrimination,  construction  in  favor  of  refusal  to  testier,  Fifth 
Amendment,  84. 
conviction  without  indictment,  prisoner  eompdled  to  testify 

against  himself,  145. 
crime  committed  within  military  reservation,  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, 159. 
effect  of  statutory  immunity  upon  constitutional  protection, 

Fifth  Amendment,  144. 
immunity  based  on  Act  of  1903,  Anti-Trust  Act,  166. 

CROPS, 

protection  against  weeds,  discrimination  against  railways,  penalties 
imposed  for  allowing  weeds,  equal  protection  not  denied,  674. 

CUSTOMS  AND  USAGES, 

Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  carriers,  statute  requiring  sep- 
arate accommodations  for  white  and  colored  persons  in  railway 
coaches,  604. 

vested  rights,  property  not  to  be  taken  from  one  man  and  given  to 
another  contrary  to  settled  usages  and  modes  of  procedure,  due 
process,  472. 


DAMAGES, 

see  Penaltixs  and  FoaFEiTCJBXs. 

animals,  damages  by  cattle,  statute  imposing  liability,  equal  proteetioB 

and  due  process  not  denied,  767. 
improvements,   consequential   damages,  claim   of   abutting   owners  to 

compensation,  protection  by  due  process,  475. 
municipal    corporations,    mobs    and    riots,    statute   imposing   liability 

for  damages,  equal  protection  not  denied,  742. 
railways,  employees,  injuries,  statute  as   to  comparative  negligence, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  686*. 
fences,  liability  of  railroad  for  omission  to  fence  railroad,  double 

damages,  equal  protection  not  denied,  655. 
fire  caused  by  locomotives,  liability  for  damages,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  668. 
killing  of  live  stock,  railroad  subjected  to  double  liability  and 
attorney's  fee,  due  process  denied,  470. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  811. 


INDEX  897 

[uriBENCIS  A&S  TO  PAOXS] 

DAMAGES— continued 
railways — continued. 

payment  of  claims,  imposition  of  penalties  for  failure   to  pay, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  809. 
vested  rights,  double  liability  for  failure  to  pay  damages  within 
certain  time,  due  process  denied,  477. 

DAMS, 

eminent  domain,  taking  private  property,  what  constitutes,  flooding  of 
land  not  a  taking,  386. 

DEAD  BODIES, 
see  Gbhetekibs. 

DEATH  BY  WRONGFUL  ACT, 

limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested  rights,  522. 

DEFINITIONS, 

citizenship,  definition  of.  Federal  constitution.  Fourteenth  Amendment, 

228. 
compensation  defined,  eminent  domain,  equivalent  under  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, 91. 
contempt,  direct  contempt  committed  in  presence  of  court,  what  con- 
stitutes, 580. 
indirect  or  civil  contempt,  what  constitutes,  582. 
deportation,  right  of  sovereign  to  deport  foreigners  already  domiciled. 

Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  93. 
"due  process  of  law"  clause  defined,  constitution.  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment, 41. 
case  involving  distress  warrant,  due  process  of  law,  definition,  62. 
common  heritage  of  all  states,  270. 
difficulties  in  way  of  complete  and  authoritative  definition  of  due 

process,  rule  of  inclusive  and  exclusive,  284. 
District  of  Columbia,  meaning  of  phrase,  104. 
fundamental  requisites,  generality  and  equality  of  laws,  297. 
hearing,  292. 
jurisdiction,  307. 
notable  attempts  to  define  due  process,  274. 
review  of  cases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  187. 
Webster's  famous  definition,  58. 
eminent  domain,  power,  definition,  power  vested  in  all  states.  Federal 
as  well  as  single,  207. 
state  definitions  of  public  use  to  be  respected,  due  process,  385. 
taking  private  property,  what  constitutes,  no  taking  for  public 
use,  387. 
"equal  protection  of  the  law''  clause  defined,  constitution,  Fourteentl) 
Amendment,  45. 

Due  Process — 57 


898  INDEX 

[BimiNCES  ABM  TO  FAfilS] 

DEFINITIONS— eontiiraed. 

f elonj  defined,  indietment  for  inf amons  crime.  Fifth  Amendmenty  eon- 

■truction,  78. 
freedom  of  contract,  definition,  496,  512. 
"liberty"  as  defined  in  Federal  law,  491. 

definition  in  state  law,  490. 
national  citizensliip,  definition  in  Slanghter  House  Gases,  228. 

question  of  birth,  definition  of  citisenahip,  231. 
police  power,  definitions  hj  American  jurists  and  text  writers,  397. 
equal  protection,  regulations  of  public  laundries  and  washhooses, 
760. 
session  of  court,  what  constitutes,  580. 
Tested  rights,  growth  in  England  of  idea,  443. 
what  constitutes,  453. 

DEPORTATION, 
see  Aluns. 

DEPOSITIONS, 

Federal    constitution,    Fifth   Amendment,   construction,   questions  of 
state  procedure  not  embraced,  89. 

DEPOSITS, 
see  Banks. 

DETECnVES, 

police  power,  ordinance  subjecting  priyate  detectives  to  police  8npe^ 
Tision,  due  process  not  denied,  438. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  817. 

DISCBIMINATION, 

see  EQUAL  Protbotion  ow  tok  Law  Clause. 

DISOBDEBLY  CONDUCT, 

amusements,  regulation  of  admission  to  places  of  public  amusement, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  779. 

DISTRESS, 

due  process  of  law,  definition,  case  involving  distress  warrant,  62. 

DIVORCE, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  divorce  proceedings  not  in  rem  or  in  personam, 
323. 

DOMICILE, 

aliens,  construction  of  Fifth  Amendment,  right  of  sovereign  to  deport 
foreigners  alreadj  domiciled,  92. 


INDEX  899 

[mEXNOXS  ABS  TO  PAGIB] 

DOMICILE — continued. 

attachment,  property  of  nonresident,  bonds  attaehed,  due  prQceaa  and 
equal  protection  not  denied,  840. 
statute  not  requiring  bond  for  attachment,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  711. 
corporations,  taxation   of  nonresident  stockholders,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  713. 
tax  on  shares  of  foreign  corporations  owned  bj  residents,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  720. 
foreign  corporations,  discrimination  against  nonresident  creditors,  equal 

protection  denied,  712. 
motor  yehides,  state  regulation,  service  of  process  on  nonresidents, 

validity  of  statute,  819. 
nonresidents,  due  process,  jurisdiction,  nonresident  corporations,  319. 
nonresident  persons,  318. 

notice,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  of  process  by  appear- 
ance, 316. 
proceedings  in  rem,  321. 
state  taxation,  due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings, 
370. 
personal  property,  taxation  of  intangible  personal  property, 

347. 
povrer  to  tax,  property  within  state  jurisdiction,  341. 
sewers,  compelling  abutting  owners  to  connect  property  with  sewer, 
discrimination  between  residents  and  nonresidents,  validity  of 
etatute,  718. 

DOWEB, 

vested  rights,  rights  below  standard  of  vested  rights,  456. 
what  constitutes,  455. 

DBAINAGE, 
see  Bkwxrs. 

assessment  of  expenses,  notice,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not 
denied,  763. 
validity  of  tax  sales,  notice  to  nonresidents,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  717. 
due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  notice,  291. 

vested  rights,  all  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  scope  of 
due  process,  459. 
arbitrary  assertion  of  power,  burdens  imposed  without  advan- 
tages, confiscation  and  denial  of  due  process,  488. 
corporations,  condemnation  of  outstanding  shares  of  owner 

of  stock  without  denial  of  due  process,  463. 
taxation,  township  compelled  to  collect  taxes  for  drain,  due 
process  not  denied,  470. 


900  INDEX 

[UEmiKOlS  ABM  TO  PAOBB] 

DRAINAGE— continued, 
dae  process — continued. 

taxing  districts,  creation  bj  legislature  bj  arbitrary  action, 
denial  of  due  process,  488. 
easements,  state  lands  on  navigable  rivers,  servitude  in  favor  of  publie, 

effect  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  766. 
eminent  domain.  Fifth  Amendment,  land  taken  to  improve  naviga- 
tion, liability  for,  113. 
state  definitions  of  public  use  to  be  respected,  due  process,  385. 
statute  compelling  railroad  to  provide  means  for  passing  water 

under  embankments,  180. 
taking  private  property,  what  constitutes,  387. 
flooding  of  land  not  a  taking,  386. 
police  power,  extent,  promotion  of  public  convenience,  419. 
railways,  imposition  of  expense  of  drainage  on  railways,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  676. 
statute  requiring  railroads  to  provide  drainage  contrary  to  eom- 
mon  law  rule,  equal  protection  not  denied,  693. 

DBUG8  AND  DRUGGISTS, 

act  as  to  Food  and  Drugs,  misbranding.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process 

Clause,  181. 
itinerant  vendors,  prohibition  of  sale  of  drugs  by,  due  process  and  equal 

protection  not  denied,  793. 
local  option  law,  prohibition  of  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  801. 
master  and  servant,  Eight-Hour  Law,  women  employed,  validity  of  stat- 
utes, 798. 
freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  statutes  regulating  employ- 
ment of  women,  516. 

DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW, 

adverse   possession,   statute   declaring  ten  years'   possession   to  give 
title,  due  process  not  denied,  481. 

aliens,  application  of  Due   Process  Clause*,   deportation  after  entry, 
Japanese  Immigrant  Case,  114. 
rights  of  aliens,  resident  and  nonresident,  233. 

animals,  damages  by  cattle, .  statute  imposing  liability,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  767. 

assets  of  safe  deposit  companies,  prohibition  of  removal,  due  process 
not  denied,  480. 

attachment,  property  of  nonresident,  bonds  attached,  due  process  and 
equal  protection  not  denied,  840. 

attorneys,  disbarment,  attorney  cannot  be  denied  due  process,  590. 

banks,  police  power,  guaranty  fund,  constitutional  exercise  of  police 
power  as  to  depositors'  fund,  433. 
creation  of  fund  as  valid  exercise  of  poUee  power^  425. 


INDEX  901 

[betsbsnces  ark  to  paoxs] 

DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW— continued. 

cigarettes,  license  for  sale,  ordinances,  due  process  and  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  769. 
common  heritage  of  all  states,  270. 
consequential   damages,   claim   of   abutting  owners   to   eompensationi 

protection  by  due  process,  475. 
contempt,  punishment,  trial   hy  jury  not  required   by  Due  Process 
Clause  since  power  to  punish  is  inherent,  580. 
right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  585. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  definition,  496. 

guaranty  of  Fifth  Amendment,  no  denial  of  freedom  by  Carmack 

Ajnendment  of  1906  to  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  500. 
impairment  of  contracts,  allowance  of  passage  of  retrospective 
state  legislation,  necessity  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  452. 
impairment  of  obligation  by  state  law  prohibited,  449. 

contract  clause  limited  to  vested  rights  that  arise  out  of  it, 
450. 
master  and  servant,  imposition  by  employer  of  certain  conditions 
on  employee  as  crime,  freedom  denied,  512. 
state  law  preventing  miners  from  contracting  for  wages  on 
certain  basis,  freedom  not  infringed,  497. 
punishment  of  selling  of  goods  at  lower  rate  in  one  place  than  in 

another,  freedom  not  abridged,  506. 
purchase  of  certain  materials  by  junk  dealers  as  crime,  freedom 

not  abridged,  507. 
right  of  state  to  regulate  combinations  and  monopolies,  494. 
state  regulations  of  boards  of  trade,  freedom  not  interfered  with, 

503. 
statute  defining  liability  of  railways  for  injuries,  freedom  not 

infringed,  502. 
subjection  to  sovereign  powers  of  state,  493. 
corporations,  alteration  of  charters  without  taking  property  of  cor- 
poration, due  process  not  denied,  482. 
condemnation  of  outstanding  shares  of  owner  of  stock  without 

denial  of  due  process,  463. 
process,   statute   appointing   state   auditor   to   accept   service   of 

process,  equal  protection  not  denied,  702. 
reorganization    of    co-operative    association    without    consent    of 

members,  power  of  state,  464. 
state  control  of  corporations,  696. 

taxation,  unequal  assessment  of  franchises  and  other  property, 
denial  of  due  process  and  equal  protection,  702. 
criminal  law,  accusation  of  felony,  necessity  of  presence  of  accused, 
privilege  not  to  be  waived,  538. 
appeal,  denial  of  right  of  review,  alien  juror,  due  process  and 
equal  protection  not  denied,  827. 


902  INDEX 

[BIVSBIN018  AU  TO  FAOIS] 

DUE  PB0CE88  OF  LAW— eontinaecL 
erimiiud  law— eontinaed. 

exemption  from   aelf •incrimination  in  state  eonrts,  due  process 

not  denied,  550. 
indictment,  sufficienej  of  indictment  for  murder,  manner  of  deatii 
not  alleged,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied, 
826. 
modification  of  procedure,  power  of  state,  541. 
BO  arraignment  or  plea  on  second  information,  due  process  not 

denied,  554. 
preliminarj  examination,  right  to,  prosecution  i]>  Manila,  841. 
procedure,  powers  of  state,  query  as  to  existence  of  restraints  upon 

powers,  573. 
punishment,  extent,  power  of  court,  due  process  and  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  841. 
indeterminate  sentence  act,  due  process  and*  equal  protection 
not  denied,  834. 
statutes  operating  on  all  alike,  equal  protection  necessary,  823. 
trial,  right  of  accused  to  be  present  in  state  court,  556. 

presence  at  trial  and  rendition  of  yerdict,  habeas  corpus,  567, 
560. 
▼erdict,  refusal  to  set  aside  irerdict,  insanity  of  juror,  552. 
definition,  case  involying  distress  warrant,  62. 

difiiculties  in  way  of  complete  and  authoritative  definition,  rule 

of  indusiTe  and  exelusiye,  284. 
meaning  ot  phrase,  District  of  Columbia,  104. 
notable  attempts  to  define  due  process,  274. 
Webster's  famous  definition,  58. 
review  of  cases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  187. 
deposits  in  savings  banks,  unclaimed  for  thirty  years,  state  control, 

bank  not  deprived  of  due  process,  469. 
double  liability  for  failure  to  pay  damages  within  ceiitain  time,  due 

process  denied,  477. 
drainage,  assessment  of  expenses  after  notice,  due  process  and  equal 
protection  not  denied,  763. 
township  compelled  to  collect  taxes  for  drain,  due  process  not 
denied,  470. 
easements,  state  lands  on  navigable  rivers,  servitude  in  favor  of  public, 

effect  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  766. 
eminent  domain,  compensation  for  taking  property,  necessity,  217. 

duty  of  state  to  guarantee  protection  to  life,  liberty  and  property, 

379. 
Federal  power  of  eminent  domain  and  due  process,  207. 
Federal  power  of  eminent  domain,  review,  377. 
matter  to  be  excluded,  in  determining  compensation  proceeding  to 

recover  for  decline  in  market  value,  393. 
power  of  eminent  domain,  limitation  by  Due  Process  Clause,  209. 


INDEX  903 

[edvexnois  abs  to  paois] 

DUB  PBOCESS  OF  LAW— <5ontiimed. 
eminent  domain— continued 

public  use,  ascertainment  by  ultimate  and  not  by  proximate  effect, 

389. 
state  power  of  eminent  domain,  due  process,  Federal  superyision, 
377. 
inherent  power  of  states,  378. 
necessity  of  clear  statement  of  case  in  trial  court,  Federal 

superrision,  385. 
state  definitions  of  public  use  to  be  respected,  due  process,  385. 
substance  and  not  form  to  be  considered.  Federal  supervision, 
380. 
taking  private  property,  due  process,  mistake  of  law,  391. 

extension  of  spur  track  for  benefit  of  single  industry,  taking 

not  unlawful,  392. 
locating  harbor  lines.  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  86. 
what  constitutes,  flooding  of  land  not  a  taking,  386. 
English  constitutional  system,  Blaekstone  as  true  guide  instead  of  Coke, 

11. 
exposition.  Coke  as  misleading  expounder  of  the  Great  Charter,  8. 
Federal  constitution,  amendments,  text  of  Fifth  Amendment,  55. 
due  process  of  law  as  embodied  in  Fifth  Amendment,  21. 
right  to  due  process  in  unincorporated  territory,  237. 
Federal  power  of  eminent  domain,  and  due  process,  chapter  IV,  207. 
Federal  procedure,  right  to  plead,  guaranty  by  Fifth  Amendment,  due 

process,  536. 
Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  Act  as  to  Food  and  Drugs, 
misbranding,  181. 
Act  of  1903  excluding  diseased  aliens,  156. 
admission  of  evidence  illegally  obtained,  131. 
alien  practicing  prostitution  after  entry,  167. 
appeal  to  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue  after  payment  of 

taxes,  182. 
assessments  for  benefits  in  City  of  Washington,  161. 
Bankruptcy  Act  of  1898  not  invalid,  denial  of  due  process,  107. 
Chinese  exclusion  cases,  conclusiveness  of  decision  of  executive 

officer,   142. 
construction,  confiscation  of  property,  73. 
legal  tender  cases,  71. 

right  of  sovereign  to  deport  foreigners  already  domiciled,  92. 
Corporation  Tax  Act,  limiting  deductions  held  not  invalid,  180. 
Eight-Hour-Law  Case,  validity  of  statute,  182. 
estoppel  to  contest  constitutionality,  availability  of  defense  against 

promoters  of  public  improvements,  138. 
excise  tax  based  on  gross  tonnage  upon  use  of  foreign  built  pleas- 
ure yachts,  171. 
extension  of  due  process  to  Philippine  Islands,  125. 


901  INDEX 

[bivsbincxs  ark  to  pagis] 

DUE  PB0CES8  OF  LAW— eontmued. 
Fifth  Amendment— eontinued. 

former  jeopardj,  effect  of  Due  Process  GkLase,  109. 
Hepburn  Act  of  1906,  commodities  clause^  155. 
interstate  commerce.  Act  of  1887  as  amended  by  Act  of  1910  held 
valid,  174. 
Oarmack  Amendment  of  1906  does  not  deny  due  process,  160. 
order  to  extend  facilities  to  connecting  carriers,  179. 
order  to  receive  and  transport  freight,  175. 
judgment  by  default,  summons  left  at  residence  of  defendant,  173. 
limitation  on  Federal  power  to  tax  dispensing  agents  of  state,  143. 
limitation  on  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  commerce, 

relative  rights  of  employer  and  employee,  150. 
limitation  on  power  of  Secretary  of  War,  alterations  in  bridges 

over  waterways,  147. 
limitation  on  power  to  exclude  alien  anarchists,  136. 
limitation  on  power  to  regulate  mails,  134. 
limitation  to  judicial  as  weU  as  legislative  power  of  Federal  gov- 
ernment, 101. 
not  limitation  on  taxing  power,  income  tax,  181. 
oleomargarine  tax,  constitutionality,  140. 
prohibition  in  Hepburn  Act  of  transportation  from  market  to  mine, 

170. 
property  of  Indians  not  taken,  removal  of  restrictions  as  to  allot- 
ments, 181. 
property  taken  by  militaxy  governor  of  Porto  Bieo  without  notice 

or  hearing,  168. 
regulation  of  foreign  conmieree,  limitation  of  power  by  Due  Process 

Clause,  128. 
relation  to  res  judicata,  139. 
review  of  eases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  186. 
rights  of  importers  under  Philippine  Act  of  1906, 149. 
Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments,  Due  Process  Clause,  identical  con- 
struction, 243. 
foreign  corporations,  jurisdiction,  foreign  corporation  not  doing  bus- 
ness  in  state  is  not  within  jurisdiction  of  state,  equal  protection, 
709. 
money  judgment  rendered  upon  service  on  resident  director,  denial 

of  due  process,  485. 
names,   exclusion    of    foreign    company    having    same    name    as 
domestic  company,  equal  protection  not  denied,  716. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,   corporation   as  person  within   the  meaning 
of  Section  1,  240. 
judicial  rule  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  as  to  deprivation  of  due 

process  and  denial  of  equal  protection,  49. 
meaning  of  "due  process  of  law"  clause,  41. 
protection  against  unlawful  or  unequal  exercise  of  state  power,  24L 


INDEX  905 

[references  ABE  TO  PAGES] 

DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW— continued. 
Fourteenth  Amendments-continued. 

protection  of  national  citizenship  against  state  action,  244. 
purpose,  Congress  as  protecting  and  enforcing  body,  266. 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  257. 
fundamental  requisites  of  due  process,  generality  and  equality  of  laws, 
297. 
hearing,  292. 

kind  of  hearing  necessary,  295. 
notice,  286. 
gambling,  presumption  of  guilt  from  possession  of  gambling  para- 
phernalia, exception  in  favor  of  public  oficers,  due  process  not 
denied,  832. 
game,  prohibition  of  killing  of  birds  or  animals  by  unnaturalized  for- 
eign-bom residents,  due  process  not  denied,  479« 
grand  jury,  abolition,  power  of  state,  544. 
guaranty  of  due  process,  chapter  VI,  249. 
American  law,  251. 
English  law,  249. 
scope  of  guaranty,  249. 
ice  cream,  statute  regulating  percentage  of  butter  fat,  due  process 

and  equal  protection  not  denied,  818. 
Indians,  Creek  freedmen  entitled  to  due  process,  472. 
instructions,  substantial  error  in  charge  to  jury,  due  process  and  equal 

protection  not  denied,  824. 
insurance,  requirements  as  to  investments  in  state  by  foreign  com- 
panies, due  process  not  denied,  484. 
itinerant  vendors,  prohibition  of  sale  by,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  793. 
jurisdiction,  chapter  VII,  312. 

divorce  proceedings  not  in  rem  or  in  personam,  323. 

fundamental  requisite  of  due  process,  307. 

judgments,  collateral  attack  on  judgment,  332. 

necessity  of  competent  tribunal  and  notice,  312. 

nonresident  corporations,  319. 

nonresident  persons,  318. 

notice,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  of  process  by  appearance, 

316. 
proceedings  in  rem,  321. 

review  of  judgment  of  highest  court  of  state  in  criminal  case,  first 

ten  amendments  as  limitations  upon  Federal  government,  82. 

jury,  criminal  trial,  petit  jury  of  eight,  right  of  state  to  authorize,  548. 

trial  by  struck  jury,  right  of  state  to  provide,  due  process,  547. 
"liberty"  as  defined  in  Federal  law,  491. 

defined  in  state  law,  490. 
life  and  liberty  as  protected  by  due  process,  procedure  in  criminal  eases 
in  Federal  courts,  chapter  XIV,  $32. 
criminal  cases  in  state  courts,  chapter  XV,  541. 


906  INDEX 

[RBTEBINCXS  ARS  to  FAGI8] 

DUE  PB00E88  OF  LAW— ^ontmned. 

limitation  statatM,  advene  poeaeseion,  due  proeeee  cot  denied  bj  limita- 
tion aet|  525. 
exemption  from  suit  as  vested  right,  ending  of  statutory  period 

of  limitations,  523. 
nature,  due  process  not  denied  hj  passage,  contracts  not  impaired, 

519. 
right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested  rights,  521. 
ICagna  Carta,  chapter  39  and  amendments,  443. 

chapter  39  as  reproduced  in  first  state  constitutions,  14. 
chapter  39  in  American  law,  wider  soepe  of  chapter,  15. 
constmctioB,  error  of  Coke's  construction,  change  of  principles 

in  bills  of  rights,  12. 
guaranties  given  to  nation,  chapter  39  of  charter,  4. 
master  and^  servant,  regulations,  requiring  waahhouses  for  coal  miners, 

due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  751. 
mineral  waters,  prohibition  of  waste,  due  process  and  equal  protection 

not  denied,  739. 
mnnicipal  corporations,  annexation   of  land,   discrimination   between 
agricultural  and  other  lands,  due  procees  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  725. 
liability  for  damages  caused  by  mobs,  due  process  not  denied,  469. 
licenses,  occupations,  classification,  due  process  and  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  745. 
ordinances,  milk,  tuberculin  test,  due  process  not  denied,  431. 

prohibiting  advertising  trucks  or  vans,  due  process  not  denied, 

426. 
prohibiting  billiard  or  pool  rooms,  due  process  not  denied,  427. 
prohibiting  brick  yards  in  certain  portions  of  city,  due  process 

not  denied,  437. 
regulating  size  of  loaves  of  bread,  due  process  not  denied,  429. 
regulation  of  livery  stables,  due  process  and  equal  protection 

not  denied,  794. 
regulation  of  private  detectives,  police  supervision,  due  process 
and  equal  protection  not  denied,  817. 
due  process  not  denied,  438. 
requiring  water-closets  under  certain  conditions,  due  process 
not  denied,  430. 
property  of  private  water  company,  taking  by  municipal  corpora- 
tion, due  process  not  denied,  473. 
national  citizenship,  creation  by  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  Federal 
constitution,  29. 
protection  of  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  Federal  constitution,  35. 
oleomargarine,  statute  restricting  sale  and  manufacture,  validity,  770. 
origin  and  growth  of  due  process,  1. 
penalties,  due  procees  denied  by  imposition  of  excessive  penalties,  474. 


INDEX  907 

[BXnEENOIS  ARS  TO  PAOIS] 

DUE  PBOCfESS  OF  LAW— contmued« 

police  power  and  due  process^  chapter  X,  395. 

carriers,  reasonableness  of  rates,  delegation-  of  legislative  power, 
411. 
elements  inTolyed  in  determining  reasonableness  of  rates,  413. 
extent,  promotion  of  public  eonyenience,  419. 
fixing  of  certain  absolute  liabilities,  due  process  not  denied,  440. 
license  tax  on  profit  sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps,  due 

process  not  denied,  440. 
limitation  on  hours  of  labor  of  women,  due  process  not  infringed, 

421. 
limitations,  reasonableness  as  limitation,  401. 

Tested  rights  as  limitation,  403. 
mines,  " run-of -mine "  or  "anti-screen"  law,  statute  as  to  com- 

pensation  of  miners,  due  process  not  denied,  436. 
prevention  of  diversion  of  waters,  due  process  not  denied,  421. 
prohibition  of  burial  within  city  limits,  due  process  not  denied, 

423. 
prohibition  of  exportation  of  Philippine  coin,  422. 
prohibition  of  sale  of  ice  cream,  lack  of  certain  percentage  of 

butter  fat,  due  process  not  denied,  431. 
prohibition  of  sale  of  malt  liquor,  due  process  not  denied,  428. 
right  of  forfeiture,  404. 
sales  in  bulk,  due  process  not  denied,  424. 
smoke,  legislation  declaring  emission  of  dense  smoke  a  nuisance, 

due  process  not  denied,  438. 
statute  inflicting  penalties  on  employer  where  certain  conditions 

are  imposed  on  emplojee,  denial  of  due  process,  435. 
statute  regulating  barrier  pillars  between  adjoining  coal  proper- 
ties, due  process  not  denied,  432. 
statute  requiring  hotel  keepers  to  give  notice  to  guests  in  case  of 
fire,  due  process  not  denied,  437. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure,  change  either  under  Federal  or  state 
law  must  not  deny  fundamental  rights,  532. 
Due  Process  Clause  of  Fifth  Amendment  re-enforced  bj  Sixth  and 

Seventh  Amendments,  533. 
right  of  state  to  regulate  its  procedure,  458. 
•  process,  necessity  to  validity  of  judgment,  314. 
property  classifications,  power  of  state,  discrimination,  464. 
property  of  absentees,  right  of  state  to  take  away,  not  denial  of  due 

process,  471. 
property  rights  as  protected  by  due  process,  limitations  and  remedies, 
chapter  XUI,  519. 
vested  rights  and  their  impairment,  chapter  XI,  443. 
protection  of  life  and  liberty  by  due  process,  contempt  proceedings, 
disbarment  of  attorneys,  chapter  XVI,  578. 


908  INDEX 

[BmUCNClS  A&S  TO  PAQXS] 

DUE  PBOCE88  OF  LAW— eontmued. 

proteetion  of  property  rights,  freedom  of  contract,  chapter  XII,  490. 
pnblie  improvements,  discrimination  against  foreign  labor,  due  process 

and  equal  protection  not  denied,  755. 
railways,  construction,  remedy  for  property  injured  by  construction, 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  661. 
double  liability  and  attorney 's  fee,  killing  of  live  stock,  due  proeess 

denied,  470. 
Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act,  due  process  and  equal  proteetion 

not  denied,  685. 
fellow  servant  act,  statute  creating  presumption  of  negligence, 

equal  protection  and  due  process  not  denied,  680. 
order  requiring  safety  appliance  at  grade  crossings,  validity,  due 

process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  673. 
payment  of  claims,  imposition  of  penalties  for  failure  to  pay,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  809. 
exaction  without  denial  of  due  process,  477. 
property  burdened  by  construction  of  bridge  over  highway,  due 

process  not  denied,  466. 
rates,  judicial  review  of  regulations,  statute  failing  to  provide 
for,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  688. 
maximum   intrastate  rates,   confiscation   and   denial   of   due 

process,  484. 
reasonableness,  denial  of  due  process  and  equal  protection,  656. 

recent  cases,  416. 
statute  establishing  rates,  invalidity,  denial  of  due  process 
and  equal  protection,  665. 
sleeping  cars,  prohibition  of  letting  down  of  unoccupied  upper 

berth,  due  process  denied,  483. 
spur  track  for  public  use,  initial  cost  may  be  imposed  upon  single 

industry,  due  process  not  denied,  476. 
statute  requiring  full  switching  crews,  due  process  not  denied,  439. 
taxation,  foreign  companies,  due  process  and  equal  proteetion  not 

denied,  691. 
vested  rights,  ordinance  prohibiting  engines  on   certain  streets, 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  651. 
remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  legislature,  526. 
schools,  requirements  of  members  of  Greek  letter  fraternity,  due  process 

not  denied,  486. 
sewers,  ordinance  requiring  abutting  owners  to  coimect  property  with 

sewer,  due  proeess  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  465,  788. 
state  statutes  and  constitutions,  construction  by  state  courts  to  be  con- 
sidered, 382. 
street  extension  proceedings,  amounts  awarded  as  damages,  property 
not  taken  without  compensation,  467. 


INDEX  909 

[BXnBINOXS  A&S  TO  PAOXS] 

DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW— continued. 

tax  titles,  etatute  as  to  notice  to  original  owners  to  cut  off  redemption, 

due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  821. 
taxation,  collection  of  taxes,  sununary  proceedings,  361. 

consolidated  railway  company,  annual  franchise  tax  on,  statute  not 

invalid,  648. 
income  tax  on  mining  companies,  equal  protection  and  due  process 

not  denied,  625. 
penalties,  discrimination  between  county  and  city  in  disposition  of 
penalties,   due   process   and   equal   protection   not    denied, 
752. 
penalty  for  nonpayment  of  taxes,  equal  protection  and  due  process, 

617. 
railroads,  imposition  of  entire  cost  of  abolishing  grade  crossings, 

vaUdity,  660. 
state  power  of  taxation  and  due  process,  chapter  VIII,  336. 
exemptions,  strict  construction  of  exemptions,  349. 
Federal  supervision,  right  to  review,  necessity  that  taxation  be 

spoliation,  384. 
notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  364. 
power  to  tax,  legislature  may  act  directly  or  may  delegate 
functions,  356. 
residuum  of  taxing  power,  376. 
property  within  state  jurisdiction,  341. 
purpose,  taxation  must  be  for  public  purpose,  352. 
statute  imposing  annual  franchise  tax  on  consolidated  railway 

corporation,  due  process  not  denied,  343. 
taking  property  for  public  use,  compensation  required  by  Due 

Process  Clause,  358. 
tax  on  gross  earnings  of  railroads,  not  confiscation,  480. 
trial  by  jury,  national  citizenship,  protection  of  Fourteenth  Amendment 

to  Federal  constitution,  35. 
usage,  property  not  to  be  taken  from  one  man  and  given  to  another 
contrary  to  settled  usages  and  modes  of  procedure,  due  process, 
472. 
vested  rights,  all  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  scope  of  due 
process,  459. 
arbitrary  assertion  of  power,  burdens  imposed  without  advantages, 

confiscation  and  denial  of  due  process,  488. 
confiscation  of  ofiSce  without  compensation,  power  of  Congress,  466. 
development  of  idea,  advancement  by  constitutional  limitations  on 

legislative  power,  445. 
effect  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  prohibition  of  arbitrary  interfer- 

enee  with  rights,  452. 
Fifth  Amendment  developing  idea  of  vested  rights,  451. 


910  INDEX 

[mEXNOlS  AXE  TO  PAOBS] 

DUB  PB0CE8S  OP  LAW— continued, 
vested  rights— eontiinied. 

formula  in  Beelaratloii  of  Independence,  life,  libertj  and  pnrniit 

of  hnppineesy  448. 
growth  in  England  of  idea,  443. 
impairment,  redress  nnder  Dne  Process  Clause,  application  of  role 

of  inclusion  and  exclusion,  461. 
legitimate  modification  of  rights  of  abutting  owner,  dne  process, 

402. 
poUey  of  legislation,  no  vested  rights  in  general  rules  of  law  or 

policj,  458. 
protection  bj  Doe  Process  Clause,  repeal  of  remedj,  390. 
right  of  state  to  enact  curative  legislation,  457. 
rights  below  standard  of  vested  rights,  456. 
taxation  without  jurisdiction,  denial  of  due  process,  487. 
taxing  districts,  creation  bj  legislature  bj  arbitrary  action,  denial 

of  due  process,  488. 
what  constitutes,  453. 
water,  restraint  on  land  owner  drawing  unnatural  quantities  of  mineral 
water  from  common  source  of  supplj,  due  process  not  denied,  467. 
statute  prohibiting  diversion  of  water  beyond  state  by  riparian 

owner,  dne  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  784. 

E 

EASEMENTS, 

eminent    domain,   riparian    owner   deprived   of   access   to   navigable 
stream,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  103. 
taking  private  property,  kind  of  property  which  may  be  taken,  218. 
state  lands  on  navigable  rivers,  servitude  in  favor  of  public,  effect  of 

Fourteenth  Amendment)  766. 
vested  rights,  legitimate  modification  of  rights  of  abutting  owner,  due 
process,  462. 

ELECTIONS, 

registration  law,  discrimination  between  citisens,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  726. 

ELEVATED  RAILWAYS, 

adTcrtisement,  prohibition  of  advertising,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

740. 
eminent  domain,  compensation,  matters  to  be  excluded  in  determining 

compensation,  proceeding  to  recover  for  decline  in  market  value, 

393. 
vested  rights,  legitimate  modification  of  rights  of  abutting  owner,  due 

process,  462. 


INDEX  911 

[BmSBXNOES  ASS  TO  PAGSS] 

ELBVATOKS, 

see  Wasshousbs. 

eminent  domain,  right  of  eminent  domain,  Fifth  Amendment,  con- 
struction, 74. 
regulation  of  charges,  validity  of  statute,  812. 
statute  requiring  barriers  of  shafts,  equal  protection  not  denied,  790. 

EMIGBANTS, 
see  Aliens. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN, 

compensation  for  taldng  property,  matters  to  be  excluded,  proceeding 
to  recover  for  decline  in  market  value,  393. 
necessity,  217. 

question  a  judicial  one,  necessity  of  competent  tribunal,  219. 
rule  for  ascertaining  value,  391. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract  subject  to  sovereign  powers  of  state,  493. 
due  process,  definition,  difficulties  in  way  of  complete  and  authoritative 
definition,  rule  of  inclusive  and  exclusive,  284. 
Fifth  Amendment,  Federal  constitution,  21. 
fundamental  requisites,  hearing,  kind  of  hearing  necessary,  295. 
state  statutes  and  constitutions,  construction  by  state  courts  to 
be  considered,  382. 
due  process  in  District  of  Columbia,  meaning  of  phrase,  104. 
equivalent  of  eminent  domain,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  90. 
Federal  power  of  eminent  domain  and  due  process,  chapter  IV,  207. 

review,  377. 
Fifth  Amendment,  early  cases  construing,  56. 

land  taken  to  improve  navigation,  liability  for,  113. 
text  of  Fifth  Amendment,  55. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  right  to  review  state  action,  380. 
laches,  right  of  Ck)ngress  to  legislate  against,  221. 
power  as  vested  in  Federal  government  paramount,  208. 
power  of  eminent  domain,  definition,  power  vested  in  all  states.  Federal 
as  well  as  single,  207. 
District  of  Ck)lumbia,  87. 
limitation  by  Due  Process  Clause,  209. 
taking  must  be  for  public  use,  '211. 
procedure,  decision  of  state  court  as  to  different  procedure,  payment 

of  compensation,  equal  protection  not  denied,  828. 
property,  vested  rights,  protection  by  Due  Process  Clause,  repeal  of 

remedy,  390, 
public  use,  ascertainment  by  ultimate  and  not  by  proximate  effect,  389. 
right  of  legislature  to  determine  what  is  public  use,  212. 
state  definitions  of  public  use  to  be  respected,  due  process,  385. 
railways,  construction  of  railroad  across  street,  damages,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  665. 
remedy  for  property  injured  by  construction,  due  process  and  equal 
protection  not  denied,  661. 


912  INDEX 

[HSraUENCZS  ARX  TO  PAGBS] 

EMINENT  DOMAIN— continued. 

state  power  of  eminent  domain,  due  process,  Federal  supervision,  377. 
neceasitj  of  clear  statement  of  case  in  trial  court,  385. 
substance  and  not  form  to  be  considered,  380. 
due  process,  dutj  of  state  to  guarantee  protection  to  life,  liberty 

and  properly,  379. 
inherent  power  of  states,  378. 
state  taxation,  compensation  required  by  Due  Process  Clause,  taking 
property  for  public  use,  358. 
purpose,  taxation  must  be  fur  public  purpose,  352. 
taking  of  private  property. 

confiscation  of  property,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  73. 
construction  of  revetments,  injury  to  riparian  rights,  127. 
Due  Process  Clause,  limitation  on  power  of  Secretary  of  War, 
alterations  in  bridges  over  waterways,  147. 
mistake  of  law,  391. 
property  of  Indians  not  taken,  removal  of  restrictions  as  to 

allotments,  181. 
review  of  cases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  187. 
Eight-Hour-Law  Case,  validity  of  statute.  Fifth  Amendment,  182. 
estoppel  to  contest  constitutionality,  availability  of  defense  against 

promoters  of  public  improvements,  138. 
extension  of  spur  track  for  benefit  of  single  industry,  taking  not 

unlawful,  392. 
Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  right  of  eminent  domidn,  74. 
kind  of  property  which  may  be  taken,  218. 
legal  tender  cases.  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  71. 
locating  harbor  lines.  Fifth  Amendment  construction,  86. 
navigable  waters,  taking  private  property,  power  of  Congress,  177. 
necessity  justifying  taking,  215. 

police  power,  carriers,  reasonableness  of  rates,  due  process,  recent 
cases,  416. 
limitations,  enjoyment  of  property  limited,  405. 
railways,  statute  establishing  rates,  invalidity,  denial  of  due  process 

and  equal  protection,  665. 
riparian   owner   deprived   of   access   to   navigable   stream.  Fifth 

Amendment,  construction,  103. 
statute  compelling  railroad  to  provide  means  for  passing  water 

under  embankments,  180. 
street  extension  proceedings,  amounts  awarded  as  damages,  prop- 
erty not  taken  without  compensation,  467. 
vested  rights.  Fifth  Amendment  developing  idea  of  vested  rights, 

451. 
what  constitutes  taking,  213. 

flooding  of  land  not  a  taking,  386. 
no  taking  for  public  use,  387. 


INDEX  913 

[BXFSRENCES  ABE  TO  PAOBS] 

EMINENT  DOMAIN— continued. 

Tested  rights,  all  laws  impairing  vested  righte  within  scope  of  due 
process,  459. 
growth  in  England  of  idea,  443. 

EQTTAL  PROTECTION  OF  THE  LAW, 
see  Due  Pbooess  of  Law,  Magna  Cabta. 

see  also  specific  topics,  such  as  Advebtisembnts,  Animals,  Cabbiebs, 
GOBPOBATiONs,   Cbiminal   Law,   Dbainaoe,   Fqbeign   Cobpoba- 

TIONS,   JUBY,   MASTEB   AND   SeBVANT,   RAILWAYS,   TAXATION,   etc. 

clause  purely  American  invention,  595. 

control  of  foreign  and  domestic  corporations,  chapter  XX,  606. 
due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  generality  and  equality  of  laws,  306. 
first  interpretation  of  clause,  chapter  XYII,  595. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  judicial  rule  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  as  to 
deprivation  of  due  process  and  denial  of  equal  protection,  49. 
meaning  of  "equal  protection  of  the  law"  clause,  45. 

EQUALITY, 

reign  of  law,  Angevin  period,  reign  of  Henry  II,  1. 

EQUITY, 

jury.  Federal  right  to  trial  by  petit  jury,  535. 

ESTATES  OF  DECEDENTS, 

inheritance  taxes,  see  Taxation. 

limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested  rights,  522. 
vested  rights,  property  of  absentees,  right  of  state  to  take  away,  not 
denial  of  due  process,  471. 
rights  below  standard  or  vested  rights,  456. 

ESTOPPEL,  \ 

Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  estoppel  to 
contest  constitutionality,  availability  of  defense  against  promot- 
ers of  public  improvements,  138. 

EVIDENCE, 

see  Witnesses. 

books  and  papers,  production,  see  Pboduction  or  Books  and  Papbbs. 
corporations,  classification  between  corporations  and  individuals,  com- 
pulsory production  of  testimony,  equal  protection  not  denied,  732. 
due  process,  admission  of  evidence  illegally  obtained,  131. 
presumptions,  arbitrary  classification,  creation  of  presumption  of  guilt, 
equal  protection  denied,  758. 
gambling,  presumption  of  guilt  from  possession  of  gambling  para- 
phernalia, exception  in  favor  of  public  officers,  due  process 
not  denied,  832. 
railways,  fellow  servant  act,  statute  creating  presumption  of  negli- 
gence, equal  protection  and  due  process  not  denied,  680. 

Due  Process — 58 


914  INDEX 

[BBTBINGn  AU  TO  PAOIS] 

EXEHPTIONB, 

limitatioii  statutes,  ezemptioii  from  rait  as  vested  right,  ending  of 

statotorj  period  of  limitations,  523. 
loeal  option  law,  prohibition  of  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  801. 
mnnieipal  corporations,  ordinances,  regulation  of  sale  of  intoxicating 

liquors,  lleenses,  equal  protection  not  denied,  799. 
phjticians,  registration,  exemption  of  practicing  phjsicianft,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  735. 
taxation,  corporations,  taxation  of  nonresident  stockholders,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  713. 
deposits  in  national  banlcs,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  642. 
foreign  corporation,  tax  on  capital  of,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

7oa. 

inheritance  tax  on  bequests  of  personalty,  validity,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  032. 
legacy  and  inheritance  taxes,  equal  protection,  615. 
state  taxation,  exemptions,  strict  construction  of  exemptions,  349. 

power  to  tax,  residuum  of  taxing  power,  371. 
tax  on  corporate  securities.  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause, 

018. 
vested  rights,  what  constitutes,  455. 
telephone  companies,  classification  for  taxation,  exemption  of  certain 

property,  equal  protection  not  denied,  747. 
usury,  exemption  of  banks,  trust  companies  and  bona  fide  mortgages, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  730. 
vested  rights,  policy  of  legislation,  no  vested  rights  in  general  rules  of 

law  or  policy,  458. 
witnesses,    self-incrimination,    exemption    not    fundamental    right   of 
national  citiienship,  153. 

EXPLOSIVES, 

regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not  denied,  780. 

EXPRESS  OOBCPANIES, 

taxation,  state  taxation  of  express  companies'  property,  equal  protec- 
tion, 013,  014. 

P 

FEDERAL  EMPLOYERS'  LIABILITY  ACT, 

due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  085. 
freedom  of  contract  not  interfered  with,  504. 

FENCES, 

see  Railways. 

FERRIES, 

police  power,  property  or  business  of  public  interest,  407. 


INDEX  915 

[BinEKXNOlS  ABX  TO  PACOBB] 

FEBTIIIZEB, 

manufaetnre,  police  power,  limitatioiis,  enjoyment  of  property  limited, 
405.  ^ 

FIFTH  AMENDMENT, 

Bee  Dux  Pkocxss  of -Law. 

Act  as  to  Food  and  Drugs,  misbranding,  Due  Process  Clause,  181. 

admission  of  evidence  illegally  obtained,  due  process,  131. 

aliens.  Act  of  1903  excluding  diseased  aliens.  Due  Process  Clause,  156. 

alien  practicing  prostitution  after  entry,  167. 
assessments  for  benefits  in  City  of  Washington,  Due  Process  Clause,  161. 

due  process  limitation  on  power  to  exclude  alien  anarchists,  136. 
attorneys,  disbarment,  attorney  cannot  be  denied  due  process,  590. 
Bankruptcy  Act  of  1898  not  invalid,  denial  of  due  process,  107. 
Bridges,  Due  Process  Clause,  limitation  on  power  of  Secretary  of  War, 

alterations  in  bridges  over  waterways,  147. 
Chinese  exclusion,  Fifth  Amendment,  denial  of  due  process  of  law  to 
aliens,  97. 
conclusiveness  of  decision  of  executive  oficer,  due  process,  142. 
constitution  of  parent  state,  right  of  colonists  to  participate  in,  116. 
construction  of  Fifth  Amendment,  55,  chapter  II,  71,  chapter  III,  101. 
aliens,  right  of  sovereign  to  deport  foreigners  already  domiciled,  92. 
case  involving  military  trial  and  service,  triumph  of  legality,  65. 
early  eases  construing,  56. 

eminent  domain,  equivalent  under  Fifth  Amendment,  90. 
right  of  eminent  domain,  74. 

right  of  eminent  domain  in  District  of  Columbia,  87. 
identical  construction.  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments,  243. 
jury,  right  of  judge  to  discharge  jury  during  trial,  right  to  express 

opinion  on  facts,  85. 
kinship  with  Fourth  Amendment,  79. 
legal  tender  cases,  71. 

questions  of  state  procedure  not  embraced,  89. 
waters,  riparian  owner  deprived  of  access  to  navigable  stream, 

103. 
witnesses,  construction  in  favor  of  refusal  to  testify,  84. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  of 
1908,  freedom  not  interfered  with,  504. 
guaranty  of  Fifth  Amendment,  no  denial  by  Oarmack  Amendment 

of  1906  to  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  500. 
impairment,  allowance  of  passage  of  retrospective  state  legislation, 
necessity  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  452. 
conviction  without  indictment,  prisoner  compelled  to  testify  against 

himself,  145. 
Corporation  Tax  Act,  limiting  deductions  held  not  invalid.  Due  Procew 
Clause,  180. 


916  INDEX 

[BinEKXNCIS  ABX  TO  PAOBS] 

FIFTH  AMENDMENT— «ontinaed. 

criminal  law,  proeednrei  powerB  of  ttate^  query  as  to  ezistenee  ot  re- 
straints upon  powers,  573.        ^ 
indictment  as  evidence  of  probable  cause,  133. 
indictment  by  grand  jury  in  body  not  required,  164. 
indictment  for  infamous  crime,  76. 
trial,  right  of  accused  to  be  present  in  state  court,  556. 
due  process  of  law,  definition,  case  involring  distress  warrant,  62. 
notable  attempts  to  define  due  process,  274. 
due  process  in  District  of  Columbia,  meaning  of  phrase,  104. 
relation  to  res  judicata,  139. 
review  of  cases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  186. 
Eight-HourLaw  Oase,  validity  of  statute,  182. 
eminent  domain,  power  of,  limitation  by  Due  Process  Clause,  209. 
taking  of  property,  construction  of  revetments,  injury  to  ripariao 
rights,  127. 
statute  compelling  railroad  to  provide  means  for  passing  water 
under  embankments,  180. 
estoppel  to  contest  constitutionality,  availability  of  defense  against 

promoters  of  public  improvement^  due  process,  138. 
excise  tax  based  on  gross  tonnage  upon  use  of  foreign  buHt  pleaanre 

yachts,  due  process,  171. 
Federal  constitution,  first  eight  amendments,  limitations  on  Federal 

powers,  60. 
Federal  power  of  eminent  domain,  review,  377. 
Federal  procedure,  right  to  plead,  guaranty  by  Fifth  Amendment,  due 

process,  536. 
foreign  commerce,  regulation  of,  limitation  of  power  by  Due  Process 

Clause,  128. 
former  jeopardy,  effect  of  Due  Process  Clause,  109. 
Fifth  Amendment,  former  jeopardy  plea,  158. 
Indians,  application  of  Fifth  Amendment  to  courts  of  Cherokee  Nation, 
constitution  does  not  apply,  99. 
power  of  Congress  not  limited.  111. 

property  of  Indians  not  taken  by,  removal  of  restrictions  as  to 
allotments,  due  process,  181. 
interstate  commerce,  Act  of  1887  as  amended  by  Act  of  1910  held 
vaUd,  174. 
Carmack  Amendment  of  1906  does  not  deny  due  process,  160. 
Hepburn  Act  of  1906,  commodities  clause,  due  process,  155. 
immunity  of  witnesses,  under  Interstate  Commerce  Act  of  1893, 

application  to  state  and  Federal  courts,  96. 
limitation  upon  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  com- 
merce,  relative   rights   of    employer    and   employee,  Doe 
Process  Clause,  150. 
order  to  extend  facilities  to  connecting  carriers,  179. 


INDEX  917 

[retzrences  abb  to  pages] 

FIFTH  AMENDMENT-Hsontinued. 
interstate  commerce — continued. 

order  to  receive  and  transport  freight,  175. 

prohibition  in  Hepburn  Act  of  transportation  from  market  to  mine, 
due  process;  170. 
judgment  hy  default,  summons  left  at  residence  of  defendant,  due 

process,  173. 
jury  of  twelve  men,  right  of  trial  by,  incorporation  of  Alaska  with 

United  States,  Fifth  and  Sixth  Amendments,  123. 
"liberty"  as  defined  in  Federal  law,  491. 

limitation  to  judicial  as  well  as  legislative  power  of  Federal  govern- 
ment, 101. 
mails,  due  process  as  limitation  on  power  to  regulate,  134. 
navigable  waters,  taking  private  property,  power  of  Congress,  177. 
oleomargarine  tax,  constitutionality  of,  Due  Process  Clause,  140. 
Philippine  Act  of  1906,  rights  of  importers  under  Due  Process  Clause, 
149. 
extension  of  due  process  to  Philippine  Islands,  125. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure,  change  under  either  Federal  or  state 
law  must  not  deny  fundamental  rights,  532. 
Due  Process  Clause  of  Fifth  Amendment  re-enforced  by  Sixth 

and  Seventh  Amendments,  533. 
indictment  by  grand  jury,  Federal  right  to  indictment,  information, 
534. 
property  taken  by  military  governor  of  Porto  Bico  without  notice  or 

hearing,  due  process,  168. 
railways.  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act,   due  process   and  equal 

protection  not  denied,  685. 
taxation,  appeal  to  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue  after  payment 
of  taxes,  Due  Process  Clause,  182. 
Due  Process  Clause,  limitation  on  Federal  power  to  tax  dispensing 
agents  of  state,  143. 
not  limitation  on  taxing  power,  income  tax,  181. 
income  tax  on  mining  companies,  equal  protection  and  due  process 
not  denied,  625. 
text  and  construction,  chapter  I,  55. 

vested  rights,  confiscation  of  office  without  compensation,  power  of 
Congress,  466. 
Fifth  Amendment  developing  idea  of  vested  rights,  451. 
impairment,  redress  under  Due  Process  Clause,  application  of  rule 

of  inclusion  and  exclusion,  461. 
railroad  property  burdened  by  construction  of  bridge  over  highway, 
due  process  not  denied,  466. 
witnesses,  self-incrimination,  crime  committed  within  military  reserva- 
tion, 159. 
effect  of  statutory  immunity  upon  constitutional  protection,  144. 
exemption  not  fundamental  right  of  national  citizenship,  153. 


918  INDEX 

[BSmiKCXB  AKX  TO  PAOSS] 

FIFTH  AlCENDMENT— eontinued. 
witnoasoB    continaed. 

immunity  baaed  on  Aet  of  1903,  Anti-Trutt  Aet»  168. 
privilege  invoked  bj  oiBeer  of  eorporation,  162. 
•tftte  need  not  aeeord  proteetioni  165. 

FIBE, 

innkeepen,  regulation  of  dntj  in  ease  of  tie,  eqoal  protection  not 
denied,  756. 
•tatate  requiring  hotel  keepers  to  give  notice  to  gnests  in  ease  of 
fire,  due  process  not  denied,  437. 
municipal  corporations,  ordinances  as  to  public  laundries,  validitj,  762. 
police  power,  equal  protection,  regulations  of  public  laundries  and  i?ash- 
houses,  760. 
fixing  of  certain  absolute  liabilities,  due  process  not  denied,  440. 
railwajs,  fire  caused  bj  locomotiyes,  liability  for  damages,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  668. 
Tested  rights,  double  liability  for  failure  to  pay  damages  within 
certain  time,  due  process  denied,  477. 

FIB8T  AMENDMENT, 

Federal  procedure,  summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guar- 
anties of  Federal  constitution,  530. 

FLAGS, 

national  flag,  state  protection,  equal  protection  not  denied,  780. 

FOOD, 

bread,  ordinance  regulating  sise  of  loaves  of  bread,  due  process  not 
denied,  429. 
freedom  of  contract  not  interfered  with,  505. 
ice  cream,  statute  regulating  percentage  of  butter  fat,  due  proeess  and 

equal  protection  not  denied,  431,  818. 
lard,  regulation  of  net  weight  of  packages,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

758.  . 
malt  liquor,  prohibition  of  sale  of,  due  process  not  denied,  428. 
meat-packing  houses,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  632. 
milk  business,  municipal  regulation,  equal  protection  not  denied,  777. 
ordinance  requiring  tuberculin  test  for  dairy  cattle,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  789. 
due  process  not  denied,  431. 
sale  of  adulterated  milk,  discrimination  against  nonprodudng  ven- 
dors, equal  protection  not  denied,  729. 
oleomargarine,  regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not  denied,  644,  765. 

statute  restricting  sale  and  manufacture,  validity,  770. 
preservatives  containing  boric  acid,  prohibition  of  sale  of,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  747. 


INDEX  919 

[bxtibenoxs  akx  to  paois] 

FOBEIGN  OOBPOBATIONS, 

admiflflioiiy  state  restrictioiiB,  eqaal  protectioii|  708. 

clasaification  between  eorporationa  and  individuals,  eompulsoTx  produc 

tion  of  testimonyi  equal  protection  not  denied,  732. 
creditors,  discrimination  against  nonresident  creditors,  equal  protection 

denied,  712. 
equal  protection,  control  of  foreign  and  domestle  corporations,  chapter 

XX,  696. 
excise  tax  on  foreign  corporation,  equal  protection  not  denied,  720. 
exclusion  of  insurance  company,  power  of  state,  noncompliance  with 

conditions,  equal  protection  not  denied,  722. 
jurisdiction,  foreign  corporation  not  doing  business  in  state  is  not 
within  jurisdiction  of  state,  equal  protection,  709. 
nonresident  corporations,  319. 
license  tax  on  foreign  corporation,  validity  equal  protection  not  denied, 

707. 
names,  exclusion  of  foreign  company  having  same  name  as  domestic 

company,  equal  protection  not  denied,  716. 
process,  money  judgment  rendered  upon  service  on  resident  director, 
denial  of  due  process,  485. 
statute  appointing  state  auditbr  to  accept  service  of  process,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  702. 
quo  warranto  proceedings  to  oust,  violation  of  anti-trust  laws,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  838. 
railways,  tax  on  foreign  companies,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  691. 
tax  on  stock,  equal  protection  not  denied,  714. 
state  control  of  corporations,  696. 

theaters,  equal  protection  not  denied,  698. 
taxation,  capital  of  foreign  corporation  taxed,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  708. 
franchise  of  foreign  company,  equal  protection  denied,  721. 
local  managers  of  foreign  packing  houses,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  716. 
shares  of  foreign  corporations  owned  by  residents,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  720. 
state  inheritance  tax,  validity,  equal  protection  not  denied,  classifi- 
cation, 630. 

FOBPEITITRES, 

see  PxNAi/ms  and  FoairirnRBs. 

FOBMEB  ADJUDICATION, 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  relation 

to  res  judicata,  139. 
police  power,  carriers,  reasonableness  of  rates,  due  process,  recent  cases, 

416. 


920  INDEX 

[bbfbeenoxs  au  to  paobs] 

FOBMEB  JEOPABDY, 

criminal  law,  no  arraignment  or  plea  on  second  inf ormatioiiy  doe  proces 

not  denied,  554. 
Federal  procedure,  aummary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guaran- 
tiee of  Federal  constitution,  539. 
Fifth  Amendment,  eonstmetion,  offense  of  counterfeiting  involved,  61. 
early  eases  construing,  66. 

right  of  judge  to  discharge  jury  during  trial,  right  to  ezpress 
opinion  on  facts,  85. 
due  process,  extension  to  Philippine  Islands,  125. 
effect  of  Due  Process  Clause,  109. 
former  jeopardy  plea,  158. 
vested  rights.  Fifth  Amendment  developing  idea  of  vested  rights,  451. 

FORNICATION, 

Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  punishment  of  offenses,  diserimi- 
nation,  602. 

FOUBTEENTH  AMENDMENT, 

see  Dux  Pbogssb  or  Law,  Equal  Pbotbotio)i  of  ths  Law,  Fifth 
Amxnduxmt;  see  also  specific  topics,  such  as  Attorkkys,  Car- 
BiKRS,  FiRX,  Jury,  Municipal  Cobporatioks,  Bailways,  etc 
anti-trust  laws,  discrimination,  equal  protection  denied,  699. 

statute  permitting  combinations  among  purchasers,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  748. 
banks,  guaranty  fund,  creation  as  valid  exercise  of  police  x^nrer,  425, 

433. 
bread,  due  process  not  denied,  police  power,  ordinance  regulating  size  of 

loaves,  429. 
brick  yards  in  certain  portions  of  ci^,  ordinance  prohibiting,  due 

process  not  denied,  437. 
burial  within  city  limits,  prohibition  of,  due  process  not  denied,  423. 
contempt,  punishment,  trial  by  jury  not  required  by  Due  Process  Clause, 
since  power  to  punish  is  inherent,  580. 
what  constitutes,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  582. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  definition,  496. 

Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  of  1908,  freedom  not  interfered 

with,  504. 
impairment,  allowance  of  passage  of  retrospective  state  legisla- 
tion, necessity  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  452. 
insurance,  nonforfeiture  provisiona  of  statute,  loan  agreement  in- 
validated, freedom  denied,  511. 
license  tax  on  merchants  using  profit  sharing  coupons  and  trading 

stamps,  freedom  not  infringed,  517. 
master  and  servant,  employment  at  will  of  parties  not  employment 
at  will  of  others,  514. 
freedom  not  infringed  by  statutes  regulating  employment  of 
women,  516. 


INDEX  921 

[befebekges  are  to  pages] 

POUBTEENTH  AMENDMENT— continued, 
contracte — eontinued. 

imposition  hy  employer  of  certain  conditions  on  employee  as 

crime,  freedom  denied,  512. 
prohibition  of  issuance  of  irredeemable  orders  in  payment  of 

labor,  freedom  not  infringed,  509. 
Ten-Hour  Law,  forbidding  employment  of  children  or  women, 
freedom  not  infringed,  509. 
punishment  of  selling  of  goods  at  lower  rate  in  one  place  than 

in  another,  freedom  not  abridged,  "506. 
purchase  of  certain  materials  by  junk  dealers  as  crime,  freedom 

not  abridged,  507. 
right  of  state  to  regulate  combinations  and  monopolies,  494. 

statute  against  combinations,  freedom  not  limited,  510. 
state  law  preventing  miners  from  contracting  for  wages  on  certain 

basis,  freedom  not  infringed,  497. 
statute  defining  liability  of  railways  for  injuries,  freedom  not 

infringed,  502. 
trade  agreement  between  retail  lumber  dealers,  condemnation  of, 
freedom  not  abridged,  499. 
corporation  as  person  within  the  meaning  of  section  one,  240. 
corporations,  condemnation  of  outstanding  shares  of  owner  of  stock 
without  denial  of  due  process,  463. 
evidence,  statute  requiring  corporations  alone  to  produce  books  and 

papers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  703. 
reorganization   of   oo-operatave    association   without   consent   of 

members,  power  of  state,  464. 
taxation,  unequal  assessment  of  franchises  and  other  property, 
denial  of  due  process  and  equal  protection,  702. 
courts,  different  courts  in  same  state,  power  of  state  to  establish,  Pour- 

teenth  Amendment  does  not  restrict,  820. 
criminal  law,  modification  of  procedure,  power  of  state,  541. 
query  as  to  existence  of  restraints  upon  powers,  573. 
struggle  to  leave  power  of  states  untrammeled,  543. 
no  arraignment  or  plea  on  second  information,  due  process  not 

denied,  554. 
punishment  of  offenses,  discrimination,  602. 
right  of  accused  to  be  present  in  state  court,  556. 

trial  and  rendition  of  verdict,  habeas  corpus,  567,  569. 
witnesses,  exemption  from  self-incrimination  in  state  courts,  due 
process  not  denied,  550. 
detectives,  ordinance  subjecting  to  police  supervision,  due  process  not 

denied,  438. 
elections,  registration  law,  discrimination  between  citizens,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  726. 
eminent  domain,  compensation,  matter  to  be  excluded,  proceeding  to 
recover  for  decline  in  market  value,  393. 


922  INDEX 

[bbfbeencis  axi  to  paois] 

POXTRTEENTH  AMENDMENT— continued, 
eminent  domain— -contmned. 

Pedend  power  of  eminent  domain,  review,  377. 
public  nee,  ascertainment  bj  ultimate  and  not  bj  proximate  effect, 
389. 

« 

state  power  of  eminent  domain,  Federal  eapervision,  dne  process, 

substance  and  not  form  to  be  considered,  380. 
taking  private  property,  extension  of  spur  track  for  benefit  of 
single  industry,  taking  not  unlawful,  392. 
no  taking  for  public  use,  387. 

what  constitutes,  flooding  of  land  not  a  taking,  386. 
foreign  corporations,  admission,  state  restrictions,  equal  protection,  708. 
creditors,  discrimination  against  nonresident  crediti^s,  equal  pro- 
tection denied,  712. 
jurisdiction,  foreign  corporation  not  doing  business  in  state  is  not 
within  jurisdiction  of  state,  equal  protection,  7091 
game,  prohibition  of  killing  of  birds  or  animals  by  unnaturaliied  for- 
eign-bom residents,  due  process  not  denied,  479* 
grand  jury,  abolition,  power  of  state,  544. 
jury,  criminal  trial,  petit  jury  of  eight,  right  of  state  to  authorize,  548. 

trial  by  struck  jury,  right  of  state  to  provide,  due  process,  547. 
laundries  and  washhouses,  police  power  of  state,  equal  proteetaon,  reg- 
ulations, 760. 
«'Uberty"  as  defined  in  Federal  Uw,  491. 
license  tax  on  foreign  corporation,  validity,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

707* 
license  tax  on  profit  sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps,  due  process 

not  denied,  440. 
licenses,  occupations,  classification,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  745. 
classification  of  merchants,  equal  protection  not  denied,  728. 
malt  liquor,  prohibition  of  sale  of,  due  process  not  denied,  428. 
master  and  servant,  assignments  of  filture  eamingSj^  regulations,  exemp- 
tion of  banks,  equal  protection  not  denied,  742. 
discrimination  against  aliens,  equal  protection  denied,  753. 
.  police  power,  statute  inflicting  penalties  on  employer  where  certain 
conditions  are  imposed  on  employee,  denial  of  due  process, 
435. 
wages,  prohibition  of  orders  for  payment  of  labor  not  redeemable 
in  money,  equal  protection  not  denied,  749. 
milk,  sale  of  adulterated  milk,  discrimination  against  nonprodnciAg 
vendors,  equal  protection  not  denied,  729. 
ordinance  as  to  milk,  tuberculin  test,  due  process  not  denied,  431. 
mineral  waters,  prohibition  of  waste,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  739. 


INDEX  923 

[BSriRlNOKS  ABX  TO  FACOBB] 

FOUBTEENTH  AMENDMENT— continued. 

mines,  dassifieation  of  coal  mines  by  nmnber  of  men  employed,  stat- 
ute as  to  wages  of  employees,  equal  protection  not  denied,  731. 
"run-of-mine"  or  "anti-screen"  law,  statute  as  to  compensation 
of  miners,  due  process  not  denied,  436. 
national  citizenship,  definition  in  Slaughter  House  Cases,  228. 
paint,  statute  requiring  labels  on  mixed  paints  to  show  ingredients, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  730. 
penalties,  due  process  denied  by  imposition  of  ezcessiye  penalties,  474. 
physicians,  registration,  exemption  of  practicing  physicians,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  735. 
police  power,  delegation  to  municipalities,  400. 

right  of  forfeiture,  404. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure,  change  of  under  either  Federal  or 
state  law  must  not  deny  fundamental  rights,  532. 
indictment  by  grand  jury.  Federal  right  to  indictment,  informa- 
tion, 534. 
property  of  private  water  company  taking  by  municipal  corporation, 

due  process  not  denied,  473. 
property,  vested  rights,  protection  by  Due  Process  Clause,  repeal  of 

remedy,  390. 
protection  against  unlawful  or  unequal  exercise  of  state  power,  241. 
purpose.  Congress  as  protecting  and  enforcing  body,  266. 
railways,  crime  for  person  to  act  as  railway  conductor  without  certain 
qualifications,  freedom  of  contract  not  abridged,  508. 
discrimination  between  carrier  and  shipper  as  to  attorneys'  fees, 

statute  rendered  invalid,  692. 
double  liability  and  attorney's  fee  for  killing  of  livo  stock,  due 

process  denied,  470. 
employees, 

fellow  servant  act,  classification  of  railway  employees,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  680. 
liability  of  railroads  for  personal  injuries  caused  by  neg- 
ligence, validity,  663. 
liability  to  employee  for  negligence,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  653,  654. 
modification  as  to  railway  employees,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  686. 
statute  abrogating  fellow  servant  rule,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  669,  675. 
injuries,   classifying  railway  mail   clerks   with   railway   em- 
ployees, equal  protection  not  denied,  677. 
statute  requiring  full  switching  crews,  due  process  not  denied, 
439. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  683. 
wages  of  employees,  statute  as  to  time  of  payment,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  667. 


924  INDEX 

[UEFEEXNCES  AXB  TO  PAOIS] 

F0I7BTEEMTH  AMENDMENT— continued, 
rftilways — continued. 

exeeatiye  penalties  for  violation  of  orden  of  state  commiBrion, 

iuTaUditj,  689. 
Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  685. 
fences,  liability  of  railroad  for  omission  to  fence  railroad,  doable 

damages,  equal  protection  not  denied,  655. 
Are  caused  by  locomotiyes,  liability  for  damages,  equal  proteetioii 

not  denied,  668. 
property  burdened  by  construction  of  bridge  over  bigliway,  doe 

process  not  denied,  466. 
rates,  judicial  review  of  regulations,  statute  failing  to  provide  for, 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  688. 
reasonableness  of  rates,  due  process,  recent  cases,  416. 
statute  establishing  rates,  invalidity,  denial  of  due  proeees 

and  equal  protection,  665. 
unjust  and  unreasonable  rates,  fixing  by  commiaaion,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  662. 
regulations,  ordinance  as  to  speed  of  trains,  exceptions,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  670. 
requiring  electric  headlights  on  locomotives,  equal  proteetioo 
not  denied,  689. 
shipments,  requiring  carrier  to  accept  reshipments  in  ears  of  other 

carriers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  689. 
taxation,  assessment  of  omitted  property,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  670. 
assessment  to  meet  expenses  of  state  railroad  eommissioB, 

vaUdity,  657. 
tax  on  foreign  companies,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  691. 
weeds,  discrimination  against  railways,  penalties  imposed  for  allow- 
ing weeds,  equal  protection  not  denied,  674. 
,  statute  requiring  railways  to  remove  noxious  weeds,  equal  pro- 

tection not  denied,  694. 
sales,  police  power,  sales  in  bulk,  due  process  not  denied,  424. 

prohibition  of  unfair  competition,  sale  at  lower  price  in  one  place, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  744. 
scope  of  section,  definition  of  dtizenship,  228. 

sewers,  compelling  abutting  owners  to  connect  property  with  sewer, 
discrimination  between  residents  and  nonresidents,  validity  of 
statute,  718. 
due  process  not  denied,  465. 
smoke,  legislation  declaring  emission  of  dense  smoke  a  nuisance,  doe 

process  not  denied,  438. 
state  action,  right  to  review,  380. 


INDEX  925 

[BSrEBENCXS  ABE  TO  PAGXS] 

POUBTEENTH  AMENDMENT— continued, 

taxation,  banks,  state  tax  law  as  to,  equal  protection,  constitutionality 
of  statue,  618. 
business  of  express  company,  tax  on,  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law 

Clause,  613. 
collection  of  taxes,  summary  proceedings,  361. 
corporate  franchises,  tax  on,  equal  protection,  626. 
corporate  securities,  tax  on.  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause^ 

612. 
discrimination  in  license  tax,  equal  protection  not  denied,  641. 
due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  368. 
excise  tax  on  corporations,  nature,  639. 
excise  tax  on  gross  earnings  of  railway  companies,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  645. 
exemptions,  strict  construction  of  exemptions,  349. 
liquor  sellers,  tax  on,  discrimination,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

633. 
meat-packing  houseSi  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  632. 
mineral  rights,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  643. 
municipal   license   fees   for   theaters,   grading   fee    according   to 

receipts,  equal  protection  not  denied,  641. 
nonpayment  of  taxes,  forfeiture  of  land,  equal  protection*  619. 
public  improvements,  assessments,  ordinance  held  invalid,  646. 
railroads,  tax  on  property  in  each  county,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  658. 
savings  banks,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  644. 
state  inheritance  tax,  validity,  equal  protection  not  denied,  629,  630. 
state  tax  laws,  constitutionality,  611. 

state  tax  on  gross  earnings  of  railroads,  not  confiscation,  480. 
stock  transfer  tax,  validity,  634. 
succession  taxes,  New  York  inheritance-tax  law  does  not  violate 

Fourteenth  Amendment,  624. 
taxation  without  jurisdiction,  denial  of  due  process,  487. 
taxing  districts,  creation  by  legislature  by  arbitrary  action,  denial 

of  due  process,  488. 
transfers  inter  vivos,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  640. 
wholesale  dealers  in  oil,  equal  protection  not  denied  by  occupation 

tax,  635. 
vested  rights,  all  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  scope  of  due 
process,  459. 
arbitrary  assertion  of  power,  burdens  imposed  without  advantages, 

confiscation  and  denial  of  due  process,  488. 
double  liability  for  failure  to  pay  damages  within  certain  time, 

due  process  denied,  477. 
effect  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  prohibition  of  arbitrary  inter- 
ference with  rights,  452. 


926  INDEX 

[BBTBINGn  AU  TO  FAOEa] 

FOUBTEENTH  AMENDMENT— continued. 
Yetted  riglit»-^eontinaed. 

fonnnU  in  Dedaration  of  Independenee,  life,  liberty  and  ponuit 

of  bappiness,  448. 
impainnenty  redreM  under  Due  Proeess  Claneei  application  of  rule 

of  ineluaion  and  exeluaion,  461.  * 

poUej  of  legislation,  no  vested  rigbts  in  general  rules  of  law  or 
policy,  458. 
water  eompanies,  municipal  corporations,  establisbment  of  competing 

plant  by  ci^,  Fourteentb  Amendment  not  violated,  746. 
water,  police  power,  prevention  of  diversion  of  waters,  due  process  not 
denied,  421. 
restraint  on  land  owner  drawing  unnatural  quantities  of  mineral 
water   from   common   source   of  supply,   due   process   not 
denied,  467. 

FOUBTH  AMENDMENT, 

Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  kinsbip  with  Fourtb  Amend- 
ment, 79. 

FRANCHISES, 

municipal   corporations,   construction   and   acquisition   of   waterworks 
system,  francbise  of  waterworks  company  ezpiriiig,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  791. 
police  power,  property  or  business  of  public  interest,  407. 
taking  private  property.  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  con- 
struction, eminent  domain,  equivalent  under  Fifth  Amendment, 
90. 
kind  of  property  vdiicb  may  be  taken,  218. 
taxation,   consolidated   railway   company,   annual    francbise   tax   on, 
statute  not  invalid,  648. 
doe  process  not  denied,  343. 
corporate  property  situated  in  several  states,  power  to  tax,  342. 
excise  tax  on  corporations,  nature,  639. 
exemptions,  strict  construction  of  exemptions,  349. 
foreign  companies,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied, 

691,  721. 
foreign  railroads,  tax  on  stock,  equal  protection  not  denied,  714. 
tax  on  corporate  franchises,  equal  protection,  626. 
tax  on  special  franchises,  equal  protection  not  denied  to  street 

railway  companies,  628. 
unequal  assessment  of  franchises  and  other  property,  denial  of  doe 
process  and  equal  protection,  702. 

FBATEBNAL  BENEFIT  SOCIETIES, 

see  INSTTBANOX. 


INDEX  927 

[BXnmiNOBS  ABM  TO  PAGBS] 


FBATEBNITIESy 
see  Schools. 


FRAUD, 

corporations,  inBorance,  statute  as  to  effect  of  false  answers  hj  appli- 
cant for  life  insurance,  equal  protection  not  denied,  698. 

foreign  commerce,  regulation  of  limitation  of  power  by  Due  Process 
Clause,  128. 

oleomargarine  tax,  constitutionality.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process 
Clause,  140. 

police  power,  prohibition  of  sale  of  malt  liquor,  due  process  not  denied, ' 
428. 

sales  in  bulk,  regulation,  record  of  notice  to  sell,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  785. 

O 

GAMBLING, 

evidence,  admission  of  evidence  iUegally  obtained,  due  process,  131. 
presumption  of  guilt  from  possession  of  gambling  paraphernalia, 
exception  in  f ayor  of  public  officers,  due  process  not  denied, 
832. 
futures,  statute  preventing  dealing  in  futures,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  777. 
municipal   corporations,  ordinances,  prohibiting  visiting  barricaded 

gambling  rooms,  equal  protection  not  denied,  776. 
policy  games,   due  process,  fundamental   requisites,   generality  and 
equality  of  laws,  306 

GAME, 

aliens,  prohibition  of  possession  of  firearms,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
792. 
prohibition  of  killing  of  birds  or  animals  by  unnaturalized  foreign- 
bom  residents,  due  process  not  denied,  479. 
police  power,  right  of  forfeiture,  404. 

GABNI8HMENT, 

due  process,  jurisdiction  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judgment, 
315. 

GAS  COMPANIES, 

rates,  police  power,  reasonableness  of  rates,  due  process,  recent  cases, 
416. 

GIFTS, 

taxation,  tax  on  transfers  inter  vivos,  equal  protection  not  denied,  640. 


928  INDEX 

[RXTEBENCBS  AKl  TO  PAOIS] 

GBAND  JTJBYy 

abolition,  power  of  Bta,te,  544. 

amendment  to  Federal  conBtitution,  text  of  Fifth  Amendment,  55. 

books  and  papers,  production,  contempt,  what  constitutes,  indireet  or 

civil  contempt,  682. 
conviction  without  indictment,  prisoner  compelled  to  testify  against 

himself,  145. 
criminal  procedure,  powers  of  state,  queiy  as  to  existence  of  restraints 

upon  powers,  573. 
due  process  of  law,  as  embodied  in  Fifth  Amendment,  21. 

denial  of  due  process  of  law  to  aliens,  Chinese  exclusion,  97. 
extension  to  Philippine  Islands,  125. 
meaning  of  "due  process  of  law"  clause,  41. 
right  to  due  process  in  unincorporated  territoiy,  237. 
Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  confiscation  of  property,  73. 

indictment  for  infamous  crime,  76. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  protection  of  national 

citizenship  against  state  action,  35,  244. 
Indians,  Fifth  Amendment,  application  to  courts  of  Cherokee  Nation, 

constitution  does  not  apply,  99. 
indictment  as  evidence  of  probable  cause,  Fifth  Amendment,  133. 
indictment  by  grand  jury.  Federal  right  to  indictment,  information, 

534. 
indictment  by  grand  juty  in  body  not  required,  Fifth  Amendment,  164. 
negroes  as  grand  jurors.  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  606,  607. 
discrimination  against  citizens  of  African  descent,  setting  aside 
jury  panel,  603. 
selection,  discrimination,  equal  protection  not  denied,  835. 
self-incrimination,  privilege  invoked  by  officer  of  corporation,  162. 

GUABDIAN  AND  WABD, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  proceedings  in  rem,  32L 


HABEAS  COBPUS, 

constitution,  Fourteenth  Amendment,  meaning  of  ''due  process  of  law" 

clause,  41. 
criminal  law,  habeas  corpus  as  proper  remedy  to  test  validity  of  deten- 
tion under  state  law,  564. 
remedies  in  state  courts,  duty  of  accused  to  exhaust  all  remedies, 
562. 

HABBOBS, 

state  taxation,  purpose,  taxation  must  be  for  public  purpose,  352. 
taking  private  property,  construction  of,  Fifth  Amendment,  locating 
harbor  lines,  86. 
navigable  waters,  power  of  Congress,  Fifth  Amendment,  177. 


INDEX  929 

[UFEBINCBS  ABB  TO  PAOSS] 

HEALTH, 

aliens.  Act  of  1903  ezeluding  diseased  aliens,  Fifth  Amendment,  Due 

Process  Clause,  156. 
animals,  quarantine,  prevention  of  disease,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

772. 
compulsory  yaccination,  equal  protection  not  denied,  775. 
master  and  servant,  regulations,  requiring  washhouses  for  coal  miners, 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  751. 
limitation  on  hours  of  labor  of  women,  due  process  not  infringed, 
421. 
milk,  ordinance  requiring  tuberculin  test  for  dairy  cattle,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  789. 
due  process  not  denied,  431. 
municipal  corporations,  ordinances  as  to  public  laundries,  validity,  762. 
equal  protection,  regulations  of  public  laundries  and  washhouses, 
760. 
X>olice  power,  definitions  by  -American  jurists  and  text  writers,  397. 
delegation  to  municipalities,  400. 
extent,  promotion  of  public  convenience,  419. 
limitations,  enjoyment  of  property  limited,  405. 
sewers,  requiring  abutting  owners  to  connect  property  with  sewer,  due 
process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  465,  788. 
discrimination   between   residents   and   nonresidents,    validity   of 
statute,  718. 
smoke,  legislation  declaring  emission  of  dense  smoke  a  nuisance,  due 

process  sot  denied,  438. 
water^osets,  ordinances  requiring,  under  certain  conditions,  due  process 
not  denied,  430. 

HEABING, 

see  Nonoi  and  Hxabino. 

HEPBUEN  ACT, 

see  INTBBSTATE  COlClCXSOS. 

HIGHWAYS  AND  STREETS, 

advertisements,  prohibition  of  advertising  wagons  on  city  streets,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  740. 
due  process  not  denied,  426. 
animals,  damages  by  cattie,  statute  imposing  liability,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  767. 
bridges,  classification  of  municipal  corporations,  requiring  certain  towns 

to  maintain  bridge  and  highway,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

768. 
extension  proceedings,  amounts  awarded  as  damages,  property  not  taken 

without  compensation,  467. 

Due  Process — 59 


930  INDEX 

[rirbxncxs  abb  to  paqis] 

HIGHWAYS  AND  STBEETS-H^ontinned. 

grade,  vested  rightoi  consequential  damages,  claim  of  abutting  owners 

to  compensation,  protection  bj  due  process,  475. 
improvements,  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  due  process  in 

District  of  Columbia,  meaning  of  phrase,  104. 
property,  vested  rights,  protection  hj  Due  Process  Clause,  repeal  of 

remedy,  31K). 
railways,  construction  of  railroad  across  street,  damages,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  665. 
order  requiring  safety  appliance  at  grade  crossings,  validity,  due 

process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  673. 
property  burdened  by  construction  of  bridge  over  highway,  due 

process  not  denied,  466. 
taxation,  imposition  of  entire  cost  of  abolishing  grade  crossings, 

vaUdity,  660. 
vested  rights,   ordinance  prohibiting  engines  on  certain  streets, 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  651. 
taxation,  state  taxation,  power  to  tax,  legislature  may  act  direetlj 
or  may  delegate  functions,  356. 
residuum  of  taxing  power,  374. 

taking  property  for  public  use,  compensation  required  by  Due 
Process  Clause,  358. 
state  tax  laws,  constitutionality,  611. 
turnpike  companies,  regulation  of  charges,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

814. 
vested  rights,  legitimate  modification  of  rights  of  abutting  owner,  due 
process,  462. 

HOMICIDE, 

conviction  without  indictment,  prisoner  compelled  to  testify  against 

himself,  145. 
due  process,  extension  to  Philippine  Islands,  125. 
former  jeopardy  plea,  158. 
Indians,  Fifth  Amendment,  application  to  courts  of  Cherokee  Nation, 

constitution  does  not  apply,  99. 
indictment,  sufficiency  of  indictment  for  murder,  manner  of  death  not 

alleged,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  826. 
self-incrimination,  crime  committed  within  military  reservation,  Fiftk 

Amendment,  159. 

HOSPITALS, 

Eight-Hour  Law,  women  employed,  validity  of  statutes,  798. 
master  and  servant,  contracts,  freedom  not  infringed  by  statutes  roga* 
lating  employment  of  women,  516. 

HOTELS, 

see  INNKKXPSBS. 


INDEX  931 

[BmBXNOBS  ABB  TO  PAOBS] 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE, 

community  property.  Tested  rights,  what  constitutes,  455. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  divorce  proceedings,  not  in  rem  or  in  per- 
sonam, 323. 
service  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judgment,  315. 
vested  rights,  rights  below  standard  of  vested  rights,  456. 


ICE  CREAM, 
see  Food. 

IMMIGBATION, 

see  ALIENS* 

INDIANS, 

allotments,  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  property  of  Indians 
not  taken  by  removal  of  restrictions  as  to  allotments,  181. 
vested  rights,  what  constitutes,  455. 
Fifth  Amendment,  application  to  courts  of  Cherokee  Nation,  constitu- 
tion does  not  apply,  99. 
power  of  Congress  not  limited,  111. 
vested  rights,  Creek  freedom  entitled  to  due  process,  472. 

INFANTS, 

Federal  constitution,   Fourteenth   Amendment,   due  process,   Supreme 

Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  263. 
master  and  servant,  Ten-Hour  Law  forbidding  employment  of  children 
or  women,  freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  509. 
prohibition  of  employment  of  minors,  hazardous  occupations,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  792. 
sale  of  property,  due  process,  jurisdiction,  judgments,  collateral  attack 
on  judgments,  334. 

INHEBITANCE  TAXES, 
see  Taxation. 

INJUNCTION, 

Due  Process  Clause,  appeal  to  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue  after 
payment  of  taxes,  182. 

Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  schools,  discrimination  against 
colored  children,  605. 

violation,  contempt,  right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or  civil  con- 
tempt, 585. 

INNKEEPERS, 

carriers,  prohibition  of  soliciting  of  business  on  carriers'  premises, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  786. 
master  and  servant,  freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  statutes 

regulating  employment  of  women,  516. 


932  INDEX 

[tmBBNOBB  ABS  TO  PAOIS] 

INNKEEPEBS— eontimied. 

municipal   eorporations,   ordinanees,   prohibition  of  billiard   or   pool 

rooms,  equal  protection  not  denied,  787. 
police  power,  property  or  business  of  public  interest,  407. 

statute  requiring  hotel  keepers  to  give  notice  to  guests  in  case  of 
fire,  due  process  not  denied,  437. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  756. 

INSANE  PEBS0N8, 

criminal  law,  Terdicty  refusal  to  set  aside  verdict,  inaanitj  of  juror, 

552. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  proceedings  in  rem,  321. 

fundamental  requisites,  notice,  issue  of  Innaey,  288. 

INSOLVENCY, 

banks,  creation  of  depositors'  guaranty  fund,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  737. 
foreign    corporations,    creditors,    discrimination    against    nonresideDt 

creditors,  equal  protection  denied,  712. 
sales  in  bulk,  regiilation,  record  of  notice  to  sell,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  785. 

INSTBUCnONS  TO  JUBIES, 

eminent  domain,  procedure,  decision  of  state  court  as  to  different 
procedure,  pajment  of  compensation,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
828. 

error,  substantial  error  in  charge  to  jurj,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  824. 

right  of  judge  to  discharge  juty  during  trial,  right  to  express  opinion 
on  facts.  Fifth  Amendmenty  construction,  85. 

INSUBANGE, 

company  connected  with  tariff  association,  penalty  imposed,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  738. 
defenses,  life  insurance,  exclusion  of  suicide  as  defense  in  action  on 

policy,  420. 
false  answers  by  applicant  for  life  insuraneOi  statute  as  to  effect  of, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  698. 
fanners'  mutual  insurance  companies,  exemption  from  statute  regulat- 
ing fire  insurance  rates,  equal  protection  not  denied,  705. 
foreign  corporations,  exclusion  of  insurance  company,  power  of  state, 
noncompliance  with  conditions,  equal  protection  not  denied,  722. 
names,  exclusion  of  foreign  company  haying  same  name  as  domestic 
company,  mutual  benefit  societies,  equal  protection  not  de- 
nied, 716. 
requirements  as  to  investments  in  state  by  foreign  companies, 
due  process  not  denied,  484. 


INDEX  )  933 

[bxfibxngbs  abx  to  PAOIS] 

TN8TTBANCB — eontinued. 

nonforfeitare  proyisions  of  statnte,  loan  agreement  invalidated,  free- 
dom of  contract  denied,  511. 

payment  of  daime,  statute  imposing  attorneys'  fees  and  penalties, 
failure  to  pay,  equal  protection  denied,  805. 

reorganization  of  co-operative  association  without  consent  of  members, 
power  of  state,  464. 

state  control  of  corporations,  696. 

statute  applicable  to  fire  insurance  companies  only,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  697. 

INTEENAL  BEVENUE, 

Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  limitation 
on  Federal  power  to  tax  dispensing  agents  of  state,  143. 

INTEBSTATE  COMMEBGE, 

Act  as  to  Food  and  Drugs,  misbranding,  Fifth  Amendment,  due  process, 

181. 
Oarmack  Amendment  of  1906  does  not  deny  due  process,  160. 

freedom  of  contract  not  denied  by  Carmack  Amendment  of  1906, 
500. 
carriers,  reasonableness  of  rates,  police  power,  due  process,  recent 

cases,  416. 
corporation  as  person  within  the  meaning  of  Section  1,  Fourteenth 

Amendment,  240. 
Eight-Hour-Law  Case,  validity  of  statute.  Fifth  Amendment,  182. 
elevators,  regulation  of  charges,  validity  of  statute,  812. 
eminent  domain,  equivalent  under  Fifth  Amendment,  90. 

land  taken  to  improve  navigation,  liability  for.  Fifth  Amendment, 

113. 
riparian   owner  deprived   of  access  to  navigable  stream.  Fifth 
Amendment,  construction,  103. 
Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  of  1908,  freedom  of  contract,  not 

interfered  with,  504. 
•foreign  commerce,  regulation  of,  limitation  of  power  by  Due  Process 

Clause,  128. 
foreign  corporations,  license  tax,  validity,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

707. 
Hepburn  Act  of  1906,  commodities  clause.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due 
Process  Clause,  155. 
prohibition  in  Hepburn  Act  of  transportation  from  market  to 
mine.  Due  Process  Clause,  170. 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  and  common  law,  police  power,  410. 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  of  1887  as  amended  by  Act  of  1910  held  valid, 
Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  174. 


934  INDEX 

[bdsbinozs  aub  to  paoes] 

/  INTEBOTATE  OOMMEBCE-Hsontmned. 

limitation  on  power  of  Secretary  of  War,  Fifth  Amendment,  Dne 

Process  danse,  alterations  in  bridges  over  waterways,  147. 
Umitation  npon  power  of  Ck>ngre88  to  regulate  interstate  emnmeree, 
Fifth  Amendment,  Dae  Process  Clause,  relatiTe  ri^ts  of  em- 
ployer and  employee,  150. 
order  to  extend  fadlitiee  to  connecting  carriers,  Fifth  Amendment, 

Dne  Process  Clause,  179. 
order  to  receive  and  transport  freight.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process 

Clause,  175. 
police  power,  origin  of  state  police  power,  English  origin,  395. 
proceedings  of  commission,  contempt,  punishment,  trial  by  jxaj  not 
required  by  Due  Process  Clause  since  power  to  punish  is  in- 
herent, 580. 
railroads,  coal  cars,  regulation  of  distribution,  freedom  of  contract 
not  destroyed,  498. 
legislatiye  control,  railway  fare  and  rates,  effect  of  Equal  Pro- 
tection Clause,  850. 
taxation,  tax  on  foreign  companies,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  691. 
taxation,  capital  of  foreign  corporation,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  708. 
consolidated  railway  company,  annual  franchise  tax  on,  statute 

not  invalid,  648. 
state  taxation.  Federal  power  to  regulate  interstate  commerce,  un- 
limited power,  340. 
vested  rights,  state  tax  on  gross  earnings  of  railroads,  not  con- 
fiscation, 480. 
witnesses,  self-incrimination,  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment, 
kinship  with  Fourth  Amendment,  79. 
immunity  of  witnesses,  under  Interstate  Commerce  Act  of  1893, 
application  to  state  and  Federal  courts,  96. 

INTOXICATING  LIQUOBS, 

injunction  violated,  contempt,  right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or 

civil  contempt,  585. 
local  option  law,  prohibition  of  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  801. 
municipal  corporations,  ordinances,  regulation  of  sale  of  intoxicating 

liquors,  licenses,  equal  protection  not  denied,  799. 
police  power,  limitations,  enjoyment  of  property  limited,  405. 

prohibition  of  sale  of  malt  liquor,  due  process  not  denied,  428. 
right  of  forfeiture,  404. 
taxation,  limitation  on  Federal  power  to  tax  dispensing  agents  of  state, 
Due  Process  Clause,  143. 


INDEX  935 

[RITEBBNCES  ABl  TO  PAOBS] 

INTOXICATING  LIQUOES— continued, 
taxation— continued. 

occupation  tax,  diatillers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  636. 
spirits  in  bond,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  635. 
tax  on  liquor  sellers,  discrimination,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
633. 

IRRIGATION, 

state  power  of  eminent  domain,  state  definitions  of  public  use  to  be 

respected,  due  process,  385. 
Tested  rights,  all  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  scope  of  due 

process,  459. 

'J 
JAILS, 

see  PSNITBNTIABISS. 

JIM  GBOW  CASS, 
see  CIVIL  Bights. 

JOINT  TENANCY, 

surrivorshipy  rights  below  standard  or  vested  rights,  456. 

JUDGES, 

right  of  judge  to  discharge  jury  during  trial,  right  to  express  opinion 

on  facts,  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction, 

85. 
terms  of  office,  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  constitution  of 

parent  state,  right  of  colonists  to  participate  in,  116. 

JT7BGMENTS, 

amendment,  criminal  law,  appeal,  refusal  of  Supreme  Court  to  amend 

record,  equal  protection  not  denied,  824. 
default,  judgment  by,  summons  left  at  residence  of  defendant,  Federal 

constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  173. 
due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  notice,  288. 

jurisdiction,  collateral  attack  on  judgments,  332. 
necessity  of  competent  tribunal  and  notice,  312. 
nonresident  persons,  318. 

service  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judgment,  314. 
notable  attempts  to  define  due  process,  282. 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  264. 
execution,  limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested 

rights,  522. 
Magna  Carta,  chapter  39  in  American  law,  wider  scope  of  chapter,  15. 
X       guaranties  given  to  nation,  chapter  39  of  charter,  5. 


936  INDEX 

[BXnmiNCU  ABB  TO  PAGB8] 

JTJDOMENT&— «oiitiiined. 

remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  legislature^  qualificatLoiiSy  527. 
repeal  of  statute,  Federal  eonstitutiony  Fifth  Amendment^  constmcUon, 

ease  involTing  military  eommission,  69. 
tazationy  due  proeess,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  369. 
vested  rights,  foreign  corporations,  money^  judgment  rendered  upon 
service  on  resident  director,  denial  of  due  process,  485. 
mnnieipalitj's  liability  for  damages  caused  by  mobs,  due  proeess 
not  denied,  469. 

JXJBISDIOnON, 

contempt,  pxuishment,  consequences  of  lack  of  jurisdiction,  588. 
courts,  different  courts  in  same  state,  power  of  state  to  establish, 

Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not  restrict,  820. 
criminal  law,  habeas  corpus  as  proper  remedy  to  test  validity  of  de- 
tention under  state  law,  564. 
jurisdiction  to  review  judgment  of  highest  court  of  state  in  crim- 
inal case,  first  ten  amendments  as  limitations  upon  Federal 
government,  82. 
remedies  in  state  courts,  duty  of  accused  to  exhaust  all  remedies, 

562. 
witnesses,  exemption  from  self-incrimination  in  state  courts,  due 
process  not  denied,  550. 
due  process  and  jurisdiction,  chapter  VII,  312. 
collateral  attack  on  judgments,  332. 
divorce  proceedings  not  In  rem  or  in  personam,  323. 
Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  conflict  of  state  law  with  state 
constitution,  jurisdiction  of  Federal  courts,  64. 
construction  as  to  right  of  eminent  domain,  74. 
eonstruction  in  case  involving  militaiy  trial  and  service,  triumph 
of  legality,  65. 
foreign  corporation  not  doing  business  in  state  is  not  within  jurisdic- 
tion of  state,  equal  protection,  709. 
fundamental  requisites  of  due  process,  jurisdiction,  307. 
notice,  286. 
necessity  of  competent  tribunal  and  notice,  312. 
nonresident  corporations,  jurisdiction,  319. 
nonresident  persons,  jurisdiction,  318. 
notice,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  of  process  by  appearance, 

316. 
proceedings  in  rem,  jurisdiction,  321. 
service  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judgment,  314. . 
remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  legislature,  qualifications,  527. 
vested  rights,  taxation  without  jurisdiction,  denial  of  due  process,  487. 


INDEX  937 

[bifxbencxs  abx  to  paoss] 

JTJBT, 

see  Grand  Jury. 

eriminal  law,  aeciuation  of  felony,  neceesitj  of  presence  of  accused, 
privilege  not  to  be  waived,  538. 
appeal,  denial  of  right  of  review,  alien  juror,  due  process  and 

equal  protection  not  denied,  827. 
arraignment  or  plea  on  second  information  not  allowed,  alien  on 

jury,  due  process  not  denied,  654. 
petit  jury  of  eight,  right  of  state  to  authorize,  548. 
procedure,  powers  of  state,  query  as  to  existence  of  restraints 

upon  powers,  573. 
statute  as  to  number  of  peremptory  challenges,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  822. 
verdict,  refusal  to  set  aside  verdict,  insanity  of  juror,  552. 
discharge,  error  of  trial  court,  equal  protection  not  denied,  834. 

former  jeopardy,  effect  of  Due  Process  Clause,  Federal  constitu- 
tion, Fifth  Amendment,  109. 
right  of  judge  to  discharge  jury  during  trial,  right  to  express 
'  opinion  on  facts,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  85. 
eminent  domain,  compensation  for  taking  property,  questioa  a  judicial 
one,  necessity  of  competent  tribunal,  219. 
Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  right  of  eminent  domain  in  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  87. 
Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  colored  race,  right  to  mixed  juries, 
597. 
denial  to  colored  persons  of  right  to  act  as  jurors,  596. 
discrimination  against  citizens  of  African  descent,  setting  aside 

jury  panel,  603. 
exclusion  of  juror  on  account  of  color,  600. 
negroes  as  jurors,  discrimination,  607. 
statute  excluding  jurors  on  account  of  race  or  color,  602. 
Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  purely  American  invention,  595. 
Federal  right  to  trial  by  petit  juiy,  535. 
selection,  local  regulations,  equal  protection  not  denied,  833. 
struck  jury  law,  validity,  830. 

trial  by  jury,  amendment  to  Federal  constitution,  text  of  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, 55. 
attorneys,  disbarment,  attorney  cannot  be  denied  due  process,  590. 
constitution,  Fourteenth  Amendment,  meaning  of  ''due  process  of 

law"  clause,  41. 
contempt,  punishment,  trial  by  jury  not  required  by  Due  Process 
Clause,  since  power  to  punish  is  inherent,  580. 
right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  585. 
criminal  law,  rights  of  accused,  trial  and  rendition  of  verdict, 
habeas  corpus,  567,  569. 


938  INDEX 

[rxtebencu  au  to  pages] 

JUBY — continued. 

trial  by  juiy — continued. 

due  proeeas,  common  heritage  of  all  states,  270. 

due  process  of  law  as  embodied  in  Fifth  Amendment,  21. 
notable  attempts  to  define  due  process,  279. 
right  to  due  process  in  unincorporated  territory,  237. 
vested  rights,  Fifth  Amendment  developing  idea  of  vested 
rights,  451. 
eminent  domain,  due  process,  duty  of  state  to  guarantee  protec- 
tion to  life,  liberty  and  property,  379. 
Federal  procedure,  summary  of  rights  of  persona  and  property, 

guaranties  of  Federal  eonstitntion,  539. 
Fifth  Amendment,  construction  in  case  involving  military  trial  and 
service,  triumph  of  legality,  65. 
denial  of  due  process  of  law  to  aliens,  Chinese  exclusion,  97. 
due  process,  admission  of  evidence  illegally  obtained,  131. 
alien  practicing  prostitution  after  entry,  167. 
extension  to  Philippine  Islands,  125. 
review  of  cases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  198. 
Fifth  and  Sixth  Amendments,  jury  of  twelve  men,  right  of  trial 

by,  incorporation  of  Alaska  with  United  States,  123. 
Magna  Carta,  chapter  39  in  American  law,  wider  scope  of  chap- 
ter, 15. 
guaranties  given  to  nation,  chapter  39  of  charter,  4. 
statute  abridging  right  of  trial  by  jury,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  829. 
trial  by  struck  juiy,  right  of  state  to  provide,  due  process,  547. 


LACHES, 

eminent  domain,  right  of  Congress  to  legislate  against,  221. 

LANDLOBB  AND  TENANT, 

foreign  corporations,  excise  tax,  lease  of  foreign  corporation,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  720. 

leases,  amusements,  regulation  of  admission  to  places  of  public  amuse- 
ment, equal  protection  not  denied,  779. 

state  tide  lands,  assessment  of  leaseholds  for  local  improvements,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  704. 

LARD, 

see  Food. 

LAUNDBIES, 

Due  Process  Clause,  guaranty  in  American  law,  256. 


INDEX  939 

[BmBXNOlS  ABB  TO  PAGBS] 

LAUNDBIES — continued. 

regulation  of  businessi  ordinances,  classification,  equal  protection  denied| 
764.' 
equal  protection,  regulations  of  public  laundries  and  washhouses, 

760. 
police  power,  limitation  on  hours  of  labor  of  women,  due  process 

not  infringed,  421. 
validity  of  ordinances  as  to  public  laundries,  762. 
taxation,  discrimination  in  license  tax,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
641. 

LAW, 

reign  of  law,  Angevin  period,  reign  of  Henry  II,  1. 

LEGACIES, 

inheritance  taxes,  see  Taxation. 

LEGAL  TENDEB, 

Federal    constitution.    Fifth    Amendment,    construction,   legal   tender 
cases,  71. 

LICENSES, 

.attorneys,  right  of  women  to  practice  law  in  state  courts.  Equal  Pro- 
tection of  the  Law  Clause,  608. 
auctions,  discrimination  in  fee,  equal  protection  not  denied,  744. 
baiics,  license  to  private  bankers,  right  to  refuse,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  737. 
cigarettes,  license  for  sale,  ordinances,  due  process  and  equal  j^rotee- 

tion  not  denied,  625,  769. 
classification,  sales  for  future  delivery,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

638. 
corporations,    discrimination    against    dealers,    articles    manufactured 

from  produce  of  another  state,  not  discrimination,  700. 
discrimination  in  license  tax,  equal  protection  not  denied,  641. 

denial  of  equal  protection,  620. 
due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  366. 
emigrant  agents,  tax  on,  equal  protection  of  the  law,  622. 
foreign  corporations,  license  tax  on  foreign  corporation,  validity,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  707. 
foreign  packing  houses,  tax  on  local  managers,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  716. 
intoxicating  liquors,  ordinances,  regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  799. 
distillers,  occupation  tax,  equal  protection  not  denied,  636. 
tax  on  liquor  sellers,  discrimination,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
633. 


940  INDEX 

[■syniNois  AUB  «o  piois] 

UCBN8E8— eontimied. 

miBMi  mapiaytm,  ftatate  imposing  responnbility  for  defaults  of  eertain 

employaei,  equal  proteetion  not  denied,  781. 
nnmieipal  eorporatioiis,  lieenee  tazes,  ordinaneee,  elamriflcation  of  mer- 
ehants,  equal  proteetion  not  denied,  728. 
oeenpatione,  clawriflfationy  due  proceu  and  equal  proteetion  not 
denied,  745. 
oleomargarine  tax,  eonstitiitioaalitjri  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Prooeai 
Glaiiae,  140. 
diierimination  againat  oleomargarine,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
644. 
pereonal  propertj,  taxation  of  Vu^ble  personal  property,  344. 
■moke,  legislation  declaring  emission  of  dense  smoke  a  nnisanee,  due 

process  not  denied,  438. 
theaters,  municipal  license  fees,  grading  fee  according  to  reeeipts,  eqnal 

protection  not  denied,  641. 
trading  stamps,  discrimination  against  trading  stamps  and  premhmi 
coupons,  equal  proteetion  not  denied,  647. 
Ueense  tax  on  profit  sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps,  due 
process  not  denied,  440. 
freedom  of  contract,  not  infringed,  517. 
vested  rights,  taxation  without  jurisdiction,  denial  of  due  process,  487. 
warehouses,  classification  of  elevators  and  warehouses,  equal  proteetion 

not  denied,  727. 
wholesale  dealers  in  oil,  equal  protection  not  denied  by  occupation  tax, 
685. 

LIENS, 

see  MxoHANios'  Lzinb. 

enforcement,  limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactiye  laws.  Tested 
rights,  522. 

LIMITATIONS,  STATUTE  OP, 

adverse  possession,  due  process  not  denied  by  limitation  act,  525. 

equal  protection  not  denied,  794. 
constitutional  limitation  of  reasonableness,  520. 
eminent  domain,  laches,  right  of  Congress  to  legislate  against,  221. 
exemption  from  suit  as  vested  right,  ending  of  statutory  period  of 

limitations,  523. 
nature,  due  process  not  denied  by  passage,  contracts  not  impaired,  519. 
property  rights  as  protected  by  due  process,  limitations  and  remedies, 

chapter  XIII,  519. 
right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested  rights,  521. 
vested  rights,  property  not  to  be  taken  from  one  and  given  to  another 

contrary  to  settled  usages  and  modes  of  procedure,  due  proeees, 

472. 


INDEX  941 

[bxtirsncxs  abx  to  paoes] 

UVBET  STABLES, 

municipal  corporations,  ordinances,  regulation  of  livery  stables,  due 
process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  794. 

LOANS, 

contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  insurance,  nonforfeiture  proidsions  of 
statute,  loan  agreement  invalidated,  freedom  denied,  511. 

LOTTERY, 

evidence,  admission  of  evidence  illegally  obtained,  Federal  constitu- 
tion, Fifth  Amendment,  due  process,  131. 

LUMBEB, 

contracts,  condemnation  of  trade  agreement  between  retail  lumber 
dealers,  freedom  of  contract  not  abridged,  499. 
punishment  of  selling  of  goods  at  lower  rate  in  one  place  than 
in  another,  freedom  of  contract  not  abridged,  506. 

M 

MAGNA  CASTA, 

chapter  39  of  the  Great  Charter,  4,  443. 

American  law,  wider  scope  of  chapter,  15. 

reproduction  in  first  state  constitutions,  13, 
charter  as  national  act,  fusion  of  Normans  and  English,  4. 
constitution,  amendments  to  Federal  Constitution,  first  eight  articles,  19. 

Fourteenth  Amendment,  meaning  of  ''due  process  of  law"  clause, 
41. 

text  of  Fifth  Amendment,  55. 
contempt,  punishment,  power  to  punish  inherent  in  all  courts,  578. 
criminal  law,  trial,  right  of  accused  to  be  present  in  state  court,  556. 
Due  Process  Clause,  common  heritage  of  all  states,  270. 

guaranty  in  American  law,  251. 

guaranty  in  English  law,  249. 

notable  attempts  to  define  due  process,  274. 

review  of  cases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  186. 

Webster's  famous  definition,  58. 
due  process  of  law  as  embodied  in  Fifth  Amendment,  21. 
eminent  domain,  due  process,  duty  of  state  to  guarantee  protection  to 

life,  liberty  and  property,  379. 
English  constitutional  system,  Blackstone  as  true  guide  instead  of 

Coke,  11. 
exposition.  Coke  as  misleading  expounder  of  the  Great  Charter,  8. 

error  of  Coke 's  construction,  change  of  principles  in  bills  of  rights, 
12. 
later  versions  of  the  Great  Charter^  6. 


942  INDEX 

[R1FIEXNC18  ABM  TO  PAOIS] 

MAGNA  CABTA-^eontiniied. 

national  citizenahip,  creation  bj  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  Federal 
constitution,  29. 

procedure,  change  of  procedure,  Due  Process  Clause  of  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, re-enforced  b>  Sixth  and  Seventh  Amendments,  533. 

property  not  to  be  taken  from  one  and  given  to  another  contrary  to 
settled  usages  and  modes  of  procedure,  due  process,  472. 

property  taken  bj  military  governor  of  Porto  Bico  without  notice  or 
hearing,  Due  Process  Clause,  168. 

rebirth  of  the  Great  Charter  in  1628,  7. 

remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  legislature,  526. 

revolutions  of  1640  and  1688,  9. 

struggle  for  charters,  reigns  of  Bichard  I  and  John,  2. 

vested  rights,  growth  in  England  of  idea,  443. 

MALiaonS  PROSECUTION, 

costs,  statute  rendering  prosecutor  liable  for  costs,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  828. 

MANDAMUS, 

attorneys'  fees,  allowance  to  successful  plaintiff,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  808. 
contempt,  punishment,  consequences  of  lack  of  jurisdiction,  588. 

MAKES  AND  BRANDS, 

Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  Act  as  to 

Food  and  Drugs,  misbranding,  181. 
paint,  statute  requiring  labels  on  mixed  paints  to  show  ingredients, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  730. 

MABBIAGE, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  divorce  proceedings  not  in  rem  or  in  per- 
sonam, 323. 

MARTIAL  LAW, 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction  in  case  involving 
military  trial  and  service,  triumph  of  legfality,  65. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT, 

aliens,   employment,    discrimination    against    aliens,    equal    protection 
denied,  753. 
public  improvements,   discrimination   against   foreign   labor,  due 
process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  755. 
compensation,  see  Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  definition,  496. 

employment  at  will  of  parties  not  employment  at  wiU  of  others,  514. 


INDEX  943 

[bEFEBENCES  ABE  TO  PAGIS] 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— continued, 
contracts— continued. 

imposition  hj  employer  of  certain  conditions  on  employee  as  crime, 

freedom  of  contract  denied,  512. 
subjection  to  sovereign  powers  of  state,  493. 
Due  Process  Clause,  limitation  upon  power  of  Congress  to  regulate 
interstate  commerce,  relative  rights  of  employer  and  employee, 
150. 
hours  of  work, 

contracts,  Ten-Hour  Law  forbidding  employment  of  children  or 

women,  freedon^  of  contract  not  infringed,  509. 
Eight-Hour  Law,  public  improvements,  equal  protection  nt)t  denied, 
774. 
validity  of  statute,  182. 

women  employed  in  hotels,  validity  of  statute,  796. 
Federal  constitution,  Fourteenth  Amendment,  due  process,  Supreme 

Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  262. 
police  power,  limitation  on  hours  of  labor  of  women,  due  process 
not  infringed,  421. 
''liberty,''  definition  in  Federal  law,  491. 

definition  in  state  law,  490. 
license  tax  on  emigrant  agents,  equal  protection  of  the  law,  622. 
mines,  classification  of  coal  mines  by  number  of  men  employed,  sta1>- 
ute  as  to  wages  of  employees,  equal  protection  not  denied,  731. 
"run-of-mine"  or  ''anti-screen"  law  as  to  compensation  of  miners, 
due  process  not  denied,  436. 
excessive  penalties,  equal  protection  not  denied,  812. 
freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  516. 
state  law  preventing  miners  from  contracting  for  wages  on  certain 

basis,  freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  497. 
statute  imposing  responsibility  for  defaults  of  certain  employees, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  781. 
washhouses  required  for  coal  miners,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  751. 
minors,  prohibition  of  employment^  hazardous  occupations,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  792. 
police  power,  statute  inflicting  penalties  on  employer  where  certain  con- 
ditions are  imposed  on  employee,  denial  of  due  process,  435. 
railways,   classification   of   employees,   relief  fund,   classification   not 
denial  of  equal  protection,  683. 
crime  for  person  to  act  as  railway  conductor  without  certain  qual- 
ifications, freedom  of  contract  not  abridged,  508. 
Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act,  due  process  and  equal  protection 

not  denied,  685.  « 

fellow  servant  act,  abolition  of  fellow  servant  rule,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  653,  654,  675,  684. 


944  INDEX 

[Em&XNCIS  ABX  TO  PAGBS] 

MASTBB  AND  SEBVANT— contmnecL 
railwajs — continued. 

elasflifieation  of  railway  emplojees,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

680. 
itatnte  changing  rale  as  to  railroad  employeee,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  069,  686. 
statute  creating  presumption  of  negligence,  equal  protection 

and  due  process  not  denied,  680. 
validity  of  statute,  663. 
injuries,  daasif jing  railway  mail  clerks  with  railway  employees, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  677. 
statute  as  to  eomparatiye  negligence,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  686. 

statute    defining   liability    of    railways   for   injuries,   free- 
dom not  infringed,  502. 
statute  requiring  full  switching  crews,,  due  process  not  denied,  439. 

equal  protection  not  denied,  683. 
wages  of  employees,  statute  as  to  time  of  payment,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  667. 
wages,  assignments  of  future  earnings,  regulations,  exemption  of  banks, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  742. 
prohibition  of  orders  for  payment  of  labor  not  redeemable  in 
money,  equal  protection  not  denied,  749. 
freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  509. 
women,  employment  of,  freedom  of  contract  not  infringed  by  statutes 
regulating  employment  of  women,  516. 

MEAT, 

tax  on  local  managers  of  foreign  packing  houses,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  716. 
tax  on  meat-packing  houses,  equal  protection  not  denied,  638. 

MECHANICS '  LIENS, 

contracts,  freedom  of  contract  subject  to  sovereign  powers  of  state, 
493. 

MILITABY  COMMISSION, 

Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  case  involving 
military  commission,  69. 
construction  in  case  involving  military  trial  and  service,  triumph 
of  legality,  65. 

MILITABY  GOVEBNOB, 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  property 
taken  by  military  governor  of  Porto  Bico  without  notice  or 
hearing,  168. 


INDEX  945 

[betebenoxs  abb  to  paqbs] 

MILITABY  RESEBVATION, 

Pedend  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  self-inerimination,  crime  com- 
mitted within  military  reservation,  159. 

MILITABY  8EBVICB, 

struggle  for  charters,  reigns  of  Bichard  I  and  John,  2. 

MILITIA, 

Fedeittl  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  persons  subject 
to  militttry  law,  95. 

statutes,  validity.  Fourteenth  Amendment,  purpose.  Congress  as  pro- 
tecting and  enforcing  body,  269. 

MILK, 

see  Food. 

MINES, 

barrier  pillars  between  adjoining  coal  properties,  statute  regulating, 

due  process  not  denied,  432. 
defaults  of  certain  employees,  statute  imposing  responsibility  for,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  781. 
entries,  statute  requiring  entries  in  coal  mines,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  791. 
explosives,  regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not  denied,  786. 
fellow  servant  act,  statute  abrogating  fellow  servant  rule,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  675. 
hours  of  work.  Federal  constitution.  Fourteenth  Amendment,  due  proc- 
ess. Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal, 
262. 
inspection  of  coal  mines,  classification,  validity  of  statute,  771. 
taxation,  income  tax  on  mining  companies,  equal  protection  and  due 
process  not  denied,  625. 
mineral  rights,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  643. 
state  taxation,  corporate  property  situated  in  several  states,  power 
to  tax,  342. 
transportation  of  products, 

police  power,  carriers,  reasonableness  of  rates,  due  process,  recent 

cases,  416. 
prohibition  in  Hepburn  Act  of  transportation  from  market  to  mine. 

Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  170. 
regulation  of  distribution  of  railroad  coal  cars,  freedom  of  contract 
not  destroyed,  498. 
wages, 

classification  of  coal  mines  by  number  of  men  employed,  statute 

as  to  wages  of  employees,  equal  protection  not  denied,  731. 
prohibition  of  orders  for  payment  of  labor  not  redeemable  in 
money,  equal  protection  not  denied,  749. 
freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  509. 

Due  Process — 60 


946  INDEX 

[references  are  to  pages] 

MINES— continued, 
wagea— continued. 

*  <  run-of -mine ' '  or  "  anti-sereen ' '  law  as  to  compenaation  of  miners, 
due  process  not  denied,  436. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  812. 
freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  516. 
state  law  preventing  miners  from  contracting  for  wages  on  certain 
basis,  freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  497. 
washhottses  required  for  coal  miners,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  751. 

MISTAKE, 

eminent  domain,  compensation  for  taking  private  property,  due  process, 
mistake  of  law,  391. 

MOBS  AND  BIOTS, 

municipality's  liability  for  damages  caused  by  mobs,  due  process  not 
denied,  469. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  742. 

MONEY, 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  legal  tender  cases, 

71. 
police  power,  due  process,  prohibition  of  exportation  of  Philippine  coin, 

422. 

MOBTGAOES, 

due  process,  vested  rights,  effect  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  prohibi- 
tion of  arbitrary  interference  with  rights,  452. 
foreclosure,  contracts  for  sale  of  land,  statute  regulating  cancellation, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  743. 
Federal  constitution,  due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  notice, 

287. 
limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  v^ted  rights, 
522. 
taxation,  mortgagee's  interest  in  land,  equal  protection,  618. 
savings  banks,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  644. 
usury,  exemption  of  banks,  trust  companies  '4Uid  bona  fide  mortgages, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  736. 

MOTOB  VEHICLES, 
see  Automobiles. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPOBATIONS, 

see  Drainage,  Pttblio  Improvements,  Sewers,  etc. 
annexation  of  land,  discrimination  between  agricultural  and  other  lands, 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  725. 


INDEX  947 

[RETERENCES  ABE  TO  PAOES] 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— continued. 

bridges,    classification    of    municipal    corporations^    requiring    certain 
towns  to  maintain  bridge  and  highway,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  768. 
elections,  registration  law,  discrimination  between  citizens,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  726. 
eminent  domain,  construction  of  Fifth  Amendment  to  Federal  consti- 
tution, right  of  eminent  domain  in  District  of  Columbia,  87. 
jury,  selection,  local  regulations,  equal  protection  not  denied,  833. 

statute  abridging  right   of  trial   by  jury,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  829. 
licenses,  occupations,  classification,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  745. 
classification  of  merchants,  equal  protection  not  denied,  728. 
tax  on  street  railways,  equal  protection  not  denied,  627. 
mobs  and  riots,  statute  imposing  liability  for  damages,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  742. 
vested  rights,  due  process  not  denied,  469. 
ordinances.  Due  Process  Clause,  guaranty  in  American  law,  256. 
ordinances  enacted  in  exercise  of  police  power, 

advertisements,  ordinance  prohibiting  advertising  trucks  or  vans, 
due  process  not  denied,  426. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  740. 
barricaded  gambling  rooms,  ordinances  prohibiting  visiting  of,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  776. 
billiard   or  pool  rooms,   ordinance  prohibiting,   due   process   not 
denied,  427. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  787. 
brick  yards,   ordinance  prohibiting  in   certain  portions  of  city, 
due  process  not  denied,  437. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  756. 
building  lines,  unconstitutional  exercise  of  police  power,  427. 
burial  within  city  limits,  prohibition  of,  due  process  not  denied,  423. 
cigarettes,  license  for  sale,  due  process  And  equal  protection  not 

denied,  769. 
engines  on  certain  streets,  ordinance  prohibiting,  due  process  and 

equal  protection  not  denied,  651. 
intoxicating  liquors,  licenses,  equal  protection  not  denied,  799. 
laundries,  regulation  -of  business,  classification,  equal  protection 
denied,  764. 
validity  of  ordinances  as  to  public  laundries,  760,  762. 
livery  stables,  regulation  of,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not 

denied,  794. 
milk  business,  municipal  regulation,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
777. 
tuberculin  test  required,  due  process  not  denied,  431. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  789. 


948  INDEX 

[UFBKNCIS  AXE  TO  PAOBS] 

MUNICIPAL  OOBPORATIONS-^eontinued. 
ordinaneM  enacted  in  eaerciae  of  poliee 

private  deteetiveSy  poliee  ■npervision,  due  proeess  and  equal  pro- 

teetton  not  denied,  438,  817. 
iewen,  ordinanee  reqoiring  abutting  owners  to  connect  property 
with  sewer,  doe  proeess  and  equal  proteetion  not  denied,  788. 
size  of  loaves  of  bread,  freedom  of  contract  not  interfered  with| 

505. 
smoke,  legislation  declaring  emission  of  dense  smoke  a  nuisance, 
due  process  not  denied,  438. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  757. 
speed  of  trains,  exceptions,  equal  protection  not  denied,  670. 
theaters,  grading  license  fee  according  to  receipts,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  641. 
water-closets,  ordinance  requiring  under  certain  conditions,  doe 
process  not  denied,  430. 
police  power,  delegation  to  municipalities,  400. 

limitations,  enjoyment  of  property  limited,  405. 
rates  of  carriers,  reasonableness,  due  process,  recent  cases,  416. 
taxation,  penalties,  discrimination  between  county  and  city  in  disposi- 
tion of  penalties,  due  proeess  and  equal  proteetion  not  denied, 
752. 
state  tax  laws,  constitutionality,  611. 
state  taxation,  power  to  tax,  residuum  of  taxing  power,  375. 

taking  property  for  publie  use,  compensation  required  by  Due 
Process  Clause,  358. 
township  compelled  to  collect  taxes  for  drain,  due  process  not 
denied,  470. 
telephone  companies,  rates,  municipal  regulation,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  816. 
water  supply, 

construction  and  acquisition  of  waterworks  system,  franchise  of 
waterworks  company  expiring,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
791. 
establishment  of  competing  plant  by  city,  Fourteenth  Amendment 

not  yiolated,  746. 
vested  rights,  property  of  private  water  company  taking  by  munic- 
ipal corporation,  due  process  not  denied,  473. 

N 

NAMES, 

corporations,  see  title,  CdBPOiunoNS. 

NATUBALIZATION, 

see  AuxNS. 


INDEX  949 

[bifkrinois  abb  to  pagbs] 

NAVIGABLE  WATEBS, 

bridges,  limitation  on  power  of  Secretarj  of  War,  Due  Process  Glanse, 

alterations  in  bridges  over  waterways,  147. 
easements,  state  lands  on  navigable  rivers,  servitude  in  favor  of  public, 

effect  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  766. 
eminent  domain,  equivalent  under  Fifth  Amendment,  90. 
power  as  vested  in  Federal  government  paramount,  208. 
power  of  Congress,  177. 
riparian   owner   deprived  of  access  to  navigable  stream,  Fifth 

Amendment,  construction,  103. 
taking  private  property,  what  constitutes  taking,  213. 

construeticm  of  revetments,  injury  to  riparian  rights,  127. 
land  taken  to  improve  navigation,  liability  for,  113. 
excise  tax  based  on  gross  tonnage  upon  use  of  foreign  built  pleasure 

yachts,  Fifth  Amendment,  I>ue  Process  Clause,  171. 
Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  conflict  of   state  law  with 

state  constitution,  jurisdiction  of  Federal  courts,  64. 
grant  of  shore,  vested  rights,  rights  below  standard  of  vested  rights^ 
456. 

NEGLIGENCE, 

see  FXDBBAL  ElCPLOYXBS'  LlABILITT  ACT,  MaSTBB  AND  SXBVANT,  WOBK- 

MBN's  Compensation  Act. 
contracts,  statute  defining  liability  of  railways  for  injuries,  freedom 

not  infringed,  502. 
limitation  of  liability,  telegraph  companies,  prohibiting  limiting  of 

liability  for  negligence,  equal  protection  not  denied,  704. 
police  power,  fixing  of  certain  absolute  liabilities,  due  process  not 

denied,  440. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTBUHENTS, 
see  Bills  and  Notbs. 

NEGBOES, 

see  CIVIL  Bights,  Slavis. 

NEWSPAPEBS, 

national  flag,  state  protection,  equal  protection  not  denied,  780. 

NOBMAN  PEBIOD, 

distinctive  feature,  development  of  system  of  central  administration,  1. 

NOTICE  AND  HEABING, 

contempt,  proceedings  criminal  in  nature,  579. 

right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  585. 
drainage,  assessment  of  expenses  after  notice,  due  process  and  equal 
protection  not  denied,  763. 
validity  of  tax  sales,  notice  to  nonresidents,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  717. 


950  INDEX 

[RErUlENCXS  ARK  TO  PAOIS] 

NOTICE  AND  HEARINO— continued. 

due  process,  Bankruptcy  Act  of  1898  not  invalid,  107. 
fundamental  requisites,  hearing,  292. 

kind  of  hearing  necessary,  295. 
jurisdiction  as  requisite,  307. 

necessity  of  competent  tribunal  and  notice,  312. 
notice  as  fundamental  requisites,  286. 

curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  of  process  by  appearance^  316. 
service  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judgment,  314. 
Indians,  Creek  freedmen  entitled  to  due  process,  472. 
property  not  to  be  taken  from  one  and  given  to  another  contrary  to 

settled  usages  and  modes  of  procedure,  due  process,  472. 
property  taken  by  military  governor  of  Porto  Bieo  without  notice  or 

hearing,  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  168. 
taxation,  dassifieation  in  proceedings,  power  of  state,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  825. 
collection  of  taxes,  summary  proceedings,  361. 
due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  364. 
power  to  tax,  legislature  may  act  directly  or  may  delegate  func- 
tions, 356. 
titles,  statute  as  to  notice  to  original  owners  to  cut  off  redemp- 
tion, due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  821. 

NinSANCE, 

brick  yards,  ordinance  prohibiting  in  certain  portions  of  city,  due 

process  not  denied,  437. 
livery  stables,  regulation  of,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not 

denied,  794. 
police  power,  definitions  by  American  jurists  and  text  writers,  397. 
delegation  to  municipalitieB,  400. 
limitations,  enjoyment  of  property  limited,  405. 
right  of  forfeiture,  404. 
railroads,   imposition   of   entire   cost    of   abolishing   grade    crossings, 

validity,  660. 
smoke,  legislation  declaring  emission  of  dense  smoke  a  nuisance,  due 
process  not  denied,  438. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  757. 


OFFICERS  AND  PUBLIO  EMPLOYEES, 

confiscation  of  office  without  compensation,  vested  rights,  power  of 
Congress,  466. 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  limitation 
on  power  of  Secretary  of  War,  alterations  in  bridges  over  water- 
ways, 147. 


INDEX  951 

[butrbnces  abb  to  pages] 

OFFICEBS  AND  PUBLIC  EMPLOYEES— continued. 

municipal  corparatians,  ordinances,  regulation  of  private  detectives, 
police  supervision,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied, 
817. 

neglect  of  duty,  railways,  taxation,  assessment  of  omitted  property, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  670. 

police  power,  limitations,  vested  rights  as  limitation,  403. 

public  funds,  vested  rights,  rights  below  standard  of  vested  rights,  456. 

railways,  taxation,  assessment  to  meet  expenses  of  state  railroad  com- 
mission, validity,  657. 

suspension,  contempt,  right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or  civil 
contempt,  585. 

taxation,  state  taxation,  due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  pro- 
ceedings, 366,  370. 

trying  title  to  office,  due  process,  common  heritage  of  all  states,  272. 

OIL, 

taxation,  wholesale  dealers  in  oil,  equal  protection  not  denied  by  occu- 
pation tax,  635. 

OLEOMABGABINE, 
see  Food. 


PAINT, 

labels,  statute  requiring  labels  on  mixed  paints  to  show  ingredients, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  730. 

PABKS, 

eminent  domain,  public  use,  right  of  legislature  to  determine  what  is 

public  use,  212. 
Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  right  of  eminent 

domain  in  District  of  Columbia,  87. 

PABTIE8, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  notice,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  of 
process  by  appearance,  316. 
service  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judgment,  315. 

PATENTS, 

state  regulation  of  sale   of   patented   articles,   equal   protection  not 
denied,  782. 

PAWNBBOEEBS  AND  SECOND-HAND  DEALEBS, 

itinerant  vendors,  prohibition  of  *  sale  by,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  793. 


952  INDEX 

[UFBKNCIS  ASl  TO  PAQIS] 

PAWNBBOEEBS  AND  SEOONDHAND  DEALEB8— continned. 

junk  dealers,  regulation,  prohibition  of  purchase  of  certain  articles, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  787. 
freedom  of  contract  not  abridged,  507. 

PAYMENT, 

master  and  senrant,  prohibition  of  issuance  of  irredeemable  orders  in 
payment  of  labor,  freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  509. 

PENALTIES  AND  rOBPEITUBES, 

corporations,  forfeiture  of  charter,  failure  to  file  affidavit  of  innocence 
not  required  of  individuals,  anti-trust  law,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  706. 
due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  generalitj  and  equality  of  laws, 
297. 
guaranty  in  English  law,  249. 
jurisdiction,  proceedings  in  rem,  321. 
Webster's  famous  definition,  68. 
Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  civil  rights  eases,  608. 
Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction  in  favor  of  refusal 

to  testify,  84. 
insurance,  company  connected  with  tariff  association,  penalty  imposed, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  738. 
payment  of  claims,  statute  imposing  attorneys'  fees  and  penalties, 
faOure  to  pay,  equal  protection  denied,  805. 
Magna  Carta,  chapter  39  in  American  law,  wider  scope  of  chapter,  15. 
milk,  sale  of  adulterated  milk,  discrimination  against  nonprodncing 

vendors,  equal  protection  not  denied,  729. 
mines,  compensation  of  employees,  "run-of-mine"  or  "anti-screen" 

law,  excessive  penalties,  equal  protection  not  denied,  812. 
police  power,  due  process,  prohibition  of  exportation  of  Philippine  coin, 
422. 
right  of  forfeiture,  404. 

statute  inflicting  penalties  on  employer  where  certain  conditions 
are  imposed  on  employee,  denial  of  due  process,  435. 
railways,  demurrage  cases,  discrimination  between  carrier  and  ship- 
per as  to  attorneys'  fees,  statute  rendered  invalid,  692. 
employees,  statute  requiring  full  switching  crew,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  683. 
excessive  penalties  for  violation  of  orders  of  state  conmiission,  in- 

vaUdity,  689. 
excessive  penalties  for  violation  of  statute,  equal  protection  denied, 

678. 
payment  of  claims,  statute  imposing  attorneys'  fees  and  penalties, 
failure  to  pay,  equal  protection  denied,  803. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  809. 


INDEX  953 

[RIFIBEN0X8  ABB  TO  PAOBS] 

PENALTIES  AND  FOBFEITUBES— continued. 
raOwajfr— Hsontinued. 

rates,  judicial  review  of  regolations,  statute  failing  to  provide  for, 

due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  688. 
weeds,    discrimination    against    railways,    penalties    imposed   for 
allowing  weeds,  equal  protection  not  denied,  674. 
taxation,  coUection  of  taxes,  summary  proceedings,  361. 

penalties,  discrimination  between  county  and  city  in  disposition  of 
penalties,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  752. 
penalty  for  nonpayment  of  taxes,  equal  protection  and  due  proc- 
ess, 617,  619. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  637. 
state  taxation,  due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings, 
364. 
vested  rights,  penalties,  due  process  denied  by  imposition  of  excessive 
penalties,  474. 

PENITENTIABIES, 

assault,  classification  of  prisoners  committing  assaults,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  837. 

PEBJTJEY, 

criminal  law,  punishment,  extent,  power  of  court,  due  process  and  equal 

protection  not  denied,  841. 
self-incrimination.  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  effect  of 

statutory  immunity  upon  constitutional  protection,  144. 

PEBSONS, 

see  Aliens,  Criminal  Law,  Dttx  Pboobss,  etc. 

Federal  constitution.  Fourteenth  Amendment,  corporation  as  person 

within  the  meaning  of  Section  1,  240. 
Federal  procedure,  summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guar- 
anties of  Federal  constitution,  539. 
Magna  Carta,  chapter  39  and  amendments,  443. 
protection  of  life  and  liberty  by  due  process,  contempt  proceedings, 
disbarment  of  attorneys,  chapter  XVI,  578. 
procedure  in  criminal  cases  in  state  courts,  chapter  XV,  541. 
rights,  national  citizenship,  definition  in  Slaughter  House  Cases,  228. 
vested  rights,  formula  in  Declaration  of  Independence,  life,  liberty  and 
pursuit  of  happiness,  448. 
growth  in  England  of  idea,  443. 

PHYSICIANS  AND  SUBGEONS, 

carriers,  prohibition  of  soliciting  of  business  on  carriers'  premises, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  786. 
health,  compulsory  vaccination,  equal  protection  not  denied,  775. 
registration,  exemption  of  practicing  physicians,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  735. 


954  INDEX 

[Em&XNCBS  AU  TO  PAOIS] 

PLEADING, 

crixninal  law.  Federal  procedure,  right  to  plead,  guaranty  by  Fifth 

Amendment,  due  process,  536. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  notice,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  of 
process  by  appearance,  316. 

POLICE  POWEB, 

see  specific  topics,  such  as  Animals,  Automobilxs,  Food,  Highways 

AND  SlSKBTS,  MUNICIPAL  CORPOaATIONS,  RAILWAYS,  Otc. 

aliens,   employment,   discrimination    against    aliens,   equal   protection 

denied,  753. 
banks,  guaranty  fund,  constitutional  exercise  of  police  power  as  to 

depositors'  fund,  433. 
creation  as  valid  exercise  of  police  power,  425. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  definition,  496. 

subjection  to  sovereign  powers  of  state,  493. 
definitions  by  American  jurists  and  text  writers,  397. 
delegation  to  municipalities,  400. 
enjoyment  of  property  limited,  405. 
equal  protection,  police  power,  chapter  XXII,  760. 
extent,  promotion  of  public  convenience,  419. 
Federal   constitution,    Fourteenth    Amendment,    Due   Process    Clause, 

protection  of  national  citizenship  against  state  action,  244. 
fixing  of  certain  absolute  liabilities,  due  process  not  denied,  440. 
Interstate  Commerce  Act,  and  common  law,  410. 
limitations,  reasonableness  as  limitation,  401. 

vested  rights  as  limitation,  403. 
ordinances  enacted  in  exercise  of  police  power,  see  Mxtnioipal  Gobpo- 

RAT10N8. 

origin  of  state  police  power,  English  origin,  395. 
property  or  business  of  public  interest,  police  power,  407. 
right  of  forfeiture,  404. 
state  police  power  ond  due  process,  chapter  X,  395. 

typical  English  state  in  America,  396. 
vested  rights,  all  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  scope  of  due 
process,  459. 

growth  in  England  of  idea,  443. 

POOL  ROOMS, 

ordinance  prohibiting  billiard  or  pool  rooms,  due  prooess  not  denied, 
427. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  787. 

P08T0FFICE, 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  due  process  as  limitation  on 

power  to  regulate  mails,  134. 
railways,  employees,  injuries,  classifying  railway  mail  clerks  with  rail- 
way employees,  equal  protection  not  denied,  677. 


INDEX  955 

[BXVEBINCIS  axe  to  PAGIS} 

PBOCEBXJBEy 

ehange  of  procednrOi  ehange  nnder  either  Federal  or  state  law  must 
not  deny  fundamental  rights,  532. 
Due  Process  Glanse  of  Fifth  Amendment,  re-enforced  by  Sixth 
and  Seventh  Amendments,  533. 
contempt,  right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  585. 
corporations,  procedure  against  corporations,  difference  in  mode  of 

procedure,  anti-trost  law,  eqnal  protection  not  denied,  836. 
courts,  different  courts  in  same  state,  power  of  state  to  establish,  Four- 
teenth Amendment  does  not  restrict,  820. 
criminal  law,  accusation  of  felony,  necessity  of  presence  of  accused, 
privilege  not  to  be  waived,  538. 
exemption  from  self-incrimination  in  state  courts,  due  process  not 

denied,  550. 
indictment  by  grand  jury,  Federal  right  to  indictment,  informa- 
tion, 534. 
modification  of  procedure,  power  of  state,  541. 

struggle  to  leave  power  of  states  untrammeled,  543. 
no  arraignment  or  plea  on  second  information,  due  process  not 

denied,  554. 
powers  of  state,  query  as  to  existence  of  restraints  upon  powers, 

573. 
punishment  of  habitual  criminals,  equal  protection  not  denied,  839. 
eminent  domain,  procedure,  decision  of  state  court  as  to  different  pro- 
cedure, payment  of  compensation,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
828. 
equal  protection,  chapter  XXIII,  820. 

equal  protection  not  denied  by  procedure  general  in  application,  829. 
Federal  procedure,  summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guar- 
anties of  Federal  constitution,  539. 
foreign  corporations,  quo  warranto  proceedings  to  oust,  violation  of 

anti-trust  laws,  equal  protection  not  denied,  838. 
Jury,  struck  Jury  law,  validity,  830. 

trial  by  struck  jury,  right  of  state  to  provide,  due  process,  547. 
life  and  liberty  as  protected  by  due  process,  procedure  in  criminal  cases 
in  Federal  courts,  chapter  XTV,  532. 
procedure  in  criminal  cases  in  state  courts,  chapter  XV,  541. 
limitation  statutes,  nature,  due  process  not  denied  by  passage,  con- 
tracts not  impaired,  519. 
vested  rights,  procedure,  right  of  state  to  regulate  its  procedure  458. 
property  not  to  be  taken  from  one  man  and  given  to  another 
contrary  to  settled  usages  and  modes  of  procedure,  due 
process,  472. 
right  of  state  to  enact  curative  legislation,  457. 


956  INDBX 

[umiNCBS  ABX  TO  TAJSEB] 

FBOCESS, 

a886B8mentS|  Talidity  of  tax  sales,  notice  to  nonresidents,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  717. 
corporations,  statute  appointing  state  auditor  to  accept  service  of 

process,  equal  protection  not  denied,  702. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  nonresident  persons,  318. 

notice,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  service  of  process  bj  appearance, 

316. 
serviee  of  process,  necessitj,  validity  of  judgment,  314. 
judgment  hj  default,  smnmons  left  at  residence  of  defendant.  Fifth 

Amendment,  Due  Process  C3ause,  173. 
motor  vebidee,  state  regulation,  service  of  process  on  nonresidents, 

validity  of  statute,  819. 
vested  rights,  foreign  corporations,  money  judgment  rendered  upon 
serviee  on  resident  director,  denial  of  due  process,  485. 

PBODUCnON  OP  BOOKS  AND  PAPEKS, 

contempt,  what  constitutes,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  582. 
corporations,  classification  between  corporations  and  individuals,  com- 
pulsory production  of  testimony,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
732. 
self-incrimination,  privilege  invoked  by  officer  of  corporation,  162. 
statute  requiring  corporations  alone  to  produce  books  and  papers, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  703. 
self-incrimination,  immunity  based  on  Act  of  1903,  Anti-Trust  Act,  166. 

PBOPERTY, 

see  EiciNBNT  Domain,  Taxation. 

adverse  possession,  due  process  not  denied  by  limitation  act,  525. 

statute  declaring  ten  years'  possession  to  give  title,  due  process 
not  denied,  481. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  794. 
attachment,  property  of  nonresident,  bonds  attached,  due  process  and 

equal  protection  not  denied,  840. 
building  restrictions,  police  power,  unconstitutional  exercise  of  police 

power,  427. 
business, 

classification   of  merchants,  license  taxes,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  728. 
license  tax  on  profit  sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps,  due 
process  not  denied,  440. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  647. 
freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  517. 
ordinance  as  to  milk,  tuberculin  test,  due  process  not  denied,  431. 
tax  on  mea^packing  houses,  equal  protection  not  denied,  632. 


INDEX  957 

[bivkbinoss  abx  to  faobs] 

PBOPBBTT— continued. 
eonflBcation, 

carriers,  reasonableness  of  rates,  delegation  of  l^gislatiye  power, 
411. 
dne  process,  recent  cases,  416. 

maxiTnnm  intrastate  rates,  confiscation  and  denial  of  due  proc« 
ess,  484. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  proceedings  in  rem,  321. 
Eight-Hour-Law  Gase,  yalidily  of  statute,  182. 
office  confiscation  without  compensation,  power  of  Congress,  466. 
police  power,  right  of  forfeiture,  404. 
raOwajB,  rates,  excessive  penalties  for  violation  of  statute,  equal 

protection  denied,  678. 
taxation,  state  taxation,  purpose,  taxation  must  be  for  public  pur- 
pose, 358. 
constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  conflict  of  state  law  with  state  con- 
stitution, jurisdiction  of  Federal  courts,  64. 
construction,  confiscation  of  property,  73. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  judicial  rule  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  as 
to  deprivation  of  due  process  and  denial  of  equal  protec- 
tion, 49. 
meaning  of  ^^ equal  protection  of  the  law"  clause,  45. 
purpose.  Congress  as  protecting  and  enforcing  body,  266. 
contracts,  impairment,  allowance  of  passage  of  retrospective  state  leg- 
islation, necessity  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  452. 
corporations,  alteration  of  charters  without  taking  property  of  cor- 
poration, due  process  not  denied,  482. 
taxation,  unequal  assessment  of  franchises  and  other  property, 
denial  of  due  process  and  equal  protection,  702. 
discrimination   against   dealers,   articles   manufactured   from 
produce  of  another  state,  not  discrimination,  700. 
deposits  in  savings  banks  unclaimed  for  thirty  years,  state  control, 

bank  not  deprived  of  due  process,  469. 
due  process,  common  heritage  of  all  states,  270. 

fundamental  requisites,  generality  and  equality  of  laws,  297. 

hearing,  kind  of  hearing  necessary,  295. 
jurisdiction,  divorce  proceedings,  not  in  rem  or  in  personam,  323. 
proceedings  in  rem,  321. 

service  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judgment,  314. 
notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  364. 
property  taken  by  military  governor  of  Porto  Bico  without  notice 

or  hearing,  168. 
protection  of  property  rights,  freedom  of  contract^  chapter  XII, 

490. 
relation  to  res  judicata,  139. 
right  to  due  process  in  unincorporated  territory,  237. 


958  INDEX 

[BXFEBXN0X8  AKB  TO  PAGKS] 

PBOPEBTY— eontinued. 
due  process — continued. 

state  statutes  and  constitutions,  constraetion  hy  state  courts  to  be 

considered,  382. 
Tested  rights,  effect  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  prohibition  of  arbi- 

trarj  interference  with  rights,  452. 
Webster's  famous  definition,  58. 
exemptions,  strict  construction  of  exemptions,  state  taxation,  349. 
Pederal  procedure,  summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guar- 
anties of  Federal  constitution,  539. 
forfeiture  for  nonpayment  of  taxes,  equal  protection  not  denied,  637. 
fraternities,  abolition  of  Greek  letter  fraternities  in  state  nniTeraitieB, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  750. 
infants,  due  process,  jurisdiction,  collateral  attack  on  judgments,  334. 
"Uberty"  defined  in  Federal  law,  49L 

defined  in  state  law,  490. 
limitation  statutes,  exemption  from  suit  as  vested  right,  ending  of 
statutory  period  of  limitations,  523. 
vested  rights  as  limitation,  403. 
liquor  sellers,  tax  on,  discrimination,  equal  protection  not  denied,  633. 
Magna  Carta,  chapter  39  and  amendments,  443. 
mineral  rights,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  643. 
paint,  statute  requiring  labels  on  mixed  paints  to  show  ingredients, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  730. 
personal  property,  inheritance  tax  on  bequests  of  personalty,  validity, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  632. 
taxation  of  intangible  personal  property,  347. 
taxation  of  tangible  jwrsonal  property,  344. 
police  power,  fixing  of  certain  absolute  liabilities,  due  process  not 
denied,  440. 
limitations,  enjoyment  of  property  limited,  405. 
ordinance  requiring  water-closets  under  certain   conditions,  due 

process  not  denied,  430. 
property  or  business  of  public  Interest,  407. 
statute  regulating  barrier  pillars  between   adjoining  coal  prop- 
erties, due  process  not  denied,  432. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure,  change  under  either  Federal  or  state 

law  must  not  deny  fundamental  rights,  532. 
railroad   property,   valuation   and  taxation   of,   equal   protection  not 
denied,  652. 
tax  on  property  in  each  coimty,  equal  protection  not  denied,  658. 
remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  le^slature,  qualificatidns,  529. 
rights  as  protected  by  due  process,  limitations  and  remedies,  chapter 
Xni,  519.  / 

vested  rights  and  their  impairment,  chapter  XI,  443. 
spirits  in  bond,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  635. 
state  tide  lands,  assessment  of  leaseholds  for  local  improvements,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  704. 


INDEX  959 

[rbterences  abb  to  pages] 

PEOPERTY— continued. 
Tested  rights, 

all  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  scope  of  due  process,  459. 
development   of  idea,   advancement   by   constitutional   limitations 

on  legislative  power,  445. 
double  liability  for  failure  to  pay  damages  within  certain  time, 

due  process  denied,  477. 
game,  prohibition  of  killing  of  birds  or  animals  by  unnaturalized 

foreign-bom  residents,  due  process  not  denied,  479. 
growth  in  England  of  idea,  443. 
legitimate  modification  of  rights  of  abutting  owner,  due  process, 

462. 
municipality's  liability  for  damages  caused  by  mobs,  due  process 

not  denied,  469. 
procedure,  right  of  state  to  regulate  its  procedure,  458. 
property  classifications,  power  of  state,  discrimination,  464. 
property  not  to  be  taken  from  one  man  and  given  to  another 

contrary  to  settled  usages  and  modes  of  procedure,  due  proc- 

esSy  472. 
property  of  absentees,  right  of  state  to  take  away,  not  denial  of 

due  process,  471. 
property  of  private  water  company,  taking  by  municipal  corpora- 
tion, due  process  not  denied,  473. 
protection  by  Due  Process  Clause,  repeal  of  remedy,  390. 

reorganization  of  co-operative  association  without  consent  of  mem- 

bersy  p0Tv»r  of  state,  464. 
spur  track  for  public  use,  initial  cost  may  be  imposed  upon  single 

industry,  due  process  not  denied,  476. 
water,  restraint  on  land  owner  drawing  unnatural  quantities  of 

mineral  water  from  common  source  of  supply,  due  process 

not  denied,  467. 
what  constitutes,  453. 

PROSTITUTION, 

Federal   constitution,   Fifth   Amendment,   Due   Process   Clause,   alien 
practicing  prostitution  after  entry,  167. 

PUBLIC  IMPROVEMENTS, 

assessments  for  improvements, 

consequential  damages,  claim  of  abutting  owners  to  compensation, 

protection  by  due  process,  475. 
drainage,  assessments,  validity  of  tax  sales,  notice  to  nonresidents, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  717. 
due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  364. 
Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  assessments  for  benefits 
in  City  of  Washington,  161. 


960  INDEX 

[BXmiNOIS  All  TO  TAOBI 

PUBIilO  IMPBOYEMENTS— «oati]ined. 
asMMments  for  improvements — eontiimed. 
ordinance  held  inTalid,  64d. 

power  to  tax,  legiilatnre  may  aet  direetty  or  may  delegate  fnne- 
tiona,  356. 
rendnnm  of  taxing  power,  374. 
pnrpoee,  taxation  must  be  for  pnblie  purpose,  352. 
railwajs,  imposition  of  expense  of  drainage  on  railways,  equal 

proteetion  not  denied,  676. 
state  tax  laws,  eonstitntionalitj,  611. 
taking  property  for  pnbHe  nse,  eompenaation  required  by  Doe 

Process  Clause,  358. 
taxing  districts,  creation  by  legisUtnre  by  arbitrary  action,  denial 

of  due  process,  488. 
township  compelled  to  collect  taxes  for  drain,  due  process  not 

denied,  470. 
▼ested  rights,  arbitrary  assertion  of  power,  burdens  imposed  with- 
out advantages,  confiscation  and  denial  of  due  process,  488. 
legitimate  modification  of  rights  of  abutting  owner,  due  proc- 
ess, 468. 
street  extension  proceedings,  amounts  awarded  as  damages, 
property  not  taken  without  compensation,  467. 
bridges,  limitation  on  power  of  Secretary  of  War,  Due  Process  Clause, 

alterations  in  bridges  over  waterways,  147. 
eonstruction  of  revetments,  injury  to  riparian  rights,  Federal  consti- 
tution, Fifth  Amendment,  taking  of  property,  127. 
due  process,  definition,  difileulties  in  way  of  complete  and  authoritative 
definition,  rule  of  inclusive  and  exclusive,  284. 
fundamental  requisites,  hearing,  292. 

notice,  288. 
Jurisdiction,  Judgments,  ooQateral  attack  on  judgments,  334. 
state  taxation.  Federal  supervision,  right  to  review,  necessity  that 
taxation  be  spoliation,  384.  « 

due  process  in  District  of  Columbia,  meaning  of  phrase,  104. 
easements,  vested  rights,  all  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  scope 

of  due  process,  450. 
eminent  domain,  laches,  right  of  Congress  to  legislate  against,  221. 
power  of  eminent  domain,  taking  must  be  for  public  use,  211. 
public  use,  right  of  legislature  to  determine  what  is  public  use,  212. 
right  of  eminent  domain,  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment, 

construction,  74. 
right  of  eminent  domain  in  District  of  Columbia,  Federal  consti- 
tution, Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  87. 
etate  power  of  eminent  domain,  state  definitions  of  publie  use  to 

be  respected,  due  process,  385. 
taking  private  property,  due  process,  mistake  of  law,  391. 


.vr. 


r- 


INDEX  961 

[refibincss  arb  to  pagxs] 

PUBLIC  IMPROVEMENTS— contmued. 
emplojeesy 

discrimination  against  foreign  labor,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
''^-  tection  not  denied,  755. 

Eight-Hour  Law,  equal  protection  not  denied,  774. 
estoppel  to  contest  constitutionality,  availability  of  defense  against  pro- 
moters of  public  improvements,  138. 
highways  and  streets,  vested  rights,  what  constitutes,  455. 
land  taken  to  improve  navigation,  liability  for.  Federal  constitution, 

Fifth  Amendment,  113. 
property,  vested  rights,  protection  by  Due  Process  Clause,  repeal  of 

remedy,  390. 
railways,  statute  compelling  railroad  to  provide  means  for  passing 
water  under  embankments.  Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, taking  private  property,  180. 
state  tide  lands,  assessment  of  leaseholds  for  local  improvements,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  704. 
war  department,  contempt^  punishment,  consequences  of  lack  of  juris- 
diction, 588. 

PUBLIC  LANDS, 

easements,  state  lands  on  navigable  rivers,  servitude  in  favor  of  public, 

effect  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  766. 
sheep,  restrictions  on  sheep  grazing,  equal  protection  not  denied,  778. 
state   tide  lands,   assessment   of   leaseholds   for   local   improvements, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  704. 
taking  private  property.  Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due 

Process  Clause,  review  of  cases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  187. 

PUNISHMENT, 

additional  punishment  on  third  conviction,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
831. 

difference  in  term  of  sentence  for  imprisonment,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  831. 

extent,  power  of  court,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  841. 

Federal  procedure,  summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guar- 
anties of  Federal  (Constitution,  539. 

habitual  criminals,  punishment  pf,  equal  protection  not  denied,  839. 

imposition  of  more  severe  punishment  for  subsequent  offenses,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  826. 

Indeterminate  Sentence  Act,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not 
denied,  834. 

statutes,  validity.  Congress  as  protecting  and  enforcing  body,  Four- 
teenth Amendment^  purpose,  269. 

Dae  Process — 61 


962  INDEX 

[smUNClS  All  TO  PAOBS] 

QUABANTTNE, 

animals,  preTention  of  diaeaae,  eqixal  proteetion  not  denied,  772. 

quo  WABRANTO, 

foreign  corporations,  qno  warranto  proceedings  to  oust,  violation  of 
anti-trust  laws,  eqnal  proteetion  not  denied,  838. 

B 

RAILWAYS, 

see  CAsams,  Intiestatb  OoMicnci. 

animals,  killing  of  live  stock  bj  railway,  payment  of  double  damages, 
refusal  to  pay  daim,  equal  protection  not  denied,  811. 
vested  rights,  railroad  subjeeted  to  double  liability  and  attorney's 
fee,  killing  of  live  stock,  due  process  denied,  470. 
exaction  without  denial  of  due  process,  477. 
bridge  over  highway,  railroad  property  burdened  by  construction,  due 

process  not  denied,  466. 
business,  prohibition  of  soliciting  of  business  on  carriers'  premises, 

equal  proteetion  not  denied,  786. 
cars, 

regulation  of  distribution  of  railroad  coal  cars,  freedom  of  con- 
tract not  destroyed,  498. 
claims,  payment  of,  imposition  of  penalties  for  failure  to  pay,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  809. 
statute  imposing  attorneys'  fees  and  penalties,  failure  to  pajr, 
equal  protection  denied,  803. 
commission  to  regulate  carriers, 

due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  generality  and  equality  of 
laws,  306. 
notice  as  fundamental  requisite,  290. 
excessive  penalties  for  violation  of  orders  of  state  commission,  in- 
validity, 689. 
reasonableness  of  rates,  delegation  of  legislative  power,  411. 
construction  of  railways, 

fellow  servant  act,  statute  abrogating  fellow  servant  rule,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  675. 
railroad  across  street,  damages,  equal  protection  not  denied,  665. 
remedy  for  property  injured,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  661. 
control  of  railways,  chapter  XIX,  650. 
corporations,  condemnation  of  outstanding  shares  of  owner  of  stock 

without  denial  of  due  process,  463. 
demurrage  cases,  discrimination  between  carrier  and  shipper  as  to  at- 
torneys'  fees,  statute  rendered  invalid,  692. 


INDEX  963 

[beherences  abx  to  pages] 

BAILWAYS— continued, 
drainage^ 

imposition  of  expense  of  drainage  on' railways,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  676. 
statute  compelling  railroad  to  provide  means  for  passing  water 
under  embankments,  Fifth  .Amendment,  taking  private  prop- 
erty, 180. 
statute  requiring  railroads  to  provide  drainage  contrary  to  com- 
mon law  rule,  equal  protection  not  denied,  693. 
electric   headlights    on   locomotives,   requiring,    equal   protection   not 

denied,  689. 
eminent  domain, 

compensation,  matters  to  be  excluded,  proceeding  to  recover  for 

decline  in  market  value,  393. 
right  of  eminent  domain,  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  74. 
taking  private  property,  extension  of  spur  track  for  benefit  of 
single  industry,  taking  not  unlawful,  392. 
kind  of  property  which  may  be  taken,  218. 
what  constitutes,  no  taking  for  public  use,  387. 
employees, 

crime  for  person  to  act  as  railway  conductor  without   certain 

qualifications,  freedom  of  contract  not  abridged,  508. 
fellow  servant  act,  abolition  of  fellow  servant  rule,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  653,  654,  684. 
classification    of    railway    employees,    equal    protection    not 

denied,  680. 
liability  of  railroads  for  personal  injuries  caused  by  negli- 
gence, validity,  663. 
modification  of  rule  as  to  railway  employees,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  669,  686. 
statute  creating  presumption  of  negligence,  equal  protection 
and  due  process  not  denied,  680. 
full  switching  crew,  statute  requiring,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
683. 
due  process  not  denied,  439. 
full  train  crew,  statute  requiring,  equal  protection  not  denied,  681. 
employees'  relief  fund, 

classification  of  employees  held  not  denial  of  equal  protection,  683. 
engines  on  certain  streets,  ordinance  prohibiting,  due  process  and  equal 

protection  not  denied,  651. 
extension  of  tracks,  vested  rights,  spur  track  for  public  use,  initial 
cost  may  be  imposed  upon  single  industry,  due  process  not  denied, 
476. 
Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  685. 


964  INDEX 

[simXNOIS  All  TO  PAOIS] 

RAILWAYS— eontinued. 

fencM,  liabilitj  of  riulroad  for  omiBBion  to  fence  railroad,  doable  dam- 

agea,  equal  protection  not  denied,  655. 
fire  eaneed  by  locomotives,  liability  for  damages,  equal  proteetion  not 
denied,  668. 
police  power,  fixing  of  eertain  absolute  liabilities,  doe  process  not 

denied,  440. 
Tested  rights,  double  liability  for  failure  to  pay  damages  nitbia 
eertain  time,  due  process  denied,  477. 
heating  of  railroad  ears,  statute  excluding  eertain  railways,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  664, 

injuries  to  employees, 

daisifying  railway  mail  clerks  with  railway  employees,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  677. 
comparative  negligence,  statute  as  to,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

686. 
statute  defining  liability  of  raHways  for  injuries,  freedom  of  con- 
tract not  infringed,  502. 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  and  common  law,  410. 
legislative  control,  raflway  fare  and  rates,  effect  of  Equal  Protection 

Clause,  650. 
local  improvements,  Federal  eonstitution,  due  process,  fundamental 

requisites,  notice,  287. 
n^gro  passengers. 

Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  statute  requiring  separate 
accommodations  for  white  and  colored  persons  in  railway 
coaches,  604. 
rates, 

classification  for  regulation,  equal  protection  not  denied,  687. 
excessive  penalties  for  violation  of  statute,  equal  protection  denied, 

678. 
judicial  review  of  regulations,  statute  failing  to  provide  for,  due 

process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  688. 
police  power,  reasonableness  of  rates,  delegation  of  kgialative 
power,  41 L 
denial  of  due  process  and  equal  protection,  656. 
due  process,  recent  eases,  416. 
elements  involved,  413. 

unjust  and  unreasonable  rates,  fixing  by  eommisdon,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  662. 
prohibiting  charging  more  for  shorter  than  for  longer  haul,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  672. 
statute  establishing  rates,  invalidity,  denial  of  due  process  and 
equal  protection,  665. 
safety  appliances,  order  requiring,  at  grade  crossings,  validity,  due 
process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  673. 


INDEX  965 

[BETIBENGBS  ABE  TO  PAQBS] 

BAILWAYS— «ontinued. 

shipments,  requiring  carrier  to  accept  reshipments  in  cars  of  other 

carriers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  689. 
sleeping  cars,  prohibition  of  letting  down  of  unoccupied  upper  berth, 

due  process  denied,  483. 
speed  of  trains,  ordinance  as  to,  exceptions,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

670. 
taxation, 

assessment  of  omitted  property,  equal  protection  not  denied,  670. 
assessment  to  meet  expenses  of  state  railroad  conmiission,  yaliditj, 

657. 
consolidated  railway  company,  annual  franchise  tax  on,  statute  not 
invalid,  648. 
due  process  not  denied,  343. 
due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  hearing,  292. 
excise  tax  on  gros^  earnings  of  railway  companies,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  645. 
exemptions,  strict  construction  cf  exemptions,  349. 
foreign  railroads,  tax  on  stock,  equal  protection  not  denied,  714. 
tax  on  foreign  companies,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not 
denied,  691. 
gross  earnings  of  railroads,  state  tax  not  confiscation,  480. 
imposition  of  entire  cost  of  abolishing  grade  crossings,  validity, 

660. 
personal  property,  taxation  of  tangible  personal  property,  344. 
property  in  each  county,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  658. 
property  situated  in  several  states,  power  to  tax,  342. 
property,  valuation  and  taxation  of,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
652. 
ticket  agent,  habeas  corpus  to  procure  discharge,  duty  of  accused  to 

exhaust  all  remedies  in  state  courts,  562. 
wages  of  employees,  statute  as  to  time  of  payment,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  667. 
weeds,  discrimination  against  railways,  penalties  imposed  for  allowing 
weeds,  equal  protection  not  denied,  674. 
statute  requiring  railways  to  remove  noxious  weeds,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  694. 

BATES, 

see  CABBIX&8,  PouoB  PowBB,  Bailboads. 

BECEIVEBS, 

contempt,  what  constitutes,  indirect  or  civil  contempt,  682. 

railways,   regulations,    requiring    electric    headlights   on   locomotives, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  689. 
vested  rights,  property  of  absentees,  right  of.  state  to  take  away,  not 

denial  of  due  process,  471. 


966  INDEX 

[rKTSBBKCXS  All  TO  PAOXS] 

BECONSTBUCTION  ACT, 

Federal  eoiutitution,  Fifth  Amendmenty  eonstruction,  cum  inTolving 
militaxy  cominiBaion,  69. 

BEO0BD8, 

iaiee  in  bulk,  regulation,  record  of  notice  to  sell,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  785. 

BELIEF  FUND, 
•ee  Bailwats. 

BEMEDIES, 

change  of  remedies,  power  of  legielature,  526. 

qnalificatiosB,  527. 
criminal  law,  habeas  corpus  as  proper  remedy  to  test  validity  of  de- 
tention under  state  law,  564. 
remedies  in  state  courts,  duly  of  accused  to  exhaust  all  remedies, 
562. 
limitation  statute!*,  constitutional  limitation  of  reasonableness,  520. 
nature,  due  process  not  denied  by  passage,  contracts  not  impaired, 
519. 
property  rights  as  protected  by  due  process,  limitations  and  remedies, 
chapter  XIII,  519. 
vested  rights,  protection  by  I>ue  Process  Clause,  repeal  of  remedy, 
390. 
railways,  construction,  remedy  for  property  injured  by  construction, 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  661. 

BESIDENCE, 
see  DouionjB. 

EEV0LUTI0N8, 

English  constitutional  system,  Blackstone  as  true  guide  instead  of 

Coke,  11. 
Magna  Carta,  revolutions  of  1640  and  1688,  9. 

EIPABIAN  OWNEBS, 

eminent  domain.  Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  construction, 
riparian  owner  deprived  of  access  to  navigable  stream,  103. 
construction  of  revetments,  injury  to  riparian  righte,  Fifth 

Amendment,  127. 
land  taken  to  improve  navigation,  liability  for.  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, 113. 
taking  private  property,  what  constitutes  taking,  213. 
water,  prevention  of  diversion  of  waters,  due  process  not  denied,  421. 
statute  prohibiting  diversion  of  water  beyond  state  by  riparian 
owner,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  784. 


INDEX  967 

[B17BBINCB8  ABB  TO  PAGBS] 


RUSSIAN  THISTLE, 
see  WBXD& 


S 


SALES, 

auction  sales,  see  AuonoNS. 

bulk  sales,  regulation,  police  power,  due  proeess  not  denied,  424. 

record  of  notice  to  sell,  equal  protection  not  denied,  785. 
cigarettes,  license  for  sale,  ordinances,  due  process  and  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  769. 
competition,  anti-trust  laws,  statute  permitting  combinations  among 
purchasers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  748. 
prohibition  of  unfair  competition,  sale  at  lower  price  in  one  place, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  744. 
freedom  of  contract  not  abridged,  506. 
corporations,  stock,  sale  on  margin,  statute  prohibiting,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  773. 
explosives,  regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not  denied,  786. 
food,  prohibition  of  sale  of  preservatives  containing  boric  acid,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  747. 
intoxicating  liquors,  ordinances,  regulation  of  sale,  Ucenses,  equal  pro- 
tection not  'denied,  799. 
prohibition  of  sale  of  malt  liquor,  due  process  not  denied,  428. 
itinerant  vendors^  prohibition  of  sale  by,  due  process  and  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  793. 
junk  dealers,  regulation,  prohibition  of  purchase  of  certain  articles, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  787. 
freedom  of  contract  not  abridged,  507. 
local  option  law,  prohibition  of  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  801. 
milk,  'sale  of  adulterated  milk,  discrimination  against  nonprodueing 

vendors,  equal  protection  not  denied,  729. 
oleomargarine,  regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not  denied,  765. 
statute  restricting  sale  and  manufacture,  validity,  770.  ' 

patented  articles,  state  regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

782. 
taxation,  classification,  sales  for  future  delivery,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  638. 
state  taxation,  personal  property,  taxation  of  tangible  personal 

property,  344. 
stock  transfer  tax,  validity,  634. 

tax  on  capital  of  foreign  corporation,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
708. 

SCHOOLS. 

Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  discrimination  against  colored  chil- 
dren, 604,  605. 


968  INDEX 

[RBFIKINC18  ABB  TO  PAGKS] 

SCHOOLS— eontinued. 

fraternities,  abolition  of  Greek  letter  fraternities  in  state  nnlTarsities, 
equal  protection  not  denied,  750. 
requirements  of  members  of  Greek  letter  f ratemitj,  due  proeeas  not 
denied,  486. 
health,  eompnlsory  vaceination,  equal  protection  not  denied,  775. 

SEABCHES  AND  SEIZUBES, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  proceedings  in  rem,  321. 
Federal  procedure,  summarj  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guar- 
anties of  Federal  constitution,  539. 
Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  confiscation  of  property,  73. 
due  process,  admission  of  evidence  illegally  obtained,  131. 
due  process  as  limitation  on  power  to  regulate  mails,  134. 
kinship  with  Fourth  Amendment,  79. 
self-incrimination,  privilege  invoked  by  officer  of  corporation,  102. 

SEOOND  AMENDMENT, 

Federal  procedure,  summary  of  rights  of  persons  and  property,  guar- 
anties of  Federal  constitution,  539. 

SECRETABY  OF  WAB, 

Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  limitation 
on  power  of  Secretary  of  War,  alterations  in  bridges  over  water- 
ways, 147. 

SEVENTH  AMENDMENT, 

jury,  Federal  right  to  trial  by  petit  jury,  535. 

procedure,  change  of  procedure.  Due  Process  Clause  of  Fifth  Amend- 
ment re-enforced  by  Sixth  and  Seventh  Amendments,  533. 

SEWEBS, 

compelling  abutting  owners  to  connect  property  with  sewer,  discrimina- 
tion between  residents  and  nonresidents,  validity  of  statute,  718. 
due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  465,  788. 
ordinance   requiring   water-closets  under   certain  conditions,    due 
process  not  denied,  430. 
Federal  constituticm,  due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  notice,  291. 
state  taxation,  power  to  tax,  residuum  of  taxing  power,  374. 

SHEBIFFS, 

due  process,  jurisdiction,  service  of  process,  necessity,  validity  of  judg- 
ment, 315. 

SHEBMAN  ACT, 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  Amendment,  self-incrimination,  efiTect  of 
statutory  immunity  upon  constitutional  protection,  144. 


INDEX  969 

[befkbbnces  are  to  pages] 

SIXTH  AMENDMENT, 

Federal  constitution,  Fifth  and  Sixth  Amendments,  jury  of 'twelve  men, 
right  of  trial  by,  incorporation  of  Alaska  with  United  States, 
123. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure,  Due  Process  Clause  of  Fifth  Amend- 
ment re-enforced  by  Sixth  and  Seventh  Amendments,  533. 
right  to  plead,  guaranty  by  Fifth  Amendment,  due  process,  536. 

SLAVES, 

constitution,  Fourteenth  Amendment,  meaning  of  "equal  protection  of 

the  law"  clause,  45. 
national  citizenship,  absence  of,  emphasis  by  Dred  Scott  Case,  25. 
creation  by  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  Federal  constitution,  29. 
definition  in  Slaughter  House  Cases,  228. 

SLEEPING  CAR  COMPANIES, 

vested  rights,  prohibition  of  letting  down  of  unoccupied  upper  berth, 
due  process  denied,  483. 

SMALLPOX, 
see  Health. 

SMOKE, 

nuisances,  abatement  of  smoke  nuisances,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
757, 
legislation   declaring   emission   of   dense   smoke   a  nuisance,   due 
process  not  denied,  438. 

SMUGGLING, 

definition,  231. 

STAMP  ACTS, 

taxation,  stock  transfer  tax,  validity,  634. 

STAMPS, 

see  Tbading  Stamps. 

STATES, 

claims,  limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested  rights, 

522. 
colonies,  transformation  into  sovereign  states,  337. 
constitutions  of  various  states, 

eminent  domain,  due  process,  duty  of  state  to  guarantee  protection 
to  life,  liberty  and  property,  379. 
limitation  by  Due  Process  Clause,  209. 
Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  colored  race,  right  to  mixed 
juries,  597. 


970  INDEX 

[smUNOU  AMM  TO  PAOIS] 

STATES— «ontinoed. 

eonstitutionB— -«o]itintted. 

Magna  CU'ta,  clutpter  39  as  reproduced  in  first  state  constitu- 
tions, 13. 
eonstmctiony  error  of  Coke 's  construction,  change  of  principles 
in  bills  of  rights,  12. 
self-incrimination^  exemption  in  bills  of  rights  and  state  constitu- 
tions, 10. 
Tested  rights,  contracts,  impairment  of  obligation  by  state  law  pro- 
hibited,  449. 
contracts, 

freedom  of  contract,  crime  for  person  to  act  as  railway  condnetor 
without  certain  qualifications,  freedom  not  abridged,  508. 
right  of  state  to  regulate  combinations  and  monopolies,  494. 
state  law  preventing  miners  from  contracting  for  wages  on 

certain  basis,  freedom  not  infringed,  497. 
state  regulations  of  boards  of  trade,  freedom  not  interfered 
with,  503. 
impairment  of  obligation  by  state  law  prohibited,  449. 

allowance  of  passage  of  retrospectiTe  state  legislation,  neo^a- 

sity  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  452. 
contract  clause  limited  to  vested  ri^ts  that  arise  out  of  it, 
450. 
corporations,  condemnation  of  outstanding  shares  of  owner  of  stock 
without  denial  of  due  process,  463. 
state  control  of  corporations,  696. 
courts,  diif  erent  courts  in  same  state,  power  of  state  to  establish,  Four- 
teenth Amendment  does  not  restrict,  820. 
criminal  law,  modification  of  procedure,  power  of  state,  541. 
query  as  to  existence  of  restraints  upon  powers,  573. 
struggle  to  leave  power  of  states  untrammeled,  543. 
deposits  in  savings  banks  unclaimed  for  thirty  years,  state  control, 

bank  not  deprived  of  due  process,  469. 
due  process  of  law, 

common  heritage  of  all  states,  270. 

fundamental  requisites,  jurisdiction,  310. 

state  statutes  and  constitutions,  construction  by  state  courts  to 

be  considered,  382. 
state  taxation,  Federal  supervision,  right  to  review,  necessity  that 

taxation  be  spoliation,  384. 
vested   rights,   effect   of   Fourteenth   Amendment,   prohibition   of 
arbitrary  interference  with  rights,  452. 
eminent  domain, 

compensation  for  taking  property,  necessity,  217. 
definition,  power  vested  in  all  states,  Federal  as  weU  as  single,  207. 
due  process,  duty  of  state  to  guarantee  protection  to  life,  liberty 
and  properly,  379. 


INDEX  971 

[siriEINGIS  ABI  TO  FAQIS] 

STATES— continued. 

eminent  domain— eontinued. 

Federal  superyiedon,  377. 

substance  and  not  form  to  be  eonsidered,  380. 
inherent  power  of  states,  378. 

power  as  vested  in  Federal  Government  paramount,  208. 
public  use,  ascertainment  by  idtimate  and  not  by  proximate  effect, 
389. 
state  definitions  of  public  use  to  be  respected,  due  process,  385. 
taking  private  property,  extension  of  spur  track  for  benefit  of 
eing^  industry,  taking  not  unlawful,  392. 
necessity  justifying  taking,  215. 
what  constitutes,  flooding  of  land  not  a  taking,  386. 
no  taking  for  public  use,  387. 
Federal  constitution, 

Amendments  to  Federal  Constitution,  first  eight  articles,  19. 

limitations  on  Federal  powers,  60. 
Fifth  Amendment,  constitution  of  parent  state,  right  of  colonists 
to  participate  in,  116. 
construction,  questions  of  state  procedure  not  embraced,  89. 
Due  Process  Clause,  limitation  on  Federal  power  to  tax  dis- 
pensing agents  of  state,  143. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  protection  of  national 
citizenship  against  state  action,  244. 
protection  against  unlawful  or  unequal  exercise  of  state  power, 

241. 
purpose,  Congress  as  protecting  and  enforcing  body,  266. 
right  to  review  state  action,  380. 
scope  of  section,  definition  of  citizenship,  228. 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as-  supervising  tribunal, 
257. 
foreign  corporations,  admission,  state  restrictions,  equal  protection,  708. 
grand  jury,  abolition,  power  of  state,  544. 
national  citizenship,  definition  in  Slaughter  House  Cases,  228. 

existence,  inquiry  in  Dred  Scott  Case,  227. 
navigable    waters.    Federal   constitution.    Fifth    Amendment,    taking 

private  property,  power  of  Congress,  177. 
ofSeers,  corporations,  statute  appointing  state  auditor  to  accept  service 

of  process,  equal  protection  not  denied,  702. 
patented  articles,  state  regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

782. 
police  power  of  states, 

delegation  to  municipalities,  400. 

due  process,  prevention  of  diversion  of  waters,  due  process  not 

denied,  421. 
extent,  promotion  of  public  convenience,  419. 
limitations,  vested  rights  as  limitation,  403. 


972  INDEX 

[nriBEMClS  ASI  TO  EAdS] 

STATES— eontinQed. 

police  power  of  etatee— continued. 

origin  of  state  police  power,  English  origin,  395. 
state*  police  power  and  due  process,  chapter  X,  395. 
typical  English  state  in  America,  396. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure^  change  under  either  Federal  or  state 
law  must  not  deny  fundamental  rights,  532. 
right  of  state  to  regulate  its  procedure,  458. 
property  elassiflcations,  power  of  state,  discriminalion,  vested  rights, 

464. 
property  of  absentees,  right  of  state  to  take  away,  not  denial  of  due 

process,  471. 
railways,  legislative  control,  railway  fare  and  rates,  effect  of  Equal 
Protection  Clause,  650.    ' 
vested  rights,  spur  track  for  public  use,  initial  cost  may  be  im- 
posed upon  single  industry,  due  process  not  denied,  476. 
reorganisation  of  co-operative  association  without  consent  of  members, 

power  of  state,  464. 
self-incrimination,  Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  state  need 

not  accord  protection,  165. 
taxes,  see  Taxation. 

power  of  taxation,  chapter  XYIII,  611. 
power  of  taxation,  and  due  process,  chapter  viii,  336. 
vested  rights,  development  of  idea,  advancement  by  constitutional  limi- 
tations on  legislative  power,  445. 
right  of  state  to  enact  curative  legislation,  457. 
taxation,  township  compelled  to  collect  taxes  for  drain,  due  process 
not  denied,  470. 
water,  statute  prohibiting  diversion  of  water  beyond  state  by  riparian 
owner,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  784. 

STATUTES, 

banks,  guaranty  fund,  constitutional  exercise  of  police  power  as  to 
depositors'  fund,  433. 
creation  as  valid  exercise  of  police  power,  425. 
classification, 

aliens,  prohibition  of  possession  of  firearms,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  792. 
anti-trust  laws,  statute  permitting  combinations  among  purchasers, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  748. 
assault,  classification  of  prisoners  committing  assaults,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  837. 
attachment,  property  of  nonresidents,  statute  not  requiring  bond, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  711. 
auctions,    licenses,    discrimination   in   fee,    equal    protection   not 
denied,  744. 


INDEX  973 

[bitxbxnobs  abx  to  pages] 

STATUTES— continuecL 
dassification — continued. 

banks,  savings  bank  deposits  undaimed,  statute  as  to  control  of 

funds,  eqaal  protection  not  denied,  741. 
bridges,  classification  of  municipal  corporations,  requiring  certain 
towns  to  maintain  bridge  and  highway,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  768. 
building  restrictions,  discrimination  in  regulations,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  734. 
carriers,  payment  of  claims,  imposition  of  penalties  for  failure  to 

pay,  equal  protection  not  denied,  809. 
corporations,  evidence,  statute  requiring  corporations  alone  to  pro- 
duce books  and  papers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  730. 
forfeiture  of  charter,  failure  to  file  afidavit  of  innocence  not 
required  of  individuals,  anti-trust  law,  equal  protection 
not  denied,  706. 
procedure  against  corporations,  difference  in  mode  of  'pro- 
cedure, anti-trust  law,  equal  protection  not  denied,  836. 
criminal  law,  appeal  by  government,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
837. 
punishment  of  habitual  criminals,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
839. 
elections,  registration  law,  discrimination  between  citizens,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  726. 
elevators,  statute  requiring  barriers  of  shafts,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  790. 
equal  protection,  arbitrary  classification,  creation  of  presumption 
of  guilt,  equal  protection  denied,  758. 
power  of  classification,  chapter  XXI,  725. 
food,  prohibition  of  sale  of  preservatives  containing  boric  acid, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  747. 
futures,  statute  preventing  dealing  in  futures,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  777. 
insurance,  company  connected  with  tariff  association,  penalty  im- 
posed, equal  protection  not  denied,  738. 
,  farmers'  mutual  insurance  companies,  exemption  from  statute 

regulating  fire  insurance  rates,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  705* 
payment  of  elidms,  statute  imposing  attorneys '  fees  anc>  penal- 
ties, failure  to  pay,  equal  protection  denied,  805. 
statute  applicable  to  fire  insurance  companies  only,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  697. 
statute  as  to  effect  of  false  answers  by  applicant  for  life  in- 
surance, equal  protection  not  denied,  698. 
jury,  statute  abridging  right  of  trial  by  jury,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  829. 


974  INDEX 

[smBBNCIS  ABS  TO  PAGIS] 

STATTFTES— continued. 
clAflflifieation— continued. 

man  dam  ua,  allowance  of  attOTneys'  fees  to  Buccessful  plaintiff, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  808. 
maater  and  servant,  Eight-Hour  Law,  women  employed  in  hotels, 
validity  of  statutes,  798. 
prohibition  of 'employment  of  minors,  hazardous  occupations, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  792. 
regulations,  requiring  washhouses  for  coal  miners,  due  process 

and  equal  protection  not  denied,  751. 
wages,  prohibition  of  orders  for  payment  of  labor  not  re- 
deemable in  money,  equal  protection  not  denied,  749. 
milk,  sale  of  adulterated  milk,  discrimination  against  nonproduc- 

ing  vendors,  equal  protection  not  denied,  729. 
mineral  waters,  prohibition  of  waste,  due  process  and  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  739. 
mines,  classification  of  coal  mines  by  number  of  men  employed, 
statute  as  to  wages  of  employees,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  731. 
inspection  of  coal  mines,  classification,  validily  of  statute,  771. 
statute  requiring  entries  in  coal  mines,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  791. 
municipal  corporations,  annexation  of  land,  discrimination  between 
agricultural  and  other  lands,  due  process  and  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  725. 
mobs  and  riots,  statute  imposing  liability  for  damages,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  742. 
patented  articles,  state  regulation  of  sale,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  782. 
physicians,  registration,  exemption  of  practicing  physicians,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  735. 
police  power  of  state,  equal  protection,  regulations  of  public  laun- 
dries and  washhouses,  760. 
railways,    demurrage    cases,    discrimination    between   carrier    and 
shipper  as  to  attorneys'  fees,  statute  rendered  invalid,  692. 
employees,  statute  requiring  full  train  crew,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  681. 
Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act,  due  process  and  qqual  pro- 
tection not  denied,  685. 
fellow  servant  act,  abolition  of  fellow  servant  rule,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  684. 
classification  of  railway  employees,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  680. 
fire  caused  by  locomotives,  liability  for  damages,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  668. 
payment  of  claims,  statute  imposing  attorneys'  fees  and  penal- 
ties, failure  to  pay,  equal  protection  denied,  803. 


INDEX  976 

[bIFEBXNCES  ABE  TO  FAOIS] 

STATTJTES— continued. 
dasBification — continued. 

property,   valuation   and   taxation   of,   equal    protection   not 

denied,  652. 
rates,  elaasifieation  for  regulation,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

687. 
regulations,  heating  of  railroad  cars,  statute  excluding  certain 
railways,  equal  protection  not  denied,  664. 
requiring  electric  headlights  on  locomotiyes,  equal  protec- 
tion not  denied,  689. 
taxation,  tax  on  foreign  companies,  due  process  and  equal  pro> 
tection  not  denied,  691. 
sales  in  bulk,  regulation,  record  of  notice  to  sell,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  785. 
sewers,  compelling  abutting  owners  to  connect  property  with  sewer, 
discrimination  between  residents  and  nonresidents,  validity 
of  statute,  718. 
stock,  sale  on  margin,  statute  prohibiting,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  773. 
stock-yards  companies,  statute  limiting  charges,  equal  protection 

denied,  814. 
taxation,  classification  in  proceedings,  power  of  state,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  825. 
corporations,  discrimination  against  dealers,  articles  manufac; 
tured  from  produce  of  another  state,  not  discrimination, 
700. 
discrimination  in  taxes,  denial  of  equal  protection,  620. 
excise  tax  on  gross  earnings  of  railway  companies,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  645. 
express  companies,  property,  state  taxation  of,  equal  protec- 
tion, 613,  614. 
foreign  corporations,  tax  on  franchise  of  foreign  company, 

equal  protection  denied,  721. 
foreign  railroads,  tax  on  stock,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

714. 
forfeiture   for   nonpayment   of   taxes,  equal   protection   not 

denied,  637. 
inheritance  tax,  validity,  equal  protection  not  deniect  classifi- 
cation, 630. 
equal  protection  not  denied  by  Illinois  law,  624. 
legacy  and  inheritance  taxes,  equal  protection,  615. 
license  tax  on  emigrant  agents,  equal  protection  of  the  law, 

622. 
municipal  Hcense  fees  for  theaters,  grading  fee  according  to 

receipts,  equal  protection  not  denied,  641. 
occupation  tax,  distillers,  equal  protection  not  denied,  636. 


976  INDEX 

[bxrbincbs  aki  to  paobs] 

STATUTES— continued, 
classification — continued. 

penalty  for  nonpayment  of  taxes,  equal  protection  and  due 

process,  617. 
sales  for  future  delivery,  equal  protection  not  denied,  638. 
spirits  in  bond,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  635. 
state  tax  law  as  to  banlu,  equal  proteclioni  constitutionality 

of  statute,  618. 
street  railways,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  627. 
tax  on  cigarette  selling,  equal  protection  not  denied,  625. 
tax  on  local  managers  of  foreign  packing  houses,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  716. 
telegraph  companies,  state  regulations,  prohibiting  limiting  of  lia- 
bility for  negligence,  equal  protection  not  denied,  704. 
telephone  companies,  classification  for  taxation,  exemption  of  cer- 
tain property,  equal  protection  not  denied,  747. 
usury,  exemption  of  banks,  trust  companies  and  bona  fide  mort- 
gages, equal  protection  not  denied,  736. 
vested  rights,  carriers,  maximum  intrastate  rates,  confiscation  and 

denial  of  due  process,  484. 
warehouses,  licenses,  classification  of  elevators  and  warehouses, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  727. 
Workmen's  Ck)mpensation  Act,  equal  protection  not  denied,  795. 
construction,  eminent  domain,  decision  of  state  court  as  to  different 
procedure,  payment  of  compensatioUi  equal  protection  not  denied, 
828. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  license  tax  on  merchants  using  profit 
sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps,  freedom  not  infringed,  517. 
impairment,  allowance  of  passage  of  retrospective  state  legislation, 
necessity  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  452. 
criminal  law,  statutes  operating  on  all  alike,  equal  protection  neces- 
sary, 823. 
due  process,  fundamental  requisites,  generality  and  equality  of  laws, 
297. 
guaranty  in  American  law,  255. 

jurisdiction,  divorce  proceedings,  not  in  rem  or  in  personam,  323. 
notable  attempts  to  define  due  process,  274. 
notice  as  fundamental  requisite,  286. 
state  statutes  and  constitutions,  construction  by  state  courts  to  be 

considered,  382. 
Webster's  famous  definition,  58. 
eminent  domain,  compensation  for  taking  property,  necessity,  217. 

question  a  judicial  one,  necessity  of  competent  tribunal,  219. 
laches,  right  of  Congress  to  legislate  against,  221. 
public  use,  ascertainment  by  ultimate  and  not  by  proximate  effect, 
389. 
right  of  legislature  to  determine  what  is  public  use,  212. 


INDEX  977 

[bsfxbencxs  abb  to  pagbs] 

STATUTES — continued. 

eminent  domain— continued. 

state  power  of  eminent  domain.  Federal  superyision,  due  process^ 
substance  and  not  form  to  be  considered,  380. 
Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  jury,  discrimination  against  citi- 
zens of  African  descent,  setting  aside  jury  panel,  603. 
statutes  excluding  jurors  on  account  of  race  or  color,  602. 
ex  post  facto  laws,  limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactive  laws, 

vested  rights,  522. 
Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  conflict  of  state  law  with  state 
constitution,  jurisdiction  of  Federal  courts,  64. 
self-incrimination,  effect  of  statutory  immunity  upon  constitu- 
tional protection,  144. 
taking  private  property,  statute  compelling  raOroad  to  pro- 
vide means  for  passing  water  under  embankments,  180. 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  proteclion  of  national 
citizenship  against  state  action,  244. 
jurisdiction  to  review  judgment  of  highest  court  of  state  in""  criminal 
case,  first  ten  amendments  as  Ibnitations  upon  Federal  govern- 
ment, 82. 
limitation  statutes,  constitutional  limitations  of  reasonableness,  520. 
Magna  Carta,  chapter  39  in  American  law,  wider  scope  of  chapter,  15. 
master  and  servant,  assignments  of  future  earnings,  regulations,  ex- 
emption of  banks,  equal  protection  not  denied,  742. 
police  power,  carriers,  reasonableness  of  rates,  delegation  of  legisla- 
tive power,  411. 

due  process,  recent  eases,  416. 
elements  involved,  413. 
fixing  of  certain  absolute  liabilities,  due  process  not  denied,  440. 
life  insurance,  exclusion  of  suicide  as  defense  in  action  on  policy, 

420. 
limitations,  reasonableness  as  limitation,  401. 
statute  regulating  barrier  pillars  between  adjoining  coal  proper- 
ties, due  process  not  denied,  432. 
statute  requiring  hotel  keepers  to  give  notice  to  guests  in  case  of 
fire,  due  process  not  denied,  437. 
procedure,  change  of  pirocedure,  change  under  either  Federal  or  <9tate 

law  must  not  deny  fundamental  rights,  532. 
remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  legislature,  526. 

qualifications,  527. 
repeals,  property,  vested  rights,  protection  by  Due  Process  Clause, 
repeal  of  remedy,  390. 
vested  rights,  rights  below  standard  of  vested  rights,  456. 
retrospective  laws,  due  process,   vested  rights,  effect  of  Fourteenth 
Amendment,  prohibition  of  arbitrary  interference  with  rightS| 
452. 

Due  Process — 62 


978  INDEX 

[UBflUNCSB  ABM  TO  PAfflW] 

8TATXTTE8— eontinned. 

retrospeetive  Umb — eontinaed. 

Umitatioii  etAtuteB,  right  to  enaet  retroaetiTO  laws,  Tested  righto, 

62L 
Twted  rigfatSy  an  laws  impairing  Tested  rights  within  scope  of 
doe  proeessy  459. 
■peeial  law,  raJlwaTS,  fellow  serrant  statute,  liabflitj  to  emplojree  for 

negligenee,  equal  protection  not  denied,  653,  654. 
taxation,  state  taxation,  power  to  tax,  legislatnre  may  act  direetlj  or 
may  delegate  functions,  356. 
purpose,  taxation  must  be  for  pnblie  purpose,  352. 
Taliditj  of  statutes,  Federal  constitution,  Fourteenth  Amendment,  pur- 
pose. Congress  as  protecting  and  enforcing  body,  269. 
Tested  rights,  contracts,  impairment  of  obligation  by  state  law  pro- 
hibited, 449. 
contract  clause  limited  to  Tested  rights  that  arise  out  of  it, 
450. 
dcTelopment  of  idea,  advancement  by  constitutional  limitations  on 

legislative  power,  445. 
growth  in  England  of  idea,  443. 
impairment,  redress  under  Due  Process  Clause,  application  of  rule 

of  inclusion  and  exclusion,  461. 
policy  of  legislation,  no  Tested  rights  in  general  rules  of  law  or 

policy,  458. 
property  dassilicationa,  power  of  state,  discrimination,  464. 
right  of  state  to  enact  euratiTO  legislation,  457. 

futures,  statute  prerenting  dealing  in  futures,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  777. 
sale  on  margin,  statute  prohibiting,  equal  protection  not  denied,  773. 
taxation,  classification,  sales  for  future  deliTOfy,  equal  protection  nst 

denied,  638. 

8TOCK-YABDS, 

statute  limiting  charges,  equal  protection  denied,  814. 

8TBEET  RAILWAYS, 

orders  requiring  safety  appliance  at   grade  crossings,  Talidity,  due 

process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  673. 
ordinance  as  to  speed  of  trains,  exceptions,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
670. 
,    rates,  classification  for  regulation,  equal  protection  not  denied,  687. 
tax  on  special  franchises,  equal  protection  not  denied  to  street  rail- 
way companies,  628. 
tax  on  street  railways,  equal  protection  not  denied,  627. 


INDEX  979 

[BIRBBNOIS  abb  to  PAGB8] 

SUICIDE, 

police  power,  life  insurance,  exclusion  of  suicide  as  defense  in  action 
on  policy,  420. 


TAEIPT, 

Insular  Tariff  Cases,  Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  constitu- 
tion of  parent  state,  right  of  colonists  to  participate,  116. 

TAXATION, 

see  LiCENSBS,  Pubuo  Impbovbmbnts. 

ad  valorem  tax,  state  taxation,  due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax 

proceedings,  366. 
capital  of  foreign  corporation,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  708. 
dassiflcation,  due  process,  fundamental  requisites  generality  and  equal- 
ity of  laws,  305. 
sales  for  future  delivery,  equal  protection  not  denied,  638. 
classification  in  proceedings,  power  of  state,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

825. 
collection  of  taxes,  summary  proceedings,  361. 
colonies,  extension  of  parliamentary  control,  taxation,  337. 
tasdng  power  of  Imperial  Parliament,  336. 
transformation  into  sovereign  states,  337. 
consolidated  railway  company,  annual  franchise  tax  on,  statute  not  in- 

vaUd,  648. 
contracts,  freedom  of  contract  subject  to  sovereign  powers  of  state, 

493. 
corporations,  discrimination  against  dealers,  articles  manufactured  from 
produce  of  another  state,  not  discrimination,  700. 
Due  Process  Clause,  Corporation  Tax  Act,  limiting  deductions  held 

not  invalid,  180. 
equal  protection  of  the  law,  623. 
tax  on  corporate  franchises,  equal  protection,  626. 
tax  on  corporate  securities,  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause, 

612. 
taxation  of  nonresident  stockholders,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

713. 
unequal  assessment  of  franchises  and  other  property,  denial  of 
due  process  and  equal  protection,  702. 
deposits  in  national  banks,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  642. 
discrimination  in  taxes,  denial  of  equal  protection,  620. 
districts,  creation  by  legislature  by  arbitrary  action,  denial  of  due 

process,  488. 
due  process,  definition,  difficulties  in  way  of  complete  and  authorita- 
tive definition,  rule  of  inclusive  and  exclusive,  284. 
fundamental  requisites,  hearing,  292. 
notable  attempts  to  define  due  process,  280. 


980  INDEX 

[umtHOIS  All  TO  PAOIS] 

TAXATION— eontinned. 

ezeite  tax  baaed  on  groM  tonnage  npon  nse  of  foreign  built  pteasnre 

jaehtsy  Fifth  Amendment,  dne  proeeae,  171. 
ezciae  tax  on  eorporations,  natore,  639. 
ezeiee  tax  on  grooe  earninga  of  raUway  companie8|  equal  protection 

not  denied,  645. 
exemptiona,  veated  righta,  what  eonatitutea,  455. 
expreaa  eompaniea,  property,  atate  taxation  of,  equal  proteetion^  ^4. 
tax  on  buaineaa  of  expreaa  eompany.  Equal  Protection  of  the  Law 
Glanae,  613. 
Federal  eonatitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Proeeaa  Clauae,  eonstita- 
tionality  of  oleomargarine  tax,  140. 
limitation  on  Federal  power  to  tax  diapenaing  agenta  of  state, 

143. 
not  limitation  on  taxing  power,  income  tax,  181. 
foreign  corporationa,  exeiae  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  720. 

tax  on  f ranchiae  of  foreign  company,  equal  protection  denied,  721. 
foreign  railroada,  tax  on  atock,  equal  protection  not  denied,  714. 
forfeiture  for  nonpayment  of  taxea,  equal  protection  not  denied,  637. 
income  tax  on  mining  eompaniea,  equal  protection  and  due  proeeaa  not 

denied,  625. 
inheritance  taxea)  equal  protection  not  denied  by  Ulinoia  law,  624,  630. 
New  York  inheritance-tax  law  doea  not  Tiolate  Fourteoith  Amend- 
ment, 624. 
inheritance  taxea  on  bequeats  of  peraonalty,  validity,  equal  protection 

not  denied,  629,  632. 
interatate  citizenahip,  development  by  aecond  Federal  Constitution,  225. 
legacy  and  inheritance  taxea,  equal  protection,  615. 
limitationa,  constitutional  limitationa  an  American  invention,  338. 
membership  in  incorporated  chamber  of  commerce,  tax  on,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  646. 
mineral  rights,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  643. 
mortgagee's  interest  in  land,  tax  on,  equal  protection,  618. 
payment,  appeal  to  Commiaaioner  of  Internal  Revenue  after  payment  of 
taxes.  Fifth  Amendment,  due  process,  182. 
nonpayment  of  taxea,  forfeiture  of  land,  equal  protection,  619. 
penalty  for  nonpayment  of  taxea,  equal  protection  and  due  proeeaa, 
617. 
penalties,  discrimination  between  county  and  city  in  diapoaition  of 

penalties,  due  proeeaa  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  752. 
power  of  taxation,  chapter  AVill,  611. 

purpose,  railways,  taxation,  asseaament  to  meet  expenses  of  atate  rail- 
road commission,  validity,  657. 
railways,  aaaeaament  of  omitted  property,  equal  protection  not  denied, 
670. 


INDEX  981 

[BEFIBINOBS  ABE  TO  PAGBS] 

TAXATION— continued, 
railways— continued. 

foreign  companiesi  tax  on^  due  process  and  equal  protection  not 

denied,  691. 
property,  valuation  and  taxation  of,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

652. 
tax  on  property  in  each  county,  equal  protection  not  denied,  658. 
eavings  banks,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  644. 
shares  of  foreign  corporations  owned  by  residents,  tax  on,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  720. 
special  franchises,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied  to  street  rail- 

way  companies,  628. 
state  taxation, 

banks,  state  tax  law  as  to,  equal  protection,  constitutionality  of 

statute,  618. 
corporate  property  situated  in  several  states,  power  to  tax,  342. 
due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  364. 
exemptions,  strict  construction  of  exemptions,  349. 
Federal  supervision,  right  to  review,  necessity  that  taxation  be 

spoliation,  384. 
limitations,  nature  and  extent,  exemption  of  governmental  agencies, 

339. 
personal  properly,  taxation  of  intangible  personal  property,  347. 

taxation  of  tangible  personal  property,  344. 
power  of  taxation  and  due  process,  chapter  VIII,  336. 
power  to  tax,  legislature  may  act  directly  or  may  delegate  func- 
tions, 356. 
property  within  state  jurisdiction,  341. 
residuum  of  taxing  power,  371. 
purpose,  taxation  must  be  for  public  purpose,  352. 
state  tax  laws,  constitutionality,  611. 
statute  imposing  annual  franchise  tax,  on  consolidated  railway 

corporation,  due  process  not  denied,  343. 
taking  property  for  public  use^  compensation  required  by  Due 
Process  Clause,  358. 
stock  transfer  tax,  validity,  634. 
street  railways,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  627. 
struggle  for  charters,  reigns  of  Bichard  I  and  John,  2. 
taking  private  property.  Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  Due 

Process  Clause,  review  of  cases  and  criticism  of  decisions,  187. 
telephone  companies,  classification  for  taxation,  exemption  of  certain 

property,  equal  protection  not  denied,  747. 
titles,  statute  as  to  notice  to  original  owners  to  cut  off  redemption,  due 

process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  821. 
transfers  inter  vivos,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  640. 
vested  rights,  all  laws  impairing  vested  rights  within  scope  of  due 
process,  459. 


982  INDEX 

[umXNClS  ABS  TO  FAfils] 

TAXATION-HSontiBQed. 
vested  rights— oontmned. 

growth  in  Engliud  of  ides,  443. 

•tate  tax  on  groee  earnings  of  railroads,  not  eonliseation,  480. 
taxation  without  jnrisdietion,  denial  of  dae  process,  487. 
township  compelled  to  collect  taxes  for  drain,  due  process  not 
denied,  470. 

TELEOBAPH  COMPANIES, 

eminent  domain,  taking  private  propertj,  kind  of  property  which  may 

be  taken,  218. 
state  regulation,  prohibiting  limiting  of  liability  for  negligence,  eqoal 

protection  not  denied,  704. 
taxation,  penalty  for  nonpayment  of  taxeS|  equal  protection  and  doe 

process,  017. 

TELEPHONE  COMPANIES, 

rates,  municipal  regulation,  equal  protection  not  denied,  818. 

police  power,  reasonableness  of  rates,  due  process,  recent  eases,  416. 
taxation,  elassiflcation,  exemption  of  certain  property,  eqoal  protection 
not  denied,  747. 

TEBRITOBIE8, 

Federal  conslitution,  due  process,  right  to  due  process  in  unincorporated 
territory,  237. 

THEATERS  AND  SHOWS, 

amusements,  regulation  of  admission  to  places  of  public  amusement, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  779. 
municipal  license  fees  for  theaters,  grading  fee  according  to  receipts, 

equal  protection  not  denied,  641. 
state  regulations  of  foreign  corporations,  theaters,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  698. 

THIRTEENTH  AMENDMENT, 

Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  CSlanse  purely  American  invention,  595. 

TOBAOCO, 

cigarettes,  license  for  sale,  doe  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied, 
769. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  625. 
notice  and  hearing  in  tax  proceedings,  367. 

TOWNS  AND  TOWNSHIPS, 

bridges,  classification  of  municipal  corporations,  requiring  certain  towns 

to  maintain  bridge  and  highway,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

768. 
taxation,  township  compelled  to  collect  taxes  for  drain,  due  process  not 

denied,  470. 


INDEX  983 

[nriBEMCBS  AEX  TO  PAGBS] 

TBABE  UNIONS, 

eontraeta,  master  and  serrant,  employment  at  will  of  parties  not  em- 
ployment at  will  of  others,  514. 
statute  inflicting  penalties  on  employer  where  certain  conditions 
are  imposed  on  employee,  denial  of  due  process,  435. 
freedom  of  contract  denied,  512. 

TBADING  STAMPS, 

police  power,  license  tax  on  profit  sharing  coupons  and  trading  stamps, 
due  process  not  denied,  440. 

equal  protection  not  denied,  647. 
freedom  of  contract  not  infringed,  517. 

TBEATIES, 

Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  constitution  of  parent  state, 
right  of  colonists  to  participate  in,  116. 
construction  of  Fifth  Amendment,  confiscation  of  property,  73. 

right  of  sovereign  to  deport  foreigners  already  domiciled,  93. 
Indians,  power  of  Congress  not  limited,  111. 

TBIAL, 

contempt,  nunishment,  power  to  punish  inherent  in  all  courts,  578. 

what  constitutes,  direct  contempt  committed  in  presence  of  court, 
580. 
criminal  law,  accusation  of  felony,  necessity  of  presence  of  accused, 
privilege  not  to  be  waived,  538. 
right  of  accused  to  be  present  in  state  court,  556. 

presence  at  trial  and  rendition  of  verdict,  habeas  corpus,  567, 
569. 

TUBERCULOSIS, 
see  HXALTH. 

TUBNPJKE8, 

regulation  of  charges,  equal  protection  not  denied,  814. 

U 

UNITED  STATES, 

due  process,  common  heritage  of  all  states,  270. 
guaranty  in  American  law,  251. 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  supervising  tribunal,  Four- 
teenth Amendment,  257. 
eminent  domain,  compensation  for  taking  property,  necessity,  217. 

definition,  power  vested  in  all  states  Federal  as  well  as  single,  207. 
power  as  vested  in  Federal  government  paramount,  208. 
public  use,  right  to  determine  what  is  public  use,  212. 

taking  must  be  for  public  use,  211. 
taking  private  property,  necessity  justifying  taking,  215. 
what  constitutes  taking,  213. 


984  INDEX 

[umXNCIS  ABS  TO  PAfils] 

UNITED  STATES— eoBtinned 

Federal  constitution,  Fourteenth  Amendment,  protection  agminrt  un- 
lawful or  unequal  exercise  of  state  power,  241. 
scope  of  section,  definition  of  citizenship,  228. 
national  citizenship,  definition  in  Slaughter  House  Cases,  228. 

existence,  inquiry  in  Bred  Scott  Case,  227. 
procedure,  change  of  procedure,  change  under  either  Federal  or  state 
law  must  not  denj  fundamental  rights,  532. 

UNIVEBSITIE8, 
see  Schools. 

USURY, 

exemption  of  banks,  trust  companiea  and  bona  fide  mortgages,  equal 

protection  not  denied,  736. 
limitation  statutes,  right  to  enact  retroactive  laws,  vested  rights,  522. 
remedies,  change  of  remedies,  power  of  legislature,  qualifications,  529. 


VALUE, 

eminent  domain,  compensation  for  property  taken,  rule  for  aseertain- 
ing  value,  391.  * 

matters  to  be  excluded,  proceeding  to  recover  for  decline  in  market 
value,  393. 
police  power,  carriers,  reasonableness  of  rates,  elements  involved,  413. 
railroad   property,   valuation  and   taxation   of,  equal  protection  not 
denied,  652. 

VEHICLES, 

advertisement,  prohibition  of  advertising  wagons  on  city  streets,  equal 
protection  not  denied,  740. 
due  process  not  denied,  426. 
motor  vehicles,  state  regulation,  service  of  process  on  nonresidents, 
validity  of  statute,  819. 

VENDOR  AND  PUBCHASEB, 

contracts  for  sale  of  land,  statute  regulating  cancellation,  equal  pro- 
tection not  denied,  743. 

VENUE, 

change  of  venue,  local  prejudice,  equal  protection  not  denied,  832. 

VERDICTS, 

criminal  law,  verdict,  refusal  to  »et  aside  verdict,  insanity  of  juror,  552. 
rendition  of  verdict,  right  of  accused  to  be  present  in  state  court, 
556. 
right  to  be  present  at  trial  and  rendition  of  verdict,  habeas 
corpus,  567,  569. 


INDEX  985 

[bifesences  aei  to  packs] 

VESSELS, 

Federal  consiltation,  Fifth  Amendment,  Due  Process  Clause,  excise  tax 

based   on   gross   tonnage   upon   use   of   foreign   built   pleasure 

yachts,  171. 
harbors,  taking  private  property,  power  of  Congress,  Fifth  Amendment, 

177. 

W 

WAIVEB, 

criminal  law,  accusation  of  felony,  necessity  of  presence  of  accused, 

privilege  not  to  be  waived,  538. 
jurisdiction,  notice,  curing  lack  of  notice  or  service   of  process  by 

appearance,  316. 

WAR, 

amendment  to  Federal  constitution,  text  of  Fifth  Amendment,  55. 
due  process,  jurisdiction,  proceedings  in  rem,  321. 
Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  construction,  confiscation  of 
property,  73. 
construction  as  to  persons  subject  to  military  law,  95. 
construction  in  case  involving  military  tria]  and  service,  triumph 

of  legality,  65. 
early  cases  construing,  56. 

WAB  DBPABTMENT, 

contempt,  punishment,  consequences  of  lack  of  jurisdiction,  588. 

WABEHOITSES, 

elevators,  regulation  of  charges,  validity  of  statute,  812. 

licenses,  classification  of  elevators  and  warehouses,  equal  protection  not 

denied,  727. 
police  power,  property  or  business  of  public  interest,  407. 
taxation,  spirits  in  bond,  tax  on,  equal  protection  not  denied,  635. 

WASTE, 

mineral  waters,  prohibition  of  waste,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  739. 

WATEB-CLOSETS, 
see  HxAi/FH. 

WATEB8  AND  WATER  COUBSES, 

see  Drainage,  Navigable  Waters,  Biparian  Owners. 
companies,  property  of  private  water  company,  taking  by  municipal 
corporation,  due  process  not  denied,  473. 
equal  protection  not  denied,  791. 

establishment   of   competing  plant   by   city,   Fourteenth   Amend- 
ment not  violated,  746. 


986  INDEX 

[RXraRXKCXS  AEX  TO  PAOXS] 

WATERS  AND  WATEB  COXJBSES— eontinued. 

eoBBtniction  of  revetments,  injury  to  riparian  rights,  Fifth  Amend- 
ment, taking  of  property,  127. 
dams,  Federal  constitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  eonatruetion,  right  of 

eminent  domain,  74. 
diversion  of  waters, 

police  power,  due  process,  prevention  of  diversion  of  waters,  due 

process  not  denied,  421. 
statute  prohibiting  diversion  of  water  beyond  state  by  riparian 
owner,  due  process  and  equal  protection  not  denied,  784. 
eiAinent  domain  in  District  of  Columbia,  right,  Fifth  Amendment,  con- 
struction, 87. 
eminent  domain,  taking  private  property,  due  process,  mistake  of  law, 
391. 
kind  of  property  which  may  be  taken,  218. 
what  constitutes  taking,  213. 
mineral  waters,  prohibition  of  waste,  due  process  and  equal  protection 
not  denied,  739. 
restraint  on  land  owner  drawing  unnatural  quantities  of  mineral 
water  from  common  source  of  supply,  due  x>rocess  not  denied, 
467. 

WEAPONS, 

aliens,   prohibition   of   possession   of   firearms,   equal   protection   not 

denied,  792. 
game,  prohibition  of  killing   of  birds   or  animals  by  unnaturalized 

foreign-bom  residents,  due  process  not  denied,  479. 

WEEDS, 

railways,  discrimination  against  railways,  penalties  imposed  for  allow- 
ing weeds,  equal  protection  not  denied,  674. 
statute  requiring  railways  to  remove  noxious  weeds,  equal  pro* 
tection  not  denied,  694. 

WEIGHTS  AND  MEASURES, 

lard,  regulation  of  net  weight  of  packages,  equal  protection  not  denied, 

758. 
police  power,  ordinance  regulating  size  of  loaves  of  bread,  due  process 
not  denied,  429. 

freedom  of  contract,  not  interfered  with,  505. 

WHARVES, 

Federal    constitution,    Fifth    Amendment,    navigable    waters,    taking 

private  property,  power  of  Congress,  177. 
police  power,  property  or  business  of  publie  interest,  407. 


INDEX  987 

[SXrEBZNCSS  ABX  TO  PAOBS] 

WITNESSES, 

Federal  ecmstitution.  Fifth  Amendment,  eonstruction,  qaestions  of  state 
proeedore  not  embraced,  89. 
light  of  sovereign  to  deport  foreigners  already  domiciled,  94. 
interstate  commerce, 

immonitj  of  witnesses  under  Interstate  Commerce  Act  of  1893, 
application  to  state  and  Federal  courts,  96. 
obstruction  of  justice,  contempt,  right  to  notice  and  hearing,  indirect 

or  civil  contempt^  585. 
self-incrimination, 

crime  committed  within  military  reservation,  159. 
eriminal  procedure,   exemption   from   self-incrimination  in  state 
courts,  due  process  not  denied,  650. 
modification  of  procedure,  struggle  to  leave  power  of  states 
untrammeled,  543. 
due  process,  vested  rights.  Fifth  Amendment  developing  idea  of 

vested  rights,  451. 
exemption  in  bills  of  rights  and  state  eonstitutioDs,  10. 
Federal  constitution,  due  process  of  law  as  embodied  in  Fifth 
Amendment,  21. 
Fifth  Amendment^  construction  in  favor  of  refusal  to  tes- 
tify, 84. 
conviction  without  indictment,  prisoner  compelled  to  tes- 
tify against  himself,   145. 
due  process,  admission  of  evidence  illegally  obtained,  131. 
effect  of  statutory  immunity  upon  constitutional  protec- 
tion, 144. 
exemption  not  fundamental  right  of  national  citizenship, 

153. 
immunity  based  on  Act  of  1903,  Anti-Trust  Act,  166. 
kinship  with  Fourth  Amendment,  79. 
privilege  invoked  by  officer  of  corporation,  162. 
state  need  not  accord  protection,  165. 
Fourteenth   Amendment,  Due  Process   Clause,   protection   of 
national  citizenship  against  stat«  action,  247. 
taxation,  state  taxation,  due  process,  notice  and  hearing  in  tax  pro- 
ceedings, 370. 

WOMEN, 

Equal  Protection  of  the  Law  Clause,  attorneys,  right  of  women  to 

practice  law  in  state  courts,  608. 
master  and  servant, 

contracts,  freedom  of  contract,  not  infringed  by  statutes  regu- 
lating employment  of  women,  516. 
due  process  not  infringed  by  limitation  on  hours  of  labor,  421. 
Eight-Hour  Law,  women  employed  in  hotels,  validity  of  statutes, 
798. 


988  INDEX 

[timnfois  AU  TO  paoes] 

WOMEN— ^ontinnod. 

BiAstar  and  senrant^-eoiitiniied. 

Ten-Hour  Iaw,   forbidding  emplqjment   of   children    or  women, 
freedom  of  eontraet  not  inf ringed,  609. 
t<Tatioti,  dieerimination  in  lieenae  tax,  e^pal  protoetion  not  denied.  Ml. 


WOBKMEN'8  OOMPENSATION  ACT, 
equal  proteetion  not  denied,  757,  79& 


■PATDUd 

1^  PraoMt  ormv  Md  ««• 


iiiP* 

3  6105  043  024  633 


B  UNIVERSfTY  LAVf  UBMit